Max Weber (1864-1920)

15. Max Weber, “Science as a Vocation”, in: H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (ed.),
Oxford University Press, New York 1946, pp. 129-156.
V . ocience as a V ocation

You wish me to speak about 'Science as a Vocation.' Now, we political

economists have a pedantic custom, which I should like to follow, of

always beginning with the external conditions. In this case, we begin
with the question: What are the conditions of science as a vocation in
the material sense of the term? Today this question means, practically
and essentially: What are the prospects of a graduate student who is

resolved to dedicate himself professionally to science in university life.?

In order to understand the peculiarity of German conditions it is ex-

pedient to proceed by comparison and to realize the conditions abroad.
In this respect, the United States stands in the sharpest contrast with
Germany, so we shall focus upon that country.

Everybody knows that in Germany the career of the young man who
is dedicated to science normally begins with the position of Privatdozent.
After having conversed with and received the consent of the re-

spective specialists, he takes up residence on the basis of a book and,

usually, a rather formal examination before the faculty of the university.

Then he gives a course of lectures without receiving any salary other

than the lecture fees of his students. It is up to him to determine, within

his venia legendi, the topics upon which he lectures.

In the United States the academic career usually begins in quite a

different manner, namely, by employment as an 'assistant.' This is

similar to the great institutes of the natural science and medical faculties

in Germany, where usually only a fraction of the assistants try to habili-

tate themselves as Privatdozenten and often only later in their career.

Practically, this contrast means that the career of the academic man in

Germany is generally based upon plutocratic prerequisites. For it is ex-

tremely hazardous for a young scholar without funds to expose himself

'Wissenschaft als Beruf,' Gesammelte Aufsaetze zitr Wissenschaftslelire (Tubingen, 1922),

pp. 524-55. Originally a speech at Munich University, 1918, published in 1919 by Duncker
& Humblodt, Munich.
129
 SCIENCE AS A VOCATION I3I
130 SCIENCE AND POLITICS

to the conditions of the academic career. He must be able to endure this

man is free to do scientific work, although this restriction of the oppor-

number of years without knowing whether he tunity to teach is somewhat involuntary.

condition for at least a
In America, the arrangement is different in principle. Precisely during
will have the opportunity to move into a position which pays well
the early years of his career the assistant is absolutely overburdened just
enough for maintenance.

In the United States, where the bureaucratic system exists, the young because he is paid. In a department of German, for instance, the full

academic man is paid from the very beginning. To be sure, his salary professor will give a three-hour course on Goethe and that is enough,

is modest; usually it is hardly as much as the wages of a semi-skilled whereas the young assistant is happy if, besides the drill in the German
language, his twelve weekly teaching hours include assignments of, say,
laborer. Yet he begins with a seemingly secure position, for he draws
may him Uhland. The officials prescribe the curriculum, and in this the assistant
a fixed salary. As a rule, however, notice be given to just as

German and frequently he definitely has to face this

is just as dependent as the institute assistant in Germany.
with assistants,

should he not come up to expectations.

Of late we can observe distinctly that the German universities in the
broad fields of science develop in the direction of the American system.
These expectations are such that the young academic in America must
draw large crowds of students. This cannot happen to a German decent;
The large institutes of medicine or natural science are 'state capitalist'

To be sure, he cannot raise )nsesPwhich cannot be managed without very considerabje funds.
once one has him, one cannot get rid of him.
But he has the understandable notion that after years of
Here we encounter the sarrie conHition that is found wherever capitalist
any 'claims.'
enterprise comes into operation: the 'separation of the worker from his
work he has a sort of moral right to expect some consideration. He also

expects —and this is often quite important —that one have some regard
means of production.' 'ihe worker, that is, the assistant, is dependent
upon the implements that the state puts'at Iiis disposal; hence he is just
for him when the question of the possible habilitation of other Privat-
as dependent upon the head of the institute as is the employee in a
dozenten comes up.
factory upon the management. For, subjectively and in good faith, the
Whether, in principle, one should habilitate every scholar who is quali-
director believes that this institute is 'his,' and he manages its affairs.
fied or whether one should consider enrollments, and hence give the
Thus the assistant's position often as precarious as that of any
existing staff a monopoly to teach —that is an awkward dilemma. It is asso-
'quasi-proletarian' existence and
is

just as precarious as the position of the

is

ciated with the dual aspect of the academic profession, which we shall
assistant in the American university.
discuss presently. In general, one decides in favor of the second alter-
In very important respects German university life is being American-
native. But this increases the danger that the respective full professor,
ized, as is German life in general. This development, I am convinced,
however conscientious he is, will prefer his own disciples. If I may will engulf those disciplines in which the craftsman personally owns the
speak of my personal attitude, I must say I have followed the principle tools, essentially the library, as is still the case to a large extent in my
that a scholar promoted by me must legitimize and habilitate himself own field. This development corresponds entirely to what happened to
with somebody else at another university. But the result has been that the artisan of the past and it is now fully under way.
one of my best disciples has been turned down at another university As with all capitalist and at the same time bureaucratized enterprises,
because nobody there believed this to be the reason. there are indubitable advantages in all this. But the 'spirit' that rules in
A further difference between Germany and the United States is that these affairs is different from the historical atmosphere of the German
in Germany the Privatdozent generally teaches fewer courses than he university. An extraordinarily wide gulf, externally and internally, exists

wishes. According to his formal right, he can give any course in his between the chief of these large, capitalist, university enterprises and
field. But to do so would be considered an improper lack of considera- the usual full j)rofessor of the old style. This contrast also holds for the
tion for the older docents. As a rule, the full professor gives the 'big' inner attitude, a matter that I shall not go into here. Inwardly as well
courses and the docent confines himself to secondary ones. The ad- as externally, the old university constitution has become fictitious. What
vantage of these arrangements is that during his youth the academic has remained and what has been essentially increased is a factor peculiar
 SCIENCE AND rOLlTICS SCIENCE AS A VOCATION I33
132

to the university career: the question whether or not such a Privatdozent, where parliaments, as in some countries, or monarchs, as in Germany
more an moving thus far (both work out in the same way), or revolutionary power-hold-
and still assistant, will ever succeed in into the position

become the head of an ers, as in Germany now, intervene for political reasons in academic selec-
of a full professor or even institute. That is
tions, can one be certain that convenient mediocrities or strainers will
simply a hazard. Certainly, chance does not rule alone, but it rules to an
know have the opportunities all to themselves.
unusually high degree. I of hardly any career on earth where
chance plays such a role. I may say so all the more since I personally
No university teacher likes to be reminded of discussions of appoint-

owe it to some mere accidents that during my very early years I was ap- ments, for they are seldom agreeable. And yet I may say that in the

pointed to a full professorship in a discipline in which men of my genera-

numerous cases known to me there was, without exception, the good
will to allow purely objective reasons to be decisive.
tion undoubtedly had achieved more tha^ I had. And, indeed, I fancy,

on the basis of this experience, that I have a sharp eye for the undeserved One must be clear about another thing: that the decision over academic
fates so largely a 'hazard' not merely because of the insufficiency
fate of the many whom accident has cast in the opposite direction and is is

who within this selective apparatus in spite of all their ability do not of the selection by the collective formation of will. Every young man

attain the positions that are due them.

who feels called to scholarship has to realize clearly that the task before

The fact that hazard rather than ability plays so large a role is not
him has a double aspect. He must qualify not only as a scholar but

alone or even predominantly owing to the 'human, all too human' also as a teacher. And the two do not at all coincide. One can be a pre-

factors, which naturally occur in the process of academic selection as in eminent scholar and at the same time an abominably poor teacher. May
any other selection. It would be unfair to hold the personal inferiority of I remind you of the teaching of men like Helmholtz or Ranke; and
they are not by any chance rare exceptions.
faculty members or educational ministries responsible for the fact that
somany mediocrities undoubtedly play an eminent role at the universities. Now, matters are such that German universities, especially the small

The predominance of mediocrity is rather due to the laws of human universities, are engaged in a most ridiculous competition for enroll-

co-operation, especially of the co-operation of several bodies, and, in this

ments. The landlords of rooming houses in university cities celebrate

case, co-operation of the faculties who recommend and of the ministries the advent of the thousandth student by a festival, and they would love
of education.
to celebrate Number Two Thousand by a torchhght procession. The
A counterpart are the events at the papal elections, which can be interest in fees^and one should openly admit it — is affected by appoint-
traced over many centuries and which are the most important control- ments in the neighboring fields that 'draw crowds.' And quite apart

lable examples of a selection of the same nature as the academic selection. from this, the number of students enrolled is a test of qualification, which
The cardinal who is said to be the 'favorite' only rarely has a chance to
may be grasped in terms of numbers, whereas the qualification for

win out. The rule is rather that the Number Two cardinal or the scholarship is imponderable and, precisely with audacious innovators,

Number Three wins out. The same holds for the President of the often debatable —that is only natural. Almost everybody thus is affected

United States. Only exceptionally does the first-rate and most prominent by the suggestion of the immeasurable blessing and value of large en- ,

man get the nomination of the convention. Mostly the Number Two and rollments. To say of a docent that he is a poor teacher is usually to

often the Number Three men are nominated and later run for elecdon. pronounce an academic sentence of death, even if he is the foremost

The Americans have already formed technical sociological terms for scholar in the world. And the question whether he is a good or a poor
these categories, and it would be quite interesting to enquire into the teacher is answered by the enrollments with which the students conde- •-

laws of selection by a collective will by studying these examples, but we scendingly honor him. V
shall not do so here. Yet these laws also hold for the collegiate bodies It is a fact that whether or not the students flock to a teacher is de-

of German universities, and one must not be surprised at the frequent termined in large measure, larger than one would believe possible, by
mistakes that are made, but rather at the number of correct appoint- purely external things: temperament and even the inflection of his

ments, the proportion of which, in spite of all, is very considerable. Only voice. After rather extensive experience and sober reflection, I have a
 SCIENCE AND POLITICS SCIENCE AS A VOCATION I35
134

deep distrust of courses that draw crowds, however unavoidable they SO easily hit from his own speciaHzed point of view. One's own work
may be. Democracy should be used only where it is in place. S cientific must inevitably remain highly imperfect. Only by strict specialization

training, as we are held to practice it in accordance with the tradition of can the scientific worker become fully conscious, for once and perhaps
German universities, is the affair of an intellectual aristocracy, and we never again in his lifetime, that he has achieved something that will en-

should not hide this from ourselves. To be sure, it is true that to present dure. A really definitive and good accomplishment is today always a.

scientific problems in such a manner that an untutored but receptive specialized acco mplishmen t. And whoever lacks the capacity to put on
—
mind can understand them and what for us is alone decisive can come — blinders, so to speak, and to come up to the idea that the fate of his)

to think about them independently is perhaps the most difficult peda- "soul depends upon whether or not he makes the correct conjecture"'at
gogical task of all. But whether this task is or is not realized is not de- this passage of this manuscript may as well stay away from science. He
cided by enrollment figures. And —to return to our theme — this very art will never have what one may call the 'personal experience' of science.

is a personal gift and by no means coincides with the scientific qualifica- Without this strange intoxicatio)i, ridiculed by every outsider; without
tions of the scholar. this passion, this 'thousands of years must pass before you enter into life

In contrast to France, Germany has no corporate body of 'immortals' and thousands more wait in silence' —according to whether or not you
in science. According to German tradition, the universities shall do justice succeed in making this conjecture; without this, you have no calling for
to the demands both of research and of instruction. Whether the abilities science and you should do something else. For nothing is worthy of man
for both are found together in a man is a matter of absolute chance. as man unless he can pursue it with passionate devotion.
Hence academic life is a mad hazard. If the young scholar asks for my Yet it is a fact that no amount of such enthusiasm, however sincere

advice with regard to habihtation, the responsibiHty of encouraging him and profound it may be, can compel a problem to yield scientific results.

can hardly be borne. If he is a Jew, of course one says lasciate ogni Certainly enthusiasm is a prerequisite of the 'inspiration' which is de-

speranza. But o'le must ask every other man: Do you in all conscience cisive. Nowadays in circles of youth there is a widespread notion that

believe that ^ou can stand seeing mediocrity after mediocrity, year after science has become a problem in calculation , fabricated in laboratories or

year, climb beyond you, without becoming embittered and without com- statistical filing sy stems just as 'in a fac tory,' a calculation involving

ing to grief? Naturally, one always receives the answer: 'Of course, I live only the cool ilntellect and not one's 'heart and soul.' First of all one must
only for my "calling." ' Yet, I have found that only a few men could say that such comments lack all clarity about what goes on in a factory

endure this situation without coming to grief. or in a laboratory. In both some idea has to occur to someone's mind ,

This much I deem necessary to say about the external conditions of the and it has to be a corr ect idea, if one is to accompl ish anything worth-
academic man's vocation. But I believe that actually you wish to~hear \^,~^
while. An3 such Intuition cannot be forced. It has nothing to do with

of something else, namely, of the inward calling for science. In our^tim^ any cold calculation. Certainly calculation is also an indispensable prereq-
the internal situation, in contrast to the org aniz ation of_sciejiC£_as_a uisite. No sociologist, for instance, should think himself too good, even
vocation, is first of all conditioned by the facts that science has entered in his old age, to make tens of thousands of quite trivial computations

a phase of specialization previously unknown and that this wfH-fDrever in his head and perhaps for months at a time. One cannot with impunity
remain the case. Not only externally, but inwardly, matters stand at a try to transfer this task entirely to mechanical assistants if one wishes
point where the individual can acquire the sure consciousness of achiev- to figure something, even though the final result is often small indeed.

ing something truly perfect in the field of science only in case he is a But if no 'idea' Occurs to his mind about the direction of his computations

strict specialist. and, during his computations, about the bearing of the emergent single
All work that overlaps neighboring fields, such as we occasionally results, then even this small result will not be yielded.
undertake and which the sociologists must necessarily undertake again Normally such an 'idea' is prepared only on the soil of very hard

and again, is burdened with the resigned realization that at best one work, but certainly this is not always the case. Scientifically, a dilet-

provides the specialist with useful questions upon which he would not tante's idea may have the very same or even a greater bearing for
 —
SCIENCE AS A VOCATION 137
136 SCIENCE AND POLITICS
become popular, especially among youth, and has put them in the serv-
science than that o£ a specialist. Many of our very best hypotheses and
ice of idols whose cult today occupies a broad place on all street corners
insights are due precisely to dilettantes. The dilettante differs from the
and in all periodicals. Tliese^dols^rejpersonality^
expert, as Helmholtz has said of Robert Mayer, only in that he lacks a
rience.' Both are intimately connected, the notion prevails that the
firm and reliable work procedure. Consequently he is usually not in the
latter constitutes the former and belongs to it. People belabor themselves
position to control, to estimate, or to exploit the idea in bearings. The
idea is not a substitute for work; and work, in turn, cannot substitute
its
in trying to 'experience' life —for that befits a personality, conscious of

its rank and station. And if we do not succeed in 'experiencing' life, we

for or compel an idea, just as little as enthusiasm can. Both, enthusiasm
must at least pretend to have this gift of grace. Formerly we called this
and work, and above all both of them jointly, can entice the idea.
'experience,' in plain German, 'sensation'; and I believe that we then
Ideas occur to us when they please, not when it pleases us. The best
had a more adequate idea of what personality is and what it signifies.
ideas do indeed occur to one's mind in the way in which Ihering de-
Ladies and gentlemen. In the field of science only he who is devoted
scribes it: when smoking a cigar on the sofa; or as Helmholtz states of
solely to the work at_hand has 'personality.' And this holds not only
himself with scientific exactitude: when taking a walk on a slowly
for the field of science; we know of no great artist who has ever done
ascending street; or in a similar way. In any case, ideas come when we
anything but serve his work and only his work. As far as his art is
do not expect them, and not when we are brooding and searching at our
concerned, even with a personality of Goethe's rank, it has been detri-
desks. Yet ideas would certainly not come to mind had we not brooded at
mental to take the liberty of trying to make his 'life' into a work of art.
our desks and searched for answers with passionate devotion.
And even if one doubts this, one has to be a Goethe in order to dare
However this may be, the scientjfic^ worker has_to_jtak e into Jiis
permit oneself such liberty. Everybody will admit at least this much:
bargain the risk that enters into all scientific _work : Does an 'idea'
that even with a man like Goethe, who appears once in a thousand years,
occur or does it not ? He may be an excellent worker and yet never have
this liberty did not go unpaid for. In politics matters are not different,
had any valuable idea of his own. It is a grave error to believe that this
butwe shall not discuss that today. In the field of science, however, the
is so only in science, and that things for instance in a business office are
man who makes himself the impresario of the subject to which he
different from a laboratory. A merchant or a big industrialist without
should be devoted, and steps upon the stage and seeks to legitimate him-
'business imagination/ that is, without ideas or ideal intuitions, will for
self through 'experience,' asking: How can I prove that I am something
man who would
.

all his life remain a better have remained a clerk or a

other than a mere 'specialist' and how can I manage to say something o/'
technical He will never be truly creative in organization. Inspira-
official.

tion in the field of science by no means plays any greater role, as academic
in form or in content that nobody else has ever said? —such a man is no
'personality.' Today such conduct is a crowd phenomenon, and it al-
conceit fancies, than it does in the field of mastering problems of practi-
ways makes a petty impression and debases the one who is thus con-
cal life by a modern entrepreneur. On the other hand, and this also
cerned. Instead of this, a n inner devotion to the ta sk, and that alone,
is often misconstrued, in spiration playj no less a role in scie nce than it
should lift the scient ist to the height and dignity of th e subject he pre-
does in the realm of art. It is a childish notion to think th at a mathe-
tends to serve. And i n_ this it is not different with the artist. .
matician attains any scientifically valuable results by sitting at his desk
In contrast with these preconditions which scientific work shares with '~-^
with a ruler, calculating machines or other mechanical means. The
art, science has a fate that profoundly distinguishes" it from artistic work.
mathematkal imagination of a Weierstrass is naturally quite differently
Scientific work is chain ed to the course ot progres s; whereas in the realm
oriented in meaning and result than is the imagination of an artist, and
of art there is no progress in the same sense. It is not true that the
differs basically in quality. But the psychological processes do not differ.
work of art of a period that has worked out new technical means, or,
Both are frenzy (in the sense of Plato's 'mania') and 'inspiration.'
for instance, the laws of perspective, stands therefore artistically higher
Now, whether we have scientific inspiration depends upon destinies
than a work of art devoid of all knowledge of those means and laws
that are hidden from us, and besides upon 'gifts.' Last but not least,
if its form does justice to the material, that is, if its object has been
because of this indubitable truth, a very understandable attitude has
 SCIENCE AS A VOCATION I39
1^8 SCIENCE AND POLITICS
tremely negative way. Let us first clarify what this intellectuaUst ration-
chosen and formed so that it could be artistically mastered without
ahzation, created by science and by oriented technology,
applying those conditions and means. A work of art which is genuine
scientifically

means practically.
'fulfilment' is never surpassed; it will never be antiquated. Individuals
works of but
Does it mean that we, today, for instance, everyone sitting in this hall,
may differ in appreciating the personal significance of art,
have a^reater Jyig wle^ge of the con ditions of life under which we exist
no one will ever be able to say of such a work that it is 'outstripped by
than has an American Indian or a Hottentot? Hardly. Unless he is a
another work which is also 'fulfilment.'
physicist, one who rides on the streetcar has no idea how the car happened
In science, each of us knows that vvhat he has accomplished^will b e
That the fate to which science
to get into motion. And he does not need to know. He is satisfied that he
antiquated in ten, twenty, fifty years. is

which
may 'count' on the behavior of the streetcar, and he orients his conduct
is subjected; it is the very jneaning of scientific work, to it is de-
according to this expectation; but he knows nothing about what it takes
voted in a quite specific sense, as compared with other spheres of cul-
to produce such a car so that it The savage knows incom-
can move.
ture for which in general the same holds. Every scientific 'fulfilment'

Whoever
parably more about his tools. When we spend money today I Let that
raises new 'questions'; it as{s to be 'surpassed' and^outdated
even if there are colleagues of political economy here in the hall, almost
wishes to serve science has to resign himself to this fact. Scientific works
every one of them will hold a different answer in readiness to the ques-
certainly can last as 'gratifications' because of their artistic quality, or they

may remain important as a means of training. Yet they will be surpassed

tion: How does it happen that one can buy something for money —some-
more and sometimes The
knows what he does
savage in order
scientifically — let that be repeated —for it is our common fate and, more,
times less?

to get his daily food and which institutions serve him in this pursuit.
our common goal. We cannot work without hoping that others will ad-
The increasing^ intellectualization an d rationalization do 7iot, therefore, j.
vance further than we have. In principle, this progress goes on ad
/^ indicate an increased and general knowledge of the cond itions under 'V^
infinitum. And with this we come to inquire into the meaning o f
/l
which one lives.
science. For, after allTlt^Ts noF self-evident that something subordinate
It means somethi ng else, namely, the kn owledge or belief that if one
to such a law is sensible and meaningful in itself. Why does one engage
|

means
'

but wished one could learn it at any time. Hence, it that prin-
in doing something that in reality never comes, and never can come,
cipally there are no mysterious incalculable forces that come into play, :

to an end?
but rather that one can, in principle, master all things by calculation, i

\lp One does it, first, for purely practical, in the broader sense of the
This means that the world is disenchanted. One need no longer have
word, for technical, purposes: in order to be able to orient our practical
recourse to magical means in order to master or implore the spirits, as did
activities to the expectations that scientific experience places at our dis-
the savage, for whom such mysterious powers existed. Technical means
posal. Good. Yet this has meaning only to practitioners. Whatjsjhe^atti-
and perform the This above what
tude of the academic man towaj;ds his vocation —that is, if he is at all in
calculations service. all is intellectuali- L,
zation means.
quest of such a personal attitude? He maintains that he engages in
Now, this process of disenchantment, which has continued to exist in
'science for science's sake' and not merely because others, by exploiting
Occidental culture for millennia, and, in general, this 'progress,' to which
science, bring about commercial or technical success and can better feed,
science belongs as a link and motive force, do they have any meanings
dress, illuminate, and govern. But what does he who allows himself to be
that go beyond the purely practical and technical? You will find this
integrated into this specialized organization, running on ad infinitum,
question raised in the most principled form in the works of Leo Tolstoi.
hope to accomplish that is significant in these productions that are al-
He came to raise the question in a peculiar way. All his broodings in-
ways destined to be outdated? This question requires a few general
creasingly revolved around the problem of whether or not death is a
considerations.
meaningful phenomenon. And his answer was: for civilized man death
Scientific progress is a fraction, the most important fractio n, of the
has no meaning. It has none because the individual Hfe of civilized man,
process of intel^tualization which we haveT)een undergoing for thou-
placed into an infinite 'progress,' according to its own imminent mean-
sands of years and which nowadays is usually judged in such an ex-
140 SCIENCE AND POLITICS SCIENCE AS A VOCATION ° I41

ing should never come to an end; for there is always a further step ahead tute an unreal realm of artificial abstractions, which with their bony
of one who stands in the march of progress. And no man who comes hands seek to grasp the blood-and-the-sap of true life without ever catch-
to die stands upon the peak which lies in infinity. Abraham, or some ing up with it. But here in life, in what for Plato was the play of
peasant of the past, died 'old and satiated with life' because he stood shadows on the walls of the cave, genuine reality is pulsating; and the
in the organic cycle of life; because his life, in terms of its meaning and rest are derivatives of life, lifeless ghosts, and nothing else. How did this
on the eve of his days, had given to him what life had to offer; because change come about?
for him there remained no puzzles he might wish to solve; and there- Plato's passionate enthusiasm in The Republic must, in the last analy-

fore he could have had 'enough' of life. Whereas civilized man, placed sis, be explained by the fact that for the first time the concept, one of the
in the midst of the continuous enrichment of culture by ideas, knowl- great tools of all scientific knowledge, had been consciously discovered.
edge, and problems, may become 'tired of life' but not 'satiated with life.' Socrates had discovered it in its bearing. He was not the only man
He catches only the most minute part of what the life of the spirit brings in the world to discover it. In India one finds the beginnings of a logic

forth ever anew, and what he seizes is always something provisional that is quite similar to that of Aristotle's. But nowhere else do we find
and not definitive, and therefore death for him is a meaningless occur- this realization of the significance of the concep t. In Greece, for the first

rence. And because death is meaningless, civilized life as such is mean- time, appeared handy means by which one could put the logical
a

ingless; by its very 'progressiveness' it gives death the imprint of mean- screws upon somebody so that he could not come out without admitting
inglessness. Throughout his late novels one meets with this thought as either that he knew nothing or that this and nothing else was truth, the

the keynote of the Tolstoyan art. eternal truth that never would vanish as the doings of the blind men
What stand should one take? Has 'progress' as s uch a recognizable vanish. That was the tremendous experience which dawned upon the
meaning that goes beyond" tEF technical, so that tO-serve it is a meaning- disciples of Socrates. And from this it seemed to follow that if one only

ful vocation? The question must be raised. But this is no longer merely found the right concept of the beautiful, the goo'd, or, foFlnstance, of

the question of man's calUng for science, hence, the problem of what bravery, o f~tKe soul —or wh atever — that then one could also grasp its

science as a vocation means to its devoted disciples. To raise this question true being. Andjhis, j n turn, seenie d_to open the way for knowing and
is to ask for the vocation of science within the totaj life q£. humanity. for teaching: how_to act rightly in life an d, above all, how to act as a

What is the value of science? citizen of the state; for this question was everything to the Hellenic man,
Here the contrast between the past and the present is tremendous. whose thinking was political throu ghou t. And for these reasons one
You will recall the wonderful image at the beginning of the seventh engaged in science.

book of Plato's Republic: those enchained cavemen whose faces are The second great tool o f scientific work, t he rational experiment, made
turned toward the stone wall before them. Behind them lies the source its appearance at the side of this discovery of the Hellenic spirit during
of the light which they cannot see. They are concerned only with the the Renaissance period. The experiment is a means of reliably controlling

shadowy images that this light throws upon the wall, and they seek experience. With out it, prese nt-day empirical science would be impos-
to fathom their interrelations. Finally one of them succeeds in shattering sible. There were experiments earlier; for instance, in India physiological

his fetters, turns around, and sees the sun. Blinded, he gropes about and experiments were made in the service of ascetic yoga technique; in
stammers of what he saw. The others say he is raving. But gradually he Hellenic antiquity, mathematical experiments were made for purposes of
learns to behold the light, and then his task is to descend to the cavemen war technology; and in the Middle Ages, for purposes of mining. But
and to lead them to the light. He is the philosopher; the sun, however, to raise t he experiment p to a was the achievement
rinciple of research
is the truth of science, which alone seizes not upon iHusions and shadows o£_the_JE£iiaissance. They were the great innovators in art, who were
but upon the true being. the pioneers of experiment. Leonardo and his like and, above all, the
Well, who today views science in such a manner? Today youth sixteenth-century experimenters in music with their experimental pianos
feels rather the reverse: the intellectual constructions of science consti- were characteristic. From these circles the experiment entered science,
 — '

SCIENCE AS A VOCATION I43

142 • SCIENCE AND POLITICS
similar in meaning, is one of the fundamental watchwords one hears
especially through Galileo, and it entered theory through Bacon; and
then it was taken over by the various exact disciplines of the continental
among German youth, whose feelings are attuned to religion or who
and then those of the Netherlands. crave religious experiences. They crave not only religious experience
universities, first of all those of Italy
mean men who but experience as such. The only thing that is strange is the method
What did science to these stood at the threshold
modern times? To artistic experimenters of the type of Leonardo
that is now followed: the spheres of the irrational, the only spheres that
of
and the musical innovators, science meant the path to ^ue art, a nd
intellectualism has not yet touched, are now raised into consciousness
and put under its lens. For in practice this is where the modern intel-
that meant for them the path to true nature. Art was to be raised to the
lectualist form of romantic irrationalism leads. This method of emanci-
rank of a science, and this meant at the same time and above all to raise

the artist to the rank of the doctor, socially and with reference to~tKe pation from intellectualism may well bring about the very opposite of
what those who take to it conceive as its goal.
meaning of his life. This is the ambition on which, for instance, Leo-

was based. And today ? way After Nietzsche's devastating criticism of those 'last men' who 'in-
nardo's sketch book 'Science as the to nature'

would sound like blasphemy to youth. Today, youth proclaims the oppo-
vented happiness,' I may leave aside altogeth er the naive optimism in

site: redemption from the intellectualism of science in order to return

which science —that isTlHF technique of mastering life which rests upon

to one's own nature and therewith to nature in general. Science as a way science— has been celebrated as the way to happiness. Who believes in

this? —aside from a few big children in university chairs or editorial

to art? Here no criticism is even needed.
offices. Let us resume our argument.
But during the period of the rise of the exact .sciences one^ejcpected
a great deal more. If you recall Swammerdam's statement, 'Here I bring
Under these internal presupposition s, what is th£ meamng of science

you the proof of God's providence in the anatomy of a louse,' you will
as a^yo^tion, now after all these former illusions, the 'way to true be-
ing,' the 'way to true art,' the 'way to true nature,' the 'way to true God,'
see what the scientific wo rker, influenced (indirectly) by^JProtestantism
the 'way to true happiness,' have been dispelled? Tolstoi has given the
and Puritanism, conceived to be his task: to show the path to^God.
simplest answer, with the words: 'Science is meaningless because it gives
People no longer found this path among the philosophers, with their
concepts and deductions. All pietist theology of the time, above all
no answer to our question, the only question important for us: "What
Spener, knew that God was not to be found along the road by which the
shall we do and how shall we live?"' That science does not give an

Middle Ages had sought him. God is hidden, His ways are not our
answer to this is indisputable. The on ly question that remains is the
sense_in which science gives 'no' answe r, and whether or not science
ways. His thoughts are not our thoughts. In the exact sciences, however,
where one could physically grasp His works, one hoped to come upon might jet be of som e use to the one w ho puts the question correctly.

what He planned for the world. And today? Who-^aside

Today one usuall y speaks of science as 'free from presuppositions.'
the traces of
Is there such a thing? It depends upon what one understands thereby.
from certain big children who are indeed found in the natural sciences

still believes that the findings of astronomy, biology, physics, or chemis-

All scientific work presupposes that the rules of logic and method are
valid; these are the general foundations of our orientation in the world;
try could teach us anything about the meaning of the world? If there is
and, at least for our special question, these presuppositions are the least
any such 'meaning,' along what road could one come upon its tracks?
problematic aspect of science. Science further presupposes that what
If these natural sciences lead to anything in this way, they are apt to
make the belief that there is such a thing as the 'meaning' of the uni-
is yielded by scientific work is important in the sense that it ~is 'wor th
being known.' In this, obviously, are contained all our problems. For
verse die out at its very roots.
this^presupposition cannot be proved by scientific means. It can only
And finally, science as a way 'to God'? Science, this specifically irreli-
gious power? That science today is irreligious no one will doubt in his be interpreted with reference to its ultimate meaning, which we must
innermost being, even if he will not admit it to himself. Redemption reject or accept~ac cordIng to our ultirnate position towards life. ^

from the rationalism and intellectualism of science is the fundamental Furthermore, the nature of the relationship of scientific work and its

presupposition of living in union with the divine. This, or something presuppositions varies widely according to their structure. The natural
 SCIENCE AS A VOCATION I45
144 SCIENCE AND POLITICS
It can only state: If one wishes this result, according to the norms of our
sciences, for instance, physics, chemistry, and astronomy, presuppose
legal thought, this legal rule the appropriate means of attaining
as self-evident that it is worth while to know the ultimate laws o T cosmic is it.

events as far as science can construe them. This is the case not only
Consider the jiistorical and cultural sciences. T hey teach us h ow to
understand and interpret polTdan^irrTTstrcTTiterary, and social phenomena
because with such knowledge one can attain technical results but for
in terms of their origins. But they give us no answer to the question,
its own sake, if the quest for such knowledge is to be a 'vocation.' Yet
whether the existence of these cultural phenomena have been and are
this presupposition can by no means be proved. And still less can it be
worth while. And they do not answer the further question, whether it is
provedHthat^the existence of The world which these sciences describe is

has any 'meaning,' or that makes sense to Uve

worth the effort required to know them. They presuppose that there is
worth while, that it it
an interest in partaking, through this procedure, of the community of
in such a world. Science does not ask for the answers to such questions.
'civilized men.' But they cannot prove 'scientifically' that this is the case;
Consider modern medicine, a practical technology which is highly de-
and that they presuppose this interest by no means proves that it goes
veloped scientifically. The general 'presuppositi on' of the medical enter-
without saying. In fact it is not at all self-evident.
prise is stated trivially in the assertion that medical science has the task of
Finally, let us consider the disciplines close to me: sociology, historyj^
maintaining life as such and of diminishing suffering as such to the
economics, political science, and those types of cultural philosophy that^
greatest possible degree. Yet this is problematical. By his means the medP
make it their task to interpret these sciences. It is said, and I agree, that
cal man preserves the life of the mortally ill man, even if the patient
politics out of place in the lecture-room. does not belong there
implores us to relieve him of life, even if his relatives, to whom his life
is It

is worthless and to whom the costs of maintaining his worthless life

on the part of the students. If, for instance, in the lecture-room of my
former colleague Dietrich Schiifer in Berlin, pacifist students were to
grow unbearable, grant his redemption from suffering. Perhaps a poor
lunatic is involved, whose relatives, whether they admit it or not, wish
surround his desk and make an uproar, I should deplore it just as much
as I should deplore the uproar which anti-pacifist students are said to
and must wish for his death. Yet the presuppositions of medicine, and
have made against Professor Forster, whose views in many ways are
the penal code, prevent the physician from relinquishing his therapeutic
efforts. Whether life is worth while li ving a nd when — this guestjon i£ as remote as could be from mine. Neither does politics, however, belong
in the lecture-room on the part of the docents, and when the docent is
not asked by medicine. Natural science gives us an answer to the ques-
we wish scientifically concerned with politics, it belongs there least of all.
tion of what we must do if to master life technically. It leaves

quite aside, or assumes for its purposes, whether we should and do wish To take a practical political stand is one thing, and to analyze political

to master life technically and whether it ultimately makes sense to do so. structures and party positions is another. When speaking in a political

Consider a discipline such as aesthetics. The fact that there are works meeting about democracy, one does not hide one's personal standpoint;

of art is given for aesthetics. It seeks to find out under what conditions indeed, to come out clearly and take a stand is one's damned duty. The
this fact exists, but it does not raise the question whether or not the words one uses in such a m^e^eting are not means of scientific analysis but

realm of art is perhaps a realm of diabolical grandeur, a realm of this means of canvassing votes and winning over others. They are not plow-

God innermost and shares to loosen the soil of contemplative thought; they are swords
world, and therefore, in its core, hostile to and, in its

aristocratic spirit, hostile to the brotherhood of man. Hence3__aesthetks against the enemies: such words are weapons. It would be an outrage,

does not ask whether there should be works of jrt. however, to use words in this fashion in a lecture or in the lecture-room.

Consider jiirisprudence. It establishes what is valid according to the If, for instance, 'democracy' is under discussion, one considers its various

rules of juristic thought, which is partly bound by logically compelling forms, analyzes them in the way they function, determines what results

and partly by conventionally given schemata. Juridical thought holds for the conditions of life the one form has as compared with the other.

when certain legal rules and certain methods of interpretations are recog- Then one confronts the forms of democracy with non-democratic forms

nized as binding. Whether there should be law and vyhether one should of political order and endeavors to come to a position where the student

establish just these rules — such questions jurisprudence does not answer. may find the point from which, in terms of his ultimate ideals, he can
 '

SCIENCE AND POLITICS SCIENCE AS A VOCATION I47

146

take a stand. But the true teacher will beware of imposing from the plat-
This is out of the question. And yet the academic teacher must desire

form any political position upon the student, whether it is expressed

and must demand of himself to serve the one as well as the other by his

or suggested. 'To let the facts speak for themselves' is the mostunfair
knowledge and methods. Now you will rightly say that the devout
Catholic will never accept the view of the factors operative in bringing
way of putting over a political position to the student.
Why should we abstain from doing this? I state in advance that some about Christianity which a teacher who is free of his dogmatic presup-

highly esteemed colleagues are of the opinion that it is not possible to positions presents to him. Certainly! The difference, however, lies in the

were following: Science 'free from presuppositions,' in the sense of a rejection

carry through this self-restraint and that, even if it possible, it

would be a whim to avoid declaring oneself. Now one cannot demon- of religious bonds, does not know of the 'miracle' and the 'revelation.'

strate scientifically what the duty of an academic teacher is. One can If it did, science would be unfaithful to its own 'presuppositions.' The
only demand of the teacher that he have the intellectual integrity to see
believer knows both, miracle and revelation. And science -^free from^
that it is one thing to state facts, to determine mathematical or logical presuppositions' expects from him no less —and no more —than acknowl-

relations or the internal structure of cultural values, while it is another edgment that // the process can be explained without those supernatural

thing to answer questions of the value of culture and its individual con-
interventions, wliich an empirical explanation has to eliminate as causal

tents and the question of how one should act in the cultural community factors, the process has to be explained the way science attempts to do.

and in political associations. These are quite heterogeneous problems. If

And the believer can do this without being disloyal to his faith.

he asks further why he should not deal with both types of problems in But has the contribution of science no meaning at all for a man who
the lecture-room, the answer is: because th e prophe t and th e demago gue does not care to know facts as such and to whom only the practical
standpoint matters? Perhaps science nevertheless contributes something.
do not belong on the academic platform.
The__primary task of a useful teac her tojeach his students jtoj-ecog-
To the prophet and tlie demagogue, it is said: 'Go your ways out into is

the streets and speak openly to the world,' that is, speak where criticism
nize 'inconvenient' facts — I mean fac ts that are inconvenient for their

is possible. In the lecture -room we stand opposite our audience, and it

party opinions. And for every party opinion there are facts that are

has to remain silent. I deem it irresponsible to exploit the circumstance

extremely inconvenient, for my own opinion no less than for others. I

that for the sake of their career the students have to attend a teacher's believe the teacher accomplishes more than a mere intellectual task if he

course while there is nobody present to oppose him with criticism. The compels his audience to accustom itself to the existence of such facts. I

task of the teacher is to serve the students with his knowledge and scien-
would be so immodest as even to apply the expression 'moral achieve-

tific experience and not to imprint upon them his personal political
ment,' though perhaps this may sound too grandiose for something

views. It is certainly possible that the individual teacher will not entirely
that should go without saying.

succeed in eliminating his personal sympathies. He is then exposed to the Th us far I have spoken only of practical reasons for avoiding the im-
position of a personal poi nt of vi ew. But these are not the only reasons.
sharpest criticism in the forum of his own conscience. And this deficiency

does not prove anything; other errors are also possible, for instance,
The impossibility of 'scientifically' pleading for practical and interested

erroneous statements of fact, and yet they prove nothing against the duty
—except
stands in discussing the means for a firmly given and presup-
of searching for the truth. I also reject this in the very interest of science.
posed end — rests upon reasons that lie far deeper.
'Scientific' pleading js meaningless in principle because the various',
Iam ready to prove from the works of our historians that whenever the
man of science introduces his personal value judgment, a full under-
value spheres of the world stand in irreconcilable conflict with each

standing of the facts ceases. But this goes beyond tonight's topic and other.TTie elder Mill, whose philosophy I will not praise otherwise, was

would require lengthy elucidation. on this point right when he said: If one proceeds from pure experience,

I ask only: How should a devout Catholic, on the one hand, and a one arrives at polytheism. This is shallow in formulation and sounds

Freemason, on the other, in a course on the forms of church and state

paradoxical, and yet there is truth in it. If anything, we realize again

or on religious history ever be brought to evaluate these subjects alike? today that something can be sacred not only in spite of its not being
 —
SCIENCE AND POLITICS SCIENCE AS A VOCATION I49
148

beautiful, but rather because and in so far as it is not beautiful. You in favor of the 'one thing that is needful.' Faced with the realities of

will find this documented in the fifty-third chapter of the book of Isaiah
outer and inner life, Christianity has deemed it necessary to make those

and in the twenty-first Psalm. And, since Nietzsche, we realize that

compromises and relative judgments, which we all know from its his-

tory. Today the routines of everyday life challenge religion. Many old
something can be beautiful, not only in spite of the aspect in which it is

You will find this expressed gods ascend from their graves; they are disenchanted and hence take
not good, but rather in that very aspect.
earlier in the Fl.eurs du mal, named his volume of poems.
as Baudelaire the form of impersonal forces. They strive to gain power over our lives

It is commonplace to observe that something may be true altho ugh and again they resume their eternal struggle with one another. What is

is not beautiful and not holy and not good. Indeed it may be true hard for modern man, and especially for the younger generation, is to
it

in precisely those aspects. But all these are only the most elementary measure up to workaday existence. The ubiquitous chase for 'experience'

cases of the struggle that the gods of the various orders and values are stems from this weakness; for it is weakness not to be able to countenance

know how one might

do not wish the stern seriousness of our fateful times.
engaged in. I to decide 'scientifically'

the value of French and German culture; for here, too, different gods Our civilization destines us to realize more clearly these struggles

struggle with one another, now and for all times to come. %/ /
again, after our eyes have been blinded for a thousand years —^blinded by
We live as when their world was not yet disenchanted
did the ancients the allegedly or presumably exclusive orientation towards the grandiose

of its gods and demons, only we live in a different sense. As Hellenic moral fervor of Christian ethics. — '
/

man at times sacrificed to Aphrodite and at other times to Apollo, and, But enough of these questions which lead far away. Those of our

above all, as everybody sacrificed to the gods of his city, so do we still

youth are in error who react to all this by saying, 'Yes, but we happen ,

nowadays, only the bearing of man has been disenchanted and denuded to come to lectures in order to experience something more than mere

of its mystical but inwardly genuine plasticity. Fate, and certainly not
analyses and statements of fact.' The error is that they seek in the pro- ^^A

'science,' holds sway over these gods and their struggles. One can on|y fessor something different from what stands before them. iThey crave a ,•

understand what the godhead is for the one order or for the ot^er, or leader and not a teacher. But we are placed upon the platform solely ,as_.,.^^-s^/

better, what godhead is in the one or in the other order. With_this teachers. And these are two different things, as one can readily see. Permit

understanding, however, the matter has reached its limit so far as it can me to take you once more to America, because there one can often ob-
serve such matters in their most massive and original shape.
be discussed in a lecture-room and by a professprj Yet the great and vital

problem that is contained therein is, of course, very far from being con- The American boy learns unspeakably less than the German boy.
In spite of an incredible number of examinations, his school life has not
cluded. But forces other than university chairs have their say in this
matter.
had the significance of turning him into an absolute creature of ex-
aminations, such as the German. For in America, bureaucracy, which
What man will take upon himself the attempt to 'refute scientifically'
presupposes the cxaminati eai, diploma as a ticket of admission to the
the ethic of the Sermon on the Mount? For instance, the sentence, 'resist
no evil,' or the image of turning the other cheek? And yet it is clear,
realm of office prebends, is only in its beginnings. The young American
has no respect for anything or anybody, for tradition or for public office
in mundane perspective, that this is an ethic of undignified conduct; one
has to choose between the religious dignity which this ethic confers and
unless it is for the personal achievement of individual men. This is what
the dignity of manly conduct which preaches something quite different;
the American calls 'democracy.' This is the meaning of democracy, how-
its intent may in reality
'resist evil — lest you be co-responsible for an overpowering evil.' Ac- ever distorted be, and this intent is what
cording to our ultimate standpoint, the one is the devil and the other matters here. The American's conception of the teacher who faces him
the God, and the individual has to decide which is God for him and is: he sells me his knowledge and his methods for my father's money,

which is the devil. And so it goes throughout all the orders of life.
just as the greengrocer sells my mother cabbage. And that is all. To be

The sure, if the teacher happens to be a football coach, then, in this field, he is
grandiose rationalism of an ethical and methodical conduct of life

which flows from every religious prophecy has dethroned this polytheism a leader. But if he is not this (or something similar in a different field
 SCIENCE AS A VOCATION I5I
150 SCIENCE AND POLITICS
haps you will say: well, that is no vegetable, but it amounts to no more
of sports), he is simply a teacher and nothing more. And no young
than the means for procuring vegetables. Well and good, let us leave it
American would think of having the teacher sell him a Weltanschauung
at that for today.
or a code of conduct. Now, when formulated in this manner, we should
Fortunately, however, the contribution of science does not reach its
But the question whether there
reject this.

contained in this feeling, which

is

I
is not a grain of
have deliberately stated in extreme
salt
limit with this. We are in a position to help you to a third objective:
to gain clarity. Of course, it is presupposed that we ourselves possess
with some exaggeration.
clarity. As far as~~this is the case, we can make clear to you the
Fellow students! You come to our lectures and demand from us the
following:
qualities of leadership, and you fail to realize in advance that of a
In practice, you can take this or that position when concerned with a
M hundred professors at least ninety-nine do not and must not claim to
be football masters in the vital problems of life, or even to be 'leaders'
problem of value —for simplicity's sake, please think of social phenomena
I
as examples. // you take such and such a stand, then, according to scien-
in matters of conduct. Please, consider that a man's value does not de-
tific experience, you have to use such and such a means in order to
pend on whether or not he has leadership qualities. And in any case, the
carry out your conviction practically. Now, these means are perhaps
qualities that make a man an excellent scholar and academic teacher
such that you believe you must reject them. Then you simply must
are not the qualities that make him a leader to give directions in prac-
choose between the end and the inevitable means. Does the end 'justify'
tical life or, more specifically, in politics. It is pure accident if a
the means? Or does it not? The teacher can confront you with the
teacher also possesses this quality, and it is a critical situation if every
necessity of this choice. He cannot do more, so long as he wishes to re-
teacher on the platform feels himself confronted with the students' ex-
main a teacher and not to become a demagogue. He can, of course,
pectation that the teacher should claim this quality. It is still more critical
also tell you that if you want such and such an end, then you must take
if it is left to every academic teacher to set himself up as a leader in the
into the bargain the subsidiary consequences which according to all
lecture-room. For those who most frequently think of themselves as
experience will occur. Again we find ourselves in the same situation
leaders often qualify least as leaders. But irrespective of whether they are
as before. These are still problems that can also emerge for the
or are not, the platform situation simply offers no possibility of proving
technician, who in numerous instances has to make decisions according
themselves to be leaders. who feels called upon to act as a
The professor
to the principle of the lesser evil or of the relatively best. Only to him one
counselor of youth and enjoys their trust may prove himself a man in
thing, the main thing, is usually given, namely, the end. But as soon
personal human relations with them. And if he feels called upon to in-
as truly 'ultimate' problems are at stake for us this is not the case.
tervene in the struggles of world views and party opinions, he may do so
With this, at long last, we come to the final service that science as such
outside, in the market place, in the press, in meetings, in associations,
can render to the aim of clarity, and at the same time we come to the
wherever he wishes. But after all, it is somewhat too convenient to
limits of science.
demonstrate one's courage in taking a stand where the audience and
Besides we can and we should state: In terms of its meaning, such
possible opponents are condemned to silence.
and such a practical stand can be derived with inner consistency, and
Finally, you will put the question: 'If this is so, what then does
hence integrity , from this or that ultimate weltanschauliche position.
science actually and positively contribute to practical and personal "life".?'
Perhaps it can only be derived from one such fundamental position, or
Therewith we are back again at the problem of science as a 'vocation.'
maybe from several, but it cannot be derived from these or those other
First, o f cours e, science contributes_tojdhe_tech^
positions. Figuratively speaking, you serve this god and you offend the
life by calculating external objects_as .welLas man's activities. Well, you
other god when you decide to adhere to this position. And if you remain
will say, that, after all, amounts to no more than the greengrocer of the
faithful to yourself, you will necessarily come to certain final conclusions
American boy. I fully agree.
that subjectively make sense. This much, in principle at least, can be
Second, science can contribute something that the greengrocer can-
accomplished. Philosophy, as a special discipline, and the essentially
not: methods of thinking, the tools and the training for thought. Per-
 SCIENCE AND POLITICS SCIENCE AS A VOCATION I53
152

philosophical discussions of principles in the other sciences attempt to do, and, how shall we arrange our lives?' or, in the words used here

achieve this. Thus, if we are competent in our pursuit (which must be tonight: 'Which of the warring gods should we serve? Or should we
presupposed here) we can force the individual, or at least we can help serve perhaps an entirely different god, and who is he?' then one can

him, to give himself an account of the ultimate meaning of his own say that only a prophet or a savior can give the answers. If there is no

conduct. This appears to me as not so trifling a thing to do, even for such man, or if his message is no longer believed in, then you will cer-

one's own personal life. Again, I am tempted to say of a teacher who tainly not compel him to appear on this earth by having thousands of

he stands in the service of 'moral' forces; he the professors, as privileged hirelings of the state, attempt as petty prophets
succeeds in this: fulfils

and a sense of in their lecture-rooms to take over his role. All they will accomplish is
duty of bringing about self-clarification responsibility.

And I believe he will be the more able to accomplish this, the more to show that they are unaware of the decisive state of affairs: the prophet

conscientiously he avoids the desire personally to impose upon or sug- for whom so many of our younger generation yearn simply does not

gest to his audience his own stand. exist. But this knowledge in its forceful significance has never become
This proposition, which I present here, always takes its point of vital for them. The inward interest of a truly religiously 'musical' man
departure from the one fundamental fact, that so long as life remains can never be served by veiling to him and to others the fundamental

immanent and is interpreted in its own

knows only of an un-
terms, it
fact that he is destined to live in a godless and prophetless time by

ceasing struggle of these gods with one another. Or speaking directly, giving him the ersatz of armchair prophecy. The integrity of his re-

the ultimately possible attitudes toward Hfe are irreconcilable, and ligious organ, it seems to me, must rebel against this.

hence their struggle can never be brought to a final conclusion. Thus Now you will be inclined to say: Which stand does one take towards

is necessary to make a decisive choice. Whether, under such condi- the factual existence of 'theology' and its claims to be a 'science'? Let us
it

tions, science is a worth while Vocation' for somebody, and whether not flinch and evade the answer. To be sure, 'theology' and 'dogmas' do

science itself has an objectively valuable Vocation' are again value judg-
not exist universally, but neither do they exist for Christianity alone.

ments about which nothing can be said in the lecture-room. To affirm Rather (going backward in time), they exist in highly developed

the value of science is a presupposition for teaching there. I personally form also in Islam, in Manicheanism, in Gnosticism, in Orphism, in

by my very work answer in the affirmative, and I also do so from Parsism, in Buddhism, in the Hindu sects, in Taoism, and in the

precisely the standpoint that hates intellectualism as the worst devil, as Upanishads, and, of course, in Judaism. To be sure their systematic

youth does today, or usually only fancies it does. In that case the development varies greatly. It is no accident that Occidental Christianity

word holds for these youths: 'Mind you, the devil is old; grow old to —in contrast to the theological possessions of Jewry —has expanded and
understand him.' This does not mean age in the sense of the birth elaborated theology more systematically, or strives to do so. In the Occi-

certificate. It means that if one wishes to settle with this devil, one must dent the development of theology has had by far the greatest historical

not take to flight before him as so many like to do nowadays. First of significance. This is the product of the Hellenic spirit, and all theology

all, one has to see the devil's ways to the end in order to realize his power of the West goes back to it, as (obviously) all theology of the East goes

and his limitations. back to Indian thought. All theology represents an intellectual ration-

Science today is a 'vocation' organized in special disciphnes in the alization of the possession of sacred values. No s cience is jbsolutely free i^j

service of self-clarification and knowledge of interrelated facts. It is not from, presuppositions, and no science can prove its fundamental value
the gift of grace of seers and prophets dispensing sacred values and to the man who rej erts th ese pre?^ i
ip po^sitionsr~Every~tKeology', however,
revelations, nor does it partake of the contemplation of sages and phi- adds a few specific presuppositions for its work and thus for the justifica-

losophers about the meaning of the universe. This, to be sure, is the tion of its^eHstehce. Their meaning and scope vary. Every theology, in-

inescapable condition of our historical situation. We cannot evade it so cluding for instance Hinduist theology, presupposes that the world must

long as we remain true to ourselves. And if Tolstoi's question recurs to have a meaning, and the question is how to interpret this meaning so

you: as science does not, who is to answer the question: 'What shall we tjiat it is intellectually conceivable.
 SCIENCE AS A VOCATION
154 SCIENCE AND POLITICS 1 55

It is the same as with Kant's epistemology. He took for his point of

deception. It is, however, no humbug but rather something very sincere

departure the presupposition: 'Scientific truth exists and it is valid7

and genuine if some of the youth groups who during recent years have

and then asked: 'Under which presuppositions of thought is truTE^

quietly grown together give their human community the interpretation
of a reUgious, cosmic, or mystical relation, although occasionally perhaps
possible and meaningful?' The modern aestheticians (actually or ex-
pressly, as for instance, G. v. Lukacs) proceed from the presupposition such interpretation rests on misunderstanding of self. True as it is that

that 'works of art exist,' and then ask: 'How is their existence meaning-
every act of genuine brotherliness may be linked with the awareness
that it contributes something imperishable to a super-personal realm, it
ful and possible?'

As a rule, theologies, however, do not content themselves with this seems to me dubious whether the dignity of purely human and com-
(essentially religious and philosophical) presupposition. They regularly munal relations is enhanced by these religious interpretations. But that
is no longer our theme.
proceed from the further presupposition that certain 'revelations' are
facts relevant for salvation and as such make possible a meaningful
The fate of our times is characterized by rationalization and intel-
lectualiz ation and, above all^__bY^]^e~^disenchantmunr~6f the world.'
conduct of life. Hence, these revelations must be believed in. Moreover,
Precisely the ultimate and most sublime values have repeated" "fronT
theologies presuppose that certain subjective states and acts possess the
public life either into the transcendental realm of mystic life or into the
quality of holiness, that is, they constitute a way of Ufe, or at least ele-

ments of one, that is religiously meaningful. Then the question of the-

brotherliness of direct and personal human relations. It is not accidental
that our greatest art intimate and not monumental, nor accidental
ology is: How can these presuppositions, which must simply be accepted
is is it

be meaningfully interpreted in a view of the universe? For theology,

that today only within the smallest and intimate circles, in personal

these presuppositions as such lie beyond the limits of 'science.' They do human situations, in pianissimo, that something is pulsating that corre-

not represent 'knowledge,' in the usual sense, but rather a 'possession.'

sponds to the prophetic pneuma, which in former times swept through

Whoever does not 'possess' faith, or the other holy states, cannot have
the great communities like a firebrand, welding them together. If we
attempt to force and to 'invent' a monumental style in art, such miserable
theology as a substitute for them, least of all any other science. On the
contrary, in every 'positive' theology, the devout reaches the point where
monstrosities are produced as the many monuments of the last twenty
the Augustinian sentence holds : credo non quod, sed quia absurdum est.
years. If one tries intellectually to new religions without a new
construe

The capacity for the accomplishment of religious virtuosos —the 'intel-

and genuine prophecy, then, in an inner sense, something similar will

lectual sacrifice' — is the decisive characteristic of the positively religious

result, but with still worse effects. And academic prophecy, finally, will

man. That create only fanatical sects but never a genuine community.
this is so is shown by the fact that in spite (or rather in con-
sequence) of theology (which unveils it) the tension between the value-
To the person who cannot bear the fate of the times like a man, one

spheres of 'science' and the sphere of 'the holy' is unbridgeable. Legiti-

must say: may he rather return silently, without the usual publicity

mately, only the disciple offers the 'intellectual sacrifice' to the prophet,
build-up of renegades, but simply and plainly. The arms of the old
churches are opened widely and compassionately for him. After all, they
the believer to the church. Never as yet has a new prophecy emerged
(and I repeat here deliberately this image which has offended some) by do not make it hard for him. One way or another he has to bring his

way of the need of some modern intellectuals to furnish their souls with,
'intellectual sacrifice' —that is inevitable. If he can really do it, we shall

so to speak, guaranteed genuine antiques. In doing so, they not rebuke him. For such an intellectual sacrifice in favor of an uncon-
happen to
ditional religious devotion is ethically quite a different matter than the
remember that religion has belonged among such antiques, and of all

what they do not evasion of the plain duty of intellectual integrity, which sets in if one
things religion is possess. By way of substitute, however,
they play at decorating a sort of domestic chapel with small sacred images lacks the courage to clarify one's own ultimate standpoint and rather

from all over the world, or they produce surrogates through all sorts of
facilitates this duty by feeble relative judgments. In my eyes, such re-

psychic experiences to which they ascribe the dignity of mystic holiness,

ligious return stands higher than the academic prophecy, which does not

which they peddle clearly realize that in the lecture-rooms of the university no other virtue
in the book market. This is plain humbug or self-
156 SCIENCE AND POLITICS

holds but plain intellectual integrity. Integrity, however, compels us to

state that for the many who today tarry for new prophets and saviors,

the situation is the same as resounds in the beautiful Edomite watchman's

song of the period of exile that has been included among Isaiah's oracles:

He calleth to me out of Seir, Watchman, what of the night? The watch-

man said, The morning cometh, and also the night: if ye will enquire, en-
quire ye: return, come.

The people to whom this was said has enquired and tarried for more
than two millennia, and we are shaken when we realize its fate. From this

we want to draw the lesson that nothing is gained by yearning and

tarrying alone, and we shall act differently. We shall set to work and
meet the 'demands of the day,' in human relations as well as in our

vocation. This, however, is plain and simple, if each finds and obeys
the demon who holds the fibers of his very life.
 Max Horkheimer (1895-1973)
& Theodor W. Adorno (1903-1969)

14. Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, tr. by J.

Cumming, Herder and Herder, New York 1972, pp. xi-42.
 Michel Foucault (1926 – 1984)
Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish. The Birth of Prison, Pantheon Books,
New York 1977.

Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality. Vol. I: An Introduction, tr. by R.

Hurley, Pantheon Books, New York 1978.
 Jean-François Lyotard Introduction
(1924 – 1998)
10. Jean-François Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, tr. by
G. Bennington and B. Massumi, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis 1984, pp.
xxiii-xxv and 31-41.

The object of this study is the condition of knowledge in the most

highly developed societies. I have decided to use the wordpost-
modernto describe that condition. The word is in current use on the
American continent among sociologists and critics; it designates
the state of our culture foEowing the transformations which, since the
end of the nineteenth century, have altered the game rules for
science, literature, and the arts. The present study will place these
transformations in the context of the crisis of narratives.
Science has always been in conflict with narratives. Judged by the
yardstick of science, the majority of them prove to be fables. But to
the extent that science does not restrict itself to stating useful
regularities and seeks the truth, it is obliged to legitimate the rules of
its own game. It then produces a discourse of legitimation with
respect to its own status, a discourse called philosophy. I will use the
termmodernto designate any science that legitimates itself with
reference to a metadiscourse of this kind making an explicit appeal
to some grand narrative, such as the dialectics of Spirit, the her-
meneutics of meaning, the emancipation of the rational or working
subject, or the creation of wealth. For example, the rule of consensus
between the sender and addressee of a statement with truth-value is
deemed acceptable if it is cast in terms of a possible unanimity be-
tween rational minds: this is the Enlightenment narrative, in which

xxiii
 xxiv G INTRODUCTION
the hero of knowledge works toward a good ethico-political end —
universal peace. As can be seen from this example, if a metanarrative
implying a philosophy of history is used to legitimate knowledge,
questions are raised concerning the validity of the institutions govern-
ing the social bond: these must be legitimated as well. Thus justice is
consigned to the grand narrative in the same way as truth.
Simplifying to the extreme, I definepostmodernas incredulity
toward metanarratives. This incredulity is undoubtedly a product
of progress in the sciences: but that progress in turn presupposes it.
To the obsolescence of the metanarrative apparatus of legitimation
corresponds, most notably, the crisis of metaphysical philosophy
and of the university institution which in the past relied on it. The
narrative function is losing its functors, its great hero, its great
dangers, its great voyages, its great goal. It is being dispersed in
clouds of narrative language elements—narrative, but also denotative,
prescriptive, descriptive, and so on. Conveyed within each cloud are
pragmatic valencies specific to its kind. Each of us lives at the inter-
section of many of these. However, we do not necessarily establish
stable language combinations, and the properties of the ones we do
establish are not necessarily communicable.
Thus the society of the future falls less within the province of a
Newtonian anthropology (such as stucturalism or systems theory)
than a pragmatics of language particles. There are many different
language games—a heterogeneity of elements. They only give rise to
institutions in patches—local determinism.
The decision makers, however, attempt to manage these clouds of
sociality according to input/output matrices, following a logic which
implies that their elements are commensurable and that the whole is
determinable. They allocate our lives for the growth of power. In
matters of social justice and of scientific truth alike, the legitimation
of that power is based on its optimizing the system's performance —
efficiency. The application of this criterion to all of our games neces-
sarily entails a certain level of terror, whether soft or hard: be opera-
tional (that is, commensurable) or disappear.
The logic of maximum performance is no doubt inconsistent in
many ways, particularly with respect to contradiction in the socio-
economic field: it demands both less work (to lower production
costs) and more (to lessen the social burden of the idle population).
But our incredulity is now such that we no longer expect salvation to
rise from these inconsistencies, as did Marx.
Still, the postmodern condition is as much a stranger to disenchant-
ment as it is to the blind positivity of delegitimation. Where, after
INTRODUCTION D xxv
the metanarratives, can legitimacy reside? The operativity criterion
is technological; it has no relevance for judging what is true or just.
Is legitimacy to be found in consensus obtained through discussion,
as Ju'rgen Habermas thinks? Such consensus does violence to the
heterogeneity of language games. And invention is always born of
dissension. Postmodern knowledge is not simply a tool of the author-
ities; it refines our sensitivity to differences and reinforces our ability
to tolerate the incommensurable. Its principle is not the expert's
homology, but the inventor's paralogy.
Here is the question: is a legitimation of the social bond, a just
society, feasible in terms of a paradox analogous to that of scientific
activity? What would such a paradox be?
The text that follows is an occasional one. It is a report on know-
ledge in the most highly developed societies and was presented to
the Conseil des Universities of the government of Quebec at the
request of its president. I would like to thank him for his kindness
in allowing its publication.
It remains to be said that the author of the report is a philosopher,
not an expert. The latter knows what he knows and what he does not
know: the former does not. One concludes, the other questions—two
very different language games. I combine them here with the result
that neither quite succeeds.
The philosopher at least can console himself with the thought that
the formal and pragmatic analysis of certain philosophical and
ethico-political discourses of legitimation, which underlies the report,
will subsequently see the light of day. The report will have served to
introduce that analysis from a somewhat sociologizing slant, one that
truncates but at the same time situates it.
Such as it is, I dedicate this report to the Institut Polytechnique de
Philosophic of the Universite de Paris VIII (Vincennes)—at this very
postmodern moment that finds the University nearing what may be
its end, while the Institute may just be beginning.
 THE POSTMODERN CONDITION D 31
supposed to deliberate and decide, and which comprise all or part of
the State. The question of the State becomes intimately entwined
with that of scientific knowledge.
But it is also clear that this interlocking is many sided. The "peo-
ple" (the nation, or even humanity), and especially their political
institutions, are not content to know—they legislate. That is, they
formulate prescriptions that have the status of norms.104 They there-
fore exercise their competence not only with respect to denotative
utterances concerning what is true, but also prescriptive utterances
with pretentions to justice. As already said, what characterizes narra-
tive knowledge, what forms the basis of our conception of it, pre-
cisely that it combines both of these kinds of competence, not to
mention all the others.
The mode of legitimation we are discussing, which reintroduces
narrative as the validity of knowledge, can thus take two routes, de-
pending on whether it represents the subject of the narrative as cog-
nitive or practical, as a hero of knowledge or a hero of liberty. Be-
cause of this alternative, not only does the meaning of legitimation
vary, but it is already apparent that narrative itself is incapable of
describing that meaning adequately.
9. Narratives of the Legitimation of Knowledge
We shall examine two major versions of the narrative of legitimation.
One is more political, the other more philosophical; both are of
great importance in modern history, in particular in the history of
knowledge and its institutions.
The subject of the first of these versions is humanity as the hero of
liberty. All peoples have a right to science. If the social subject is
not already the subject of scientific knowledge, it is because that has
been forbidden by priests and tyrants. The right to science must be
reconquered. It is understandable that this narrative would be directed
more toward a politics of primary education, rather than of univer-
sities and high schools.105 The educational policy of the French
Third Republic powerfully illustrates these presuppositions.
It seems that this narrative finds it necessary to de-emphasize
higher education. Accordingly, the measures adopted by Napoleon
regarding higher education are generally considered to have been
motivated by the desire to produce the administrative and profes-
sional skills necessary for the stability of the State.106 This overlooks
the fact that in the context of the narrative of freedom, the State
receives its legitimacy not from itself but from the people. So even if
imperial politics designated the institutions of higher education as a
32 D THE POSTMODERN CONDITION
breeding ground for the officers of the State and secondarily, for the
managers of civil society, it did so because the nation as a whole was
supposed to win its freedom through the spread of new domains of
knowledge to the population, a process to be effected through agen-
cies and professions within which those cadres would fulfill their
functions. The same reasoning is a fortiori valid for the foundation
of properly scientific institutions. The State resorts to the narrative of
freedom every time it assumes direct control over the training of the
"people," under the name of the "nation," in order to point them
down the path of progress.107
With the second narrative of legitimation, the relation between
science, the nation, and the State develops quite differently. It first
appears with the founding, between 1807 and 1810, of the University
of Berlin,108 whose influence on the organization of higher education
in the young countries of the world was to be considerable in the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
At the time of the University's creation, the Prussian ministry
had before it a project conceived by Fichte and counterproposals
by Schleiermacher. Wilhelm von Humboldt had to decide the matter
and came down on the side of Schleiermacher's more "liberal"
option.
Reading Humboldt's report, one may be tempted to reduce his
entire approach to the politics of the scientific institution to the
famous dictum: "Science for its own sake." But this would be to
misunderstood the ultimate aim of his policies, which is guided by
the principle of legitimation we are discussing and is very close to the
one Schleiermacher elucidates in a more thorough fashion.
Humboldt does indeed declare that science obeys its own rules,
that the scientific institution "lives and continually renews itself on
its own, with no constraint or determined goal whatsoever." But he
adds that the University should orient its constituent element,
science, to "the spiritual and moral training of the nation."109 How
can thisBildung-effectresult from the disinterested pursuit of learn-
ing? Are not the State, the nation, the whole of humanity indifferent
to knowledge for its own sake? What interests them, as Humboldt
admits, is not learning, but "character and action."
The minister's adviser thus faces a major conflict, in some ways
reminiscent of the split introduced by the Kantian critique between
knowing and willing: it is a conflict between a language game made
of denotations answerable only to the criterion of truth, and a language
game governing ethical, social, and political practice that necessarily
involves decisions and obligations, in other words, utterances expected
 THE POSTMODERN CONDITION D 33
to be just rather than true and which in the final analysis lie outside
the realm of scientific knowledge.
However, the unification of these two sets of discourse is indis-
pensable to the Bildung aimed for by Humboldt's project, which con-
sists not only in the acquisition of learning by individuals, but also in
the training of a fully legitimated subject of knowledge and society.
Humboldt therefore invokes a Spirit (what Fichte calls Life), animated
by three ambitions, or better, by a single, threefold aspiration: "that
of deriving everything from an original principle" (corresponding to
scientific activity), "that of relating everything to an ideal" (govern-
ing ethical and social practice), and "that of unifying this principle
and this ideal in a single Idea" (ensuring that the scientific search for
true causes always coincides with the pursuit of just ends in moral
and political life). This ultimate synthesis constitutes the legitimate
subject.
Humboldt adds in passing that this triple aspiration naturally in-
heres in the "intellectual character of the German nation."110 This is
a concession, but a discreet one, to the other narrative, to the idea
that the subject of knowledge is the people. But in truth this idea is
quite distant from the narrative of the legitimation of knowledge
advanced by German idealism. The suspicion that men like Schleier-
macher, Humboldt, and even Hegel harbor towards the State is an
indication of this. If Schleiermacher fears the narrow nationalism,
protectionism, utilitarianism, and positivism that guide the public
authorities in matters of science, it is because the principle of science
does not reside in those authorities, even indirectly. The subject of
knowledge is not the people, but the speculative spirit. It is not em-
bodied, as in France after the Revolution, in a State, but in a System.
The language game of legitimation is not state-political, but philoso-
phical.
The great function to be fulfilled by the universities is to "lay open
the whole body of learning and expound both the principles and the
foundations of all knowledge." For "there is no creative scientific
capacity without the speculative spirit."111 "Speculation" is here the
name given the discourse on the legitimation of scientific discourse.
Schools are functional; the University is speculative, that is to say,
philosophical.112 Philosophy must restore unity to learning, which
has been scattered into separate sciences in laboratories and in pre-
university education; it can only achieve this in a language game that
links the sciences together as moments in the becoming of spirit, in
other words, which links them in a rational narration, or rather meta-
narration. Hegel'sEncyclopedia(1817-27) attempts to realize this
34 D THE POSTMODERN CONDITION
project of totalization, which was already present in Fichte and
Schelling in the form of the idea of the System.
It is here, in the mechanism of developing a Life that is simultane-
ously Subject, that we see a return of narrative knowledge. There is a
universal "history" of spirit, spirit is "life," and "life" is its own self-
presentation and formulation in the ordered knowledge of all of its
forms contained in the empirical sciences. The encyclopedia of Ger-
man idealism is the narration of the "(hi)story" of this life-subject.
But what it produces is a metanarrative, for the story's narrator must
not be a people mired in the particular positivity of its traditional
knowledge, nor even scientists taken as a whole, since they are
sequestered in professional frameworks corresponding to their
respective specialities.
The narrator must be a metasubject in the process of formulating
both the legitimacy of the discourses of the empirical sciences and
that of the direct institutions of popular cultures. This metasubject,
in giving voice to their common grounding, realizes their implicit goal.
It inhabits the speculative University. Positive science and the people
are only crude versions of it. The only valid way for the nation-state
itself to bring the people to expression is through the mediation of
speculative knowledge.
It has been necessary to elucidate the philosophy that legitimated
the foundation of the University of Berlin and was meant to be the
motor both of its development and the development of contempor-
ary knowledge. As I have said, many countries in the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries adopted this university organization as a
model for the foundation or reform of their own system of higher
education, beginning with the United States.113 But above all, this
philosophy—which is far from dead,especiallyinuniversitycircles114
— offers a particularly vivid representation of one solution to the
problem of the legitimacy of knowledge.
Research and the spread of learning are not justified by invoking
a principle of usefulness. The idea is not at all that science should
serve the interests of the State and/or civil society. The humanist
principle that humanity rises up in dignity and freedom through
knowledge is left by the wayside. German idealism has recourse to
a metaprinciple that simultaneously grounds the development of
learning, of society, and of the State in the realization of the "life"
of a Subject, called "divine Life" by Fichte and "Life of the spirit"
by Hegel. In this perspective, knowledge first finds legitimacy within
itself, and it is knowledge that is entitled to say what the State and
what Society are.115 But it can only play this role by changing levels,
 THE POSTMODERN CONDITION D 35
by ceasing to be simply the positive knowledge of its referent (nature,
society, the State, etc.), becoming in addition to that the knowledge
of the knowledge of the referent—that is, by becoming speculative.
In the names "Life" and "Spirit," knowledge names itself.
A noteworthy result of the speculative apparatus is that all of the
discourses of learning about every possible referent are taken up not
from the point of view of their immediate truth-value, but in terms
of the value they acquire by virtue of occupying a certain place in
the itinerary of Spirit or Life—or, if preferred, a certain position in
the Encyclopedia recounted by speculative discourse. That discourse
cites them in the process of expounding for itself what it knows, that
is, in the process of self-exposition. True knowledge, in this perspec-
tive, is always indirect knowledge; it is composed of reported state-
ments that are incorporated into the metanarrative of a subject that
guarantees their legitimacy.
The same thing applies for every variety of discourse, even if it is
not a discourse of learning; examples are the discourse of law and
that of the State.Contemporaryhermeneuticdiscourse116isornof
this presupposition, which guarantees that there is meaning to know
and thus confers legitimacy upon history (and especially the history
of learning).tatementsarereatedastheirownautonyms117andet
in motion in a way that is supposed to render them mutually engend-
ering: these are the rules of speculative language. The University, as
its name indicates, is its exclusive institution.
But, as I have said, the problem of legitimacy can be solved using
the other procedures as well. The difference between them should be
kept in mind: today, with the status of knowledge unbalanced and
its speculative unity broken, the first version of legitimacy is gaining
new vigor.
According to this version, knowledge finds its validity not within
itself, not in a subject that develops by actualizing its learning possi-
bilities, but in a practical subject—humanity. The principle of the
movement animating the people is not the self-legitimation of know-
ledge, but the self-grounding of freedom or, if preferred, its self-
management. The subject is concrete, or supposedly so, and its epic
is the story of its emancipation from everything that prevents it from
governing itself. It is assumed that the laws it makes for itself are just,
not because they conform to some outside nature, but because the
legislators are, constitutionally, the very citizens who are subject to
the laws. As a result, the legislator's will—the desire that the laws be
just—will always coincide with the will of the citizen, who desires
the law and will therefore obey it.
36 O THE POSTMODERN CONDITION
Clearly, this mode of legitimation through the autonomy of the
will118givesrioritytoaotallydifferentlanguageame,which Kant
called imperative and is known today as prescriptive. The important
thing is not, or not only, to legitimate denotative utterances pertain-
ing to the truth, such as "The earth revolves around the sun," but
rather to legitimate prescriptive utterances pertaining to justice, such
as "Carthage must be destroyed" or "The minimum wage must be set
at x dollars." In this context, the only role positive knowledge can
play is to inform the practical subject about the reality within which
the execution of the prescription is to be inscribed. It allows the sub-
ject to circumscribe die executable, or what it is possible to do. But
the executory, what should be done, is not within the purview of
positive knowledge. It is one thing for an undertaking to be possible
and another for it to be just. Knowledge is no longer the subject, but
in the service of the subject: its only legitimacy (though it is formi-
dable) is the fact that it allows morality to become reality.
This introduces a relation of knowledge to society and the State
which is in principle a relation of the means to the end. But scientists
must cooperate only if they judge that the politics of the State, in
other words the sum of its prescriptions, is just. If they feel that the
civil society of which they are members is badly represented by the
State, they may reject its prescriptions. This type of legitimation
grants them the authority, as practical human beings, to refuse their
scholarly support to a political power they judge to be unjust, in
other words, not grounded in a real autonomy. They can even go so
far as to use their expertise to demonstrate that such autonomy is not
in fact realized in society and the State. This reintroduces the critical
function of knowledge. But the fact remains that knowledge has no
final legitimacy outside of serving the goals envisioned by the practi-
cal subject, the autonomous collectivity.119
This distribution of roles in the enterprise of legitimation is inter-
esting from our point of view because it assumes, as against the
system-subject theory, that there is no possibility that language
games can be unified or totalized in any metadiscourse. Quite to the
contrary, here the priority accorded prescriptive statements—uttered
by the practical subject—renders them independent in principle from
the statements of science, whose only remaining function is to supply
this subject with information.
Two remarks:
1. It would be easy to show that Marxism has wavered between
the two models of narrative legitimation I have just described. The
Party takes the place of the University, the proletariat that of the
 THE POSTMODERN CONDITION D 37
people or of humanity, dialectical materialism that of speculative
idealism, etc. Stalinism may be the result, with its specific relation-
ship with the sciences: in Stalinism, the sciences only figure as cita-
tions from the metanarrative of the march towards socialism, which
is the equivalent of the life of the spirit. But on the other hand
Marxism can, in conformity to the second version, develop into a
form of critical knowledge by declaring that socialism is nothing
other than the constitution of the autonomous subject and that the
only justification for the sciences is if they give the empirical subject
(the proletariat) the means to emancipate itself from alienation and
repression: this was, briefly, the position of the Frankfurt School.
2. The speech Heidegger gave on May 27, 1933, on becoming
rector of the university of Freiburg-in-Breisgau,120 can be read as an
unfortunate episode in the history of legitimation. Here, speculative
science has become the questioning of being. This questioning is
the "destiny" of the German people, dubbed an "historico-spiritual
people." To this subject are owed the three services of labor, defense,
and knowledge. The University guarantees a metaknowledge of the
three services, that is to say, science. Here, as in idealism, legitima-
tion is achieved through a metadiscourse called science, with ontolog-
ical pretensions. But here the metadiscourse is questioning, not total-
izing. And the University, the home of this metadiscourse, owes its
knowledge to a people whose "historic mission" is to bring that
metadiscourse to fruition by working, fighting, and knowing. The
calling of this people-subject is not to emancipate humanity, but to
realize its "true world of the spirit," which is "the most profound
power of conservation to be found within its forces of earth and
blood." This insertion of the narrative of race and work into that of
the spirit as a way of legitimating knowledge and its institutions is
doubly unfortunate: theoretically inconsistent, it was compelling
enough to find disastrous echoes in the realm of politics.
10. Delegitimation
In contemporary society and culture—postindustrial society, post-
modernculture 121 —the question of the legitimation of knowledge is
formulated in different terms. The grand narrative has lost its credi-
bility, regardless of what mode of unification it uses, regardless of
whether it is a speculative narrative or a narrative of emancipation.
The decline of narrative can be seen as an effect of the blossoming
of techniques and technologies since the Second World War, which
has shifted emphasis from the ends of action to its means; it can also
38 O THE POSTMODERN CONDITION
be seen as an effect of the redeployment of advanced liberal capital-
ism after its retreat under the protection of Keynesianism during the
period 1930-60, a renewal that has eliminated the communist alter-
native and valorized the individual enjoyment of goods and services.
Anytime we go searching for causes in this way we are bound to
be disappointed. Even if we adopted one or the other of these
hypotheses, we would still have to detail the correlation between the
tendencies mentioned and the decline of the unifying and legitimat-
ing power of the grand narratives of speculation and emancipation.
It is, of course, understandable that both capitalist renewal and
prosperity and the disorienting upsurge of technology would have an
impact on the status of knowledge. But in order to understand how
contemporary science could have been susceptible to those effects
long before they took place, we must first locate the seeds of "dele-
gitimation"122 and nihilism that were inherent in the grand narratives
of the nineteenth century.
First of all, the speculative apparatus maintains an ambigious rela-
tion to knowledge. It shows that knowledge is only worthy of that
name to the extent that it reduplicates itself ("lifts itself up,"hebt
sich auf; is sublated) by citing its own statements in a second-level
discourse (autonymy) that functions to legitimate them. This is as
much as to say that, in its immediacy, denotative discourse bearing
on a certain referent (a living organism, a chemical property, a physi-
cal phenomenon, etc.) does not really know what it thinks it knows.
Positive science is not a form of knowledge. And speculation feeds
on its suppression. The Hegelian speculative narrative thus harbors a
certain skepticism toward positive learning, as Hegel himself admits.123
A science that has not legitimated itself is not a true science; if
the discourse that was meant to legitimate it seems to belong to a
prescientific form of knowledge, like a "vulgar" narrative, it is de-
moted to the lowest rank, that of an ideology or instrument of
power. And this always happens if the rules of the science game that
discourse denounces as empirical are applied to science itself.
Take for example the speculative statement: "A scientific state-
ment is knowledge if and only if it can take its place in a universal
process of engendering." The question is: Is this statement knowledge
as it itself defines it? Only if it can take its place in a universal process
of engendering. Which it can. All it has to do is to presuppose that
such a process exists (the Life of spirit) and that it is itself an expres-
sion of that process. This presupposition, in fact, is indispensable to
the speculative language game. Without it, the language of legitima-
tion would not be legitimate; it would accompany science in a
 THE POSTMODERN CONDITION D 39
nosedive into nonsense, at least if we take idealism's word for it.
But this presupposition can also be understood in a totally differ-
ent sense, one which takes us in the direction of postmodern culture:
we could say, in keeping with the perspective we adopted earlier,
that this presupposition defines the set of rules one must accept in
order to play the speculative game.124 Such an appraisal assumes first
that we accept that the "positive" sciences represent the general
mode of knowledge and second, that we understand this language to
imply certain formal and axiomatic presuppositions that it must
always make explicit. This is exactly what Nietzsche is doing, though
with a different terminology, when he shows that "European nihil-
ism" resulted from the truth requirement of science being turned
back against itself.125
There thus arises an idea of perspective that is not far removed, at
least in this respect, from the idea of language games. What we have
here is a process of delegitimation fueled by the demand for legitima-
tion itself. The "crisis" of scientific knowledge, signs of which have
been accumulating since the end of the nineteenth century, is not
born of a chance proliferation of sciences, itself an effect of progress
in technology and the expansion of capitalism. It represents, rather,
an internal erosion of the legitimacy principle of knowledge. There is
erosion at work inside the speculative game, and by loosening the
weave of the encyclopedic net in which each science was to find its
place, it eventually sets them free.
The classical dividing lines between the various fields of science are
thus called into question—disciplines disappear, overlappings occur
at the borders between sciences, and from these new territories are
born. The speculative hierarchy of learning gives way to an immanent
and, as it were, "flat" network of areas of inquiry, the respective
frontiers of which are in constant flux. The old "faculties" splinter
into institutes and foundations of all kinds, and the universities
lose their function of speculative legitimation. Stripped of the
responsibility for research (which was stifled by the speculative
narrative), they limit themselves to the transmission of what is judged
to be established knowledge, and through didactics they guarantee
the replication of teachers rather than the production of researchers.
This is the state in which Nietzsche finds and condemns them.126
The potential for erosion intrinsic to the other legitimation proce-
dure, the emancipation apparatus flowing from theAufklarung,is no
less extensive than the one at work within speculative discourse. But
it touches a different aspect. Its distinguishing characteristic is that
it grounds the legitimation of science and truth in the autonomy of
40 D THE POSTMODERN CONDITION
interlocutors involved in ethical, social, and political praxis. As we
have seen, there are immediate problems with this form of legitima-
tion: the difference between a denotative statement with cognitive
value and a prescriptive statement with practical value is one of rele-
vance, therefore of competence. There is nothing to prove that if a
statement describing a real situation is true, it follows that a prescrip-
tive statement based upon it (the effect of which will necessarily be
a modification of that reality) will be just.
Take, for example, a closed door. Between "The door is closed"
and "Open the door" there is no relation of consequence as defined
in prepositional logic. The two statements belong to two autono-
mous sets of rules defining different kinds of relevance, and therefore
of competence. Here, the effect of dividing reason into cognitive or
theoretical reason on the one hand, and practical reason on the other,
is to attack the legitimacy of the discourse of science. Not directly,
but indirectly, by revealing that it is a language game with its own
rules (of which the a priori conditions of knowledge in Kant provide
a first glimpse) and that it has no special calling to supervise the game
of praxis (nor the game of aesthetics, for that matter). The game of
science is thus put on a par with the others.
If this "delegitimation" is pursued in the slightest and if its scope
is widened (as Wittgenstein does in his own way, and thinkers such as
Martin Buber and Emmanuel Levinas in theirs)127 the road is then
open for an important current of postmodernity: science plays its
own game; it is incapable of legitimating the other language games.
The game of prescription, for example, escapes it. But above all,
it is incapable of legitimating itself, as speculation assumed it could.
The social subject itself seems to dissolve in this dissemination of
language games. The social bond is linguistic, but is not woven with
a single thread. It is a fabric formed by the intersection of at least
two (and in reality an indeterminate number) of language games,
obeying different rules. Wittgenstein writes: "Our language can be
seen as an ancient city: a maze of little streets and squares, of old
and new houses, and of houses with additions from various periods;
and this surrounded by a multitude of new boroughs with straight
regular streets and uniform houses."128 And to drive home that the
principle of unitotality—or synthesis under the authority of a meta-
discourse of knowledge—is inapplicable, he subjects the "town" of
language to the old sorites paradox by asking: "how many houses or
streets does it take before a town begins to be a town?"129
New languages are added to the old ones, forming suburbs of the
 THE POSTMODERN CONDITION D 41

old town: "the symbolism of chemistry and the notation of the infin-
itesimal calculus."130 Thirty-five years later we can add to the list:
machine languages, the matrices of game theory, new systems of
musical notation, systems of notation for nondenotative forms
of logic (temporal logics, deontic logics, modal logics), the language
of the genetic code, graphs of phonological structures, and so on.
We may form a pessimistic impression of this splintering: nobody
speaks all of those languages, they have no universal metalanguage,
the project of the system-subject is a failure, the goal of emancipa-
tion has nothing to do with science, we are all stuck in the positivism
of this or that discipline of learning, the learned scholars have turned
into scientists, the diminished tasks of research have become compart-
mentalized and no one can master them all.131 Speculative or human-
istic philosophy is forced to relinquish its legitimation duties,132
which explains why philosophy is facing a crisis wherever it persists
in arrogating such functions and is reduced to the study of systems
of logic or the history of ideas where it has been realistic enough to
surrender them.133
Turn-of-the-century Vienna was weaned on this pessimism: not
just artists such as Musil, Kraus, Hofmannsthal, Loos, Schonberg, and
Broch, but also the philosophers Mach and Wittgenstein.134 They
carried awareness of and theoretical and artistic responsibility for
delegitimation as far as it could be taken. We can say today that the
mourning process has been completed. There is no need to start all
over again. Wittgenstein's strength is that he did not opt for the
positivism that was being developed by the Vienna Circle,1butout-
lined in his investigation of language games a kind of legitimation not
based on performativity. That is what the postmodern world is all
about. Most people have lost the nostalgia for the lost narrative. It
in no way follows that they are reduced to barbarity. What saves
them from it is their knowledge that legitimation can only spring
from their own linguistic practice and communicational interaction.
Science "smiling into its beard" at every other belief has taught them
the harsh austerity of realism.136

11. Research and Its Legitimation through Performativity

Let us return to science and begin by examining the pragmatics of
research. Its essential mechanisms are presently undergoing two
important changes: a multiplication in methods of argumentation
and a rising complexity level in the process of establishing proof.