~l - l _ ~l l - ~l .

A R M Y A C Q U IS IT IO N
A i r D e fe n s e A n ti ta n k
S y s te m D i d N o t M e e t
O p e ra ti o n a l T e s t
O b j e c ti v e s

II Il l
142922

R E S T R IC I’E D --N o t ta b e re l e a s e d d & s i d e th e

G e n e ra l A c c o u n ti n g O fl ’S r ~ u n l e s s s p e c i fl c a l l y
a p p ro v e d b y th e O fW e a Y C o n g re s s i o n a l
R e l a ti o n s .

G A O /N S IA I)-9 1 -5 1
I”l _ (l _ -_.._.“. ..- .._ .- .. ..--..-- --_-__------ -.-..---
 Uni t ed States
General Accounti n g 0ffi c e
Washi n gton, D.C. 20548

Nati o nal Securi t y and

Internati o nal Affai r s Di v i s i o n

B-240822

December l o ,1990

The Honorabl e Sam Nunn

Chai r man, Commi t tee on Armed Servi c es
Uni t ed States Senate

The Honorabl e Les Aspi n

Chai r man, Commi t tee on Armed Servi c es
House of Representati v es

As requi r ed by the fi s cal year 1989 Nati o nal Defense Authori z ati o n Act
(P.L. l O O-456), we eval u ated the performance of the Army’s l i n e-of-si g ht
forward heavy air defense system duri n g operati o nal testi n g. The act
requi r es that the Secretary of Defense certi f y that the system meets or
exceeds the Army’s operati o nal test performance cri t eri a before the Sec-
retary of the Army obl i g ates procurement funds after fi s cal year 1989.
Accordi n gl y , our obj e cti v e was to determi n e whether the system had
adequatel y demonstrated i t s operati o nal sui t abi l i t y and operati o nal
effecti v eness. We are reporti n g on the cl a ssi f i e d test resul t s i n a sepa-
rate document.

Operati o nal testi n g di d not demonstrate that the l i n e-of-si g ht forward

Resul t s i n Bri e f heavy air defense system was operati o naIl y sui t abl e . The system fel l far
short of i t s avai l a bi l i t y requi r ements, i n l a rge part because many system
components were unrel i a bl e . In addi t i o n, other sui t abi l i t y measures
were ei t her not tested or not met.

The system di d not meet a number of effecti v eness requi r ements duri n g
operati o nal testi n g. These i n cl u de the i n di v i d ual fire uni t cri t eri o n for
destroyi n g threat ai r craft wi t hi n a speci f i e d engagement area and detec-
ti o n requi r ements. In addi t i o n, we bel i e ve that pl a toon-l e vel and
response ti m e requi r ements for the system-al t hough met-may have
been set too l o w.

The Army has acknowl e dged the system’s rel i a bi l i t y probl e ms; however,
it bel i e ves that the system demonstrated suffi c i e nt operati o nal effec-
ti v eness to support conti n uati o n of the program. In August 1990, the
Army deci d ed to defer producti o n of the system for 2 years. Duri n g that
ti m e, the Army hopes to resol v e the system’s rel i a bi l i t y probl e ms and
demonstrate i t s sui t abi l i t y for combat.

Page 1 GAO/NSIADBl - 61 Ai r Defense Anti t ank System

 B.240822

_.. I. __ _ ..- ..__^ ^^_.._ _ _...._..__--

Because the system has not demonstrated that it can meet establ i s hed
requi r ements, by l a w the Secretary of the Army may not obl i g ate any
procurement fundi n g after fi s cal year 1989 unti l the system meets or
exceeds the Army’s operati o nal test performance cri t eri a .

In November 1987, the Army chose i t s current l i n e-of-si g ht forward

Background heavy ai r defense system, trade-named the “A i r Defense Anti t ank
System” (ADATS), to provi d e needed ai r defense to the maneuver force
(see fi g . 1). ADATS was sel e cted partl y because it was i n producti o n in
Canada and therefore coul d move qui c kl y i n to producti o n to sati s fy
Army requi r ements. An earl y Army esti m ate of the system’s uni t cost
was about $11.2 mi l i o n.

Page 2 GAO/NSLADSl - 51 Ai r Defense Anti t ank System

 B.240822

Fi g ure 1: the Ai r Defense Anti t ank System

: i‘ /’ ”

ADATS i s one of fi v e components i n the Army’s pl a nned Forward Area

Ai r Defense System, whi c h together are expected to meet the Army’s
forward ai r defense needs. ADATS' mi s si o n i s to defend tanks and
i n fantry fi g hti n g vehi c l e s. The Army expects ADATS to si g ni f i c antl y
enhance i t s current ai r defense capabi l i t y because of the system’s
extended ranges and i t s abi l i t y to operate i n adverse envi r onments. The
system consi s ts of a l a uncher and ei g ht mi s si l e s that are gui d ed by a
l a ser beam and mounted on a modi f i e d Bradl e y Fi g hti n g Vehi c l e chassi s .
The system must be posi t i o ned so that i t has a l i n e of si g ht to enemy

Page 3 GAO/NSIAD-91-61 Ai r Defense Anti t ank System

 B-249822

ai r craft. A shoot-on-the-move capabi l i t y was not part of the system’s

requi r ement.

The Army conducted two phases of operati o nal testi n g, whi c h were
compl e ted i n May 1990, In the fi r st, i n di v i d ual ADATS uni t s fi r ed l i v e mi s -
si l e s agai n st drone ai r craft at Whi t e Sands Mi s si l e Range, New Mexi c o.
In the second phase, the Army conducted a seri e s of tests that repl i c ated
ground battl e s at Fort Hunter-Li g gett, Cal i f orni a , duri n g whi c h fi r i n gs
by ai r and ground weapon systems were si m ul a ted by l a sers.

Operati o nal avai l a bi l i t y measures the proporti o n of ti m e a system wi l

ADATS’ Operati o nal be avai l a bl e to successful l y conduct assi g ned mi s si o ns. Such avai l a bi l i t y
Avai l a bi l i t y Is Not depends on the rel i a bi l i t y of component parts and the ti m e it takes to
Adequate to Compl e te mai n tai n
broken
them, to acqui r e
component parts.
needed spare parts, and to repai r or repl a ce
Its Mi s si o n
The Army’s operati o nal tests showed that the ADATS system di d not meet
i t s requi r ements for overal l operati o nal avai l a bi l i t y or for the rel i a bi l i t y
of i n di v i d ual components. Further, we bel i e ve that the test resul t s over-
state actual avai l a bi l i t y because the Army excl u ded i m portant data
from i t s cal c ul a ti o ns. In addi t i o n, ADATS exceeded the mai n tenance ti m e
al l o tted for each hour of the system’s operati o n. Moreover, the Army
di d not desi g n these tests to col l e ct certai n i n formati o n necessary to
ful l y eval u ate the Army’s abi l i t y to mai n tai n or l o gi s ti c al l y support
ADATS.

Avai l a bi l i t y and The operati o nal avai l a bi l i t y requi r ement for fi e l d i n g ADATS i s 71 percent.
Reliability Requi rements For operati o nal testi n g, the Army set an i n teri m avai l a bi l i t y requi r e-
ment of 66 percent and reported an adj u sted avai l a bi l i t y of 39 percent
Were Not Met duri n g the tests.

The system al s o fel l far short of i t s requi r ements for the rel i a bi l i t y of
i n di v i d ual components. Rel i a bi l i t y i s measured by the average ti m e
between operati o nal mi s si o n fai l u res, whi c h i n cl u de crew performance-
rel a ted fai l u res, and between fai l u res sol e l y caused by equi p ment. In
both cases, requi r ements were set and tested for the overal l fi r e uni t and
for the mi s si l e weapon subsystem.

For the fi r e uni t , the average ti m e requi r ed between operati o nal mi s si o n

fai l u res i s 60 hours at the ti m e of fi e l d i n g and 38 hours for the opera-
ti o nal tests. However, the system demonstrated an abi l i t y to operate for

Page 4 GAO/NSIAD-91-61 Ai r Defense Anti t ank System

 8240822

onl y about 9 hours before it fai l e d. For the weapon subsystem, the
fi e l d i n g requi r ement i s 92 hours, and the i n teri m test requi r ement is
66 hours. The subsystem demonstrated about 8 hours. Thi s performance
al s o represents a decl i n e from 1987 tests i n whi c h the demonstrated
average ti m e between operati o nal mi s si o n fai l u res was 16 hours for the
fi r e uni t and 17 hours for the weapon subsystem.

The system’s performance, as measured by the average ti m e between

equi p ment fai l u res, has al s o worsened despi t e Army efforts to i m prove
it. The demonstrated average ti m e between equi p ment fai l u res
decreased from 17 hours i n 1987 to about 12 hours for the fi r e uni t and
to 11 hours for the weapon subsystem duri n g the operati o nal tests.

Army Resul t s Overstate In cal c ul a ti n g an operati o nal avai l a bi l i t y of 39 percent, the Army
Avai l a bi l i t y excl u ded some cri t i c al test data and made certai n erroneous assump-
ti o ns. We di d not quanti f y the cumul a ti v e effect of al l the probl e ms that
we found i n the Army’s cal c ul a ti o n. However, on the basi s of the effects
that we di d cal c ul a te and the di s crepanci e s outl i n ed bel o w, we bel i e ve
that the actual avai l a bi l i t y of ADATS i s l o wer than reported by the Army.

For exampl e , the Army’s cal c ul a ti o ns di d not i n cl u de any test data from
one of two test phases- the mi s si l e fi r i n gs. Thi s phase was cri t i c al
because it was the onl y ti m e duri n g testi n g that the enti r e system was
actual l y i n operati o n. Our cal c ul a ti o ns, usi n g the methodol o gy the Army
appl i e d for the force-on-force test resul t s, show an operati o nal avai l a -
bi l i t y of 33 percent for the mi s si l e -fi r i n g phase.

In addi t i o n, al t hough the system requi r ements sti p ul a te that al l

unschedul e d mai n tenance ti m e be i n cl u ded i n test cal c ul a ti o ns, the
Army i n cl u ded onl y correcti v e mai n tenance ti m e associ a ted wi t h opera-
ti o nal mi s si o n fai l u res. For exampl e , as a resul t of a mal f uncti o n wi t h
the system’s radar-a mi s si o n-cri t i c al pi e ce of equi p ment-about 6
hours were needed to repai r the subsystem over a 4-day peri o d. Because
the mal f uncti o n was not scored as an operati o nal mi s si o n fai l u re, how-
ever, the mai n tenance ti m e was not i n cl u ded i n the cal c ul a ti o n. Li k e-
wi s e, unschedul e d mai n tenance ti m e needed to repl a ce a uni t that
affects the turret’s movement was not i n cl u ded. In total , the Army per-
formed 145 hours of unschedul e d mai n tenance that were not i n cl u ded in
the force-on-force avai l a bi l i t y cal c ul a ti o n.

Page 6 GAO/NSLAD-91-61 Ai r Defense Anti t ank System

 Y

B-240822

M i s si o n-Essenti a l Fai l u res Army requi r ements documents defi n e the “m i s si o n-essenti a l ” functi o ns
Not Adequatel y Defi n ed that an ai r defense system must perform to successful l y defend the
heavy maneuver force. These i n cl u de, for exampl e , the abi l i t y to shoot,
move, and communi c ate. Identi f yi n g the component fai l u res that resul t
i n a l o ss of m i s si o n-essenti a l functi o ns i s cri t i c al because test cal c ul a -
ti o ns of operati o nal avai l a bi l i t y i n cl u de the fai l u re of and l o gi s ti c al sup-
port needed for onl y those component fai l u res. The Army di d not cl e arl y
defi n e these operati o nal m i s si o n fai l u res unti l tests were underway and
after parti a l scori n g resul t s were al r eady known. We bel i e ve that these
defi n i t i o ns shoul d have been approved before testi n g began. Wai t i n g
unti l after some scores were known provi d es the appearance of
affecti n g the outcome of test resul t s by deci d i n g the cri t eri a to be used
after the fact.

We bel i e ve that the defi n i t i o ns used to eval u ate ADATS' operati o nal avai l -
abi l i t y i n appropri a tel y el i m i n ated the fai l u re of some components that
were essenti a l for ADATS to perform i t s m i s si o n. For exampl e , after the
tests were underway, the Army deci d ed not to consi d er the fai l u res of
the l a ser range fi n der to be operati o nal m i s si o n fai l u res, even though (1)
sol d i e rs used i t as an i n tegral part of the test m i s si l e s’ fi r i n g sequence;
(2) the Army determ i n ed that the range fi n der’s faul t y performance was
responsi b l e for m i s sed targets duri n g the m i s si l e -fi r i n g phase of opera-
ti o nal testi n g; and (3) test procedures requi r ed that the range fi n der, as
a key component, be operati o nal for the start of each m i s si l e -fi r i n g test.
If these data had been i n cl u ded i n the Army’s cal c ul a ti o ns, the number
of operati o nal m i s si o n fai l u res woul d have been hi g her, and ADATS' oper-
ati o nal avai l a bi l i t y woul d have been l o wer.

Fi n al l y , bui l t -i n test equi p ment messages, desi g ned to al e rt the ADATS

crew to component fai l u res, were not al w ays treated as i n di c ati o ns of
operati o nal m i s si o n fai l u res, as i s requi r ed by test procedures. Doi n g so
woul d further reduce the system’s avai l a bi l i t y rate.

Li m i t ed Mai n tenance The ADATS schedul e cal l s for contractor mai n tenance support above the
Capabi l i t y Demonstrated organi z ati o nal l e vel , or that l e vel i m medi a tel y above the crew’s mai n te-
nance responsi b i l t y, unti l the system i s fi e l d ed outsi d e of the Uni t ed
Duri n g Testi n g States. Because there are l e gal prohi b i t i o ns on contractor i n vol v ement in

Page 0 GAO/NSIALL91-61 Ai r Defense Anti t ank System

 E-240822

operati o nal testi n g,’ the Army deci d ed to eval u ate the mai n tenance pro-
vi d ed onl y at the organi z ati o nal l e vel duri n g operati o nal tests. The test
resul t s showed a l i m i t ed Army capabi l i t y to mai n tai n ADATS at the orga-
ni z ati o nal l e vel . Army mai n tenance personnel demonstrated thei r capa-
bi l i t y to meet one of the two mai n tenance-rel a ted requi r ements, but fel l
far short of meeti n g the other.

The average ti m e to correct equi p ment fai l u res at the organi z ati o nal
l e vel - or the mean ti m e to repai r -was 0.62 hours, a fi g ure that was
wel l wi t hi n the requi r ement of 1.5 hours. However, not al l organi z a-
ti o nal mai n tenance tasks were tested; cri t eri a for the ti m e associ a ted
wi t h each task have not been establ i s hed; and the al l o cati o n of tasks
among vari o us l e vel s of mai n tenance was not based on fi r m requi r e-
ments. Therefore, the val u e of thi s i n formati o n i s l i m i t ed.

The second measure of performance-peopl e and ti m e al l o tted to orga-

ni z ati o nal l e vel mai n tenance per system operati n g hour, or mai n tenance
rati o -was set at 0.094 mai n tenance hours per system operati n g hour.
Thi s requi r ement was not met. The system demonstrated a rati o of 0.56,
or, i n other words, the mai n tenance support needed for each hour of
system operati o n was al m ost 500 percent more than al l o wed by the
requi r ement. Thi s poor performance resul t ed i n part from the system’s
numerous rel i a bi l i t y fai l u res,

W i t hout cl e arl y defi n ed tasks and associ a ted repai r ti m es i d enti f i e d at

al l mai n tenance l e vel s , the Army wi l not have a cl e ar understandi n g of
the mai n tenance needed to support the system.

Logi s ti c s Support Not The Army performed a qual i t ati v e assessment rather than a test of the
Tested l o gi s ti c s support that wi l be requi r ed for ADATS because i t has not yet
determi n ed ADATS l o gi s ti c s support requi r ements. The test cal c ul a ti o ns
assumed that wai t i n g for spare parts, mai n tenance personnel , and trans-
portati o n servi c es i n vol v ed i n correcti n g operati o nal mi s si o n fai l u res
woul d take an average of 14 hours. The actual ti m e may change after
the Army conducts i t s l o gi s ti c s support anal y si s . Any i n crease i n ti m e
spent wai t i n g for parts, personnel , or other servi c es woul d decrease
ADATS' avai l a bi l i t y. In si m i l a r, previ o us testi n g of an ai r defense weapon,
the Sergeant York, a 23-hour del a y was assumed.

C‘ ontractor i n vol v ement duri n g operati o nal testi n g of a maj o r defense acqui s i t i o n system i s prohi b -
i t ed by statute unl e ss the contractor i s to be i n vol v ed i n the operati o n, mai n tenance, and support of
the system when i t i s depl o yed i n combat.

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The Army reported that ADATS demonstrated superi o r mi s si o n perform-

ADATS’ Operati o nal ante for condi t i o ns under whi c h i t was tested duri n g operati o nal testi n g.
Effecti v eness Is 5 The system di d not, however, meet i t s requi r ements for an i n di v i d ual
Questi o nabl e fi r e uni ts’
boundary,
performance agai n st
nor for the detecti o n
targets wi t hi n
of threat ai r craft.
a certai n engagement
We are reporti n g on
the speci f i c resul t s i n a separate cl a ssi f i e d document.

In addi t i o n, we questi o n the system’s effecti v eness because

. some requi r ements mi g ht have been set too l o w and

. the operati o nal tests di d not demonstrate al l of the requi r ed perform-
ance capabi l i t i e s.

The tests were based on two measures of operati o nal effecti v eness-the
abi l i t y of an i n di v i d ual fi r e uni t to destroy a target wi t hi n certai n
boundari e s and the abi l i t y of a pl a toon of four fi r e uni t s to defeat enemy
ai r attacks. The fi r e uni t cri t eri o n i s contai n ed i n the Army’s requi r ed
operati o nal capabi l i t y statement for the l i n e-of-si g ht forward heavy ai r
defense system, whi c h predates the sel e cti o n of ADATS. Test offi c i a l s
from the Army and the Offi c e of the Secretary of Defense determi n ed
that a more operati o nal l y accurate measure of effecti v eness woul d be at
the pl a toon l e vel agai n st al l attacki n g targets regardl e ss of boundari e s.
Therefore, they deri v ed a second cri t eri o n from the cost and operati o nal
effecti v eness anal y si s that had been performed for the Forward Area
Ai r Defense System program.

For both the fi r e uni t and pl a toon-l e vel cri t eri a , requi r ements for the
system’s effecti v eness were set agai n st fi x ed-wi n g and rotary-wi n g ai r -
craft. A number of addi t i o nal performance measures, some of whi c h had
quanti t ati v e requi r ements, al s o were i d enti f i e d.

Operati o nal Effecti v eness Al t hough ADATS met i t s overal l pl a toon-l e vel effecti v eness requi r ement,
Requi r ement May Be we bel i e ve the requi r ement mi g ht have been set too l o w to accuratel y
refl e ct the condi t i o ns expected when the system i s fi e l d ed. The cost and
Understated operati o nal effecti v eness anal y si s , from whi c h the cri t eri o n was
deri v ed, contai n ed several assumpti o ns, such as the fol l o wi n g, that we
bel i e ve understate the requi r ements for ADATS' effecti v eness:

. The anal y si s assumed that ADATS woul d al w ays be avai l a bl e , that i s , that
i t s avai l a bi l i t y woul d equal 100 percent. Thi s avai l a bi l i t y rate i s greater
than the requi r ement of 71 percent and much greater than ADATS’
demonstrated performance of 39 percent or l e ss.

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 0240822

. The si m ul a ted battl e on whi c h the mi n i m um pl a toon requi r ement was

based showed that arti l e ry made a si g ni f i c ant contri b uti o n to the out-
come of the battl e , yet arti l e ry was not used i n the operati o nal tests.
Further, the anal y si s assumed that ADATS had a gun, whi c h contri b uted
to i t s performance i n battl e . The Army currentl y has no fi r m pl a ns to
produce a gun for ADATS.
. The anal y si s di d not address a number of threats to ADATS.

Another i n di c ati o n that the ADATS pl a toon-l e vel effecti v eness requi r e-
ment may be too l o w i s that i t can destroy as many or more fri e ndl y
ai r craft than threat ai r craft and sti l meet the requi r ement. In addi t i o n,
the requi r ement agai n st pri m ary targets i s not onl y l o wer than the
requi r ement agai n st secondary targets, but al s o si g ni f i c antl y l o wer than
that requi r ed for an i n di v i d ual fi r e uni t . There i s no di r ect correl a ti o n
between the cri t eri a contai n ed i n the requi r ed operati o nal capabi l i t y
documents and used for fi r e uni t s and the l o wer cri t eri a devel o ped for
operati o nal testi n g for pl a toons.

Some Requi r ed The Army had pl a nned to use the operati o nal tests to assess ADATS' per-
Performance Capabi l i t i e s formance under a vari e ty of real i s ti c condi t i o ns. However, because of
safety consi d erati o ns and other factors, the tests di d not suffi c i e ntl y
Were Not Demonstrated demonstrate some capabi l i t i e s cri t i c al to performance on the battl e fi e l d .
Some capabi l i t i e s were not tested, whi l e others were tested but di d not
meet requi r ements,

Shortcomi n gs were especi a l y cri t i c al i n the mi s si l e -fi r i n g phase. The

Army al l o cated 11 mi s si l e s for the operati o nal tests and actual l y fi r ed
onl y 9. These l i m i t ed tests were not adequate to demonstrate al l
requi r ed performance capabi l i t i e s.

Test and performance probl e ms are summari z ed as fol l o ws:

l Duri n g l i v e mi s si l e fi r i n gs, onl y one successful shot was fi r ed agai n st a

hoveri n g hel i c opter. Our anal y si s of test data i n di c ates, however, that
the hel i c opter never hovered, fl e w too hi g h, and remai n ed exposed too
l o ng to trul y represent the threat.
l The Army di d not measure the system’s performance agai n st maneu-
veri n g targets duri n g ei t her the l i v e mi s si l e fi r i n gs or the ground battl e
testi n g, al t hough there i s a requi r ement for such a capabi l i t y.
. Testi n g under adverse weather condi t i o ns di d not take pl a ce.

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 B-240022

. Informati o n on the system’s capabi l i t y at ni g ht was not suffi c i e nt

because safety concerns prevented threat hel i c opters from usi n g real -
i s ti c tacti c s.
. Force-on-force tests of the l a ser range fi n der were not conducted under
real i s ti c battl e condi t i o ns. However, data gathered duri n g the mi s si l e -
fi r i n g phase of testi n g showed that the range fi n der’s poor performance
was responsi b l e for one mi s sed fi r i n g and one mi s sed engagement. In
addi t i o n, accordi n g to Army offi c i a l s , data on the range fi n der from the
force-on-force tri a l s coul d not be anal y zed.
. The ranges al l o wed duri n g the ground battl e s for si m ul a ted mi s si l e fi r -
i n gs exceeded those that had been demonstrated under real i s ti c test con-
di t i o ns. Because the l a ser range fi n der coul d not be used duri n g most of
the force-on-force testi n g, target range data was someti m es unavai l a bl e
to the ADATS crew. To compensate, ADATS was al l o wed to fi r e at ranges up
to al m ost twi c e as far as those demonstrated i n the mi s si l e -fi r i n g phase
and was gi v en credi t for these si m ul a ted ki l s . Army offi c i a l s bel i e ve,
however, that techni c al test fi r i n gs are suffi c i e nt to demonstrate range
capabi l i t i e s.
. The requi r ement for fi r i n g a certai n number of mi s si l e s per ti m e peri o d
was tested and demonstrated i n onl y one l i v e mi s si l e fi r i n g.
. The requi r ement that crew members rel o ad and rearm the system’s mi s -
si l e s was tested but not achi e ved. Al t hough sol d i e rs met the ti m e
requi r ement, the l o aded mi s si l e s were not avai l a bl e for fi r i n g i n suffi -
ci e nt quanti t i e s.

The Army has deci d ed to defer ADATS producti o n, has devel o ped a new
The Army’s New schedul e , and i s devel o pi n g associ a ted quanti t y and cost data for the
Program Proposal May program. Producti o n i s bei n g postponed for at l e ast 2 years; quanti t i e s
Not Overcome wi l decrease;
$3.6 mi l i o n
and i n i t i a l esti m ates
per uni t . The Army hopes to resol v e
of uni t costs show an i n crease
the system’s
of over
rel i a bi l i t y
Probl e ms probl e ms and demonstrate i t s operati o nal sui t abi l i t y through a fol l o w-
on eval u ati o n before the next producti o n deci s i o n, However, the Army
has not yet determi n ed the ful l scope of testi n g i n the proposed schedul e
and may not conduct addi t i o nal operati o nal testi n g before the ful l - rate
producti o n deci s i o n.

The Army recei v ed $54.8 mi l i o n i n research, devel o pment, test, and

Congressi o nal Fundi n g eval u ati o n fundi n g for fi s cal year 1990. It al s o requested, and Congress
Acti o ns ” appropri a ted, $208.9 mi l i o n i n procurement fundi n g that cannot be obl i -
gated unti l the Secretary of Defense certi f i e s that ADA-E successful l y
compl e ted operati o nal testi n g. For fi s cal year 1991, the Army requested

Page 10 GAO/NSIAD-91-61 Ai r Defense Anti t ank System

 I B-240822
A g e n cy C o m m e n ts and
O u r E val u ati o n
$ 2 7 1 .8 m i l i o n in procurement fu n d i n g a n d $ 9 .1 m i l i o n i n research,
d e v e l o p m e n t, test, a n d eval u ati o n fu n d s for A D A T S - r e l a te d p r o d u c t
i m p r o v e m e n ts.
S i n ce th e c o m p l e ti o n o f o u r revi e w, th e c o n fe r e n c e c o m m i tte e s on
d e fe n s e a u thori z ati o n a n d o n d e fe n s e appropri a ti o ns h a v e d e n i e d th e
A rmy’s r e q u e s t for p r o c u r e m e n t fu n d i n g i n fi s cal year 1 9 9 1 . T h e c o n fer-
e n c e c o m m i tte e o n d e fe n s e appropri a ti o ns al s o r e s c i n d e d th o s e procure-
m e n t fu n d s th a t h a d b e e n a p p r o p r i a t e d i n fi s cal year 1 9 9 0 .” H o w e v e r ,
th e A rmy r e q u e s te d a n d fu n d s w e r e a u th o r i z e d and appropriated i n th e
a m o u n t o f $ 9 2 m il ion for c o n ti n u e d research, d e v e l o p m e n t, test, a n d
eval u ati o n o f A D A T S .B e c a u s e o f c o n ti n u i n g congressional concerns about
A D A T Sperformance, th e c o n fe r e n c e c o m m i tte e report o n d e fe n s e a p p r o -
pri a ti o ns restri c ts hal f o f th a t fu n d i n g u n ti l o th e r studi e s a r e c o m p l e te d .
T h e D e p a r tm e n t o f D e fe n s e ( D O D ) p r o v i d e d o ffi c i a l c o m m e n ts o n th e con-
te n ts o f o u r draft report. ( S e e a p p . I.) It d i d n o t a d d r e s s th e speci f i c
fi n d i n g s i n th e report, b u t r e c o g n i z e d th e seri o usness o f th e m . D O D al s o
p o i n te d o u t th a t further testi n g a n d D O D revi e ws o f th e restructured
A D A T S p r o g r a m wi l ta k e p l a c e pri o r to a ful l - rate p r o d u c ti o n deci s i o n.
In l i g ht o f th e severi t y o f rel i a bi l i t y, avai l a bi l i t y, a n d m a i n tai n abi l i t y
probl e ms, escal a ti n g system costs, a n d th e c o m p r e s s e d 2-year s c h e d u l e
wi t hi n w h i c h th e A rmy p l a n s to i d e n ti f y a n d resol v e p r o b l e m s a n d test
fi x es, th e C h a i r m a n o f th e H o u s e A r m e d Servi c es C o m m i tte e has
r e q u e s te d th a t w e revi e w th e A rmy’s n e w A D A T Sp r o g r a m . In a d d i ti o n ,
th e report o f th e H o u s e C o m m i tte e o n A p p r o p r i a ti o n s o n th e fi s cal year
1 9 9 1 d e fe n s e b u d g e t r e q u e s ts th a t w e eval u ate th e p l a n n e d testi n g
program.
Appendix II sets forth th e obj e cti v es, s c o p e , a n d m e th o d o l o g y o f thi s
revi e w. A s a r r a n g e d wi t h your o ffi c e, unl e ss y o u publ i c l y announce its
c o n te n ts earl i e r, w e p l a n n o further di s tri b uti o n o f thi s report u n ti l 3 0
d a y s from i t s i s sue d a te . A t th a t ti m e , w e wi l s e n d copi e s to th e
Chairmen o f th e S e n a te C o m m i tte e s o n A p p r o p r i a ti o n s and on Govern-
m e n tal A ffai r s a n d th e H o u s e C o m m i tte e s o n A p p r o p r i a ti o n s and on
Government O p e r a ti o n s , th e S e c r e tari e s o f D e fe n s e a n d th e A rmy, a n d
2 T h e s e funds w e r e i d enti f i e d for potenti a l reducti o ns i n o u r report D e f e n s e B u d g e t : Potenti a l Reduc-
ti o ns to the A r m y a n d N a v y Mi s si l e P r o g r a m s ( G A O / N S I A D 8 0 3 0 m , Sept. 1 9 9 0 ) .
Page 11 G A O /NSIAD-91-61 A i r Defense Anti t ank System
B-240822 ,

the Di r ector of the Offi c e of Management and Budget. Copi e s wi l al s o be

made avai l a bl e to other i n terested parti e s on request.

Pl e ase cal l me at (202) 275-4141 if you or your staff have any questi o ns.
Maj o r contri b utors to the report are l i s ted i n Appendi x III.

Ri c hard Davi s
Di r ector, Army Issues

Page 12 GAQ/NSLAD-91-61 Ai r Defense Anti t ank System

Page 13 GAO/NSIAD-91-51 Ai r Defense Anti t ank System
 ,
Contents

Letter 1

Appendi x I 16
Comments From the
Department of
Defense
Appendi x II 17
Obj e cti v es, Scope, and
Methodol o gy
Appendi x III
Maj o r Contri b utors to
Thi s Report
Fi g ure Fi g ure 1: The Ai r Defense Anti t ank System 3

Abbrevi a ti o ns

ADATS Ai r Defense Anti t ank System

DOD Department of Defense

Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-91-51 Ai r Defense Anti t ank System

.

Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-91-61 Ai r Dkfense Anti t ank System

Appendi x I

Comments From the Departxnent of Defense’ I*

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF

DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING
WASHINGTON, DC 20301

27 SEP 1990

Mr. Frank C. Conahan

Assi s tant Comptrol l e r General
Nati o nal Securi t y and
Internati o nal Affai r s Di v i s i o n
U.S. General Accounti n g Offi c e
Washi n gton, DC 20548
Dear Mr. Conahan:
Thi s is the Department of Defense (DOD) response to the
General Accounti n g Offi c e (GAO) draft report, "Army Acqui s i t i o n:
Operati o nal Testi n g of the Ai r Defense Anti t ank System Reveal s
Seri o us Weaknesses", dated 13 September 1990 (GAO Code 393345/
OSD Case 8461).
The DOD recogni z es your concern wi t h the seri o usness of the
fi n di n gs speci f i e d i n the draft report. It is not possi b l e to
address each fi n di n g speci f i c al l y because the fi n al Army test
data is not yet avai l a bl e . Upon recei p t of that data we wi l
exami n e it i n detai l .
The Army has approved a restructured program to correct
rel i a bi l i t y probl e ms wi t h the system. Addi t i o nal testi n g is an
i n tegral part of the restructured program. We have schedul e d
Conventi o nal Systems Commi t tee (CSC) and Defense Acqui s i t i o n
Board (DAB) revi e ws on 31 October 1990, and 16 November 1990,
respecti v el y , to assess the vi a bi l i t y of the restructured Li n e
of Si g ht-Forward-Heavy program. Further testi n g as wel l as
cost, performance, schedul e , and supportabi l i t y are to be
addressed i n that process.
Assumi n g Congressi o nal authori z ati o n and appropri a ti o n of
the necessary funds, authori t y to proceed i n to ful l rate
producti o n wi l be conti n gent upon approval by the Defense
Acqui s i t i o n Board. Based upon successful compl e ti o n of the BAM
Maturati o n Phase, whi c h i n cl u des a Fol l o w-On Eval u ati o n
(Operati o nal Test), certi f i c ati o n wi l be provi d ed per the
fi s cal year 1989 Defense Authori z ati o n Act (P.L. 100-456) that
the system is operati o nal l y sui t abl e and effecti v e.

Si n cerel y ,

Frank Kendal l
Acti n g Deputy Di r ector
(Tacti c al Warfare Programs)

Page16 GAO/NSIALI-91.51 Ai r Defense Anti t ank System

Append@ II

obj e cti v es, Scope, and Methodol o gy

As requi r ed by the fi s cal year 1989 Nati o nal Defense Authori z ati o n Act
(P.L. l O O-456), we eval u ated the performance of the Ai r Defense Anti -
tank System (ADATS), the Army’s l i n e-of-si g ht forward heavy ai r defense
system, duri n g operati o nal testi n g.’ Our obj e cti v e was to determi n e
whether the system had adequatel y demonstrated i t s sui t abi l i t y and
effecti v eness for combat.

Fi n al Army and Offi c e of the Secretary of Defense reports on the resul t s

of ADATS' operati o nal testi n g were not avai l a bl e when we compl e ted our
revi e w. As a resul t , thi s report i s based on our anal y si s of i n teri m test
resul t s and other program-rel a ted documents, our observati o ns of the
operati o nal tests, and our di s cussi o ns wi t h Army and Offi c e of the Sec-
retary of Defense offi c i a l s . Our cal c ul a ti o ns are based on the programs
and the data base of the Army’s Operati o nal Test and Eval u ati o n
Agency.

Between January and May 1990, we attended al l operati o nal tests at

Whi t e Sands Mi s si l e Range, New Mexi c o, and the maj o ri t y of tests and
post-tri a l meeti n gs at Fort Hunter-Li g gett, Cal i f orni a . We di s cussed the
conduct of the tests, thei r resul t s, and anal y si s wi t h numerous test
parti c i p ants.

We revi e wed test pl a nni n g documents devel o ped by the ADATS Program
Manager, the Operati o nal Test and Eval u ati o n Agency, other Army
organi z ati o ns, and the Di r ector of Operati o nal Test and Eval u ati o n in
the Offi c e of the Secretary of Defense. We di s cussed the ADATS program
and test-rel a ted i s sues wi t h Army and defense i n tel l i g ence offi c i a l s ; the
Forward Area Ai r Defense System Program Executi v e Offi c er; the ADATS
Program Manager; Test and Experi m entati o n Command test conductors;
and offi c i a l s of the Ai r Defense Arti l e ry School and Center, the Opera-
ti o nal Test and Eval u ati o n Agency, the Logi s ti c s Eval u ati o n Agency, the
Army Materi e l Systems Anal y si s Acti v i t y, Headquarters of the Depart-
ment of the Army, and the Offi c e of the Secretary of Defense.

We exami n ed the Army’s i n ternal control s for ensuri n g the val i d i t y of

test data by revi e wi n g the i n strumentati o n and audi o , vi d eo, and
manual systems for tri a l data col l e cti o n, The Army recogni z ed that the
data col l e cti o n system woul d contai n errors. However, due to ti m e con-
strai n ts, we di d not test those systems to quanti f y the magni t ude of
potenti a l errors.

T‘he act al s o requi r es that the Di r ector, Operati o nal Test and Eval u ati o n, perform a si m i l a r revi e w.

Page 17 GAO/NSIAD=91-51 Ai r Defense Anti t ank System

Appendi x II
Obj e cti v es, Scope, and Methodol o gy

We al s o revi e wed i n ternal control s for ensuri n g accuracy i n data anal -

ysi s and conducted a l i m i t ed test of those control s . On the basi s of our
observati o ns duri n g tri a l s and attendance at post-tri a l meeti n gs, we
i d enti f i e d anomal i e s i n tri a l condi t i o ns and conduct. We traced sel e cted
anomal i e s through the Army’s data val i d ati o n processes to determi n e
how Army eval u ators had treated anomal i e s. Due to the compl e xi t y and
vol u me of generated data and the numerous anomal i e s i d enti f i e d duri n g
the tri a l s , we di d not quanti f y the i m pact of tri a l anomal i e s on the
Army’s concl u si o ns. Further, we di d not veri f y the Operati o nal Test and
Eval u ati o n Agency’s programs. Therefore, our current anal y si s accepted
the Army-devel o ped data as val i d .

We conducted our work from December 1989 to August 1990 i n accor-

dance wi t h general l y accepted government audi t i n g standards.

Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-91-61 Ai r Defense Anti t ank System

Appendi x III

Maj o r Contri b utors to Thi s Report

Henry L. Hi n ton, Associ a te Di r ector

Nati o nal Securi t y and Raymond Dunham, Assi s tant Di r ector
Internati o nal Affai r s Katheri n e V. Schi n asi , Eval u ator-i n -Charge
Di v i s i o n, Washi n gton, Robert Shi e l d s, Eval u ator
Jai Eun Lee, Computer Programmer Anal y st
D.C. Eugene Thompson, Consul t ant

Fl o yd Ortega, Regi o nal Assi g nment Manager

San Franci s co Chri s ti n e Frye, Eval u ator
Regi o nal Offi c e
Robert Thames, Regi o nal Assi g nment Manager
Denver Regi o nal Wi l i a m Wri g ht, Eval u ator
Offi c e

Page 19 GAO/NSi A D-91-51 Ai r Defense Anti t ank System

*.
l
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1J.S. General Accounti n g Offi c e

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