2022 BAR EXAMINATIONS TRIAL

POLITICAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

LEGAL EDGE BAR REVIEW CENTER

legaledge8@gmail.com
0942-949-9176 / 0917-894-5356

1. In 2013, Republic Act No. 10533 or the “K to 12 Law” was enacted. Petitioners questioned the
validity of the law inasmuch as the enrolled bill, which the President signed into law, varies
significantly from the reconciled version of the bill as approved by the Congress and reported in the
Senate Journal on January 30, 2013. Petitioners posit that the Court, pursuant to its ruling in Astorga
v. Villegas, should look into the entries in the Journal to determine whether the K to 12 Law was duly
enacted. Petitioners also alleged that there was undue delegation of legislative power in the
enactment of the K to 12 Law, especially considering that the K to 12 Law did not have any provision
on labor. Petitioners further alleged that K to 12 Law is unconstitutional on the ground of violation of
the equal protection clause by arguing that private schools are allowed to offer extra and optional
curriculum subjects in addition to those required by the K to 12 Law and the Department of Education
Orders. Thus, rich families will tend to enroll their children in private schools, while poor families will
be constrained to enroll their children in English starved public schools. Should the Court look into the
alleged irregularities claimed in the enactment of the law? Why or why not? (5 points)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No.

The Court has held that under the "enrolled bill doctrine," the signing of a bill by the Speaker of
the House and the Senate President and the certification of the Secretaries of both Houses of
Congress that it was passed is conclusive not only as to its provisions, but also as to its due
enactment.

Here, in stark contrast to Astorga v. Villegas – where the Senate President himself, who
authenticated the bill, admitted a mistake and withdrew his signature – this case presents no
exceptional circumstance to justify the departure from the salutary rule.

Accordingly, the Court should not look into alleged irregularities claimed in the enactment of
the law.

(See Council of Teachers and Staff of Colleges and Universities of the Philippines v. Secretary
of Labor, GR 216930, 9 October 2018, En Banc, Caguioa [J])

2. AAA and BBB were accused of Malversation through Falsification of Public Documents. The
Ombudsman found probable cause against the accused and recommended the filing of the
necessary Information against them with the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan ruled to convict the
accused of the crime, holding that the accused made it appear on the Time Books and Payrolls that:
(1) the Municipality was maintaining a Barangay Road existing between two barangays, where there
really was no Barangay Road existing; and (2) one of the laborers, who supposedly worked to help
maintain the Barangay Road is a ghost employee, because he died more than a month before work
on the road began. The accused sought to overturn the conviction, alleging that the absence of a
name did not conclusively prove beyond reasonable doubt that there was a ghost employee in the
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have presented evidence that the said deceased laborer was replaced by another person
subsequently, and that since the Time Books and Payrolls passed audit, it followed that they were in
order. Should the Supreme Court sustain the findings of the Ombudsman and the Sandiganbayan,
considering that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts? Why or why not? (5 points)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No.

The Court has held that as a rule, findings of fact by the Ombudsman, being an administrative
agency, are deemed conclusive and binding when supported by the records and based on
substantial evidence. In the same manner, findings of fact of the Sandiganbayan as trial court
are accorded great weight and respect. However, in cases where there is a misappreciation of
facts, the Court will not hesitate to reverse the conclusions reached by the trial court.

Here, it appears that the Prosecution relied only on the following facts to hold the accused
liable:
(i) that there were blanks next to the signatures in the Time Books and Payrolls, and (ii) that
there was no road directly connecting the two barangays; and thus the evidence is severely
insufficient and inconclusive to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt for
the crime charged. Outside of the foregoing facts, the Sandiganbayan resorted to surmises to
arrive at its conclusions.

Accordingly, the Court cannot sustain the findings of the Ombudsman and the Sandiganbayan
as they were insufficient to establish proof beyond reasonable doubt.

(See Maamo v. People of the Philippines, GR 201917, 1 December 2016, First Division,
Caguioa [J])

3. AAA began working in the Bureau of Customs (BOC), starting in 1973, while his wife also worked
for the government from 1969 until her retirement in 1988. Sometime in 2003, the Ombudsman,
through its Field Investigation Office (FIO), conducted motu proprio lifestyle checks on government
officials and employees, including AAA. The Ombudsman observed that while AAA admits that he
and his wife acquired a house and lot through inheritance in 1969, and subsequently purchased a
contiguous lot and built a house thereon in 1973 and 1988, respectively, these assets were not
reported in his 1994, 1995 and 1996 Statements of Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth (SALNs). AAA
also failed to report that his wife won P2,000,000.00 from the sweepstakes in 1994. In addition, the
Ombudsman found that while AAA' s children were all practicing professionals, at the time of the
investigation, the documentary evidence on record show that the cost of the disputed assets were
grossly disproportionate to their respective incomes at the time of acquisition. The Ombudsman held
AAA guilty of Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct, and imposing upon him the penalty of dismissal
from service, cancellation of civil service eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, and perpetual
disqualification from re-employment in the government service. AAA moved for reconsideration from
the findings of the Ombudsman, which was denied. He then appealed to the Court of Appeals, which
sustained the Ombudsman's findings. In the case before the Supreme Court, AAA claims that he
does not question the general authority of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute erring public
officials and employees. However, he submits that Section 10 of Republic Act (RA) No. 6713 vests
upon heads of executive departments the specific and direct authority to review their subordinates'

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SALNs. Proceeding therefrom, AAA alleges that the review, investigation, and corrective action taken
by the Ombudsman collectively constitute a violation

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of RA No. 6713, an encroachment of the authority of the Commissioner of Customs, and a blatant
disregard of the latter's guidelines prescribing the review and compliance procedure for the
submission of SALNs governing the employees and officials of the BOC. Is AAA correct? Why or why
not? (5 points)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No.

The Court has held that Section 10 of RA No. 6713 vests upon heads of executive
departments the authority to ensure faithful compliance with the SALN requirement. However,
it does not strip the Ombudsman of its sole power to investigate and prosecute, motu proprio
or upon complaint of any person, any public official or employee for acts or omissions which
appear to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient.

Here, the fact that AAA had not been previously placed under a BOC sanctioned investigation
does not make the Ombudsman's acts void or premature, as the latter's power to investigate
and prosecute him on account of discrepancies in his SALNs stands independent of the power
of the Commissioner of Customs to ensure compliance with the SALN requirement within the
BOC.

Accordingly, AAA is incorrect in his allegation that the Ombudsman did not encroach upon the
authority of the Commissioner of Customs.

(See De Castro v. Field Investigation Office, Office of the Ombudsman, GR 182723, 5 June
2017, First Division, Caguiao [J])

4. Batangas City is a local government unit created by virtue of its charter, Republic Act (RA) No.
5495. In 2001, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Batangas City enacted an Ordinance, which requires
heavy industries operating along the portions of Batangas Bay, within the territorial jurisdiction of
Batangas City, to construct desalination plants to facilitate the use of seawater, as coolant for their
industrial facilities. Among the facilities affected by the assailed Ordinance is Philippine Shell
Petroleum Corporation (PSPC)'s Tabangao Refinery. In 2006, PSPC filed against Batangas City and
the Sangguniang Panlungsod a Petition for Declaration of Nullity before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) praying that the Ordinance be declared null and void. PSPC argued that the Ordinance
contravenes the Water Code of the Philippines and encroaches upon the power of the National Water
Resources Board to regulate and control the Philippines' water resources. Meanwhile, Batangas City
and the Sangguniang Panlungsod maintained that they have the power to enact the Ordinance
pursuant to the general welfare clause under the Local Government Code. According to City and the
Sanggunian, the rationale of the Ordinance is to stop industries from relying "too much" on ground
water as coolants for their machineries, and alternatively promote the use of seawater for such
purpose, considering that fresh ground water is a perishable commodity. Is the ordinance valid? Why
or why not? (5 points)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No.

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In furtherance of the State's policy to foster genuine and meaningful local autonomy, the
national legislature delegated the exercise of police power to local government units (LGUs) as
agents

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of the State. Such delegation can be found in Section 16 of the LGC, which embodies the
general welfare clause. Since LGUs exercise delegated police power as agents of the State, it
is incumbent upon them to act in conformity to the will of their principal, the State.

Here, the Ordinance effectively contravenes the provisions of the Water Code as it arrogates
unto Batangas City the power to control and regulate the use of ground water which, by virtue
of the provisions of the Water Code, pertains solely to the NWRB. By enacting the Ordinance,
Batangas City acted in excess of the powers granted to it as an LGU.

Accordingly, the Ordinance by Batangas City, enacted through its Sangguniang Panglungsod,
is invalid.

(See City of Batangas v. Philippine Shell Petroleum Corporation, GR 195003, 7 June 2017,
First Division, Caguiao [J])

5. In November 1991, heavy rains in Ormoc City caused the Malbasag River to overflow resulting in a
flashflood throughout the city. To avoid a similar tragedy, the Republic of the Philippines, through the
Department of Public Works and Highways, undertook a massive flood mitigation project at the
Malbasag River, which required a right of way, affecting the property rights of AAA, BBB, and CCC.
The Republic filed the complaint for expropriation and took possession of portions of the land of AAA,
BBB, and CCC. The Regional Trial Court (RTC), through the help of commissioners, determined the
just compensation based solely on comparative sales of other properties. Was the RTC's
determination of just compensation correct? Why or why not? (5 points)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No.

The Court has held that just compensation cannot be arrived at arbitrarily; several factors must
be considered such as, but not limited to, acquisition cost, current market value of like
properties, tax value of the condemned property, its size, shape, and location. But before
these factors can be considered and given weight, the same must be supported by
documentary evidence.

Here, the RTC's determination of just compensation did not consider any of the foregoing
factors. There was no consideration made of the acquisition cost, current market value of like
properties, the tax value of the properties of respondents, and the size, shape and location of
the properties.

Clearly, in the absence of any actual and reliable data - and the abject failure to explain this
absence - there can be no other conclusion that can be drawn except that the RTC's
determination of just compensation was arbitrary and incorrect.

(See Republic of the Philippines v. Larrazabal, GR 204530, 26 July 2017, First Division,
Caguioa [J])

6. Republic Act (RA) No. 8973 was enacted creating the province of Zamboanga Sibugay from the

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province of Zamboanga del Sur. As a result of the creation of the new province after positive results
in the plebiscite, the Internal Revenue Allocation of Zamboanga del Sur was reduced by 36%,
requiring

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the provincial governor to reduce the workforce of the government. A new staffing pattern was
approved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. Certain employees, who were occupying permanent
positions in the old plantilla, were not given placement preference, but were instead terminated. The
Civil Service Commission (CSC) Regional Office IX found the appointments made in the new staffing
pattern were in violation of RA No. 6656, because position holders were replaced by either new
employees or those holding lower positions in the old staffing pattern. Thus, it invalidated ninety six
(96) appointments made by the governor after the reorganization. Is the CSC empowered to nullify
such appointments in light of RA No. 6656? Why or why not? (5 points)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Yes.

The Court has held, in countless occasions, that the only function of the CSC is merely to
ascertain whether the appointee possesses the minimum requirements under the law; if it is
so, then the CSC has no choice but to attest to such appointment. Nevertheless, in light of the
circumstances unique to a government reorganization, such pronouncements must be
reconciled with the provisions of RA No. 6656. In instances of reorganization, there is no
encroachment on the discretion of the appointing authority when the CSC revokes an
appointment on the ground that the removal of the employee was done in bad faith. In such
instance, the CSC is not actually directing the appointment of another but simply ordering the
reinstatement of the illegally removed employee.

Here, the termination of the employees who enjoy security of tenure, as a result of the
reorganization, was tainted with bad faith; and thus, the action of the CSC to nullify the new
appointments were not made to encroach the power of the appointing authority but merely a
rectification for the reinstatement of an illegal removed employee.

Accordingly, the CSC is empowered to nullify such appointment in light of non-compliance with
RA No. 6656.

(See Cerilles v. Civil Service Commission, GR 180845, 6 June 2018, Second Division,
Caguioa [J])

7. Carlos is a teller at a casino operated by PAGCOR, a government-owned and -controlled

corporation with original charter. In the course of his work, he was handed cash by a customer, Celia.
Carlos erroneously spread the bills into four (4) clusters instead of five (5) clusters, and placed
markers for P10,000.00 each cluster. When he declared that the cash is P40,000.00, Celia was
perplexed and told him to recount, as the first cluster appeared to be thicker than the others. Carlos
recounted and corrected himself, issued a receipt for P50,000.00 and apologized to Celia. Celia
nonetheless accused Carlos of trying to shortchange her, and despite his explanation, Celia
continued to berate and curse him. To ease the tension, Carlos went on a ten-minute break, but
before leaving, he slammed the cash at the counter window. When he returned after his break, Celia
showed up again and continued to berate and insult him. Carlos was administratively charged for
discourtesy towards a casino customer. After hearing, PAGCOR meted him a penalty of thirty (30)
days suspension. Carlos moved to reconsider saying that it was his first offense and the penalty
under the Civil Service Rules is reprimand only, but his Motion was denied. He went to the Court of
Appeals alleging grave abuse of discretion. He alleged that his case is not appealable to the Civil

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Service Commission (CSC) because PAGCOR’s charter

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provides that administrative decisions shall be final, except when the penalty imposed is removal from
office. He alleged that the CSC has appellate jurisdiction only when the penalty imposed is more than
thirty days suspension. The Court of Appeals immediately dismissed the petition for failure to exhaust
administrative remedy. Is the Court of Appeals correct? (5 points)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

The Court of Appeals is not correct.

While the general rule is that a party must exhaust administrative remedies before seeking the
intervention of the court, there are several exceptions – one is where no administrative review
is provided by law.

This case falls squarely under the exception, since the law per se provides no administrative
review for administrative cases whereby an employee like Carlos is covered by Civil Service
law and penalized with a suspension of not more than thirty (30) days. Decisions of
administrative agencies which are declared final and unappealable by law are still subject to
judicial review if they fail the test of arbitrariness, or upon proof of gross abuse of discretion,
fraud or error of law.

There being no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law, Carlos is correct in bringing his case to the Court of Appeals, as there is no more
administrative remedy available for him. The Court of Appeals should resolve the case on the
merits and not dismiss the same immediately.

(See Mark Jerome Maglalang vs. PAGCOR, GR No. 190566, 11 December 2013)

8. The charter of Pag-IBIG Fund provides that exemption from the Fund coverage may be granted to
employer with plan for retirement AND/OR housing benefits superior to those provided under the Pag-
IBIG Fund. Pursuant to this, RMB company was exempted in 1995 from the coverage of the Pag-IBIG
Fund, because it had a superior retirement plan. In September 1995, the Board of Trustees modified
the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Pag-IBIG, which now provides that for a company to be
entitled to a waiver or suspension of fund coverage, it must have a plan providing for both retirement
AND housing benefits superior to those provided under the Pag-IBIG Fund. Based from this amended
Implementing Rules, RMB Company was denied exemption in 1996, because it has no housing
benefits superior to those of Pag-IBIG. RMB argued that the Implementing Rules repealed the law
when it required both retirement plan and a housing plan. Pag-IBIG contended that it did not amend
or repeal the law, but merely implemented it. Whose position will you uphold? Explain. (5 points)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

RMB Co. is correct.

Administrative issuances must not override, supplant, or modify the law they intend to carry
out. If the law allows exemption from the fund coverage employers who have superior
retirement and/or housing benefits, the implementing rule should not interpret it to mean both
retirement and housing benefits because the word “or” in the law means that one of the two
can be a ground for exemption

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Here, RMB can still avail of the exception from the fund coverage if it grants retirement benefits
compared to that of Pag-IBIG Fund. Rules and regulations should be within the scope of the
statutory authority granted by the legislature to the administrative agency.

Therefore, the correct position is that of RMB Co.

(See Romulo Mabanta vs. HDMF ( G.R. No. 131082, June 19, 2000)

9. Dr. Felix joined the National Center for Mental Health (NCMH) as a Resident Physician in 1979.
Later, he was promoted as Senior Resident Physician, until the Department of Health (DOH)
reorganized the NCMH and the employees tendered voluntary resignations. Felix was appointed to
the position of Medical Specialist I on a temporary basis in 1988, which was renewed the following
year. In 1989, DOH issued an Order requiring board certification, as a prerequisite for renewal of
specialist positions to upgrade the quality of specialists in DOH hospitals. Since Dr. Felix did not
qualify, his temporary appointment was not renewed in 1990. He filed for illegal dismissal at the Civil
Service Commission and alleged that his constitutional right to security of tenure was violated. Is Dr.
Felix correct? Why or why not? (5 points)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Dr. Felix is not correct.

His acceptance of his appointment to the position of Medical Specialist I on a temporary basis
means that he has accepted the legal consequence thereof. A temporary appointment is for a
definite and renewable period which when not renewed, does not involve a dismissal but an
expiration of the term.

In this case, his failure to assert a claim or the voluntary acceptance of another position in
government, without reservation, means that the civil servant has either given up his claim or
has already settled into the new position.

Thus, the position of Dr. Felix is bereft of merit.

(See Felix vs. Buenaseda, G.R. No. 109704, July 17, 1995)

10. Tallano was the duly elected Governor of the Province of Oro in 2010, 2013 and 2016 elections.
He fully served his 2010-2013 and 2013-2016 terms. In 2016, an administrative case was filed again
against Gov. Tallano before the Ombudsman. He was found guilty and the penalty of dismissal from
service was imposed against him. Although he appealed the Decision to the Court of Appeals, the
Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) implemented the decision of the
Ombudsman. The Vice Governor was directed to assume the position of Governor in a Memorandum
issued by the DILG and the Vice Governor took his oath as Governor. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals lowered the penalty to six (6) months, so Gov. Tallano resumed his position and took his
oath of office after serving the suspension. Gov. Tallano filed his certificate of candidacy as Governor
for the 2019 local elections. His opponent, Goldie, filed a petition to deny due course and/or cancel
his certificate of candidacy for having served three (3) terms from 2010 to 2019. If you were the
COMELEC, how will you decide the petition? (5 points)

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SUGGESTED ANSWER:

I will decide in favor of Governor Tallano.

There was an involuntary interruption in his term as a local elective official when there was a
break in his third term from 2016-2019 as a result of his loss of title to the office.

While Tallano was elected for three consecutive terms, specifically in 2010, 2013 and 2016,
yet the intervening dismissal from the service prevented him from fully serving the third
consecutive term. His dismissal issued by the Ombudsman resulted to permanent vacancy.
The implementation by the DILG immediately carried legal repercussions that no
developments in relation to the appeal could change or undo.

Tallano effectively lost his title to the office by the DILG’s call of directing the Vice Governor to
take his oath of office as Governor.

(See Tallado vs COMELEC, Sept. 10, 2019)

11. Section 40 (a) of the Local Government Code (LGC) provides for the disqualification for local
elective position “those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an
offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving
sentence.” Mr. M was charged and convicted with the crime of statutory rape and was sentenced to
reclusion perpetua. His sentence was commuted by the President, and after two (2) years from
discharge from prison, he filed his Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) for a local elective position. When
his CoC was assailed on the ground that he is convicted of a crime that carries with it an accessory
penalty of perpetual disqualification from office, his defense is that Section 40 (a) of the LGC, being a
later law, has amended partially the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, and therefore, he is now
qualified to run for local elective office. Is Mr. M correct? (5 points)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No, Mr. M is not correct.

While Section 40 (a) of the Local Government Code allows a prior convict to run for a local
elective office after the lapse of two (2) years from the time he serves sentence, the same
should not be deemed to cover cases wherein the law imposes a penalty either as principal or
accessory, which has the effect of disqualifying the convict to run for public office.

Article 30 of the RPC provides that the penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification has the
effect of depriving the felon of the privilege to run for a public office. A conviction of a felony
indicative of moral turpitude is unfit to hold public office as the same partakes of a privilege
which the State grants only to such classes of persons which are most likely to exercise it for
the common good.

The import of the provisions of the Revised Penal Code is more direct and specific in nature
insofar as it deprives the candidate to run for public office due to his conviction as compared to
Section 40 (a) of the Local Government Code.

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Accordingly, the provisions of the Local Government Code should be considered as a law of
general application, and must yield to the more definitive RPC provisions.

(See Romeo Jalosjos vs. COMELEC, June 18, 2013, GR No. 205033)

12. With its tremendous success in several cities, PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to
Cagayan de Oro City. It leased a commercial building, renovated and equipped the same, and
prepared to inaugurate its casino in the city. To preserve the moral well-being of its constituents and
to deter them from being hooked to the game of chance, a city ordinance was passed in Cagayan de
Oro prohibiting the issuance of a business permit to and cancelling any business permit of any
establishment allowing its premises to be used as a casino. Is the said ordinance legal? Why? (5
points)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No, the city ordinance is invalid.

Although a local government unit may, in the exercise of police power under the general
welfare clause, regulate the operation of business, it cannot prohibit activities which are
allowed by law such as the casino operation being undertake by PAGCOR pursuant to its
charter.

Here, PAGCOR has its own charter, which has a character and force of a statute.

Therefore, the city ordinance cannot prevail over the law allowing PAGCOR to undertake
legitimate casino operations.

(See Magtajas and City of Cagayan de Oro vs Pryce Properties, Inc., G.R. No. 111097, July
20, 1994)

13. The Congress of the Philippines passed Republic Act No. 123456, which regulates the ownership
and possession of firearms, and their registration and licensing in the country. Petitioners are lawyers,
who, because of the recent spate of violent incidents against members of the legal profession, argue
that they do not need licenses and permits to carry handguns. Petitioners distinguish these from rifles
and machine guns, which they admit should be regulated as these are not proportional to the need of
self-defense. Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the above regulation on the ground that the
State has deprived them of their rights without due process of law. Are the petitioners correct? (5
points)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No, they are not.

Article III, Section 1 of the Philippine 1987 Constitution states that “[n]o person shall be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.”

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In this case, there are no rights deprived under the foregoing clause. The right to bear arms in
the Philippines has never been a constitutional right, and neither is it a statutory right. It is a
mere statutory privilege, where any person wanting to keep and bear arms should obtain a
license

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from the State. Furthermore, the license to own and possess a firearm is not property nor a
property right.

The distinction among handguns, rifles, and machine guns is irrelevant for judicial review, and
is a policy question to be determined by Congress.

Thus, there are no rights violated.

(See Acosta v. Ochoa, G.R. Nos. 211559, 211567, 212570, & 215634, Oct. 15, 2019)

14. B wishes to register the trademark “FIVE-6” for their money lending business. The Intellectual
Property Office (IPO) of the Philippines rejected B’s application on the ground that it offends a certain
racial group. Accordingly, it allegedly violates Section CDE of Republic Act No. 123456, which
prohibits the registration of a trademark before the IPO if, among others, the mark consists of matter
which disparage persons, institutions, or beliefs, or bring them into contempt or disrepute. Rule on the
constitutionality of Section CDE. (5 points)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

The provision is argued to be unconstitutional.

Article III, Section 4 of the Philippine 1987 Constitution states that “no law shall be passed
abridging the freedom of speech and of expression.”

While the Philippine Supreme Court has not specifically ruled on this matter, the United States
Supreme Court – whose decisions are persuasive in our jurisdiction, as applicable – has held
that the US trademark law’s equivalent provision violates the right to freedom of speech since
“it offends a bedrock principle that speech may not be banned on the ground that it expresses
ideas that offend,” and is thus, unconstitutional.

In no uncertain terms, the US Supreme Court stated that “the disparagement clause
discriminates on the basis of ‘viewpoint.’ It denies registration to any mark that is offensive to a
substantial percentage of the members of the group. Giving offense is a viewpoint.”

(See Matal v. Tam, 582 U.S., June 19, 2017)

15. During a stake out operation, police officers heard noises and detected activity from the house
they were watching. They opened the closed but unlocked gate and looked inside the house through
the glass windows. Upon doing so, they saw X and Y smoking a rolled aluminum foil. The police
arrested X and Y, subjected them to drug testing, and reported positive tests for shabu. The police
argue that their entry was justified: based on a tip; because of the noises they heard; that they saw X
and Y smoking something; and that they tested positive for shabu. Thus, the arrests were allegedly
valid. Are the police officers correct? (5 points)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No, they are incorrect.

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Article III, Section 2 of the Philippine 1987 Constitution states that “the right of the people to be
secure in their persons, and houses against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable.” Relatedly, Rule 113, Section 5 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure further provides for the cases wherein warrantless arrests are
lawful.

Here, X and Y’s rights against unreasonable searches and seizures are violated. X and Y were
not in the presence of the police officers when they were smoking the foil. The police also did
not have probable cause based on personal knowledge that X and Y were committing or had
just committed a crime. The police needed to enter the closed gate and look inside the house
through the windows before they could witness the alleged offense.

Thus, the arrest of X and Y was not a case of a valid warrantless arrest.

(See Lapi v. People, G.R. No. 210731, Feb. 13, 2019)

16. On 8 January 1988, A was born in the Philippines to Filipino parents. When A was two (2) years
old, her parents brought her to the United States and was eventually naturalized as an American
Citizen. In 2004, A took the required oath of allegiance to the Philippines under Republic Act No.
9225. A intends to purchase a house in Muntinlupa City. May she do so? (5 points)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Yes, she may purchase the house.

Article XII, Section 8 of the Philippine 1987 Constitution states that “[a] natural born citizen of
the Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship may be a transferee of private lands,
subject to limitations provided by law.”

In this case, A has a clear right to purchase the house, as she reacquired her natural born
Filipino citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225.

17. A new 2023 Constitution provides the following: “The President of the Philippines shall exercise
supervision and control over local governments.” Is there a change from the 1987 Constitution,
particularly pertaining to the foregoing provision? If so, does the change require an amendment or a
revision? (5 points)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Yes, there is a change, which requires a revision.

Jurisprudence emphasizes that the chief executive only has supervision and not control, to
ensure local autonomy.

Here, Article X, Section 2 of the Philippine 1987 Constitution states that “the President of the
Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local governments,” while the new 2023

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LEGAL EDGE BAR REVIEW
Constitution states “supervision and control.” This change is a revision, and not an
amendment, as it alters a basic principle in the constitution – that local governments have
autonomy, and mere general supervision is exercised by the president over them.

Thus, a revision is necessary in effecting the proposed changes in the case at bar.

(See Lambino v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 174153, Oct. 25, 2006; Villafuerte, Jr. v. Robredo, G.R.
No. 195390, Dec. 10, 2014)

18. The Philippines initiated arbitration proceedings against China, pursuant to the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), seeking an award regarding, among others, the
parties’ rights and obligations over the waters, seabed, and maritime features of the South China
Sea. China rejected the Philippines’ recourse to arbitration and stayed resolute in its position of non-
acceptance and non-participation in the proceedings. Does China’s position deprive the tribunal of
jurisdiction? (5 points)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No, China’s non-participation in the proceedings does not deprive the tribunal of jurisdiction.

Annex VII, Article 9 of the UNCLOS provides: “If one of the parties to the dispute does not
appear before the arbitral tribunal or fails to defend its case, the other party may request the
tribunal to continue the proceedings and to make its award. Absence of a party or failure of a
party to defend its case shall not constitute a bar to the proceedings. Before making its award,
the arbitral tribunal must satisfy itself not only that it has jurisdiction over the dispute but also
that the claim is well founded in fact and law.”

In this case, the tribunal ensured that it has jurisdiction over the dispute – the instant case was
a dispute regarding the interpretation and application of the UNCLOS, and not about
sovereignty.

Moreover, both China and the Philippines are parties to the UNCLOS, and the provisions for
the settlement of disputes form an integral part of the UNCLOS. A State may not except itself
generally from the Convention’s mechanism for the resolution of disputes.

(See In the Matter of the South China Sea Arbitration, PCA Case No. 2013-19, paras. 149-
156, July 12, 2016; Award on Jurisdiction, Oct. 29, 2015)

-NOTHING FOLLOWS-

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