PEACE AND CONFLICT: JOURNAL OF PEACE PSYCHOLOGY, 9(3), 219–233

Copyright © 2003, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.

Social Psychology of
People Power II in the Philippines
Maria Elizabeth J. Macapagal
Psychology Department
Ateneo de Manila University

Jasmin Nario-Galace
Center for Peace Education
Ateneo de Manila University

This research looked at the nonviolent process of the Philippines’ People Power II, us-
ing first-person observations and newspaper accounts. The social psychological na-
ture of this contemporary phenomenon is explained in terms of subjective experi-
ences of the activists, organizational features of the political movement, and
collective behaviors involved in active nonviolence. During People Power II, partici-
pants felt angry, afraid, stressed, and yet happy. Psychological antidotes to fear were
Filipino cultural dispositions such as bahala na (leave it to God), lakas ng loob (inner
strength), and one’s Christian faith. On the cognitive level, People Power II partici-
pants believed that Philippine President Joseph Estrada was guilty of the charges filed
against him, the judicial and political systems were no longer effective, and active
nonviolence could make Estrada step down from office. Civil society groups utilized
mass media and information technology to network, mobilize, and conscientize the
public-at-large. During People Power II, Filipino street protesters employed active
nonviolent tactics such as communicating with a wider audience, representing their
group, acting symbolically, pressuring the opponent, dramatizing and singing, spon-
soring public assemblies, and withdrawing support from the politically powerful.

In 2001, Filipino people used active nonviolence to topple a president widely be-
lieved to have plundered government resources through wide scale corruption. Mil-

Requests for reprints should be sent to Maria Elizabeth J. Macapagal, Psychology Department,
Ateneo de Manila University, Loyola Heights, Quezon City, Philippines. E-mail:
mmacapagal@ateneo.edu
220 MACAPAGAL AND NARIO-GALACE

lions of Filipinos gathered peacefully along the main highway of Epifanio Delos
Santos Avenue (EDSA) demanding the resignation of President Joseph Estrada.
On January 20, 2001, Estrada stepped down, paving the way for the oath-taking of
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as the 14th president of the Philippines. This event is
known as People Power II.
The concept of People Power became popular in 1986 when it was used to
describe the process leading to President Ferdinand Marcos’ fall from power in
the Philippines (Ackerman & Kruegler, 1994). The term People Power, how-
ever, is not new. Since the 1970s, Filipino community organizers have used the
term with popular participation, empowerment of people, and community orga-
nizing and mobilization. Licuanan (1987) defined People Power as the involve-
ment of a significant number of persons in situations or actions, which enhance
well-being–for example, their income, security, or self-esteem. After the 1986
EDSA revolution, People Power became more associated with political action.
People Power has become a model for the Filipino people and other countries as
well. Governments around the world on January 20, 2001, congratulated the
Philippines for its second successful bloodless People Power action in 15 years.
The transition—in a country historically prone to coup attempts—drew praise
from the governments of Japan, Thailand, Australia, Canada, and the United
States (Pazzibugan & Ilustre, 2001).
The phenomenon of People Power has become a regular part of the Filipinos’
political lives and should be explored and understood (Ackerman & Kruegler,
1994). This article focuses on the 2001 People Power Revolution. The research
uses a social psychological lens in analyzing a process that is context-sensitive.
The essay starts with a historical and contextual background of People Power II,
then proceeds with a discussion of the concept of active nonviolence.
People Power II occurred only 15 years after the first People Power overthrew
the Marcos dictatorship. Since then, democratic institutions had been fully re-
stored in the Philippines. In 1998, the Filipinos elected a popular movie actor, Jo-
seph Estrada, for president. During Estrada’s term, Manila Stock Exchange values
plunged and the peso traded at an all-time low (Burton, 2001). After 2 years in of-
fice, Estrada’s friend, former Governor of Ilocos Sur, Luis Singson, accused the
President of accepting more than P500 million ($9 million) in jueteng (a gambling
game) payoffs, and tobacco tax kickbacks. An impeachment complaint was then
filed by Congress against Estrada in October, 2000 for bribery, graft and corrup-
tion, betrayal of public trust, and culpable violation of the constitution. A month
later, Estrada became the first Philippine President to be impeached by Congress.
The Filipino people resorted to People Power to ensure that the impeachment
trial against Estrada in the Philippine Senate would be fair. As the trial went on, the
head of the catholic church, Cardinal Sin, and former Presidents Aquino and
Ramos called on the people to stage peaceful rallies to force Estrada to resign.
Many students and workers staged walkouts.
 PHILIPPINE PEOPLE POWER 221

In a vote of 11 to 10 senators on January 16, 2001, Estrada managed to suppress

the opening of an envelope allegedly containing damaging evidence that he con-
trolled bank accounts containing 3.3 billion ill-gotten pesos ($71 million). Within
minutes of this Senate vote, text messages (short message service) through mobile
phones flashed through Manila telling anti-Estrada Filipinos to go to EDSA. By 11
PM that night, a noise barrage resounded. Thousands converged at EDSA wearing
black. People Power II had begun.
As the numbers and momentum built up at EDSA, civil groups organized con-
tinuous entertainment to keep the crowd awake through the night and over many
long hours. The people expressed their political sentiments through hand-carried
placards, caricatures, CDs, and cassettes ridiculing Estrada, his cronies, and his al-
lies. They lit candles and prayed the rosary constantly for a peaceful resolution of
the crisis. On the third day of People Power II, Armed Forces Chief General
Angelo Reyes and Defense Secretary Orlando Mercado joined the people at EDSA
calling for the President’s resignation. The following day, January 20, 2001, Vice
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was sworn in as the 14th president of the Phil-
ippines, thus ending People Power II.

ACTIVE NONVIOLENCE

People Power II is an example of the continuing active nonviolence tradition in

Philippine political action. This section discusses the definition of active nonvio-
lence and presents evidence of the use of nonviolent action to demand political and
social change in different parts of the world and in different times in history
(Ackerman & Kruegler, 1994; Ash, 1990; Carroll, 1989; Holmes, 1990).
According to Sharp (1973), nonviolent action referred to methods of protest,
noncooperation, and intervention in which the activists do or refuse to do certain
things without using physical force. It is active rather than passive, and it avoids
physical violence although it can cause economic and political harm (Martin,
2001). Ackerman and Kruegler (1994) referred to it as strategic nonviolent conflict
to reflect the process because it conveys both intent as well as content.
Sharp categorized the methods of nonviolent action in three broad categories:
nonviolent protest and persuasion, nonviolent noncooperation, and nonviolent in-
tervention. Nonviolent protest and persuasion is used to express a group’s disap-
proval or opposition to a policy or event largely through symbolic actions. These
actions are intended to help persuade the opponent or to communicate with the
public, directly or through publicity, to arouse attention, invite support, and induce
those directly affected by the issue to take action (Holmes, 1990).
Nonviolent action has been recorded in Rome as early as 195 B. C. (Carroll,
1989). Examples of early collective direct action were those waged by women of
England and France in the 17th and 18th centuries. They held street demonstra-
222 MACAPAGAL AND NARIO-GALACE

tions, defied oppressive social norms, and staged marches to press for their de-
mands. Gandhi and Martin Luther King have shown more popular pragmatic
applications of nonviolence as a form of resistance. Holmes (1990) listed more re-
cent examples of nonviolent action that have occurred in various parts of the
world. In the 1970s in California, for instance, Cesar Chavez campaigned for the
creation of a workers’ union to end oppressive conditions in the labor force. The
union he led made use of nonviolent strikes, pickets, boycotts, and fasting to
achieve their end. In 1975, the California Agricultural Labor Relations Act was
signed, which assured the workers the right to petition for union representation.
The mass use of nonviolent direct action by civilian populations proliferated in
the late 1980s and early 1990s (Ackerman & Kruegler, 1994). The revolutions
throughout East Central Europe, the Chinese uprising in 1989, resistance to the
failed Soviet coup in 1991, the South African struggle against apartheid, and ef-
forts to advance democracy in many other nations after the Cold War have de-
pended largely on people applying methods of nonviolent action (Ackerman &
Kruegler, 1994).
The spirit of active nonviolence was present as well in Eastern Europe as com-
munism collapsed in Poland, East Germany, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia in
1989. People chanted for free elections in mock funerals, public discussions, and
mass demonstrations. Czechs sang in demonstrations, lit candles, and handed
flowers to police. Peaceful yet forceful street demonstrations brought authoritarian
rulers down, using ideas and tactics borrowed from the traditions of nonviolence
(Ash, 1990).

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF ACTIVE NONVIOLENCE

Few studies have examined the social psychological aspects of active nonviolence.
Licuanan (1987) identified some basic components of People Power I in the Philip-
pines–namely, the awareness that a problem exists, initial powerlessness of people
banding together to achieve power as a group, strength in numbers, concrete in-
volvement rooted in social development, and a psychological transformation
within the individuals in the group. Developing critical awareness and organizing
people are ways of sustaining the active nonviolence ideology.
Montiel (2001) focused her analysis on structural peacebuilding, which is a
“social psychological process of transforming relatively permanent unequal rela-
tionships among collectivities in a social structure to new sets of intergroup rela-
tions where all groups have more equitable control over politico-economic
resources needed to satisfy basic needs” (p. 285). Structural peacebuilding re-
quires networking, mobilizing, and political education. The social psychological
components of collective active nonviolence are a high level of psychological tol-
erance for the enemy, knowledge of human rights, the partner system, obedience to
 PHILIPPINE PEOPLE POWER 223

the group’s security marshals, and protective collective behaviors in case of physi-
cal violence. People Power I in the Philippines demonstrated how large groups can
use peaceful means to break up authoritarian political structures.
In sum, Licuanan’s (1987) and Montiel’s (2001) analyses of People Power I re-
flected the interplay of the structural and contextual components, as well as per-
sonal and interpersonal elements of active nonviolence. They showed that social
interaction occurs within a context, which can influence the way we behave
(Hayes, 1993). Moreover, behavior is not solely determined by environment but is
likewise an effect of dispositions (Greenstein, 1992). This article focuses on the
nature of People Power II, specifically looking into three social psychological ele-
ments that were not discussed extensively by Licuanan (1987) and Montiel
(2001)–namely, the subjective experiences, organizational systems, and collective
behavior of People Power.
According to Hermann (1986), it is important to emphasize not only the indi-
vidual, but also the organizational dynamics and collectivities involved in political
action. This article uses analytical units ranging from the individual, collective,
and organizational levels. Subjective individual experiences include emotions,
values, and cognitions of the participants of People Power II. Organizational dy-
namics refer to the organized groups and resources that facilitated the occurrence
of People Power II, whereas collective behaviors are political actions that involved
large numbers of people.

RESEARCH PROBLEMS

Given the limited literature on the social psychology of active nonviolence and
the fact that such a political response is context-sensitive, this research aimed to
describe and explain the nature of People Power II. Research questions about the
subjective, organizational, and collective features of People Power II guided the
study.

METHOD

The descriptions of the subjective aspects, organizational dynamics, and collec-

tive behavior of People Power II are derived from the authors’ personal experi-
ences and observations as active participants in the events leading to and during
People Power II. Both authors joined major demonstrations and rallies calling
for Estrada’s ouster, and went to EDSA daily during People Power II until
Estrada stepped down from office. Both observed organized groups and commit-
tees at work, and helped mobilize university students for collective nonviolent
actions. As a relative of a top anti-Estrada politician, Macapagal obtained access
224 MACAPAGAL AND NARIO-GALACE

to backdoor operations during People Power II. Nario-Galace was an active

member of the Center for Peace Education in Miriam College, which formed
networks among civil society groups, lobbied at the Senate and Congress, and
mobilized anti-Estrada protest actions.
Psychologists have reported the value of participant observation in studying po-
litical processes (Montiel, 2000; Schwerin, 1998; Zisk, 1998) and active nonvio-
lence (Agger, 2001; Montiel, 2001). Political psychologists also have been
interested in studying subjective reactions in considering what is happening in the
political arena (Hermann, 1986). Participant observers have the advantage of gain-
ing access to key people and inside information, as well as identifying with the
people being observed (Lofland & Lofland, 1995; Zisk, 1998). By using partici-
pant observation, the researchers are better able to see, feel, and analytically articu-
late the events. An argument against use of the method, however, is the heightened
possibility of bias and loss of objectivity (Denzin & Lincoln, 1998; Strauss &
Corbin, 1998; Zisk, 1998). Despite this methodological danger, participant obser-
vation continues to be “one of the few tools available for studying interesting but
intransigent political problems and populations” (Zisk, 1998, p. 131). Using tradi-
tional research methods may not capture the human processes of individuals and
organizations that seek to change political institutions using nontraditional means,
which is the case in People Power II (Zisk, 1998).
Aside from personal observations and experiences, the researchers studied arti-
cles in locally-circulated newspapers. They chose dailies with the widest reader-
ship and analyzed write-ups that described subjective experiences, organizational
features, and collective behaviors during People Power II.

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL NATURE

OF PEOPLE POWER II

This section describes the social psychological nature of People Power II. It begins
with the subjective experiences of the individuals and organizational features of
People Power II. The last part of this section describes collective behaviors associ-
ated with People Power II.

Subjective Aspects of People Power II Participants

Individuals who participated in People Power II exhibited varied feelings and

cognitions. On the affective level, activists held diverse emotions such as anger,
fear, and stress. They expressed anger at Estrada and the senators who voted against
opening the controversial envelope, by shouting at and cursing these politicans.
People Power II activists feared violence would erupt. They were likewise physically
worn-out and could not foretell when the crisis would end.
 PHILIPPINE PEOPLE POWER 225

Of interest, strong expressions of negative affect coexisted along with a happy,

even festive atmosphere exemplifying the Filipino spirit of heroism and sense of
humor. The people stayed on believing in the Filipino values of bahala na (leave it
to chance/God) and lakas ng loob (inner strength). Instead of being passive, lakas
ng loob pushed them to action. Moreover, the Filipinos’ deep sense of faith and re-
ligiosity enabled them to remain. The people prayed nonstop for a peaceful resolu-
tion of the crisis.
On the cognitive level, People Power II participants believed that: (a) Estrada
was guilty of the charges filed against him and was not worthy of remaining as
president, (b) the judicial and political systems were no longer effective, and (c)
active nonviolence was the solution in making Estrada step down from office.
Information regarding Estrada’s guilt came largely from Filipino journalists
The media provided vivid images of Estrada’s mansions, his extended families’
extravagant lifestyles, and his gambling and drinking sprees. To illustrate, the
Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism gathered and documented data on
Estrada and his families’ extensive business interests and real property holdings,
the value of which far exceeds his declared assets (“Statement of the Kongreso,”
2000). As reported by friends and former members of his administration, Estrada
lived a life of wanton luxury. He would often spend the entire night with presiden-
tial friends playing mahjong with stakes as high as $500,000, over bottles of wine
that cost about $1,000 per bottle. He had little interest in the most basic tasks of
governance, neglecting to show up at official functions and meetings, and hardly
scanning briefing papers (Chandrasekaran, 2000).
When the Senate voted to conceal evidence against Estrada that night of Janu-
ary 16, 2001, the people thought that they could no longer rely on constitutional
mechanisms to seek redress for their grievances and affect political change. Thus,
if they could no longer achieve justice through the political and judicial systems,
then it was time to go back to the streets and use People Power again to ask him to
step down.
In sum, People Power II participants felt angry, afraid, physically and emotion-
ally stressed, yet continued to have fun. Psychological antidotes to negative affect
were Filipino cultural values such as bahala na (leave it to God), lakas ng loob (in-
ner strength), and one’s Christian faith. On the cognitive level, People Power II
participants believed that Estrada was guilty of the charges filed against him and
not worthy of remaining as president, that the judicial and political systems were
no longer effective, and that active nonviolence was the solution in making
Estrada step down from office.

Organizational Dynamics of People Power II

An organization is a group of people intentionally organized to accomplish an

overall, common goal or set of goals (McNamara, 2003). Thus, People Power II
226 MACAPAGAL AND NARIO-GALACE

can be considered as a large organized group with the common goal of persuad-
ing Estrada to step down peacefully. Although the 4 days of People Power II oc-
curred spontaneously, the event was relatively unchaotic. The following
organizational features facilitated the success of People Power II: (a) organized
civil society groups, (b) mass media support, and (c) optimum use of information
and communication technology.

Civil society groups. Civil society refers to that sphere of voluntary associa-
tions and informal networks in which individuals and groups engage in activities of
public consequence (Sirianni & Friedland, 2003). In the Philippines, civil society
groups provide an essential link between citizens and the government and are com-
prised of nongovernment organizations (NGOs), people’s organizations or move-
ments, advocacy groups, and community based organizations.
These civilian groups organized events and activities prior to and during People
Power II. They engaged actively in all the peacebuilding tasks of networking, mo-
bilizing, and consciousness-raising. They planned and initiated nonviolent actions
calling on the Filipinos to do something about the leadership crisis. During People
Power II, they helped maintain peace and order by forming impromptu committees
that managed food and water, media (for press conferences), security, entertain-
ment, and speeches. Volunteers organized medical stations and even clean-up
teams.
Because of civil society, sustaining human and financial resources was rela-
tively easy. The groups brought their own food, provided for their transportation at
rallies, printed their own leaflets, and made their own banners and streamers.

Mass media. Because the Filipinos experienced freedom of the press in

2001, the government did not control the mass media. Filipinos made extensive
use of print and broadcast media to raise public consciousness and create wide-
spread perceptions that Estrada was corrupt. For example, the proceedings of
Estrada’s impeachment trial were televised live and Filipinos closely monitored
the events. Furthermore, for approximately 4 months before Estrada stepped
down, newspaper columnists and editors wrote about the President’s excesses
and misconduct.
Protesting groups extensively used newspapers, radio, and television to mobi-
lize and conscientize people to act against Estrada. They placed advertisements,
deluged news editors with letters calling for Estrada’s resignation, printed sched-
ules as well as narrated protest activities in news, feature, and column reports. Ra-
dio commentators and television anchors constantly interviewed and featured
leaders of the various movements working for the ouster or impeachment of
Estrada. Daily television news showed footages of mass demonstrations and other
 PHILIPPINE PEOPLE POWER 227

protest activities. For 4 consecutive months, television and radio news were about
the leadership crisis and the peoples’ action to end this crisis.

Information and communication technology. The protesters utilized in-

formation and communication technology to the fullest in making Estrada’s
wrongdoing salient and to call on the Filipino people to act. For example, over 20
websites listed scandals that hounded the Estrada administration (“Erap Foes,”
2000). One website, www.eLAGDA.com, was created to gather signatures to ask
for Estrada’s resignation. The website gathered more than 100,000 signatures col-
lected from Filipino Internet users worldwide, crowding e-mail boxes of congress-
men, senators, and cabinet members (Sison, 2000).
Cellular phones were used to mobilize large numbers of protesters and to share
political information rapidly. Filipinos sent text messages (short message service)
to contact people and transport them to EDSA. In fact, mobilization was quite fast.
Within minutes, people informed their friends and family to proceed to the rally
sites. Text messages, factual or not, gave out information as regards Estrada’s sins
against the people. It was a means for Filipinos, known for their sense of humor, to
mock and taunt Estrada, his family, cronies, and mistresses, as well as the senators
identified with him.
In sum, the presence of civil society groups made the conduct of People Power
II organized and systematic. Protesters used mass media and information technol-
ogy to facilitate political networking, mobilizing, and consciousness-raising.

Collective Behaviors During People Power II

This next section illustrates Filipinos’ nonviolent political tactics during People
Power II. Of the 198 methods of nonviolent action that Sharp listed in The Politics
of Nonviolent Action (1973), he identified 54 methods of nonviolent protest and
persuasion. The People Power II participants employed these methods, along with
some new homegrown and technologically-constructed techniques. The following
descriptions of nonviolent tactics cite Sharp’s categories to illustrate multifarious
techniques protest leaders employed to get the people’s support for their political
cause.

Communications with a wider audience. These methods were designed

to communicate ideas and information to a wide audience to influence Estrada to
step down, gain sympathy from politically-neutral Filipinos, and consolidate sup-
port behind the nonviolent group. For example, several groups nationwide initiated
petition signing for the impeachment or ouster of Estrada. Protesters made use of
228 MACAPAGAL AND NARIO-GALACE

catchy slogans and eye-catching banners, posters, and stickers. With the advent of
desktop publishing, people produced their own stickers, mostly with the “Resign”
message, and posted them on their cars, clothes, hats, umbrellas, pets, and even on
their faces!

Group representations. Protesting groups made representations on behalf

of the Filipinos against Estrada. They made much use of pickets and group lobby-
ing methods. The Estrada Resign Movement picketed not only the Senate but also
the houses of senators to dissuade them from attempting a whitewash of the charges
against Estrada. In the lobbying efforts, worth mentioning was the day Manuel
Villar, then Speaker of the House, transmitted the impeachment complaint to the
Senate. Knowing that pro-Estrada lawmakers were bent on blocking the transmis-
sion of the impeachment complaint, Villar instantaneously conveyed the complaint
to the Senate. Surprised pro-Estrada congressmen hurried to the microphone to stop
him from transmitting the complaint, but their objection was met by loud boos and
yells from the Congress gallery. Soon after the impeachment complaint was trans-
mitted, anti-Estrada protesters who had jampacked the Congress gallery stood up,
hugged one another, sang a nationalistic hymn, and cried tears of joy.

Symbolic public acts. Protesting individuals and groups made their senti-
ments known to the public through the use of symbols. Many wore pins and buttons
bearing messages like Women Say No to Erap or Alis (Get Out) and peach-colored
ribbons to stress their personal call for Estrada’s impeachment. Many were bolder
in their attempt to send their message across and shaved their hair to tell Estrada that
they wanted him out of their hair. In demonstrations, people wore all sorts of masks
and costumes painted with the Resign or Impeach message. Even pets were part of
rallies and dutifully wore their symbols. One author noticed a small dog in a rally
adorned with protest stickers and a horse pulling a carriage pasted with protest post-
ers (“Last Quarterstorm,” 2000). Artists showed that they spoke best with colors
and images with creative and collaborative art work on display in big rallies and
public assemblies. And as in People Power I, confetti or paper cut into strips rained
on big demonstrations staged against Estrada.
The 4-month long protest drama was filled with several activities of prayer, wor-
ship, and rituals. Catholics, Christian evangelical groups, and indigenous communi-
ties nationwide constantly held prayer rallies, services, or rituals in their own
localities (“CBCP Mobilizes,” 2000). Symbolic lights were a part of the protest.
Symbolic torches of truth were lit to manifest the public’s desire to enlighten sena-
tor–judges during the impeachment trial (“Peoples’ Court,” 2000). Protesters lit
candles and formed human chains stretching up to more than 5 kilometers in length.
 PHILIPPINE PEOPLE POWER 229

The burning of effigies and symbols as well as noise-making characterized the

protests. The citizens burned Estrada’s nickname and effigy. Several times during
the protest, different groups staged noise barrages to dramatize their calls for resig-
nation—lighting firecrackers, banging tin cans, and blowing car horns.

Pressures on individuals. The protesters used several methods to pressure

individuals to abandon Estrada and support the opposition. Protesters haunted or
nagged Estrada’s colleagues in the form of letters of appeal, declarations, and illus-
trated advertisements. The haunting strategies were meant to create anxiety in the
minds of the opponents. The methods of taunting, on the other hand, refer to mock-
ing and insulting the officials such as in the forms of column opinions, paid adver-
tisements, and letters to editors. For example, labor group protesters wore masks re-
sembling Estrada’s face and waved placards with slogans like We love Erap and
Erap forever but pinned on their backs was the disclaimer Joke Only! (“Kids at
Forefront,” 2000). Protesters made fun of Estrada’s mistresses and the senators per-
ceived to be biased for him. In a Women March! Rally, a group of women dressed
like Estrada’s mistresses paraded before an audience that booed and hissed.

Drama and music. Because band music was popular among the young, pro-
testers turned overnight vigils into song and dance concerts, and street parties with
demonstrators singing and dancing to their hearts’ content as popular and alterna-
tive bands performed. Protesters enjoyed watching street acts and plays where thea-
tre groups role-played Estrada with his abuses as storyline. They staged cultural
shows in key cities of the country. Creative anti-Estrada leaders offered games,
sports, and food to the protesters. They played dart games and shooting gallery with
pictures of Estrada as targets (“Protesters Zero,” 2000).
To dramatize the death of justice, protesters buried the presidency in memorial
parks in Manila and other parts of the country on All Saints’ Day. Protesters carried a
ghastly coffin with a sketch of Estrada’s face on the window, went from tomb to
tomb and gathered signatures for Estrada’s resignation (“Protesters Bury,” 2000).

Public assemblies. Soon after Luis Singson exposed the corruption of Pres-
ident Estrada, more individuals and groups held protest meetings and banded to-
gether to push for a common cause: the ouster of the President. Women, youth, law-
yers, teachers, laborers, peasants, gay men and lesbians, and government
employees spontaneously formed groups and alliances in small towns, provinces,
and big cities nationwide. Some big coalitions formed were the Estrada Resign
Movement and Kongreso ng Mamamayang Pilipino (Filipino Peoples’ Congress)
that had chapters in key cities nationwide (“Anti-Erap Groups,” 2000). The protest-
230 MACAPAGAL AND NARIO-GALACE

ers sponsored teach-ins and invited political leaders to talk about the need for
Estrada to resign in the light of allegations of massive graft and corruption (“Sin
Asks,” 2000).

Withdrawal and renunciation. To protest nonviolently, people can with-

draw from their routine behaviors as an expression of disagreement (Sharp, 1973).
To build anti-Estrada pressure, organizers declared a National Day of Strike or Peo-
ples’ Strike. Teachers and students boycotted classes, workers and businessmen
suspended company work, young professionals and business executives walked
out of their air-conditioned offices, and government employees joined the peoples’
strike. Even stock market traders left the trading floor.
The biggest walkout was when Estrada’s political party mates and cabinet
members resigned from their positions. The Senate President, the Speaker of the
House, the President of the League of Governors, and a host of lawmakers, local
executives, and the trade secretary, among others, tendered their resignations from
his political party. All these withdrawals happened as the biggest business groups
in the country, one after another, left him.
In sum, the protesters made use of nonviolent means such as communicating
with a wider audience, representing their group, acting symbolically, putting pres-
sure on the opponent, dramatizing and singing, sponsoring public assemblies, and
withdrawing support.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This article has described the nature of People Power II, focusing on three social
psychological variables of subjective experiences, organizational systems, and col-
lective behaviors. The protesters held diverse emotions ranging from negative af-
fect such as anger, fear, and frustration to positive ones such as joy and pride. Al-
though the participants felt negative emotions, their belief in Filipino values of
bahala na, lakas ng loob, sense of humor, and faith helped them to remain in EDSA
until Estrada stepped down.
The participants of People Power II felt cognitive dissonance as they were shown
evidence of Estrada’s corruption and inability to govern the country. On one hand
was the fact that Joseph Estrada was the head of state, and on the other was the infor-
mation that he engaged in corrupt activities and behavior unbefitting a leader. The
media emphasized the discrepancy between the ideal and the actual leader. This,
along with the belief that the judicial and political systems were no longer effective,
pushed Filipinos to organize widespread protest actions. The successful experience
of People Power I only 15 years earlier influenced the protesters to employ nonvio-
lent means hoping once again for a successful political outcome.
 PHILIPPINE PEOPLE POWER 231

The organizational features of People Power II include the civil society groups,
mass media, and information and communication technology that facilitated net-
working, consciousness-raising, and mobilization of the People Power II partici-
pants. Numerous NGOs established in the post-Marcos era emerged as a strong
presence in People Power II. These civilian groups helped in the political educa-
tion of the active nonviolent ideology among Filipinos. They helped maintain the
order of the events leading to and during People Power II.
The mass media highlighted Estrada’s corruption and immoral actions. It is sig-
nificant to note that the Philippine government did not control the mass media,
which in fact, contributed to the impression formation that Estrada was not a good
leader. Advances in information and communication technology such as the in-
ternet and mobile phones facilitated communication and mobilization of people.
Finally, the Filipinos employed numerous, multifarious, and creative protest
and persuasion techniques. The witty, warm, fun, festive, peaceful, and ergo,
non-threatening protest activities aroused people’s attention and prodded them to
get involved. These collective behaviors employed by different groups enhanced
the shared cognitive belief that Joseph Estrada was unfit to be head of state, evok-
ing emotions of anger and frustration and motivating people to oust him from
power.
As more and more people chose to take action against Estrada’s leadership, sec-
tors vital to his perpetuation in power started to withdraw support from him—his
own political allies, the business community, and the military. With the collapse of
his support system in his own administration, Estrada decided to leave office, pav-
ing the way for a change in administration. Estrada could have opted to use vio-
lence to remain in power, but he chose to step down peacefully to avoid possible
bloodshed.
Active nonviolence is indeed possible and effective in carrying out desired po-
litical change, as reflected in People Power II in the Philippines. People Power II in
the Philippines gives the world a message that erring government officials need
not be accepted passively. Their power to rule depends on the people’s support and
cooperation. Thus, good governance is an imperative. Otherwise, people have no
choice but to use the arsenal of nonviolent weapons in their hands. And as proven,
active nonviolence can achieve its aim.

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES

Maria Elizabeth J. Macapagal, Ph. D., is an assistant professor at the Psychology

Department of Ateneo de Manila University. She has a Master of Arts degree in So-
cial Psycholoogy from the Claremont Graduate University in California, and a
Ph.D. in Social Psychology from Ateneo de Manila University. Her research inter-
ests include political psychology, gender issues, and peace psychology.
232 MACAPAGAL AND NARIO-GALACE

Jasmin Nario-Galace obtained her Master of Arts in Peace Studies at the Uni-
versity of Notre Dame in Indiana. She also holds a Ph.D. in Educational Psychol-
ogy from the University of the Philippines. A former college registrar and
coordinator of the Office of Social Concerns at Miriam College, Nario-Galace is a
Program Officer of the Center for Peace Education at Miriam College, as well as a
faculty member of the Departments of International Studies and Child Develop-
ment and Education.

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“Peace is not a distant goal that we seek, but a means
by which we arrive at that goal.”

Martin Luther King, Jr.,

quoted in Molly Ivins column, January 19, 2003