Nationals 56 P

5TH NATIONAL MOOT COMPETITION 2020 - 2021
Team Code: TC 56_P
5th NATIONAL MOOT COMPETITION 2020 - 21
BEFORE THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF AMPHISSA
Writ Petition W. P. No ___/2021
Special Leave Petition S. L. P. No ___/2021
IN MATTERS RELATED TO ARTICLES 14, 21, 25, 32, AND 136 OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF AMPHISSA, 1950
ALONG WITH
SECTIONS 340 AND 498A OF THE AMPHISSIAN PENAL CODE, 1860
AND
THE PROVISIONS OF THE UPPAM PRADESH PROHIBITION OF UNLAWFUL
RELIGIOUS CONVERSION ORDINANCE, 2020
DANIEL & ORS………………………………………………………………...(PETITIONER)

V.
STATE OF UPPAM PRADESH……………………………………………(RESPONDENT 1)
PRABHA & ORS…………………………………………………………….(RESPONDENT 2)
UPON SUBMISSION TO THE HON’BLE CHIEF JUSTICE AND HIS COMPANION JUSTICES
OF
THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF AMPHISSA
MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER
COUNSEL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER
i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Index of Authorities ..................................................................................................................................... iii
Statement of Jurisdiction ............................................................................................................................ v
Statement of Facts ........................................................................................................................................ vi
Issues Involved ............................................................................................................................................ viii
Summary of Arguments ............................................................................................................................. ix
Body of Arguments ....................................................................................................................................... 1
ISSUE I: Whether the Writ Petition and the Special Leave Petition filed by Mr. Daniel &
others before the Supreme Court of Amphissa is maintainable. ................................................... 1
[I.1] Grave injustice suffered by the Petitioners ........................................................................... 1
[I.2] Substantial Question of Law having public importance ................................................... 2
[I.3] Fundamental Rights of the petitioners have been violated ............................................... 2
[I.4] No bar on exhaustion of alternate remedies .......................................................................... 3
ISSUE II: Whether the Uppam Pradesh Prohibition of Unlawful Religious Conversion
Ordinance, 2020 is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of Republic of Amphissa. ... 4
[II.1] Prima Facie violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of Republic of Amphissa. 4
[II.2] Applicability of the Void for the Vagueness Doctrine .................................................... 6
[II.3] Absence of Rational Nexus and Intelligible Differentia.................................................. 7
ISSUE III: Whether the Uppam Pradesh Prohibition of Unlawful Religious Conversion
Ordinance, 2020 is violative of Article 21 of the Constitution of Republic of Amphissa ..... 9
[III.1] Violation of procedure established by law ........................................................................ 9
[III.2] Violation of an individual’s right to marry a person of one’s choice ...................... 10
[III.3] Violation of Right to Privacy .............................................................................................. 12
ISSUE IV: Whether the Uppam Pradesh Prohibition of Unlawful Religious Conversion
Ordinance, 2020 is violative of Article 25 of the Constitution of Republic of Amphissa. . 13
ii
MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF PETITIONERS
[IV.1] Infringement upon freedom of Conscience ..................................................................... 14
[IV.2] Infringement upon freedom to Propagate Religion ....................................................... 15
[IV.3] Violation of International Treaties ..................................................................................... 16
ISSUE V: Whether the District Magistrate of the Bajna District was legally justified in
denying bail to Mr. Daniel and his family members. ..................................................................... 16
[V.1] The Marriage was solemnised under the Special Marriage Act, 1956 ...................... 17
[V.2] Conversion was willingly undertaken by the respondent .............................................. 17
[V.3] Unsubstantiated and Wrongful claim of Wrongful Confinement under Section 340
of the APC and Harassment under Section 498A of the APC ................................................ 18
Prayer ............................................................................................................................................................... 20
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
1. A. K. Gopalan v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 27. ------------------------------------------ 9

2. Bharat Kala Bhandar Ltd. v. Dhamangaon Municipal Committee, AIR 1966 SC 249. ---- 2
3. Budhan Choudhry & Ors. v. State of Bihar, 1955 AIR 191. --------------------------------- 8
4. DC Wadhwa v. State of Bihar, 1987 AIR 579. ------------------------------------------------ 10
5. Delhi Judicial Service Association Delhi v. State of Gujarat, (1991) 3 S.C.R. 936 -------- 2
6. Dhakeswari Cotton Mills Ltd v. Commissioner of Income Tax, West, AIR 1955 SC 65 - 1
7. Esher Singh v. State of A. P., AIR 2004 SC 3030. --------------------------------------------- 3
8. Gobind v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr., AIR 1975 SC 1378. --------------------------- 12
9. Gurcharan Singh v. State of Punjab, (2017) 1 SCC 433 -------------------------------------- 19
10. Joseph Shine v. Union of India, 2018 SC 1676 ------------------------------------------------- 4
11. K. A. Abbas v. The Union of India & Anr., 1971 AIR 481. ---------------------------------- 6
12. Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1993 SC 341. ------------------------------------------- 6
13. Krishna Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar, 2017 (2) SCJ 136. ---------------------------------- 10
14. Lata Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 2006 SC 2522 ------------------------------------ 11
15. Laxmi Khandsari v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1981 SC 873. ------------------------------ 7
16. M.G. Badappanavar v. State of Karnataka, AIR 2001 SC 260. ------------------------------- 5
iii
17. M/s Baburam Prakash Chandra Maheshwari v. Antarim Zilla Parishad, AIR 1969 SC 556
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 3
18. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, 1978 AIR 597. --------------------------------------------- 9
19. Murli S. Deora v. Union of India, AIR 2002 SC 40. ------------------------------------------- 9
20. Om Kumar & Ors. v. Union of India, AIR 2000 SC 3689.----------------------------------- 13
21. Perumal Nadar (Dead) by Legal Representative v. Ponnuswami Nadar, 1971 AIR 2352. 8
22. R. C. Cooper v. Union of India, AIR 1970 SC 564. ------------------------------------------- 10
23. Rajinder Kumar Jain v. State through Special Police Establishment & Ors., AIR 1980 SC
1510. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1
24. Ratilal Panachand Gandhi v. State of Bombay, 1954 AIR 388 ------------------------------ 14
25. Re: Gopal Naidy & Anr, (1923) 44 MLJ 655. ------------------------------------------------- 18
26. Rev Stainislaus v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors., AIR 1977 SC 908. ------------------- 14
27. Robinson Balmain v. New Ferry Co. Ltd., (1910) AC 295 ---------------------------------- 19
28. Robinson Balmain v. New Ferry Co. Ltd., (1910) AC 295. ---------------------------------- 19
29. Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 124. -------------------------------------- 3
30. Salamat Ansari & Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., 2020 SCC OnLine All 1382 --- 11
31. Shafin Jahan v. Ashokan K. M., AIR 2018 SC 357. ------------------------------------------ 10
32. Sher Singh & Ors. v. State of Punjab, 1983 AIR 465 ------------------------------------------ 9
33. Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, AIR 2015 SC 1523 ---------------------------------------- 6
34. Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Shri Justice S. R. Tendolkar, 1958 AIR 538. ----------------- 8
35. Sir Chunilal Mehta & Sons Ltd. v. The Century Spinning and Manufacturing Co., Ltd.
AIR 1962 SC 1314. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2
36. Smt. Safiya Sultana v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 2021 All 56. ---------------------------- 13
37. Sri Srinivasa Theatre v. Govt. of Tamil Nadu, 1992 AIR 999 -------------------------------- 4
38. State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors. v. Vishnu Prasad Sharma & Ors., 1966 AIR 1593 ---- 6
39. State of Rajasthan v. Sohan Lal, (2004) 5 SCC 573. ------------------------------------------- 1
40. The Ahmedabad St. Xavier’s College v. State of Gujarat, 1974 AIR 1389.----------------- 4
41. The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar,
(1954) 1954 AIR 282 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------14
42. The State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar, AIR 1952 SC 75. --------------------------- 4
43. Tinsukhia Electric Supply Co. v. State of Assam, AIR 1990 SC 123 ------------------------ 6
44. Tirupati Balaji Developers Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Bihar, AIR 2004 SC 2351 ----------------- 1
iv
45. Union of India & Ors. v. Tantia Construction Pvt. Ltd., (2011) 5 SCC 697 ---------------- 3
46. Valsamma Paul v. Cochin University, AIR 1996 SC 1011----------------------------------- 17
47. Western U.P. Electric Power & Supply Co. Ltd. v. State of U.P., 1970 AIR 21. ----------- 4
48. Y. Theclamma v. Union of India, (1987) 2 SCC 516. ----------------------------------------- 3
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
I. W. P. No. ___/2021
The petitioners, Mr. Daniel and others have approached the Hon’ble Supreme Court of
Amphissa under Article 32 of the Constitution of Republic of Amphissa.1
II. S.L.P. No. ___/2021
The petitioners, Mr. Daniel and others have approached the Hon’ble Supreme Court of
Amphissa under Article 136 of the Constitution of Republic of Amphissa.2
1
Article 32 of the Constitution of Republic of Amphissa, 1950, states;
“Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by this Part —
1. The right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of the rights
conferred by this Part is guaranteed.
2. The Supreme Court shall have power to issue directions or orders or writs, including writs in the
nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, whichever may be
appropriate, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by this Part.
3. Without prejudice to the powers conferred on the Supreme Court by clauses (1) and (2), Parliament
may by law empower any other court to exercise within the local limits of its jurisdiction all or any of
the powers exercisable by the Supreme Court under clause (2).
4. The right guaranteed by this article shall not be suspended except as otherwise provided for by this
Constitution.”
2
Article 136 of the Constitution of Republic of Amphissa, 1950, states;
“Special leave to appeal by the Supreme Court —
1. Notwithstanding anything in this Chapter, the Supreme Court may, in its discretion, grant special leave
to appeal from any judgment, decree, determination, sentence or order in any cause or matter passed
or made by any court or tribunal in the territory of India.
2. Nothing in clause (1) shall apply to any judgment, determination, sentence or order passed or made by
any court or tribunal constituted by or under any law relating to the Armed Forces.
v
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. The Republic of Amphissa’s legal framework and laws are pari materia
to the Republic of India. The Constitution of the Republic of Amphissa
guarantees its citizens myriad rights. The Constitution guarantees its
citizens Fundamental rights that include but are not limited to the Right
BACKGROUND
to Freedom of Religion, Freedom to carry on Trade, Profession and
Business, and Right to Life and Personal Liberty. The Amphissian Penal
Code (hereinafter referred to as ‘APC’) is a substantive legislation and
ensures the maintenance of Law and Order.
2. During March 2019, there were multiple news reports on ‘Love Jihad’
and how it was spreading rampantly in the Republic of Amphissa. Owing
to the same, the Government of Uppam Pradesh promulgated the Uppam
Pradesh Prohibition of Unlawful Religious Conversion Ordinance, 2020
(‘Love Jihad Law’). This ordinance was approved and signed by the
Uppam Pradesh State Governor on 24th November, 2020. As per this

INTRODUCTION ordinance, religious conversion through way of misinformation, force,
unlawful means, allurement, or alleged fraud is a non-bailable offense
with punishment extending to 10 years of imprisonment. The ordinance
also mandates approval by the District Magistrate in cases of religious
conversions for marriage in the state of Uppam Pradesh. The state of
Uppam Pradesh saw a lot of uprisings owing to this ordinance as it was
opined that it was violative of an individual’s Right to marry a person of
one’s choice and Restrictive to one’s Fundamental right to Life,
Autonomy, Privacy, and Equality.
3. In December 2020, two people, Ms. Prabha and Mr. Daniel who lived in
Lunnow, the Capital of Uppam Pradesh mutually decided to marry each
other. Ms. Prabha followed ‘Jainism’ and Mr. Daniel followed ‘Islam’.
EVENTS
They were to be wed through the provisions of the Special Marriage Act,
LEADING TO
1956. While Ms. Prabha’s family refused to accept the union, Mr.
Daniel’s family unwillingly accepted it.
vi
THE CAUSE
OF 4. Ms. Prabha chose to convert to Islam and subsequently decided to not
ACTION inform her family of this choice. On 10th January, 2021 Ms. Prabha and
Mr. Daniel got married. The married couple decided to live in Jallabad
and on 11th March, 2021 they decided to visit Mr. Daniel’s family who
resided in Lunnow.
th
5. They were welcomed by Mr. Daniel’s family and soon after, on 15
March, 2021 a 2-week lockdown was instituted in the state of Uppam
Pradesh due to the COVID – 19 pandemic.
6. During the lockdown, Ms. Prabha’s brother got injured and was put to bed
rest.
PARTIES
TO A. Daniel & Ors.
THE ACTION B. Prabha & Ors.
C. The State of Uppam Pradesh
7. Despite requests from Ms. Prabha to visit her brother, Mr. Daniel and his
family refused to let her go see her brother. They expressed their
apprehensions of Ms. Prabha contracting the virus while travelling. Ms.
Prabha was confined to her in-laws’ place for 2 months and frustrated, she
called her parents and asked them to pick her up.
CAUSE OF 8. Her family suspected Mr. Daniel and his family committing Love Jihad
ACTION and owing to these suspicions they filed an FIR under Sections 498A and
340 of the APC and the provisions of the Uppam Pradesh Prohibition of
Unlawful Conversion of Religion Ordinance, 2020. On 20th May, 2021
Mr. Daniel and his family were arrested and presented before a District
Magistrate who issued a non-bailable warrant against Mr. Daniel under
Section 498A of the APC. Following this arrest, Mr. Daniel and his family
preffered for a Special Leave Petition before the Supreme Court. They
also filed a writ petition challenging the validity of Uppam Pradesh
Prohibition of Unlawful Conversion of Religion Ordinance, 2020.
vii
ISSUES INVOLVED
~ ISSUE I ~
WHETHER THE WRIT PETITION AND THE SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION FILED BY
MR. DANIEL & OTHERS BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF AMPHISSA IS
MAINTAINABLE.
~ ISSUE II ~
WHETHER THE UPPAM PRADESH PROHIBITION OF UNLAWFUL RELIGIOUS

CONVERSION ORDINANCE, 2020 IS VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 14 OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF REPUBLIC OF AMPHISSA.
~ ISSUE III ~

~ ISSUE IV ~

~ ISSUE V ~
WHETHER THE DISTRICT MAGISTRATE OF THE BAJNA DISTRICT WAS LEGALLY

JUSTIFIED IN DENYING BAIL TO MR. DANIEL AND HIS FAMILY MEMBERS.
viii
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
ISSUE I
WHETHER THE WRIT PETITION AND THE SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION FILED
BY MR. DANIEL & OTHERS BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF AMPHISSA IS
MAINTAINABLE.
There exists a substantial question of law having public importance and whether the District
Magistrate was justified in denying bail which cause grave injustice to the petitioners.
Furthermore, the fundamental rights of the petitioners have been violated because of the Uppam
Pradesh Prohibition of Unlawful Religious Conversion Ordinance, 2020 which enables the Writ
Petition maintainable under Article 32 of the Constitution of Republic of Amphissa and as there
exists no bar on the exhaustion of alternate remedies for the Special Leave Petition, the same is
maintainable under Article 136 of the Constitution of Republic of Amphissa.
ISSUE II

The Uppam Pradesh Prohibition of Unlawful Religious Conversion Ordinance, 2020

arbitrarily and without rationale classifies individuals which violates Article 14 of the
Constitution of Republic of Amphissa. The applicability of the Void for Vagueness doctrine
further highlights the ambiguous and arbitrary nature of the ordinance which lacks intelligible
differentia and rational nexus. Owing to this and the prima facie discrimination owing to sex
and religion in the promulgation of the ordinance, it is violative of Article 14 of the
Constitution of Republic of Amphissa.
ISSUE III

The Uppam Pradesh Prohibition of Unlawful Religious Conversion Ordinance, 2020 infringes
upon a person’s right to choose an individual of one’s choice and the right to privacy as
ix
guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of Republic of Amphissa. Furthermore, it has

not been promulgated by the procedure established by law and thus, the violation of the
fundamental rights of an individual that are guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution of
Republic of Amphissa, are not justified
ISSUE IV

The Uppam Pradesh Prohibition of Unlawful Religious Conversion Ordinance, 2020

prohibits a person from propagating and professing one’s own religion as guaranteed under
Article 25 of the Constitution of Republic of Amphissa. It also lays down unreasonable
restrictions on a person’s freedom of conscience and beliefs. Additionally, it is violative of
international treaties to which the Republic of India is a signatory. Since the laws of the
Republic of Amphissa are pari materia to that of Republic of India, the ordinance violates
Article 25 of the Constitution of Republic of Amphissa.
ISSUE V
WHETHER THE DISTRICT MAGISTRATE OF THE BAJNA DISTRICT WAS

LEGALLY JUSTIFIED IN DENYING BAIL TO MR. DANIEL AND HIS FAMILY.
The marriage between Mr. Daniel and Ms. Prabha was solemnised under the Special
Marriage Act, 1956. Additionally, Ms. Prabha’s conversion was undertaken by her out of her
own conviction thus negating the claim of forced, unlawful conversion. Furthermore, there
exists no proof for allegations of Wrongful confinement under Section 340 and Harassment
under Section 498A of the APC. Due to this, the District Magistrate was not legally justified
in denying Mr. Daniel and his family bail.
x
BODY OF ARGUMENTS
ISSUE I: WHETHER THE WRIT PETITION AND THE SPECIAL LEAVE

PETITION FILED BY MR. DANIEL & OTHERS BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT
OF AMPHISSA IS MAINTAINABLE.
1. It is humbly contended that the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Amphissa does have
jurisdiction to hear the issues brought in through the Special Leave Petition and Writ
Petition, under Article 136 and Article 32 of the Constitution of Republic of Amphissa
respectively. This contention is sought to be established on four grounds, namely; [I.1]
Grave injustice suffered by the petitioners, [I.2] Substantial Question of Law having
Public Importance to be answered, [I.3] Fundamental Rights of the petitioners have been
violated, and [I.4] No bar on exhaustion of remedies.
[I.1] Grave injustice suffered by the Petitioners
2. Article 136 of the Constitution of Republic of Amphissa provides that the Supreme Court
may, in its discretion, grant special leave to appeal from any judgement in any cause or
matter passed by any court or tribunal in the country. 3 The Article provides extraordinary
power with an objective to ensure that there will be no miscarriage of justice. 4 In the exercise
of this jurisdiction, due diligence and care must be observed and the consideration
of justice is paramount.5 Additionally, if a court reaches the conclusion that a person has
been dealt with arbitrarily by a legal authority, then no technical hurdles of any kind like
the finality of finding of facts or otherwise can stand in the way of exercising these
powers.6 The power to grant special leave is not confined to judgments, decrees or orders
of the High Courts. It can be granted even against the decisions of the lower courts such
as that of Magistrates.7
3. In the instant matter, the petitioners were arrested and charged under Sections 340 & 498A of
the APC and under the provisions of the Uppam Pradesh Prohibition of Unlawful Religious
Conversion Ordinance, 2020.8 The District Magistrate denied bail based on the
3
AMPHISSA CONST, art. 136.
4
State of Rajasthan v. Sohan Lal, (2004) 5 SCC 573.
5
Tirupati Balaji Developers Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Bihar, AIR 2004 SC 2351.
6
Dhakeswari Cotton Mills Ltd v. Commissioner of Income Tax, West, AIR 1955 SC 65.
7
Rajinder Kumar Jain v. State through Special Police Establishment & Ors., AIR 1980 SC 1510.
8
Moot Proposition ¶ 13, Lines 7 – 10.
1
complaint made by the respondents without applying rationale. Owing to this, a non-
bailable warrant was issued to Mr. Daniel and the petitioners were denied bail.9 All these
actions violate Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of Republic of Amphissa and this
gross miscarriage of injustice to the petitioners requires immediate attention before the
Supreme Court of Amphissa.
[I.2] Substantial Question of Law having public importance
4. The grounds for allowing a Special Leave Petition include all matters involving substantial
questions of law relating to the interpretation of the Constitution of Amphissa and/ or matters
of national or public importance. Additionally, such petitions also deal with the
validity of laws and the judicial review of constitutional amendments.10 If the question of
law is of public importance, which also affects the rights of the parties involved, it calls
for judicial review.11
5. In the instant matter, the substantial question that is to be answered is, has the magistrate
erred in his interpretation of the law while passing orders. While issuing the petitioners
with a non-bailable warrant under Section 498A of the APC, there is ambiguity and
arbitrariness.12 The facts do not insinuate matters of domestic violence or a demand for
dowry. It further does not imply that forceful conversion took place. However, the liberty
and rights of the petitioners have been curtailed and infringed upon by complying with
the ordinance. Furthermore, the nature of the case is similar to that of criminal nature and
towards the rights of the parties and is hence an issue of public interest and importance.
[I.3] Fundamental Rights of the petitioners have been violated
6. Under Article 32 of the Constitution of Republic of Amphissa, the Supreme Court has the
power to enforce the fundamental rights guaranteed in Part III of the Constitution. 13 This
Article gives Supreme Court the power to enforce and protect fundamental rights by
issuing writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and
certiorari. Article 32 of the Constitution gives extensive original jurisdiction to the
Supreme Court with regard to enforcement of Fundamental Rights.14
9
10
Bharat Kala Bhandar Ltd. v. Dhamangaon Municipal Committee, AIR 1966 SC 249.
11
Sir Chunilal Mehta & Sons Ltd. v. The Century Spinning and Manufacturing Co., Ltd. AIR 1962 SC 1314.
12
Supra note 6.
13
AMPHISSA CONST. art. 32, § 1.
14
Delhi Judicial Service Association Delhi v. State of Gujarat, (1991) 3 S.C.R. 936.
2
7. In the instant matter, the ordinance makes an arbitrary classification of individuals thus,
making the application of the law discriminatory. It violates the rights of an individual to
choose a partner of their choice and the right to privacy. Further, by unreasonably
restricting a person’s right to propagate or follow any religion and the right to freedom of
conscience and belief, there is a prima facie violation of an individual’s fundamental rights.
[I.4] No bar on exhaustion of alternate remedies
8. In Union of India & Ors. v. Tantia Construction Pvt. Ltd., it was observed that mere
existence of an alternative remedy cannot be a bar to maintainability.15 The Supreme
Court has complete discretionary power and can hear appeals from cases of any nature.16
9. The remedy provided under Article 32 of the Constitution of Republic of Amphissa is a
fundamental right. It is the duty and obligation of the Hon’ble court to safeguard the rights
enshrined in the Part III.17 Additionally, the right so guaranteed is absolute and may not be
impaired on any ground. In matters where allegations of an infringement of fundamental
rights have been made, the pursuit of alternate remedy is a meaningless ritual or the alternate
remedy is not equally efficacious or if there is a violation of natural justice or fairness, then
alternate remedy is never a bar to maintainability. Thus, the rule of exhaustion of alternate
remedies is limited in case of an application under Article 32 of the
Constitution.18 A petition under Article 32 can be filed in the first instance to the
Supreme Court, without resorting to the High Court under Article 22619 of the
Constitution of Republic of Amphissa.20
10. In the instant matter, the denial of bail under Section 498A of the APC constitutes a
criminal case and as the Supreme Court has complete discretionary power, there is no
necessity to exhaust alternate remedies. Furthermore, as contended in [I.3] the
fundamental rights of the petitioners have been violated by the promulgation of the
ordinance and hence, there exists no bar on the exhaustion of alternate remedies.
11. Thus, it is humbly submitted before the Supreme Court of Amphissa that the Writ petition
and the Special Leave petition brought under Article 32 and Article 136 of the
Constitution of Republic of Amphissa respectively is maintainable.
15
Union of India & Ors. v. Tantia Construction Pvt. Ltd., (2011) 5 SCC 697.
16
Esher Singh v. State of A. P., AIR 2004 SC 3030.
17
M/s Baburam Prakash Chandra Maheshwari v. Antarim Zilla Parishad, AIR 1969 SC 556.
18
Y. Theclamma v. Union of India, AIR 1987 SC 1210.
19
AMPHISSA CONST. art. 226.
20
Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 124.
3
ISSUE II: WHETHER THE UPPAM PRADESH PROHIBITION OF UNLAWFUL

RELIGIOUS CONVERSION ORDINANCE, 2020 IS VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 14
OF THE CONSTITUTION OF REPUBLIC OF AMPHISSA.
12. It is humbly contended before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Amphissa that the Uppam
Pradesh Prohibition of Unlawful Religious Conversion Ordinance, 2020 is violative of
Article 14 of the Constitution of Republic of Amphissa. This contention is sought to be
established by three grounds, namely; [II.1] Prima Facie violation of Article 14 of the
Constitution of Republic of Amphissa, [II.2] Applicability of the Void for Vagueness
Doctrine, and [II.3] Absence of Rational Nexus and Intelligible Differentia.
[II.1] Prima Facie violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of Republic of Amphissa.
13. Article 14 of the Constitution of Republic of Amphissa 21 guarantees its citizens Equality
before the Law and Equal Protection of the laws of the Republic of Amphissa. The meaning
and content of the law is to be found, analyzed and determined keeping in mind the context
and the scheme of the Constitution of Republic of Amphissa.22 The purpose of this article
is to ensure equality among equals and to protect similar people from discriminatory or
prejudiced treatment.23 People shall be treated equally in terms of privileges conferred
and in the liabilities imposed upon them.24 No person can be discriminated based on
religion, which further includes the choice made to convert one’s religion.25
14. In the case of Joseph Shine v. Union of India26, Section 497 of the APC was held to be
violative of the Constitution of Republic of Amphissa. Section 497 of the APC criminalizes
Adultery when committed by a man.27 This provision of the APC without intelligible
differentia and reasonable nexus distinguished a male from a female for the same crime
committed. If a man had committed the offense with a married woman, it is the man only who
will be held guilty while the woman who committed the same offense, will not. Equality is a
basic and fundamental feature of the Constitution and any treatment of equals
21
22
Sri Srinivasa Theatre v. Govt. of Tamil Nadu, 1992 AIR 999;
23
Western U.P. Electric Power & Supply Co. Ltd. v. State of U.P., 1970 AIR 21.
24
The State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar, AIR 1952 SC 75.
25
The Ahmedabad St. Xavier’s College v. State of Gujarat, 1974 AIR 1389.
26
Joseph Shine v. Union of India, 2018 SC 1676.
27
The Amphissian Penal Code, 1860, § 497, No. 45, Acts of Parliament, 1860 (Amphissa).
4
unequally or unequal people as equals will be in violation of the basic structure of the
Constitution of Amphissa.28
15. Similarly in the instant issue, the Uppam Pradesh Prohibition of Unlawful Religious
Conversion Ordinance, 2020 fails to conform with this principle. The purpose of
promulgating this ordinance was to provide for the prohibition of unlawful conversion of
religion through misrepresentation, unlawful activities, force, allurement, or other allegedly
fraudulent means or by marriage.29 It states that if a person commits the offenses mentioned
in Section 3 of the Uppam Pradesh Prohibition of Unlawful Religious Conversion Ordinance,
2020 then that person shall be liable for a term of imprisonment ranging from
one – five years and shall be liable for a fine not less than Rs. 15,000.30 It additionally states
that if the same offense is committed against a woman, minor, or a person belonging to
Scheduled Castes or Tribes, then for such person, the term of imprisonment will range from
two years to ten years with a penalty not lesser than Rs. 50,000.31 When such unlawful
conversion is performed or abetted, the penalty imposed when it is performed against a
woman is more when compared to when it is performed against a man, and thus evidently
distinguishes and discriminates against males and females. While it may not evidently
express ‘male’, the same is implied in the ordinance and through the term ‘marriage’.
16. Additionally, the ordinance discriminates against those inter-faith couples that seek to get
married from those married couples who belong to the same faith. Couples belonging to
the same religion who seek to get married, can do so without attaining the consent of the
State. However, owing to this ordinance, if one party to a marriage, out of their own
conviction wishes to convert to another religion, they would have to seek consent from
the District Magistrate and go through a police inquiry to get married.
17. The ordinance would fail to meet its objective if it does not criminalize religious
conversion undertaken through unlawful means as mentioned in the ordinance. However,
as contended the portion of the ordinance that effectuates the purpose is prima facie in
violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of Republic of Amphissa and thus, the same
can be held for the ordinance.
28
M.G. Badappanavar v. State of Karnataka, AIR 2001 SC 260.
29
Uppam Pradesh Prohibition of Unlawful Religious Conversion Ordinance, 2020, No. 21, Ordinance of
Uppam Pradesh State Legislature, 2020 (Amphissa).
30
Uppam Pradesh Prohibition of Unlawful Religious Conversion Ordinance, 2020, § 5, No. 21, Ordinance of
31
Supra note 20.
5
[II.2] Applicability of the Void for the Vagueness Doctrine
18. As per the Void for vagueness doctrine, a statute can be held as unconstitutional if the
legislature’s delegation of authority to the Judiciary or the Executive is so extensive that it
would lead to arbitrary interpretations and prosecution.32 However, with the practice of
the principle of ut res magis valeat quam pereat (that the thing may have effect rather
than fail), courts are generally encouraged to steer away from reducing statutes to futile
pieces of legislation33.
19. In the case of K. A. Abbas v. The Union of India & Anr., it was held that vagueness may make
a statute void, but that the judiciary has a natural tendency to interpret this vagueness
and bring the legislation into effect.34 If the bodies applying the law are in a boundless
sea of uncertainty and the law prima facie violates, infringes upon, or takes away a
guaranteed freedom provided by the Constitution, then the law must be held to be in
violation of the Constitution.35
20. So, if a legislation is vague and its language is hard to decipher and absolutely meaningless,
the statute can be struck down and can be declared void for vagueness.36 Further, it was
opined by many experts that one of justifications for Section 377 of the Amphissian Penal
Code, 1860 being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of Republic of Amphissa was
the applicability of the Void for vagueness doctrine.37 In the Kartar Singh v. State of
Punjab verdict, it was observed that, vague laws delegate basic policy matters to the
Executive and the Judiciary on an ad hoc and subjective basis thus promoting arbitrary
and discriminative application of the law.38
21. In the instant matter, the Uppam Pradesh Prohibition of Unlawful Religious Conversion
Ordinance, 2020 has many terms and provisions that are vague and open to interpretation.
In the country of Amphissa, the major religions are that of Hinduism, Buddhism,
Christianity, Islam, Jainism, and Sikhism.39 Hinduism, Christianity, Islam and Jainism
32
Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, AIR 2015 SC 1523.
33
Shamnad Basheer, Sroyon Mukherjee & Karthy Nair, Section 377 and the Order of Nature: Nurturing
Indeterminacy in the Law, 2 NUJS L. REV. 433, 438-439 (2009).
34
K. A. Abbas v. The Union of India & Anr., 1971 AIR 481.
35
State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors. v. Vishnu Prasad Sharma & Ors., 1966 AIR 1593.
36
Tinsukhia Electric Supply Co. v. State of Assam, AIR 1990 SC 123.
37
Supra note 23.
38
Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1993 SC 341.
39
6
account for 99% of the population40. The phrase “Any organized system of worship
pattern, faith, belief, worship, or lifestyle”, is ambiguous.41 The extent of religions, faiths,
and beliefs this ordinance will extend to is vague, thus paving the way for interpretations
by the executive and the judiciary.
22. The Uppam Pradesh Prohibition of Unlawful Religious Conversion Ordinance, 2020 does
not cover reconversion to the individual’s immediate past religion. In the instant matter of
Mr. Daniel and Ms. Prabha, when her is aware of her situation, they are furious 42. They
construe the facts as one of Love Jihad and thus proceed legally.43 The chances of Ms. Prabha
being forced to convert to her religion, while it may not be high, still exists and the law fails
to account for this, thus allowing the judiciary and the executive to interpret conversion in
their accord. The ordinance also states that a person who omits from enabling
or abetting another to commit the offense as stated in its objective. 44 The ordinance includes
‘omits to do any act’ under the ambit of active participation. This gives a wide scope of
interpretation to the judiciary and executive, thus paving the way for arbitrary
interpretations and prosecutions that are arbitrary. This goes against the principles
enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution of Republic of Amphissa and thus violates the
same.
[II.3] Absence of Rational Nexus and Intelligible Differentia
23. In the case of Laxmi Khandsari v. State of Uttar Pradesh, it was reiterated and laid down that
in statutes, the classification made has to be reasonable and it should be for the purpose
of achieving specific ends.45 It laid down two tests to identify if classification made is
reasonable or not. One being the test of intelligible differentia, which states that the
classification made should distinguish people or things grouped in one class to those that
are left out of it. The second one is the test of rational or reasonable nexus, which states
that the means used to distinguish into groups must be reasonable in in consonance with
the object of the statute in question.46 Article 14 prohibits class legislation which means
40
41
42
43
44
45
Laxmi Khandsari v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1981 SC 873.
46
M. P. Jain, Indian Constitutional Law 980 (8th ed. 2018).
7
division of people of legislative subjects into classes based on an arbitrary, or unjust

principle, or making arbitrary discrimination between people or things that have been
divided through sound and justifiable principles.47 It was also established that if a statute
does not make any classification, but leaves such classifying to the judiciary or the
executive, and if no means of guiding the statute is also mentioned, then the court can
strike down both the law and the executive action taken under such law.48
24. Further, it has been established that no formal ceremony of purification or expiration is
necessary to convert one’s religion.49 Any person can change their religion as long as it is
done in good faith, but it should be kept in mind that valid evidence signifying the intent
to convert followed by expressed acts to actualize that intent is necessary.50
Ordinance, 2020 prohibits conversion for the purpose of marriage and marriage for the
purpose of conversion.51 However, it does not distinguish between those conversions that are
of free will and those conversions that are forced upon an individual. It also does not mention
a means to identify the same. The entire purpose of the ordinance is to provide for unlawful
conversion through means specified in the ordinance, but there exists no reasonable nexus in
the distinction of unlawful conversion and lawful conversion for marriage. Owing to this
lacunae, the ordinance provides a wide scope for the judiciary and the executive to determine
whether conversion of one’s religion followed by marriage is legally acceptable or not. Facts
in the instant matter are clear when it states that Mr. Daniel
and Ms. Prabha willingly got married to each other.52 Ms. Prabha out of her own
conviction converted her religion in the hopes of her in-laws accepting her.53 While the
intent over here may not be for the purpose of marriage, there is no real distinction made
in the ordinance with respect to this and intelligible differentia ceases to exist as they may
still be held liable under the provisions of the ordinance.
47
Budhan Choudhry & Ors. v. State of Bihar, 1955 AIR 191.
48
Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Shri Justice S. R. Tendolkar, 1958 AIR 538.
49
Perumal Nadar (Dead) by Legal Representative v. Ponnuswami Nadar, 1971 AIR 2352.
50
235th Law Commission of India Report, Conversion/ Reconversion to another religion - mode of proof.
51
52
53
8
26. Thus, it is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Amphissa that the
Uppam Pradesh Prohibition of Unlawful Religious Conversion Ordinance, 2020 violates
ISSUE III: WHETHER THE UPPAM PRADESH PROHIBITION OF UNLAWFUL

established by three grounds, namely; [III.1] Violation of procedure established by law,
[III.2] Violation of an individual’s right to marry a person of one’s choice, and [III.3]
Violation of Right to Privacy.
[III.1] Violation of procedure established by law
28. Article 21 of the Constitution of the Republic of Amphissa states that no individual shall
be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedures established by
law.54 Procedure established by law has had many interpretations including the most literal
one, a legal framework prescribed by the law of the state and that this restricted the right
of personal liberty as guaranteed under the article to a reasonable extent.55 In Maneka
Gandhi v. Union of India, it was held that ‘procedure established by law’ within the scope
of Article 21 of the Constitution of Republic of Amphissa must be ‘right and just and fair’
and not arbitrary, fanciful or oppressive.56 It should answer the test of reasonableness in
order to conform with Article 14 of the Constitution of Republic of Amphissa. 57 Along
with the law, the means and methods of operating the law should also be ‘right and fair
and just’ and not arbitrary. So, all the procedure, irrespective of the stage of
implementation or enactment must be fair, right, and just.58
29. Article 213 of the Constitution of Republic of Amphissa gives the Governor power to
promulgate an ordinance if both the houses of the State legislature are not in session and if
the Governor is satisfied with the existing circumstances which make it necessary for him
54
AMPHISSA CONST, art 21.
55
A. K. Gopalan v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 27.
56
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, 1978 AIR 597.
57
Supra note 47.
58
Sher Singh & Ors. v. State of Punjab, 1983 AIR 465; Murli S. Deora v. Union of India, AIR 2002 SC 40.
9
to take immediate action.59 In the landmark judgement of R. C. Cooper v. Union of India,

it was held that the President’s promulgation of an ordinance under Article 123 of the
Constitution of Republic of Amphissa60 could be challenged on the grounds that
‘immediate and urgent action’ was not needed.61 The same would be applicable to the
Governor of a state under Article 213 of the Constitution of Republic of Amphissa.
However, it can be used in special and exceptional circumstances only and is not a
substitute for the legislative procedure to be followed by the Legislature. 62 This
conditional power of the Governor is based on the existence of certain circumstances to
take action has been reiterated and upheld in many judgements.63
30. In the instant matter, the State Cabinet cleared the Ordinance on November 20, 2020 and
later, the Governor of the State of Uppam Pradesh signed and approved the ordinance on
November 24, 2020.64 The 3 essentials laid down by Article 213 of the Constitution of
Republic of Amphissa needs to be met to ensure that the procedure established by law for
the promulgation of the ordinance is followed. Firstly, the factual matrix fails to specify if
the State Legislative assembly was in session and thus, it is reasonably concluded that the
State Legislative assembly was in session. Secondly, as per the facts, the Republic of
Amphissa witnessed 3,000 – 4,000 reported unlawful conversions in the past four years.65
This is a very insignificant number when compared to the population of an entire country
and the chances of it affective public order is miniscule, especially in a particular state.
Thus, the circumstances for which the action was undertaken is not significant. Thirdly,
as the chances of something insignificant affecting public order is small, the urgency of
the promulgation also reduces, thus making the promulgation procedure arbitrary and
unnecessary.
[III.2] Violation of an individual’s right to marry a person of one’s choice
31. The Constitution of Republic of Amphissa guarantees the right of the ability of an individual
to take decisions on issues that are pertinent to the pursuit of happiness and the right to marry
a person of one’s choice comes under its ambit.66 It protects an individual’s
59
AMPHISSA CONST. art. 213, cl. 1.
60
61
R. C. Cooper v. Union of India, AIR 1970 SC 564.
62
DC Wadhwa v. State of Bihar, 1987 AIR 579.
63
Krishna Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar, 2017 (2) SCJ 136.
64
65
66
Shafin Jahan v. Ashokan K. M., AIR 2018 SC 357.
10
ability to pursue a way of life or faith he or she wants to pursue and under this, matters
related to dressing, food, ideas and ideologies, love and partnership are covered.67 Article
16 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that men and women have the
right to marry without any restriction on race, nationality, or religion.68 Further, the Right
to marry a person of one’s choice is integral to Article 21 of the Constitution of Republic
of Amphissa.69
32. A person who has attained the age of majority has the right to live with or marry an
individual of one’s choice and if this right is infringed upon, then Article 21 of the
Constitution of Republic of Amphissa which includes an individual’s right of choice, to
choose a partner, autonomy and the right to live with dignity, will be violated.70
Ordinance, 2020 prohibits conversion for marriage and marriage for conversion.71 So as
to make conversion for the purpose of marriage legal, the person converting is to be put
through unnecessary and complicated legal procedures. It involves a post conversion
declaration72, burden on the accused to prove innocence73, and allows any person who is
related by blood, marriage, or adoption to file an FIR in the police station if they suspect
the commission of Unlawful conversion.74 While filing an FIR will not annul the marriage, it
will result in a police investigation on the accused. As the offense stated in the ordinance is
non-bailable and cognizable, a person so accused, irrespective of the genuineness of the
complaint, will be arrested and this is an arbitrary violation of that person’s right to live
with dignity. Additionally, it imposes a burden on the accused to prove innocence.75 Even
for offenses and crimes where the accused has to prove innocence like Dowry death or
rape, there is some condition attached to it. However, this element has been ignored in the
ordinance and thus, Article 21 has been violated.
67
Supra note 61.
68
Article 16, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948.
69
Supra note 45.
70
Lata Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 2006 SC 2522; Salamat Ansari & Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh &
Ors., 2020 SCC OnLine All 1382.
71
Supra note 40.
72
Uppam Pradesh Prohibition of Unlawful Religious Conversion Ordinance, 2020, § 9, No. = 21, Ordinance of
73
74
75
Moot Proposition, ¶ 8, Lines 1 - 5.
11
[III.3] Violation of Right to Privacy
34. An individual’s right to privacy is a fundamental right enshrined under Article 21 of the
Constitution of Republic of Amphissa.76 The right to privacy is an essential ingredient in
ensuring personal liberty and a violation of the same would amount to violation of Article
21 of the Constitution of Republic of Amphissa.77 In the landmark verdict of Justice K.S.
Puttaswamy (Retd) v. Union of India, it was observed that the right to choose one’s partner
comes under the ambit of right to privacy.78 Further, it was laid down that privacy was
not an absolute right and that reasonable restrictions can be imposed by the state to
protect state interests.
35. Therefore, Justice DY Chandrachud in the infamous ‘Right to privacy’ judgement laid
down the ‘Triple Test’ also called the Test of reasonableness so as to determine whether a
particular statute or legislative piece is in consonance with the principle of natural
justice79. Any infringement on the Right to privacy must be justified by;
i. Existence of a law that justifies the violation of the right;
ii. A legitimate state aim or need that ensures that the law is reasonable and operates
against arbitrary state action; and
iii. The means adopted by the state to effectuate the law is proportional to the object
and need of the law.
Ordinance, 2020 requires a pre-post conversion declaration80, announcement of the
conversion through the District Magistrate’s office81, police investigation on genuineness of
conversion82, and restrictions on marriage83. By mandating declaration of pre-post
conversion, the privacy of an individual is violated. Publishing notice of conversion at the
District Magistrate’s office is also violative of a person’s privacy and liberty. The same was
held in the case of Smt. Safiya Sultana v. State of Uttar Pradesh, where the contention was
76
Supra note 45.
77
Gobind v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr., AIR 1975 SC 1378.
78
Supra note 51.
79
Supra note 51.
80
Uppam Pradesh Prohibition of Unlawful Religious Conversion Ordinance, 2020, § 8 & 9, No. 21, Ordinance
of Uppam Pradesh State Legislature, 2020 (Amphissa).
81
Supra note 64.
82
83
Supra note 40.
12
regarding the necessity of publishing notice of marriage as per the Special Marriage Act,
195684. Similarly, police investigating into the intent of conversion violates a person’s
right to privacy, liberty, autonomy, and live with dignity. As contended in [III.2] of the
current issue, it violates the right to privacy and marry a person of one’s choice.
37. While these rights are being violated, the conditions in which such violation may be allowed
are also not met. Firstly, as contended in [III.1], the procedure that was used to promulgate
the ordinance was not the same as that established by the law. Article 213 of the Constitution
of Republic of Amphissa necessitates circumstances that make the need of the ordinance
immediate and since the same element is absent, it cannot be said that the ordinance passed is
legally valid and hence, the first condition stands unsatisfied. Secondly, as contended in
[II.3], the ordinance lacks reasonable nexus and intelligible differentia. The rationality with
which the ordinance has been passed does not correspond with its need. It is arbitrary and
promotes the scope of the Judiciary and the Executive in interpreting the statute. Thus, the
second condition also stands unsatisfied. Thirdly, the Doctrine of Proportionality which states
there must be some proportionality between the negative
effects of a legislation on the rights of an individual and the objective of such
legislation85. However, in the current legislation, intent of the ordinance which is to
provide for the unlawful conversion of religion through means mentioned in the ordinance
is disproportional to the means in which the same will be implemented. By compromising
the rights and liberties of individuals to an unreasonable extent such as this without
providing much clarity, signifies that there is no proper balance between the objective of
the act and its means of effectuation. Thus, the third condition also remains unsatisfied.
ISSUE IV: WHETHER THE UPPAM PRADESH PROHIBITION OF UNLAWFUL

84
Smt. Safiya Sultana v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 2021 All 56.
85
Om Kumar & Ors. v. Union of India, AIR 2000 SC 3689.
13

established by three grounds, namely; [IV.1] Infringement upon freedom of Conscience,
[IV.2] Infringement upon freedom to Propagate Religion, and [IV.3] Violation of
International treaties pari materia to the Republic of Amphissa.
[IV.1] Infringement upon freedom of Conscience
40. Article 25 (1) of the Constitution of Republic of Amphissa which guarantees an individual
the right to profess a religion of their choice, the Freedom of right to conscience is an
implied fundamental right.86 Choice of religion is a matter of faith, conducive to the

doctrine of belief in one’s spiritual well-being.87 As far as conversion of any religion is
concerned, the presence of wilful consent of the party is elementary for the court to
consider if the conversion is voluntary or not.88
41. The Uppam Pradesh Prohibition of Unlawful Religious Conversion Ordinance, 2020 paves
the way for the arbitrary encroachment upon the fundamental right to profess a religion of
one’s choice. The ways in which each person can adopt another religion is defined vaguely
that it includes almost any proselytization act. This makes conversion through any means void
in the eyes of the law. The Ordinance states the circumstances under which conversion
of one’s religion is punishable.89 However, nothing in the Ordinance expressly defines

the procedure that is to be followed by the courts for deciding upon the cases pertaining
religious conversion. It will be a troublesome process for the state to distinguish between
a sincere act of conscience from that of one brought about by fraudulent and corruptible
means.90
42. Currently, many states of India have their own Anti - Conversion laws. When
constitutionality of these laws were challenged, the Supreme Court upheld their
constitutional validity91. The court opined that these laws were meant to avoid public
disorder by prohibiting conversion from one religion to another ‘in a manner reprehensible
86
Ratilal Panachand Gandhi v. State of Bombay, 1954 AIR 388.
87
The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar, (1954) 1954 AIR 282.
88
235th Law Commission of India Report, Conversion/ Reconversion to another religion - mode of proof.
89
Uppam Pradesh State Legislature, 2020 (Amphissa); Supra note 75.
90
Neha Chauhan, Religious Conversion and Freedom of Religion in India: Debates and Dilemmas, 1 J IND. L
INSTt. 126, 133 (2017).
91
Rev Stainislaus v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors., AIR 1977 SC 908.
14
to the conscience of the community’.92 The laws of Madhya Pradesh93 and Odisha94
were however, silent on conversion by marriage. This feature made them different from
the Uppam Pradesh Prohibition of Unlawful Religious Conversion Ordinance, 2020,
which penalises conversion for marriage95. Owing to this restriction on the freedom of
conscience of an individual, there is a violation of Article 21 of the Constitution of
Republic of Amphissa.
[IV.2] Infringement upon freedom to Propagate Religion

43. The wilful acceptance, profession, practice and propagation of religion is guaranteed under
Article 25 (1) of the Constitution of Amphissa.96 If the conversion of a person is

considered unlawful, then it is an unabashed violation of a person’s fundamental right to
propagate a religion of one’s choice and will also prove detrimental to the secular nature
of the Republic of Amphissa. By way of conversion, a person seeks to practice, observe,
or communicate through expounding particular religious tenets.97
44. Propagation of a religion is not just to impart knowledge and spread it at a larger scale. It
is to produce intellectual and moral conviction leading to the adoption of the religion.98
The success of any propagation of the religion would most definitely result in conversion.
Conversion in no sense meddles with freedom of conscience but is a fulfilment of it and
gives meaning to it.99 Even though social values and morals have their space; they are not
above constitutionally guaranteed freedoms100.
Ordinance, 2020 prohibits a person from counselling, convincing, or procuring a person for
the purpose of conversion.101 Propagation refers to the spreading of an idea or in this

context, spreading word about a particular religion. By prohibiting and making these acts
punishable, it is in violation of the Freedom of an individual to propagate one’s religion.
92
Supra note 91.
93
The Madhya Pradesh Dharma Swatantrya Adhinivam, 1968, No. 27, Act of the Madhya Pradesh State
Legislature, 1968 (Amphissa).
94
The Odisha Freedom of Religion Act, 1967, No. 2, Act of the Odisha State Legislature, 1967 (Amphissa).
95
Supra note 29.
96
Supra note 78.
97
Supra note 83.
98
H.M Seervai, Constitutional Law of India 1289 (Universal Law Publishing, 4th edition, 2013)
99
Supra note 98.
100
Shafin Jahan v. Asokan K.M., 2018 SCC OnLine SC 343.
101
Uppam Pradesh Prohibition of Unlawful Religious Conversion Ordinance, 2020, § 11 (4), No. 21, Ordinance of
Uppam Pradesh State Legislature, 2020 (Amphissa)
15
[IV.3] Violation of International Treaties pari materia to Republic of India
46. It is humbly contended that the Uppam Pradesh Prohibition of Unlawful Religious
Conversion Ordinance, 2020 is in direct violation of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (hereinafter referred to as ‘UDHR’). As established in Article 18 of the UDHR,
everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes
freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with
others and in public or private.102 A similar view has been put forth in the International
Covenant of Cultural and Political Rights (hereinafter referred to as ‘ICCPR’). Under
Article 18(1) of the ICCPR, confers a right to adopt a religion or belief of choice. 103 The
Republic of India ratified the ICCPR and the UDHR on April 10, 1979 and since the laws
of the Republic of Amphissa are pari materia to that of the Republic of Amphissa, the
same will be applicable to them.104
47. Both these instruments explicitly mention that right to conversion is a part of right to
Freedom of Religion. However, the Indian Constitution does not explicitly mention the
right to convert. The right to religious conversion may not be a fundamental right but it
certainly is a right to convert one’s right if there is no allurement, fraud and coercion.105
Denying this right to the citizens of a democratic nation or putting a restrictive meaning
to this would be violative of a person’s rights guaranteed under Article 25 of the
Constitution of Republic of Amphissa.
ISSUE V: WHETHER THE DISTRICT MAGISTRATE OF THE BAJNA DISTRICT

WAS LEGALLY JUSTIFIED IN DENYING BAIL TO MR. DANIEL AND HIS
FAMILY MEMBERS.
49. It is humbly contended before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Amphissa that the District
Magistrate of the Bajna District was not legally justified in denying bail to Daniel and his
family members. This contention is sought to be established by three grounds, namely:
102
Article 18, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948.
103
Article 18 (1), International Covenant of Cultural and Political Rights, 1966.
104
Moot Proposition.
105
Supra note 91.
16
[V.1] The Marriage was solemnised under the Special Marriage Act, 1956, [V.2]
Conversion was willingly undertaken by the respondent, [V.3] Unsubstantiated and
Wrongful claim of Wrongful Confinement under Section 340 of the APC and Harassment
under Section 498A of the APC.
[V.1] The Marriage was solemnised under the Special Marriage Act, 1956
50. The Special Marriages Act, 1956 provides for the solemnization and the registration of
marriages of any two parties, regardless of the caste, faith or religion they belong to. 106
Section 4 of the Act107 guarantees the solemnisation of marriage of two individuals,
provided the parties satisfy the age criterion and are capable and fit to express consent.
Further, if provided the parties are not within the ‘degrees of prohibited relationships’ as
laid down in the first schedule108 and, the parties voluntarily express consent to the
marriage, the marriage is considered to be a legally valid relationship.
51. In the given case matter, the couple wished to be wed under the provisions of the above
Act and were consequently, married duly on the 10th of January, 2021, as affirmed in ¶
11.109 Further, it is evidently stated in ¶ 10 that both the parties willingly expressed their
consent to wed each other.110
52. It is also established by the facts that there was no coercion from the petitioner’s side to
marry and there was express consent of Ms. Prabha to marry the petitioner. It is therefore
stated that both the parties were eligible and were married voluntarily under the Act. This
negates the argument that the petitioner feigned love and forced the respondent to marry
him.
[V.2] Conversion was willingly undertaken by the respondent
53. It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Amphissa that the
respondent had willingly converted her faith and there was no role that the petitioner or
his family played in her undertakings.
54. Freedom of conscience is a fundamental right under Article 25 (1) 111 and every individual
can choose to practise, profess and propagate a religion of their choice. 112 The country of
106
Valsamma Paul v. Cochin University, AIR 1996 SC 1011.
107
Special Marriage Act, 1956, § 4, No. 43, Acts of Parliament, 1956 (Amphissa).
108
Special Marriage Act, 1956, § 4, No. 43, Acts of Parliament, 1956 (Amphissa), The First Schedule.
109
110
111
Supra note 84.
112
Supra note 85.
17
Amphissa is also a signatory to the UDHR, and Article 18 affirms the above stated113 -
“Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes
freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with
others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practicing,
worship and observance.”
55. There was no role or action or implication from the petitioner’s behalf that could have
unreasonably influenced the respondent and clouded her judgement. It is further explicitly
established that Ms. Prabha had her own beliefs and reasons to convert to the Islamic faith.
56. Therefore, there exists no reasonable proof that proves that the petitioner had allured or
coerced the respondent to convert to a faith different from her natal faith. It is thus
contended that the charges against the petitioner under the Uppam Pradesh’s Ordinance
on unlawful conversion does not hold.
[V.3] Unsubstantiated and Wrongful claim of Wrongful Confinement under Section 340
of the APC and Harassment under Section 498A of the APC
57. Section 340 of the APC lays down that an unlawful, intentional, complete and wrongful
restraint upon a person in a manner that prevents the person from proceeding beyond certain
circumscribing limits will amount to “Wrongful Confinement’ of the person.114 For the
constitution of a wrongful confinement, it is therefore, essential to prove that the alleged
party had an intention to confine the person and more importantly, without any lawful
justification for the same.115
58. For an act of confinement to be wrongful, it is important to primarily prove that there was
an intention to wrongfully confine such person and wilful affirmative action was taken
towards the same.
59. In the instant matter, the petitioner had no wrongful or malicious intention to contain the
respondent. The petitioner denied the respondent’s request to leave the premises due to
the apprehension that she might be exposed to the COVID – 19 viruses, which will not
only jeopardise her health and safety, but will also jeopardise the health and well-being of
the petitioner’s family. This establishes the fact there was no wrongful intention present.
113
Supra note 97.
114
Amphissian Penal Code,1860, § 340, No. 45, Acts of Parliament, 1860 (Amphissa).
115
Re: Gopal Naidy & Anr, (1923) 44 MLJ 655.
18
60. Further, as held in the Robinson Balmain vs. New Ferry Co. Ltd.116, there must be the
presence of an unlawful justification to constitute false imprisonment and wrongful
confinement.
61. In the given matter, the state of Uppam Pradesh was under a state wide lockdown from the
15th of March, 2021, and strict restrictions were set in place to prevent deaths from the rising
COVID cases in the state.117 The lockdown restricted travelling and there were little to no
travel options available.118 Further, one cannot travel in a state of lockdown, until it is a
matter of dire emergency. The petitioners are law-abiding citizens, who respected the
lockdown guidelines laid down by the state, and they were therefore, justified in cautioning
the respondent to not leave the house. There was reasonable apprehension about the mode of
transportation that the respondent might avail in such situations, and more pertinently, the
petitioners were reasonable in their concern that such travel would expose and make both the
parties susceptible and vulnerable to contracting COVID- 19.119
62. It is therefore humbly contented that as there was no intention or lawful justification
present in the given matter, the respondent’s claim of wrongful confinement under
Section 340 of the APC does not hold any good.
63. The petitioner is also charged with cruelty and mental harassment under Section 498A of
the APC. The provisions punish the husband or the relative(s) of the husband who subject
a woman to cruelty that can abet the women to suicide or can cause grave injury or
danger to life, limb or mental/physical health of a woman.
64. Here, the respondents claim of suffering cruelty and harassment from her husband and her
in-laws will not hold good, as there were no such deeds committed against her. Further, it
was held in the judgement of Gurcharan Singh v. State of Punjab that the proof of the
wilful conduct actuating the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger
to life, limb or health, whether mental or physical, is the sine qua non for entering a
finding of cruelty against the accused person. 120
65. In the instant matter, the petitioner insisted that the respondent must not travel in the state
of lockdown for the her good and the good of the family.121 There was no intention to
116
Robinson Balmain v. New Ferry Co. Ltd., (1910) AC 295.
117
118
119
Supra note 109.
120
Gurcharan Singh v. State of Punjab, (2017) 1 SCC 433.
121
Supra note 109.
19
confine her and there was no wrongful confinement of the victim as established above.
Further, the petitioner and his family did not cause any harm to her in any manner. There
exists no proof of evidence to prove the guilt of the petitioners for having wilfully
conducting themselves in a manner that has caused the respondent grave injury to her
mental and emotional health.
66. It is humbly submitted that the District Magistrate of the Bajna District was legally not
justified in denying bail to Daniel and his family members.
PRAYER
Wherefore, in light of the facts put forth, arguments advanced and the authorities citied, it is
most humbly prayed by the Petitioners in this matter that the Hon’ble Supreme Court of
Amphissa may be pleased to:
1. HOLD, that the present Special Leave Petition and Writ Petition is maintainable.
2. DECLARE, that the Uppam Pradesh Prohibition of Unlawful Religious Conversion
Ordinance, 2020 is unconstitutional as it is violative of Articles 14 of the Constitution
of the Republic of Amphissa.
5. HOLD, that the District Magistrate of the Bajna District was not legally justified in
denying bail to Daniel and his family members.
AND/ OR
Pass any other order it may deem fit in the interest of Justice, Equity and Good Conscience.
All of which is most humbly and respectfully prayed for as Counsel for the Petitioners who
are humbly bound to pray.
Sd/-
Counsels for the Petitioners
20

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5TH NATIONAL MOOT COMPETITION 2020 - 2021

Team Code: TC 56_P

5th NATIONAL MOOT COMPETITION 2020 - 21

BEFORE THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF AMPHISSA

Writ Petition W. P. No ___/2021

Special Leave Petition S. L. P. No ___/2021

CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF AMPHISSA, 1950

SECTIONS 340 AND 498A OF THE AMPHISSIAN PENAL CODE, 1860

THE PROVISIONS OF THE UPPAM PRADESH PROHIBITION OF UNLAWFUL

RELIGIOUS CONVERSION ORDINANCE, 2020

DANIEL & ORS………………………………………………………………...(PETITIONER)

THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF AMPHISSA

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

COUNSEL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

Index of Authorities ..................................................................................................................................... iii

Statement of Jurisdiction ............................................................................................................................ v

Statement of Facts ........................................................................................................................................ vi

Issues Involved ............................................................................................................................................ viii

Summary of Arguments ............................................................................................................................. ix

Body of Arguments ....................................................................................................................................... 1

[I.1] Grave injustice suffered by the Petitioners ........................................................................... 1

[I.2] Substantial Question of Law having public importance ................................................... 2

[I.3] Fundamental Rights of the petitioners have been violated ............................................... 2

[I.4] No bar on exhaustion of alternate remedies .......................................................................... 3

[II.1] Prima Facie violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of Republic of Amphissa. 4

[II.2] Applicability of the Void for the Vagueness Doctrine .................................................... 6

[II.3] Absence of Rational Nexus and Intelligible Differentia.................................................. 7

[III.1] Violation of procedure established by law ........................................................................ 9

[III.2] Violation of an individual’s right to marry a person of one’s choice ...................... 10

[III.3] Violation of Right to Privacy .............................................................................................. 12

[IV.1] Infringement upon freedom of Conscience ..................................................................... 14

[IV.2] Infringement upon freedom to Propagate Religion ....................................................... 15

[IV.3] Violation of International Treaties ..................................................................................... 16

[V.2] Conversion was willingly undertaken by the respondent .............................................. 17

1. A. K. Gopalan v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 27. ------------------------------------------ 9

II. S.L.P. No. ___/2021

Uppam Pradesh State Governor on 24th November, 2020. As per this

WHETHER THE UPPAM PRADESH PROHIBITION OF UNLAWFUL RELIGIOUS

WHETHER THE UPPAM PRADESH PROHIBITION OF UNLAWFUL RELIGIOUS

WHETHER THE UPPAM PRADESH PROHIBITION OF UNLAWFUL RELIGIOUS

WHETHER THE DISTRICT MAGISTRATE OF THE BAJNA DISTRICT WAS LEGALLY

WHETHER THE UPPAM PRADESH PROHIBITION OF UNLAWFUL RELIGIOUS

The Uppam Pradesh Prohibition of Unlawful Religious Conversion Ordinance, 2020

WHETHER THE UPPAM PRADESH PROHIBITION OF UNLAWFUL RELIGIOUS

guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of Republic of Amphissa. Furthermore, it has

WHETHER THE UPPAM PRADESH PROHIBITION OF UNLAWFUL RELIGIOUS

The Uppam Pradesh Prohibition of Unlawful Religious Conversion Ordinance, 2020

WHETHER THE DISTRICT MAGISTRATE OF THE BAJNA DISTRICT WAS

ISSUE I: WHETHER THE WRIT PETITION AND THE SPECIAL LEAVE

[I.1] Grave injustice suffered by the Petitioners

[I.2] Substantial Question of Law having public importance

[I.3] Fundamental Rights of the petitioners have been violated

ISSUE II: WHETHER THE UPPAM PRADESH PROHIBITION OF UNLAWFUL

[II.2] Applicability of the Void for the Vagueness Doctrine

division of people of legislative subjects into classes based on an arbitrary, or unjust

ISSUE III: WHETHER THE UPPAM PRADESH PROHIBITION OF UNLAWFUL

to take immediate action.59 In the landmark judgement of R. C. Cooper v. Union of India,

a person of one’s choice comes under its ambit.66 It protects an individual’s

[III.3] Violation of Right to Privacy

ISSUE IV: WHETHER THE UPPAM PRADESH PROHIBITION OF UNLAWFUL

Article 25 of the Constitution of Republic of Amphissa. This contention is sought to be

implied fundamental right.86 Choice of religion is a matter of faith, conducive to the

of one’s religion is punishable.89 However, nothing in the Ordinance expressly defines