A RESEARCH ASSIGNMENT ON

“Use of Interpreting Principles in the Landmark Case of Ayodhya

Judgement & Abolishment of 377 and Recent Developments”

SUBMITTED TO:
Ms Koyel Roy

(FACULTY AT AMITY LAW SCHOOL KOLKATA)

SUBMITTED BY:

SAHIL SINHA
ROLL NO.-
A90856120002
BATCH (2020-2023)

AMITY LAW SCHOOL,

AMITY UNIVERSITY, KOLKATA
 DECLARATION

We, Sahil Sinha and Venkatesh Mishra, students of LLB 3Yrs, hereby declare that the project
work entitled “Use of Interpreting Principles In The Landmark Case of Ayodhya
Judgement & Abolishment of 377” submitted to the AMITY Law School, AMITY
University, KOLKATA is a record of an original work done by us under the guidance of Ms
Koyel Roy, teacher in Interpretation of Statutes, AMITY Law School, AMITY University,
KOLKATA.

NAME- Sahil Sinha (A90856120002)

Venkatesh Mishra (A90856120003)

 CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the project report entitled Use of Interpreting Principles In The
Landmark Case of Ayodhya Judgement & Abolishment of 377 submitted by Sahil Sinha
and Venkatesh Mishra in partial fulfilment of the requirement for the award of degree of
LLB to AMITY Law School, AMITY University, KOLKATA is a record of the candidates
own work carried out by them under my supervision. The matter embodied in this project is
original and has not been submitted for the award of any other degree.

DATE: Ms Koyel Roy

 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

We would specially like to thank our guide, mentor, Ms Koyel Roy without whose constant
support and guidance this project would have been a distant reality.

This work is an outcome of an unparalleled infrastructural support that we have received

from AMITY Law School, AMITY University, KOLKATA.
We owe our deepest gratitude to the library staff of the college.

It would never have been possible to complete this study without an untiring support from
our family, especially parents.

This study bears testimony to the active encouragement and guidance of a host of friends and
well-wishers.

NAME- Sahil Sinha (A90856120002)

Venkatesh Mishra (A90856120003)
BATCH- 2020-2023
 INTROUCTION
“the essence of law lies in the spirit, not its letter, for the letter is significant only as being the
external manifestation of the intention that underlies it” – Salmond

Interpretation means the art of finding out the true sense of an enactment by giving the words
of the enactment their natural and ordinary meaning. It is the process of ascertaining the true
meaning of the words used in a statute. The Court is not expected to interpret arbitrarily and
therefore there have been certain principles which have evolved out of the continuous
exercise by the Courts. These principles are sometimes called ‘rules of interpretation’.

The object of interpretation of statutes is to determine the intention of the legislature

conveyed expressly or impliedly in the language used. As stated by SALMOND, "by
interpretation or construction is meant, the process by which the courts seek to ascertain the
meaning of the legislature through the medium of authoritative forms in which it is
expressed." Interpretation is as old as language. Elaborate rules of interpretation were
evolved even at a very early stage of the Hindu civilization and culture. The importance of
avoiding literal interpretation was also stressed in various ancient text books – “Merely
following the texts of the law, decisions are not to be rendered, for, if such decisions are
wanting in equity, a gross failure of Dharma is caused.” Interpretation thus is a familiar
process of considerable significance. In relation to statute law, interpretation is of importance
because of the inherent nature of legislation as a source of law. The process of statute making
and the process of interpretation of statutes are two distinct activities. In the process of
interpretation, several aids are used. They may be statutory or non-statutory. Statutory aids
may be illustrated by the General Clauses Act, 1897 and by specific definitions contained in
individuals Acts whereas non-statutory aids is illustrated by common law rules of
interpretation (including certain presumptions relating to interpretation) and also by case-laws
relating to the interpretation of statutes.
 Need For Interpretation
Interpretation of something means ascertaining the meaning or significance of that thing or
ascertaining an explanation of something that is not immediately obvious. Construction and
Interpretation of a statute is an age-old process and as old as language. Interpretation of
statute is the process of ascertaining the true meaning of the words used in a statute. When
the language of the statute is clear, there is no need for the rules of interpretation. But, in
certain cases, more than one meaning may be derived from the same word or sentence. It is
therefore necessary to interpret the statute to find out the real intention of the statute.
Interpretation of statutes has been an essential part of English law since Heydon's Case in
1854 and although it can seem complex, the main rules used in interpretation are easy to
learn. Elaborate rules of interpretation were evolved even at a very early stage of Hindu
civilization and culture. The rules given by ‘Jaimini’, the author of Mimamsat Sutras,
originally meant for srutis were employed for the interpretation of Smritis also.

The concept of interpretation of a Statute cannot be static one. Interpretation of statutes

becomes an ongoing exercise as newer facts and conditions continue to arise. We can say,
interpretation of Statutes is required for two basic reasons viz. to ascertain:

• Legislative Language - Legislative language may be complicated for a layman, and hence
may require interpretation; and

• Legislative Intent - The intention of legislature or Legislative intent assimilates two

aspects, the concept of ‘meaning’, i.e., what the word means; and the concept of ‘purpose’
and ‘object’ or the ‘reason’ or ‘spirit’ pervading through the statute.

Necessity of interpretation would arise only where the language of a statutory provision is
ambiguous, not clear or where two views are possible or where the provision gives a different
meaning defeating the object of the statute. If the language is clear and unambiguous, no need
of interpretation would arise.
 INTERPRETATION IN THE AYODHYA VERDICT
Mir Baqi built Babri Masjid in 1528 for Mughal Emperor Babur. The Hindus and Muslims
had always been wrangling over the ownership of that land. The Hindus claim that the
mosque was built after the demolition of the Ram temple and it is the birthplace of Lord Ram,
whereas, the Muslims, on the other hand, were denying such claims. As a result, various riots
broke out between then in 1856-57, followed by the desecration of mosques on the night of
December 22-23, 1949. After placing Lord Ram’s sculpture into the central dome of the
mosque, the Allahabad High Court even permitted the Hindus to worship there. The tensions
among various groups like Ram Lalla Virajmaan, Nirmohi Akhara, Sunni Wakf Board, etc.
were increasing for claiming ownership. Various petitions were also filed in the Allahabad
High Court and the Supreme Court of India.

The mosque was demolished in 1992. Writ petitions were mounting up in the court. In 2002,
the high court directed the Archeological Survey of India to carry out a scientific
investigation over the disputed land. It submitted its final report in 2003. The report indicated
that the pillars of the mosque contained Devanagari script inscribed on it and the temple
might have belonged to Lord Vishnu, but no evidence was found whether the temple
belonged to Lord Ram or not.

The final judgment on the Ayodhya verdict was announced in October 2019. The court
granted the disputed land of about 2.77 acres for the construction of the temple and allocated
5 acres of land as compensation to the UP Sunni Wakf Board.

 The dispute involved property rights. The Supreme Court heavily relied upon the findings of
the Archeological Survey of India, but it also tried to maintain the balance between the
religious groups. It gave the judgement keeping in mind its sociological and religious impact
on the people. In our view, the Supreme Court applied the rule of harmonious construction of
interpretation of statutes as it resolved the contradicting interpretations in such a way that the
effect is given to both interpretations so far as possible.  
 ABOLITION OF SECTION 377 OF INDIAN PENAL CODE
Section 377 of IPC earlier criminalized unlawful sexual acts against the order of nature,
including consensual penile non-vaginal intercourse among adults of same-sex, non-
consensual penile non-vaginal intercourse with children or animals, and even penile non-
vaginal intercourse between the adults of same-sex.

Naz Foundation vs. Government of NCT, Delhi and Others –Naz Foundation is Delhi based
NGO that has been working on HIV/ AIDS and sexual health issues, filed a petition in the
Delhi High Court challenging the constitutional validity of Section 377 of IPC as it violated
the fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 14(3), 15(4), 19(5) and 21(6) of the
Constitution of India. The petitioner contended that the discrimination faced by the LGBTQ
community was impeding its work on combating the spread of HIV/ AIDS. It also contended
that penile non-vaginal intercourse is likely to reduce the number of HIV/ AIDS infected
persons in India.

Delhi High Court applied the golden rule of interpretation of statutes and held that Section
377 of IPC is violative of the fundamental rights of privacy and dignity under Articles 14, 15,
and 21 of the Indian Constitution and decriminalized consensual relationship between adults
of same-sex.

Navtej Singh Johar vs. Union of India – A writ petition was filed in 2016 by Navtej Singh
Johar to declare section 377 of IPC to be unconstitutional and to declare the right to choose a
sexual partner and the right to sexual autonomy to be part of the right to life guaranteed under
Article 21 of the Constitution of India.

Mr. Arvind Datar, a learned senior counsel appearing for the writ petitioner contended that
the decision of the court in the Suresh Koushal case was totally driven by social morality that
the majority of people in India consider the sexual relationship between the partners of same
sex as a criminal act, while the court, in actuality, should have debated upon the
constitutional morality. He also cited the sayings of the J. Chandrachud in K.S. Puttaswamy
and Anr. vs. Union of India and Ors. that sexual orientation is an essential component of
rights granted by the Constitution of India which cannot be construed on majoritarian
acceptance by the society.

Mr. Datar argued that Section 377 of IPC cannot be used as interpretation as a reasonable
restriction wholly. It is an accepted principle of interpretation of statutes that a provision does
not become unconstitutional merely because there can be an abuse of the same. As a
result, “the court held that the application of section 377 of IPC on consensual relationship
between the adults of same sex as unconstitutional, though non-consensual relationship
between the same sex, whether adult or child, and with animals is still criminalized.”

STAY ORDER ON THE ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT’S

ORDER FOR IMPOSITION OF LOCKDOWN
Being concerned about the rapid increase of the coronavirus and the acute availability of
oxygen cylinders and other medical facilities, Allahabad High Court gave the order on April
19, 2021, to impose lockdown in the 5 cities of Uttar Pradesh – Lucknow, Gorakhpur,
Varanasi, Kanpur, and Allahabad. The UP Government moved to the Supreme Court of India
against the high court’s order. A bench headed by the 46th Chief Justice of India put an
interim stay on this order.

Tushar Mehta, the Solicitor General, appearing for UP Government, said that imposing
lockdown through a judicial order of the High Court may not be the right approach to deal
with the pandemic. It was contended that the judiciary is exceeding its domain by passing
such orders. It is the duty of the executive part of the UP Government to pass lockdown
orders and the regulations and guidelines of coronavirus.

It can be seen from the above judgement that the mischief rule of statute Interpretation was
applied here as it curbs the mischief of the High Court by passing a stay order and advances
the remedy by asking the UP Government to immediately inform the High Court of steps it
has taken and to be taken in the future. 
 Conclusion
Interpretation, thus, is a familiar process of considerable significance. In relation to statute
law, interpretation is of importance because of the inherent nature of legislation as a source of
law. The process of statute making and the process of interpretation of statutes take place
separately from each other, and two different agencies are concerned. An interpretation Act
serves as the bridge of understanding between the two.

Judicial determination of questions of law requires the use of materials of various types,
depending on the nature of the question. In the interpretation of statutory provisions the
material used will naturally have a sharply legal character, as distinct from the application of
a general common law doctrine where it may have a more diffused character. In statutes,
greater precision is, therefore, required. The process of interpretation is more legalistic and
makes more intensive use of the legal technique in statutory interpretation, as contrasted with
the application of common law rules.

So, interpretation plays a vital role in removing ambiguity, semantic barriers, and the various
hurdles which arise due to technical use of language, various jargon, etc. but it cannot be used
arbitrarily by the judges as such practice will be against the constitutional practice.