G.R. No.
187417, February 24, 2016 proof adduced by Brent to support such sweeping
CHRISTINE JOY CAPIN-
CADIZ, Petitioner, v. BRENT HOSPITAL AND
COLLEGES, INC., Respondent.
Facts:
Cadiz was the Human Resource Officer of respondent
Brent Hospital and Colleges, Inc. (Brent) at the time of her
indefinite suspension from employment in 2006. The cause
of suspension was Cadiz's Unprofessionalism and
Unethical Behavior Resulting to Unwed Pregnancy. It
appears that Cadiz became pregnant out of wedlock, and
Brent imposed the suspension until such time that she
marries her boyfriend in accordance with law.
Cadiz then filed with the Labor Arbiter (LA) a complaint
for Unfair Labor Practice, Constructive Dismissal, Non-
Payment of Wages and Damages with prayer for
Reinstatement.4
ISSUE: Whether or not Christine Joy Cadiz’ premarital
relations with her boyfriend and the resulting pregnancy out
of wedlock constitute immorality, hence a valid ground for
dismissal?
Ruling: No. To resolve this, the Court makes reference to
the recently promulgated case of Cheryll Santos Leus v. St.
Scholastica's College Westgrove and/or Sr. Edna
Quiambao, OSB. The Court ruled in Leus that the
determination of whether a conduct is disgraceful or
immoral involves a two-step process: first, a consideration
of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the
conduct; and second, an assessment of the said
circumstances vis-a-vis the prevailing norms of conduct,
i.e., what the society generally considers moral and
respectable.
In the present case, the surrounding facts leading to Cadiz's
dismissal are straightforward - she was employed as a
human resources officer in an educational and medical
institution of the Episcopal Church of the Philippines; she
and her boyfriend at that time were both single; they
engaged in premarital sexual relations, which resulted into
pregnancy. The labor tribunals characterized these as
constituting disgraceful or immoral conduct. They also
sweepingly concluded that as Human Resource Officer,
Cadiz should have been the epitome of proper conduct and
her indiscretion "surely scandalized the Brent community."
The foregoing circumstances, however, do not readily
equate to disgraceful and immoral conduct. Brent’s Policy
Manual and Employee’s Manual of Policies do not define
what constitutes immorality; it simply stated immorality as
a ground for disciplinary action. Instead, Brent erroneously
relied on the standard dictionary definition of fornication as
a form of illicit relation and proceeded to conclude that
Cadiz’ acts fell under such classification, thus constituting
immorality.
Jurisprudence has already set the standard of morality with
which an act should be gauged - it is public and secular, not
religious. Whether a conduct is considered disgraceful or
immoral should be made in accordance with the prevailing
norms of conduct, which, as stated in Leus, refer to those
conducts which are proscribed because they are detrimental
to conditions upon which depend the existence and
progress of human society. The fact that a particular act
does not conform to the traditional moral views of a certain
sectarian institution is not sufficient reason to qualify such
act as immoral unless it, likewise, does not conform to
public and secular standards. More importantly, there must
be substantial evidence to establish that premarital sexual
relations and pregnancy out of wedlock is considered
disgraceful or immoral. The labor tribunals' respective
conclusion that Cadiz's "indiscretion" "scandalized the
Brent community" is speculative, at most, and there is no
conclusion.
Hence, "premarital sexual relations between two consenting
adults who have no impediment to marry each other, and,
consequently, conceiving a child out of wedlock, gauged
from a purely public and secular view of morality, does not
amount to a disgraceful or immoral conduct under Section
94(e) of the 1992 MRPS." (Cheryll Santos Lens v. St.
Scholastica’s College Westgrove and/or Sr. Edna
Quiambao, OSB).
G.R. No. 183896               January 30, 2013
SYED AZHAR ABBAS, Petitioner, 
vs.
GLORIA GOO ABBAS, Respondent.
Facts:
Petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas (Syed) filed for the
declaration of nullity of his marriage to Gloria Goo-Abbas
(Gloria) with the RTC of Pasay City. Syed alleged the
absence of a marriage license, as provided for in Article 4,
Chapter I, Title 1 of Executive Order No. 269, otherwise
known as the Family Code of the Philippines, as a ground
for the annulment of his marriage to Gloria.
Syed, a Pakistani citizen, and Gloria, a Filipino citizen, met
in Taiwan in 1991. He arrived in the Philippines and on
January 9, 1993, at around 5 o’clock in the afternoon, he
was at his mother-in-law’s residence, in Malate, Manila,
when his mother-in-law arrived with two men. He was told
that he was going to undergo some ceremony, one of the
requirements for his stay in the Philippines, but was not
told of the nature of said ceremony where he and Gloria
signed a document. He claimed that he only found out that
it was a marriage contract when Gloria told him. He further
testified that he did not go to Carmona, Cavite to apply for
a marriage license, and that he had never resided in that
area.
In July of 2003, he went to the Office of the Civil Registrar
of Carmona, Cavite, to check on their marriage license. The
Municipal Civil Registrar, issued a certification stating that
the marriage license number appearing in the marriage
contract he submitted was the number of another marriage
license issued to another couple. He also alleged that Gloria
had filed bigamy cases against him in 2001 and 2002. On
the other hand, Gloria presented her own side. Rev. Mario
Dauz, a minister of the Gospel and a brgy captain stated
that he is authorized to solemnize marriage and that he was
doing it since 1982 and he is familiar with the
requirements. There were two witnesses, one of them was
Atty. Sanchez who handed him the marriage license on the
day of the wedding. Gloria testified that a certain Qualin
went to their house and said that he will get the marriage
license for them, and after several days returned with an
application for marriage license for them to sign, which she
and Syed did. After Qualin returned with the marriage
license, they gave the license to Atty. Sanchez who gave it
to Rev. Dauz, the solemnizing officer. Gloria also alleged
that she has a daughter with Syed. She filed a bigamy case
because Syed married a certain Maria Corazon
Buenaventura.
The Ruling of the RTC
no valid marriage license was issued by the Municipal Civil
Registrar of Carmona, Cavite in favor of Gloria and Syed,
as Marriage License No. 9969967 had been issued to
Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan, and the Municipal
Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite had certified that no
marriage license had been issued for Gloria and Syed.
The Ruling of the CA
The CA gave credence to Gloria’s arguments, and granted
her appeal. It held that the certification of the Municipal
Civil Registrar failed to categorically state that a diligent
search for the marriage license of Gloria and Syed was
conducted, and thus held that said certification could not be
accorded probative value.36 The CA ruled that there was
sufficient testimonial and documentary evidence that Gloria
and Syed had been validly married and that there was
compliance with all the requisites laid down by law.
ISSUE:
WON the marriage of Gloria and Syed was void ab initio.
RULING: Yes.
As the marriage of Gloria and Syed was solemnized on
January 9, 1993, Executive Order No. 209, or the Family
Code of the Philippines, is the applicable law.
Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:
(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;
(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases
provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and
(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with
the appearance of the contracting parties before
the solemnizing officer and their personal
declaration that they take each other as husband
and wife in the presence of not less than two
witnesses of legal age.
Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal
requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as
stated in Article 35(2).
In this case, Respondent Gloria failed to present the actual
marriage license, or a copy thereof, and relied on the
marriage contract as well as the testimonies of her
witnesses to prove the existence of said license. To prove
that no such license was issued, Syed turned to the office of
the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite which
had allegedly issued said license. It is telling that Gloria
failed to present their marriage license or a copy thereof to
the court. She failed to explain why the marriage license
was secured in Carmona, Cavite, a location where,
admittedly, neither party resided. It is also noted that the
solemnizing officer testified that the marriage contract and
a copy of the marriage license were submitted to the Local
Civil Registrar of Manila. Thus, a copy of the marriage
license could have simply been secured from that office
and submitted to the court. However, Gloria inexplicably
failed to do so, further weakening her claim that there was a
valid marriage license issued for her and Syed.
Hence, All the evidence cited by the CA to show that a
wedding ceremony was conducted and a marriage contract
was signed does not operate to cure the absence of a valid
marriage license. Again, this marriage cannot be
characterized as among the exemptions, and thus, having
been solemnized without a marriage license, is void ab
initio.1âwphi1
G.R. No. 201061               July 3, 2013
SALLY GO-BANGAYAN, Petitioner,  requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as
vs.
BENJAMIN BANGAYAN, JR., Respondent.
DOCTRINE: A marriage solemnized without a license,
except those covered by Article 34 where no license is
necessary, "shall be void from the beginning."
Facts:
On 15 March 2004, Benjamin Bangayan, Jr. (Benjamin)
filed a petition for declaration of a non-existent marriage
and/or declaration of nullity of marriage before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 43 (trial court).
Benjamin alleged that on 10 September 1973, he married
Azucena Alegre (Azucena) in Caloocan City. They had
three children, namely, Rizalyn, Emmamylin, and
Benjamin III.
Benjamin and Sally developed a romantic relationship in
1979. Sally’s father was against the relationship. Sally
brought Benjamin to an office in Santolan, Pasig City
where they signed a purported marriage contract. Sally,
knowing Benjamin’s marital status, assured him that the
marriage contract would not be registered. Sally filed
criminal actions for bigamy and falsification of public
documents against Benjamin, using their simulated
marriage contract as evidence. Benjamin, in turn, filed a
petition for declaration of a non-existent marriage and/or
declaration of nullity of marriage before the trial court on
the ground that his marriage to Sally was bigamous and that
it lacked the formal requisites to a valid marriage.
Benjamin also asked the trial court for the partition of the
properties he acquired with Sally in accordance with
Article 148 of the Family Code, for his appointment as
administrator of the properties during the pendency of the
case, and for the declaration of Bernice and Bentley as
illegitimate children. A total of 44 registered properties
became the subject of the partition before the trial court.
Aside from the seven properties enumerated by Benjamin
in his petition, Sally named 37 properties in her answer.
The trial court ruled that the marriage was not recorded
with the local civil registrar and the National Statistics
Office because it could not be registered due to Benjamin’s
subsisting marriage with Azucena. The trial court ruled that
the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was not
bigamous.
ISSUE:
1. Whether the marriage between Benjamin and Sally are
void for not having a marriage license.
2. Whether Art. 148 should govern Benjamin and Sally’s
property relations
RULING: Yes.
Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:
(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;
(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases
provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and
(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with
the appearance of the contracting parties before
the solemnizing officer and their personal
declaration that they take each other as husband
and wife in the presence of not less than two
witnesses of legal age.
Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal
stated in Article 35(2).
Thus, Under Article 35 of the Family Code, a marriage
solemnized without a license, except those covered by
Article 34 where no license is necessary, "shall be void
from the beginning."

First, Benjamin’s marriage to Azucena on 10 September

1973 was duly established before the trial court, evidenced
by a certified true copy of their marriage contract. At the
time Benjamin and Sally entered into a purported marriage
on 7 March 1982, the marriage between Benjamin and
Azucena was valid and subsisting.

In this case, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was

solemnized without a license. It was duly established that
no marriage license was issued to them and that Marriage
License No. N-07568 did not match the marriage license
numbers issued by the local civil registrar of Pasig City for
the month of February 1982. The case clearly falls under
Section 3 of Article 3520 which made their marriage void ab
initio. The marriage between Benjamin and Sally was also
non-existent. Applying the general rules on void or
inexistent contracts under Article 1409 of the Civil Code,
contracts which are absolutely simulated or fictitious are
"inexistent and void from the beginning."21 Thus, the Court
of Appeals did not err in sustaining the trial court’s ruling
that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was null and
void ab initio and non-existent.

2. The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the property

relations of Benjamin and Sally is governed by Article 148
of the Family Code which states:

Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the

preceding Article, only the properties acquired by both of
the parties through their actual joint contribution of money,
property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in
proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence
of proof to the contrary, their contributions and
corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same
rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money
and evidences of credit.

If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her

share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute
community of conjugal partnership existing in such valid
marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly
married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the
manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding
Article.