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IMPACT OF TURBOGENERATOR UPRATING ON ITS TRANSIENT RESPONSE

IN CASE OF GRID EVENTS

L. Rouco
Universidad Pontificia Comillas

J. Archilla and C. Gavilán

Iberdrola

SPAIN

SUMMARY
The process of increasing the licensed power level of a commercial Nuclear Power Generating Station
(NPGS) is called a power uprate. Power uprates have been implemented at a number of NPGSs in
many countries. Such uprates are an economical way of producing more electricity at an NPGS and
have attracted interest due to increased electricity prices. The increase in the electricity produced at an
NPGS can be achieved in two ways: increase the thermal power in the reactor and improve the thermal
conversion efficiency in the secondary side of the power plant by refurbishing or replacing the high
pressure or low pressure turbine units, by feedwater heater refurbishment/replacement, or by a
combination of these actions. Hence, their synchronous generator has to be repowered or replaced at
some point of the NPGS life time. Obviously, the step-up transformer should be also replaced.

This paper addresses the impact of turbogenerator uprating of a 1092 Mw Spanish NPGS in its
transient response in case of grid events, namely faults. Repowering has mainly comprised machine
stator rewinding. The main purpose of machine rewinding was to increase the life time of the machine
after more than 30 years of successful operation. It has affected not only the steady-state
characteristics (namely reactive power capability diagram) but the transient and subtransient
reactances and time constants have changed as well. Moreover, the rotor inertia in the machine MVA
base has changed.

The impact of machine rewinding on its transient response will be evaluated using a detailed model of
synchronous generator and its excitation and turbine-governor models.

Grid Codes have been developed by Transmission System Operators (TSOs) to formalize their
obligations and to establish the framework of their technical relationships with different actors of
electric power systems (generators, distributors, consumers, etc.). Grid codes have legal liability in the
country they apply. Grid codes have added new requirements with respect to IEC and IEEE standards.
ENTSO-E Network Code on Requirements for Generators has been developed to harmonize Grid
Code requirements through Europe.

Hence, the fault ride capability of synchronous generators as formulated by the ENTSO-E Network
Code on Requirements for Generators will be discussed in this test case.

KEYWORDS
Turbogenerator uprating, turbogenerator rewinding, transient response.

rouco@comillas.edu
1 INTRODUCTION
The process of increasing the licensed power level of a commercial Nuclear Power Generating Station
(NPGS) is called a power uprate. Power uprates have been implemented at a number of NPGSs in
many countries [1]. Such uprates are an economical way of producing more electricity at an NPGS
and have attracted interest due to increased electricity prices, a situation that is expected to remain.
The increase in the electricity produced at an NPGS can be achieved in two ways: increase the thermal
power in the reactor and improve the thermal conversion efficiency in the secondary side of the power
plant by refurbishing or replacing the high pressure or low pressure turbine units, by feedwater heater
refurbishment/replacement, or by a combination of these actions.

Hence, their synchronous generator has to be repowered or replaced at some point of the NPGS life
time. Obviously, the step-up transformer should be also replaced.

This paper addresses the impact of turbogenerator uprating of a 1092 Mw Spanish NPGS in its
transient response in case of grid events, faults. Repowering has mainly comprised machine stator
rewinding. The main purpose of machine rewinding was to increase the life time of the machine after
more than 30 years of successful operation. It has affected not only the steady-state characteristics
(namely reactive power capability diagram) but the transient and subtransient reactances and time
constants have changed as well. Moreover, the rotor inertia in the machine MVA base has changed.

The impact of machine uprating on its transient response will be evaluated using a detailed model of
synchronous generator and its excitation and turbine-governor models. Moreover, the fault ride
capability of synchronous generators as formulated by the ENTSO-E Network Code on Requirements
for Generators will be discussed in this test case.

2 MACHINE REACTIVE POWER CAPABILITY

The NPGS of our interest began its commercial operation in 1984. The original rated output was 975
Mw which was converter into electrical power through a four poles, 1082.5 MVA, 1500 rpm, 20 kV,
0.9 power factor synchronous generator and delivered to the transmission grid through a step-up
transformer bank 3x361 MVA, 420 kV/20 kV. The NGGS output has been successively increased up
to 1092 Mw. The original step-up transformer was also replaced by a 3x420 Mw transformer bank 420
kV/20 kV. The cooling system of the isolated phase buses was also improved. To accommodate
successive increases of power output, the synchronous generator was also repowered up to 1120 MVA
by improving the efficiency of its cooling system. Now, at the more than 30 years of lifetime, the
stator of the synchronous generator is rewound achieving 1198 MVA. The main purpose of machine
rewinding was to increase the life time of the machine after more than 30 years of successful
operation.

Figure 1 compares the reactive power capability diagrams of the stages of the evolution of the
synchronous machine of the NPGS of our interest.

3 MACHINE PARAMETERS
Synchronous machine rewound has affected not only the reactive capability diagram but also the
values of the machine reactances and time constants in per unit of the machine MVA. The inertia in
per unit of the machine MVA has also been affected. Table I compares the relative variation of
parameters of the rewound generator with respect to the parameters of the original turbogenerator
computed according to:

rewinded  original
     100 (1)
original

1
In addition, Table II compares the actual values of some parameters. Reactances and times constants
of rewound turbogenerators are greater than those of the original turbogenerator. In contrast, the total
rotor inertia (comprising the turbine rotor, generator rotor and exciter rotor) of the rewound
turbogenerator is smaller than those of the original turbogenerator.

P (Mw)

Figure 1: Comparison of the reactive power capability diagrams.

Table I: Parameter relative variation of the rewound turgogenerator with respect to the original turbogenerator.
Parameter Relative variation (%)
D-axis open circuit transient time constant 11
Q-axis open circuit transient time constant 13
D-axis open circuit subtransient time constant 27
Q-axis open circuit subtransient time constant 5
D-axis synchronous reactance 16
Q-axis synchronous reactance 14
D-axis transient reactance 13
Q-axis transient reactance 15
D-axis subtransient reactance 12
Q-axis subtransient reactance 18
Leakage reactance 18
Saturation factor at 1 pu 21
Saturation factor at 1.2 pu -8
Armature resistance -6
Inertia -4

Table II: Comparison of several parameters of the rewound turgogenerator with respect to those of the original
turbogenerator.
Parameter Original turbogenerator Rewound
turbogenerator
D-axis open circuit transient time constant (s) 7.5 9.5
D-axis synchronous reactance (pu) 1.99 2.26
D-axis transient reactance (pu) 0.435 0.5
Inertia (s) 3.7422 3.0594

4 TRANSIENT RESPONSE

4.1 Models
The transient response of the turbogenerator has been evaluated using a model of the generating unit
connected to an infinite bus through its step-up transformer and an external impedance according to
Figure 2. The external impedance has been obtained from short-circuit studies of a fully detailed

2
representation of the Spanish Mainland power system. The lowest short circuit capacity scenario of the
system has been considered.
Pg 0
Generator
Operating Qg 0
Point VT 0
Connection Point

G 

Generator External Impedance

Step-up
Transformer

Fault
Figure 2: Test system.

The generating unit model includes a six order electromechanical model of the synchronous machine,
the model of the excitation system and the models of the turbine and governor. Figure 3 shows the
model of excitation system. The excitation system is an AC excitation system . Figure 4 depicts the
steam turbine model. Figure 5 displays the turbine governor. Turbine controls are of turbine following
reactor type. The overall generating unit model is described by 28 state variables.

VLV


K LR 


HV
gate
VS
VAMAX KR

VT  VA VR
1 1  sTC KA 1
      EFD
1  sTR    1  sTB 1  sTA  sTE
   
xe1 VREF VF xe 2 VAMIN 0
K LI FEX  I N 
xe 3 VFE xe4

VT VFA K FA

1  sTFA
 

xe 6 K C I FD
 KE  SE IN 
 VE


KD
I FD
VN KN
s VN
KF
1  sTF

EFDN EFD
xe5

Figure 3: Excitation system model.

REFERENCE
TURBINE
STEAM
FLOW xt11
xt11,MAX

BYPASS  1 TURBINE
FLOW sT11  PRESSURE



xt11, MIN

Pressure
PM
Drop 
TURBINE
STEAM

FLOW PM , HP PM , LP

FHP FLP

1 1 1
K12
1  sTCH 1  sTRH 1  sTCO

xt12 xt13 xt14

Figure 4: Turbine model.

3
 xt 5 ,MAX xt 5 ,MAX xt 7 ,MAX xt 7 ,MAX

 1  sT01  1 xt1   
1 1 1 BYPASS
PS1 K0 K5 K7
1  sT02 sT1 HI 1MAX sT5 1  sT6 sT5 FLOW
    
xt 5 xt 7
TURBINE xt 0 HI 1  ut 5 ,REF xt 5, MIN xt 5, MIN xt 6 xt 7, MIN xt 7,MIN
PRESSURE
HI xt 4 ,MAX xt 4 ,MAX xt 8 ,MAX xt 8 ,MAX

 TURBINE
 1  sT21  1 xt 3 HI1MIN 1
1 STEAM
PS 2 K2 LO K8
1  sT22 sT3 sT4 sT8
   FLOW

xt 4, MIN xt 4 xt 8
xt 2 xt 4, MIN xt 8, MIN xt 8, MIN


xt 9 ,MAX

SPEED
 1
DEVIATION K2 HI 1  sT9
 % 

1  sT15 xt 9 xt 9,MIN
K15
1  sT16
LOAD
SETPOINT
xt15

Figure 5: Governor model.

4.2 Operating points

Generating unit operating point is defined at synchronous machine terminals. Two operating point of
both the repowered and the rewound machines will be evaluated: extreme lagging (maximum reactive
power generation) and extreme leading (maximum reactive power consumption) at rated active power
generation (1092 Mw) and at rated voltage. Table III details the reactive power generation (Mvar) at
both the extreme lagging and extreme leading operating points. It must be noted that the extreme
leading operating point is not defined by the reactive power capability diagram. It is defined by the
Under-Excited Reactive Ampere Limiter (URAL) of the excitation system [3] since the settings of the
URAL are more restrictive that the reactive power capability diagram itself.

Table III: Comparison of reactive power generation (Mvar) at extreme lagging and extreme leading operating points at rated
active power generation.
Turbogenerator Extreme lagging Extreme leading
Repowered 248.9 -122.8
Rewound 390 -91.2

4.3 Simulation results

The critical clearing time of a solid three phase fault at the high voltage bus of the step-up transformer
is used to measure the stability of the synchronous machine. The critical clearing time is the maximum
fault duration that the machine can sustain without losing synchronism. The fault duration results from
the overall protection and circuit breaker times. Table IV compares the critical clearing times of both
the repowered and rewound turbogenerators in case of the extreme lagging and extreme leading at
rated active power operating points. The critical clearing times are higher than the clearing times of
instantaneous (first zone) protections and circuit breakers (100 ms according to the protection criteria
of the Spanish Mainland power system [4]). In other words, the machine will remain stable in case of a
fault properly cleared by the instantaneous (first zone) protections.

The critical clearing times in extreme leading operating points and lower that in extreme lagging
operating points as expected. The critical clearing times of the rewound turbogenerator are slighter
lower that the repowered turbogenerator due to the increase of machine reactances and the reduction
of machine inertia in the machine MVA base. They are still higher that clearing times of instantaneous
protection and circuit breakers.

Table IV: Critical clearing times (ms) of repowered and rewound turbogenerator.
Extreme lagging Extreme leading
Repowered turbogenerator 165 135
Rewound turbogenerator 160 130

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Figure 6 compares the rotor angle of the repowered and the rewound turbogenerators in case of 160
ms fault. The rotor angle excursion of the rewound turbogenerator is greater that the excursion of the
repowered one due to the higher reactance and the lower inertia of the rewound turbogenerator. In
addition, the rotor angle oscillation of the rewound turbogenerator is slightly higher. Figure 7
compares the connection point voltage of the repowered and the rewound turbogenerators in case of
160 ms fault. The connection point voltage excursion of the rewound turbogenerator is greater that the
excursion of the repowered one due to the higher rotor angle excursion of the rewound turbogenerator.
Figure 8 explains the effect of rotor angle excursions on connection point voltage excursions. From the
machine stability point of view, connection point voltage excursions are consecuences of rotor angle
excursions. Of course, the magnitude of the connection point voltage excursion depends on the
machine, transformer and network impedances.
Rotor angle (degrees)

Figure 6: Comparison of the response of the repowered and rewound turbogenerators in case of extreme lagging operating
point: rotor angle.
Connection point voltage (pu)

Figure 7: Comparison of the response of the repowered and rewound turbogenerators in case of extreme lagging operating
point: connection point voltage.

5
 X X t Xe

E  E  + + V  V 0
VCP
 

E

E


 VCP
VCP

V V
Figure 8: Connection point voltage excursions due to rotor angle excursions.

In case of loss of synchronism, the synchronous machine is protected by several protections. The main
protections are the loss of synchronism (78) and the maximum frequency relays (81M).

Figure 9 shows the loss of synchronism relays characteristics (impedance and blinders [5]) together
with the generator impedance in the critical unstable clearing of the rewound turbogenerator in case of
extreme lagging operating point (165 ms). The simulation confirms that the loss of synchronism relays
issue a trip signal since the generator impedance enters into the impedance relay and crosses both
blinders.
X (pu)

Figure 9: Critical unstable clearing of the rewound turbogenerator in case of extreme lagging operating point: Loss of
synchronism relays.

Figure 10 shows the settings of the maximum and minimum frequency relays together with the
generator frequency in the critical unstable clearing of the rewound turbogenerator in case of extreme
lagging operating point (165 ms). The simulation confirms that the maximum frequency relays issue a
trip signal since the generator frequency is over the maximum frequency setting for more than 120 ms.

6
 Frequency (Hz)

Figure 10: Critical unstable clearing of the rewound turbogenerator in case of extreme lagging operating point: Maximum
and minimum frequency relays.

5 DISCUSSION OF GRID CODE REQUIREMENTS

Grid Codes have been developed by Transmission System Operators (TSOs) to formalize their
obligations and to establish the framework of their technical relationships with different actors of
electric power systems (generators, distributors, consumers, etc.). Grid codes have legal liability in the
country they apply. Grid codes have added new requirements [5] with respect to IEC [7] and IEEE
standards [8]. ENTSO-E Network Code on Requirements for Generators has been developed to
harmonize Grid Code requirements through Europe [9]. On 26 June 2015, the Network Code on
Requirements for Generators was adopted by Member States of the EU in Comitology. It will now go
through scrutiny from the European Parliament and Council [10].

One of the requirements imposed by grid codes to generators of any kind is Fault Ride Through
Capability (FRTC). FRTC refers to the generator ability to remain stable connected to the grid in case
of an external fault as long as the voltage at the connection point remains above a defined voltage-
against-time profile. Firstly, FRTC was required to wind generators to prevent massive wind
generation disconnection in case that a fault occurs in the transmission network and it was
subsequently imposed on synchronous generators. ENTSO-E FRTC requirement has evolved through
the elaboration and consultation process of the Network Code on Requirements for Generators.

According to the draft of 8 March 2013, TSOs could require a voltage-against-time between the
maximum fault duration and minimum fault duration curves of Figure 11 which means that the
maximum clearing time of a fault could be between 140 and 250 ms. In contrast, according to the draft
of 26 June 2015, TSOs could require a voltage-against-time between the maximum fault duration and
minimum fault duration curves of Figure 12 which It means that the maximum clearing time of a fault
could be between 140 and 150 ms. In fact, the of 26 June 2015 points out that the maximum clearing
time of a fault could be between 140 and 250 ms if “system protection and secure operation so
require”.

The evaluation of the FRTC of a synchronous generator requires the accurate characterization of the
pre-fault and the post-fault operating point (generator active power generation, reactive power
generation, terminal voltage and network short circuit capacity). ENTSO-E Network Code on
Requirements for Generators does not define them and assigns to each TSO the responsibility of
defining them.

Although ENTSO-E Network Code on Requirements for Generators is mainly aimed at new
generators, it is interesting to discuss its FRTC requirement in this test case. Assuming that system

7
protection and secure operation do not require the extension of the clearing time (as it is the case) of
Figure 12, our machine fulfils the FRTC requirement in the extreme lagging operating point whereas it
is very close to fulfil it in the extreme leading operating point. Hence, the criterion to set the value of
the maximum clearing time could be argued. We believe that what it should be guaranteed is that the
instantaneous protections and circuit breakers clear the fault before the machine loses synchronism.
State-of-the-art instantaneous protection systems and circuit breakers, as those that equip the Spanish
transmission systems, guarantee clearing times below 100 ms.

For more than 25 years, The Spanish Nuclear Security Council, TSO and NGPS operators have been
performing periodically stability studies to review the stability conditions of the Spanish NGSPs. Very
detailed models of the NGPSs themselves and the Spanish Mainland power system and the external
systems are used to conduct such studies. Such detailed stability studies provide a wider perspective of
the plan-grid interaction than the simplified grid code approach.

tclear   0.14  0.25  s

tclear

Figure 11: ENTSO-E fault ride through capability requirement as draft of the Network Code on Requirements for Generators
of 8 March 2013 [9].

tclear   0.14  0.15  s

tclear

Figure 12: ENTSO-E fault ride through capability requirement as draft of the Network Code on Requirements for Generators
of 26 June 2015 [10].

8
6 CONCLUSIONS
This paper has studied the impact of turbogenerator uprating of a 1092 Mw Spanish NPGS in its
transient response in case of grid faults. Repowering has mainly comprised machine stator rewinding.
Although ENTSO-E Network Code on Requirements for Generators is mainly aimed at new
generators, its FRTC requirement has been discussed in this test case.

7 BIBLIOGRAPHY
[1] International Atomic Energy Agency, “Power Uprate in Nuclear Power Plants: Guidelines and
Experience”, IAEA Nuclear Energy Series, Technical Reports No. NP-T-3.9, available at
http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/Pub1484_web.pdf.
[2] IEEE, “IEEE Recommended Practice for Excitation System Models for Power System Stability
Studies”, IEEE Std 421.5-2005.
[3] GE, “ALTERREXTM EXCITATION SYSTEM STATIC CONTROL 3S7932EA210 SERIES”,
document GEK-14870E, available at
http://store.gedigitalenergy.com/manuals/documents/general/gek-14870e.pdf.
[4] Red Eléctrica de España, “GENERAL PROTECTION CRITERIA OF SPANISH MAINLAND
POWER SYSTEM”, (In Spanish CRITERIOS GENERALES DE PROTECCIÓN DEL SISTEMA
ELÉCTRICO PENINSULAR ESPAÑOL), available at
http://www.ree.es/sites/default/files/downloadable/criterios_proteccion_sistema_1995.pdf.
[5] GE, “Out-of-step Protection of Generators”, available at
http://store.gedigitalenergy.com/FAQ/Documents/CEB/GER-3179.pdf.
[6] L. Rouco, K. Chan, S. Keller, J. Oesterheld, “Recent evolution of European grid code
requirements and its impact on turbogenerator design”, 2012 IEEE Power and Energy Society
General Meeting, San Diego, California, 22-27 July 2012.
[7] International Electrotechnical Commission, “International Standard, Rotating electrical machines,
Part 3: Specific requirements for synchronous generators driven by steam turbines or combustion
gas turbines”, IEC Standard 60034-3, Edition 6.0, 2007-11.
[8] IEEE, “IEEE Standard for Cylindrical-Rotor 50 Hz and 60 Hz Synchronous Generators Rated 10
MVA and Above”, IEEE Standard C50.13-2005
[9] ENTSO-E, “Network Code for Requirements for Grid Connection Applicable to all Generators”, 8
March 2013, available at
https://www.entsoe.eu/fileadmin/user_upload/_library/resources/RfG/130308_Final_Version_NC_
RfG.pdf.
[10] European Commission, “Commission Regulation (EU) establishing a network code on
requirements for grid connection of generators”, final draft, 26 June 2015, available at
https://www.entsoe.eu/Documents/Network%20codes%20documents/NC%20RfG/draft_ec_netwo
rkCodesJune.pdf.