ANTONIA MARANAN VS. PASCUAL PEREZ ET AL.

GR NO. L-22272; JUNE 26, 1967

PONENTE: JUSTICE BENZON

TOPIC: DAMAGES IN CRIMES AND QUASI-DELICTS – ARTICLE 2202

FACTS: Rogelio Corachea, on October 18, 1960, was a passenger in a taxicab owned and operated
by Pascual Perez when he was stabbed and killed by the driver, Simeon Valenzuela.

Valenzuela was prosecuted for homicide in the Court of First Instance of Batangas. Found
guilty, he was sentenced to suffer imprisonment and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the
sum of P6,000. 

Antonia Maranan, mother of Rogelia, thereafter filed an action for breach of contract of
carriage to herein respondent Pascual Perez, wherein the court a quo awarded petitioner P3,000.00
as damages.

Maranan appealed asking for more damages and also Perez appealed insisting on non-liability
claiming that the death of Rogelio was a caso fortuito for which the carrier was not liable.

Hence , this petition.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT PASCUAL PEREZ, OWNER AND OPERATOR OF THE TAXI, BE
HELD LIABLE ON ACCOUNT OF HIS EMPLOYEES CRIME;

RULING: YES. The New Civil Code expressly makes the common carrier liable for intentional
assaults committed by its employees upon its passengers, Article 175 states that:

Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through the negligence or
willful acts of the former's employees, although such employees may have acted beyond the scope of
their authority or in violation of the orders of the common carriers.

The basis of the carrier’s liability for assaults on passengers committed by its drivers rests on
the principle that it is the carrier’s implied duty to transport the passenger safely. It is enough that the
assault happens within the course of the employee's duty. It is no defense for the carrier that the act
was done in excess of authority or in disobedience of the carrier's orders. The carrier's liability here is
absolute in the sense that it practically secures the passengers from assaults committed by its own
employees.

Accordingly, it is the carrier's strict obligation to select its drivers and similar employees with
due regard not only to their technical competence and physical ability, but also, no less important, to
their total personality, including their patterns of behavior, moral fibers, and social attitude.

Applying this stringent norm to the facts in this case, therefore, the lower court rightly adjudged
the defendant carrier liable pursuant to Art. 1759 of the Civil Code.
 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. JOSE SALIG (died during appeal), RAMON SALIG,
GREGORIO BATALAN(died during trial) AND ROMEO BENLOT(at large), ACCUSED; JOSE
SALIG AND RAMON MACARI SALIG, DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS

G.R. NO. L-53568; OCTOBER 31, 1984

PONENTE: JUSTICE RELOVA

TOPIC: DAMAGES IN CRIMES AND QUASI-DELICTS

FACTS: On the evening of December 15, 1971, respondents entered the house of one Manuel
Oliveros and Ramon Salig dragged the victim to the sala, and there he was ganged up the
respondent. Thereafter, Ramon Salig fired shots at Manuel who was hit once on the chest, following
which, the group left hurriedly. The wallet of Manuel containing P2,000.00 and the P1,500.00 placed
inside a suitcase on top of the aparador were found missing. On the way to the hospital, Manuel died
due to internal hemorrhage due to gunshot wounds.

Respondents were found guilty of the the crime of robbery with homicide, to which they were
sentenced to jointly and severally indemnify the heirs of the victim totalling to P40, 500.00.

Pending appeal, Jose Salig died at the New Bilibid Prison. Thereafter, Solicitor General moved
that the case against him be dismissed insofar as his criminal liability only is concerned; his civil
liability of indemnifying the heirs is not extinguished, as his death having occurred after judgment was
rendered by the trial court.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT JOSE SALIG IS CIVILLY LIABLE TO THE HEIRS OF THE
DECEASED DESPITE HIS DEATH PENDING APPEAL;

RULING: YES. The case against Jose Salig, who died during the pendency of the appeal, is
dismissed. However, his estate and appellant Ramon Salig are hereby sentenced to jointly and
severally indemnify the heirs of Manuel Oliveros as adjudged by the lower court, except the payment
of P3,500.00 which was allegedly taken from the victim and with the further modification that the
indemnity for the death of the victim is increased from P20,000.00 to P30,000.00.

As per the concurring opinion of Justice Gutierrez, Jr., the fact of the murder has already been
established in the trial court; hence even if the accused dies pending appeal, his civil liability will not
be extinguished.

DISSENTING OPINION OF JUSTICE CUEVAS:

Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code provides-"that criminal liability is totally extinguished-(1) by the
death of the convict, as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the
offender occurs before final judgment."

It is clear from the aforesaid provision that when death of 'the offender occurs before final judgment,
then not only the personal but also the pecuniary penalty is extinguished. That is precisely the situation
obtaining in the instant case. Jose Salig's death taking place before final judgment or during the pendency of
his appeal before this Court, no reason exists as why his civil liability arising from the offense should not be
extinguished

The civil liability referred to, which is extinguished by the death of the convict taking place prior to final
judgment, is that civil liability arising from the offense charged, the civil action for the recovery of which, is
impliedly instituted with the criminal action under Sec. 1, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, and not any other
liability. Any pronouncement holding the heirs or estate of the deceased convict liable will render Art. 89 of the
Revised Penal Code inutile and totally meaningless.

FINAL JUDGMENT MEANING:

The term “final judgment” employed in the R.P.C means judgment beyond recall. As long as a
judgment has not become executory, it cannot be truthfully said that defendant is definitely guilty of
the felony charged against him.