SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS JUDGE CARINGAL 3D 2020

CASE NAME
COPY THE FORMAT
FACTS:
1. Blah CTRL+F YOUR CASE TITLE, IT’S ALREADY DISTRIBUTED.
2. Blah DEADLINE: SUNDAY (APR. 28, 2019), 11:59PM
a. Sub Blah
3. RTC ruled RULES ON CHANGE, CANCELLATION OR CORRECTION OF ENTRIES
4. CA ruled Change of Name
1. Republic v. CA, et al., G.R. No. 97906, May 21, 1992 - MAGISTRADO
ISSUES: 2. Republic v. Belmonte, GR L-32600, February 26, 1988`- HILADO
1. WoN Blah is blah? YES/NO 3. Republic v. Mercadera, GR 186027, December 8, 2010 - SANTOS, JR.
4. Republic v. Kho, GR 170340, June 29, 2007 - BAUTISTA
RULING + RATIO: 5. Silverio v. Republic, G.R. No. 174689, October 22, 2007 - ALCAZAR
1. Blah 6. People v. Cagandahan, G.R. No. 166676, September 12, 2008 -
a. Sub Blah ALCANTARA
2. Concept 7. Republic v. Marcos, GR L-31065, February 15, 1990 - BALONAN
a. Explain explain
NOTE: RA No. 9255 [re: Allowing Illegitimate Children to Use the Surname of
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION? REVERSED?
their Father]
1. In Re: Petition of Julian Wang, GR 159966, March 30, 2005 - ROMERO
DOCTRINE: etc etc etc
2. Republic v. Capote, GR 157043, February 2, 2007 - FERNANDO
3. Grande v. Antonio, GR 206248, February 18, 2014 - DESLATE

Clerical Errors
1. Lee v. CA, GR 118387, October 11, 2001 - OCAMPO
2. Republic v. Kho, G.R. No. 170340, 29 June 2007, supra
3. Kilosbayan Foundation v. Ong, G.R. No. 177721, July 3, 2007 - TAYLO
4. Onde v. Local Civil Registrar of Las Piñas, GR 197174, September 10,
2014 - PELONGCO
5. Republic v. Sali, G.R. No. 206023, April 3, 2017 - SO
6. Republic v. Gallo, G.R. No. 207074, January 17, 2018 - PEREZ

Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry

1. Republic v. Belmonte, GR L-32600, February 26, 1988, supra
2. Braza et. al., v. Civil Registrar, GR 181174, December 4, 2009 - NOEL
3. Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, GR 186571, August 11, 2010 - REYES, G.
4. Republic v. Coseteng Magpayo, GR 189476, February 2, 2011 -
MANAHAN
5. Alba v. Court of Appeals, GR 164041, July 29, 2005 - MANALANG
6. Ceruila v. Delantar, GR 140305, December 9, 2005 - NAVAL
7. Republic v. Uy, GR 198010, August 12, 2013 - CABUSORA

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SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS JUDGE CARINGAL 3D 2020
Republic v. CA, et al., G.R. No. 97906, May 21, 1992
FACTS:
1. Private respondent Maximo Wong is the legitimate son of Maximo Alcala, Sr.
and Segundina Alcala.
2. He (2 ½ years old then) and her sister (9 years old then), with the consent of
their natural parents and by order of the court, were adopted by spouses
Hoong Wong and Concepcion Ty Wong (both naturalized Filipinos. They
decided to adopt the children as they remained childless after 15 years of
marriage.
3. Upon reaching the age of 22, Maximo filed a petition to change his name to
Maximo Alcala, Jr. It was averred that:
a. his use of the surname Wong embarrassed and isolated him from
his relatives and friends, as the same suggests a Chinese ancestry
when in truth and in fact, he is a Muslim Filipino residing in a
Muslim community;
b. he wants to erase any implication whatsoever of alien nationality;
c. he is being ridiculed for carrying a Chinese surname, thus,
hampering his business and social life; and
d. his adoptive mother does not oppose his desire to revert to his
former surname.
4. The trial court resolved the matter in favor of Maximo.
5. On appeal to the CA, and over the opposition of petitioner Republic through
the SolGen, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in full.
6. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WoN the reasons given by Maximo in his petition for change of name are
valid, sufficient and proper to warrant the granting of said petition.
RULING + RATIO: YES
1. The SC is guided by jurisprudential dictum that the State has an interest in
the names borne by individuals and entities for the purpose of identification,
and a change of name is not a matter of right but of sound judicial discretion,
to be exercised in the light of reasons adduced and the consequences that
will likely follow; it is a privilege which may be granted only upon a showing
of a proper or reasonable cause or compelling reason therefor.
2. The SC found unacceptable the assertion of the SolGen that Maximo’s
allegations of ridicule and embarrassment due to the use of his present
surname is unsubstantiated. As such, the SC upheld the observations in the
decision of the CA.
a. The purpose of the law in allowing a change of name as
contemplated by the provisions of Rule 103 of the Rules of Court is
to give a person an opportunity to improve his personality and to
provide his best interest. In granting or denying the petition for
change of name, the question of proper and reasonable cause is
left to the discretion of the court. The evidence presented need only
be satisfactory to the court and not all the best evidence available is
required.
b. In the present case, the CA believes that the trial court had
exercised its discretion judiciously when it granted the petition.
c. From the testimony of Maximo and of his adopter mother
Concepcion, the CA discerns that said Maximo was prompted to file
the petition for change of name because of the embarrassment and
ridicule his family name ‘Wong’ brings in his dealings with his
relatives and friends, he being a Muslim Filipino and living in a
Muslim community. Another cause is his desire to improve his
social and business life. It has been held that in the absence of
prejudice to the state or any individual, a sincere desire to adopt a
Filipino name to erase signs of a former alien nationality which only
hampers social and business life, is a proper and reasonable cause
for change of name.
d. Justice dictates that a person should be allowed to improve his
social standing as long as in doing so, he does not cause prejudice
or injury to the interest of the state or of other persons. Nothing
whatsoever is shown in the record of this case that such prejudice
or injury to the interest of the state or of other persons would result
in the change of petitioner’s name.
3. To justify a request for change of name, Maximo must show not only some
proper or compelling reason therefor but also that he will be prejudiced by
the use of his true and official name. Among the grounds for change of name
which have been held valid are:
a. When the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to
write or pronounce;
b. When the change results as a legal consequence, as in
legitimation;
c. When the change will avoid confusion;
d. Having continuously used and been known since childhood by a
Filipino name, unaware of her alien parentage;
e. A sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former
alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing anybody; and
f. When the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing
that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or
that the change of name would prejudice public interest.
4. In granting or denying petitions for change of name, the question of proper
and reasonable cause is left to the sound discretion of the court. The
evidence presented need only be satisfactory to the court and not all the
best evidence available.
5. Summarizing, in special proceedings for change of name, what is involved is
not a mere matter of allowance or disallowance of the request, but a
judicious evaluation of the sufficiency and propriety of the justifications
advanced in support thereof, mindful of the consequent results in the event
of its grant and with the sole prerogative for making such determination
being lodged in the courts.
6. A petition for change of name is a remedy allowed under our law only by
way of exception to the mandatory provisions of the Civil Code on the use of
surnames. The law fixes the surnames that may be used by a person, at
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SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS JUDGE CARINGAL 3D 2020

least inceptively, and it may be changed only upon judicial permission

granted in the exercise of sound discretion.
7. Section 1 of Rule 103, in specifying the parties who may avail of said
remedy, uses the generic term “persons” to signify all natural persons
regardless of status. If a legitimate person may, under certain judicially
accepted exceptional circumstances, petition the court for a change of
name, the SC does not see any legal basis or logic in discriminating against
the availment of such a remedy by an adopted child.
8. The SC is of the view that the circumstances herein obtaining are within the
ambit of the established exemptions and found merit in Maximo’s
submission:
a. In the instant case, the trial court found the petition of Maximo
Wong for change of name justifiable after due hearing, thus its
factual findings and appreciation of testimonies count heavily and
need not be disturbed unless for strong and cogent reasons
because the trial court is in a better position to examine real
evidence as well as to observe the demeanor of the witnesses
while testifying in the case. Moreover, the trial court could take
judicial notice of other existing factors in the community where
herein respondent lives which it considers material in its judicious
determination of the case…
b. Additionally, Maximo is already of age and as such he can decide
what is best for him. His experience with regards his social and
business dealings is personal and it is only him who can attest to
the same. Finding his predicaments proper remedy is solely
through legal process, Maximo accordingly filed a petition pursuant
to Rule 103 of the Rules of Court which was granted by the trial
court.

DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision of

respondent Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

DOCTRINE: In special proceedings for change of name, what is involved is not a

mere matter of allowance or disallowance of the request, but a judicious evaluation of
the sufficiency and propriety of the justifications advanced in support thereof, mindful
of the consequent results in the event of its grant and with the sole prerogative for
making such determination being lodged in the courts.

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SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS JUDGE CARINGAL 3D 2020

Republic v. Belmonte, GR L-32600, February 26, 1988
FACTS:
1. Anita Po, 16 years old, filed a petition for change of name to Veronica Pao
and also sought to correct her birth records by changing the name of her
father to Pao Yu from Po Yu and her mother’s name from Pakiat Chan to
Helen Chan.
2. She alleged that her mother’s maiden name is Helen Chan and that “Pakiat”
was her maternal grandmother’s name and that her father’s name was
erroneously written due to common misunderstanding of chinese names.
3. She claimed that she was baptized by a Catholic priest as Veronica Pao and
that since childhood, she had always been known as Veronica Pao and not
Anita Po.
4. Solicitor General opposed alleging that a petition for change of name and a
petition for correction of entries in the Civil Register are distinct and separate
from each other and have different requirements. It claimed that the petition
satisfies Rule 103 on change of name but fails under Rule 108 for correction.
5. SolGen claimed that before Anita can claim a change in her name, her
parents’ name must first be changed so that she can use the surname “Pao”.
6. Trial court ruled in favor of Anita and was allowed to change her name and
also allowed the correction of the names of her parents.
c. Under Section 3, Rule 108, when cancellation or correction of an
entry in the civil register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons
who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby
should be made parties to the proceeding. In this case, the local
civil registrar concerned was never made a party. The civil
registrar is an indispensable party.
d. The procedure under Rule 103 and Rule 108 are separate and
distinct. They may not be substituted one for the other for the sole
purpose of expediency. To hold otherwise, would render nugatory
the provisions of the Rules of Court. If both reliefs are to be
sought in the same proceedings, all the requirements of Rules
103 and 108 must be complied with.
DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of the Court of
First Instance of Baguio and Benguet in Special Proceeding Case No. 642 dated July
24,1969 is hereby SET ASIDE and declared to be without force or effect. The entries
in the local civil registry of La Trinidad, Benguet pertaining to the petitioner Anita Po
and her parents Po Yu and Pakiat Chan stand as they were before such Decision. Let
a copy of this Decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of La Trinidad, Benguet
for his information and implementation. We make no pronouncement as to costs.

ISSUES:
1. WON Anita presented a proper and reasonable cause to change her name
2. WON the correction in the birth certificates can be claimed in the same
proceeding for the change of name.

RULING + RATIO:
1. NO. Her assumption that her correct name of Veronica Pao, based from the
correct name of her father as Pao Yu instead of Po Yu, is baseless absent
any proof that the name of her father was entered erroneously.
a. Until the name of her father is shown to have been registered
erroneously, there is no justification for allowing petitioner to use
the surname “Pao”. The corrections sought by Anita involve the
very identity of her parents. The propriety of such corrections
should first be determined in a different proceeding more adversary
in character than the summary case instituted by Anita.
2. YES, but all the requirements under Rule 103 and 108 must be complied
with.
a. The correction of entries in the civil registry for the benefit of her
parents cannot be done through summary proceeding. The
summary procedure for correction of the civil register under Rule
108 is confined to innocuous or clerical errors and not to material
changes in the spelling of a surname.
b. A clerical error must be apparent on the face of the record and
should be capable of being corrected by reference to the record
alone. In this case, Anita seeks more than just the correction of a
clerical error.
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SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS JUDGE CARINGAL 3D 2020
Republic v. Mercadera, GR 186027, December 8, 2010
FACTS:
1. Mercadera, represented by Oga (her sister and attorney-in fact), sought the
correction of her given name as it appeared in her Certificate of Live Birth
from Marilyn L. Mercadera to Merlyn L. Mercadera before the Office of the
Local Civil Registrar of Dipolog City R.A. No. 9048. Office of the Local Civil
Registrar of Dipolog City, however, refused to effect the correction unless a
court order was obtained "because the Civil Registrar therein is not yet
equipped with a permanent appointment before he can validly act on
petitions for corrections filed before their office as mandated by Republic Act
9048.
2. Mercadera was then constrained to file a Petition For Correction of Some
Entries as Appearing in the Certificate of Live Birth under Rule 108 before
the RTC. Following Facts were gathered from the documentary evidence
and testimony of OGA
a. Exhibit C: In the certification of birth dated May 9, 2005 issued by
the same registry, her given name appears as Marilyn and not
Merlyn.
b. Exhibit D: certificate of baptism issued by said church, she was
baptized by the name Merlyn L. Mercadera.
c. Exhibits E, F, and G: In her elementary diploma, her high school
diploma; and college diploma uniformly show her name as
Merlyn L. Mercadera.
d. Exhibit H:Certificate of membership issued by GSIS also bears
his [sic] complete name as Merlyn Lacquiao Mercadera
3. RTC: granted the petition and directed the Office of the City Civil Registrar
to correct her name appearing in her certificate of live birth, Marilyn
Lacquiao Mercadera, to MERLYN Lacquiao Mercadera.. Considering that
she had used "Merlyn" as her given name since childhood.
4. The OSG file an appeal which alleged that the correction in the spelling of
Mercadera’s given name might seem innocuous enough to grant but "it is in
truth a material correction as it would modify or increase substantive rights.
What the lower court actually allowed was a change of Mercadera’s given
name, which would have been proper had she filed a petition under
Rule 103 and proved any of the grounds therefor.
a. CA: Affirmed RTC
ISSUE: W/N the proper remedy is under Rule 103 or under rule 108?
RULING + RATIO: RULE 108
1. In the case at bench, the OSG posits that the conversion from "MARILYN" to
"MERLYN" is not a correction of an innocuous error but a material correction
tantamount to a change of name which entails a modification or increase in
substantive rights. For the OSG, this is a substantial error that requires
compliance with the procedure under Rule 103, and not Rule 108.
2. The "change of name" contemplated under Article 376 and Rule 103 must
not be confused with Article 412 and Rule 108. A change of one’s name
under Rule 103 can be granted, only on grounds provided by law. In order to
justify a request for change of name,
a. there must be a proper and compelling reason for the change and
proof that the person requesting will be prejudiced by the use of his
official name.
b. To assess the sufficiency of the grounds invoked therefor, there
must be adversarial proceedings.
3. In petitions for correction, only clerical, spelling, typographical and other
innocuous errors in the civil registry may be raised. Considering that the
enumeration in Section 2, Rule 108 also includes "changes of name," the
correction of a patently misspelled name is covered by Rule 108.
Suffice it to say, not all alterations allowed in one’s name are confined under
Rule 103. Corrections for clerical errors may be set right under Rule 108.
4. This rule in "names," however, does not operate to entirely limit Rule 108 to
the correction of clerical errors in civil registry entries by way of a summary
proceeding. Republic v. Valencia is the authority for allowing
substantial errors in other entries like citizenship, civil status, and
paternity, to be corrected using Rule 108 provided there is an
adversary proceeding. After all, the role of the Court under Rule 108 is
to ascertain the truths about the facts recorded therein.
5. Thus, the petition filed by Mercadera before the RTC correctly falls under
Rule 108 as it simply sought a correction of a misspelled given name.
To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the faults or
error from." To change means "to replace something with something else of
the same kind or with something that serves as a substitute.
6. From the allegations in her petition, Mercadera clearly prayed for the lower
court:
a. "to remove the faults or error" from her registered given name
"MARILYN," and "to make or set aright" the same to conform
to the one she grew up to, "MERLYN."
b. It does not take a complex assessment of said petition to learn of
its intention to simply correct the clerical error in spelling.
Mercadera even attempted to avail of the remedy allowed by R.A.
No. 9048 but she unfortunately failed to enjoy the expediency which
the law provides and was constrained to take court action to obtain
relief.
DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the December 9, 2008 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CAG. R. CV No. 00568MIN Is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED
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SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS JUDGE CARINGAL 3D 2020
Republic v. Kho, GR 170340, June 29, 2007
FACTS:
1. Carlito and his siblings Michael, Mercy Nona and Heddy Moira filed before
the RTC of Butuan City a verified petition for correction of entries in the civil
registry of Butuan City to effect changes in their respective birth certificates.
Carlito also asked the court in behalf of his minor children, Kevin and Kelly,
to order the correction of some entries in their birth certificates.
2. In the case of Carlito, he requested the correction in his birth certificate of
the citizenship of his mother to "Filipino" instead of "Chinese," as well as the
deletion of the word "married" opposite the phrase "Date of marriage of
parents" because his parents, Juan Kho and Epifania Inchoco (Epifania),
were allegedly not legally married.
3. The same request to delete the "married" status of their parents from their
respective birth certificates was made by Carlito’s siblings Michael, Mercy
Nona, and Heddy Moira.
4. With respect to the birth certificates of Carlito’s children, he prayed that the
date of his and his wife’s marriage be corrected from April 27, 1989 to
January 21, 2000, the date appearing in their marriage certificate.
5. The Local Civil Registrar of Butuan City was impleaded as respondent and
the public prosecutor appeared on behalf of the OSG and the Republic of
the Philippines. Carlito et al. then filed an Amended Petition in which it was
additionally prayed that Carlito’s second name of "John" be deleted from his
record of birth; and that the name and citizenship of Carlito’s father in his
(Carlito’s) marriage certificate be corrected from "John Kho" to "Juan Kho"
and "Filipino" to "Chinese," respectively.
6. In a letter of June 18, 2001 addressed to the trial court, the city civil registrar
stated her observations and suggestions to the proposed corrections in the
birth records of Carlito and his siblings but interposed no objections to the
other amendments. The trial court later granted Carlito and his siblings’
prayer.
7. Petitioner, Republic of the Philippines, appealed the RTC Decision to the CA
but the latter denied their appeal.
8. In the present petition, petitioner contends that since the changes sought by
respondents were substantial in nature, they could only be granted through
an adversarial proceeding in which indispensable parties, such as Marivel
and respondents’ parents, should have been notified or impleaded.
Petitioner further contends that the jurisdictional requirements to change
Carlito’s name under Section 2 of Rule 103 of the Rules of Court were not
satisfied because the Amended Petition failed to allege Carlito’s prior three-
year bona fide residence in Butuan City, and that the title of the petition did
not state Carlito’s aliases and his true name as "Carlito John I. Kho."
Petitioner concludes that the same jurisdictional defects attached to the
change of name of Carlito’s father.
ISSUE: Whether the failure to implead Marivel and Carlito’s parents rendered the trial
short of the required adversary proceeding and the trial court’s judgment void.
RULING + RATIO: NO
1. It cannot be gainsaid that the petition, insofar as it sought to change the
citizenship of Carlito’s mother as it appeared in his birth certificate and
delete the "married" status of Carlito’s parents in his and his siblings’
respective birth certificates, as well as change the date of marriage of Carlito
and Marivel involves the correction of not just clerical errors of a harmless
and innocuous nature. Rather, the changes entail substantial and
controversial amendments.
2. Clearly, the changes sought can only be granted in an adversary
proceeding. Labayo-Rowe v. Republic explains the raison d etre:
a. If the entries in the civil register could be corrected or changed
through mere summary proceedings and not through appropriate
action wherein all parties who may be affected by the entries are
notified or represented, the door to fraud or other mischief would be
set open, the consequence of which might be detrimental and far
reaching.
3. In the present case, there is no dispute that the trial court’s Order setting the
petition for hearing and directing any person or entity having interest in the
petition to oppose it was posted as well as published for the required period;
that notices of hearings were duly served on the Solicitor General, the city
prosecutor of Butuan and the local civil registrar; and that trial was
conducted on January 31, 2002 during which the public prosecutor, acting in
behalf of the OSG, actively participated by cross-examining Carlito and
Epifania.
4. Furthermore, Barco v. Court of Appeals: Verily, a petition for correction is
an action in rem, an action against a thing and not against a person.
The decision on the petition binds not only the parties thereto but the
whole world. An in rem proceeding is validated essentially through
publication. Publication is notice to the whole world that the
proceeding has for its object to bar indefinitely all who might be
minded to make an objection of any sort against the right sought to be
established. It is the publication of such notice that brings in the whole
world as a party in the case and vests the court with jurisdiction to
hear and decide it.
5. Given the above ruling, it becomes unnecessary to rule on whether Marivel
or respondents’ parents should have been impleaded as parties to the
proceeding. It may not be amiss to mention, however, that during the
hearing on January 31, 2002, the city prosecutor who was acting as
representative of the OSG did not raise any objection to the non-inclusion of
Marivel and Carlito’s parents as parties to the proceeding. Parenthetically, it
seems highly improbable that Marivel was unaware of the proceedings to
correct the entries in her children’s birth certificates, especially since the
notices, orders and decision of the trial court were all sent to the residence
she shared with Carlito and the children.
DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED.
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SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS JUDGE CARINGAL 3D 2020

Silverio v. Republic, G.R. No. 174689, October 22, 2007 questions of public policy to be addressed solely by the legislature, not by
the courts.
FACTS:
1. Silverio was born and registered as male. He admitted that he is a male
DISPOSITION: Request for change of name and sex in the birth certificate is
transsexual, that is, “anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts as a
DENIED.
“female” and that he had always identified himself with girls since childhood.
2. He underwent psychological examination, hormone treatment, breast
DOCTRINE: Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present
augmentation and sex reassignment surgery. From then on, petitioner lived
proper or reasonable cause or any compelling reason justifying such change. In
as female and was in fact engaged to be married.
addition, he must show that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official
3. He then sought to have his name in his birth certificate changed from
name.
Rommel Jacinto to Mely, and his sex from male to female.
4. The trial court rendered a decision in favor of the petitioner. Republic of the
Philippines thru the OSG filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals.
CA rendered a decision in favor of the Republic.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner is entitled to change his name and sex in his birth
certificate.

RULING + RATIO: NO
1. Article 376 of the Civil Code provides that no person can change his name
or surname without judicial authority which was amended by RA 9048 –
Clerical Error Law which does not sanction a change of first name on the
ground of sex reassignment. Before a person can legally change his given
name, he must present proper or reasonable cause or any compelling
reason justifying such change. In addition, he must show that he will be
prejudiced by the use of his true and official name.
2. In this case, he failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice that he
might suffer as a result of using his true and official name.
3. Article 412 of the Civil Code provides that no entry in the civil register
shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order. The birth
certificate of petitioner contained no error. All entries therein, including
those corresponding to his first name and sex, were all correct. Hence,
no correction is necessary.
4. Article 413 of the Civil Code provides that all other matters pertaining to the
registration of civil status shall be governed by special laws.
5. However, there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex
reassignment and its effects. Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate
is a historical record of the facts as they existed at the time of birth. Thus,
the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth
attendant (the physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant.
Considering that there is no law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the
determination of a person’s sex made at the time of his or her birth, if not
attended by error is immutable.
6. For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering her body
and appearance through the intervention of modern surgery, no law
authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the civil registry for that reason.
7. There is no legal basis for the petition for the correction or change of the
entries in the birth certificate. The remedies petitioner seeks involve
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SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS JUDGE CARINGAL 3D 2020
People v. Cagandahan, G.R. No. 166676, September 12, 2008
FACTS:
1. On December 11, 2003, respondent Jennifer Cagandahan filed a Petition for
Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate before the RTC, Branch 33 of
Siniloan, Laguna.
2. In her petition, she alleged that she was born on January 13, 1981 and was
registered as a female in the Certificate of Live Birth but while growing up,
she developed secondary male characteristics and was diagnosed to have
Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH), which is a condition where persons
thus afflicted possess both male and female characteristics. She further
alleged that she was diagnosed to have clitoral hyperthropy in her early
years and at age six, underwent an ultrasound where it was discovered that
she has small ovaries. At age thirteen, tests revealed that her ovarian
structures had minimized, she has stopped growing and she has no breast
or menstrual development. She then alleged that for all interests and
appearances as well as in mind and emotion, she has become a male
person. Thus, she prayed that her birth certificate be corrected such that her
gender be changed from female to male and her first name be changed from
Jennifer to Jeff.
3. The petition was published in a newspaper of general circulation for three
consecutive weeks and was posted in conspicuous places by the sheriff of
the court. The Solicitor General entered his appearance and authorized the
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor to appear in his behalf.
4. To prove her claim, respondent testified and presented the testimony of Dr.
Sionzon of the Department of Psychiatry, PGH. Dr. Sionzon issued a
medical certificate stating that respondents condition is known as CAH. He
explained that genetically respondent is female but because her body
secretes male hormones, her female organs did not develop normally and
she has two sex organs female and male. He testified that this condition is
very rare, that respondent’s uterus is not fully developed because of lack of
female hormones, and that she has no monthly period. He further testified
that respondent’s condition is permanent and recommended the change of
gender because respondent has made up her mind, adjusted to her chosen
role as male, and the gender change would be advantageous to her.
5. RTC: granted respondent’s petition, ordering the Civil Register of Pakil,
Laguna to make the following corrections in the birth certificate of Jennifer
upon the payment of prescribed fees: a) By changing the name from
Jennifer Cagandahan to JEFF CAGANDAHAN; and b) By changing the
gender from female to MALE.
6. The OSG filed the present petition, seeking a reversal of the RTC’s ruling.
ISSUE: W/N the RTC erred in ordering the correction of entries in the birth certificate
of respondent Cagandahan to change her sex or gender, from female to male, on the
ground of her medical condition known as CAH, and her name from “Jennifer” to
“Jeff,” under Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court.
RULING + RATIO: NO, RTC did NOT err.
1. OSG contends that the petition is fatally defective:
a. for non-compliance with Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court
because while the local civil registrar is an indispensable party in a
petition for cancellation or correction of entries under Section 3,
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, respondent’s petition before the
court a quo did not implead the local civil registrar.
b. also since it failed to state that respondent is a bona fide resident of
the province where the petition was filed for at least three years
prior to the date of such filing as mandated under Section 2(b),
Rule 103 of the Rules of Court.
2. Respondent’s contentions:
a. although the Local Civil Registrar of Pakil, Laguna was not formally
named a party in the petition, nonetheless the Local Civil Registrar
was furnished a copy of the Petition, the Order to publish and all
pleadings, orders or processes in the course of the proceedings,
respondent is actually a male person and hence his birth certificate
has to be corrected to reflect his true sex/gender, change of sex or
gender is allowed under Rule 108.
b. that she substantially complied with the requirements of Rules 103
and 108 of the Rules of Court. She invokes Section 6, Rule 1 of the
Rules of Court, which states that courts shall construe the Rules
liberally to promote their objectives of securing to the parties a just,
speedy and inexpensive disposition of the matters brought before it.
3. SC: Section 3, Rule 108 provides that the civil registrar and all persons who
have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made
parties to the proceedings. Likewise, the local civil registrar is required to be
made a party in a proceeding for the correction of name in the civil registry.
He is an indispensable party without whom no final determination of the case
can be had. Unless all possible indispensable parties were duly notified of
the proceedings, the same shall be considered as falling much too short of
the requirements of the rules. The corresponding petition should also
implead as respondents the civil registrar and all other persons who may
have or may claim to have any interest that would be affected thereby.
4. The Court agrees that there is substantial compliance with Rule 108 when
respondent furnished a copy of the petition to the local civil registrar.
5. OSG likewise contends: Rule 108 does not allow change of sex or gender in
the birth certificate and respondents claimed medical condition known as
CAH does not make her a male.
6. SC: The determination of a person’s sex appearing in his birth
certificate is a legal issue and the court must look to the statutes.
Article 412 of the Civil Code provides: “Art. 412. No entry in a civil register
shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order.”
7. Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was
amended by Republic Act No. 9048 in so far as clerical or
typographical errors are involved. The correction or change of such
matters can now be made through administrative proceedings and
without the need for a judicial order. In effect, Rep. Act No. 9048
removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the
8
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS JUDGE CARINGAL 3D 2020
correction of such errors. Rule 108 now applies only to substantial
changes and corrections in entries in the civil register.
8. Under Rep. Act No. 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the
change of sex is not a mere clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial
change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
9. The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable
under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are those provided in Articles 407
and 408 of the Civil Code:
a. “ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil
status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register.”
b. “ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register: (1)
Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5)
annulments of marriage; (6) judgments declaring marriages void
from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9)
acknowledgments of natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss,
or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial
determination of filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a minor;
and (16) changes of name.”
10. The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the
Civil Code include even those that occur after birth.
11. Respondent undisputedly has CAH. This condition causes the early or
inappropriate appearance of male characteristics. A person, like respondent,
with this condition produces too much androgen, a male hormone. A
newborn who has XX chromosomes coupled with CAH usually has a (1)
swollen clitoris with the urethral opening at the base, an ambiguous genitalia
often appearing more male than female; (2) normal internal structures of the
female reproductive tract such as the ovaries, uterus and fallopian tubes; as
the child grows older, some features start to appear male, such as
deepening of the voice, facial hair, and failure to menstruate at puberty.
About 1 in 10,000 to 18,000 children are born with CAH.
12. CAH is one of many conditions that involve intersex anatomy. During the
twentieth century, medicine adopted the term intersexuality to apply to
human beings who cannot be classified as either male or female. The term
is now of widespread use. Intersex individuals are treated in different ways
by different cultures. More commonly, an intersex individual is considered as
suffering from a disorder which is almost always recommended to be
treated, whether by surgery and/or by taking lifetime medication in order to
mold the individual as neatly as possible into the category of either male or
female.
13. In deciding this case, the Court considers the compassionate calls for
recognition of the various degrees of intersex as variations which should not
be subject to outright denial. It has been suggested that there is some
middle ground between the sexes, a no-man’s land for those individuals who
are neither truly male nor truly female. The current state of Philippine
statutes apparently compels that a person be classified either as a
male or as a female, but the Court is not controlled by mere
appearances when nature itself fundamentally negates such rigid
classification.
14. In the instant case, if the Court determines respondent to be a female, then
there is no basis for a change in the birth certificate entry for gender. But if it
determines, based on medical testimony and scientific development showing
the respondent to be other than female, then a change in the subject’s birth
certificate entry is in order.
15. Ultimately, the Court is of the the view that where the person is biologically
or naturally intersex the determining factor in his gender classification would
be what the individual, like respondent, having reached the age of majority,
with good reason thinks of his/her sex. Respondent here thinks of himself as
a male and considering that his body produces high levels of male hormones
(androgen) there is preponderant biological support for considering him as
being male. Sexual development in cases of intersex persons makes the
gender classification at birth inconclusive. It is at maturity that the gender of
such persons, like respondent, is fixed.
16. Respondent here has simply let nature take its course and has not taken
unnatural steps to arrest or interfere with what he was born with. And
accordingly, he has already ordered his life to that of a male. Respondent
could have undergone treatment and taken steps, like taking lifelong
medication, to force his body into the categorical mold of a female but he did
not. He chose not to do so. Nature has instead taken its due course in
respondent’s development to reveal more fully his male characteristics.
17. In the absence of a law on the matter, the Court will not dictate on
respondent concerning a matter so innately private as one’s sexuality and
lifestyle preferences, much less on whether or not to undergo medical
treatment to reverse the male tendency due to CAH. The Court will not
consider respondent as having erred in not choosing to undergo treatment in
order to become or remain as a female. Neither will the Court force
respondent to undergo treatment and to take medication in order to fit the
mold of a female, as society commonly currently knows this gender of the
human species. Respondent is the one who has to live with his intersex
anatomy. To him belongs the human right to the pursuit of happiness and of
health. Thus, to him should belong the primordial choice of what courses of
action to take along the path of his sexual development and maturation. In
the absence of evidence that respondent is an incompetent and in the
absence of evidence to show that classifying respondent as a male will harm
other members of society who are equally entitled to protection under the
law, the Court affirms as valid and justified the respondents position and his
personal judgment of being a male.
18. In so ruling, the Court does no more than give respect to (1) the diversity of
nature; and (2) how an individual deals with what nature has handed out. In
other words, it respects respondent’s congenital condition and his mature
decision to be a male. Life is already difficult for the ordinary person. The
Court cannot but respect how respondent deals with his unordinary state
and thus help make his life easier, considering the unique circumstances in
this case.
19. As for respondent’s change of name under Rule 103, this Court has held
that a change of name is not a matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be
exercised in the light of the reasons adduced and the consequences that will
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SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS JUDGE CARINGAL 3D 2020

follow. The trial court’s grant of respondent’s change of name from Jennifer
to Jeff implies a change of a feminine name to a masculine name.
Considering the consequence that respondent’s change of name merely
recognizes his preferred gender, the Court finds merit in respondents
change of name. Such a change will conform with the change of the entry in
his birth certificate from female to male.

DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the Republic's petition is DENIED. The Decision

dated January 12, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna, is
AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.

DOCTRINE: [in bold font]

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SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS JUDGE CARINGAL 3D 2020

Republic v. Marcos, GR L-31065, February 15, 1990 d. having continuously used and been known since childhood by a
Filipino name, unaware of his alien parentage or
FACTS: e. a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former
1. Pang Cha Quen is a Chinese National and currently married to a Filipino, alienage all in good faith and not to prejudice anybody
Alfredo Dela Cruz 5. The reason offered in the petition was that the daughter grew up to love her
2. She has a daughter from her previous marriage with another Chinese step father as her own father. This is not one of the valid reasons mentioned
National (Mary Sia alias Manman Huang) 6. The petition was also not filed by the proper party. Pang Cha Quen was the
3. She caused her daughter to be registered as an Alien under the name of one who filed the petition not the daughter, the one who’s changing names
Mary Pang (used Pang Cha Quen’s surname because previous husband
abandoned her) DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is granted, and the order
4. Mary had always been using the name Mary Pang at home and at school appealed from is hereby reversed and set aside. No costs.
5. Mary recognized her step-father Alfredo Dela Cruz as her own father and
desires to adopt his surname (Mary Pang Dela Cruz)
6. Alfredo agreed to the petition by signing at the bottom of the pleading
7. The purpose of the petition was not to conceal a crime nor to evade any
execution of a judgement nor to prejudice any third person
8. Judge ordered for a hearing and order all interested parties to appear and
show cause why the petition should not be granted
9. Judge ordered the petitioner to publish in a newspaper of general circulation
in Baguio for three consecutive weeks
10. Nobody opposed, petition granted
11. Gov’t through solicitor general appealed to SC

ISSUES:
1. W/N respondent Judge acquired jurisdiction over the case?
2. W/N there was proper or reasonable cause for the change of name of the
minor Mary Sia alias Manman Huang?

RULING + RATIO:
1. Gov’t claims that the petition and publication was defective since both did
not contain the name Mary Pang which was the name the daughter most
commonly used (fatal jurisdictional defect)
2. Gov’t is correct the petition’s title or caption must contain the aliases of the
petitioner because the ordinary reader only glances fleetingly at the caption
of the published order or the title of the petition in a special proceeding for a
change of name. Only if the caption or the title strikes him because one or all
of the names mentioned are familiar to him, does he proceed to read the
contents of the order. The probability is great that he will not notice the other
names or aliases of the applicant if they are mentioned only in the body of
the order or petition.
3. The title or caption in the present petition omits the alias Mary Pang thus
defeats the purpose of the publication
4. Gov’t also claims there was failure of petitioner Pang Cha Quen to state the
proper reasonable cause for a change of name
a. when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable, or extremely difficult to
write or pronounce;
b. when the change results as a legal consequence, as in legitimation;
c. when the change will avoid confusion
11
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS JUDGE CARINGAL 3D 2020
In Re: Petition of Julian Wang, GR 159966, March 30, 2005
FACTS:
1. Julian Lin Carulasan Wang (petitioner), a minor, represented by his mother
Anna Lisa Wang, filed a petition for change of name and/or correction of
entry in the Civil Registry of petitioner. Petitioner sought to drop his middle
name an have his registered name changed from Julian Lin Carulasan
Wang to Julian Lin Wang.
2. Petitioner was born in Cebu City to parents Anna Lisa Wang and Sing-Foe
Wang who were not yet married to each other. When his parents married
eventually, they executed a deed of legitimation so that the child’s name was
change from Julian Lin Carulasan to Julian Lin Carulasan Wang.
3. The parents plan to stay in Singapore. In Singapore, middle names or the
maiden surname of the mother are not carried in a person’s name. They
anticipate that petitioner will be discriminated against because of his current
name. Carulasan sounds funny in Singapore’s Mandarin language.
4. The RTC denied the petition. The RTC found that the reason provided did
not fall within the grounds recognized by law. It is merely for convenience.
Petitioner can decide on his own when he reaches the age of majority.
Legitimate children have the right to bear the names of the father and the
mother, and this right should not easily be taken away.
5. MR filed but was denied. TC maintained that adopting the Singaporean
practice would be tantamount to giving due recognition to or application of
the laws of Singapore instead of our own laws. Petitioner raised to SC
through Rule 45 Certiorari,
ISSUE: W/N dropping the middle name of a minor child is contrary to Article 174[7] of
the Family Code?
RULING + RATIO:
1. The names of individuals usually have two parts: the given name or proper
name, and the surname or family name. The given or proper name is that
which is given to the individual at birth or baptism, to distinguish him from
other individuals. The name or family name is that which identifies the family
to which he belongs and is continued from parent to child. The given name
may be freely selected by the parents for the child; but the surname to which
the child is entitled is fixed by law.
2. A name is said to have the following characteristics: (1) It is absolute,
intended to protect the individual from being confused with others. (2) It is
obligatory in certain respects, for nobody can be without a name. (3) It is
fixed, unchangeable, or immutable, at least at the start, and may be changed
only for good cause and by judicial proceedings. (4) It is outside the
commerce of man, and, therefore, inalienable and intransmissible by act
inter vivos or mortis causa. (5) It is imprescriptible.
3. This citation does not make any reference to middle names, but this does
not mean that middle names have no practical or legal significance. Middle
names serve to identify the maternal lineage or filiation of a person as well
as further distinguish him from others who may have the same given name
and surname as he has.
4. Our laws on the use of surnames state that legitimate and legitimated
children shall principally use the surname of the father. The Family Code
gives legitimate children the right to bear the surnames of the father and the
mother, while illegitimate children shall use the surname of their mother,
unless their father recognizes their filiation, in which case they may bear the
father’s surname.
5. In Oshita, the Court granted her petition based on the following
considerations: she had elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age
of majority; her other siblings who had also elected Philippine citizenship
have been using their mother’s surname; she was embarrassed to bear a
Japanese surname there still being ill feeling against the Japanese due to
the last World War; and there was no showing that the change of name was
motivated by a fraudulent purpose or that it will prejudice public interest.
6. In Calderon, the Court allowed petitioner, an illegitimate minor child acting
through her mother who filed the petition in her behalf, to change her name,
taking the surname of her stepfather, her mother’s husband. The Court held
that a petition for change of name of an infant should be granted where to do
is clearly for the best interest of the child. The Court took into consideration
the opportunity provided for the minor petitioner to eliminate the stigma of
illegitimacy which she would carry if she continued to use the surname of her
illegitimate father. The Court pronounced that justice dictates that every
person be allowed to avail of any opportunity to improve his social standing
as long as doing so he does not cause prejudice or injury to the interests of
the State or of other people.
7. In Alfon, the Court ruled Article 364 of the Civil Code states that,, as a
legitimate child, she should principally use the surname of her father, but
there is no legal obstacle for her to choose to use the surname of her mother
to which she is entitled. In addition, the Court found that there was ample
justification to grant her petition, i.e., to avoid confusion.
8. The factual antecedents and unique circumstances of the cited cases are
not at all analogous to the case at bar. The instant case is clearly
distinguishable from the cases of Oshita and Alfon, where the petitioners
were already of age when they filed their petitions for change of name. Being
of age, they are considered to have exercised their discretion and judgment,
fully knowing the effects of their decision to change their surnames. It can
also be unmistakably observed that the reason for the grant of the petitions
for change of name in these two cases was the presence of reasonable or
compelling grounds therefore. The Court, in Oshita, recognized the tangible
animosity most Filipinos had during that time against the Japanese as a
result of World War II, in addition to the fact of therein petitioner’s election of
Philippine citizenship. In Alfon, the Court granted the petition since the
petitioner had been known since childhood by a name different from her
registered name and she had not used her registered name in her school
records and voter’s registration records; thus, denying the petition would
only result to confusion.
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SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS JUDGE CARINGAL 3D 2020

9. Calderon, on the other hand, granted the petition for change of name filed by
a mother in behalf of her illegitimate minor child. Petitioner cites this case to
buttress his argument that he does not have to reach the age of majority to
petition for change of name. However, it is manifest in Calderon that the
Court, in granting the petition for change of name, gave paramount
consideration to the best interests of the minor petitioner therein.
10. In the case at bar, the only reason advanced by petitioner for the dropping
his middle name is convenience. However, how such change of name
would make his integration into Singaporean society easier and convenient
is not clearly established. That the continued use of his middle name would
cause confusion and difficulty does not constitute proper and reasonable
cause to drop it from his registered complete name.
11. In addition, petitioner is only a minor. Considering the nebulous foundation
on which his petition for change of name is based, it is best that the matter of
change of his name be left to his judgment and discretion when he reaches
the age of majority. As he is of tender age, he may not yet understand and
appreciate the value of the change of his name and granting of the same at
this point may just prejudice him in his rights under our laws.

DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition for Review on

Certiorari is DENIED.

DOCTRINE: Dropping the middle name for a minor should only be for compelling
reasons for the benefit of the minor. Jurisprudence cites examples for allowing such a
change. In this case, there is no such showing. The child may still choose to drop his
middle name, if it is indeed prejudicial, when he reaches the age of majority.

13
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS JUDGE CARINGAL 3D 2020
Republic v. Capote, GR 157043, February 2, 2007
RULING + RATIO: YES.
FACTS:
1. Respondent TRINIDAD CAPOTE filed a petition for change of name of her
ward from GIOVANNI N. GALLAMASO to GIOVANNI NADORES
2. Capote, as Giovanni’s guardian ad litem averred:
a. Respondent CAPOTE is a Filipino citizen, of legal age, married,
while minor GIOVANNI N. GALLAMASO, is also a Filipino citizen,
16 years old.
b. Respondent was appointed guardian ad litem of minor GIOVANNI
N. GALLAMASO by virtue of a court order authorizing her to file in
court a petition for change of name of said minor in accordance
with the desire of his mother who is residing and working abroad.
c. The minor GIOVANNI N. GALLAMASO was left under the care of
respondent since he was 9 years old up to the present
d. The minor GIOVANNI N. GALLAMASO is the illegitimate natural
child of Corazon P. Nadores and Diosdado Gallamaso. He was
born on July 9, 1982, prior to the effectivity of the New Family Code
and as such, his mother used the surname of the natural father
despite the absence of marriage between them.
e. The father, Diosdado Gallamaso, from the time GIOVANNI was
born and up to the present, failed to take up his responsibilities to
him on matters of financial, physical, emotional and spiritual
concerns.
f. GIOVANNI is now fully aware of how he stands with his father and
he desires to have his surname changed to that of his mother’s
surname;
g. GIOVANNI’S mother might eventually petition him to join her in the
United States and his continued use of the surname Gallamaso, the
surname of his natural father, may complicate his status as natural
child
h. The change of name from GIOVANNI N. GALLAMASO to
GIOVANNI NADORES will be for the benefit of the minor.
3. RTC: rendered a decision ordering the change of name from GIOVANNI N.
GALLAMASO to GIOVANNI NADORES
4. Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, through the OSG, filed an appeal with
a lone assignment of error: the court a quo erred in granting the petition in a
summary proceeding.
5. CA: affirmed the RTC decision ordering the change of name
6. The Republic contends that the CA erred in affirming the trial court’s
decision which granted the petition for change of name despite the non-
joinder of indispensable parties.
a. The Republic also claims that the purported parents and all other
persons who may be adversely affected by the child’s change of
name should have been made respondents to make the proceeding
adversarial.
ISSUE: Whether or not the change petition for change of name should be granted?
1. The Rules of Court provides the requirements and procedure for change of
name. Here, the appropriate remedy is covered by Rule 103, a separate and
distinct proceeding from Rule 108 on mere cancellation and correction of
entries in the civil registry (usually dealing only with innocuous or clerical
errors thereon).
2. The law and facts obtaining here favor Giovanni’s petition. Giovanni availed
of the proper remedy, a petition for change of name under Rule 103 of
the Rules of Court, and complied with all the procedural requirements. After
hearing, the trial court found (and the appellate court affirmed) that the
evidence presented during the hearing of Giovanni’s petition sufficiently
established that, under Art. 176 of the Civil Code, Giovanni is entitled to
change his name as he was never recognized by his father while his mother
has always recognized him as her child. A change of name will erase the
impression that he was ever recognized by his father. It is also to his best
interest as it will facilitate his mother’s intended petition to have him join her
in the United States. This Court will not stand in the way of the reunification
of mother and son.
3. Moreover, it is noteworthy that the cases cited by petitioner in support of its
position deal with cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry, a
proceeding separate and distinct from the special proceedings for change of
name. Those cases deal with the application and interpretation of Rule 108
of the Rules of Court while this case was correctly filed under Rule 103.
Thus, the cases cited by petitioner are irrelevant and have no bearing on
respondent’s case.
4. While the OSG is correct in its stance that the proceedings for change of
name should be adversarial, the OSG cannot void the proceedings in the
trial court on account of its own failure to participate therein. As the CA
correctly ruled:
a. x x x In this regard, [appellee] Capote complied with the
requirement for an adversarial proceeding by posting in a
newspaper of general circulation notice of the filing of the petition.
The lower court also furnished the OSG a copy thereof.
b. Despite the notice, no one came forward to oppose the petition
including the OSG. The fact that no one opposed the petition did
not deprive the court of its jurisdiction to hear the same nor does it
make the proceeding less adversarial in nature.
5. A proceeding is adversarial where the party seeking relief has given legal
warning to the other party and afforded the latter an opportunity to contest it.
Respondent gave notice of the petition through publication as required by
the rules. With this, all interested parties were deemed notified and the
whole world considered bound by the judgment therein. In addition, the trial
court gave due notice to the OSG by serving a copy of the petition on it.
6. Thus, all the requirements to make a proceeding adversarial were satisfied
when all interested parties, including petitioner as represented by the OSG,
were afforded the opportunity to contest the petition.
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SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS JUDGE CARINGAL 3D 2020

DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the January 13,
2003 decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66128 AFFIRMED.

15
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS JUDGE CARINGAL 3D 2020
Grande v. Antonio, GR 206248, February 18, 2014
FACTS:
1. Grande and Antonio lived together as husband and wife although Antonio
was already married. From their relationship they had two sons. Antonio,
however, did not expressly recognize the children in their Records of Birth in
the Civil Registry.
2. Eventually, Grande and Antonio’s relationship soured. Grande left for the US
with her two sons.
3. This prompted Antonio to file a Petition for Judicial Approval of Recognition
with Prayer to take Parental Authority, Parental Physical Custody,
Correction/Change of Surname of Minors and for the Issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8 of Aparri,
Cagayan (RTC), appending a notarized Deed of Voluntary Recognition of
Paternity of the Children.
4. In relation to change of surname, both RTC and CA ruled in favor of
changing their surnames to Antonio.
ISSUE: W/N the father has the right to compel the use of his surname by his
illegitimate children upon his recognition of their filiation.
RULING + RATIO: NO.
1. Grande posits that Article 176 of the Family Code – as amended by Republic
Act No. (RA) 9255, couched as it is in permissive language – may not be
involved by a father to compel the use by his illegitimate children of his
surname without the consent of their mother.
2. Based on Article 176 of the FC as amended by RA 9255, it is clear that the
general rule is that an illegitimate child shall use the surname of his or her
mother. The exception provided by RA 9255 is, in case his or her filiation is
expressly recognized by the father through the record of birth appearing in
the civil register or when an admission in a public document or private
handwritten instrument is made by the father. In such a situation, the
illegitimate child may use the surname of the father.
3. In the case at bar, respondent filed a petition for judicial approval of
recognition of the filiation of the two children with the prayer for the
correction or change of the surname of the minors from Grande to Antonio
when a public document acknowledged before a notary public under Sec.
19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court is enough to establish the paternity of his
children. But he wanted more: a judicial conferment of parental authority,
parental custody, and an official declaration of his children’s surname as
Antonio.
4. Art. 176 gives illegitimate children the right to decide if they want to
use the surname of their father or not. It is not the father (herein
respondent) or the mother (herein petitioner) who is granted by law the
right to dictate the surname of their illegitimate children.
5. Nothing is more settled than that when the law is clear and free from
ambiguity, it must be taken to mean what it says and it must be given
its literal meaning free from any interpretation. Respondent’s position
that the court can order the minors to use his surname, therefore, has
no legal basis.
6. On its face, Art. 176, as amended, is free from ambiguity. And where
there is no ambiguity, one must abide by its words. The use of the
word "may" in the provision readily shows that an acknowledged
illegitimate child is under no compulsion to use the surname of his
illegitimate father. The word "may" is permissive and operates to
confer discretion upon the illegitimate children.
7. It is best to emphasize once again that the yardstick by which policies
affecting children are to be measured is their best interest. On the
matter of children’s surnames, this Court has, time and again, rebuffed
the idea that the use of the father’s surname serves the best interest of
the minor child.
8. An argument, however, may be advanced advocating the mandatory use of
the father’s surname upon his recognition of his illegitimate children, citing
the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9255.
9. Nonetheless, the hornbook rule is that an administrative issuance cannot
amend a legislative act. Thus, We can disregard contemporaneous
construction where there is no ambiguity in law and/or the construction is
clearly erroneous. What is more, this Court has the constitutional prerogative
and authority to strike down and declare as void the rules of procedure of
special courts and quasi- judicial bodies when found contrary to statutes
and/or the Constitution.
10. Thus, We exercise this power in voiding the above-quoted provisions of the
IRR of RA 9255 insofar as it provides the mandatory use by illegitimate
children of their father’s surname upon the latter’s recognition of his
paternity.
11. To conclude, the use of the word "shall" in the IRR of RA 9255 is of no
moment. The clear, unambiguous, and unequivocal use of "may" in Art. 176
rendering the use of an illegitimate father’s surname discretionary controls,
and illegitimate children are given the choice on the surnames by which they
will be known.
12. At this juncture, We take note of the letters submitted by the children, now
aged thirteen (13) and fifteen (15) years old, to this Court declaring their
opposition to have their names changed to "Antonio." However, since these
letters were not offered before and evaluated by the trial court, they do not
provide any evidentiary weight to sway this Court to rule for or against
petitioner. A proper inquiry into, and evaluation of the evidence of, the
children's choice of surname by the trial court is necessary.
DISPOSITION: The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8 of
Aparri, Cagayan for the sole purpose of determining the surname to be chosen by the
children Jerard Patrick and Andre Lewis.
Rule 7 and Rule 8 of the Office of the Civil Registrar General Administrative Order
No. 1, Series of 2004 are DISAPPROVED and hereby declared NULL and VOID.
16
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS JUDGE CARINGAL 3D 2020

Lee v. CA, GR 118387, October 11, 2001
FACTS:
1. Lee Tek Sheng (Father) had two families with two sets of kids: one with his
lawful wife Keh Siok Cheng (Wife), and another with his mistress Tiu Chan
(Mistress).
2. Unbeknownst to anyone whenever Mistress gave birth the Father would
have the birth certificate say that Wife was actually the mother.
a. In effect it’s like all of Father’s children are with Wife and are all
legitimate.
b. Nobody knew this was the case and they proceeded as normal with
two different sets of kids to two different women.
3. When Wife died Father insisted that all of his children be mentioned in the
obituary which roused suspicion amongst the legitimate children.
a. They found out what Father had done.
4. The Legitimate Children filed a petition under Rule 108 to correct the birth
certificates of the Illegitimate Children to reflect their true parentage.
a. They discovered a LOT of inconsistencies that made it clearly
impossible that the Wife was the mother of all the children.
(Records showed inconsistencies with age of mother, birth order,
etc.)
b. Notified the Illegitimate Children.
5. The Illegitimate Children on the other hand filed a motion to dismiss arguing
that to change the birth certificate now would be like impugning their
legitimacy.
a. They argue that not only can their legitimacy not be collaterally
attacked using Rule 108, but the action has long prescribed.
6. The lower court denied the motion to dismiss finding the petition has proper
form and told them to file an opposition instead.
happens though is that rather than being summary in nature it becomes
adversarial for those whose rights will be affected.
ISSUE #2:
1. Rule 108 can be used to make substantial corrections to public records. The
confusion as to whether this is allowed arises from jurisprudence and Art.
412 of the CC. Art. 412 merely provides that no entry shall be changed or
corrected without a judicial order but does not provide for a procedure.
Jurisprudence thought that this procedure must be summary in nature and
as a result any change affecting another person’s rights would be
unconstitutional.
2. RA9048 further modified Art. 412 of the CC saying that no record can be
changed without a judicial order, but mere typos or clerical errors may be
changed with the Civil Registrar itself without resorting to judicial order. With
that in mind what’s left for Rule 108 is substantial changes since any
clerical mistake can be corrected directly with the Registrar. RA9048 is
Congress’ response to the confusion arising from how these changes, or the
application of Rule 108, are to be made and to what they apply to.
3. In order for these substantial changes to be made the proceeding must be
adversarial in nature. Substantial changes are usually those that change the
civil status of a person. It only requires that the procedure must be followed,
so publication once a week for 3 consecutive weeks, notice to all
interested parties and the Civil Registrar, and that there must be a
hearing to see if they should grant or dismiss the petition.

ISSUES/HELD:
1. WON Rule 108 is being used to collaterally attack or impugn
legitimacy? NO. What is being done is they are correcting a mistaken
birth certificate. The children had no relation to the wife to begin with.
2. WON Rule 108 can allow persons to make substantial corrections to
the records? YES. Rule 108 can actually be used to make substantial
corrections to the records. However in doing so the proceeding must
be adversarial and not merely summary.

RATIO:
ISSUE #1:
1. What is being done in the petition is the correction of errors in the birth
certificate. The act is not to declare that the children of Mistress are
illegitimate children of the Wife, but to establish that they are not
Wife’s children. There is nothing to impugn as they are not Wife’s children
to begin with.
2. While it is true that this change is more than just a clerical error Rule 108
actually allows you to make substantial corrections to the record. What
17
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS JUDGE CARINGAL 3D 2020
Republic v. Kho, G.R. No. 170340, 29 June 2007, supra
FACTS:
1. Carlito and his siblings Michael, Mercy Nona and Heddy Moira filed before
the RTC of Butuan City a verified petition for correction of entries in the civil
registry of Butuan City to effect changes in their respective birth certificates.
Carlito also asked the court in behalf of his minor children, Kevin and Kelly,
to order the correction of some entries in their birth certificates.
2. In the case of Carlito, he requested the correction in his birth certificate of
the citizenship of his mother to "Filipino" instead of "Chinese," as well as the
deletion of the word "married" opposite the phrase "Date of marriage of
parents" because his parents, Juan Kho and Epifania Inchoco (Epifania),
were allegedly not legally married.
3. The same request to delete the "married" status of their parents from their
respective birth certificates was made by Carlito’s siblings Michael, Mercy
Nona, and Heddy Moira.
4. With respect to the birth certificates of Carlito’s children, he prayed that the
date of his and his wife’s marriage be corrected from April 27, 1989 to
January 21, 2000, the date appearing in their marriage certificate.
5. The Local Civil Registrar of Butuan City was impleaded as respondent and
the public prosecutor appeared on behalf of the OSG and the Republic of
the Philippines. Carlito et al. then filed an Amended Petition in which it was
additionally prayed that Carlito’s second name of "John" be deleted from his
record of birth; and that the name and citizenship of Carlito’s father in his
(Carlito’s) marriage certificate be corrected from "John Kho" to "Juan Kho"
and "Filipino" to "Chinese," respectively.
6. In a letter of June 18, 2001 addressed to the trial court, the city civil registrar
stated her observations and suggestions to the proposed corrections in the
birth records of Carlito and his siblings but interposed no objections to the
other amendments. The trial court later granted Carlito and his siblings’
prayer.
7. Petitioner, Republic of the Philippines, appealed the RTC Decision to the CA
but the latter denied their appeal.
8. In the present petition, petitioner contends that since the changes sought by
respondents were substantial in nature, they could only be granted through
an adversarial proceeding in which indispensable parties, such as Marivel
and respondents’ parents, should have been notified or impleaded.
Petitioner further contends that the jurisdictional requirements to change
Carlito’s name under Section 2 of Rule 103 of the Rules of Court were not
satisfied because the Amended Petition failed to allege Carlito’s prior three-
year bona fide residence in Butuan City, and that the title of the petition did
not state Carlito’s aliases and his true name as "Carlito John I. Kho."
Petitioner concludes that the same jurisdictional defects attached to the
change of name of Carlito’s father.
ISSUE: Whether the failure to implead Marivel and Carlito’s parents rendered the trial
short of the required adversary proceeding and the trial court’s judgment void.
RULING + RATIO: NO
1. It cannot be gainsaid that the petition, insofar as it sought to change the
citizenship of Carlito’s mother as it appeared in his birth certificate and
delete the "married" status of Carlito’s parents in his and his siblings’
respective birth certificates, as well as change the date of marriage of Carlito
and Marivel involves the correction of not just clerical errors of a harmless
and innocuous nature. Rather, the changes entail substantial and
controversial amendments.
2. Clearly, the changes sought can only be granted in an adversary
proceeding. Labayo-Rowe v. Republic explains the raison d etre:
a. If the entries in the civil register could be corrected or changed
through mere summary proceedings and not through appropriate
action wherein all parties who may be affected by the entries are
notified or represented, the door to fraud or other mischief would be
set open, the consequence of which might be detrimental and far
reaching.
3. In the present case, there is no dispute that the trial court’s Order setting the
petition for hearing and directing any person or entity having interest in the
petition to oppose it was posted as well as published for the required period;
that notices of hearings were duly served on the Solicitor General, the city
prosecutor of Butuan and the local civil registrar; and that trial was
conducted on January 31, 2002 during which the public prosecutor, acting in
behalf of the OSG, actively participated by cross-examining Carlito and
Epifania.
4. Furthermore, Barco v. Court of Appeals: Verily, a petition for correction is
an action in rem, an action against a thing and not against a person.
The decision on the petition binds not only the parties thereto but the
whole world. An in rem proceeding is validated essentially through
publication. Publication is notice to the whole world that the
proceeding has for its object to bar indefinitely all who might be
minded to make an objection of any sort against the right sought to be
established. It is the publication of such notice that brings in the whole
world as a party in the case and vests the court with jurisdiction to
hear and decide it.
5. Given the above ruling, it becomes unnecessary to rule on whether Marivel
or respondents’ parents should have been impleaded as parties to the
proceeding. It may not be amiss to mention, however, that during the
hearing on January 31, 2002, the city prosecutor who was acting as
representative of the OSG did not raise any objection to the non-inclusion of
Marivel and Carlito’s parents as parties to the proceeding. Parenthetically, it
seems highly improbable that Marivel was unaware of the proceedings to
correct the entries in her children’s birth certificates, especially since the
notices, orders and decision of the trial court were all sent to the residence
she shared with Carlito and the children.
DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED.
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SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS JUDGE CARINGAL 3D 2020
Kilosbayan Foundation v. Ong, G.R. No. 177721, July 3, 2007
FACTS:
1. Petitioners → people's and/or non-governmental organizations engaged in public
and civic causes aimed at protecting the people's rights to self-governance and
justice.
2. Respondent Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita → the head of the Office of the
President + in charge of releasing presidential appointments including those of
Supreme Court Justices.
3. Respondent Gregory S. Ong → allegedly the party whose appointment would fill up
the vacancy in this Court.
4. Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari to annul the appointment issued to
respondent Ong as Associate Justice of this Court, contending that the
appointment extended to respondent Ong through respondent Executive
Secretary is patently unconstitutional, arbitrary, whimsical and issued with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
a. They claim that respondent Ong is a Chinese citizen, that this fact
is plain and incontestable, and that his own birth certificate
indicates his Chinese citizenship.
i. Petitioners attached a copy of said birth certificate as
Annex "H" to the petition, revealing that at the time of
respondent Ong's birth on May 25, 1953, his father was
Chinese and his mother was also Chinese.
b. They invoke the Constitution:
i. Section 7 (1) of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution → "No
person shall be appointed Member of the Supreme Court or any
lower collegiate court unless he is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines."
ii. Sec. 2 of Art. IV → defines "natural-born citizens as those who
are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to
perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine
Citizenship."
c. They maintain that even if it were granted that eleven years after
respondent Ong's birth his father was finally granted Filipino
citizenship by naturalization, that, by itself, would not make
respondent Ong a natural-born Filipino citizen.
d. They argue that respondent Ong's birth certificate speaks for itself
and it states his nationality as "Chinese" at birth. They invoke the
Civil Code:
i. Article 410 of the Civil Code → "[t]he books making up the
civil register and all documents relating thereto . . . shall be
prima facie evidence of the facts therein contained."
1. Therefore, the entry in Ong's birth certificate
indicating his nationality as Chinese is prima
facie evidence of the fact that Ong's citizenship at
birth is Chinese.
ii. Article 412 of the Civil Code → "[N]o entry in a civil register
shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order."
1. Thus, as long as Ong's birth certificate is not
changed by a judicial order, the Judicial & Bar
Council, as well as the whole world, is bound by
what is stated in his birth certificate.
e. They assert that this birth certificate prevails over:
i. Respondent Ong's new Identification Certificate issued by
the Bureau of Immigration dated October 16, 1996, stating
that he is a natural-born Filipino; and
ii. The opinion of then Secretary of Justice Teofisto
Guingona that he is a natural-born Filipino.
f. They maintain that the Department of Justice (DOJ) does not have
the power or authority to alter entries in a birth certificate; that
respondent Ong's old Identification Certificate did not declare that
he is a natural-born Filipino; and that respondent Ong's remedy is
an action to correct his citizenship as it appears in his birth
certificate.
5. Respondent Executive Secretary filed his Comment, essentially stating that:
a. The appointment of respondent Ong as Associate Justice of this
Court on May 16, 2007 was made by the President pursuant to the
powers vested in her by Article VIII, Section 9 of the Constitution.1
b. The President appointed respondent Ong from among the list of
nominees who were duly screened by and bore the imprimatur of
the JBC created under Article VIII, Section 8 of the Constitution.
i. Said respondent further stated: "The appointment,
however, was not released, but instead, referred to the
JBC for validation of respondent Ong's citizenship."
ii. To date, however, the JBC has not received the referral.
6. Respondent Ong submitted his Comment with Opposition, maintaining that:
a. He is a natural-born Filipino citizen;
b. Petitioners have no standing to file the present suit;
c. The issue raised ought to be addressed to the JBC as the
Constitutional body mandated to review the qualifications of those it
recommends to judicial posts.
d. Petitioners in his view failed to include the President who is an
indispensable party as the one who extended the appointment.
e. As to his citizenship:
i. Respondent Ong traces his ancestral lines to one Maria
Santos of Malolos, Bulacan, born on November 25, 1881,
who was allegedly a Filipino citizen who married Chan Kin,
a Chinese citizen; that these two had a son, Juan Santos;
ii. In 1906 Chan Kin died in China, as a result of which Maria
Santos reverted to her Filipino citizenship;
iii. At that time Juan Santos was a minor;
iv. Juan Santos thereby also became a Filipino citizen;
1 SEC. 9. The Members of the Supreme Court and Judges of lower courts shall be appointed by
the President from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for
every vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation.
19
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS JUDGE CARINGAL 3D 2020
v. Respondent Ong's mother, Dy Guiok Santos, is the
daughter of the spouses Juan Santos and Sy Siok Hian, a
Chinese citizen, who were married in 1927;
vi. Therefore, respondent's mother was a Filipino citizen at
birth;
vii. Dy Guiok Santos later married a Chinese citizen, Eugenio
Ong Han Seng, thereby becoming a Chinese citizen;
viii. When respondent Ong was eleven years old his father,
Eugenio Ong Han Seng, was naturalized, and as a result
he, his brothers and sisters, and his mother were included
in the naturalization.
f. Respondent Ong subsequently obtained from the Bureau of
Immigration and the DOJ a certification and an identification that he
is a natural-born Filipino citizen under Article IV, Sections 1 and 2
of the Constitution, since his mother was a Filipino citizen when he
was born.
7. Petitioners, in turn, filed a Consolidated Reply, in which:
a. They asserted their standing to file this suit on the strength of
previous decisions of this Court, e.g., Kilosbayan, Incorporated v.
Guingona and Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Morato, on the ground
that the case is one of transcendental importance.
b. They claim that the President's appointment of respondent Ong as
Supreme Court Justice violates the Constitution and is, therefore,
attended with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.
c. They reiterate that respondent Ong's birth certificate, unless
corrected by judicial order in non-summary proceedings for the
purpose, is binding on all and is prima facie evidence of what it
states, namely, that respondent Ong is a Chinese citizen.
d. The alleged naturalization of his father when he was a minor would
not make him a natural-born Filipino citizen.
ISSUE: W/N responden Ong is a natural-born Filipino citizen
RULING + RATIO: NO
1. On this point, the Court takes judicial notice of the records of respondent
Ong's petition to be admitted to the Philippine bar.
2. In his petition to be admitted to the Philippine bar, respondent Ong alleged
that he is qualified to be admitted to the Philippine bar because, among
others, he is a Filipino citizen; and that he is a Filipino citizen because his
father, Eugenio Ong Han Seng, a Chinese citizen, was naturalized in 1964
when he, respondent Ong, was a minor of eleven years and thus he, too,
thereby became a Filipino citizen.
a. As part of his evidence, in support of his petition, be submitted his
birth certificate and the naturalization papers of his father.
b. His birth certificate states that he was a Chinese citizen at birth and
that his mother, Dy Guiok Santos, was a Chinese citizen and his
father, Eugenio Ong Han Seng, was also a Chinese citizen.
3. In fact, Emilio R. Rebueno, Deputy Clerk of Court and Bar Confidant, wrote
respondent Ong a letter stating that in connection with his Petition for
Admission to the 1979 Bar Examinations, he has to submit: (1) A certified
clear copy of his Birth Certificate; and (2) A certification of non-appeal re his
citizenship from the Office of the Solicitor General.
a. Respondent Ong complied with these requirements.
b. It was on the basis of these allegations under oath and the
submitted evidence of naturalization that this Court allowed
respondent Ong to take the oath as a lawyer.
4. It is clear, therefore, that from the records of this Court, respondent Ong is a
naturalized Filipino citizen.
a. The alleged subsequent recognition of his natural-born status by
the Bureau of Immigration and the DOJ cannot amend the final
decision of the trial court stating that respondent Ong and his
mother were naturalized along with his father.
5. Furthermore, as petitioners correctly submit, no substantial change or
correction in an entry in a civil register can be made without a judicial
order, and, under the law, a change in citizenship status is a
substantial change.
a. Labayo-Rowe v. Republic → Changes which affect the civil
status or citizenship of a party are substantial in character and
should be threshed out in a proper action depending upon the
nature of the issues in controversy, and wherein all the parties
who may be affected by the entries are notified or represented
and evidence is submitted to prove the allegations of the
complaint, and proof to the contrary admitted.
6. Section 2 (3) of Republic Act No. 9048 provides that a summary
administrative proceeding to correct clerical or typographical errors in
a birth certificate cannot apply to a change in nationality.
a. Substantial corrections to the nationality or citizenship of
persons recorded in the civil registry should, therefore, be
effected through a petition filed in court under Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court.
DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED as one of injunction directed
against respondent Gregory S. Ong, who is hereby ENJOINED from accepting an
appointment to the position of Associate Justice of the Supreme Court or assuming
the position and discharging the functions of that office, until he shall have
successfully completed all necessary steps, through the appropriate adversarial
proceedings in court, to show that he is a natural-born Filipino citizen and correct the
records of his birth and citizenship.
20
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS JUDGE CARINGAL 3D 2020
Onde v. Local Civil Registrar of Las Piñas, GR 197174, September 10, 2014
FACTS:
1. Francler Onde filed a petition for correction of entries in his certificate of live
birth before the RTC and named respondent Office of the Local Civil
Registrar of Las Piñas City as sole respondent. Petitioner alleged that he is
the illegitimate child of his parents Guillermo A. Onde and Matilde DC
Pakingan but his birth certificate stated that his parents were married. 'is
birth certificate also stated that his mother(s first name isTely and that his
first name is Franc Ler. 'e prayed that the following entries on his birth
certificate be corrected as follows:
Entry From To
1) Date and place of marriage of his December 23, 1983 - Not
parents Bicol Married
2) First name of his mother Tely Matilde
3) His first name Franc Ler Francler
2. October 4, 2010 the RTC dismissed the petition for correction of entries on
the ground that it is insufficient in form and substance. It ruled that the
proceedings must be adversarial since the first correction is substantial in
nature and would affect petitioner’s status as a legitimate child. It was further
held that the correction in the first name of petitioner and his mother can be
done by the city civil registrar under Republic Act 9048 entitled An Act
authorizing the City or Municipal Civil Registrar or the Consul General to
Correct a Clerical or Typographical Error in an Entry and/or Change of First
Name or Nickname in the Civil Registrar Without Need of a Judicial Order,
Amending for this Purpose Articles 376 and 412 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines
3. March 1, 2011, RTC denied petitioner’s MR, as it found no proof that
petitioner’s parents were not married on December 23, 1983
ISSUES/HELD:
1. Whether the RTC erred in ruling that the correction on the first name of
petitioner and his mother can be done by the city civil registrar under R.A.
No. 9048; (NO, IT CAN CORRECT)
2. Whether the RTC erred in ruling that correcting the entry on petitioner’s birth
certificate that his parents were married on December 23, 1983 in Bicol to
"not married" is substantial in nature requiring adversarial proceedings; (NO)
3. Whether the RTC erred in dismissing the petition for correction of entries;
(NO)
4. Whether the RTC erred in ruling that there is no proof that petitioner’s
parents were not married on December 23, 1983. (NOT NECESSARY)
RATIO:
ISSUE #1: NO, IT CAN CORRECT ENTRIES
1. On the first issue, we agree with the RTC that the first name of petitioner and
his mother as appearing in his birth certificate can be corrected by the city
civil registrar under R.A. No. 9048. We note that petitioner no longer
contested the RTC’s ruling on this point.4 Indeed, under Section 15 of R.A.
No. 9048, clerical or typographical errors on entries in a civil register can be
corrected and changes of first name can be done by the concerned city civil
registrar without need of a judicial order. Aforesaid Section 1, as amended
by R.A. No. 10172, now reads: SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or
Typographical Error and Change of First Name or Nickname. – No entry in a
civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order, except for
clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or nickname, the
day and month in the date of birth or sex of a person where it is patently
clear that there was a clerical or typographical error or mistake in the entry,
which can be corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal/civil
registrar or consul general in accordance with the provisions of this Act and
its implementing rules and regulations.
ISSUE #2: NO, RTC NOT WRONG.
1. On the second issue, we also agree with the RTC in ruling that correcting
the entry on petitioner’s birth certificate that his parents were married on
December 23, 1983 in Bicol to "not married" is a substantial correction
requiring adversarial proceedings. Said correction is substantial as it will
affect his legitimacy and convert him from a legitimate child to an illegitimate
one. In Republic v. Uy, we held that corrections of entries in the civil register
including those on citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy
of marriage,involve substantial alterations. Substantial errors in a civil
registry may be corrected and the true facts established provided the parties
aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary
proceedings.
ISSUE #3: NO, RTC ALSO CORRECT.
1. On the third issue, we likewise affirm the RTC in dismissing the petition for
correction of entries. As mentioned, petitioner no longer contested the RTC
ruling that the correction he sought on his and his mother’s first name can be
done by the city civil registrar. Under the circumstances, we are constrained
to deny his prayer that the petition for correction of entries before the RTC
be reinstated since the same petition includes the correction he sought on
his and his mother’s first name.
2. We clarify, however, that the RTC’s dismissal is without prejudice. As we
said, petitioner can avail of the administrative remedy for the correction of
his and his mother’s first name. He can also file a new petition before the
RTC to correct the alleged erroneous entry on his birth certificate that his
21
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS JUDGE CARINGAL 3D 2020

parents were married on December 23, 1983 in Bicol. This substantial

correction is allowed under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE #4: NO NEED TO DISCUSS 4TH ISSUE

1. In view of the foregoing discussion, it is no longer necessary to dwell on the
last issue as petitioner will have his opportunity to prove his claim that his
parents were not married on December 23, 1983 when he files the new
petition for the purpose.

DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition and AFFIRM the Orders

dated October 7, 2010 and March 1, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
201, Las Pifias City, in Special Proceedings Case No. 10-0043. The dismissal
ordered by the Regional Trial Court is, however, declared to be without
prejudice.

22
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS JUDGE CARINGAL 3D 2020
Republic v. Sali, G.R. No. 206023, April 3, 2017
FACTS:
1. Lorena Omapas Sali filed a Verified Petition for Correction of Entry under
Rule 108.
2. Petitioner was born on April 24, 1968 in Baybay, Leyte. A copy of the
Baptismal Certificate issued by the Parish of the Sacred Heart is attached.
3. Unfortunately, in recording the facts of her birth, the personnel of the Local
Civil Registrar of Baybay, Leyte, thru inadvertence and mistake, erroneously
entered in the records the following:
a. The first name of the petitioner as "DOROTHY" instead of
"LORENA" and
b. The date of birth of the petitioner as "June 24, 1968" instead of
"April 24, 1968."
4. A copy of the Certificate of Live Birth of Dorothy A. Omapas issued by the
National Statistics Office (NSO) and Certification from the Local Civil
Registrar of Baybay, Leyte is attached.
5. Petitioner has been using the name "Lorena A. Omapas["] and her date of
birth as "April 24, 1968" for as long as she (sic) since she could remember
and is known to the community in general as such.
6. Petitioner attached the ff: the Certificate of Marriage of her mother and
father, and a photocopy of the Postal Identity Card of the petitioner.
7. After Petitioner proved her compliance with the jurisdictional requirements,
reception of evidence followed.
8. The petition was granted.
9. The Republic, through the OSG, appealed the RTC Decision for lack of
jurisdiction because the title of the petition and the order setting the petition
for hearing did not contain Petitioner’s aliases.
10. The CA denied the appeal.
ISSUE: Whether the petitions is under Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108
(Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry)?
RULING + RATIO: RULE 108.
1. The Republic argues that although Petitioner’s petition is entitled: "IN THE
MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR CORRECTION OF ENTRY IN THE
CERTIFICATE OF LIVE BIRTH OF DOROTHY A. OMAPAS," it is actually a
petition for a change of name. The first name being sought to be changed
does not involve the correction of a simple clerical, typographical or
innocuous error such as a patently misspelled name, but a substantial
change in Petitioner’s first name. This considering, the applicable rule is
Rule 103, which requires that the applicant's names and aliases must be
stated in the title of the petition and the order setting it for hearing, and that
the petition can be granted only on specific grounds provided by law.
Further, assuming that a petition for correction of entries under Rule 108 is
the appropriate remedy, the petition should not have been granted for failure
to exhaust administrative remedies provided for under RA 9048.
2. The petition is partially granted.
3. The evidence presented show that, since birth, Petitioner has been using the
name "Lorena." Thus, it is apparent that she never had any intention to
change her name. What she seeks is simply the removal of the clerical fault
or error in her first name, and to set aright the same to conform to the name
she grew up with.
4. Nevertheless, at the time Petitioner’s petition was filed, R.A. No. 9048 was
already in effect. Section 1 of the law states:
5. SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and
Change of First Name or Nickname. - No entry in a civil register shall be
changed or corrected without a judicial order, except for clerical or
typographical errors and change of first name or nickname which can be
corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or
consul general in accordance with the provisions of this Act and its
implementing rules and regulations.
6. The petition for change of first name may be allowed, among other grounds,
if the new first name has been habitually and continuously used by the
petitioner and he or she has been publicly known by that first name in the
community. The local city or municipal civil registrar or consul general has
the primary jurisdiction to entertain the petition. It is only when such petition
is denied that a petitioner may either appeal to the civil registrar general or
file the appropriate petition with the proper court.
7. Under the law, therefore, jurisdiction over applications for change of first
name is now primarily lodged with the aforementioned administrative
officers. The intent and effect of the law is to exclude the change of first
name from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108
(Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of
Court, until and unless an administrative petition for change of name is first
filed and subsequently denied. It likewise lays down the corresponding
venue, form and procedure. In sum, the remedy and the proceedings
regulating change of first name are primarily administrative in nature, not
judicial.
8. Thus the petition of Petitioner was not within the RTC's primary jurisdiction. It
was improper because the remedy should have been administrative, i.e.,
filing of the petition with the local civil registrar concerned. For failure to
exhaust administrative remedies, the RTC should have dismissed the
petition to correct Petitioner’s first name.
9. On the other hand, anent Sali's petition to correct her birth date from "June
24, 1968" to "April 24, 1968," R.A. No. 9048 is inapplicable. It was only on
August 15, 2012 that R.A. No. 10172 was signed into law amending R.A.
No. 9048. As modified, Section 1 now includes the day and month in the
date of birth and sex of a person.
10. Considering that Sali filed her petition in 2008, Rule 108 is the appropriate
remedy in seeking to correct her date of birth in the civil registry.
11. Here, Petitioner complied with the old rule and therefore the change of date
in her birth certificate is proper.
DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is PARTIALLY
GRANTED. The February 11, 2013 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB
23
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS JUDGE CARINGAL 3D 2020

CV No. 03442, which affirmed in toto the February 23, 2010 Decision of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 14, Baybay City, Leyte, is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION.
The Petition for Correction of Entry in the Certificate of Live Birth of Dorothy A.
Omapas with respect to her first name is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to its
filing with the local civil registrar concerned.

DOCTRINES:
1. The petition for change of first name may be allowed, among other grounds,
if the new first name has been habitually and continuously used by the
petitioner and he or she has been publicly known by that first name in the
community. The local city or municipal civil registrar or consul general has
the primary jurisdiction to entertain the petition. It is only when such petition
is denied that a petitioner may either appeal to the civil registrar general or
file the appropriate petition with the proper court.
2. Under the law, therefore, jurisdiction over applications for change of first
name is now primarily lodged with the aforementioned administrative
officers. The intent and effect of the law is to exclude the change of first
name from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108
(Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of
Court, until and unless an administrative petition for change of name is first
filed and subsequently denied. It likewise lays down the corresponding
venue, form and procedure. In sum, the remedy and the proceedings
regulating change of first name are primarily administrative in nature, not
judicial.

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SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS JUDGE CARINGAL 3D 2020
Republic v. Gallo, G.R. No. 207074, January 17, 2018
FACTS:
1. Gallo has never been known as "Michael Soriano Gallo." She has always
been female. Her parent have never changed their names. According to her,
in her petition before the RTC, her birth certificate contained errors, which
should be corrected and she was not changing the name that was given to
her but was merely correcting its entry. Gallo prayed for the correction of her
name from "Michael" to "Michelle" and of her biological sex from "Male" to
"Female" under Rule 108, asked for the inclusion of her middle name,
"Soriano"; her mother's and father's middle name, and her parent's marriage
in her birth certificate, as these were not recorded.
2. She showed that her college diploma, voter's certification, and transcript
indicated that her name was "Michelle Soriano Gallo." The doctor who
examined her also certified that she was female. Gallo explained that she
never undertook any gender-reassignment surgery and that she filed the
petition not to evade any civil or criminal liability, but to obtain a passport.
3. RTC granted the petition.
4. OSG appealed, alleging that the applicable rule should be Rule 103 for
Petitions for Change of Name. It argued that Gallo did not comply with the
jurisdictional requirements under Rule 103 because the title of her Petition
and the published Order did not state her official name, "Michael Gallo."
Furthermore, the published Order was also defective for not stating the
cause of the change of name.
5. CA denied the OSG’s appeal and found that Gallo availed of the proper
remedy under Rule 108 as the corrections sought were clerical, harmless,
and innocuous.
ISSUE: Whether Michelle Soriano Gallo's petition involves a substantive change
under Rule 103 instead of mere correction of clerical errors
RATIO: Mere correction of clerical errors
1. RA 10172 defines a clerical or typographical error as a recorded mistake,
"which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding." By qualifying
the definition of a clerical, typographical error as a mistake "visible to the
eyes or obvious to the understanding," the law recognizes that there is a
factual determination made after reference to and evaluation of existing
documents presented. Thus, corrections may be made even though the
error is not typographical if it is "obvious to the understanding," even if there
is no proof that the name or circumstance in the birth certificate was ever
used.
2. SC agreed with RTC’s determination, concurred in by CA, that this case
involves the correction of a mere error. As these are findings of fact, SC is
bound by the lower courts' findings.
3. In any case, Rule 103 does not apply here. The change in the entry of
Gallo's biological sex is governed by Rule 108 while RA 9048 applies to all
other corrections sought. Under the old rules, a person would have to file an
action in court under Rule 103 for substantial changes in the given name or
surname provided they fall under any of the valid reasons recognized by law,
or Rule 108 for corrections of clerical errors. This requirement for judicial
authorization was justified to prevent fraud and allow other parties, who may
be affected by the change of name, to oppose the matter, as decisions in
these proceedings bind the whole world.
4. Applying Article 412 of the Civil Code, a person desiring to change his or her
name altogether must file a petition under Rule 103 with the Regional Trial
Court, which will then issue an order setting a hearing date and directing the
order's publication in a newspaper of general circulation. 61 After finding that
there is proper and reasonable cause to change his or her name, the
Regional Trial Court may grant the petition and order its entry in the civil
register.
5. On the other hand, Rule 108 applies when the person is seeking to correct
clerical and innocuous mistakes in his or her documents with the civil
register. It also governs the correction of substantial errors in the entry of the
information enumerated in Section 2 of this Rule 64 and those affecting the
civil status, citizenship, and nationality of a person. The proceedings under
this rule may either be summary, if the correction pertains to clerical
mistakes, or adversary, if it pertains to substantial errors.
6. However, RA. 9048 amended Articles 376 and 412 of the Civil Code,
effectively removing clerical errors and changes of the name outside the
ambit of Rule 108 and putting them under the jurisdiction of the civil
registrar. Republic Act No. 9048 also dispensed with the need for judicial
proceedings in case of any clerical or typographical mistakes in the civil
register or changes in first names or nicknames. Thus, a person may now
change his or her first name or correct clerical errors in his or her name
through administrative proceedings. Rules 103 and 108 only apply if the
administrative petition has been filed and later denied.
7. In 2012, RA 9048 was amended by RA 10172. In addition to the change of
the first name, the day and month of birth, and the sex of a person may now
be changed without judicial proceedings. RA 10172 clarifies that these
changes may now be administratively corrected where it is patently clear
that there is a clerical or typographical mistake in the entry.
8. Nevertheless, RA. 10172 does not apply in the case at bar as it was only
enacted on August 15, 2012 — more than two (2) years after Gallo filed her
Petition for Correction of Entry on May 13, 2010. Hence, RA 9048 governs.
a. SC ruled that Gallo's Petition involves a mere correction of clerical
errors. Corrections which involve a change in nationality, age, or
status are not considered clerical or typographical. Considering that
Gallo had shown that the reason for her petition was not to change
the name by which she is commonly known, her petition is not
covered by Rule 103. Gallo is not filing the petition to change her
current appellation. She is merely correcting the misspelling of her
name.
b. Correcting and changing must differentiated. Gallo is not attempting
to replace her current appellation. She is merely correcting the
misspelling of her given name. "Michelle" could easily be
misspelled as "Michael," especially since the first four (4) letters of
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SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS JUDGE CARINGAL 3D 2020

these two (2) names are exactly the same. The differences only
pertain to an additional letter "a" in "Michael," and "le" at the end of
"Michelle." "Michelle" and "Michael" may also be vocalized similarly,
considering the possibility of different accents or intonations of
different people. In any case, Gallo does not seek to be known by a
different appellation. The lower courts have determined that she
has been known as "Michelle" all throughout her life. She is merely
seeking to correct her records to conform to her true given name.
9. However, Rule 108 does not apply in this case either. As stated, Gallo filed
her Petition for Correction of Entry on May 13, 2010. 101 The current law,
Republic Act No. 10172, does not apply because it was enacted only on
August 19, 2012. The applicable law then for the correction of Gallo's name
is Republic Act No. 9048. Therefore, it is the civil registrar who has primary
jurisdiction over Gallo's petition, not the Regional Trial Court. Only if her
petition was denied by the local city or municipal civil registrar can the
Regional Trial Court take cognizance of her case. (The SC, nevertheless,
still affirmed the RTC and CA).
10. Likewise, the prayers to enter Gallo's middle name as Soriano, the middle
names of her parents as Angangan for her mother and Balingao for her
father, and the date of her parents' marriage as May 23, 1981 fall under
clerical or typographical errors as mentioned in Republic Act No. 9048.
These corrections may be done by referring to existing records in the civil
register. None of it involves any change in Gallo's nationality, age, status, or
sex. Moreover, errors "visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding"
108 fall within the coverage of clerical mistakes not deemed substantial. If it
is "obvious to the understanding," even if there is no proof that the name or
circumstance in the birth certificate was ever used, the correction may be
made. Thus, as to these corrections, Gallo should have sought to correct
them administratively before filing a petition under Rule 108.
11. The petition to correct Gallo's biological sex was rightfully filed under Rule
108 as this was a substantial change excluded in the definition of clerical or
typographical errors in RA 9048.

DISPOSITION: OSG’s appeal denied.

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SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS JUDGE CARINGAL 3D 2020

Republic v. Belmonte, GR L-32600, February 26, 1988, supra
FACTS:
1. Anita Po, 16 years old, filed a petition for change of name to Veronica Pao
and also sought to correct her birth records by changing the name of her
father to Pao Yu from Po Yu and her mother’s name from Pakiat Chan to
Helen Chan.
2. She alleged that her mother’s maiden name is Helen Chan and that “Pakiat”
was her maternal grandmother’s name and that her father’s name was
erroneously written due to common misunderstanding of chinese names.
3. She claimed that she was baptized by a Catholic priest as Veronica Pao and
that since childhood, she had always been known as Veronica Pao and not
Anita Po.
4. Solicitor General opposed alleging that a petition for change of name and a
petition for correction of entries in the Civil Register are distinct and separate
from each other and have different requirements. It claimed that the petition
satisfies Rule 103 on change of name but fails under Rule 108 for correction.
5. SolGen claimed that before Anita can claim a change in her name, her
parents’ name must first be changed so that she can use the surname “Pao”.
6. Trial court ruled in favor of Anita and was allowed to change her name and
also allowed the correction of the names of her parents.
c. Under Section 3, Rule 108, when cancellation or correction of an
entry in the civil register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons
who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby
should be made parties to the proceeding. In this case, the local
civil registrar concerned was never made a party. The civil
registrar is an indispensable party.
d. The procedure under Rule 103 and Rule 108 are separate and
distinct. They may not be substituted one for the other for the sole
purpose of expediency. To hold otherwise, would render nugatory
the provisions of the Rules of Court. If both reliefs are to be
sought in the same proceedings, all the requirements of Rules
103 and 108 must be complied with.
DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of the Court of
First Instance of Baguio and Benguet in Special Proceeding Case No. 642 dated July
24,1969 is hereby SET ASIDE and declared to be without force or effect. The entries
in the local civil registry of La Trinidad, Benguet pertaining to the petitioner Anita Po
and her parents Po Yu and Pakiat Chan stand as they were before such Decision. Let
a copy of this Decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of La Trinidad, Benguet
for his information and implementation. We make no pronouncement as to costs.

ISSUES:
1. WON Anita presented a proper and reasonable cause to change her name
2. WON the correction in the birth certificates can be claimed in the same
proceeding for the change of name.

RULING + RATIO:
1. NO. Her assumption that her correct name of Veronica Pao, based from the
correct name of her father as Pao Yu instead of Po Yu, is baseless absent
any proof that the name of her father was entered erroneously.
a. Until the name of her father is shown to have been registered
erroneously, there is no justification for allowing petitioner to use
the surname “Pao”. The corrections sought by Anita involve the
very identity of her parents. The propriety of such corrections
should first be determined in a different proceeding more adversary
in character than the summary case instituted by Anita.
2. YES, but all the requirements under Rule 103 and 108 must be complied
with.
a. The correction of entries in the civil registry for the benefit of her
parents cannot be done through summary proceeding. The
summary procedure for correction of the civil register under Rule
108 is confined to innocuous or clerical errors and not to material
changes in the spelling of a surname.
b. A clerical error must be apparent on the face of the record and
should be capable of being corrected by reference to the record
alone. In this case, Anita seeks more than just the correction of a
clerical error.
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SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS JUDGE CARINGAL 3D 2020
Braza et. al., v. Civil Registrar, GR 181174, December 4, 2009
FACTS:
1. Petitioner Ma. Cristina Torres and Pablo Braza also known as Pablita Braza
were married on January 4, 1978. They bore Paolo Josef, Janelle Ann, and
Gian Carlo.
2. Pablo died in a vehicular accident in Bandung Indonesia
3. During the wake following the repatriation of his remains, respondent Lucille
began introducing her co-respondent minor Patrick Alvin Braza as her and
Pablo’s son
4. Ma. Cristina thereupon made inquiries in the course of which she obtained
Patrick’s birth certificate from the Local Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City
containing the following remarks:
a. “Acknowledged (sic) by the father Pablito Braza on January 13,
1997”
b. “Legitimated by virtue of subsequent marriage of parents on April
22 1998 at Manila. Henceforth the child shall be known as Patrick
Alvin Titular Braza”
5. Petitioner also obtained the marriage contract showing that Pablo and Lucille
were married, which made her file before the RTC of Negros a petition to
correct the entries in the birth record of Patrick in the Local Civil Registrar
6. Contending that Patrick could not have been legitimated by the marriage of
Pablo and Lucille since it was bigamous in account of the valid and
subsisting marriage between petitioner and Pablo, petitioners prayed for:
a. The correction of the entries in Patrick’s birth record with respect to
his legitimation and father’s acknowledgement, and the use of the
last name “Braza”
b. Also includes prayer to submit Patrick to DNA testing to determine
paternity and filiation
c. Declaration of nullity of the legitimation of Patrick and for this
purpose, the declaration of the marriage of Lucille and Pablo as
bigamous
7. RTC dismissed the petition, holding that in a special proceeding for
correction of entry, the court, which is not acting as a family court under the
Family Code, has no jurisdiction over an action to annul the marriage of
Lucille and Pablo, impugn the legitimacy of Patrick, and order Patrick to be
subjected to a DNA test – should be ventilated in an ordinary adversarial
action
8. Petitioner maintains that the lower court may pass upon the validity of
marriage and questions on legitimacy even in an action to correct entries in
the civil registrar because even substantial errors such as those prayed for,
can be the subject of a petition under Rule 108
ISSUE: W/N in a special proceeding for correcting of entries in civil registrar may rule
on the legitimacy and filiation of a child and nullity of marriage?
RULING + RATIO: Petition FAILS
1. In a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108, the trial court
has NO JURISDICTION to nullify marriages and rule on legitimacy and
filiation
2. Rule 108 of the ROC vis-à-vis Art. 412 of the Civil Code charts the
procedure by which an entry in the civil registry may be cancelled or
corrected. The proceeding contemplated therein may generally be used only
to correct clerical, spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in the
civil registry
3. Clerical error is one which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the
understanding; an error made by a clerk or transcriber; a mistake in copying
or writing, or a harmless change such as a correction of name that is clearly
misspelled or of a misstatement of the occupation of the parent
4. Substantial or contentious alterations may be allowed only in adversarial
proceedings in which all interested parties are impleaded and due process is
properly observed
5. The allegations of the petition clearly show that petitioners seek to nullify the
marriage between Pablo and Lucille on the ground that it is bigamous and
impugn Patrick’s filiation in connection with the DNA test
6. Such are not incidental to the supposed “main cause of action” for correction
of Patrick’s birth records. Their cause of action is actually to seek the
declaration of Pablo and Lucille’s marriage as void and impugning Patrick’s
legitimacy, which are not covered by Rule 108 but by A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
and Art. 171 of Family Code. Petition should be filed in a Family Court
a. Validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can only be
questioned in a direct action and not through collateral attack such
as the petition filed before the court a quo
DISPOSITION: Petition is DENIED
DOCTRINES:
1. The proceeding contemplated therein may generally be used only to correct
clerical, spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in the civil
registry
2. Clerical error is one which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the
understanding; an error made by a clerk or transcriber; a mistake in copying
or writing, or a harmless change such as a correction of name that is clearly
misspelled or of a misstatement of the occupation of the parent
3. Substantial or contentious alterations may be allowed only in adversarial
proceedings in which all interested parties are impleaded and due process is
properly observed
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SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS JUDGE CARINGAL 3D 2020
Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, GR 186571, August 11, 2010
RATIO:
FACTS:
1. Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired
Canadian citizenship through naturalization on November 29, 2000. On
January 18, 2005, Gerbert married respondent Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a
Filipina, in Pasig City.
2. Due to work and other professional commitments, Gerbert left for Canada
soon after the wedding. He returned to the Philippines sometime in April
2005 to surprise Daisylyn, but was shocked to discover that his wife was
having an affair with another man.
3. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert returned to Canada and filed a petition for
divorce. The Superior Court of Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted
Gerbert’s petition for divorce on December 8, 2005. The divorce decree took
effect a month later, on January 8, 2006.
4. Two years later, the petitioner has already moved on and found another
woman that he wants to marry. Thus, for his love to his fiancée; the
petitioner went to the Pasig Civil Registry Office and registered the Canadian
divorce decree on his and the respondent’s marriage certificate. Despite the
registration of the divorce decree, an official of the National Statistics Office
(NSO) informed the petitioner that the marriage between him and the
respondent still subsists under the Philippine Law and to be enforceable, the
foreign divorce decree must first be judicially recognized by a competent
Philippine court, pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, Series of 1982.
5. Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce
and/or declaration of marriage as dissolved (petition) with the RTC. Although
summoned, Daisylyn did not file any responsive pleading but submitted
instead a notarized letter/manifestation to the trial court. She offered no
opposition to Gerbert’s petition and, in fact, alleged her desire to file a similar
case herself but was prevented by financial and personal circumstances.
She, thus, requested that she be considered as a party-in-interest with a
similar prayer to Gerbert’s.
6. In its October 30, 2008 decision, the RTC denied Gerbert’s petition. The
RTC concluded that Gerbert was not the proper party to institute the action
for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree as he is a naturalized
Canadian citizen. It ruled that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the
remedy, under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code,8 in
order for him or her to be able to remarry under Philippine law.
7. Accordingly, the petitioner filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign
divorce and/or declaration of marriage dissolved with the RTC. The RTC
denied his petition, hence this recourse by the petitioner.
ISSUES/HELD:
1. Whether or not the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
extends to aliens the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the
recognition of a foreign divorce decree? NO.
2. Whether or not the registry of deeds erred in registering the foreign decree
of divorce? YES
1. The alien spouse can claim no right under the second paragraph of Article
26 of the Family Code as the substantive right it establishes is in favor of the
Filipino spouse.
2. The unavailability of the second paragraph of Art 26 of the Family Code to
aliens does not necessarily strip the petitioner of legal interest to petition the
RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The petitioner, being a
naturalized Canadian citizen now, is clothed by the presumptive evidence of
the authenticity of foreign divorce decree with conformity to alien’s national
law.
3. Recognizing the reality that divorce is a possibility in marriages between a
Filipino and an alien, President Corazon C. Aquino, in the exercise of her
legislative powers under the Freedom Constitution, enacted Executive Order
No. (EO) 227, amending Article 26 of the Family Code to its present
wording, as follows:
a. Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and
(6), 36, 37 and 38.
b. Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is
validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law.
4. The provision was included in the law "to avoid the absurd situation where
the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining
a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.” The legislative intent
is for the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her marital status,
settling the doubts created by the divorce decree. Essentially, the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provided the Filipino spouse a
substantive right to have his or her marriage to the alien spouse considered
as dissolved, capacitating him or her to remarry. Without the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the judicial recognition of the
foreign decree of divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted precisely for
that purpose or as a related issue in another proceeding, would be of no
significance to the Filipino spouse since our laws do not recognize divorce
as a mode of severing the marital bond; Article 17 of the Civil Code provides
that the policy against absolute divorces cannot be subverted by judgments
promulgated in a foreign country. The inclusion of the second paragraph in
Article 26 of the Family Code provides the direct exception to this rule and
serves as basis for recognizing the dissolution of the marriage between the
Filipino spouse and his or her alien spouse
1. As a matter of "housekeeping" concern, we note that the Pasig City Civil
Registry Office has already recorded the divorce decree on Gerbert and
Daisylyn’s marriage certificate based on the mere presentation of the
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SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS JUDGE CARINGAL 3D 2020

decree. We consider the recording to be legally improper; hence, the need to

draw attention of the bench and the bar to what had been done.
2. Article 407 of the Civil Code states that "[a]cts, events and judicial decrees
concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register."
The law requires the entry in the civil registry of judicial decrees that produce
legal consequences touching upon a person’s legal capacity and status, i.e.,
those affecting "all his personal qualities and relations, more or less
permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his
being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married or not."
3. A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, although a foreign one, affecting a
person’s legal capacity and status that must be recorded.
4. But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil registry,
the law and the submission of the decree by themselves do not ipso facto
authorize the decree’s registration. The law should be read in relation with
the requirement of a judicial recognition of the foreign judgment before it can
be given res judicata effect. In the context of the present case, no judicial
order as yet exists recognizing the foreign divorce decree. Thus, the Pasig
City Civil Registry Office acted totally out of turn and without authority of law
when it annotated the Canadian divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyn’s
marriage certificate, on the strength alone of the foreign decree presented by
Gerbert.
5. Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that "no entry in a civil register shall be
changed or corrected, without judicial order." The Rules of Court
supplements Article 412 of the Civil Code by specifically providing for a
special remedial proceeding by which entries in the civil registry may be
judicially cancelled or corrected. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets in detail
the jurisdictional and procedural requirements that must be complied with
before a judgment, authorizing the cancellation or correction, may be
annotated in the civil registry. It also requires, among others, that the verified
petition must be filed with the RTC of the province where the corresponding
civil registry is located; that the civil registrar and all persons who have or
claim any interest must be made parties to the proceedings; and that the
time and place for hearing must be published in a newspaper of general
circulation. As these basic jurisdictional requirements have not been met in
the present case, we cannot consider the petition Gerbert filed with the RTC
as one filed under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari, and

REVERSE the October 30, 2008 decision of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City,
Branch 11, as well as its February 17, 2009 order. We order the REMAND of the case
to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with our ruling above. Let a
copy of this Decision be furnished the Civil Registrar General. No costs.

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SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS JUDGE CARINGAL 3D 2020
Republic v. Coseteng-Magpayo, GR 189476, February 2, 2011
FACTS:
1. Respondent Julian Coseteng Magpayo was born in Makati on 1972. He is
the son of Fulvio Magpayo Jr., and Anna Marquez-Lim Coseteng, and his
certificate of live birth shows that his parents contracted marriage on March
1972.
2. Respondent claims that his parents were never legally married so he filed a
petition to change his name to Julian Marquez Lim Coseteng at RTC QC.
a. Respondent submitted a certification from the NSO stating that his
mother does not appear in its National Indices of Marriage
b. He also submitted his academic records from elementary to college
showing that he carried the surname “Coseteng”
c. He also showed the birth certificate of his child where “Coseteng”
appears as his surname
d. He also ran and was elected as Councilor of QC using the name
“JULIAN M.L. COSETENG”.
3. Notice setting the hearing was published in the newspaper. No opposition to
the petition was filed and an order of general default was entered by the trial
court.
4. The Trial Court in its Decision, granted Respondent’s petition.
a. Corrected his last name to “Coseteng”
b. Deleted the entry for “Date and Place of Marriage of Parties” in his
birth certificate
c. Deleted the name of his father
5. The Republic filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the
Trial Court.
a. Republic contends that the deletion of the entry on the date and
place of marriage of respondent’s parents from his birth certificate
has the effect of changing his civil status from legitimate to
illegitimate, hence, any change in civil status of a person must be
effected through an appropriate adversary proceeding
b. Republic adds that by ordering the deletion of respondent’s parents’
date of marriage and the name of respondent’s father from the
entries in respondent’s birth certificate, the trial court exceeded its
jurisdiction
ISSUE: W/N the TC erred? YES the petition is impressed with merit
RULING + RATIO:
1. A person can effect a change of name under Rule 103 (CHANGE OF
NAME) using valid and meritorious grounds including (a) when the name is
ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when
the change results as a legal consequence such as legitimation; (c) when
the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and
been known since childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien
parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of
former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing anybody; and (f)
when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the
desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of
name would prejudice public interest.Respondent’s reason for changing his
name cannot be considered as one of, or analogous to, recognized grounds,
however.
2. The present petition must be differentiated from Alfon v. Republic of the
Philippines.In Alfon, the Court allowed the therein petitioner, Estrella Alfon,
to use the name that she had been known since childhood in order to avoid
confusion. Alfon did not deny her legitimacy, however. She merely sought to
use the surname of her mother which she had been using since childhood.
Ruling in her favor, the Court held that she was lawfully entitled to use her
mother’s surname, adding that the avoidance of confusion was justification
enough to allow her to do so. In the present case, however, respondent
denies his legitimacy.
3. The change being sought in respondent’s petition goes so far as to
affect his legal status in relation to his parents. It seeks to change his
legitimacy to that of illegitimacy. Rule 103 then would not suffice to
grant respondent’s supplication.
a. Labayo-Rowe v. Republic categorically holds that "changes which
may affect the civil status from legitimate to illegitimate . . . are
substantial and controversial alterations which can only be allowed
after appropriate adversary proceedings . . ."
b. Since respondent’s desired change affects his civil status from
legitimate to illegitimate, Rule 108 applies.
4. Rule 108 clearly directs that a petition which concerns one’s civil
status should be filed in the civil registry in which the entry is sought
to be cancelled or corrected – that of Makati in the present case, and
"all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected
thereby" should be made parties to the proceeding.
a. As earlier stated, however, the petition of respondent was filed not
in Makati where his birth certificate was registered but in Quezon
City. And as the above-mentioned title of the petition filed by
respondent before the RTC shows, neither the civil registrar of
Makati nor his father and mother were made parties thereto.
5. Republic v Belmonte: The procedure recited in Rule 103] regarding change
of name and in Rule 108 concerning the cancellation or correction of entries
in the civil registry are separate and distinct. They may not be substituted
one for the other for the sole purpose of expediency. To hold otherwise
would render nugatory the provisions of the Rules of Court allowing the
change of one’s name or the correction of entries in the civil registry only
upon meritorious grounds. . . .
6. Even assuming arguendo that respondent had simultaneously availed of
these two statutory remedies, respondent cannot be said to have sufficiently
complied with Rule 108. For, as reflected above, aside from improper venue,
he failed to implead the civil registrar of Makati and all affected parties as
respondents in the case.
7. IN FINE, when a petition for cancellation or correction of an entry in the
civil register involves substantial and controversial alterations
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including those on citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or

legitimacy of marriage, a strict compliance with the requirements of
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is mandated.

DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the petition is, in light of the foregoing discussions,

GRANTED. The January 8, 2009 Decision of Branch 77 of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City in SP Proc. No. Q-0863058 is NULLIFIED.

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Alba v. Court of Appeals, GR 164041, July 29, 2005
FACTS:
1. Rosendo Herrera filed a petition for cancellation of the following entries in
the birth certificate of "Rosendo Alba Herrera, Jr.":
a. the surname "Herrera" as appended to the name of said child;
b. the reference to private respondent as the father of Rosendo Alba
Herrera, Jr.; and
c. the alleged marriage of private respondent to the child’s mother,
Armi A. Alba
2. Rosendo claims that the said entries are false and that it was only sometime
in September 1996 that he learned of the existence of said birth certificate.
3. Rosendo alleged that he married only once and never contracted marriage
with Armi nor fathered Rosendo Alba Herrera, Jr.
4. Rosendo presented certifications from the Civil Registrar of Mandaluyong
and NSO both stating that they have no record of marriage between private
respondent and Armi.
5. Rosendo filed an amended petition, impleading Armi and all the persons
who have or claim any interest in the petition.
6. RTC set the petition for hearing and publication and service of notice.
7. RTC issued an Amended Order re-scheduling the hearing. A copy of said
Amended Order was published in a newspaper of general circulation in
Manila. Copies thereof were also sent to Armi’s address.
8. At the scheduled hearing, OSG appeared but filed no opposition to the
petition. Armi, on the other hand was not present. The notice to her was
returned stating that she is no longer residing at said given address.
9. RTC granted some of Rosendo’s petition
10. Rosendo filed an MR to include the cancellation of all entries having
reference to him as the father of petitioner minor. This was granted
11. Armi and the minor filed a petition for annulment of judgment before the CA
on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction over their person.
12. She allegedly came to know of the decision of the RTC only on 1998, when
San Beda College, where her son was enrolled as a high school student,
was furnished by private respondent with a copy of a court order directing
the change of petitioner minor’s surname from Herrera to Alba.
a. Armi averred that private respondent was aware that her address is
at Ermita, Manila, because such was her residence when she and
private respondent cohabited as husband and wife for 6 years. She
also alleged that Rosendo gave support to their son until 1998.
b. She said that private respondent knew all along of her residence
and that he deliberately caused the service of notice therein to
prevent her from opposing the petition.
13. In his answer, private respondent denied paternity and his purported
cohabitation with Armi.
14. CA dismissed the petition holding that Armi failed to prove that private
respondent employed fraud and purposely deprived them of their day in
court.
ISSUES/HELD:
1. W/N Armi was denied due process? NO
2. W/N there was extrinsic fraud? NO
RATIO:
1. Under Section 2, Rule 47 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, judgments may be
annulled on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and extrinsic fraud.
2. The filing with the trial court of the petition for cancellation vested the latter
jurisdiction over the res. Substantial corrections or cancellations of entries in
civil registry records affecting the status or legitimacy of a person may be
effected through the institution of a petition under Rule 108 of the Revised
Rules of Court, with the proper Regional Trial Court. Being a proceeding in
rem, acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of petitioner is therefore not
required in the present case. It is enough that the trial court is vested with
jurisdiction over the subject matter.
a. The service of the order her house in Ermita, Manila and the
publication thereof in a newspaper of general circulation in Manila,
sufficiently complied with the requirement of due process, the
essence of which is an opportunity to be heard. Said address
appeared in the birth certificate of petitioner minor as the residence
of Armi.
b. Moreover, the publication of the order is a notice to all
indispensable parties, including Armi and petitioner minor, which
binds the whole world to the judgment that may be rendered in the
petition.
c. The absence of personal service of the order to Armi was therefore
cured by the trial court’s compliance with Section 4, Rule 108,
which requires notice by publication.
3. The purpose precisely of Section 4, Rule 108 is to bind the whole world to
the subsequent judgment on the petition. The sweep of the decision would
cover even parties who should have been impleaded under Section 3, Rule
108, but were inadvertently left out.
4. The issue of extrinsic fraud was not proven.
a. Armi contended that private respondent is aware of her present
address because they lived together as husband and wife in the
condominium unit from 1982 to 1988 and because private
respondent continued to give support to their son until 1998.
b. To prove her claim, she presented (1) private respondent’s title
over the condominium unit; (2) receipts allegedly issued to private
respondent for payment of homeowner’s or association dues; (2) a
photocopy of a January 14, 1991 deed of sale of the subject unit in
favor of Armi; and (3) the subsequent title issued to the latter.
5. However, these documents only tend to prove private respondent’s previous
ownership of the unit and the subsequent transfer thereof to Armi, but not
the claimed live-in relationship of the parties.
a. Deed of sale stated that Armi resides at Ermita, Manila, the same is
not sufficient to prove that private respondent has knowledge of
Armi’s address because the former objected to the offer of the deed
for being a mere photocopy.
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b. The alleged love letters/notes from Rosendo were only attached as

annexes to the petition and not formally offered as evidence before
the Court of Appeals. They do not have probative value because
they were mere photocopies and never proven to be an authentic
writing of private respondent.
c. The affidavits of Armi and her sister are of no evidentiary weight
since they were hearsay.
6. The proper remedy of a party aggrieved by a decision of the Court of
Appeals in an action to annul a judgment of a Regional Trial Court is a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure, where only questions of law may be raised. The resort of
petitioner to the instant civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 is therefore
erroneous.
7. Petitioner failed to establish the merits of her petition to annul the trial court’s
decision. Under Article 176 of the Family Code, illegitimate children shall use
the surname of their mother, unless their father recognizes their filiation, in
which case they may bear the father’s surname.
a. An illegitimate child whose filiation is not recognized by the father,
bears only a given name and his mother’s surname. The name of
the unrecognized illegitimate child identifies him as such. It is only
when said child is recognized that he may use his father’s surname,
reflecting his status as an acknowledged illegitimate child.
b. In the present case, it is clear from the allegations of Armi that
petitioner minor is an illegitimate child because she was never
married to private respondent. Considering that the latter strongly
asserts that he is not the father of petitioner minor, the latter is
therefore an unrecognized illegitimate child. As such, he must bear
the surname of his mother.

DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The February 27, 2004

decision and the May 14, 2004 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 61883 are AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.

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Ceruila v. Delantar, GR 140305, December 9, 2005
FACTS:
1. Rosilyn Delantar complained against her father, Simplicio Delantar
(Simplicio) for child abuse, particularly prostitution. Simplicio was
incarcerated at the Pasay City Jail. This prompted the filing of a petition for
involuntary commitment of Rosilyn with the DSWD.
2. Petitioner Ceruila, the alleged mother of Rosilyn as per the birth certificate of
Rosilyn, filed a petition before the RTC to annul the birth certificate of
Rosilyn Delantar praying that the birth certificate of Rosilyn be canceled and
declared null and void for the reasons that said birth certificate was made an
instrument of the crime of simulation of birth and therefore invalid and
spurious
3. Petitioner Ceruila alleged that she was not the mother of Rosilyn as listed in
the birth certificate and the birth certificate of Rosilyn was forged to make it
seem like Petitioner Ceruila was the mother.
4. Summons was sent to the Civil Register of Manila. However, no
representative appeared during the scheduled hearing.
5. RTC granted the petition. CA reversed the RTC decision.
6. CA reasoned that petitioner Rosilyn Delantar represented by her legal
guardian, DSWD, was not made a party-respondent therein, contrary to the
mandatory provision of Section 3 of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court
6. In the present case, only the Civil Registrar of Manila was served summons,
who, however, did not participate in the proceedings. This alone is clearly
not sufficient to comply with the requirements laid down by the rules.
7. Petitioners further claim that the lack of summons on Rosilyn was cured by
the publication of the order of the trial court setting the case for hearing for
three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation.
8. We do not agree. Summons must still be served, not for the purpose of
vesting the courts with jurisdiction, but to comply with the requirements of
fair play and due process. This is but proper, to afford the person
concerned the opportunity to protect her interest if she so chooses.
DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
DOCTRINE: Unless all possible indispensable parties were duly notified of the
proceedings, the same shall be considered as falling much too short of the
requirements of the rules. Summons must still be served, not for the purpose of
vesting the courts with jurisdiction, but to comply with the requirements of fair play
and due process.

ISSUE: WoN the Rosilyn should have been made a party to the annulment of the
birth certificate

RULING + RATIO: YES

1. Indeed, not only the civil registrar but also all persons who have or claim any
interest which would be affected by a proceeding concerning the
cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register must be made
parties thereto.
2. Did the Ceruilas comply with the requirements of Rule 108? We answer in
the negative.
a. Sec. 3, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, expressly states that: “SEC.
3. Parties. --- When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil
register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or
claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made
parties to the proceeding.
3. As enunciated in Republic vs. Benemerito, unless all possible indispensable
parties were duly notified of the proceedings, the same shall be considered
as falling much too short of the requirements of the rules.
4. Here, it is clear that no party could be more interested in the cancellation of
Rosilyn’s birth certificate than Rosilyn herself. Her filiation, legitimacy, and
date of birth are at stake.
5. Petitioners claim that even though Rosilyn was never made a party to the
proceeding, it is enough that her name was included in the caption of the
petition. Such reasoning is without merit. All other persons who may be
affected must be notified.
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Republic v. Uy, GR 198010, August 12, 2013
FACTS:
1. Respondent Dr. Norma S. Lugsanay Uy filed a Petition for Correction of
Entry in her Certificate of Live Birth (CLB). Impleaded as respondent therein
is the Local Civil Registrar of Gingoog City.
2. Uy wants to change her name in her CLB from “Anita Sy” to “Norma S.
Lugsanay”, which was what appears in her school records, PRC Board of
Medicine Certificate, and passport. She claimed that she was the illegitimate
daughter of Sy Ton and Sotera Lugsanay. She also wants to correct her
citizenship as Filipino and not Chinese.
3. Respondent allegedly filed earlier a petition for correction of entries with the
Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Gingoog City to effect the corrections on
her name and citizenship which was supposedly granted. However, the NSO
records did not bear such changes. Hence, the petition before the RTC.
4. RTC: Found petition to be sufficient in form thus ordered for hearing and to
be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the City of Gingoog
and the Province of Misamis Oriental at least once a week for three (3)
consecutive weeks at the expense of respondent, and that the order and
petition be furnished the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and the City
Prosecutor’s Office for their information and guidance. Respondent complied
with the publication requirement.
5. RTC: Granted petition of respondent and ordered to effect the correction or
change of the entries in the CLB as to her name and citizenship.
6. CA: AFFIRMED in toto the RTC Order. Respondent’s failure to implead
other indispensable parties was cured upon the publication of the Order
setting the case for hearing in a newspaper of general circulation for three
(3) consecutive weeks and by serving a copy of the notice to the Local Civil
Registrar, the OSG and the City Prosecutor’s Office. As to whether the
petition is a collateral attack on respondent’s filiation, the CA ruled in favor of
respondent, considering that her parents were not legally married and that
her siblings’ birth certificates uniformly state that their surname is Lugsanay
and their citizenship is Filipino.
ISSUE: WON petition is dismissible for failure to implead indispensable parties.
RULING + RATIO: YES.
SEC. 3. Parties. – When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil
register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any
interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the
proceeding.
SEC. 4. Notice and Publication. – Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall,
by an order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause
reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition. The
court shall also cause the order to be published once a week for three (3)
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.
SEC. 5. Opposition. – The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any
interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought may, within
fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or from the last date of publication
of such notice, file his opposition thereto.
1. In this case, respondent sought the correction of entries in her birth
certificate – first name, surname and citizenship. She sought the correction
allegedly to reflect the name which she has been known for since childhood,
including her legal documents (e.g. passport and school and professional
records). She likewise relied on the birth certificates of her full blood siblings
who bear the surname “Lugsanay” instead of “Sy” and citizenship of
“Filipino” instead of “Chinese.” The changes, however, are obviously not
mere clerical as they touch on respondent’s filiation and citizenship. In
changing her surname from “Sy” (which is the surname of her father)
to “Lugsanay” (which is the surname of her mother), she, in effect,
changes her status from legitimate to illegitimate; and in changing her
citizenship from Chinese to Filipino, the same affects her rights and
obligations in this country. Clearly, the changes are SUBSTANTIAL.
2. Republic v. Valencia: Even substantial errors in a civil registry may be
corrected and the true facts established provided the parties aggrieved
by the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding2
not just by summary proceeding.
3. It must be noted that it was only the Local Civil Registrar of Gingoog City
who was impleaded as respondent in the petition below. As stated in #1,
changes being substantial, respondent should have impleaded and
notified not only the Local Civil Registrar but also her parents and
siblings as the persons who have interest and are affected by the
changes or corrections respondent wanted to make.
4. The fact that the notice of hearing was published in a newspaper of
general circulation and notice thereof was served upon the State will
not change the nature of the proceedings taken. A reading of Sections 4
and 5, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court shows that the Rules mandate two
sets of notices to different potential oppositors: one given to the persons
named in the petition and another given to other persons who are not
named in the petition but nonetheless may be considered interested or
affected parties. Summons must, therefore, be served not for the purpose
of vesting the courts with jurisdiction but to comply with the
requirements of fair play and due process to afford the person concerned
the opportunity to protect his interest if he so chooses.
5. [EXCEPTIONS] While there may be cases where the Court held that the
failure to implead and notify the affected or interested parties may be cured
by the publication of the notice of hearing 3, earnest efforts were made by
2 One having opposing parties; contested, as distinguished from an ex parte application, one of
which the party seeking relief has given legal warning to the other party, and afforded the latter
an opportunity to contest it. Excludes an adoption proceeding.
3 Alba v. Court of Appeals: Considering that the petition for correction of entries is a
proceeding in rem, acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner [an
indispensable party] is, therefore, not required and the absence of personal service was
cured by the trial court’s compliance with Rule 108 which requires notice by publication.
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petitioners in bringing to court all possible interested parties. Such

failure was likewise excused where the interested parties themselves
initiated the corrections proceedings; when there is no actual or
presumptive awareness of the existence of the interested parties; or
when a party is inadvertently left out.
6. When a petition for cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil
register involves substantial and controversial alterations, including
those on citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of
marriage, a strict compliance with the requirements of Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court is mandated. If the entries in the civil register could be
corrected or changed through mere summary proceedings and not through
appropriate action wherein all parties who may be affected by the entries are
notified or represented, the door to fraud or other mischief would be set
open, the consequence of which might be detrimental and far reaching.

DISPOSITION: PETITION GRANTED. RTC Ruling is NULLIFIED. Petition for

Change of Name not allowed.

DOCTRINE: see Rationale #6.

Barco v. Court of Appeals: The issue was whether the court acquired jurisdiction over petitioner
and all other indispensable parties to the petition for correction of entries despite the failure to
implead them in said case. The failure to implead [an indispensable party] was cured by
compliance with Section 4 of Rule 108 which requires notice by publication. The
petitioner in a petition for correction cannot be presumed to be aware of all the parties
whose interests may be affected by the granting of a petition. It emphasized that the
petitioner therein exerted earnest effort to comply with the provisions of Rule 108. Thus,
the publication of the notice of hearing was considered to have cured the failure to implead
indispensable parties.
37