SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS JUDGE CARINGAL 3D 2020

CASE NAME
COPY THE FORMAT
FACTS:
1. Blah CTRL+F YOUR CASE TITLE, IT’S ALREADY DISTRIBUTED.
2. Blah DEADLINE: SUNDAY (FEB. 24, 2019), 11:59PM
a. Sub Blah
3. RTC ruled RULE 80
4. CA ruled 1. Heirs of Castillo v. Gabriel, GR 162934, November 11, 2005 - NOEL
2. Corona v. CA, GR L-59821, August 30, 1982 - REYES, G.
ISSUES: 3. Roxas v. Pecson, GR L-2211, December 20, 1948 - MANAHAN
1. WoN Blah is blah? YES/NO 4. Ocampo v. Ocampo, GR 187879, July 5, 2010 - MANALANG
5. Tan v. Gedorio, Jr., GR 166520, March 14, 2008 - NAVAL
RULING + RATIO: 6. Pijuan v. Gurrea, GR L-21917, November 29, 1966 - CABUSORA
1. Blah 7. Cobarrubias v. Dizon, 76 Phil 209 (1946) - FUEGO
a. Sub Blah 8. Co v. Rosario et al., GR No. 160671, April 30, 2008 - CAPUCHINO
2. Concept
a. Explain explain RULE 81
1. Tan v. Go Chiong Lee, GR 21969, September 25, 1924 - SOLCO
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION? REVERSED? 2. Cosme de Mendoza v. Pacheco, 64 Phil 134 (1937) - CABOCHAN
3. Luzon Surety Co., Inc. v. Quebrar, 127 SCRA 295 (1984) - SY
DOCTRINE: etc etc etc
RULE 82
1. Co v. Rosario et al., GR No. 160671, April 30, 2008, supra
2. Ocampo v. Ocampo, GR 187879, July 5, 2010, supra

RULE 83
1. Hilado v. CA, GR 164108, May 8, 2009, supra
2. Aranas v. Mercado, GR 1516407, January 5, 2014 - REMOLLO, P.
3. Moore & Sons v. Wagner, GR L-25842, March 18, 1927 - DONES
4. Pijuan v. Gurrea, GR L-21917, November 29, 1966, supra
5. Santero v. CFI of Cavite, GR L-61700, September 14, 1987 - ONGSIAKO

RULE 84
1. San Diego v. Nombre, 11 SCRA 165 (1964) - CANDELARIA
2. Jaroda v. Cusi, 28 SCRA 1008 (1969) - UY
3. Mananquil v. Villegas, August 30, 1990 - TALION

RULE 85
1. De Gala-Sison v. Maddela, GR L-24584, October 30, 1975 - DOROJA
2. Tumang v. Laguio, GR 50277, February 14, 1980 - REMOLLO, D.
3. Quasha v. LCN Construction Corp., GR 174873, August 26, 2008 -
MAGISTRADO

1
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS JUDGE CARINGAL 3D 2020

2
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS JUDGE CARINGAL 3D 2020

Heirs of Castillo v. Gabriel, GR 162934, November 11, 2005
FACTS:
1. Crisanta Yanga-Gabriel, wife of Lorenzo Almoradie, died leaving behind a
sizable inheritance of real estate and shares of stock.
2. Her mother Crisanta Santiago Vda. De Yanga commenced an intestate
proceeding before Malabon RTC, alleging that to her knowledge, her
daughter died intestate leaving behind an estate worth 1,500,000 but was
being managed by her incompetent-son-in-law Lorenzo. She prayed that
letters of administration be issued to her son, Mariano Yanga, brother of
deceased. But RTC appointed Lorenzo as administrator
3. The marriage of decedent and Lorenzo was declared void for being
bigamous. RTC then removed Lorenzo and appointed Mariano as
administrator
4. Belinda Castillo, claiming to be the only legitimate child of Lorenzo and
Crisanta, filed a motion for intervention but such motion was held in
abeyance
5. Roberto Gabriel, the legally adopted son of Crisanta, filed before Malabon
RTC a petition for probate of an alleged will and issuance for letters
testamentary in his favor. He allegedly discovered his mother’s will which
institutes him as sole heir.
6. Heirs of Belinda, Bena Jean, prayed to be substituted in lieu of their late
mother Belinda
7. The 2 special proceedings were consolidated. RTC issued an order
dismissing the intestate proceeding involving Mariano Yanga. Probate court
appointed Roberto as special administrator of his mother’s estate. Mariano
questioned the dismissal to the CA.
8. Gabriel died and his widow, Dolores Gabriel, substituted him and alleged
that she had a degree in law, and asked the court to appoint her as
administratrix of estate of Crisanta
9. Bena Jean filed a motion for appointment as administrator of the estate of
her grandmother Crisanta Dolores opposed such motion claiming that Bena
Jean has neither proven her kinship with Crisanta nor shown any
qualification
10. RTC appointed Dolores as special administratrix. It merely noted that heirs
of Belina were mere strangers to the cause and that their case should be
ventilated in a separate proceeding
11. CA affirmed the RTC’s ruling and ruled that probate court did not commit
grave abuse in appointing Dolores as special administratrix
12. Petitioners argue that respondent doesn’t have any right to inherit from their
grandmother because she is not qualified to be appointed; that principal
consideration in appointment of administrator is the applicant’s interest
therein
1. The appointment of a special administrator lies in the sound discretion of the
probate court
2. A Special Administrator is a representative of a decedent appointed by
the probate court to care for and preserve his estate until an executor
or general administrator is appointed
1. When appointed, a special administrator is regarded NOT as a
representative of the agent of parties but as the administrator
in charge of the estate and as an officer of the court
2. He is subject to the supervision and control of the court and
expected to work for the best interests of entire estate,
especially administration and settlement
3. In appointing, Court does not determine the shares, but merely
appoints who is entitled to administer
2. Principal object of appointment of temporary administrator is to
preserve the estate until it can pass into the hands of person
authorized to administer it for the benefit of creditors and heirs
3. Occasion for such appointment arises where there is Delay in
administration—new Rules broadened such by including when there is
delay in granting letters testamentary or administration by any cause
4. Deceased Crisanta left a document purporting to be her will where her
adopted son Roberto was named as sole heir. However, Roberto died
pending probate, leaving his widow respondent Dolores—Dolores has much
stake even in the estate
5. Petitioners’ invocation of Sec. 6 Rule 78 is misplaced. Appointment of
special administrators is NOT governed by the rules regarding appointment
of regular administrators
DISPOSITION: Petition is DENIED.

ISSUES:
1. W/N the appointment of Dolores as special administratrix was proper? YES

RULING + RATIO:
3
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS JUDGE CARINGAL 3D 2020
Corona v. CA, GR L-59821, August 30, 1982
[Rowena F. Corona, Petitioners, v. The Court of Appeals, Romarico G. Vitug,
AVELINO L. CASTILLO, NICANOR CASTILLO, KATHLEEN D. LUCHANGCO,
GUILLERMO LUCHANGCO, JR., ANTONIO LUCHANGCO, RODOLFO TORRES,
REYNALDO TORRES and PURISIMA T. POLINTAN, Respondents.]
FACTS:
1. On November 10, 1980, Dolores Luchangco Vitug died in New York, U.S.A.,
leaving two Wills: one, a holographic Will dated October 3, 1980, which
excluded her husband, respondent Romarico G. Vitug, as one of her heirs,
and the other, a formal Will sworn to on October 24, 1980, or about three
weeks thereafter, which expressly disinherited her husband Romarico "for
reason of his improper and immoral conduct amounting to concubinage,
which is a ground for legal separation under Philippine Law
2. Decedent bequeathed her properties in equal shares to her sisters
Exaltacion L. Allarde, Vicenta L. Faustino and Gloria L. Teoxon, and her
nieces Rowena F. Corona and Jennifer F. Way
3. Decedent appointed Rowena F. Corona, herein petitioner, as her Executrix.
4. On November 21, 1980, Rowena filed a petition for the probate of the Wills
before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch VI and for the
appointment of Nenita P. Alonte as Administrator because she (Rowena) is
presently employed in the United Nations in New York City.
5. On December 2, 1980, upon Rowena's urgent Motion, the Probate Court
appointed Nenita P. Alonte as Special Administratrix, upon a P100,000.00
bond.
6. On December 12, 1980, the surviving husband, Romarico Vitug, filed an
"Opposition and Motion" and prayed that the Petition for Probate be denied
and that the two Wills be disallowed on the ground that they were procured
through undue and improper pressure and influence, having been executed
at a time when the decedent was seriously ill and under the medical care of
Dr. Antonio P. Corona,, petitioner's husband, and that the holographic Will
impaired his legitime.
7. Romarico further prayed for his appointment as Special Administrator
because the Special Administratrix appointed is not related to the heirs and
has no interest to be protected, besides, the surviving spouse is qualified to
administer.
8. Oppositions to probate with almost Identical arguments and prayers were
also filed by respondent (1) Avelino L. Castillo and Nicanor Castillo,
legitimate children of Constancia Luchangco, full blood sister of the
decedent; (2) Guillermo Luchangco, full blood brother of the decedent; (3)
Rodolfo Torres, Reynaldo Torres, and Purisima Torres Polintan, all
legitimate children of the deceased Lourdes Luchangco Torres, full blood
sister of the decedent.
9. On February 6, 1981, the Probate Court set aside its Order of December 2,
1980 appointing Nenita as Special Administratrix, and appointed instead the
surviving husband, Romarico as Special Administrator with a bond of
P200,000.00, essentially for the reasons that under Section 6, Rule 78, of
the Rules of Court, the surviving spouse is first in the order of preference for
appointment as Administrator as he has an interest in the estate; that the
disinheritance of the surviving spouse is not among the grounds of
disqualification for appointment as Administrator; that the next of kin is
appointed only where the surviving spouse is not competent or is unwilling to
serve besides the fact that the Executrix appointed, is not the next of kin but
merely a niece, and that the decedent's estate is nothing more than half of
the unliquidated conjugal partnership property.
10. Petitioner filed MR. Denied.
11. Petitioner resorted to certiorari before CA.
12. CA denied. Stating that Probate Court strictly observed the order of
preference established by the Rules. That petitioner though named Executrix
in the alleged will, declined the trust and instead nominated a stranger as
Special Administrator. That the surviving husband has legitimate interests to
protect which are not adverse to the decedent’s estate which is part of the
conjugal property. And that disinheritance is not a disqualification to
appointment as Special Administrator besides the fact that the legality of the
disinheritance would involve a determination of the intrinsic validity of the will
which is decidedly premature at this stage.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not the the order of preference laid down in the Rules should
not be followed where the surviving spouse is expressly disinherited, opposes
probate, and clearly possess an adverse interest to the estate which would disqualify
him from the trust?
RULING + RATIO:
1. Nenita F. Alonte should be appointed as co-Special Administrato with
Romarico. The executrix’s choice of Special Administrator, considering her
own inability to serve and the wide latitude of discretion given her by the
testratrix in her Will, is entitled to the highest consideration
2. Objections to Nenita's appointment on grounds of impracticality and lack of
kinship are over-shadowed by the fact that justice and equity demand that
the side of the deceased wife and the faction of the surviving husband be
represented in the management of the decedent's estate.
3. Special Administrators that while they may have respective interests to
protect, they are officers of the Court subject to the supervision and control
of the Probate Court and are expected to work for the best interests of the
entire estate, its smooth administration, and its earliest settlement.
DISPOSITIVE:
WHEREFORE, modifying the judgment under review, the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Branch VI, is hereby ordered, in Special Proceedings No. 9398 pending before
it, to appoint Nenita F. Alonte as co-Special Administrator, properly bonded, who shall
act as such jointly with the other Special Administrator on all matters affecting the
estate.
4
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS JUDGE CARINGAL 3D 2020

DOCTRINE:

The executrix's choice of Special Administrator, considering her own inability to serve
and the wide latitude of discretion given her by the testatrix in her Will (Annex "A-1"),
is entitled to the highest consideration. Objections to Nenita's appointment on
grounds of impracticality and lack of kinship are over-shadowed by the fact that
justice and equity demand that the side of the deceased wife and the faction of the
surviving husband be represented in the management of the decedent's estate.

5
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS JUDGE CARINGAL 3D 2020
Natividad Roxas v. Pecson (Maria and Pedro Roxas), GR L-2211, December 20,
1948
FACTS:
1. Pablo Roxas died leaving properties in Bulacan.
2. August 3, 1946: His brother and sister, the respondents Maria and Pedro
Roxas filed a petition for administration of Pablo’s estate in a special
intestate proceeding in CFI Bulacan wherein Maria Roxas, was appointed
special administratrix upon an ex parte petition.
3. August 10, 1946: Pablo’s widow, Petitioner Natividad Roxas, filed a petition
for the probate of Pablo’s alleged will and for her appointment as executrix
as designated in the will in the same CFI. (In the alleged will, ½ of the estate
goes to Natividad, and the other ½ to Reynaldo Roxas, Pablo’s adulterous
child). Upon agreement of the parties, the first special intestate proceeding
was dismissed and closed by the Court.
4. In view of the opposition to the probate of the will by the respondents Maria
and Pedro Roxas, the petitioner was appointed on September 10, 1946,
special administratrix and qualified as such over the objection of the
respondents Maria and Pedro Roxas, who sought the appointment of Maria
as such. The said respondents filed on October 21, 1946, a motion for
reconsideration of the order of the court appointing the petitioner as special
administratrix, with an alternative prayer that Maria Roxas be appointed as
special co-administratrix, which motion was not acted upon.
5. Respondent Judge Pecson, denied probate of the will on the ground that
the attesting witnesses did not sign their respective names in the presence
of the testator.
6. On December 29, 1947, the respondents Maria and Pedro Roxas renewed
their petition for the appointment of Maria Roxas as special administratrix or
special co-administratrix, and on May 5, 1948, the respondent judge
rendered his resolution appointing the petitioner Natividad I. Vda. de Roxas
as special administratrix only of all the conjugal properties of the deceased,
and Maria Roxas as special administratrix of all capital or properties
belonging exclusively to the deceased Pablo M. Roxas.
ISSUE: W/N Respondent Judge Pecson acted in excess of the court's jurisdiction in
appointing two special co-administratices of the estate of the deceased Pablo Roxas,
one of the capital or properties belonging exclusively to the deceased, and another of
his conjugal properties with his wife (now widow), the petitioner? YES
RULING + RATIO:
1. There is nothing wrong in that the respondent judge, in exercising his
discretion and appointing the petitioner as special administratrix, had taken
into consideration the beneficial interest of the petitioner in the estate of the
decedent and her being designated in the will as executrix thereof. But the
respondent's subsequent act of appointing her as special administratrix only
of the conjugal or community property, and Maria Roxas as special
administratrix of the capital or exclusive property of the decedent, does not
seem to be in conformity with logic or reason. The petitioner has or claims to
have the same beneficial interest after the decision of the court disapproving
the will, which is now pending on appeal, as she had prior to it, because the
decision is not yet final and may be reversed by the appellate court.
2. Besides, even if the will is not probated, the widow in the present case would
have, under the law, the right of usufruct over one-half of the exclusive
property of the decedent, besides her share in the conjugal partnership. The
beneficial interest required as a qualification for appointment as
administrator of the estate of a decedent is the interest in the whole estate
and not only in some part thereof. The petitioner being entitled to one-half in
usufruct of all the exclusive properties of the decedent, she would have as
much if not more interest in administering the entire estate correctly, in order
to reap the benefit of a wise, speedy, economical administration of the state,
and not suffer the consequences of the waste, improvidence or
mismanagement thereof. The good or bad administration of the property
may affect rather the fruits than the naked ownership of a property.
3. There is absolutely no reason for appointing two separate administrators,
specially if the estate to be settled is that of a deceased husband as in the
present case, for according to articles 1422 and 1423 of the Civil Code, only
after the dowry and parapherna of the wife and the debts, charges, and
obligations of the conjugal partnership have been paid, the capital or
exclusive property of the husband may be liquidated and paid in so far as
the inventoried estate may reach; and if the estate inventoried should not be
sufficient to pay the dowry and the parapherna of the wife and the debts,
charges and obligations of the partnership, the provision of Title XVII of the
Civil Code relating to concurrence and preference of credits shall be
observed. If two separate administrators are appointed as done in the
present case, in every action which one of them may institute to recover
properties or credit of the deceased, the defendant may raise the question or
set up the defense that the plaintiff has no cause of action, because the
property or credit in issue belongs to the class which is being administered
by the other administrator, which can not be done if the administrator of the
entire estate is only one.
4. As under the law only one general administrator may be appointed to
administer, liquidate and distribute the estate of a deceased spouse, it
clearly follows that only one special administrator may be appointed to
administer temporarily said estate, because a special administrator is but a
temporary administrator who is appointed to act in lieu of the general
administrator. "When there is delay in granting letters testamentary or of
administration occasioned by an appeal from the allowance or disallowance
of will, or from any other cause, the court may appoint a special
administrator to collect and take charge of the estate of the deceased until
the questions causing the delay are decided and executors or administrators
thereupon appointed," (sec. 1, Rule 81). Although his powers and duties are
limited to "collect and take charge of the goods, chattels, rights, credits, and
estate of the deceased and preserve the same for the executor or
administrator afterwards appointed, and for that purpose may commence
and maintain suits as administrator, and may sell such perishable and other
property as the court orders sold. A special administrator shall not be liable
to pay any debts of the deceased." (Section 2, Rule 81.)
6
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS JUDGE CARINGAL 3D 2020

DISPOSITION: In view of all the foregoing, we hold that the court below has no power
to appoint two special administratrices of the estate of a deceased husband or wife,
one of the community property and another of the exclusive property of the decedent,
and therefore the respondent judge acted in excess of the court's jurisdiction in
rendering or issuing the order complained of, and therefore said order is hereby set
aside, with costs against the respondents. So ordered.

5.

net

7
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS JUDGE CARINGAL 3D 2020
Ocampo v. Ocampo, GR 187879, July 5, 2010
FACTS:
1. Vicente and Maxima Ocampo are spouses. They died intestate and left their
properties to their three kids, Leonardo, Renato, and Erlinda
2. The kids did not partition the property. Rather, they co-administered the
properties, and split the income into three.
3. When Leonardo died, he left his wife and his children.
4. Leonardo’s wife filed for the intestate proceedings of his husband.
a. She alleged that after Leonardo’s death his siblings took
possession of Vicente and Maxima’s properties to the exclusion of
Leonardo’s heirs
b. She asked for the settlement of Vicente and Maxima’s estate, and
asked to be the administrator of Leonardo’s estate
5. Leonardo’s siblings, Renato and Erlinda, opposed the petition saying it was
defective for asking for the settlement of two estates. They further argued
that Leonardo’s estate settlement is premature because it can only be
determined after the settlement of Vicente’s and Maxima’s estate. They also
asked to be the special joint administrator of the estate of Vicente.
RTC
1. RTC denied the opposition and ruled in favor of Leonardo’s wife. Upon MR,
RTC appointed the wife and the brother as special joint administrators.
2. Leonardo’s siblings, Renato and Erlinda, asked for another MT, saying
Dalisay is an incompetent administrator— she even failed to take care of her
husband Leonardo while the latter was paralysed. RTC revoked the wife’s
appointment, and appointed the sister in her stead. The siblings became
joint administrators.
3. There were many issues in the RTC, among which was the siblings asking
exemption from posting the bond.
4. The siblings also asked for the revocation of the special administratorship
and asked instead for the regular administratorship of the estate. They said
the special administratorship is NOT necessary, since it’s not a complex
estate. They allege that to make it a special administratorship would only
prolong the settlement.
5. RTC granted the motion, but did not rule on the bond exemption. They
revoked the special adminstratorship of the siblings since they failed to post
a bond and submit the inventory. RTC made Leonardo’s child Melinda the
administrator.
CA
1. CA ruled that RTC abused its discretion when it revoked the sibling’s special
administratorship and vested regular administratorship to Leonardo’s child,
when it didn’t even rule on the bond exemption. The posting of the bond is a
prerequisite before the siblings could enter their duties and responsibilities,
particularly their submission of an inventory of the properties of the estate
and an income statement thereon.
ISSUE: W/N the court should have acted with grave abuse of discretion in revoking
the appointment of Renato and Erlinda as joint special administrators? NO.
HELD:
1. The court ruled that the trial court did not act with grave abuse of discretion
in revoking the appointment of the respondents as special administrators.
2. A special administrator is an officer of the court who is subject to its
supervision and control, expected to work for the best interest of the entire
estate, with a view to its smooth administration and speedy settlement.
When appointed, he or she is not regarded as an agent or representative of
the parties suggesting the appointment. The principal object of the
appointment of a temporary administrator is to preserve the estate until it
can pass to the hands of a person fully authorized to administer it for the
benefit of creditors and heirs, pursuant to Section 2 of Rule 80 of the Rules
of Court.
3. While the RTC considered that respondents were the nearest of kin to their
deceased parents in their appointment as joint special administrators, this is
not a mandatory requirement for the appointment.
4. The selection or removal of special administrators is not governed by the
rules regarding the selection or removal of regular administrators. The
probate court may appoint or remove special administrators based on
grounds other than those enumerated in the Rules at its discretion. As long
as the discretion is exercised without grave abuse, and is based on reason,
equity, justice, and legal principles, interference by higher courts is
unwarranted. The appointment or removal of special administrators, being
discretionary, is thus interlocutory and may be assailed through a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
5. Pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 81, the bond secures the performance of the
duties and obligations of an administrator namely:
a. to administer the estate and pay the debts;
b. to perform all judicial orders;
c. to account within one (1) year and at any other time when required
by the probate court; and (4) to make an inventory within three (3)
months.
6. More specifically, per Section 4 of the same Rule, the bond is conditioned on
the faithful execution of the administration of the decedents estate requiring
the special administrator to
a. make and return a true inventory of the goods, chattels, rights,
credits, and estate of the deceased which come to his possession
or knowledge;
b. truly account for such as received by him when required by the
court; and
c. deliver the same to the person appointed as executor or regular
administrator, or to such other person as may be authorized to
receive them.
7. The administration bond is for the benefit of the creditors and the heirs, as it
compels the administrator, whether regular or special, to perform the trust
reposed in, and discharge the obligations incumbent upon, him.
8
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS JUDGE CARINGAL 3D 2020

8. Its object and purpose is to safeguard the properties of the decedent, and,
therefore, the bond should not be considered as part of the necessary
expenses chargeable against the estate, not being included among the acts
constituting the care, management, and settlement of the estate. Moreover,
the ability to post the bond is in the nature of a qualification for the office of
administration.

On Melinda’s appointment
1. On the other hand, the Court finds the RTCs designation of Melinda as
regular administratrix improper and abusive of its discretion.
2. There was no petition for letters of administration with respect to Melinda, as
the prayer for her appointment as co-administrator was embodied in the
motion for the termination of the special administration.
3. The prayer for the appointment of Melinda as regular administratrix of the
estate was not specifically traversed in the said pleading, and there’s no
hearing conducted to ascertain whether she was fitting to be an
administrator. Thus, the capacity, competency, and legality of Melindas
appointment as such was not properly objected to by respondents despite
being the next of kin to the decedent spouses, and was not threshed out by
the RTC acting as a probate court in accordance with the above mentioned
Rules.
4. However, to put an end to the squabbles of the heirs, we take into account
the fact that Melinda already posted the required bond of 200k, and the
Letters of Administration were issued to her the following day, and that she
filed an Inventory of the Properties.
5. These acts clearly manifested her intention to serve willingly as
administratrix of the decedents estate, but her appointment should be
converted into one of special administration, pending the proceedings for
regular administration. Furthermore, since it appears that the only unpaid
obligation is the hospital bill due from Leonardos estate, which is not subject
of this case, judicial partition may then proceed with dispatch.

DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision

dated December 16, 2008 and the Resolution dated April 30, 2009 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 104683 are AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the
Order dated March 13, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 24, Bian, Laguna,
with respect to the revocation of the special administration in favor of Renato M.
Ocampo and Erlinda M. Ocampo, is REINSTATED. The appointment of Melinda
Carla E. Ocampo as regular administratrix is SET ASIDE. Melinda is designated
instead as special administratrix of the estate under the same administrators bond
she had posted. The trial court is directed to conduct with dispatch the proceedings
for the appointment of the regular administrator and, thereafter, to proceed with
judicial partition. No costs.

9
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS JUDGE CARINGAL 3D 2020
Tan v. Gedorio, Jr., GR 166520, March 14, 2008
FACTS:
1. Gerardo Tan died intestate. On 31 October 2001, private respondents
(illegitimate children of Gerardo Tan) filed with the RTC a Petition for the
issuance of letters of administration.
2. Petitioners, on the other hand, claiming to be the legitimate heirs, filed an
opposition.
3. The illegitimate children then moved for the appointment of a special
administrator, asserting the need for a special administrator to take
possession and charge of Gerardo’s estate until the Petition can be resolved
by the RTC or until the appointment of a regular administrator. They also
prayed that their attorney Romualdo be appointed as the special
administrator
4. The legitimate children again filed an opposition and argued that none of the
private respondents can be appointed as the special administrator since they
are not residing in the country and they requested that their co-petitioner
should be the special administrator since she has been the de facto
administratrix since Gerardo’s death
5. The Court-appointed commissioner then issued directives to Vilma in her
capacity as de facto administratrix which she failed to comply with.
6. More than a year later, the RTC gave Vilma to comply with the directive but
still no compliance was made so it appointed Romualdo as the special
administrator.
7. Petitioners opposed the said RTC order and appealed with the CA.
Petitioners contend that they should be given priority in the selection of a
special administrator of the estate since they are allegedly the legitimate
heirs of the late Gerardo, as opposed to private respondents, who are
purportedly Gerardo’s illegitimate children. Petitioners rely on the doctrine
that generally, it is the nearest of kin, whose interest is more preponderant,
who is preferred in the choice of administrator of the decedent’s estate.
8. CA: denied appeal
ISSUES:
1. WON the Petitioners (legitimate children) should be given priority in the
selection of a special administrator -- NO
RULING + RATIO:
1. The preference under Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court for the next of
kin refers to the appointment of a regular administrator, and not of a special
administrator, as the appointment of the latter lies entirely in the discretion
of the court, and is not appealable.
2. We agree with the Court of Appeals that there was no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of respondent Judge Gedorio in affirming Judge
Menchavez’s appointment of Romualdo as special administrator. Judge
Menchavez clearly considered petitioner Vilma for the position of special
administratrix of Gerardo’s estate, but decided against her appointment
because Vilma was already given enough time to comply with the directive
given to her but to no avail.
3. We also find immaterial the fact that private respondents reside abroad, for
the same cannot be said as regards their attorney-in-fact, Romualdo, who is,
after all, the person appointed by the RTC as special administrator. It is
undisputed that Romualdo resides in the country and can, thus, personally
administer Gerardos estate.
4. If petitioners really desire to avail themselves of the order of preference
provided in Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, so that petitioner Vilma
as the supposed next of kin of the late Gerardo may take over administration
of Gerardo’s estate, they should already pursue the appointment of a regular
administrator and put to an end the delay which necessitated the
appointment of a special administrator.
5. The appointment of a special administrator is justified only when there is
delay in granting letters, testamentary (in case the decedent leaves behind a
will) or administrative (in the event that the decedent leaves behind no will,
as in the Petition at bar) occasioned by any cause. The principal object of
the appointment of a temporary administrator is to preserve the estate until it
can pass into the hands of a person fully authorized to administer it for the
benefit of creditors and heirs.
DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari is
DENIED. The Decision dated 29 July 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
79335 affirming the Order dated 17 July 2003 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Ormoc City, in SP. PROC. No. 4014-0 denying reconsideration of its Order dated 12
June 2003, whereby it appointed Romualdo D. Lim as special administrator of the
estate of Gerardo Tan, is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
DOCTRINE: The preference under Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court for the
next of kin refers to the appointment of a regular administrator, and not of a special
administrator, as the appointment of the latter lies entirely in the discretion of the
court, and is not appealable.
10
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS JUDGE CARINGAL 3D 2020

Pijuan v. Gurrea, GR L-21917, November 29, 1966
FACTS:
1. Appellant Manuela Ruiz and Carlos Gurrea were married in Spain until 1945
when he abandoned her and came, with their son Teodoro, to the
Philippines
2. Here he lived maritally with Rizalina Perez, by whom he had two (2) children.
3. Having been informed by her son Teodoro, years later, that his father was
residing in Pontevedra, Negros Occidental, Manuela came to the Philippines
but, Carlos refused to admit her to his residence thus she stayed with their
son, Teodoro, in Bacolod City.
4. Manuela instituted against Carlos a case for support and the annulment of
some alleged donations of conjugal property, in favor of his common-law
wife, Rizalina.
5. Court issued an order granting Mrs. Gurrea a monthly alimony, pendente
lite, of P2K, but was reduced by the CA to P1K.
6. Carlos Gurrea died leaving a document, allegedly his last will and testament,
where Marcelo Pijuan was named as executor and Manuela and Teodora
were disinherited.
7. Pijuan petitioned for the probate of said will. Pijuan was appointed special
administrator without bond.
8. Manuela, Teodoro and Pilar Gurrea (allegedly an illegitimate child of
decedent) opposed the probate.
9. Manuela filed in a special proceeding motion praying that the Special
Administrator be ordered to continue paying it (Fact #5) pending the final
determination of the case. Motion denied. Thus she filed to be appointed as
administratrix but denied as well.
ISSUE:
1. WON Manuela should still receive monthly alimony, pendente lite and P1K
monthly. – YES. (Not really important. May be skipped)
2. WON Manuela should be named as executor. – NO.
clear to us that the continuation of the monthly alimony, pendente lite, and P1K is fairly
justified.
3. (Second Issue) Manuela, as widow of the deceased, claims a right of
preference under Sec. 6, Rule 78, Revised Rules of Court. In the language
of this provision, said preference exists "if no executor is named in the
will or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or
fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate." None of these conditions
obtains in the case at bar.
4. The deceased Carlos Gurrea has left a document purporting to be his will,
which, seemingly, is still pending probate. So, it cannot be said, as yet, that
he has died intestate. Again, said document names Marcelo Pijuan as
executor thereof, and it is not claimed that he is incompetent therefor.
5. What is more, he has not only not refused the trust, but, has, also, expressly
accepted it, by applying for his appointment as executor, and upon his
appointment as special administrator, has assumed the duties thereof.
6. It may not be amiss to note that the preference accorded by the
aforementioned provision of the Rules of Court to the surviving spouse
refers to the appointment of a regular administrator or administratrix,
not to that of a special administrator, and that the order appointing the
latter lies within the discretion of the probate court, and is not appealable.
DISPOSITION: Modified the decision only with respect to the Manuela being entitled
to the monthly alimony, pendente lite and P1K monthly.
DOCTRINE: It may not be amiss to note that the preference accorded by the
aforementioned provision of the Rules of Court to the surviving spouse refers
to the appointment of a regular administrator or administratrix, not to that of a
special administrator, and that the order appointing the latter lies within the
discretion of the probate court, and is not appealable.

HELD + RATIO:
1. (First Issue) TC erred when it held that pursuant to Article 188 of our Civil Code
(Article 1430 of the Spanish Civil Code), the support of a surviving spouse constitutes,
not an encumbrance upon the estate of the decedent, but merely an advance from her
share of said estate, and that Manuela is not entitled to such advance, there being
neither allegation nor proof that he had contributed any paraphernal property to said
estate or that the same includes properties forming part of the conjugal partnership
between her and the deceased citing Manresa.
2. Court held that on account of the absence of proof as regards the status, nature or
character of the property courts are bound by law to assume that the estate of the
deceased consists of property belonging to the conjugal partnership, one-half of which
belongs presumptively to Manuela, aside from such part of the share of the deceased
in said partnership as may belong to her as one of his compulsory heirs, if his alleged
will were not allowed so probate, or even if probated, if the provision therein
disinheriting her were nullified. Inasmuch as the aforementioned estate is worth
P205,397.64, according to the inventory submitted by the special administrator, it is

11
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS JUDGE CARINGAL 3D 2020
Cobarrubias v. Dizon, 76 Phil 209 (1946)
FACTS:
1. In the special performance proceeding entitled Intestado de la Finada Pilar
Leyba y Cobarrubias, which started on 05 July 1945, Magdalena
Cobarrubias presented on the same date an urgent motion, alleging that
Pilar Leyba had deposited jewelry worth P4,500 in the security section of
BPI.
a. That BPI notified all interested parties that they withdrew the
contents of their section within the shortest possible time, for
which reason Magdalena asked to be named a special
administrator, and that she was authorized to remove said jewelry
from the bank.
2. On that same day, Judge Dizon named Magdalena as special
administrator on bond of P200.
3. The next day, Judge Dizon authorized the special administrator to withdraw
from the bank's security section the jewelry deposited, with instructions to
report to the Court within 48 the result of its management.
4. On July 13, Magdalena asked the Court to order the suspension and the
postponement of the hearing of the petition, indicated for 28 July 1945,
until further notice, because she "wishes to have time to settle with her
coheirs an extra-judicial partition.
5. Upon learning of the true facts that are contrary to the allegations made by
Magdalena in her request, the court revoked the orders naming Magdalena
as special administrator and authorizing her to remove the jewelry,
respectively.
6. On July 19, Magdalena petitioned the Court for the cancellation of the
P200 bond and its return, since the Court has vacated its order dated July
5 of that year.
7. The next day, Magdalena submitted a duly sworn affidavit stating that the
only heirs of the late Pilar Leyba are her daughters Rosario and
Carmencita, and that she renounces in favor of the two minor children all
rights, interest and participation that she may have or could have in the
property left by the deceased Pilar Leyba.
8. At the hearing held on 28 July 1945, the applicant's attorney requested
that the petition for intestate proceeding be amended.
9. On 28 August 1945, Judge Dizon issued an order declaring that:
a. All the properties mentioned in the 05 July 1945 application as
amended, belong to the minors Rosario and Carmen, nine and six
years of age;
b. The plot of land with a house of materials strong has already been
transferred in the name of said minors;
c. The furniture corresponding to items 2, 3 and 7 have already been
sold by the deceased
d. There is no other property that should be administered in the
name of said deceased;
e. To protect the In the interest of said minors, the proceeding
for intestacy be one for guardianship.
10. Current petition is based on the fact that the aforementioned minors
Rosario and Carmen are the absolute owners of all the properties
described, and that Magdalena petitioned that she be appointed guardian
of said minors by the Court. Denied.
11. MR denied Judge Ocampo (case silent re: reason for change of judge;
theory: Magdalena appealed to a higher court where Ocampo was judge –
he denied both appeal and MR).
ISSUE: WON Judges Dizon and Ocampo acted outside their jurisdiction in
issuing their orders and decisions (particularly the one revoking Magdalena’s
appointment as special administrator) -- NO.
RATIO:
1. The power of the CFI to revoke the appointment of an administrator when
the appointment has been obtained through false or incorrect
representations is indisputable.
2. When the Court appointed the appellant special administrator with
authorization to withdraw from the bank goods valued at P4,500 under a
P200 bond, it took into account her essential claim that "she was the sole
heiress of the deceased." There was no danger of possible embezzlement.
The court could still name her without bail.
3. But upon receiving a report that this allegation was inaccurate, a report
confirmed by the motion of the same applicant that requested the
"suspension of the publication and postponement of the hearing" because
he wished "to have time to arrange consensus co-heirs an extrajudicial
partition," the court had plenty of reasons to revoke these orders even
without notifying the administrator, since the intestate is not initiated for the
benefit of the administrators but of the heirs.
a. The Court should act immediately and not jeopardize, with its
indifference, the jewels.
4. The position of special administrator is a trustworthy one. As soon the
confidence in the integrity of the special administrator is lost, the Court is
fully justified in revoking the appointment as a special administrator and, in
this case, voiding its authorization to remove the jewelry from the bank.
5. When the Court declared that all the properties mentioned in the
application of 05 July 1945 as amended belong to the minors Rosario and
Carmen, it took into account all the statements made by Magdalena under
oath in her motion of 20 July 1945, and approved in the minors’ favor all
the rights, interest and participation that Magdalena has and could have in
the property left by the deceased Pilar Leyba "
a. Magdalena is thus estopped. Any attempt to withdraw said
resignation after approved by the Court is inadmissible.
6. Judicial performance is not Penelope’s cloth (taray ng pa-The Odyssey
reference!) that is woven and unweaved to the liking of one of the parties.
7. The judicial declaration of heirs that the appellant asked in her
supplementary report is no longer valid since the applicant "has already
renounced in favor of the minors Rosario and Carmen all the rights,
12
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS JUDGE CARINGAL 3D 2020

interest and participation that she has and could have in the property left by
the deceased Pilar Leyba."
8. If the resignation has been approved by the Court in its order of 28 August
1945, what interest or participation still remains for Magdalena? Absolutely
nothing.
a. It is useless, then, any discussion about who are the heirs of the
late Leyba. The appellant's statements that she "was the only heir
apparent" (original request); that "he wanted to arrange with her
co-heirs an extra-judicial partition" (Motion of July 13, 1945); "that
the sole heirs of the late Pilar Leyba are her daughters Rosario
and Carmencita" and "that she renounces in favor of these two
minors all rights, interests and interests that she has or could
have in the property left by the late Pilar Leyba" ( Motion of July
20, 1945), put her in an untenable situation.

DISPOSITION: The petition is denied with the costs against the appellant.

DOCTRINE:
The position of special administrator is a trustworthy one. As soon the confidence in
the integrity of the special administrator is lost, the Court is fully justified in revoking
the appointment as a special administrator.

13
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS JUDGE CARINGAL 3D 2020
Co v. Rosario et al., GR No. 160671, April 30, 2008
FACTS:
1. (RTC) OF Makati City, Branch 66, in Sp. Proc. No. M-4615, appointed
petitioner and Vicente O. Yu, Sr. as the special administrators of the estate
of the petitioner's father, Co Bun Chun
2. Petitioner consequently, nominated his son, Alvin Milton Co (Alvin, for
brevity), for appointment as co-administrator of the estate
3. RTC RULED - appointed Alvin as special co-administrator
4. RTC RULED - the RTC, acting on a motion filed by one of the heirs, issued
order revoking and setting aside the appointment of Alvin.
a. The trial court reasoned that Alvin had become unsuitable to
discharge the trust given to him as special co-administrator
because his capacity, ability or competence to perform the
functions of co-administrator had been beclouded by the
filing of several criminal cases against him, which, even if
there was no conviction yet, had provided the heirs ample
reason to doubt his fitness to handle the subject estate with
utmost fidelity, trust and confidence
5. CA RULED - the appellate court affirmed the revocation of the appointment
and dismissed the petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the revocation / removal of Alvin as a special co-
administrator is proper? – YES
RULING + RATIO:
1. We affirm the appellate court's ruling that the trial court did not act with
grave abuse of discretion in revoking Alvin's appointment as special co-
administrator.
2. Settled is the rule that the selection or removal of special administrators is
not governed by the rules regarding the selection or removal of
regular administrators
3. Courts may appoint or remove special administrators based on
grounds other than those enumerated in the Rules, at their discretion.
As long as the said discretion is exercised without grave abuse,
higher courts will not interfere with it.
4. Thus, even if a special administrator had already been appointed, once the
court finds the appointee no longer entitled to its confidence, it is justified in
withdrawing the appointment and giving no valid effect thereto
a. In this case, we find that the trial court's judgment on the issue of
Alvin's removal as special co-administrator is grounded on
reason, equity, justice and legal principle. It is not characterized
by patent and gross capriciousness, pure whim and abuse,
arbitrariness or despotism
5. Lower court took into consideration the fiduciary nature of the office
of a special administrator which demands a high degree of trust and
confidence in the person to be appointed
a. The court a quo observed that, burdened with the criminal
charges of falsification of commercial documents leveled against
him (sic), and the corresponding profound duty to defend himself
in these proceedings, Alvin Milton Co's ability and qualification to
act as special co-administrator of the estate of the decedent are
beclouded, and the recall of his appointment is only proper under
the attendant circumstances.
6. The Court finds no grave abuse of discretion attending such ruling, as it
was reached based on the court a quo's own fair assessment of the
circumstances attending the case below, and the applicable laws
7. As a final note, the Court observes that this prolonged litigation on the
simple issue of the removal of a special co-administrator could have been
avoided if the trial court promptly appointed a regular administrator. We,
therefore, direct the trial court to proceed with the appointment of a regular
administrator as soon as practicable.
DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is hereby
DENIED. The October 28, 2003 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
72055 is AFFIRMED
DOCTRINES:
1. Settled is the rule that the selection or removal of special administrators is
not governed by the rules regarding the selection or removal of
regular administrators
2. Courts may appoint or remove special administrators based on
grounds other than those enumerated in the Rules, at their discretion.
As long as the said discretion is exercised without grave abuse,
higher courts will not interfere with it.
3. Lower court took into consideration the fiduciary nature of the office
of a special administrator which demands a high degree of trust and
confidence in the person to be appointed
14
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS JUDGE CARINGAL 3D 2020
Tan v. Go Chiong Lee, GR 21969, September 25, 1924
FACTS
1. In 1920, Go Bung Kiu died in China. His encargado Go Chiong Lee was
appointed special administrator of his estate, with 3 other Chinese people
as sureties on his bond in the sum of P30,000. A month later, Go Chiong
Lee's status was changed to that of administrator. He filed a motion that
he be allowed to operate two stores belonging to the estate, one in
Cebu City and the other in Toledo, Cebu. The court granted the motion
but the judge added in ink a condition to his order (in Spanish) to the effect
that a report must be filed monthly. Another bond also in the amount of
P30,000 and with the same sureties were filed by the administrator, and
letters of administration were issued in his favor. Go Chiong Lee continued
to discharge his duties as administrator until he was relieved by Maximina
Tan in 1921 (case didn’t say why). Until being replaced, he filed 3 reports
each covering periods more than a month long.
2. The committee on claims rendered its report in 1921, admitting as proved,
claims amounting to P69,029.91. The court thus issued an order to Go
Chiong Lee to pay each and every of the persons mentioned in the report
the whole amount appearing therein without any preference either as to
the amount or as to the time of payment. Go Chiong Lee paid the
creditors of the estate P16,700.39. It appeared that during his
administration, the estate lost over P19,000 as the two stores hardly made
any sales such that the one in Toledo was closed.
3. Maximina Tan now sues Go Chiong Lee and his sureties on four causes of
action (enumerated in the issues), on amounts totaling P54,700. The trial
court awarded P42,849.08 but limited the liabilities of the sureties to
P30,000. Hence this petition by Tan
ISSUES
A. WON Go Chiong Lee is liable for the business losses incurred by the
estate during his administration. (1st and 3rd COA) NO
B. WON Go Chiong Lee is liable for 850 sacks of corn, valued at P6,375,
which he failed to inventory. (2nd COA) YES
C. WON Go Chiong Lee is liable for the fact that while some of the creditors
have been paid entirely and others partially, some of them received
absolutely nothing on account of the hit and miss method he followed. (4 th
COA) NO
HELD
A. NO.
1. The standard of responsibility of the administrator is best measured
as in essence the responsibility of a bailee. Like any bailee, he must
pursue his discretion honestly and in good faith, or he will become
personally liable, to those who are interested in the estate, for waste,
conversion, or embezzlement. But where an administrator, entrusted
with the carrying on of an estate, acts in good faith and in accordance
with the usual rules and methods obtaining in such business, he will
not be held liable for losses incurred.
2. Tan argues that the losses could have been prevented had Go Chiong Lee
submitted the reports demanded of him faithfully. On the contrary, the
losses sustained by the estate resulted from the risk necessarily attending
the operation of the two stores is a much more reasonable assumption.
The personal responsibility of the former administrator and the sureties on
his bond for these losses incurred by the estate during his administration
has not been proved because there is no proof of bad faith in managing the
two stores.
B. YES.
1. An administrator who has qualified shall, within 3 months after his
appointment, return to the court a true inventory of the real estate and
of the goods, chattels, rights, and credits of the deceased, which
come into his possession or knowledge. The administrator shall be
chargeable in his account with the goods, chattels, rights, and credits
of the deceased, which come into his possession. The administrator
is accountable on his bond along with the sureties for the
performance of these legal obligations.
2. The issue is one of fact. The Court follows the findings of the trial court if
proof to substantiate such findings appears in the record. Here, such proof
exists, which means that the judgment appealed from must be affirmed in
this respect.
C. NO.
1. A personal representative will be protected in the payment of a claim
which has been duly allowed or ordered paid by the court, although it
should not have been paid in full, unless it is made to appear that
such allowance of the claim, or order for the payment thereof, was
obtained through his collusion or bad faith.
2. After reading the order of the trial court relating to the distribution of the
assets among the creditors, the impression of the Court is that the
administrator, although unwisely, attempted to follow the order (which
didn’t specify any preference) to the best of his ability. Moreover, it is not
at all certain that the estate will finally show enough on the profit side of the
ledger either to pay all of the creditors to the full extent of their claims, or to
give to most of the creditors who have not been paid a proportion similar to
that of the creditors who have been paid. In these same proceedings, the
administratrix on her motion, or the creditors at their initiative, may recover
the excess imprudently paid out to certain creditors.
DISPOSITION: Judgment is modified. The plaintiff shall only recover the amount of
P6,375 (2nd COA re the 850 sacks of corn) with legal interest from the date the
complaint was presented.
15
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS JUDGE CARINGAL 3D 2020
Cosme de Mendoza v. Pacheco, 64 Phil 134 (1937)
FACTS:
1. Manuel Soriano was former administrator of the estate of Baldomero
Cosme in civil case No. 5494, Court of First Instance of Laguna.
a. He filed a bond for P5,000, with the herein appellants, Januario
Pacheco and Raymundo Cordero, as sureties.
2. Soriano though was indebted to the estate in the sum of P23,603.21.
Unable to turn this amount over to the estate upon demand of Rosario
Cosme, the new administratrix, the lower court ordered the execution of his
bond, with notice to the Sureties.
3. Later, the court approved a settlement had between the adminstratrix and
the ex-administrator, whereby the latter ceded certain real properties to the
estate reducing on that account his indebtedness to the estate from
P23,603.21 to P5,000.
4. Separate motions to he discharged from the bond were filed by sureties
Pacheco and Cordero. Both motions were denied. A motion by Cordero to
reconsider the order of denial met a like fate. Brought on appeal to this
court, the appeal was dismissed.
5. When the case was remanded to the lower court, the sureties filed a
motion challenging, for the first time, the jurisdiction of the trial court to
issue the order of November 4, 1932, executing the bond. The trial court
denied the motion in view of the decision of this court. The case is elevated
here for the second time on appeal.
ISSUES:
1. WON the CFI of Laguna possessed jurisdiction to order the execution
of the administrator’s bond? YES.
RULING + RATIO:
1. It is clear that a Court of First Instance, exercising probate jurisdiction, is
empowered to require the filing of the administrator's bond, to fix the
amount thereof, and to hold it accountable for any breach of the
administrator's duty. Possessed, as it is, with an all-embracing power over
the administrator's bond and over administration proceedings, a Court of
First Instance in a probate proceeding cannot be devoid of legal authority
to execute and make that bond answerable for the very purpose for which
it was filed. It is true that the law does not say expressly or in so many
words that such court has power to execute the bond of an administrator,
but by necessary and logical implication, the power is there as eloquently
as if it were phrased in unequivocal term.
a. It should be observed that section 683 of the Code of Civil
Procedure provides that "Upon the settlement of the account of an
executor or administrator, trustee, or guardians, a person liable as
surety in respect to such amount may, upon application, be
admitted as a party to such accounting, and may have the right to
appeal as hereinafter provided." There is here afforded to a
person who may be held liable as surety in respect to an
administrator's account the right, upon application, to be admitted
as a party to their accounting, from which we may not
unreasonably infer that a surety, like the appellants in the case
before us, may be charged with liability upon the bond during the
process of accounting.
b. "Probate and like courts have a special jurisdiction only, and their
powers as to ancillary or incidental questions must of necessity to
exercise within certain limitations; but such powers include the
right to try questions which arise incidentally in a cause over
which such courts have jurisdiction and the determination of which
are necessary to a lawful exercise of the powers expressly
conferred in arriving at a decision… And it has been held that
statutes conferring jurisdiction on such courts, being remedial and
for the advancement of justice, should receive a favorable
construction, such as will give them the force and efficiency
intended by the legislature.
c. The questions raised in the appeal at bar, appellant's second
attempt to go about and frustrate the order in question, could have
been passed upon once for all in the case referred to. We cannot
encourage a practice that trenches violently upon the settled
jurisprudence of this court that the policy and purpose of
administration proceedings is ". . . to close up, and not to continue
an estate . . ."
DISPOSITION: The order appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against the
appellants. So ordered.
DOCTRINE: It is clear that a Court of First Instance, exercising probate jurisdiction,
is empowered to require the filing of the administrator's bond, to fix the amount
thereof, and to hold it accountable for any breach of the administrator's duty.
Possessed, as it is, with an all-embracing power over the administrator's bond and
over administration proceedings, a Court of First Instance in a probate proceeding
cannot be devoid of legal authority to execute and make that bond answerable for
the very purpose for which it was filed. It is true that the law does not say expressly
or in so many words that such court has power to execute the bond of an
administrator, but by necessary and logical implication, the power is there as
eloquently as if it were phrased in unequivocal term.
16
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS JUDGE CARINGAL 3D 2020
Luzon Surety Co., Inc. (plaintiff-appellee) v. Pastor T. Quebrar and Francisco
Kilayko (defendant-appellants), 127 SCRA 295 (1984)
1. Luzon Surety Company, Inc. (plaintiff-appellee) issued in 1954 two
administrator's bond of P15,000.00 each, in behalf of the defendant-
appellant Pastor T. Quebrar, as administrator in 2 Special Proceedings
cases of the CFI of Negros Occidental, entitled " Re Testate Estate of A. B.
Chinsuy," and Re Testate Estate of Cresenciana Lipa," respectively.
a. In the suretyship arrangement, Luzon Surety was bound solidarily
with defendant appellant Pastor T. Quebrar, the latter, together with
Francisco Kilayko, executed 2 indemnity agreements, where
among other things, they agreed:
i. to jointly and severally to pay the Luzon Surety P300 in
advance as premium thereof for every 12 months or
fraction thereof while the agreements or a renewal or
substitution thereof is in effect.
ii. to indemnify Luzon Surety against any and all damages,
charges, and expenses, whatsoever, including the 15% of
the amount involved in any litigation, for attorney's fees.
2. For the first year (Aug. 1954 to Aug. 1955): Quebrar and Kilayko
(defendants-appellants) paid P304.50 under each indemnity agreement or a
total of P609.00 (P304.50 x 2) for premiums and documentary stamps.
3. CFI of Negros Occidental approved the amended Project of Partition and
Accounts of Quebrar and Kilayko in 1957.
4. Luzon Surety demanded in 1962 from Quebrar and Kilayko the payment of
the premiums and documentary stamps from Aug. 1955 .
a. Then, Quebrar and Kilayko ordered a motion for cancellation and/or
reduction of executor's bonds on the ground that "the heirs of these
testate estates have already received their respective shares."
Thereafter, the CFI, acting on the motion, ordered the bonds
cancelled.
5. Luzon Surety’s demand amounted to P2,436.00 (P304.50 x 8 years) in each
case, hence, a total of P4,872.00 for the period of Aug. 1955 to Oct. 1962.
Quebrar and Kilayko to pay the said amount of P4,872.00.
6. Luzon Surety in 1963 filed the case with the CFI of Manila.
a. Quebrar and Kilayko offered P1,800.00 by way of amicable
settlement which the Luzon Surety refused.
7. CFI of Manila allowed Luzon Surety to recover from Quebrar and Kilayko,
finding both liable under the Indemnity Agreements, even though that they
have not expressly sought the renewal of these bonds because the same
were in force and effect until they were cancelled by order of the Court.
8. CA certified the case to the SC after finding that this case involves only
errors or questions of law.
ISSUE: W/N the administrator's bonds were in force and effect from and after the
year that they were filed and approved by the court in 1957 up to the time when they
were cancelled in 1962. — YES.
RULING & RATIO:
1. The bonds herein were required by Section 1 of Rule 81 of the Rules of
Court.
2. While a bond is nonetheless a contract because it is required by
statute, the statute which requires the giving of a bond becomes a part
of the bond and imparts into the bond any conditions prescribed by the
statute.
3. The bonds in question herein contain practically the very same conditions in
Sec. 1, Rule 81 of the Rules of Court. Pertinent provision of the
administrator's bonds is as follows:
a. “Therefore, if the said Pastor T. Quebrar faithfully prepares and
presents to the Court, within three months from the date of his
appointment, a correct inventory of all the property of the
deceased ...; faithfully pays all the debts, legacies, and bequests
which encumber said estate, pays whatever dividends which the
Court may decide should be paid, and renders a just and true
account of his administrations to the Court within a year or at any
other date that he may be required so to do, and faithfully executes
all orders and decrees of said Court, then in this case this
obligation shall be void, otherwise it shall remain full force and
effect.”
4. Section 1 of Rule 81 of the Rules of Court requires the
administrator/executor to put up a bond for the purpose of indemnifying the
creditors, heirs, legatees and the estate. It is conditioned upon the faithful
performance of the administrator's trust. The conditions enumerated in
Section 1, Rule 81 is substantially the same as the pertinent provision in the
administrator’s bonds cited above.
5. Given the purpose of the law, the surety is then liable under the
administrator's bond, for as long as the administrator has duties to do as
such administrator/executor. Since the liability of the sureties is co-extensive
with that of the administrator, it follows that the administrator is still duty
bound to respect the indemnity agreements entered into by him in
consideration of the suretyship.
6. It is shown that the defendant-appellant Pastor T. Quebrar, still had
something to do as an administrator/executor even after the approval of the
amended project of partition and accounts in 1957.
a. The defendant-appellant Quebrar did not cease in 1957, for
administration is for the purpose of liquidation of the estate and
distribution of the residue among the heirs and legatees. And
liquidation means the determination of all the assets of the estate
and payment of all the debts and expenses. It appears that there
were still debts and expenses to be paid after June 6, 1957.
7. In Montemayor vs. Gutierrez, an estate may be partitioned even before
the termination of the administration proceedings. Hence, the approval
of the project of partition did not necessarily terminate the
administration proceedings.
17
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS JUDGE CARINGAL 3D 2020

8. Thus, notwithstanding the approval of the partition, the CFI of Negros

Occidental still had jurisdiction over the administration proceedings of the DOCTRINE: (in bold text format)
estate of A.B. Chinsuy and Cresenciana Lipa.
9. The sureties of an administration bond are liable only as a rule, for
matters occurring during the term covered by the bond. And the term
of a bond does not usually expire until the administration has been
closed and terminated in the manner directed by law. Thus, as long as
the probate court retains jurisdiction of the estate, the bond
contemplates a continuing liability notwithstanding the non-renewal of
the bond by the defendants-appellants.
10. The contention then of the defendants-appellants that both the
Administrator's Bonds and the Indemnity Agreements ceased to have any
force and effect, the former since 1957 with the approval of the project of
partition and the latter since 1955 with the non-payment of the stated
premiums, is without merit. Such construction of the said contracts entered
into would render futile the purpose for which they were made.
11. Moreover, the lower court was correct in holding that there is no merit in the
defendants' claim that payments of premiums and documentary stamps are
conditions precedent to the effectivity of the bonds.
12. Likewise, there is no provision or condition in the bond to the effect that it will
terminate at the end of the first year if the premium for continuation
thereafter is not paid. And there is no clause by which its obligation is
avoided or even suspended by the failure of the obligee to pay an annual
premium.
13. The payment of the annual premium is to be enforced as part of the
consideration, and not as a condition. In Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc.
vs. Villarama, it was held that "the one-year period mentioned therein refers
not to the duration or lifetime of the bond, but merely to the payment of
premiums, and, consequently, does not affect at all the effectivity or efficacy
of such bond. But such non-payment alone of the premiums for the
succeeding years ... does not necessarily extinguish or terminate the
effectivity of the counter-bond in the absence of an express stipulation in the
contract making such non-payment of premiums a cause for the
extinguishment or termination of the undertaking. ...There is no necessity for
an extension or renewal of the agreement because by specific provision
thereof, the duration of the counter-bond was made dependent upon the
existence of the original bond."
14. With the payment of the premium for the first year, the surety already
assumed the risk involved, that is, in case defendant-appellant Quebrar
defaults in his administrative duties. The surety became liable under the
bond for the faithful administration of the estate by the
administrator/executor. Hence, for as long as Quebrar was administrator of
the estates, the bond was held liable and plaintiff-appellee's liability subsists
since the liability of the sureties is co-extensive with that of the administrator.

DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF FIRST

INSTANCE OF MANILA DATED NOVEMBER 3, 1964 IS HEREBY AFFIRMED.
WITH COSTS AGAINST DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS.
18
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS JUDGE CARINGAL 3D 2020
Co v. Rosario et al., GR No. 160671, April 30, 2008, supra
FACTS:
1. (RTC) OF Makati City, Branch 66, in Sp. Proc. No. M-4615, appointed
petitioner and Vicente O. Yu, Sr. as the special administrators of the estate
of the petitioner's father, Co Bun Chun
2. Petitioner consequently, nominated his son, Alvin Milton Co (Alvin, for
brevity), for appointment as co-administrator of the estate
3. RTC RULED - appointed Alvin as special co-administrator
4. RTC RULED - the RTC, acting on a motion filed by one of the heirs, issued
order revoking and setting aside the appointment of Alvin.
a. The trial court reasoned that Alvin had become unsuitable to
discharge the trust given to him as special co-administrator
because his capacity, ability or competence to perform the
functions of co-administrator had been beclouded by the
filing of several criminal cases against him, which, even if
there was no conviction yet, had provided the heirs ample
reason to doubt his fitness to handle the subject estate with
utmost fidelity, trust and confidence
5. CA RULED - the appellate court affirmed the revocation of the appointment
and dismissed the petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the revocation / removal of Alvin as a special co-
administrator is proper? – YES
RULING + RATIO:
1. We affirm the appellate court's ruling that the trial court did not act with
grave abuse of discretion in revoking Alvin's appointment as special co-
administrator.
2. Settled is the rule that the selection or removal of special administrators is
not governed by the rules regarding the selection or removal of
regular administrators
3. Courts may appoint or remove special administrators based on
grounds other than those enumerated in the Rules, at their discretion.
As long as the said discretion is exercised without grave abuse,
higher courts will not interfere with it.
4. Thus, even if a special administrator had already been appointed, once the
court finds the appointee no longer entitled to its confidence, it is justified in
withdrawing the appointment and giving no valid effect thereto
a. In this case, we find that the trial court's judgment on the issue of
Alvin's removal as special co-administrator is grounded on
reason, equity, justice and legal principle. It is not characterized
by patent and gross capriciousness, pure whim and abuse,
arbitrariness or despotism
5. Lower court took into consideration the fiduciary nature of the office
of a special administrator which demands a high degree of trust and
confidence in the person to be appointed
a. The court a quo observed that, burdened with the criminal
charges of falsification of commercial documents leveled against
him (sic), and the corresponding profound duty to defend himself
in these proceedings, Alvin Milton Co's ability and qualification to
act as special co-administrator of the estate of the decedent are
beclouded, and the recall of his appointment is only proper under
the attendant circumstances.
6. The Court finds no grave abuse of discretion attending such ruling, as it
was reached based on the court a quo's own fair assessment of the
circumstances attending the case below, and the applicable laws
7. As a final note, the Court observes that this prolonged litigation on the
simple issue of the removal of a special co-administrator could have been
avoided if the trial court promptly appointed a regular administrator. We,
therefore, direct the trial court to proceed with the appointment of a regular
administrator as soon as practicable.
DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is hereby
DENIED. The October 28, 2003 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
72055 is AFFIRMED
DOCTRINES:
1. Settled is the rule that the selection or removal of special administrators is
not governed by the rules regarding the selection or removal of
regular administrators
2. Courts may appoint or remove special administrators based on
grounds other than those enumerated in the Rules, at their discretion.
As long as the said discretion is exercised without grave abuse,
higher courts will not interfere with it.
3. Lower court took into consideration the fiduciary nature of the office
of a special administrator which demands a high degree of trust and
confidence in the person to be appointed
19
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS JUDGE CARINGAL 3D 2020
Ocampo v. Ocampo, GR 187879, July 5, 2010, supra
FACTS:
1. Vicente and Maxima Ocampo are spouses. They died intestate and left their
properties to their three kids, Leonardo, Renato, and Erlinda
2. The kids did not partition the property. Rather, they co-administered the
properties, and split the income into three.
3. When Leonardo died, he left his wife and his children.
4. Leonardo’s wife filed for the intestate proceedings of his husband.
1. She alleged that after Leonardo’s death his siblings took
possession of Vicente and Maxima’s properties to the exclusion of
Leonardo’s heirs
2. She asked for the settlement of Vicente and Maxima’s estate, and
asked to be the administrator of Leonardo’s estate
5. Leonardo’s siblings, Renato and Erlinda, opposed the petition saying it was
defective for asking for the settlement of two estates. They further argued
that Leonardo’s estate settlement is premature because it can only be
determined after the settlement of Vicente’s and Maxima’s estate. They also
asked to be the special joint administrator of the estate of Vicente.
RTC
1. RTC denied the opposition and ruled in favor of Leonardo’s wife. Upon MR,
RTC appointed the wife and the brother as special joint administrators.
2. Leonardo’s siblings, Renato and Erlinda, asked for another MT, saying
Dalisay is an incompetent administrator— she even failed to take care of her
husband Leonardo while the latter was paralysed. RTC revoked the wife’s
appointment, and appointed the sister in her stead. The siblings became
joint administrators.
3. There were many issues in the RTC, among which was the siblings asking
exemption from posting the bond.
4. The siblings also asked for the revocation of the special administratorship
and asked instead for the regular administratorship of the estate. They said
the special administratorship is NOT necessary, since it’s not a complex
estate. They allege that to make it a special administratorship would only
prolong the settlement.
5. RTC granted the motion, but did not rule on the bond exemption. They
revoked the special adminstratorship of the siblings since they failed to post
a bond and submit the inventory. RTC made Leonardo’s child Melinda the
administrator.
CA
1. CA ruled that RTC abused its discretion when it revoked the sibling’s special
administratorship and vested regular administratorship to Leonardo’s child,
when it didn’t even rule on the bond exemption. The posting of the bond is a
prerequisite before the siblings could enter their duties and responsibilities,
particularly their submission of an inventory of the properties of the estate
and an income statement thereon.
ISSUE:
W/N the court should have acted with grave abuse of discretion in revoking the
appointment of Renato and Erlinda as joint special administrators? NO.
HELD:
1. The court ruled that the trial court did not act with grave abuse of discretion
in revoking the appointment of the respondents as special administrators.
2. A special administrator is an officer of the court who is subject to its
supervision and control, expected to work for the best interest of the entire
estate, with a view to its smooth administration and speedy settlement.
When appointed, he or she is not regarded as an agent or representative of
the parties suggesting the appointment. The principal object of the
appointment of a temporary administrator is to preserve the estate until it
can pass to the hands of a person fully authorized to administer it for the
benefit of creditors and heirs, pursuant to Section 2 of Rule 80 of the Rules
of Court.
3. While the RTC considered that respondents were the nearest of kin to their
deceased parents in their appointment as joint special administrators, this is
not a mandatory requirement for the appointment.
4. The selection or removal of special administrators is not governed by the
rules regarding the selection or removal of regular administrators. The
probate court may appoint or remove special administrators based on
grounds other than those enumerated in the Rules at its discretion. As long
as the discretion is exercised without grave abuse, and is based on reason,
equity, justice, and legal principles, interference by higher courts is
unwarranted. The appointment or removal of special administrators, being
discretionary, is thus interlocutory and may be assailed through a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
5. Pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 81, the bond secures the performance of the
duties and obligations of an administrator namely:
1. to administer the estate and pay the debts;
2. to perform all judicial orders;
3. to account within one (1) year and at any other time when required
by the probate court; and (4) to make an inventory within three (3)
months.
6. More specifically, per Section 4 of the same Rule, the bond is conditioned on
the faithful execution of the administration of the decedents estate requiring
the special administrator to
1. make and return a true inventory of the goods, chattels, rights,
credits, and estate of the deceased which come to his possession
or knowledge;
2. truly account for such as received by him when required by the
court; and
3. deliver the same to the person appointed as executor or regular
administrator, or to such other person as may be authorized to
receive them.
7. The administration bond is for the benefit of the creditors and the heirs, as it
compels the administrator, whether regular or special, to perform the trust
reposed in, and discharge the obligations incumbent upon, him.
20
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS JUDGE CARINGAL 3D 2020

8. Its object and purpose is to safeguard the properties of the decedent, and,
therefore, the bond should not be considered as part of the necessary
expenses chargeable against the estate, not being included among the acts
constituting the care, management, and settlement of the estate. Moreover,
the ability to post the bond is in the nature of a qualification for the office of
administration.

On Melinda’s appointment
1. On the other hand, the Court finds the RTCs designation of Melinda as
regular administratrix improper and abusive of its discretion.
2. There was no petition for letters of administration with respect to Melinda, as
the prayer for her appointment as co-administrator was embodied in the
motion for the termination of the special administration.
3. The prayer for the appointment of Melinda as regular administratrix of the
estate was not specifically traversed in the said pleading, and there’s no
hearing conducted to ascertain whether she was fitting to be an
administrator. Thus, the capacity, competency, and legality of Melindas
appointment as such was not properly objected to by respondents despite
being the next of kin to the decedent spouses, and was not threshed out by
the RTC acting as a probate court in accordance with the above mentioned
Rules.
4. However, to put an end to the squabbles of the heirs, we take into account
the fact that Melinda already posted the required bond of 200k, and the
Letters of Administration were issued to her the following day, and that she
filed an Inventory of the Properties.
5. These acts clearly manifested her intention to serve willingly as
administratrix of the decedents estate, but her appointment should be
converted into one of special administration, pending the proceedings for
regular administration. Furthermore, since it appears that the only unpaid
obligation is the hospital bill due from Leonardos estate, which is not subject
of this case, judicial partition may then proceed with dispatch.

DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The

Decision dated December 16, 2008 and the Resolution dated April 30, 2009 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 104683 are AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that the Order dated March 13, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 24, Bian, Laguna, with respect to the revocation of the special administration
in favor of Renato M. Ocampo and Erlinda M. Ocampo, is REINSTATED. The
appointment of Melinda Carla E. Ocampo as regular administratrix is SET ASIDE.
Melinda is designated instead as special administratrix of the estate under the same
administrators bond she had posted. The trial court is directed to conduct with
dispatch the proceedings for the appointment of the regular administrator and,
thereafter, to proceed with judicial partition. No costs.

21
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS JUDGE CARINGAL 3D 2020
Hilado v. CA, GR 164108, May 8, 2009, supra
FACTS:
1. Roberto S. Benedicto died intestate
a. He was survived by his wife, Julita Campos Benedicto
(administratrix Benedicto), and his only daughter.
2. At the time of his death, there were two pending cases against Benedicto
involving the petitioners in the Bacolod RTC.
3. Administratrix Benedicto filed with the Manila RTC a petition for the issuance
of letters of administration in her favor, where she acknowledged the value
of the assets of the decedent to be P5 Million, net of liabilities
a. The Manila RTC appointed her as administrator of the estate of the
deceased, and issued letters of administration in her favor.
b. As administratrix, she submitted an Inventory of the Estate, Lists of
Personal and Real Properties, and Liabilities of the Estate of her
deceased husband.
i. In the list of Liabilities, Administratrix Benedicto included
the two pending cases; she stated the amounts of liability
to the two cases as P136K and P36K, respectively.
4. Petitioners filed with the Manila RTC a Manifestation/Motion Ex Abundanti
Cautela, praying that they be furnished with copies of all processes and
orders pertaining to the intestate proceedings.
a. Administratrix Benedicto opposed the manifestation, disputing the
personality of petitioners to intervene in the intestate proceedings of
her husband.
b. Petitioners filed an omnibus motion praying that the Manila RTC set
a deadline for the submission by Administratrix Benedicto of the
required inventory of the decedent’s estate. Petitioners also
alleged, through other pleadings or motions, that there were lapses
on the part of Administratrix Benedicto in her administration of the
estate, and assailing the inventory that had been submitted as
unverified, incomplete and inaccurate.
5. The Manila RTC denied the manifestation and motion on the ground that
petitioners are not interested parties, within the contemplation of Rule 19 of
the Rules of Court; that they cannot intervene in the intestate proceedings.
6. In a petition for certiorari of the RTC Decision, the petitioners argued that
they had the right to intervene in the intestate proceedings since the
decedent was the defendant in the two pending cases in the Bacolod RTC.
7. The CA upheld the Decision of the Manila RTC, holding that the claims of
petitioners against the decedent were in fact contingent or expectant, as
there were still pending litigation in separate proceedings before other
courts.
8. Hence the present petition to the SC where the petitioners argue that they
have the right to intervene in the intestate proceedings of the decedent
considering that the deceased is the defendant in the two pending cases.
ISSUES: WoN the petitioners have the right to intervene in the intestate proceedings?
NO, intervention cannot be used if the claim is contingent or expectant (i.e. depends
on the outcome of the pending cases)
RULING + RATIO:
1. While the language of Section 1, Rule 19 does not literally preclude
petitioners from intervening in the intestate proceedings, case law has
consistently held that the legal interest required of an intervenor “must be
actual and material, direct and immediate, and not simply contingent and
expectant.”
a. Settlement of estates of deceased persons fall within the rules of
special proceedings, not the Rules on Civil Procedure. Section 2,
Rule 27 provides that “in the absence of special provisions, the
rules provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as practicable,
applicable to special proceedings.”
b. Notwithstanding Section 2, Rule 72, intervention as set forth under
Rule 19 does not extend to creditors of a decedent whose credit is
based on a contingent claim. The definition of “intervention” under
Rule 19 simply does not accommodate contingent claims,
contingent claims such as cases as yet pending.
c. Petitioners cannot used “intervention” under Rule 19, Rules of Civil
Procedure since their claims are still contingent as the cases are
still pending with the Bacolod RTC. However, they are not totally
precluded from participating in the intestate proceedings.
2. While there is no general right to intervene on the part of the petitioners, they
may be allowed to seek certain prayers or reliefs from the intestate court not
explicitly provided for under the Rules, if the prayer or relief sought is
necessary to protect their interest in the estate, and there is no other
modality under the Rules by which such interests can be protected.
3. [Not so important for purposes of Rule 72] The Court allowed them relief in
the form of access to the records of the case. The court, however, denied
their request to be furnished of all processes and orders in relation to the
intestate proceedings, as well as the other requests they made in their
omnibus motion.
4. Section 1 of Rule 83 requires the administrator to return to the court a
true inventory and appraisal of all the real and personal estate of the
deceased within three (3) months from appointment, while Section 8 of
Rule 85 requires the administrator to render an account of his
administration within one (1) year from receipt of the letters
testamentary or of administration.
a. We do not doubt that there are reliefs available to compel an
administrator to perform either duty, but a person whose claim
against the estate is still contingent is not the party entitled to
do so.
b. Still, even if the administrator did delay in the performance of
these duties in the context of dissipating the assets of the
estate, there are protections enforced and available under Rule
22
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS JUDGE CARINGAL 3D 2020

88 to protect the interests of those with contingent claims

against the estate.
5. Concerning complaints against the general competence of the administrator,
the proper remedy is to seek the removal of the administrator in accordance
with Section 2, Rule 82.
a. While the provision is silent as to who may seek with the court the
removal of the administrator, we do not doubt that a creditor, even
a contingent one, would have the personality to seek such relief.
b. After all, the interest of the creditor in the estate relates to the
preservation of sufficient assets to answer for the debt, and the
general competence or good faith of the administrator is necessary
to fulfill such purpose.

DISPOSITION: Petition DENIED, subject to the qualification the petitioners, as

persons interested in the intestate estate of Roberto Benedicto, are entitled to such
notices and rights as provided for such interested persons in the Rules on Settlement
of Estates of Deceased Persons under the Rules on Special Proceedings.

DOCTRINE: Section 1 of Rule 83 requires the administrator to return to the court a

true inventory and appraisal of all the real and personal estate of the deceased within
three (3) months from appointment, while Section 8 of Rule 85 requires the
administrator to render an account of his administration within one (1) year from
receipt of the letters testamentary or of administration.

23
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS JUDGE CARINGAL 3D 2020
Aranas v. Mercado, GR 1516407, January 5, 2014
FACTS:
1. Emigdio S. Mercado (Emigdio) died intestate on January 12, 1991,
survived by his second wife, Teresita V. Mercado (Teresita), and their five
children, namely: Allan V. Mercado, Felimon V. Mercado, Carmencita M.
Sutherland, Richard V. Mercado, and Maria Teresita M. Anderson; and his
two children by his first marriage, namely: respondent Franklin L. Mercado
and petitioner Thelma M. Aranas (Thelma).
2. Emigdio inherited and acquired real properties during his lifetime. He
owned corporate shares in Mervir Realty Corporation (Mervir Realty) and
Cebu Emerson Transportation Corporation (Cebu Emerson). He assigned
his real properties in exchange for corporate stocks of Mervir Realty, and
sold his real property in Badian, Cebu (Lot 3353 covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 3252) to Mervir Realty.
3. Thelma filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Cebu City a petition for
the appointment of Teresita as the administrator of Emigdio's estate. The
RTC granted the petition considering that there was no opposition. The
letters of administration in favor of Teresita.
4. As the administrator, Teresita submitted an inventory of the estate of
Emigdio for the consideration and approval by the RTC. She indicated in
the inventory that at the time of his death, Emigdio had "left no real
properties but only personal properties" worth P6,675,435.25 in all,
consisting of cash of P32,141.20; furniture and fixtures worth P20,000.00;
pieces of jewelry valued at P15,000.00; 44,806 shares of stock of Mervir
Realty worth P6,585,585.80; and 30 shares of stock of Cebu Emerson
worth P22,708.25.
5. Claiming that Emigdio had owned other properties that were excluded from
the inventory, Thelma moved that the RTC direct Teresita to amend the
inventory, and to be examined regarding it. Teresita filed a compliance with
the order of January 8, 1993, 3 supporting her inventory with copies of
three certificates of stocks covering the 44,806 Mervir Realty shares of
stock; 4 the deed of assignment executed by Emigdio on January 10, 1991
involving real properties with the market value of P4,440,651.10 in
exchange for 44,407 Mervir Realty shares of stock with total par value of
P4,440,700.00; 5 and the certificate of stock issued on January 30, 1979
for 300 shares of stock of Cebu Emerson worth P30,000.00.
6. Thelma again moved to require Teresita to be examined under oath on the
inventory. The RTC issued an order expressing the need for the parties to
present evidence and for Teresita to be examined to enable the court to
resolve the motion for approval of the inventory. Thelma opposed the
approval of the inventory, and asked leave of court to examine Teresita on
the inventory.
7. The RTC issued on March 14, 2001 an order finding and holding that the
inventory submitted by Teresita had excluded properties that should be
included. The RTC denied the administratrix's motion for approval of
inventory and orders the said administratrix to re-do the inventory of
properties which are supposed to constitute as the estate of the late
Emigdio S. Mercado. The RTC also directed the administratrix to render an
account of her administration of the estate of the late Emigdio S. Mercado
which had come to her possession.
8. Teresita, joined by other heirs of Emigdio, timely sought the
reconsideration of the order of March 14, 2001 on the ground that one of
the real properties affected, Lot No. 3353 located in Badian, Cebu, had
already been sold to Mervir Realty.
9. On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC decision insofar as the inclusion of
the inclusion of parcels of land known as Lot No. 3353 located at Badian,
Cebu with an area of 53,301 square meters subject matter of the Deed of
Absolute Sale dated November 9, 1989 and the various parcels of land
subject matter of the Deeds of Assignment dated February 17, 1989 and
January 10, 1991 in the revised inventory to be submitted by the
administratrix is concerned.
ISSUE: Whether or not he RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in directing the inclusion of certain properties in the
inventory notwithstanding that such properties had been either transferred by sale or
exchanged for corporate shares in Mervir Realty by the decedent during his
lifetime? - NO. The CA's conclusion of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
RTC was unwarranted and erroneous.
RULING + RATIO:
1. The probate court is authorized to determine the issue of ownership of
properties for purposes of their inclusion or exclusion from the inventory to
be submitted by the administrator, but its determination shall only be
provisional unless the interested parties are all heirs of the decedent, or the
question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the
assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third
parties are not impaired. Its jurisdiction extends to matters incidental or
collateral to the settlement and distribution of the estate, such as the
determination of the status of each heir and whether property included in
the inventory is the conjugal or exclusive property of the deceased spouse.
2. Under Section 6 (a), Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, the letters of
administration may be granted at the discretion of the court to the surviving
spouse, who is competent and willing to serve when the person dies
intestate. Upon issuing the letters of administration to the surviving spouse,
the RTC becomes duty-bound to direct the preparation and submission of
the inventory of the properties of the estate, and the surviving spouse, as
the administrator, has the duty and responsibility to submit the inventory
within three months from the issuance of letters of administration pursuant
to Rule 83 of the Rules of Court, viz.:
a. Section 1. Inventory and appraisal to be returned within three
months. — Within three (3) months after his appointment every
executor or administrator shall return to the court a true inventory
and appraisal of all the real and personal estate of the deceased
which has come into his possession or knowledge. In the
24
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS JUDGE CARINGAL 3D 2020
appraisement of such estate, the court may order one or more of
the inheritance tax appraisers to give his or their assistance.
3. The usage of the word all in Section 1, supra, demands the inclusion of all
the real and personal properties of the decedent in the inventory. However,
the word all is qualified by the phrase which has come into his possession
or knowledge, which signifies that the properties must be known to the
administrator to belong to the decedent or are in her possession as the
administrator. Section 1 allows no exception, for the phrase true inventory
implies that no properties appearing to belong to the decedent can be
excluded from the inventory, regardless of their being in the possession of
another person or entity.
4. The objective of the Rules of Court in requiring the inventory and appraisal
of the estate of the decedent is "to aid the court in revising the accounts
and determining the liabilities of the executor or the administrator, and in
malting a final and equitable distribution (partition) of the estate and
otherwise to facilitate the administration of the estate." Hence, the RTC that
presides over the administration of an estate is vested with wide discretion
on the question of what properties should be included in the inventory.
According to Peralta v. Peralta, the CA cannot impose its judgment in order
to supplant that of the RTC on the issue of which properties are to be
included or excluded from the inventory in the absence of "positive abuse
of discretion," for in the administration of the estates of deceased persons,
"the judges enjoy ample discretionary powers and the appellate courts
should not interfere with or attempt to replace the action taken by them,
unless it be shown that there has been a positive abuse of discretion." As
long as the RTC commits no patently grave abuse of discretion, its orders
must be respected as part of the regular performance of its judicial duty.
5. There is no dispute that the jurisdiction of the trial court as an intestate
court is special and limited. The trial court cannot adjudicate title to
properties claimed to be a part of the estate but are claimed to belong to
third parties by title adverse to that of the decedent and the estate, not by
virtue of any right of inheritance from the decedent. All that the trial court
can do regarding said properties is to determine whether or not they should
be included in the inventory of properties to be administered by the
administrator. Such determination is provisional and may be still revised.
6. As the Court said in Agtarap v. Agtarap:
a. The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court, either as a
probate court or an intestate court, relates only to matters having
to do with the probate of the will and/or settlement of the estate of
deceased persons, but does not extend to the determination of
questions of ownership that arise during the proceedings. The
patent rationale for this rule is that such court merely exercises
special and limited jurisdiction. As held in several cases, a
probate court or one in charge of estate proceedings, whether
testate or intestate, cannot adjudicate or determine title to
properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are
claimed to belong to outside parties, not by virtue of any right of
inheritance from the deceased but by title adverse to that of the
deceased and his estate. All that the said court could do as
regards said properties is to determine whether or not they should
be included in the inventory of properties to be administered by
the administrator. If there is no dispute, there poses no problem,
but if there is, then the parties, the administrator, and the
opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action before a
court exercising general jurisdiction for a final determination of the
conflicting claims of title.
7. However, this general rule is subject to exceptions as justified by
expediency and convenience.
8. The probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or a testate
proceeding the question of inclusion in, or exclusion from, the inventory of
a piece of property without prejudice to final determination of ownership in
a separate action. Second, if the interested parties are all heirs to the
estate, or the question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties
consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights
of third parties are not impaired, then the probate court is competent to
resolve issues on ownership. Verily, its jurisdiction extends to matters
incidental or collateral to the settlement and distribution of the estate, such
as the determination of the status of each heir and whether the property in
the inventory is conjugal or exclusive property of the deceased spouse.
9. The inventory of the estate of Emigdio must be prepared and submitted for
the important purpose of resolving the difficult issues of collation and
advancement to the heirs. Article 1061 of the Civil Code required every
compulsory heir and the surviving spouse, herein Teresita herself, to "bring
into the mass of the estate any property or right which he (or she) may
have received from the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of
donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order that it may be computed in
the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the account of the
partition." Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court also provided that any
advancement by the decedent on the legitime of an heir "may be heard and
determined by the court having jurisdiction of the estate proceedings, and
the final order of the court thereon shall be binding on the person raising
the questions and on the heir." Rule 90 thereby expanded the special and
limited jurisdiction of the RTC as an intestate court about the matters
relating to the inventory of the estate of the decedent by authorizing it to
direct the inclusion of properties donated or bestowed by gratuitous title to
any compulsory heir by the decedent.
10. The determination of which properties should be excluded from or included
in the inventory of estate properties was well within the authority and
discretion of the RTC as an intestate court. In making its determination, the
RTC acted with circumspection, and proceeded under the guiding policy
that it was best to include all properties in the possession of the
administrator or were known to the administrator to belong to Emigdio
rather than to exclude properties that could turn out in the end to be
actually part of the estate. As long as the RTC commits no patent grave
abuse of discretion, its orders must be respected as part of the regular
performance of its judicial duty. Grave abuse of discretion means either
25
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS JUDGE CARINGAL 3D 2020

that the judicial or quasi-judicial power was exercised in an arbitrary or

despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, or that the
respondent judge, tribunal or board evaded a positive duty, or virtually
refused to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law, such
as when such judge, tribunal or board exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
powers acted in a capricious or whimsical manner as to be equivalent to
lack of jurisdiction.

DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for review on

certiorari; REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision promulgated on May 15,
2002; REINSTATES the orders issued on March 14, 2001 and May 18, 2001 by the
Regional Trial Court in Cebu; DIRECTS the Regional Trial Court in Cebu to proceed
with dispatch in Special Proceedings No. 3094-CEB entitled Intestate Estate of the
late Emigdio Mercado, Thelma Aranas, petitioner, and to resolve the case; and
ORDERS the respondents to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.

DOCTRINE:
1. The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court, either as a probate
court or an intestate court, relates only to matters having to do with the
probate of the will and/or settlement of the estate of deceased persons, but
does not extend to the determination of questions of ownership that arise
during the proceedings.
2. Exception, the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or
a testate proceeding the question of inclusion in, or exclusion from, the
inventory of a piece of property without prejudice to final determination of
ownership in a separate action. If the interested parties are all heirs to the
estate, or the question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties
consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the
rights of third parties are not impaired, then the probate court is competent
to resolve issues on ownership. Verily, its jurisdiction extends to matters
incidental or collateral to the settlement and distribution of the estate, such
as the determination of the status of each heir and whether the property in
the inventory is conjugal or exclusive property of the deceased spouse.

26
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS JUDGE CARINGAL 3D 2020
Moore & Sons v. Wagner, GR L-25842, March 18, 1927
FACTS
1. In the settlement of the intestate estate of Samuel William Allen, the court,
upon petition of the widow, entered an order requiring the administrator to
give the widow and her daughter an allowance of P80.
a. The Special Administrator appointed objected on the ground that
the estate is insolvent.
b. Atty P.J. Moore, in behalf of several creditors of the estate, also
entered his opposition to the order upon the same ground.
2. The estate is insolvent.
a. It appears from the report of the administrator, which is not
contradicted by the widow, that the value of the property of the
estate sold by the said special administrator, excluding the
expenses amounts to only P899.79 from which must be deducted
P28.82 for expenses incurred, leaving a balance of P870.97, and
it must be noted that there still remains to be paid P64 as
commissioner’s fee plus P50 for charges of administration. It also
appears from the record on appeal that the claims against the
estate allowed by the committee amount P2,457.99.
b. Notwithstanding the estate’s insolvency, the lower court allowed
the aforementioned support pending litigation.
ISSUE
WON support may be demanded when the liabilities exceed the assets of the estate
of the deceased spouse - NO
RULING + RATIO
1. General rule is that allowance may be given to the widow and the minor or
incapacitated child of a deceased person during the settlement of the
estate, per Sec. 3, Rule 83 and Art. 1430 of the then Civil Code.. The
exception to this rule is when the liabilities of the estate are greater than
the assets of the estate (here, no allowance may be given to the widow or
child).
a. Law in force at the time was Art. 1430, Civil Code, which provides
that “[t]he surviving spouse and his or her children shall be given
an allowance for their support out of the general estate, pending
the liquidation of the inventoried estate, and until their share has
been delivered to them, but it shall be deducted from their portion
in so far as it exceeds what they may have been entitled to as
fruits or income.
b. Supreme Court of Spain: [In the exception above,.] to give
allowance to the widow would be prejudicial to the creditors who
are entitled to recover the value of the debts owing to them in their
entirety.
c. That the support does not encumber the property of the deceased
spouse, but the general estate, and that by the general estate or
the inventoried estate is meant the dowry or capital of the wife;
wherefore, even if the indebtedness exceed the residue of the
estate, the wife can always be allowed support as part payment of
the income of her property. In any case, the support is given prior
to the termination of the liquidation of the partnership, and it does
not seem logical to deny the same before knowing exactly the
result of the liquidation, just because of the fear that the liabilities
will exceed the estate, or on the ground of estimates more or less
uncertain, and without any sufficient proof of its reality. The judge
or the administrator, as the case may be, must grant the support
referred to in article 1430, when the same is requested, and if the
creditors believe that they are prejudiced by such an action, by
separating from the estate a part of its income, they can appeal to
the court therefrom, by satisfactorily proving that there is no
property or asset that may, in any case, be allotted to the
interested parties. It having proven that no property, either private
or conjugal, pertains to the surviving spouse or the heirs of the
deceased, the support cannot be granted, because this, in effect,
according to article 1430, is only an advance payment on account
of the respective share of each partner.
d. It having been proven by the evidence that the liabilities exceed
the assets of the deceased husband’s intestate estate and that his
widow had not contributed any property to the marriage, she
cannot be granted support, pending the liquidation of the intestate
estate because said support, having the character of an advance
payment from the estate to be deducted from the respective share
of each participant, is without legal basis under Art. 1430 of the
Civil Code when there is no property to be partitioned anymore.
DISPOSITION
Order appealed from REVERSED, record REMANDED for further proceedings.
DOCTRINE
General rule is that allowance may be given to the widow and the minor or
incapacitated child of a deceased person during the settlement of the estate, per
Sec. 3, Rule 83 and Art. 1430 of the then Civil Code.. The exception to this rule is
when the liabilities of the estate are greater than the assets of the estate (here, no
allowance may be given to the widow or child).
27
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS JUDGE CARINGAL 3D 2020

Pijuan v. Gurrea, GR L-21917, November 29, 1966, supra
FACTS:
1. Appellant Manuela Ruiz and Carlos Gurrea were married in Spain until 1945
when he abandoned her and came, with their son Teodoro, to the
Philippines
2. Here he lived maritally with Rizalina Perez, by whom he had two (2) children.
3. Having been informed by her son Teodoro, years later, that his father was
residing in Pontevedra, Negros Occidental, Manuela came to the Philippines
but, Carlos refused to admit her to his residence thus she stayed with their
son, Teodoro, in Bacolod City.
4. Manuela instituted against Carlos a case for support and the annulment of
some alleged donations of conjugal property, in favor of his common-law
wife, Rizalina.
5. Court issued an order granting Mrs. Gurrea a monthly alimony, pendente
lite, of P2K, but was reduced by the CA to P1K.
6. Carlos Gurrea died leaving a document, allegedly his last will and testament,
where Marcelo Pijuan was named as executor and Manuela and Teodora
were disinherited.
7. Pijuan petitioned for the probate of said will. Pijuan was appointed special
administrator without bond.
8. Manuela, Teodoro and Pilar Gurrea (allegedly an illegitimate child of
decedent) opposed the probate.
9. Manuela filed in a special proceeding motion praying that the Special
Administrator be ordered to continue paying it (Fact#5) pending the final
determination of the case. Motion denied. Thus she filed to be appointed as
administratrix but denied as well.
ISSUE:
1. WON Manuela should still receive monthly alimony, pendente lite and P1K
monthly. – YES. (Not really important. May be skipped)
2. WON Manuela should be named as executor. – NO.
clear to us that the continuation of the monthly alimony, pendente lite, and P1K is fairly
justified.
3. (Second Issue) Manuela, as widow of the deceased, claims a right of
preference under Sec. 6, Rule 78, Revised Rules of Court. In the language
of this provision, said preference exists "if no executor is named in the
will or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or
fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate." None of these conditions
obtains in the case at bar.
4. The deceased Carlos Gurrea has left a document purporting to be his will,
which, seemingly, is still pending probate. So, it cannot be said, as yet, that
he has died intestate. Again, said document names Marcelo Pijuan as
executor thereof, and it is not claimed that he is incompetent therefor.
5. What is more, he has not only not refused the trust, but, has, also, expressly
accepted it, by applying for his appointment as executor, and upon his
appointment as special administrator, has assumed the duties thereof.
6. It may not be amiss to note that the preference accorded by the
aforementioned provision of the Rules of Court to the surviving spouse
refers to the appointment of a regular administrator or administratrix,
not to that of a special administrator, and that the order appointing the
latter lies within the discretion of the probate court, and is not appealable.
DISPOSITION: Modified the decision only with respect to the Manuela being entitled
to the monthly alimony, pendente lite and P1K monthly.
DOCTRINE: It may not be amiss to note that the preference accorded by the
aforementioned provision of the Rules of Court to the surviving spouse refers
to the appointment of a regular administrator or administratrix, not to that of a
special administrator, and that the order appointing the latter lies within the
discretion of the probate court, and is not appealable.

Held + Ratio:
1. (First Issue) TC erred when it held that pursuant to Article 188 of our Civil Code
(Article 1430 of the Spanish Civil Code), the support of a surviving spouse constitutes,
not an encumbrance upon the estate of the decedent, but merely an advance from her
share of said estate, and that Manuela is not entitled to such advance, there being
neither allegation nor proof that he had contributed any paraphernal property to said
estate or that the same includes properties forming part of the conjugal partnership
between her and the deceased citing Manresa.
2. Court held that on account of the absence of proof as regards the status, nature or
character of the property courts are bound by law to assume that the estate of the
deceased consists of property belonging to the conjugal partnership, one-half of which
belongs presumptively to Manuela, aside from such part of the share of the deceased
in said partnership as may belong to her as one of his compulsory heirs, if his alleged
will were not allowed so probate, or even if probated, if the provision therein
disinheriting her were nullified. Inasmuch as the aforementioned estate is worth
P205,397.64, according to the inventory submitted by the special administrator, it is

28
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS JUDGE CARINGAL 3D 2020

Santero v. CFI of Cavite, GR L-61700, September 14, 1987 wards have already attained majority age so that they are no longer under
guardianship
FACTS
1. Princesita Santos-Morales, Frederico Santero and Willie Santero ISSUE: W/N CFI acted with abuse of discretion in granting the allowance to
(Petitioners) are children of the late Pablo Santero with Felixberta Pacursa Respondents despite the fact that all of them are not minors and all are gainfully
while Victor, Rodrigo, Anselmina and Miguel Santero (Respondents) are 4 employed with the exception of Miguel?
of the 7 children by Pablo Santero with Anselma Diaz. Both sets of children
are the natural children of the late Pablo since neither of their mothers was HELD + RATIO:
married to their father. Pablo was the only legitimate son of Pascual 1. The controlling provision of law is not Rule 83, Sec. 3 but Arts. 290 and
Santero and Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero. 188 of the NCC. The fact that Respondents are of age, gainfully employed,
2. The issue in this case springs from the Motion for Allowance filed by or married is of no moment and should not be regarded as the determining
Respondents through their guardian, Anselma in 1981 wherein the ground factor of their right to allowance under Art. 188. While the ROC limit the
cited was for support which included educational expenses, clothing and allowances to the widow and minor or incapacitated children of the
medical necessities, which was granted. Again, Respondents filed a Motion deceased, the NCC gives the surviving spouse and his/her children without
for Allowance in 1982, citing the same grounds. Petitioners opposed and distinction. Hence, Respondents are entitled to allowances as advances
contended that the wards for whom allowance is sought are no longer from their shares in the inheritance from their father Pablo. Since the
schooling and have attained majority age so that they are no longer under provisions of the NCC, a substantive law, gives the surviving spouse and to
guardianship. They likewise allege that the administrator does not have the children the right to receive support during the liquidation of the estate
sufficient funds to cover the said allowance because whatever funds are in of the deceased, such right cannot be impaired by Rule 83 which is a
the hands of the administrator, they constitute funds held in trust for the procedural rule. (Spouse however must be legitimate spouse),
benefit of whoever will be adjudged as owners of the Kawit property from 2. It is not true that the Motion for Allowance was granted without hearing. It
which said administrator derives the only income of the intestate estate of contains a Notice of Hearing addressed to the lawyers for Petitioners. It
Pablo. was duly received because lawyer filed an Opposition.
3. In the Reply to the Opposition filed by Anselma, she admitted that some of
her children are of age and not enrolled for the first semester due to lack of DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, in the light of the aforementioned circumstances, the
funds but will be enrolled as soon as they are given the requested instant Petition is hereby DISMISSED and the assailed judgment is AFFIRMED.
allowances. She cited Art. 290 of the Civil Code and Sec. 3 of Rule 83 of
the Rules of Court.
4. CFI granted the allowance to the Respondents (2k each).
5. While the case was pending in the SC, Respondents filed another Motion
for Allowance to include Juanita, Estelita and Pedro Santero as children of
Pablo with Anselma praying that an order be granted directing the
administrator to deliver 6k to each of the 7 children as their allowance. CFI
granted again but Petitioners asked the CFI to reconsider. An Amended
Order was issued directing Anselma to submit her clarification or
explanation as to the additional 3 children included. Anselma stated that in
her previous motions, only the last 4 minor children were included and her
first 3 who were then of age should have been included since all her
children have the right to receive allowance as advance payment of their
shares in the inheritance of Pablo under Art. 188 of the NCC.
6. CFI issued another Order directing the administrator to get back the
allowance of the 3 additional recipients or children of Anselma.
7. Petitioners argue that Respondents are not entitled to any allowance since
they have already attained majority, 2 are gainfully employed and 1 is
married as provided for under Sec. 3 Rule 83, of the ROC. Petitioners also
allege that there was misrepresentation on the part of the guardian in
asking for allowance for tuition fees, book and other school materials and
other miscellaneous expenses for school term 1982-83 because these
29
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS JUDGE CARINGAL 3D 2020

San Diego v. Nombre, 11 SCRA 165 (1964) Registry of Property, or in case of an agency, where the agent enters into
a contract of lease with a term of more than (1) year.
FACTS: 3. CA was correct in sustaining the validity of the contract of lease in favor of
1. 1960: Nombre, as judicial administrator of the intestate estate, leased one Escanlar, notwithstanding the lack of prior court approval. While it may be
of the properties of the estate (a fishpond in Negros Occidental) to admitted that the duties of a judicial administrator and an agent are, in
Escanlar for three (3) years done without previous approval of the Court some sense, identical, the provisions on agency should NOT apply to a
where the proceedings was pending. judicial administrator. A judicial administrator is appointed by the court. He
2. 1961: Nombre was removed as administrator by court order and another, is not only the representative of the court, but also the heirs and creditors
Campillanos was appointed. of the estate.
3. Campillanos filed a motion asking for authority to execute a lease contract 4. The protection which the law gives the principal, in limiting the powers and
of the same fishpond, in favor of petitioner San Diego for 5 years from rights of an agent, stems from the fact that control by the principal can
1961. Nombre opposed stating that the fishpond had been leased by him only be thru agreements, whereas the acts of a judicial administrator are
to Escanlar for 3 years. He also stated that to grant the motion of the new subject to specific provisions of law and orders of the appointing court
administrator would nullify the contract in favor of Escanlar, a person on
whom the Court has no jurisdiction. He also intimated that the validity of RULING: CA decision affirmed.
the lease contract entered into by a judicial administrator, must be
recognized unless so declared void in a separate action. DOCTRINE: There is no limitation on the power of a judicial administrator to grant a
4. The TC declared that the lease contract between Nombre and Escanlar lease of property placed under his custody.
was void for want of judicial authority. His MR was denied, the court stating
that the contract in favor of Escanlar was executed in bad faith and was
fraudulent because of the imminence of Nombre's removal as
administrator, one of the causes of which was his indiscriminate leasing of
the property with inadequate rentals.
5. The CA reversed, stating that no such limitation on the power of a judicial
administrator to grant a lease of property placed under his custody is
provided for in the present law. Under Article 1647 of the present Civil
Code, it is only when the lease is to be recorded in the Registry of Property
that it cannot he instituted without special authority. Thus, regardless of the
period of lease, there is no need of special authority unless the contract is
to be recorded in the Registry of Property. And where the lease has
formally been entered into, the court cannot, in the same proceeding, annul
the same, to the prejudice of the lessee, over whose person it has no
jurisdiction. The proper remedy would be a separate action by the
administrator or the heirs to annul the lease.
6. San Diego, lessee in the 2nd lease contract entered into by the 2nd
administrator, appeals from the decision.

ISSUE: W/N a judicial administrator can validly lease property of the estate without
prior judicial approval. YES.

HELD:
1. The RoC provides that an executor or administrator has the right to
possession of real and personal estate of the deceased, as long as it is
necessary for the payment of debts and expenses, and shall administer
the estate of the deceased.
2. Lease has been considered an act of administration. The Civil Code only
limits the exercise of leasing the property if it is to be recorded in the

30
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS JUDGE CARINGAL 3D 2020
Jaroda v. Cusi, 28 SCRA 1008 (1969)
FACTS
1. Antonio V. A. Tan commenced Special Proceeding No. 1391 on 22 April
1965, alleging that Carlos Villa Abrille died intestate on 3 April 1965; and
left an estate consisting of his conjugal share in real and personal
properties, ie. (a) 19% share in co-ownership (Juna Subdivision); (v) BPI
savings.
2. Among the heirs of the deceased are his surviving spouse, 9 children
(among them the herein petitioner, Natividad), and 4 grandsons (including
respondent Antonio, who was also appointed as special administrator).
3. Respondent special administrator Tan filed an ex-parte petition for
withdrawal of P109k and P72k from PNB Davao, alleging that these were
deposited in the name of the deceased but it actually was held in trust for,
co-owners of the Juna Subdivision.
4. Annexed to the said petition are powers of attorney purportedly signed by
the coowners authorizing the late Carlos to sell the lots in the Juna
Subdivision and to deposit the proceeds thereof with the PNB. The alleged
coowners of the Subdivision concurred in the petition, but not the heirs of
the deceased.
5. Special administrator Tan, together with the other coowners of the Juna
Subdivision, executed a power of attorney appointing himself as attorneyin-
fact to "sell (or) dispose upon terms and conditions as he deems wise" the
lots in the 99.546hectare subdivision.
6. Respondent Tan was issued letters of administration by the respondent
court. Asregular administrator, heTan filed a petition alleging that the
deceasedwas the manager of and a co-owner in the Juna Subdivision and
that he had been engaged in the business of selling the lots, praying for the
approval by the court of the power of attorney. Court granted.
7. Natividad moved to nullify order that allowed withdrawal of bank deposits
and order which approved power of attorney. But this was denied.
8. Petitioner Natividad filed the present petition for certiorari with preliminary
injunction, alleging that appeal would not be speedy and adequate as
respondent Tan has sold and continues to sell the subdivision lots on the
strength of the respondent court's order, to her irreparable prejudice and
that of the other heirs.
ISSUE: W order allowing special administrator Tan to withdraw bank deposits
standing in the name of the decedent is in abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. YES.
RULING/RATIO:
1. As provided by Sec 2 of Rule 80, said withdrawal is foreign to the powers
and duties of a special administrator. Said powers include taking
possession and charge of the goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate of
the deceased and preserving the same for the executors or administrator
afterwards appointed, and for that purpose may commence and maintain
suits as administrator
2. Moreover, the order was issued without notice to, and hearing of, the heirs
of the deceased. The withdrawal of the bank deposits may be viewed as a
taking of possession and charge of the credits of the estate, and apparently
within the powers and duties of a special administrator, but actually, said
withdrawal is a waiver by the special administrator of a prima facie
exclusive right of the intestate estate to the bank deposits is favor of the
coowners of the Juna Subdivision, who were allegedly claiming the same.
3. Bank deposits were in the name of the deceased; they, therefore, belong
prima facie to his estate after his death. And until the contrary is shown by
proper evidence, the special administrator is without power to make the
waiver or to hand over part of the estate, or what appears to be a prima
facie part of the estate, to other persons on the ground that the estate is
not the owner thereof.
4. The order approving the power of attorney executed by administrator Tan
and appointing himself as attorneyin fact to sell the subdivision lots for a
price at his discretion is, likewise, void for want of notice and for approving
an improper contract or transaction.
5. It has been broadly stated that an administrator is not permitted to deal
with himself as an individual in any transaction concerning trust property.
6. Thus, both orders are declared null and void.
DISPOSITION: The orders of the Court of First Instance of Davao, Branch I, in its
Special Proceeding No. 1391, are hereby set aside and declared null and void. The
preliminary injunction heretofore issued is hereby made permanent.
DOCTRINE: Where the withdrawal of bank deposits is foreign to the powers and
duties of a special administrator under Section 2, Rule 80 of the Rules of Court, and
the order of the lower court in the instant case allowing the special administrator to
withdraw the bank deposits standing in the name of the decedent was issued
without notice to; and hearing of, the heirs of the deceased, said order is in abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
31
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS JUDGE CARINGAL 3D 2020

Mananquil v. Villegas, August 30, 1990 DISPOSITION: Atty. Crisostomo C. Villegas committed acts of gross misconduct,
the Court Resolved to SUSPEND respondent from the practice of law for four (4)
FACTS: months with a warning that future misconduct on respondent’s part will be more
1. Felomina Zerna died. Administration proceedings initiated, w/ Felix Leong severely dealt with.
appointed as administrator. Atty. VIllegas served as Leong's lawyer.
2. Mananquil alleges that over a period of 20 years, Atty. Villegas allowed DOCTRINE: Administrator can exercise acts of administration without special
lease contracts to be executed between his client Felix Leong and the authority from the court having jurisdiction of the estate. He has the power to enter
partnership HIJOS DE JOSE VILLEGAS. Moreover, complainant charges into lease contracts involving the properties of the estate even without prior judicial
that these contracts were made without the approval of the probate court authority and approval so long as it is necessary for the payment of the debts and
and in violation of Articles 1491 and 1646 of the new Civil Code. the expenses of administration.
3. A lease contract was executed between Leong (administrator) and the
Heirs of Jose Villegas (to which Atty. Villegas belonged), represented by
brother in law of Atty. Villegas involving several sugar lands
4. 2 years after, Hijos De Jose Villegas was formed among the heirs of Jose
Villegas, with Atty. Villegas was a partner. Another lease contract entered
between Leong and Hijos De Jose Villegas, with Atty. Villegas evetually
becoming manager, signing as representative of Hijos on 2 renewals of the
contract.

ISSUE: WON Atty. Villegas committed acts of misconduct in failing to secure the
approval of the court in Special Proceedings to the various lease contracts executed
between Felix Leong and his family’s partnership. NO

RULING + RATIO:
1. Pursuant to Section 3 of Rule 84 of the Revised Rules of Court, a judicial
executor or administrator has the right to the possession and management
of the real as well as the personal estate of the deceased so long as it is
necessary for the payment of the debts and the expenses of administration.
2. He may, therefore, exercise acts of administration without special authority
from the court having jurisdiction of the estate. It has long been settled that
an administrator has the power to enter into lease contracts involving the
properties of the estate even without prior judicial authority and approval
3. Thus, considering that Leong was not required under the law and prevailing
jurisprudence to seek prior authority from the probate court in order to validly
lease real properties of the estate, Atty. Villegas, as counsel, cannot be
taken to task for failing to notify the probate court of the various lease
contracts involved herein and to secure its judicial approval thereto.
4. Nevertheless, contrary to the opinion of the Solicitor General, the Court finds
sufficient evidence to hold respondent subject to disciplinary sanction for
having, as counsel of record for the administrator in Special Proceedings No.
460, participated in the execution in 1975 and 1978 of renewals of the lease
agreement involving properties of the estate in favor of the partnership
HIJOS DE JOSE VILLEGAS, of which respondent is a member and in 1968
was appointed managing partner.
5. However, there is sufficient grounds for disciplinary sanction, as he is
prohibited under the civil code to enter into any transaction regarding the
property which he is supposed to litigate.

32
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS JUDGE CARINGAL 3D 2020

De Gala-Sison v. Maddela, GR L-24584, October 30, 1975
FACTS:
1. Petitioner was the administratrix in a proceeding in the CFI where she was
ordered in 1952 to inventory the properties left by the deceased and to
deposit cash in her possession amounting to P40,998.56 with a reputable
banking institution
2. The order was affirmed by the CA but on a petition for certiorari, the SC
modified the order, directing petitioner to deposit only such balance of the
original amount of P40,938.56 as may be in the possession of the
administratrix, after deducting the expenses approved by the court and the
allowances and inheritances authorized by the court to be given to the
widow and the heirs
3. Petitioner, in compliance with said order, filed an inventory but did not
comply with the portion requiring her to deposit the remainder of the cash in
her possession, stating in her Manifestation that "there is really no necessity
for any deposit to be made with a banking institution which the probate court
then believed was necessary way back in 1952 when the accountable fund
was still a sizable one" since from the remainder of the amount ordered to
be deposited, several deductions should be made consisting in the following:
a. Additional expenses in the sum of P1,698.41 which was approved
by the probate court
b. Advances and allowances to petitioner as heir (she being the only
surviving child of the decedent in the sum of P22,000.00
c. Expenses of litigation and attorney's fees already incurred and paid
since 1952
d. Compensation of petitioner as administratrix of the intestate estate
in the sum of P20,000
4. The judge in the proceeding did not allow the deductions and directed her to
deposit the cash
5. The gist of petitioner's contention is that she cannot be compelled to deposit
in a bank what she no longer has, considering that she is entitled to the
deductions which she made from the original amount, for (a) as sole
surviving child of decedent, she is entitled to advances and allowances from
the inheritance, and (b) as administratrix, she is to be reimbursed for her
expenditures and to deduct her fees as such administratrix
2. The administrator may be allowed a greater or additional sum "where the
estate is large, and the settlement has been attended with great difficulty,
and has required a high degree of capacity on the part of the executor or
administrator"
3. It must be noted that petitioner is seeking as her compensation as
administratrix an amount greater than that ordinarily allowed under the rules
on the ground that the estate is large, its settlement "having been attended
with great difficulty (since 1947 or almost 17 years ago) and required a high
degree of capacity"
4. In order to entitle the executor or administrator to additional compensation,
the estate must be large, the settlement extraordinarily difficult, and a high
degree of capacity demonstrated by him
5. The amount of his fee in special cases under the Rules is a matter largely in
the discretion of the probate court, which will not be disturbed on appeal,
except for an abuse of discretion
DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby dismissed, with costs
against the petitioner.
DOCTRINE: Pursuant to Section 7 of Rule 85 of the Rules, 3 a judicial administrator
is entitled, by way of compensation as such, to either (a) P4.00 per day "for the time
actually and necessarily employed" by him as such administrator, or (b) a
"commission upon the value of so much of the estate as comes into his possession
and was finally disposed of by him" according to the schedule therein provided. In
order to entitle the executor or administrator to additional compensation, the estate
must be large, the settlement extraordinarily difficult, and a high degree of capacity
demonstrated by him.

ISSUES:
1. WON the deductions petitioner is claiming should be allowed -- NO

RULING + RATIO:
1. Pursuant to Section 7 of Rule 85 of the Rules, 3 a judicial administrator is
entitled, by way of compensation as such, to either (a) P4.00 per day "for the
time actually and necessarily employed" by him as such administrator, or (b)
a "commission upon the value of so much of the estate as comes into his
possession and was finally disposed of by him" according to the schedule
therein provided

33
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS JUDGE CARINGAL 3D 2020

Tumang v. Laguio, GR 50277, February 14, 1980
FACTS:
1. This case involved the estate of the late Dominador Tumang who left a
widow, Magdalena A. Tumang, administratrix and executrix of the will.
2. Magdalena filed a petition to declare the testate proceedings definitely
terminated and closed with respect to herself and two of her children —
Melba Tumang Ticzon and Nestor A. Tumang.
3. The petition was premised on the fact that the heirs already acknowledged
receipt of the properties adjudicated to them, and in order for such
properties to be transferred in their names, there was need for an order of
the court declaring the proceedings closed with respect to the aforesaid
heirs.
4. The petition was opposed by appellee's daughter, Guia T. Laguio and her
children on the ground that appellee, as administratrix and executrix, had
not yet delivered all properties adjudicated to them.
5. The court sided with Magda by saying that the final accounting of the
administratrix was already approved.
6. A motion for reconsideration of the foregoing Order was filed by Guia T.
Laguio and her minor children.
7. MR DENIED: The Court resolves to deny the motion for reconsideration
for the reason that in view of said counter-petitioner's receipt of the cash
dividends (from the estate) without first requiring the administratrix the
accounting now being sought to be rendered for purposes of determining
the correctness of the cash dividends constitutes already a waiver on her
part to question such correctness of the aforesaid cash dividends.
3. Further, it has been held that an executor or administrator who receives
assets of the estate after he has filed an account should file a
supplementary account thereof, and may be compelled to do so.
4. There is no question that in the instant case, the fact that the executrix
received funds of the estate after the approval of her final accounts and
before the issuance of an order finally closing the proceedings is admitted.
She must, therefore, account for the same, in consonance with her duty to
account for all the assets of the decedent's estate which have come into
her possession by virtue of her office. An executor should account for all
his receipts and disbursements since his last accounting.
5. We disagree with the lower court's finding that petitioners, by receiving the
dividends without requiring an accounting, had waived their right to do so.
The duty of an executor or administrator to render an account is not a mere
incident of an administration proceeding which can be waived or
disregarded. The fact that the final accounts had been approved does not
divest the court of jurisdiction to require supplemental accounting for, aside
from the initial accounting, the Rules provide that "he shall render such
further accounts as the court may require until the estate is wholly settled."
DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Orders of the lower
court dated February 5, 1971 and August 16, 1971 are set aside, and respondent
executrix is hereby ordered to render a supplemental accounting of all cash and
stock dividends as well as other properties of the estate which came into her
possession after the approval of her final accounts.

ISSUES/HELD:
1. Whether or not the court should have required the executrix to render an
accounting of the cash and stock dividends received after the approval of
her final accounts. YES
2. A corollary issue is whether or not petitioners have waived their right to
demand such accounting. NO

RATIO:
1. Section 8 of Rule 85 provides that the "executor or administrator shall
render an account of his administration within one (1) year from the time of
receiving letters testamentary or of administration ..., and he shall render
such further accounts as the court may requite until the estate is wholly
settled."
2. In the instant case, further accounts by the executrix appear to be in order,
in view of the fact that the dividends sought to be accounted for are not
included in the final accounts rendered by the executrix. It appears that the
interests of all the parties will be better served and the conflict between
petitioners and respondent will be resolved if such additional accounting is
made.

34
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS JUDGE CARINGAL 3D 2020
Quasha v. LCN Construction Corp., GR 174873, August 26, 2008
FACTS:
1. After the death of Raymond Triviere, proceedings for the settlement of his
intestate estate were instituted by his widow before the RTC of Makati.
2. Atty. Enrique Syquia and Atty. William Quasha of the Quasha Law Office,
representing the widow and children of the deceased, were appointed
administrators of the estate.
a. As administrators, they incurred expenses for the payment of real
estate taxes, security services, and the preservation and
administration of the estate, as well as litigation expenses.
3. Atty. Syquia and Atty. Quasha filed before the RTC a motion for payment
of their litigation expenses, but the same was denied for failure to submit
an accounting of the assets and liabilities of the estate under
administration.
4. When Atty. Quasha died, Atty. Redentor Zapata, also of the Quasha Law
Office, took over as the counsel of the Triviere children, and continued to
help Atty. Syquia in the settlement of the estate.
5. Atty. Syquia and Atty. Zapata filed another motion for payment, for their
own behalf and for their respective clients. They alleged, among others:
a. that they have performed diligently and conscientiously their
duties as co-administrators, having paid the required estate tax
and settled the various claims against the estate (except the
remaining baseless claim of LCN Construction Corp.);
b. that for all their work, they were only given a total amount of
P170,000 to cover their administration fees, counsel fees and
expenses (nothing more has been paid to them after);
c. that administrator Syquia, who is a lawyer, is entitled to additional
Administrator’s fees, as provided in Sec. 7, Rule 85 of the RoC:
“...where the estate is large, and the settlement has been
attended with great difficulty, and has required a high degree of
capacity on the part of the executor or administrator, a greater
sum may be allowed...”
6. LCN Construction, as the only remaining claimant against the estate of the
deceased, filed its comment on/opposition to the abovementioned motion.
a. It countered that the RTC had already resolved the issue of
payment of litigation expenses when it denied the first motion for
payment.
b. It also averred that the administrators and the heirs of the
deceased had earlier agreed to fix the former’s fees at only 5% of
the gross estate.
c. It further asserted that contrary to what was stated in the second
motion for payment, Sec. 7, Rule 85 of the RoC was inapplicable
since the administrators failed to establish that the estate was
large, or that its settlement was attended with great difficulty, or
required a high degree of capacity on the part of the
administrators.
d. Lastly, it argued that its claims are still outstanding and
chargeable against the estate of the deceased; thus, no
distribution should be allowed until they have been paid.
7. RTC: granted the second motion for payment; however, it reduced the sum
to be paid:
a. P100,000 (from P200,000) as attorney’s fees and litigation
expenses for Quasha Law Office
b. P100,000 (from P200,000) for the co-administrator Atty. Syquia
and for litigation costs and expenses
8. LCN filed an MR, but it was denied.
9. CA: ruled in favor of LCN
a. While the CA conceded that Atty. Syquia and the Quasha Law
Office, as the administrators of the estate of the deceased, were
entitled to administrator’s fees and litigation expenses, they could
not claim the same from the funds of the estate.
b. Referring to Sec. 7, Rule 85 of the RoC, the CA reasoned that the
award of expenses and fees in favor of executors and
administrators is subject to the qualification that where the
executor or administrator is a lawyer, he shall not charge against
the estate any professional fees for legal services rendered by
him.
c. Instead, the CA held that the attorney’s fees due Atty. Syquia and
the Quasha Law Office should be borne by their clients (the
widow and children of the deceased).
d. The CA also found the failure of the administrators to render an
accounting excusable on the basis of Sec. 8, Rule 85 of the RoC.
ISSUES: WoN the CA erred in nullifying the award of attorney’s fees in favor of the
co-administrators? YES
RULING + RATIO:
1. Quasha Law Office contends that it is entitled to the award of attorney’s
fees and that the 3rd paragraph of Sec. 7, Rule 85 of the RoC (i.e., …When
the executor or administrator is an attorney, he shall not charge against the
estate any professional fees for legal services rendered by him.) is
inapplicable to it.
2. Here, in attempting to exempt itself from the coverage of said rule, the
Quasha Law Office presents conflicting arguments to justify its claim for
attorney’s fees against the estate.
a. At one point, it alleges that the award of attorney’s fees was
payment for its administration of the estate of the late Raymond
Triviere; yet, it would later renounce that it was an administrator.
b. In the pleadings filed by the Quasha Law Office before the CA, it
referred to itself as co-administrator of the estate.
c. In the comment submitted to the CA, it would again claim to be
the “co-administrator and counsel for the heirs of the late
Raymond Triviere.”
35
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS JUDGE CARINGAL 3D 2020

3. Quasha Law Office asserts that it is not within the purview of Sec. 7, Rule b. This Court is thus inclined to give credence to Quasha Law
85 of the RoC since it is not an appointed administrator of the estate. Office’s contention that while it rendered legal services for the
a. When Atty. Quasha passed away, Atty. Syquia was left as the settlement of the estate of Raymond Triviere since the time of
sole administrator of the estate of the deceased. Atty. Quasha’s death, it did not serve as co-administrator thereof,
b. The person of Atty. Quasha was distinct from that of Quasha Law granting that it was never even issued letters of administration.
Office; and the appointment of Atty. Quasha as administrator of 8. However, while Quasha Law Office, serving as counsel of the Triviere
the estate did not extend to his law office. children from the time of death of Atty. Quasha, is entitled to attorney’s
c. Neither could Quasha Law Office be deemed to have substituted fees and litigation expenses of P100,000 as prayed for in the motion for
Atty. Quasha as administrator upon the latter’s death for the same payment, and as awarded by the RTC, the same may be collected from the
would be in violation of the rules on the appointment and shares of the Triviere children, upon final distribution of the estate, in
substitution of estate administrators, particularly, Sec. 2, Rule 82 consideration of the fact that the Quasha Law Office, indeed, served as
of the RoC. counsel (not anymore as co-administrator), representing and performing
d. Hence, when Atty. Quasha died, Quasha Law Office merely legal services for the Triviere children in the settlement of the estate of their
helped in the settlement of the estate as counsel for the children deceased father.
of the deceased.
4. In its memorandum before this Court, however, Quasha Law Office argues DISPOSITION: PARTLY GRANTED
that “what is being charged are not professional fees for legal services
rendered but payment for administration of the estate which has been
DOCTRINE: When the executor or administrator is an attorney, he shall not charge
under the care and management of the co-administrators for the past 14
against the estate any professional fees for legal services rendered by him.
years.”
5. On the other hand, in the motion for payment filed with the RTC, Quasha
Law Office prayed for P200,000 as “attorney's fees and litigation
expenses.”
6. The Court notes with disfavor the sudden change in the theory by Quasha
Law Office.
a. As a general rule, a party cannot change his theory of the case or
his cause of action on appeal.
b. When a party adopts a certain theory in the court below, he will
not be permitted to change his theory on appeal, for to permit him
to do so would not only be unfair to the other party but it would
also be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice and due
process.
c. This rule, however, admits of certain exceptions. In the interest of
justice and within the sound discretion of the appellate court, a
party may change his legal theory on appeal, only when the
factual bases thereof would not require presentation of any further
evidence by the adverse party in order to enable it to properly
meet the issue raised in the new theory.
7. On the foregoing considerations, this Court finds it necessary to exercise
leniency on the rule against changing of theory on appeal, consistent with
the rules of fair play and in the interest of justice.
a. The records of the case are wanting in evidence that Quasha Law
Office or any of its lawyers substituted Atty. Quasha as co-
administrator of the estate. None of the documents attached
pertain to the issuance of letters of administration to Quasha Law
Office or any of its lawyers at any time after the demise of Atty.
Quasha.

36