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Yasir Arafat: Psychological Proﬁle and Strategic Analysis
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Yasir Arafat
Psychological Profile and Strategic Analysis
Dr. Shaul Kimhi

Dr. Shmuel Even
Prof. Jerrold Post
The International Policy Institute for Counterterrorism
The Interdisciplinary Center, Herzliya
The American Jewish Committee
May 2002
Yasir Arafat – Psychological Profile and Strategic Analysis 2
About the Authors
Dr. Shaul Kimhi is a senior lecturer in Psychology at Tel Hai Academic College. He is also a
member of the American Psychological Association and the International Society of Political
Psychology, and is a research associate at the International Policy Institute for Counterterrorism at
the Interdisciplinary Center in Herzliya. In the past, he served as special adviser to the Research
Unit of the Intelligence Branch of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF).
Dr. Colonel (Reserves) Shemuel Even is a strategic, economic, and management consultant,
chief executive officer (CEO) of Multi Concept (Consultants), Ltd. Dr. Even is an economist and a
member of the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University. In the past, he served as
a senior officer in the Intelligence Branch of the IDF, where his responsibilities included the
consolidation of national intelligence evaluations in the Research Unit of the Intelligence Branch.
Prof. Jerrold Post is a professor of psychiatry, political psychology, and international affairs and
the director of the Political Psychology Program at George Washington University. In the past, he
established and headed the U.S. Government Center for the Analysis of Personality and Political
Behavior. He wrote psychological profiles of Menahem Begin and Anwar Sadat for President
Jimmy Carter before the Camp David summit. His latest book, co-authored with Robert Robins, is
Political Paranoia: The Psychopolitics of Hatred.
CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ......................................................................................................................... 5
Psychological Profile and Strategic Analysis

Shaul Kimhi and Shemuel Even, 11
INTRODUCTION.................................................................................................................................... 11
Methodology: Behavioral analysis .................................................................................................11
PSYCHOLOGICAL PROFILE ............................................................................................................... 13
I. Outstanding Features ................................................................................................................. 13
1. Emotional Stability................................................................................................................... 13
2. Independence at All Costs........................................................................................................ 14
3. Suspiciousness.......................................................................................................................... 14
4. Need to Demonstrate Excellence and Superiority.................................................................... 14
5. Interpersonal Relations............................................................................................................. 16
6. Authenticity: Dramatic Ability, Double-Talk, Exaggerations, and Lies.................................. 16
7. Symbol of the Palestinian Revolution...................................................................................... 19
8. Honor Above All...................................................................................................................... 20
9. A Place in History .................................................................................................................... 21
10. Determination and Tenacity of Purpose, Ability to Survive .................................................. 21
II. Characteristics of Arafat’s Functioning .................................................................................. 23
1. Cognitive Functioning.............................................................................................................. 23
2. Family Life............................................................................................................................... 23
3. Lifestyle and Work Habits ....................................................................................................... 24
4. Health and Age......................................................................................................................... 25
5. Functioning under Pressure...................................................................................................... 25
III. Leadership Style..................................................................................................................... 266
1. Decision-Making.................................................................................................................... 266
2. Financial Control.................................................................................................................... 266
3. Personal Appointments and the Policy of Divide-and-Conquer ............................................ 277
4. Establishment of Dual and Triple Governmental Systems .................................................... 288
5. Global Air Travel: “The Frequent-Flyer Club Member” ..........................................................28
6. Political and Personal Religiosity .............................................................................................28
IV. Developmental Background and General Psychological Hypotheses ..................................29
1. A Difficult Childhood: An Orphan .......................................................................................... 29
2. Betrayal and Sense of Victimization........................................................................................ 30
3. Arafat as a Survivor: In Constant Struggle ............................................................................ 311
4. Self-Identity............................................................................................................................ 311
5. On the Verge of the Realization of the Dream....................................................................... 311

6. Summary of Personality Attributes ........................................................................................ 322
STRATEGIC ANALYSIS OF ARAFAT ...........................................................................................333
I. Is Arafat a Strategist or a Leader Acting on Instinct? .......................................................... 333
II. The Basic Premises of Arafat’s Strategy ............................................................................... 344
III. Characteristics of Arafat’s Strategy..................................................................................... 355
1. Arafat’s Strategy in the Political Negotiations with Israel..................................................... 355
2. Arafat’s Strategy with Regard to the Use of Force against Israel ............................................ 38
3. Arafat’s Strategy Concerning World Opinion and Israeli Opinion........................................ 400
4. Arafat’s Strategy Concerning Foreign Countries................................................................... 411
5. Arafat’s Strategy in the Palestinian Arena ............................................................................. 422
IV. Summary of the Features of Arafat’s Strategy ......................................................................45
V. Conclusions..................................................................................................................................46
REFERENCE LIST……………...…………..…………………………………………..……………………...49
YASIR ARAFAT: IDENTITIES IN CONFLICT

Jerrold Post, 56
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
In the past decade, mainly thanks to the Oslo Accords, Yasir Arafat has gone from being the
leader of an organization ostracized by most of the world following the Gulf War to becoming
accepted by all the nations. >From the status of international terrorist, under whose leadership
numerous deadly attacks were committed—among them, the Coastal Road Massacre (March
1978), the Munich Massacre of Olympic athletes (September 1972), and the Achille Lauro
hijacking (October 1985)—Arafat won a Nobel Peace Prize, before turning once more to
terrorism. From the start of the bargaining, when Israel offered the Palestinians “autonomy”
(without sovereignty over territory) at the 1991 Madrid Conference, Arafat eventually obtained an
Israeli proposal to establish an independent Palestinian state, with East Jerusalem as its capital, in
the majority of the territories of Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip. He was even offered alternate
territories from within the Green Line to make up for land kept by Israel. This proposal, made
during the second Camp David summit and the ensuing negotiations, was also rejected by Arafat.
Furthermore, Arafat is responsible, in a large part, for the difficult situation of the Palestinians.
He is known to be one who misses historic opportunities. Such was the case when he caused the
expulsion of the Palestinians from Jordan in “Black September” 1970, and again in 1982 when he
goaded Israel into the Lebanon War, which eventually led to his expulsion to Tunisia. Similarly,
his support of Saddam Hussein during the Gulf War severely damaged the status of the
Palestinians and led to the expulsion of hundreds of thousands of them from the Persian Gulf
states. It is possible that Arafat’s rejection of the Israeli proposals of the second Camp David
summit could be considered yet another missed historic opportunity, as it is doubtful that an
independent Palestinian state will be established in the near future under better conditions than
those offered the Palestinians at Camp David. In any case, many Palestinians and Israelis have
suffered and will suffer as a result of that decision.
Arafat was born in 1929 and has always enjoyed good health. He does not smoke, does not
drink alcohol, and watches his weight. Following the airplane accident in the Libyan Desert (April
1992), he sustained a head injury and underwent an operation to drain blood clots. Lip trembling
appeared a few years later, without a decline in his working capability or damage to his cognitive
abilities. He ignores his advancing age and his health condition, refuses to consider the possibility
of retiring from the political arena, and has not indicated any potential successor. Arafat surprised
everyone in 1990, when, at age 62, he married Suah Tawil. Despite his marriage, he did not
change his daily schedule or lifestyle at all, and does not devote any time to his family.
This study analyzes the behavioral patterns and policies of Arafat, using two tools:
psychological analysis and strategic analysis. The psychological analysis attempts to identify
Arafat’s behavioral patterns and to deduce from them the main characteristics of his personality—
his outstanding features, functional characteristics, and leadership style. In addition, the study
investigates his psychological development, and presents an analysis of the connection between
these and his present behavioral patterns. The strategic analysis attempts to identify Arafat’s
typical operational patterns, from an understanding of his past actions, and the way he relates to
the various “players” in the arena. From these two analyses, the study presents operative
conclusions regarding the question of how Israel should deal with Arafat.
Psychological Analysis
An analysis of Arafat’s behavioral patterns, from the psychological point of view, shows that
Arafat has limited emotional stability. This expresses itself, among other things, in a strong need
to control his environment, down to the most minor detail, as well as in impulsive behavior and
rapid changes of mood. Sometimes he is bundle of nerves, while at other times, he is in high
spirits. Arafat is a man of action who requires constant stimulation and finds it difficult to enjoy
periods of quiet and relaxation. Owing to his emotional limitations, he is not ready to accept the
authority of others and does not tolerate any dispute regarding his status. Arafat is suspicious
toward enemies and allies alike. He does not trust anyone, and his suspicions are accompanied by
extreme sensitivity to any criticism on the part of his people. He is personally hurt when people in
his camp express criticism—even constructive criticism—regarding his political courses of action.
Similarly, Arafat has a strong emotional need to demonstrate superiority over his partners as well
as his rivals. He perceives himself as a leader of extraordinary historic stature. Arafat’s
interpersonal skills are characterized by problems with relationships, stemming from his need to
manipulate people, bringing them closer or distancing them as needed. He has neither intimate
relationships nor any close friends, and apparently feels no need for them.
It appears that Arafat does not place great importance on authenticity. He has a natural dramatic
ability, of which he makes extensive use. With great skill, he adapts his style of speech and his
message to his target audience. He uses repetition and exaggeration (some of which he apparently
he believes with all his heart). He often uses body language, along with euphemistic language and
hints, to say what he is prevented from stating openly. He is able to lie without batting an eye, and
without his listeners being the wiser. He tends to accuse Israel of evil intent and conspiracy to
persecute him.
Arafat sees himself as the symbol of the Palestinian nation. This is outwardly expressed in his
habitual appearance in a military-style uniform. He lacks any of the characteristics of a private
life—hobbies, entertainment, going out, etc. One can describe him as a one-dimensional
personality—his whole attention and all of his interests bound solely to Palestinian political
issues—and he takes a very narrow perspective on congruent topics (such as historical processes,
political economy, and social processes). Arafat is very sensitive to his honor and takes care that
his surroundings demonstrate the appropriate level of respect. He is capable of breaking the rules
of the political game when he senses that he is not getting the respect he deserves. Arafat is very
sensitive to his place in history. He wants to be remembered as the father of the Palestinian
revolution, as the founder of a Palestinian state, and as the Arab leader who returned the holy
places in Jerusalem to the rule of the Arab nation. Arafat is characterized by resoluteness and
tenacity of purpose; he does not give up, and does not surrender—even when faced with a
hopeless situation. He has a surprising ability to recover, and an ability to maintain faith and hope.
He also demonstrates great patience, along with an ability to instill faith and hope in the hearts of
his people and a superb ability to maneuver.
Arafat has experienced many high-pressure situations and crises throughout the course of his
life, some of which were life-threatening, and he functioned well in these situations. One gets the
impression that at times of crisis he not only demonstrates an impressive ability to resist, but also
feels great satisfaction. When he acts against a stronger power (for example, Israel), he appears to
be spiritually elevated and in a great mood; he does not hesitate to make difficult decisions, shows
courage, and is ready to sacrifice for the goal. In these situations, he refuses to give in to external
dictates and pressure, and demonstrates a lack of readiness to compromise.
Arafat’s leadership style is characterized by extreme centralization. He is the source of
authority and decides on all issues, minor and major. His style is hierarchical and rigid; he is the
final arbiter. Even when he consults with his assistants, he reserves for himself decisions on truly
important matters: plotting principal positions and operative plans. He brings decisions to the
PLO’s forums for debate only when he is guaranteed support in advance.
Prominent among the psychological milestones that have crafted Arafat’s personality and world
outlook are his becoming orphaned from his mother at a very young age (three or four), his
removal from his father’s house in Cairo (at around the age of four) to his uncle’s house in
Jerusalem, then under Jordanian rule. The event, apparently, caused parental depravation, as from
a young age he had to learn to get by on his own. These events contributed to the development of
an extreme reaction of emotional denial, and taught him that he could rely only on himself and
must be better than others in order to survive. From a young age, Arafat lived with the feeling that
he had been betrayed on a personal level and on a national level (in his view, betrayal of the
Palestinians by the Arab countries and the world). From this experience, Arafat also expresses a
strong feeling that the Palestinians are victims, and that the world must understand and
compensate him.
Strategic Analysis
Strategic analysis shows that Arafat acts with all the characteristics of strategic thought and
long-term planning, among them: vision definition and establishment of clear objectives,
identification of the principal players, taking advantage of all possible tools to attain his
objectives, recognition of constraints, and choice of paths of action based on their relative
advantages.
One can see from the Palestinian strategy in political negotiations with Israel that Arafat has set
red lines for himself and has stood by them consistently throughout the years. Comparing the red
lines that the Palestinians brought to the negotiations at the 1991 Madrid conference to their
positions in the negotiations at the second Camp David summit in the year 2000, one can see that
Arafat stood by the red lines that he set for himself, and relaxed his positions to a very small
extent, in contrast to the erosion that occurred in Israel’s positions. Thus, for example, in the
interim agreement, the Palestinians did not give in on anything, and in the permanent status
negotiations they agreed to allow Israel to maintain settlement blocks on land whose size equals a
few percent of the territories, in exchange for alternate land within the boundaries of the Green
Line.
An additional strategic characteristic is Arafat’s success in shifting the battle to the playing
field that suits him. Arafat dragged Israel to Oslo after he had created a deadlock in the
negotiations in Washington and undermined the Israeli-American attempt to conduct negotiations
with representatives of the disputed territories. Israeli politicians, not taking into consideration the
significance of the Palestinian demand in Oslo for the “right of return” and sovereignty over
Jerusalem, agreed to include these issues in the permanent status negotiations, and even to defer
deliberations on them for a period of five years, in the hope that Arafat would soften his position
by then. However, as long as Arafat wins more concessions from Israel, he takes tougher positions
on these matters.
In conducting negotiations, Arafat customarily goes to the brink and sometimes beyond. He
does not worry about stretching the rope to the limit, changing tactics at the last minute, presenting
crises, and reneging on agreements he previously agreed to. Arafat also customarily recycles the
concessions that he gives Israel in negotiations. Thus, for example, he gives Israel security
cooperation with the Palestinians again and again, and then violates the arrangement afterwards.
Each time he issues new demands in exchange for this cooperation. Arafat also always leaves
himself an opening for additional demands on Israel. Thus, among other things, he did not agree to
complete the interim agreement and to compromise on the third withdrawal. From his standpoint,
as long as the interim agreement had not been completed, he had a basis for additional demands,
without even bringing up permanent status disagreements. In keeping with his internalization of
the role of victim, Arafat prefers not to present proposals of his own, but rather to be in a position
of reacting to Israeli and U.S. proposals.
Arafat’s strategy to achieve his goals is based on political negotiation simultaneous with the
continuation of the armed struggle. He saw his choice of the diplomatic path in Oslo as one
strategy to attain his objectives, and, when it did not advance him sufficiently within a limited
time frame, he took the tool of violence out of his toolbox. Arafat views the Intifada both as a tool
to exert pressure on Israel, and thus improve his negotiating position, and as a tool likely to bring
about Israel’s unilateral withdrawal without an agreement.
Arafat’s strategy toward public opinion in Israel is aimed at enlisting the aid of large portions
of the Israeli public to influence the decision-making process in Israel. He does so via two
different paths: On the one hand, he emphasizes his adherence to the path of peace, and, on the
other hand, he exacts a price in blood from the citizens of Israel, in order to pressure them to
change their political views. Arafat sees the disagreements within Israeli society as a weakness.
This contributes to the increasing extravagance of his demands, since he assumes that weakness
will bring about a softening of Israel’s positions. Thus, for example, mindful of the dispute in
Israel regarding control of the disputed territories, Arafat prefers to encourage attacks on settlers
and IDF forces in the territories over attacks in the heart of the Israeli population within the Green
Line (even if he does not actively prevent such attacks). In addition, Arafat tries to influence the
decision-making process by means of Israeli Arabs. Nevertheless, it appears that he did not
calculate how much the Al-Aqsa Intifada would negatively influence the left-wing camp in Israel,
and, therefore, his gains from this course of action have been minimal.
In the area of foreign relations, Arafat cooperates with the United States, based on his
recognition of its power and influence. Nevertheless, he does what he can to reduce American
domination of the political process by making an effort to turn the Israeli-Palestinian dispute into
an international issue. He strives to include mediators from European countries and to introduce
into the territories forces and observers from the UN or from other foreign countries. This policy
is aimed at narrowing Israel’s range of operation in the territories. The Americans, who brought
Arafat closer in previous years, are disappointed in him. After he finished his term as president to
the United States, Bill Clinton classified Arafat as an aging leader who lives with a victim
mentality and is incapable of reaching a final peace agreement. According to Clinton, what caused
negotiations between the Barak government and Arafat to fail was Arafat’s demand to specify
large numbers of refugees who would be permitted to return to Israel in the framework of the
“right of return.”
Arafat also attempts to enlist the aid of the Arab establishment. He does so by means of
manipulative leverage on leaders of Arab countries, knowing that bloody demonstrations in the
disputed territories will stir up internal agitation in Jordan and Egypt that will require those leaders
to consider his position. Regarding the Islamic world, Arafat emphasizes the struggle for
Jerusalem, the third most holy Islamic site. Among leaders of the Arab countries, it appears that
only Hosni Mubarak, the president of Egypt, exerts considerable influence over Arafat, being the
patron of the Palestinians, Arafat’s dialogue partner, peer, and partner in the political process.
Mubarak is likely to allow Arafat to give in on certain issues in negotiations; however, in many
cases, the Egyptian president has caused a hardening of the Palestinian position in the negotiations
(for example, on the issue of Jerusalem). On the other hand, Arafat is able to identify with Saddam
Hussein, president of Iraq, who is perceived by some Palestinians as a symbol of firm resistance.
King Abdullah of Jordan and President Bashar Assad of Syria do not have much influence over
Arafat, owing to their young age and residual tension between them.
In the internal arena, Arafat is aware of the constraints placed on him by the Palestinian street.
He is aware of the leaning of Palestinian public opinion, which has become more extreme
following disappointment in the peace process. The unilateral withdrawal of the IDF from
southern Lebanon has apparently toughened his position, since it stirred up expectations among
the population that it is possible to bring about IDF withdrawal by means of violent confrontation.
Nevertheless, Arafat is capable of going against the flow in the Palestinian camp when he is
convinced that it will advance the achievement of his goal of a Palestinian state, and that,
eventually, most of the Palestinian public will realize he is right.
Among his people, Arafat adopts a policy of divide and conquer: He does not designate a
successor, and takes care to divide the centers of power in the Palestinian Authority. Thus, for
example, the control of the various forces are split between the “outsiders”—those who arrived
from Tunisia and other locations in the Palestinian Diaspora—and “insiders” from the territories.
Similarly, a clear separation exists between control of the security apparatus in Gaza and the
security apparatus in Judea and Samaria.
Arafat avoids direct confrontation with opposition organizations, as long as they do not directly
threaten his rule, since he perceives himself to be the leader of all Palestinians. Additionally,
Arafat needs the threat of terrorism on the part of the opposition organizations as a bargaining chip
in negotiations with Israel and as reinforcement of the Palestinian war effort. Arafat thereby
avoids true security cooperation with Israel.
Operative Conclusions
Arafat will prefer negotiations only if he sees that nothing good will come out the continuation
of violent struggle. Thus, he must not be allowed to attain political achievements as a result of
violence.
Grandiose military operations—such as massive air force bombings and artillery shelling—
have little effect on Arafat as long as they do not involve conquest of Palestinian authority
territories. Under these conditions, Arafat is at his best, tends more toward taking risks, and is
prepared to sacrifice victims. Nevertheless, many limited military operations are likely to be more
effective since they undermine Arafat’s feeling of control.
Economic pressure on the population, such as closures of access to Israel from the territories
for workers, water cutoffs, and electricity cutoffs, will not significantly influence Arafat. He has
no difficulty sacrificing victims, and thereby will find it beneficial to present to the world the
distress of the Palestinian population. On the other hand, cutting off tax monies collected by Israel
and cutting off outside aid do influence him, since money is one of his means of control.
American pressure influences Arafat, but will not change his position on essential issues
(Jerusalem, the right of return, etc.). As stated earlier, Arafat prefers that representatives of the UN
and Western European countries who support him sit around the table, in order to weaken the
American hegemony in negotiations.
It is best not to act against Arafat by means of a public ultimatum, since he will conclude that
its aim is to humiliate him. It is best to treat him with respect, using gestures related to his
personal status. Such niceties influence his mood, satisfying his desire to win respect and
recognition.
Permanent status negotiations must be based on a final and absolute agreement that will not
allow Arafat to come up with any additional strategic demands from Israel. Nevertheless, Arafat
apparently needs more time to digest essential matters, such as a solution to the problem of the
Temple Mount and an end to the dispute, and to reconcile himself to the fact that he cannot
demand more of Israel. Thus, when the negotiations resume, Israel must not pressure him too
much to reach a quick decision, although at the same time Israel must not give him any additional
significant intermediate concessions. Should Israel will give up the ability to bargain with him in
the future, there will be no way to convince him to sign an agreement to end the dispute.
It is reasonable to assume that Arafat will not give up on Palestinian sovereignty over the
Temple Mount in the framework of a permanent agreement. His insistence on receiving
sovereignty in East Jerusalem stems both from his vision of establishing a Palestinian capital
there, to which he has committed himself, and from his desire to be an important leader in the eyes
of the Arab world, both Muslim and Christian. It appears that Arafat is not ready to go down in
history as one who gave in on the Temple Mount. Nevertheless, one should not discount the
possibility that Arafat will agree to a compromise formulation, on condition that it be acceptable
to the top leaders in the Arab world, such as Egyptian president Mubarak.
If Israel carries out a unilateral separation, which would mean withdrawal without an
agreement from most of the territories under its control, Arafat is liable unilaterally to declare the
establishment of an independent Palestinian state and to see himself as having brought about
Israel’s resounding military defeat. It is possible that the Palestinians would then gain for
themselves all the rights of a country, in accordance with current international law and treaties,
such as the right to self-defense, water rights, and more. In this framework, they would attempt to
establish an army, without the limitations involved today, to establish foreign relations, and
perhaps even to sign defense treaties with parties hostile to Israel, such as Iraq, Iran, and Libya.
Arafat will not rest until the central issues of the negotiations, such as sovereignty over the
Temple Mount, right of return, borders, and settlements (those not evacuated via unilateral
withdrawal), are resolved. Therefore, unilateral withdrawal and the establishment of a Palestinian
state will not end the conflict. Hence, it is better for Israel either to attain separation in an
agreement with the Palestinians or to continue to control the territories under its authority by
creating a security buffer between the Palestinian population and Israel until an agreement is
reached.
PSYCHOLOGICAL PROFILE AND STRATEGIC ANALYSIS
Shaul Kimhi and Shemuel Even
The personality characteristics of a leader and the degree to which he influences the course of
history have been subject to debate from time immemorial in various scientific disciplines.
Historians deal with the degree to which an individual leader influences history, as opposed to the
influence of the zeitgeist. They ask whether the leader sets the historical narrative, or is only a
pawn in the hands of history (Schlesinger, 1986). Among political scientists, the argument has
been made that the personality characteristics of a leader, such as the president of the United
States, cannot contribute much to our understanding of the political process and its outcome
(Skowronek, 1986).
This debate also exists to the study of the behavior of political personalities from a
psychological point of view. Some scholars believe that the psychological features of a leader
influence the political process, while others criticize any attempt to sketch a psychological profile
of a leader. According to these critics, the personality of each person is unique, and there is no
possible explanation, based on personality, for a political process. Additionally, there are those
who believe that theories of personality are not sufficient to serve as a foundation for political
conclusions (Craik, 1986). Despite this criticism, the topic continues to occupy researchers, with
the result that a number of outstanding political leaders have been so analyzed. For example, all
the recent presidents of the United States have been the subject of psychological evaluations
(Feldman and Valenty, 2001).
The present study analyzes the behavioral patterns and policies of Yasir Arafat based on the
assumption that such an analysis would be of value in forecasting his future behavior. The analysis
utilizes two tools: psychological analysis and strategic analysis. The psychological analysis
attempts to identify Arafat’s behavioral patterns and to deduce from them his personality traits:
outstanding characteristics, functional features, and leadership style. In addition, the study
examines the psychological characteristics of his development and attempts to link those
characteristics with his current patterns of behavior. The strategic analysis tries to identify Arafat’s
typical operational patterns based on his past courses of action and the way he relates to the
various “players” in the arena. On the basis of these analyses, the study presents operative
conclusions regarding the question of how Israel should deal with Arafat.
Methodology: Behavioral Analysis

The building of an objective psychological profile of a political leader is a topic in political
psychology (Renshon and Duckit, 2000). A leader’s profile is created for the purpose of analyzing
diverse psychological characteristics—behavior patterns, outstanding features, character lines,
main motivators, personality structure, leadership characteristics—and how these influence his
political behavior. Objective analysis is done with psychological tools different from those
commonly accepted in psychology (such as interviews and psychological tests). The material
available to the investigators is diverse, mostly information publicized in the media. The task
requires gathering, sorting, and analyzing the material in an unconventional manner, for the
purpose of personality evaluation.
A survey of the professional literature dealing with the personality profiles of political leaders
reveals two key methodologies.
(1) Quantitative methodologies: such as historiometry (Simonton, 1990); integrated
complexities of leaders’ expressions (Suedfeld, 1994; Suedfeld, Wallace & Thachuk, 1993;
Suedfeld and Bluck, 1993; Suedfeld and Granatstein, 1995; Suedfeld, Tetlock, and Thachuk,
1996; Marfleet, 2000; Schafer and Crichlow, 2000; Wallace, Suedfeld, and Thachuk, 1996;
Wallace, Suedfeld, and Thachuk, 1993); operational coding of speeches and expressions
(Marfleet, 2000; Schaefer and Crichlow, 2000; Walker and Schaefer, 2000); objective
measurement of motivators (Dille and Young, 2000; Hermann, 1983; Walker, 1983; Weintraub,
1989; Winter, 1983). These methodologies allow random sampling of material and establishment
of quantitative ratings. These studies are less susceptible to the subjective leanings of the
investigator and provide a reliable test for comparison of different leaders over different periods of
time. Nevertheless, they cover only some of the personality characteristics of a political leader. An
important part of the leader’s characteristics, including family life, emotions, interpersonal
relations, and developmental course, as well as his functional patterns as a leader are not included
in these studies.
(2) Qualitative methodologies, in which the investigators sketch a psychological profile
based on diverse information (biographies, testimonies, newspaper articles, interviews in the
media, etc.). These profiles are based on qualitative analysis of content and, to a certain degree, on
psychological intuition and interpretation by the investigator. Some of the studies focus on the
description and the analysis of outstanding features of the leader, without emphasizing specific
personality theories (Choiniere and Keirsey, 1992; Dekleva and Post, 1997; Greenstein, 1994;
Heifetz, 1994; Kofodimos, 1990). Other studies, based on analytical personality theories, attempt
to explain hidden psychological processes (Muslin and Jobe, 1991; Renshon, 1996; Swansbrough,
1994). Other qualitative studies (as well as quantitative ones) focus on the identification and the
classification of the personality types of leaders (Barber, 1972; Hermann, 1994; Hermann and
Preston, 1994; Lyons, 1997).
The relative advantage of qualitative studies lies in their ability to present a broad picture of the
leader’s personality, as well as putting forward psychological theories and commentaries, which
allow a more profound understanding. This article objectively describes the psychological profile
of Yasir Arafat, using the qualitative methodology of behavioral analysis, based on content
analysis (Kimhi, 2001). The methodology was developed as a result of an attempt to create a
psychological profile derived from both clinical analysis and practical political analysis.
Behavioral analysis is based primarily on a wide sample of the leader’s behavior, without
preconceived notions derived from specific developmental personality theories.
The theoretical psychological approach is based on behavioral analysis methodology described
by Maddi (1989). He sees in personality “a stable set of tendencies and characteristics that
determine common behavior, and differentiate between psychological behaviors of different
people (thoughts, emotions, and actions) that have continuity over the course of time, and cannot
be understood to be the result of biological and social pressures at a particular moment.”
Behavioral analysis examines a wide variety of behaviors on different levels, as reported in the
media, and relates to expressions, thoughts, feelings, and actions that have continuity over the
course of time and under different conditions. Moreover, the methodology distinguishes between
psychological assumptions and actual findings from data that has been gathered. In this article,
psychological assumptions are brought forth at the end of each of the content categories, as well as
at the end of the profile, where general psychological assumptions are brought forth.
This study is based on a systematic collection of data whose sources are newspaper reporting
inside and outside of Israel and previously published literature about Yasir Arafat. The sources
include:
o The database in the University of Haifa Library,
o The database of the International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism,
o Published features about Arafat in foreign and local newspapers,
o Books, mainly biographies (Hart, 1994; 1984; Gowers, 1992; Kierman, 1976;
Rubinstein, 1995a; 1995e; Sayigh, 1997; Wallach, 1990).
The primary material surveyed is from 1990 onward. A small portion of the material also
includes articles and interviews from the years 1985-1990. Among the information gathered,
preference was given to information whose source was Arafat himself (interviews with the media
and behavior), and to reports of people who know him well.
Psychological Profile
I. Outstanding Features
1. Emotional Stability
Arafat has a great need to feel that he controls a situation at every moment and that he guides
events. This need expresses itself in various ways:
o He zealously reserves the right to have the last word in all political
developments (even when his representatives agree to matters with the
Israelis).
o He tries to control all the minor details of the Palestinian Authority, even the
most peripheral, such as, for example, checking traffic tickets on cars in Gaza
(Rubinstein, 1995e).
o He attempts to take the initiative during interviews that he grants, and, when
asked uncomfortable questions, he answers with a question or changes the
subject, in an attempt to control the direction of the interview (Vitz, 1993).
o He is the only one who sets his daily schedule, and all others must conform to
his extraordinary routine (Levitsky, 1993).
o One of the best-known examples of Arafat’s uncompromising need to have the
last word was his first appearance at the UN General Assembly on November
13, 1974, at which he was requested to appear without his pistol. Forced to
accept this limitation, he appeared before the General Assembly wearing an
empty holster.
Parallel to his great need for control, Arafat has shown impulsiveness and a tendency toward
outbursts of anger (see the testimony of his wife, Suah, in Perry, 1992d). Among other things, this
behavior expresses itself in unpredictable outbursts of anger against his partners in dialogue.
Occasionally, these outbursts arise from his perception that others are disputing his authority or
are not paying him suitable respect. Sometimes the outbursts come during difficult periods when
Arafat feels he is cornered (Shaked, 2001d). However, they have been known to occur without any
discernable reason, and it is possible that in these cases, the outbursts reflect depression (Rosen,
1992). One gets the impression that, as Arafat has grown older, such episodes have become more
frequent. During his outbursts, he tends to shout, cry, plead, and retreat into himself, completely
ignoring those around him. During these fits of angry, Arafat has a tendency to present unrealistic
positions, to exaggerate, to threaten, and to present himself as a victim or as one being threatened.
It has been reported that in situations when one of his underlings annoyed him, Arafat reacted with
an angry attack and threw the subordinate into jail for a few days (Azulay-Katz, 1993).
Nevertheless, in general, Arafat tends “to cool off” quickly, and often even apologizes for his
outbursts. Those who have met him describe his changing moods—which rise and fall (Levitsky,
1993)—his tension, nervousness, and suspiciousness. His eyes dart about restlessly (Perry, 1994),
or show signs of deep depression (Kamir, 1998). At other times, he is subject to practically
euphoric moods, when he full of vitality, immersed in a strange cheerfulness, and amused by
events (Yaari, 2001). At such times, his mood is optimistic (Shaked, 2001d); and generally light-
hearted (Marcus, 2001).
Arafat is a man of action who requires constant stimulation. In his book on Arafat, Arafat:
Terrorist or Peacemaker?, Alan Hart (1984) states that all of the Palestinians with whom he spoke
describe the activities of Arafat thus: His eyes dart about all the time, his body moves, his hands
move in meaningless motions, and his knees jump (Hart, 1984, p. 26). He seems to have difficulty
relaxing for any length of time, or enjoying himself, except for short periods of quiet; he explains
this as due to lack of time and the impossible demands of his position. In an interview with a
journalist (Sa’id, 1988) Arafat said, “When I don’t have too many things to do, I become restless,
bored, or depressed.” He has been characterized as being excessively active from youth. In a
newspaper interview a few years ago, his eldest sister described him: “>From the moment he
exited the womb, he was already the leader of the neighborhood children. He would divide them
into groups and perform with them military-style exercises; he had a stick, and would hit those
who didn’t obey his orders.” (Hart, in Arafat’s biography, quoted by Freedman, 1990, p. 104). It is
possible that, in professional terms, Arafat would have been classified as a hyperactive child. This
hyperactivity continues to characterize him today, despite his advanced age, expressing itself in
his many hours of work, in his daily schedule, in his inability to relax, in his frenetic travels
throughout the world, and in his nonstop talking (e.g., Colbin, 1990).
2. Independence at All Costs

Arafat does not accept the authority of others. He is fearful and very sensitive concerning his
independence. This attribute apparently developed at a young age, and has characterized him
throughout his life. Arafat’s behavior pattern of zealously guarding his independence has been
particularly noticeable in the political arena. Several people who have written about Arafat have
described this as an obsession for independence from other Arab countries and from oversight on
the Palestinian issue (Sayigh, 1977). He tolerates no dispute concerning his positions, and must
feel there is no one above him or even on his level. A characteristic example is Arafat’s
relationship with other leaders of the Palestinian Authority. For example he took steps to humiliate
Hanan Ashrawi, when it became clear that she had reservations regarding his manner of operation
(Rubinstein, 2001, p. 124). This attribute comes out not only in everyday behavior, but also in the
more important things. This guarding of his independence sometime takes on a somewhat childish
nature: Suah Arafat relates that he even fixes his socks by himself and sews on his own buttons.
When she once offered to do the job for him, he answered, “No way!” According to her, he has
been accustomed to doing for himself his entire life (Avrech, 1993).
3. Suspiciousness
Arafat’s striving for independence is accompanied by great suspicion toward enemies and allies
alike. This expresses itself, first and foremost, in all matters of his personal security. Arafat relies
on no one but himself. He changes his schedule at the very last minute, without even reporting to
his bodyguards (Perry, 1992a). He keeps his flight paths secret, customarily changing his pilots’
flight plans, including destinations, and reporting to the airport just a short time before takeoff
(Egozi, 1992). In light of the numerous attempts on his life, this behavior is understandable;
however, his suspiciousness is not limited to personal security. Reports from those close to him
describe him as a man who does not believe anyone, to the extent that he himself establishes his
bodyguards’ schedules, and he takes care that management of all negotiations remains in his hands
and is not given over to his assistants. Some of Arafat’s assistants have told journalists that his
suspicion often borders on paranoia (Azulay-Katz, 1993). A survey of Arafat’s behavior indicates
a consistent pattern: He trusts only himself and suspects the entire world surrounding him.
Arafat is very sensitive to any criticism from those close to him and or even from well-wishers.
He reacts impulsively to such criticism, and has even arrested a Palestinian Authority activist for
criticizing him (Sella, 1994). The result is that his underlings limit their criticism (if any), for they
can never predict how the “Rais” (big chief) will react. Arafat has been known to react with anger
to even a hint of criticism from journalists or strangers, immediately going on the offensive
(Shaked , 2001b).
4. Need to Demonstrate Excellence and Superiority

Arafat has a strong need to demonstrate excellence and superiority. He ceaselessly tries to show
those around him that he is successful and better than they are—his supporters, as well as his
enemies. The need to demonstrate excellence expresses itself in astonishingly boastful talk. For
example, to a Jordanian reporter in Tunisia, Arafat said, “The Palestinians would have stopped
General Schwartzkopf at the gates of Kuwait if they had decided to fight the Americans, just like
we stopped Sharon at the gates of Beirut” (Zarai, 1991). In an interview his office in Cairo, he
said: “Many times I stood facing death, and I overcame it” (Gabai, 1993a). In a meeting with
Israeli guests, Arafat declared with incomprehensible seriousness: “I am the most important
person in the Middle East” (Michael, 2001). In a meeting with the German foreign minister
following the Dolphinarium attack, Arafat said, “Sharon and I are the two greatest generals in
history. But the difference between us is that I never lost a war” (Tipenbraun and Lior, 2001).
These expressions show Arafat’s tendency to present himself as a successful leader with
exceptional historical stature. Moreover, Arafat appears to see himself as better than other regional
leaders, on the Israeli and the Arab sides—the exception being, apparently, Egypt’s President
Husni Mubarak (Rubinstein, 1996). Some of Arafat’s expressions hint at an occasional lapse into
megalomania and self-perceptions unconnected with reality.
Arafat is a man of struggle; he feels a strong need to strive and overcome. This combativeness
is so engrained in his nature that his assistants often use it to manipulate him to give his consent,
playing a game of “devil’s advocate.” The following grotesque example illustrates how Arafat’s
negative-combative behavior brought him to agree to a proposal by Israel’s Foreign Minister
Shimon Peres (Barnea, 2001d): The technique, used successfully at Oslo, went like this: Abu
Allah comes to Arafat, and tells him that Peres is despicable. He presents what he claims to be
Peres’s proposal to Arafat, and declares that it is not in the Palestinian’s interests. He then presents
what he claims to be his own different proposal, which he insists, “I forced … upon that
despicable Peres.” The truth, of course, is that the proposal “forced upon Peres” was first
contemplated in the creative mind of Peres. Only in this way would Arafat agree to the proposal.
In addition, one can understand by reading between the lines that Arafat sees himself as sly and
superior to his rivals in his ability to manipulate others. This is also how he is perceived by the
Palestinian street. Thomas Friedman in his book From Beirut to Jerusalem (1990) describes him
as follows: “Arafat has the slyness of a merchant in the shuk (market), the sleight of hand of a
magician, and the balance of a juggler in the circus, and, above all, the skin of a chameleon, which
allows him to be painted with all political colors, each in its season” (p. 102). As an example of
Arafat’s juggling ability, one can cite his sudden invitation to six important Israeli journalists to
meet with him at the height of the current Intifada. According to journalist Joel Marcus, this was a
“classic example of the manipulative ability of the Galicean (clever one) of Gaza.” The fruits
Arafat harvested from this meeting can be found, according to Marcus, in the wide coverage he
received in Israeli newspapers. In one place, the meeting was described as a fascinating event. In
another, a journalist wrote that Arafat was very alert, focused, and even optimistic. The general
thread of the reports was admiration for his vigor, alertness, and good mood (Marcus, 2001). This
action should be seen as psychological warfare at its best, reflecting Arafat’s ability to manipulate
and influence public opinion, in this case, the Israeli public opinion.
5. Interpersonal Relations
Various reports, quoting sources close to Arafat, indicate very problematic interpersonal
relations between Arafat and those closest to him. The Arab author Mamdoch Nofel, who wrote a
book on Arafat, reports a dismal atmosphere and defective personal relations in Arafat’s close
environment (Mantzur, 1995). Additional testimonies of people close to Arafat indicate that he
“maneuvers” a great deal in his relations with those around him. He uses various ploys and tactics,
drawing people close to him and distancing them, as he feels necessary. His people do not know in
advance how he will react; and therefore they are always tense when asking anything of him (e.g.,
Rubinstein, 2001, p. 126). Among the tactics he employs with his subordinates are: instilling fear,
arrests, outbursts of anger, pleading, presenting himself as a victim and/or a pathetic person,
showering praise, meaningless appointments, and even bear hugs. In all cases, the outcome is
identical—Arafat gets the last word, and the requester sometimes departs confused and even
stunned. Arafat uses some of these tactics (especially presenting himself as a victim of
circumstances) in his contacts with Israelis, as well (Barnea, 2001c).
The testimonies about Arafat’s interpersonal relations, dating from the beginning of his life as a
political activist, indicate a pattern based on the inability to maintain intimate contacts. From a
review of several Arafat biographies, one gets the impression that this pattern of relationships was
already present at a young age. As a result, he has had travel companions, but no real friends or
comrades with whom he shares experiences, emotions, and difficulties. It appears that Arafat has
practically no need for confidantes and intimacy, and he has never expressed feelings of loneliness
in interviews, writing, or conversation. When a personal issue arises, Arafat always repeats his
standard answer—that he has no time to talk about anything besides the Palestinian revolution.
His relations with those around him are based principally on the pattern of “divide and conquer.”
At the same time, Arafat can be impressive during personal meetings. Journalists and others
who have met Arafat describe him as having the ability to impress and win the heats of his
listeners. For example, the Palestinian author Dr. Rashida Maharan, who wrote a book on Arafat,
describes her first meeting with him: “A man of hope, very quiet, a bitter revolutionary, but a very
attractive man; he captivated me with ease; he controlled me; I could not break free of his
influence; he spoke sweetly, with simplicity” (Gabai, 1993a). According to Sa’id (1988), Arafat
has an amazing ability to make you feel you love him, not as a politician but as a vulnerable man
whom you’ve missed and are about to converse with in private. In personal meetings, Arafat is
wont to shower his guests with food and to seem personally concerned that they eat. He gives
them the feeling that he considers them important and cares about them—a feeling that transcends
gaps in status and in power.
6. Authenticity: Dramatic ability, double-talk, exaggerations, and lies

Arafat has a natural dramatic ability, which he puts to extensive use. He is a natural-born actor.
It appears that some of his outbursts of crying were planned in advance (as practiced by
experienced actors). Arafat is able to switch character in the blink of an eye, and takes advantage
of this ability to advance his goals within the Palestinian movement and in his efforts to win
recognition and support among leaders of the world, in Israeli public opinion, and in world public
opinion. As an example of his dramatic ability, one can cite his behavior during the signing of the
interim agreement maps in Cairo in 1993: While standing on the stage, Arafat refused at the last
minute to sign some of the documents, and aroused the anger of President Mubarak (Rubinstein,
2001, p. 125).
Arafat uses his dramatic ability to convey his messages to the world with gestures, metaphors,
and symbols. An example was his donation of blood in front of the television cameras, several
days after the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001. He posed in front of
the cameras to donate blood for the many injured, with full knowledge that his donation had no
practical significance; there was no way to send fresh blood to the United States from Gaza. Not
only had the United States not requested blood donations, but Arafat himself takes medication that
makes his blood unacceptable for donation. However, as in other cases, Arafat spoke to his people
and to the world through symbols and gestures, not with concrete language (see a similar
assessment of Arafat’s behavior in the course of the Camp David II talks, by Prof. Shlomo Ben-
Ami, foreign minister in the Barak government, in Shavit, 2001).
Arafat is capable of adapting his style of speech to his target audience: the Palestinian national
assembly in a refugee camp, the Jewish public in an Israeli television interview, etc. (See, for
example, the appeasing, relaxed interview he gave Israeli television’s Channel 2 on the eve of
elections in Israel in February 2001.) Arafat is capable of changing positions at will. He knows
how to “turn on the charm,” and to appear as a serious and levelheaded diplomat without allowing
his behavior to reflect his true plans and his upcoming course of action. When necessary, he
presents himself as a pathetic person, whose life is threatened and who most urgently needs help.
In the next breath, he can threaten to burst out in anger–and then invite his listener to appease him
(Levitzky, 1993).
An Arab journalist who came to Tunisia to interview Arafat describes his impressions: “I saw
him in a national assembly in which he demonstrated unbelievable ability to control. With Arafat,
this always starts with friendly courtship, which includes many kisses and handholding.
Afterwards, he cuts them off, gets tough, and controls the rules of the ceremony. Finally, when he
cannot convince them, he becomes theatrical. He has a variety of expressions that can compete
with great actors: amazement, moral outrage, anger, splendor, and clumsy charm. He pulls them
out one after the other with amazing speed. Even his performances appear spontaneous” (Sa’id,
1988).
As the result of this dramatic behavior, it is very difficult to predict his reactions. A typical
example of his unpredictability was Arafat’s speech at the meeting of the World Economic Forum
in Davos. After a “good” meeting with Peres, his entourage expected him to make a moderate
speech, as he had promised beforehand. However, in front of more than 500 world leaders, he
made an aggressive speech, accusing Israel of the destruction of hope (Aichner, 2001).
Arafat’s use of double-talk has been well-known for many years, and has attracted widespread
journalistic review and analysis. Despite this exposure, Arafat has not changed his ways. He
continues to adapt his messages to his target audience and to the situation. When the media
pressures and confronts him with the contradictions between his words, he sidesteps the issue and
generally blames them for misunderstanding him or taking his words out of context. A salient
example of Arafat’s double-talk was his speech in a Johannesburg mosque before a Muslim
audience, in which he declared that the Oslo agreement was like the agreement that the Prophet
Muhammad signed with the Koresh tribe of Mecca (an agreement based on tactical considerations
at a time of weakness, entered with no intention of abiding by it in the long term (Margalit, 1995).
Another example was Arafat’s declaration upon signing the Wye Plantation agreement: “We shall
not return to violence.” However, upon his return to the West Bank, he again declared: “Our guns
are ready, and we are ready to raise them” (Zuckerman, 1998). In an interview with CNN at the
height of the first Intifada, Arafat said, “The forces in the field are pressuring me to authorize the
use of arms in their possession, but I will not allow them.” However, in conversations and in
secret documents disseminated to his people in the territories, he urged the escalation of the
Intifada struggle and the use of live ammunition against the IDF, settlers, and new immigrants
(Shaked, 1990). In an appearance on Palestinian television after the elimination of Yehiye Ayyash
(nicknamed “the Engineer”), he praised suicide terrorists: “Let us honor the holy ones who rise up
from the nation, and, especially, Yehiye Ayyash. Our mutual purpose is to carry on in their
footsteps. Obviously, all of us are candidates to sacrifice our lives at the death of the holy ones, in
remembrance of the holy noble and brave ones” (Atlas, 1998). In the same breath, Arafat put in a
call to Israel’s Prime Minister Sharon and President Katzav to convey New Year greetings, and,
just afterward, to Saddam Hussein, to request his help to put an end “to the terror of the Zionist
entity” (Shaked and Zinger, 2001). He can hug and kiss Israeli leaders, giving an impression of
intimacy, friendship, and even a glimmer of hope (Rosenblum, 2001). A review of the vast
amount of material gathered indicates a consistent pattern throughout the years of the use of
double-talk and even triple-talk.
Another facet of Arafat’s character is his strong tendency toward exaggeration. His
exaggerations cover many diverse areas. He claims that Israel uses depleted uranium shells and
chemical weapons against his people (Barnea, 2001b). He gives completely untenable numbers of
dead and wounded on the Palestinian side (Schiff, 2001a), and blames the increase in abortions
among Palestinian women on the use of the Israelis’ tear gas (Perry, 1989). And this is only a
partial list. His exaggerations are often completely untenable, and yet Arafat continues to use
them, despite their easy refutation. For example, he continues to spread the myth that a map
hanging above the main entrance to the Israeli Knesset shows the Land of Israel stretching from
the Nile to the Euphrates (interview with John Afrek, and Playboy, August 1998). Similarly, he
claims that the two blue stripes on the Israeli flag symbolize the Nile and the Euphrates
(Rubinstein, 2001, p. 14). Some journalists have been amazed, on more than one occasion, by the
“proofs” upon which his claims are based, which actually appear to be illogical. In general, he
pulls notes from his pocket containing newspaper excerpts without distinguishing between facts,
assumptions, and estimations, and with disregard for the reliability of the sources.
One gets the impression that Arafat tends to believe partial and unsubstantiated information
when it supports his beliefs, accepting them—or at least presenting them—as hard facts.
Sometimes it appears that he himself does not perceive his words as lies, but believes them
completely. Thus, for example, after a terrorist attack in Israel, in mid-February 2001, Arafat
claimed that it was only a traffic accident, despite the terrorist himself having acknowledged that it
was a deliberate attack. Arafat thus has tried to evade requests for him to denounce a terrorist act,
or to negate Israeli claims regarding Palestinian Authority responsibility for the incitement that led
to the attack. The use of polyglot is one of the ways Arafat conveys messages to his people. He
makes use of body language, implicit statements, hints, etc. Even his travels abroad at crucial
stages of the struggle are meant to convey a message, and are often the occasion of deadly terrorist
attacks (Carmel, 2001). Arafat’s people know how to read his code of behavior (Shaked, 2001a).
In this way, Arafat can later claim that the words were not his responsibility and can place the
blame on others. An example of such “subtle hints” was Arafat’s appearance (August 25, 2001)
with a small submachine gun in his hands during a visit to a site in the Gaza Strip shelled by the
IDF. All of this was done with full knowledge that he was being filmed by Palestinian television,
and that pictures of him would be transmitted worldwide).
One gets the impression that Arafat is not concerned with telling the truth (to say the least) and
has no emotional difficulty with that; his prevarication is not accompanied by any external signs
that could give him away (e.g., Hopshtein and Hess, 2001). For example, in a meeting with
General Moshe Yaalon on October 7, 1995, Arafat was presented with a list of 35 wanted men.
When Yaalon reached Muhammad Deif, the number-one wanted man at that time, Arafat put on
an innocent face, turned to Muhammad Dachlan, and asked him, “Muhammad Esh?” (Muhammad
who?) Intelligence information in the Yaalon’s hands showed that this same Deif had been in
Arafat’s office at a personal meeting only three days prior (see also Carney, 2001). From some of
his utterances, one gets the impression that he assumes that everyone lies. For example, the
German foreign minister, Joschka Fischer, became angry when he heard from Arafat that he had
no intention of denouncing those who had carried out the terrorist attack at the Dolphinarium.
However, he was even more astounded by Arafat’s response to his question: “Are you ready, from
the depths of your heart, to renounce terror?” Arafat replied, “And the renouncement of the
Holocaust by the Germans—are you really going to tell me that it is from the depths of your
heart?” (Tipenbraun and Lior, 2001).
This behavior pattern comes into play especially when Arafat is attacked by the media—as, for
example, after terrorist attacks. He usually blames the Israelis, claiming that they themselves
initiated a particular action. For example, Arafat repeated many times the claim that Israeli
security services assisted terrorists in carrying out the lethal attack at Beit Lid junction (January
1995) in which 19 soldiers and civilians were killed. Similarly, after one of many attacks in
Netanya (Autumn 1999), Arafat announced that the Palestinians had nothing to do with the action,
and that it was an operation of the Israeli Mafia (Rubinstein, 2001, p. 13). Owing to Arafat’s
extensive use of his dramatic ability, double-talk and tendency to exaggerate, it is hard to evaluate
whether Arafat truly believes his words, or whether it is all part of the “show,” each time targeting
a different audience. From a review of the material before us, one gets the impression, that, at least
in some cases, Arafat truly believes what he is saying: This is evidence of extreme suspiciousness
that borders on paranoia.
From this behavioral pattern, Arafat emerges as utterly unreliable, and it is impossible to rely
on his word. His unreliability expresses itself in diverse ways: He does not object to lies, uses
half-truths and exaggerations, speaks in double-talk, and conveys double messages. As a result, on
the one hand, it is very hard to predict his behavior, since it comes from a man whose manner of
thought and behavior is completely different from that recognized and accepted in politics and
business in the Western world, and, on the other hand, it is difficult to know what his intentions
truly are.
7. Symbol of the Palestinian Revolution

Arafat is seen by himself and by those around him as a symbol of the Palestinian revolution.
His perception of himself as a revolutionary symbol is expressed in several ways, most
outstandingly in his external appearance. Every detail is symbolic: his unshaven face, the kaffiyeh
on his head, his military uniform, and his pistol. When he is asked in various interviews about his
external appearance, he avoids responding on a personal level, and always gives answers of a
political-ideological nature (Rubinstein, 2001, p. 42). For example, he says that he does not want
to waste time that he could be dedicating to the Palestinian nation on shaving; or, in the style of a
guerilla, he claims that the conditions of his life do not allow luxuries such as shaving. In response
to a question concerning his uniform, he answered: “Don’t forget that I am the supreme
commander of the Palestinian forces. I cannot change my skin. I am not a chameleon. I also said to
President Reagan, if you give me a country, I am ready to wear a tuxedo and bow tie” (Avrech,
1993). Similarly, he pays great attention to his uniform, a symbol of the Palestinian collective
(Gabai, 1993e), to his pistol (symbol of the armed struggle), and to the kaffiyeh on his head
(which creates a profile of the map of Palestine). All of these symbolize his path and the armed
struggle, to which he has dedicated his entire life.
He takes care not to change his uniform even in international appearances, and, in this way,
broadcasts to the world, and especially to his people, that he is in a constant struggle for the
Palestinian revolution. On the wall in his office in Tunisia hung a photograph of himself and his
wife, Suah, against a background of the Dome of the Rock—a photomontage, of course. On
another wall were two large portraits of Arafat, one as an old guru and the second as a dynamic
warrior (Avneri, 1994). In this way, he strengthens the myth surrounding his image, built
throughout the years, as the father of the revolution and the creator of its symbols. Despite the
apparent sloppiness, Arafat’s assistants say that he dedicates much attention to this appearance.
All of his external appearance—the theatrical and the provocative—serves to emphasize that he is
the symbol of the Palestinian struggle, which stands completely opposed to the diplomatic
appearance “acceptable” in the world.
Arafat has a strong tendency to blur every uniquely personal component of his personality and
to present himself as “Mr. Palestine.” Arafat has cultivated this approach throughout the years in
various ways. For example, he has fostered myths about his biography, attempting to present
himself as Jerusalem-born, while, as far as is known, he was born in 1929 in Cairo, his family
moved to Egypt for economic reasons, and they were never refugees (Rubinstein, 1996).
Similarly, his answer to the repeated questions over the years, before he got married, as to why he
was not married was: “I am married to the Palestinian revolution” (Araf, 1994). He repeatedly
claims that any personal criticism of him is criticism of the Palestinian revolution, and, therefore,
not legitimate (Colbin, 1990). After the plane accident in the Libyan Desert, Arafat warded off all
attempts to appoint a successor for him, saying, “I am the Palestinian revolution, and there will be
no other symbol for the revolution in my lifetime” (Perry, 1992). Even Arafat’s birthdays have
turned into the birthdays of the Palestinian revolution (Rubinstein, 2001, p. 153), in a manner that
indicates a high-level personality cult.
Many components of private life, characteristic of other leaders, practically do not exist for
Arafat. He has no hobbies, free time for going out, personal friends, or social engagements; he
reads only material connected with his work and does not read good literature of any kind; as far
as is known; he does not go to plays, the theatre, or any other entertainment. He does not travel for
pleasure (all of his many travels are solely for purposes of work), and has never been known to
visit nature reserves, parks, or museums. His wife testifies that he sometimes watches cartoons
and Westerns on television. One gets the impression that even if the blurring of boundaries is done
deliberately for political purposes—to merge his personal identity with the Palestinian collective
identity, which he symbolizes—Arafat has internalized his being a symbol of the struggle for
Palestinian independence, making it part and parcel of his internal identity: “I am the revolution.”
His personal identity has merged completely with the collective.
This perception helps Arafat, among other things, to see himself throughout the years as a sole
leader without a substitute. Therefore, apparently, Arafat has never designated a successor and has
not “mentored” any of the people around him to “grab the wheel” when the time comes. Another
explanation for this is his never-ending need to strengthen his position as sole leader and only
decision-maker among the Palestinians (Perry, 1992b). For example, after signing the principles of
agreement in Washington, Abu Mazen (Mahmoud Abbas) won the hearts of the world media—as
well as the hearts of the Western leadership—with his openness, moderation, precise formulations,
and his leadership ability. In private, there was talk of Abu Mazen as the successor to Arafat. But
when this talk reached the ears of the chairman, he immediately took steps to distance Abu Mazen
from the stage (Azulay-Katz, 1993).
8. Honor Above All

Arafat attaches great importance to his honor. This tendency has characterized him throughout
his life and has become more pronounced as his international status has risen. He perceives respect
toward him as respect toward the Palestinian nation. His people are also very careful to guard his
honor. For example, according to a British newspaper, Naji El-Ali, the Palestinian caricaturist of
the Kuwaiti newspaper El-Kubs, was murdered in London because he did not hesitate to publicize
a caricature that ridiculed Arafat, showing Arafat hiding the existence of a lover. There is no proof
that Arafat gave the order to murder the cartoonist. According to the same newspaper, Naji was
warned in advance in dozens of telephone conversations “to stop using Arafat in his drawings”
(Machanayami, 1987b).
Arafat’s sensitivity to his honor is so great that he is capable of halting important political
processes if it appears to him that he is not receiving the honor he deserves. From here also stems
his sensitivity to formalities—and not only substance—during any negotiations: attitudes toward
him, meetings with him, his status as the most veteran politician in the Middle East, relating to
him as a de facto president, etc. For example, in conversation just before the Oslo agreement, Jack
Nariye, a political adviser of Prime Minister Rabin, mentioned that Arafat was not yet president of
a state, and, in reaction, the chairman shouted, “I am a president, I am a president” (Granot,
1993a).
When Arafat senses disrespectful behavior, he tends “to break the rules of the game.” The
insult to his honor does not have to be direct. He can be offended, for example, when he is not
approached at the right time, or, when it appears to him that he is being ignored. For example, in a
meeting with Prime Minister Rabin, he was approached last and asked how he (Arafat) explains
the celebrations in the Palestinian authority after every murder of Israeli civilians by Hamas and
jihad activists. Since Arafat did not have any real answer, “he expressed displeasure that Rabin
called him chairman, while the entire world called him president” (Verter, 1994). When Arafat
gave a public speech condemning Jordan’s position on the peace agreement and regarding
Jerusalem, experts attributed the criticism to his not having been invited to the signing of the
peace agreement between Israel and Jordan (Sella, October 26, 1994). When asked by journalists,
Arafat says that his honor is important to him and adds, “I am a president without land, without a
country, so what is left for me? Only honor and etiquette” (Levitzky, 1993).
It is possible to attribute his behavior throughout the years—e.g., forcing many people who
wanted to meet with him to wait for days and weeks, without knowing whether they would be
called to meet with him—to his high sensitivity to honor, as well as to his tendency toward
dramatics and even megalomania (Sa’id, 1988; Rubinstein, 2001, page 121). A list of the
journalists who have suffered this treatment is very long. When the meeting actually took place, it
was usually after midnight, shrouded under heavy cover of secrecy and mystery. Arafat never
bothered to apologize to those who had to wait, nor did he mention the late hour, as if it were
obvious that it is not easy to get an interview with such an exalted personage, and the path to
meeting with him is long and difficult.
9. A Place in History
Arafat is very sensitive to his place in history, i.e., to how he will be remembered and what will
be written about him and his leadership in the history books. This sensitivity expressed itself, for
example, when his plane was caught in a storm above the Libyan Desert, and was about to make
an emergency landing (April 1992). Arafat, who was sitting in his track suit, changed into his
official uniform, strapped on his pistol, and carefully arranged his kaffiyeh, with the intent that if
he should be found injured or dead—it would be in uniform (Weaver, 1994). Various analysts
have argued over what historical image Arafat would like to emulate and how he would like to be
perceived by his people. General Amos Gilad, the former head of the Research Section of the IDF
Intelligence Unit, reasoned that Arafat sees himself as a second Saladin. The commentator Ehud
Ya’ari believes that Arafat sees himself more as a modern reincarnation of the “Sahaba”—friends
of the prophet Muhammad, who conquered all of the eastern world on behalf of Islam, and are
considered by Muslims to be semiholy. According to Ya’ari, it is no coincidence that Arafat’s
favorite historical figure is Khalif Omar, who entered the gates of Jerusalem (Yaari, 2001).
From a review of Arafat’s statements one may discern three central foundations to his historical
self-perception. First, Arafat wants to be remembered as the “Father of the Palestinian
Revolution,” the man who founded and established the Palestinian movement, achieved after
difficult struggle and many sacrifices, and succeeded where all the other Arab countries failed
(Araf, 1994). As father of the revolution, he sees himself as a figure representative of all
Palestinians, wherever they are (including residents of the refugee camps and Palestinians in the
Diaspora). Second, Arafat wants to be remembered as the president and founder of a Palestinian
state, the man who started with a small organization and succeeded in establishing a country with
all the trappings of an independent state, recognized by the entire world. Third, Arafat wants to be
remembered as the Arab leader who returned the holy places in Jerusalem to the bosom of the
Arab nation (Gabai, 1993b), and thus assured himself a place of honor among Arab leaders
forever. In this, he sees himself also as the representative of the Christians, who, according to him,
will benefit from his protection by receiving complete freedom of religion and freedom of ritual
practice. The spreading of his protection to Christians will also, according to his understanding,
ensure his place in history as a leader of universal stature.
10. Determination and Tenacity of Purpose, Ability to Survive

One of Arafat’s prominent characteristics is his determination and tenacity of purpose. Arafat
does not surrender, even when he finds himself facing a hopeless situation. Throughout his stormy
life, full of upheavals, he has held faithfully to his long-term objectives. He has emerged phoenix-
like from crushing military and political defeats. He absorbed a severe blow in September 1970,
when he was deported from Jordan by King Hussein’s Jordanian Legion. He soon moved on to
Lebanon with his forces, establishing, in fact, a quasi-government of his own within parts of
Lebanon. Expelled from Lebanon by Israel in 1982, he established his new headquarters in
Tunisia; he then faced a serious inner mutiny supported by the Syrians (the Abu Mussa mutiny) in
1983. In 1991, he prominently supported Saddam Hussein during the Gulf War, which cost him
his economic support from the Gulf emirates and Saudi Arabia. From all these setbacks—and
these were only the most outstanding ones—that would have ended most leaders’ political careers,
he recovered and returned to the arena, ready to resume his struggle.
To withstand all these trials, Arafat obviously is endowed not only with great determination,
but also with an astonishing ability to recover, to maintain faith and hope without despairing, to be
endlessly patient, to inspire hope and faith in the Palestinian “street” as well as in the top
leadership, and to maneuver so as to cope with changing demands. All these have enabled him,
despite opponents and criticism, to continue and maintain his position at the head of the
Palestinian hierarchy. He is also willing to sacrifice for his goals. For example, on his first visit to
Jordan after the Sabra and Shatilla massacre, in an assembly in his honor in the PLO headquarters
in Amman, he stood on the stage, and with sweeping motions of rage, he said to thousands of
Palestinians who came to salute him: “We have lost 5,000 people in Sabra and Shatilla, and we are
ready to lose 50,000 people more to free our homeland” (Friedman, 1990, p.104). In all the
enormous quantity of material written about Arafat, not even one incident is recorded in which
Arafat engaged in soul-searching regarding his people’s sacrifice or questioned the price being
paid for their “liberation.” On the contrary, Arafat emphasizes and glorifies sacrifice as a way to
achieve the Palestinian goal. He sometimes claims that the sacrifices the Palestinians have already
made oblige them to continue the struggle with determination, so that past suffering and loss will
not be in vain. He regards all Palestinians, including children, as potential fighters in the struggle
(Araf, 1994). From his words, one receives the impression that the goal justifies all possible
means, or that “there is no other alternative.”
To these qualities two prominent behavior patterns should be added: First, Arafat tries—
sometimes with success—to turn military and political defeats into victories in the perception of
the Palestinian “street.” An example from the beginning of his career was the Karame action
(March 21, 1968), which he has represented as “the first historical Arab triumph over the state of
Israel.” (Wallach, 1990, p. 29) An additional example is his characterization of the Israeli siege of
Beirut, which ended in the evacuation of Palestinian forces from Lebanon, as an unprecedented
victory of “the few against the entire great Israeli army, on its air and sea forces” (Rubinstein,
2001, p.77). In other words, Arafat succeeds in turning defeats into myths of unprecedented
victories—and the Palestinian “street” enthusiastically adopts these myths. Second, Arafat reveals
personal courage. Even in defeat, he does not abandon his forces but remains with them, refusing
opportunities for personal escape. This happened in the siege of Beirut, and again when he entered
Tripoli, which was besieged by the Syrians from the sea in order to head off his forces.
Arafat demonstrates very high survival ability, both physical and political. He has survived
many attempts on his life (forty such attempts, according to him), battles, accidents, and endeavors
by his opponents to depose him. Even if the numbers are exaggerated, there is no denying that he
has an uncanny ability to land on his feet.
Arafat has a good ability to identify threats, to adjust himself to changes in his surroundings,
and to react quickly to developments. These qualities helped him escape life-threatening dangers,
such as his escape from Jordan in 1970, the siege on Beirut in 1982, etc. The Palestinian “street”
(with help from Arafat himself) has created myths and folklore surrounding his escapes from
danger. The connecting thread in all these stories is Arafat’s sixth sense, which guides him to
leave a house which is going to be blown up at the very last moment, to change his direction at the
last opportunity, to change his lodging, etc. (Bergman, 1998). Thus Arafat’s survival turns into a
myth of the Palestinian street that he is “a cat with nine lives” (Perry, 1992a), whose many
enemies cannot overcome him.
II. Characteristics of Arafat’s Functioning
1. Cognitive Functioning
Arafat is “a one-mission person,” with the Palestinian issue taking center stage. He himself
testifies that “only politics interests me, and I live for it” (Sa’id, 1988). From several reports, it
appears that when the subject is not politics, he becomes bored and loses interest and
concentration (Levy, 1995). It is possible that this is connected to his hyperactivity, making it hard
for him to concentrate on subjects other than those central to his interest. Arafat is one who has
only one issue at the center of his life and no other.
His subordinates and those close to him testify that Arafat has a superb memory for details and
people, mainly with regard to anything related to their attitude toward him over the years (Araf,
1994). Most of his interviewers report that he maintains vitality during an interview, repeats
himself accurately, avoids slips of the tongue, and does not allow himself to be dragged into
subjects in which he is not interested (Perry, 1989). Some of those who met him reported that he
has a compulsive sense of accuracy and order. For example, he repeats actions in a systematic and
precise way, such as a fixed arrangement of the kaffiyeh on his head or emptying his revolver and
arranging the bullets in perfect order (Kolbin, 1990). In general, the impression is that Arafat has
an obsessive tendency to accuracy and order, but this tendency does not seem to interfere with his
everyday life.
Apart from his theatrical behavior, Arafat appears to be accustomed to adapting information
that suits his worldview, without any factual basis. One of many examples is his strange fixation
that “the wall of the Temple Mount is not the Wailing Wall, but a Moslem mosque” (Zuckerman,
2000). Arafat insists on holding onto these claims even when his assistants try to divert him from
the topic, due to the clear inaccuracy of his words, contradicting research-based facts. These
claims make his words ridiculous. The impression is that his way of thinking sometimes becomes
emotional-intuitive, ignoring the facts.
Arafat is not characterized (in the past as well as in the present) by orderly, bureaucratic work
that includes teamwork, listening to various opinions, discussions about long-term policy,
clarifying alternatives, determining defined objectives, etc. Arafat’s management style includes by
tactics that change from one moment to another, according to data. When criticized that it is
impossible to work this way, Arafat has dismissed his critics by saying, “With time, everything
will fall into place” (Louise, 1995). Among other things, as a result of this conduct, observers find
it hard to understand his desires and intentions, what he is striving for, and they interpret it—
mistakenly—as lack of direction.
2. Family Life
Arafat presents himself to his people as an ascetic who dedicates his entire life to the
revolution, at the expense of his private life. At the same time, there have been reports throughout
the years that Arafat has had several love affairs (for instance, Araf, 1994; Rubinstein, 2001, p.
111; Kierman, 1976). Arafat himself took the trouble to strongly deny these stories. In the past,
there were malicious rumors about his being homosexual (Yon Michay Patzapa, one of Nicolae
Ceausescu’s Romanian heads of espionage, who defected to the West, wrote about this in his book
Red Horizons), but there is no additional support for it, and, most probably, the rumors are
unfounded.
Arafat surprised all of his acquaintances when he married Suah Tawil in 1990, at the age of 62.
Suah, a member of a wealthy Christian family from Ramallah, is 34 years younger than Arafat.
Her mother, Ramonda, was active in the 1970s in opposition to the Israeli occupation. When Suah
was eighteen years old, the family moved to Paris. Suah worked in Arafat’s office in Tunisia, and
the two married secretly. She converted to Islam for the marriage; recently she made a hajj, the
pilgrimage to Mecca (Perry, 2001). Suah herself claims that she initiated the relationship, courted
Arafat, and urged him to marry (Perry, 1992e). Since then and up to the present, there have been
rumors concerning a crisis in their marriage and commenting on the fact that Suah and their
daughter live long periods of time in Europe (Kotlovski and Gabai, 1994). Most of the information
about Arafat’s family life comes from his wife’s interviews in the media.
From a psychological point of view, the most prominent fact is that Arafat’s schedule and way
of life have not changed in the slightest since his marriage. He continues to conduct a lifestyle and
daily agenda that is overfilled to the point of exhaustion, and hardly dedicates any time at all to his
wife and his only daughter—something that his wife has verified in various interviews (Peperblit,
1992; Perry, 1992e). Suah comments that the daughter, Zoah, knows Arafat mainly from pictures
and from television (Perry, 1996). This conduct also indicates the huge gap between the image
presented to his people (for example, Suah’s description of fifty Intifada orphans adopted by her
and her husband in Segev, 1994) and Arafat’s actual conduct. This gap is probably part of the
efforts of Arafat and those close to him to magnify the myth of “the father of the nation.” Arafat
continues to dedicate his whole being to the Palestinian cause, and even his marriage and the birth
of his daughter have not changed his course. Several years ago, it was reported that Arafat gave
Suah signatory rights on funds that he distributes among various PLO sectors and in the territories
(Ha’aretz, 1992), and that she is, in fact, in charge of the PLO’s secret bank accounts abroad and
holds the secret account numbers (Perry, 1992e; Levin, 1993). If this is true, then it indicates the
trust that Arafat has in his wife. There is no information corroborating this from any recent period.
It appears from various reports that Suah leads a completely different lifestyle than that of her
husband: She loves shopping, cafes, museums, and Paris. She reports disagreements with Arafat
regarding the management of the Palestinian Authority. Suah even has taken upon herself various
roles in the Palestinian organizations. With regard to attitude toward Israel, there is, apparently,
agreement between the couple: Her words during Hillary Clinton’s visit in Gaza, claiming that the
Israelis poison the Palestinians, are well remembered. In an interview to the Saudi Arabian
newspaper Saiidati, she said that she “hates the Israelis, and opposes normalization and the peace
process” (Perry, 2001).
3. Lifestyle and Work Habits

>From the many reports of people connected to Arafat in the past and in the present, a picture
emerges of a person whose lifestyle and work habits have hardly changed over the years, despite
the many political changes. Arafat works very long hours, day and night. By Western standards he
would be called a “workaholic.” He himself testifies regarding his concept of work saying, “a
competent politician ought to read every piece of paper on his own” (Avrech, 1993). His schedule
usually includes getting up late in the morning, breakfast (healthy food), exercise, and then
meetings and work well into the late hours of the night (Kolbin, 1990; Raviv, 1995). The morning
hours he generally dedicates to requests from individuals, such as women seeking university
scholarships for their sons. Important meetings and serious business are conducted at night, until
the early morning hours. During the late night hours, Arafat is at his best and is described by his
interviewers as vigorous and alert (Avrech, 1993).
Psychologically, the outstanding fact is that, despite the many changes Arafat has undergone
(Jordan, Lebanon, Tunisia, the Gaza Strip, and the West Bank), his daily agenda and his basic
work habits have hardly changed. He continues to live a lifestyle and keep up a daily schedule
much more appropriate for an underground revolutionary or a leader of a secret organization than
for a leader of a country. He continues to be occupied with all the details of his organization, from
the smallest to the largest, keeping his hands on all the strings. Therefore, he carries excessive
assignments and has no time left for anything else (Rubinstein, 1994b). Suah Arafat relates that
when she asks him to stay with her more, he answers, “I have no time. I am busy. I need to handle
our state affairs” (Perry, 1996). Throughout the years, the people surrounding him have had to
adjust themselves to Arafat’s daily agenda and his priorities.
4. Health and Age

Arafat was born in 1929. Throughout the years, it has been reported that his health was good.
He does not smoke, does not drink alcohol, is strict about healthy food, takes care of his health,
and exercises. Despite his pressure-filled daily agenda, he devotes very little time to tension-
reducing activities such as watching television or comedies, which he loves (Altman, 1989).
The great change in his health occurred in April 1992, following a plane crash. He suffered a
head injury and underwent an operation to drain blood clots. After the accident, there were many
reports about his tiredness, his poor health (Bechor and Rabin, 1992), and even about his lowered
mental condition (Rozen, 1992). Later on, there were medical reports saying he was exhausted,
but refuting rumors that he had had a stroke or was suffering from any serious diseases (Bechor,
1996). Nevertheless, after several years, the trembling of his lips appeared. The Palestinian
Authority even blamed Israel for spreading false propaganda regarding Arafat’s health (Sokol and
Hess, 1997). American experts said that Arafat appeared to have Parkinson’s disease. According
to another assessment, he was suffering from hydrocephalus (Krouse, 1997). An article in Foreign
Report presented testimonies that Arafat was suffering from deep depression (Kamir, 1998). At
the same time, reports continue to maintain that Arafat is relatively healthy, strong in body and
soul (Shaked, 2001c). One of the differences recently visible is that one of Arafat’s assistants
stands next to him during interviews and whispers to him whenever he finds it hard to formulate
his words.
So identified is Arafat with the struggle that he has not designated a successor, despite his age
(74) and health problems. Palestinian leaders, aware of his advanced age and his medical
condition, do not address the absence of an identified successor because of their respect for Arafat
and out of fear of his sudden rages, as well as from fear of a war of succession in the Palestinian
camp. The Palestinian leader’s blunt treatment of Hanan Ashrawi, when she called for an
appointment of another Palestinian leader in his stead, after all traces of his plane were lost in the
Libyan Desert, is well remembered. He never forgave her (Bechor, 1996).
5. Functioning under Pressure

Over the years, Arafat experienced many pressure-filled situations, some of which placed him
in mortal danger. Relying on descriptions of Arafat’s conduct in times of crisis, one may conclude
that he functions well under pressure. Reports about his mood and manner of functioning during
crises corroborate this. Well-remembered are, for example, the interviews Arafat granted
reporters, including Israeli journalists, from his bunker in the besieged city of Beirut during the
Lebanon War (1982), in which he demonstrated an impressive ability to resist. Similar conduct
has recurred during the current crisis. In a speech given on the occasion of Nachba Day (the
Palestinian designation for Israeli Independence Day), listeners from the veteran PLO team
testified (according to one of his bureau staff), “For years we have not seen such vitality in him;
Arafat demonstrates a good mood, is recently absorbed in strange cheerfulness, and is amused by
the events” (Ya’ari, 2001)
One of the impressive testimonies to Arafat’s ability to cope with difficult situations and threats
to his life was an interview granted to a New Yorker reporter in 1994, in which he described what
he had undergone while his plane was about to crash in the Libyan Desert. Arafat, according to his
testimony, was quite and calm. As a religious Moslem, he was absolutely certain that man’s fate
was in the hands of God, who determines the years of one’s life. After whispering verses from the
Koran, he said aloud, “Oh, Abu Jihad, wait for me, I am joining you” (Rubinstein, 2001, p. 99).
Religious fatalism enables Arafat to feel relaxed in times of stress and strengthens his courage. It
is probable that, after so many crises, Arafat’s faith has grown stronger because of his feeling that
he “is guarded from above.”
In addition, it is notable that Arafat feels great satisfaction when he acts against a force greater
than himself. Among the abundant examples of this are the Karame action (March 1968), the siege
on Beirut (July 1982), and facing the IDF in the territories since October 2000. Psychologically,
the impression is that in such situations Arafat is on a kind of “mental high.” He appears to be in
good spirits, does not hesitate to make difficult decisions, shows courage, and is willing to
sacrifice people for the good of the cause. He refuses to submit to the dictates of external pressure
and shows an intense unwillingness to compromise. Sometimes, he exhibits a strong religious
inclination that allows him to believe he is fulfilling a holy ordinance and so makes him willing to
take greater risks. Such a description is fitting when Arafat does not descend into one of his
gloomy moods, during which his reactions are diverse: anger, tantrums, excessively dramatic
behavior, and expressions of victimization.
III. Leadership Style

A subject that attracts extensive coverage in the press and in the many books on Arafat is his
leadership style. This combines his character traits, although the main factor is extreme centralism.
1. Decision-Making
Arafat is at the top of the decision-making pyramid; he is the sole source of authority and
makes decisions on all issues, large and small. This is a clearly hierarchical style in which
information flows vertically (from the top down) rather than horizontally. Arafat is the final arbiter
in the organization (Machanayami, 1987a; Kolbin, 1990), and this pattern has continued to
characterize him even after the Oslo Accords and the move to the territories (Rubinstein, 1994b).
Yehosafat Harkabi, a Middle East expert, expressed the view that Arafat tends to consult with
others, yet reserves decisions on genuinely important matters for himself, including formulating
fundamental approaches and practical action plans (Perry, 1992c). Moreover, it appears that most
of his advisers tend to offer advice consistent with Arafat’s own views (Waller, 2001).
Some of the important decisions made by Arafat are approved by the PLO’s official bodies,
such as the executive committee, the central council, etc. It appears that in most cases, Arafat
brings his decisions up for discussion in these forums only when support is ensured. Experts who
follow the political processes in the PLO estimate that Arafat manages to manipulate activists to
secure a majority (Bechor, 1993). In other cases, Arafat makes the decision alone without
convening other bodies (Granot, 1993a). Criticism on this point has sometimes been voiced
(behind his back) by various PLO figures. For example, Faisel Husseini and Hanan Ashrawi at
one point threatened to resign their public offices, hoping to convince Arafat that decisions could
not be made in a democratic society without consultation (Sella, 1994a). Gaza leaders have also
expressed harsh criticism at Arafat’s behavior as a leader, claiming that he makes decisions alone,
shares decision-making with no one, and continues to exhibit the mannerisms of a leader of an
underground organization rather than of a head of state. In this context, they mention his
demanding the presence of members of his government at two o’clock in the morning—a request
no one dares refuse (Verter, 1994; Barel, 1994).
Officially, Arafat’s centralization of power is expressed in three primary titles: president of the
State of Palestine, chairman of the PLO, and chairman of the Palestine National Authority. This
entails extraordinary centralization: an authoritarian government, similar to that typical of most
Arab nations (Louise, 1995), without surrendering the illusion of democracy (Ya’ari, 1996b).
2. Financial Control
The most prominent expression of Arafat’s central rule is his absolute control over the
organization’s financial resources. For example, a member of the PLO Central Committee once
said that if Arafat were to die, the PLO would need 50 years to reorganize because Arafat was the
only person who knew all the details relating to finances (Levin, 1993). Even allowing a degree of
exaggeration in this statement, it is indicative of his style of financial leadership; Arafat is the sole
signatory on checks and the only person who decides what is done with the money (Levitzky,
1993; Levin, 1993). He administers the Fatah Fund, is the treasurer of the PLO’s military arm,
and, in practice, controls the committee that administers the Palestinian National Fund, the PLO’s
central financial organization (Levin, 1993). After the Oslo Accords, contributing states
announced that Arafat would not see one single cent until the establishment of an organized
reporting system and the submission of development and rehabilitation programs with specific
details as to the purpose of the funds. A mechanism was established on paper, but it quickly
became apparent to Palestinian economists who enthusiastically joined this effort that programs
were made ineffective by Arafat’s centralist policy, which indicated clearly to them that he would
be the sole decision-maker (Verter, 1994).
In terms of financial control, there have been many reports of inappropriate use of funds and
corruption in Arafat’s management. There are reports that Arafat granted his wife signatory
powers on checks (Ha’aretz, 1992; Globes, 1993), and reports of “dubious financial management”
(Yechezkeli, 1993), as well as unsuccessful financial management (Granot, 1993a). One reporter
quotes the London Sunday Times as reporting that Arafat and his subordinates made inappropriate
use of donations. According to the Times, the Palestinians used $20 million donated by European
sources expressly for the building of inexpensive housing in Gaza to build luxury apartments for
Arafat’s bodyguards (Dettmer, 1998). Three years earlier, the same newspaper published a
Palestinian document indicating Arafat’s diversion of millions of dollars in donations to finance
political actions in Israel. This document showed that PECDAR—the Palestinian Economic
Council, which is almost completely financed by donations—purchased real estate in East
Jerusalem to reinforce Palestinian holdings in the area. The document also reported the use of
donations to support Arafat’s relatives, including his brother-in-law, in their businesses and to
build luxury apartments for them. Another recent example was the report that Jawad el Hussein,
the PLO treasurer, was forcefully returned to the PNA from Abu Dhabi (in the United Arab
Emirates) in Arafat’s plane. According to the report, Arafat became afraid that el Hussein was
beginning to “spill the beans.” El Hussein was responsible for the monthly transfer of almost $8
million from the National Palestinian Fund to Arafat’s private bank account, for what was defined
as operational needs of the Palestine Liberation Army, a PLO organization. The bank account in
question was never under any supervision and, even today, it seems that only three people know
exactly what happens to the money (Bergman and Meltzer, 2001). Arafat was never personally
charged with appropriating money for his own personal needs, and his name was apparently never
tied to accounts of corruption (Rubinstein, 2001, p. 182). Various reports indicate that Arafat used
the funds to bolster his own rule and foster the dependency of his subordinates. There is no doubt
that Arafat stands at the head of a corrupt organization, and his administration of affairs points
responsibility clearly at him. Despite his declared intention to fight corruption, Arafat has yet to
fulfill his promises on this issue.
3. Personal Appointments and the Policy of Divide-and-Conquer

An additional central element in Arafat’s leadership is the personal appointments he makes,
especially the appointment of his family members. Immediately upon his arrival to Gaza and the
West Bank, Arafat initiated an accelerated process of appointing men from the movement’s
leadership who had been with him in Tunisia to key positions. However, he then ignored them,
kept distant from them, and brought in various activists close to him, so that no one knew his
intentions in advance (Rubinstein, 1994a; 1994b). For example, Bassam Abu-Sharif, who was one
of the people closest to Arafat and his confidante regarding the Oslo Accords, was cut off after
several months. One of Arafat’s deputies said to a reporter in response to a question on this matter,
“On things like that you do not ask ‘Why?’ The chairman decided that Bassam should go; we
don’t know why; maybe he spoke too much or voiced criticism when he should not have done so.
Nobody here asks unnecessary questions. If you ask too much, you come under suspicion”
(Azulai-Katz, 1993). Arafat behaved in a similar manner to Faisal Husseini (Barnea, 2001a).
Rubinstein (1995d) explains this policy by claiming that Arafat always appointed two different
people to the same office, so they would argue and compete with each other. All the individuals
close to Arafat are continuously aware of the precariousness of their position, and they are
consequently forced to behave obsequiously toward Arafat. In this manner, Arafat’s status is
maintained and reinforced through a cynical use of a “divide-and-conquer” policy.
4. Establishment of Dual and Triple Governmental Systems

Another attribute of Arafat’s style of government is to establish several parallel governmental
systems. A reporter of the U.S. News and World Report quotes Mansur Showa, former mayor of
Gaza, as saying that Arafat disliked the decisions made by the city council and therefore
established a small rival council, without informing Showa. This council, administered by
Showa’s cousin, approved the construction of a 20-story tower, the approval for which had been
previously rejected by the city council, despite the fact that water and sewage did not reach the
tower’s upper floors (Louise, 1995). Ehud Ya’ari (1996b) recounts that, in addition to the existing
hierarchy of military command, Arafat established an alleged civil counterpart, subordinate in
practice to the Palestinian Ministry of Internal Affairs—a ministry whose portfolio Arafat himself
holds. In a similar manner, Arafat circumvents the structural components of the Palestinian
Authority, the elected council, and the government ministries. This pattern places exclusive
control in his hands, yet maintains an illusion of democratic rule. In the past, Arafat similarly
established multiple agencies and corresponding departments inside the Fatah, fragmenting the
foci of power to bolster his own rule. He then replicated this pattern inside the PLO by
establishing multiple security organizations (with overlapping areas of autonomy and authority)
with the aim of undermining his rivals and rewarding his supporters (Sayigh, 1977).
5. Global Air Travel: “The Frequent-Flyer Club Member”

It is almost impossible to refer to Arafat and his leadership style without mention of his practice
in recent years of flying all over the world with unprecedented frequency. Masses of commentary
have been written to explain this behavior: his need for respect, a reflection of his lack of a home
and homeland, his sense of a nomadic existence, his hyperactivity, and his inability to be in one
place for an extended period of time. We will add no interpretation to this behavior, as it is
reasonable to assume that underlying it are many elements of Arafat’s personality, described
above. However, it is salient that his pattern of behavior hardly changed (excepted when confined
to Ramallah during the winter and spring of 2002), despite the political changes since the Oslo
Accords. This point combines with other various behaviors of Arafat that have remained virtually
unchanged, despite the shift in status from head of an underground organization to leader of a
state-in-the-making.
6. Religiosity
Throughout his life, Arafat has exhibited religious faith. Though not extremely religious, Arafat
observes a significant part of the five daily prayers of a devout Muslim. He uses religion to help
him cope with questions of destiny. (“My destiny is determined by Allah and not by man.”)
Throughout his life, he has declared himself to be a religious person. In his youth in Cairo, he
joined in Muslim Brotherhood activities and was first arrested in 1954 as a result of these
connections (Hart, 1984). It appears that this relationship was not rooted in religious fanaticism,
but stemmed from his negative attitude toward Arab institutions, which had abandoned the
Palestinians. Arafat typically uses religion for political purposes. He frequently mentions the
significance of the holy places in Jerusalem and repeats the vision, “Soon we will all return to el-
Kuds and conduct a jihad prayer in its mosques,” to mobilize the support of the Muslim world
(Gabai, 1992). Nonetheless, we can assume that his insistence on Palestinian sovereignty of the
places holy to Islam in Jerusalem also stems from his own personal religious motives in addition
to political motives.
IV. Developmental Background and General Psychological Hypotheses

Much has been written about Arafat’s biography from a psychological point of view. This
report has no intention of recounting Arafat’s development, but will point to significant
psychological milestones, which, in its view, shaped his personality and worldview, and we shall
attempt to derive general psychological hypotheses on this foundation.
1. A Difficult Childhood: An Orphan

The most prominent fact in Arafat’s development from a psychological perspective was the
death of his mother when he was four years old. After his mother’s death, Arafat and a younger
brother were sent to their uncle in Jerusalem for several years, far from his father and his close
family in Cairo (Friedman, 1990, pp. 100-106). Information on these years is scanty and is
primarily based on much later testimonies of his relatives. The existing testimonies are sufficient
to assess that Arafat had a “difficult childhood” (Lavi, 1994). It appears that only at the
approximate age of eight, did he return to his father’s home in Egypt where, as the accounts
suggest, his eldest sister Anam played a central role in raising the children. Years later in an
interview, Arafat said that she was a mother, a sister, and a best friend to him (Landers, 1994).
Several biographies describe an unfavorable relationship between Arafat and his father. It is
known that Arafat did not go to his father’s funeral, and did not visit his grave when returning to
Gaza after signing the Oslo Accords (Raphael, 1998). Arafat’s psychological framework
consequently includes the traumatic death of his mother at a tender age and life away from his
father (at least during the years he spent in Jerusalem). This may be seen as a life event that forced
him to be “a child who raises himself and learns to depend exclusively on himself”—a child who
grew up with many emotional deficiencies and, possibly, little emotional support after the death of
his mother.
The death of his mother at a tender age apparently caused an extreme response of emotional
denial as a defense mechanism (see the testimony of his brother in Lavi, 1994). This denial of
emotions apparently allowed him to cope with the numerous difficulties involved in losing the
most significant figure in his life at so young an age. It had a significant affect on his personality:
a restricted emotional world, limited ability to establish intimate relations, intense isolation
stemming from a lack of emotional need for intimacy (therefore, this isolation is not oppressive),
an obsessive need for control, an extreme need for respect and honor from others, and a difficulty
in understanding and empathizing with others.
As noted earlier, Arafat learned at a young age that he could depend only on himself. This
constant aspiration for independence and self-sufficiency (Sayigh, 1977, p. 697) is probably based
on adults having disappointed him in times of need. This trait may be reflected in his inability to
collaborate with others or work in a team; he sees himself as the one who knows best; he also has
an intense inability to rely on others or delegate authority to others. This perception is later
generalized to the state of the Palestinian nation, betrayed by the world and by the Arabs. Arafat’s
conclusion is to aim for independence at any price, placing no trust in the Arab states or their
leaders. He formed a perception that only the Palestinians can help themselves and their actions
will “force” the Arab world to rally to their support.
Arafat’s struggle for survival taught him that he must be better than others to survive. He
developed an approach to life that includes extreme suspicion toward people “on the other side”
(Mansur, 1995) and an incessant need to prove to his environment (rivals and well as partners) just
how successful and superior he is. On the other hand, this need is accompanied by militarism,
expressed in attempts to deceive his rivals, overcome them, and have the last word. This feeling
probably explains his leadership style and his belief that he is the only person qualified to
administer the policy of the Palestinian movement. This is the source of his adherence to a
centralist leadership style.
2. Betrayal and Sense of Victimization

As early as his childhood, Arafat became involved in underground political activities and stood
out as a leader of Palestinian students in Cairo. From the beginning, he was exceptional in his
independent approach that deviated from that of the traditional leadership, which he saw as
defeatist. In the 1948 war, when he was a student in Cairo, he joined a small group of students
who attempted to reach Israel to take part in the fighting. When they reached Gaza, a regular
Egyptian army unit disarmed them and prevented them from joining in the hostilities. Arafat and
his colleagues would later state: “The Nachba began when we were banished from the
battleground in Palestine” (Rubinstein, 2001, p.57). He was an eyewitness to the Arab defeat in
the wars with Israel and to the unchanging deplorable situation of the Palestinians resulting from
the Arab states’ lack of mobilization for their cause. Arafat interpreted this as betrayal of the
Palestinian cause by the Arab states, first and foremost (see also Rubinstein, 2001, pp. 53-57).
This, inter alia, is the source of his belief that others cannot be relied upon. Arafat expresses this
belief in a statement that he frequently repeats, “The truth is that the Arabs betrayed us” (Hart,
1994, p.77). Arafat also experienced personal humiliation at the hands of Arab governments. For
example, in 1966, he was imprisoned in Syria for several weeks when the Syrian government
attempted to gain control of the Fatah movement. Some of his biographies recount that he was
also tortured. A review of Arafat’s own statements indicates that this sense of betrayal is a
continuous thread throughout his long years of struggle.
This sense of betrayal probably comes in addition to a sense of personal betrayal. The origin of
this feeling was in his childhood. A child is likely to perceive the death of a parent at a young age
as betrayal and abandonment. This feeling could have been exacerbated after Arafat and his
brother were sent away from their father’s house in Cairo to their uncle’s house in Jerusalem for a
few years. This was a double betrayal: the death of his mother and his being sent away from his
father’s house at a young age, when a child is not yet able to understand and formulate the
experience in words (in adult language). These things become imprinted, mainly at the emotional
level. One can only surmise that Arafat is very sensitive to this issue, due to his personal
background.
A high sensitivity toward betrayal could be one of the psychological explanations of Arafat’s
obvious reluctance to come to a confrontation with the Palestinian opposition. He is very sensitive
to this type of accusation, and will do anything to come to terms with the opposition and to reach a
compromise with it, if only to avoid having to fight it and be accused by some of his people as
having betrayed them. This is true as long as the opposition does not directly threaten his rule or
the realization of his strategic objectives.
As part of the political perception of betrayal of the Palestinians, Arafat also expresses a strong
sense of their being the victims. Arafat has a fundamental sense of himself as a victim, which is
inseparable from his perception of the Palestinian people as victims. (See President Clinton’s
evaluation, in Yediot Aharonot, 2001). It can be assumed that this stems both from his childhood
experiences and from his complete identification with the fate of the Palestinian people. Therefore,
he feels that he (in other words, the Palestinian people) is always in the right, and the world must
always understand him—even when what is at issue is terrorism and the murder of innocent
civilians. It seems that this inclination enables Arafat to lay the blame on Israel, even for severe
acts of terrorism and to feel that these acts are the reaction of the weak party, the victim, whom the
world has ignored and left to suffer. As a result he has developed a conviction that the terrible
wrong that was perpetrated on the Palestinians constitutes a moral justification for any act of
opposition, including the use of terrorism, which he regards as both legitimate and moral.
3. Arafat as a Survivor: In Constant Struggle

Most of Arafat’s life as an adult can be characterized having the stance of the leader of an
underground, persecuted by his enemies who wish to kill him and who must wage a constant war
with his enemies for his very existence and must struggle over the position of authority with his
partners. Despite all the attempts to liquidate him or to oust him from the position of leadership,
he overcame his enemies and survived. Moreover, he has brought his organization to impressive
achievements: from a marginal, unimportant underground organization, he brought it to the brink
of statehood, with most of the world recognizing its right to exist.
Arafat practically doesn’t know a pattern of living that is not a struggle. It is reasonable to
assume that he sees himself as someone who has overcome all of his opponents—many of whom
are no longer alive—and triumphed over them. His survival is probably also connected to his
development and to the background that characterized his upbringing. It can be assumed that
already as a young boy he was obliged to develop a sophisticated ability to survive, in order to
cope with the difficulties of his reality. Among other characteristics, he became highly active,
developed an ability to lead and to manipulate the children in his environment, and from a very
young age he directed all his resources to political struggle.
It can be surmised that a person who has spent all his life in constant struggle will find it
difficult—especially at an advanced age—to make the abrupt switch to a life of peace and
cooperation, based on trust. There is no evidence that there were any marked changes in Arafat’s
behavior when he made the transition from Tunisia to the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in the
wake of the Oslo Accords. His style of expression (mainly when directed toward his own people)
provides no evidence of any marked change in his outlook. Neither do any other characteristics of
his behavior show any evidence of such changes.
4. Self-Identity
Arafat’s choice at an early stage of his life to devote his whole being to the Palestinian cause
can be explained as a circumvention of the need to deal with difficulties and problems on the
personal level. The total devotion of his life to the Palestinian cause enables him to minimize his
inner emotional and personal world, by being focused only on the political “really important”
issues. Thus, Arafat found an efficient way to deal with emotional problems, with development of
individual identity (as noted, his personal and collective identity merged) and with individual
growth and other developmental tasks. He has paid a price for this in that his personality is one-
dimensional, structured totally around the political issue.
5. On the Verge of Realization of the Dream

All of his life, Arafat struggled for the Palestinian cause. In recent years he has seen the
realization of his dream (Gabai, 1993c; 1993d). For example, at the central gathering of the
Palestinian Authority on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the proclamation of Palestinian
independence, Arafat stated: “We want our State in May (1999). The Palestinian people are in the
process of realizing the declaration of independence of 1998 and in the process of liberating their
land. In the coming days we shall have control over half of the Palestinian land, until we reach
Jerusalem, to raise the flag above its mosques and churches” (Hess, 1998).
He began as the head of a small and unknown organization and currently is at the center of the
Middle East conflict, a personage famous all over the world, who enjoys extensive international
support and is honorably received by many world leaders. Arafat currently faces a very difficult
dilemma: He wants to go down in history as the founder of the Palestinian state and as the father
of its revolution. To succeed in the first, he must make difficult concessions that will severely
harm, from his point of view, his status as the “father of the revolution” (because it will entail the
subjection of his opponents and a difficult struggle to overcome them). This dilemma is
exacerbated by his advanced age and the status of his health. So far, there are no signs that he has
made a conclusive choice between these two aspirations.
6. Summary of Personality Attributes

The characteristic features of Arafat’s personality do not indicate, in our opinion, a clearly
specific disorder (according to the definitions of the American Psychiatric Association: DSM-IV,
1994). At the same time, it is possible to point out various characteristics that accord with an
unspecific personality disorder. The nature of this overview, based mainly on evidence provided
by others, does not enable us to determine with certainty whether these characteristics meet the
complete criterion necessary for a determination of a personality disorder.
Therefore, we limit ourselves to an enumeration of the characteristics that have been raised
here: a large measure of suspicion, including toward his close associates and members of his
entourage; distrust of the loyalty of people who are close to him; being unforgiving of people
whom he sees as having offended or hurt him (characteristic features of the paranoid personality);
lack of emotional stability expressing itself in high spirits alternating with dejection; a difficulty in
controlling anger and a tendency to outbursts of rage (characteristic features of the borderline
personality); a sense of grandeur and importance, and the expectation that others should recognize
him as unique and superior to others; exaggerated sensitivity to criticism; demanding admiration
from the people around him; a developed sense of “I deserve”; manipulative interpersonal
relationships (a characteristic feature of the narcissistic personality).
Beyond the attempt to diagnose a specific disorder there is another characteristic, which we
shall term “a one-dimensional personality.” This one-dimensionality is a result of an exclusive
preoccupation with the Palestinian issue and is expressed in a narrow perspective on a range of
subjects, such as historical processes, political economics, global processes, sociological
processes, long-range planning, etc. (See a similar evaluation in Eldar, 2001.) In other words,
Arafat lacks a wide base of knowledge based on education, reading, and an acquaintance with
cultures, nations, and different people. At the same time, he does not sense any lack of knowledge
and regards himself as more qualified and better suited than others.
Strategic Analysis of Arafat
This section will present the strategic characteristics of Yasir Arafat. The components of his
strategy are a direct outcome of his personality, his environmental conditions, and the players
involved. As Arafat is entirely focused on Palestinian national affairs, his strategy is directed at
two principal objectives: preserving his personal status as leader of the Palestinians and achieving
a solution to the Palestinian problem.
The players or factors involved with Arafat are as follows: in Israel, the government of Israel,
elements from the opposition, Israeli public opinion, and Israeli Arabs; in the international arena,
the United States, the Arab countries, Europe, Russia, the United Nations, other countries
throughout the world, and worldwide public opinion; in the Arab arena, the rulers of the Arab
states (principally Egypt and Jordan) and Arab public opinion; on the domestic front, his intimates
in power, opposition organizations, and the entire Palestinian public, both in the areas under his
control and in the Palestinian Diaspora (Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, the Gulf states, etc.).
I. Is Arafat a Strategist or a Leader Acting on Instinct?

A preliminary question with regard to the strategy adopted by Arafat is whether he operates as
a strategist, or as a leader reacting instinctively and emotionally to events. The conclusion of this
study is that Arafat makes use of all the characteristics of strategic thought and long-term
planning: definition of a vision and setting clear goals; identification of the players; utilization of
all possible tools for the purpose of attaining his goals; selecting courses of action (including
identification of his relative advantages), and the like.
Thanks to the strategy that he has adopted and the existence of certain environmental
conditions (such as Israel’s willingness to enter into a dialogue with him), Arafat has racked up
some impressive achievements in the last decade. Once the head of an organization shunned by
the entire world, Arafat has become a leader who is popular across the globe; once an international
terrorist (for example: the attack on the bus on Israel’s Coastal Road in March 1978, the murder of
the Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics in September 1972, the murder on the Achille Lauro in
October 1985, and so forth), he became a Nobel Peace Prize laureate – and subsequently returned
to the ways of terror. From the early bargaining point at which Israel was offering the Palestinians
“autonomy for the population only” (with no sovereignty over the land), Arafat reached the
heights of Camp David II, where Israel and the United States proposed that he establish an
independent Palestinian state, with East Jerusalem as its capital, extending over approximately 95
percent of Judea and Samaria and the Gaza Strip, as well as alternative territory within the Green
Line. At the same time, it is possible that Arafat’s rejection of Israel’s proposal and his
contribution to the outbreak of the Al-Aqsa Intifada will prove to be the missed opportunity of all
time, because it is doubtful whether an independent Palestinian state can be established in the
coming years on better terms than those which were offered to the Palestinians (see interview with
Shlomo Ben Ami, Israel’s foreign minister at the time of the Camp David II summit, Shavit,
2001).
On the other hand, there are those who believe that Arafat is not a strategist, or that, at times, he
does not adopt a course of action that requires profound thought. For example, Palestinian Prof.
Yazid Sayagh explained, in August 2001, that, on the eve of the Al-Aqsa Intifada, Arafat was
facing a political dilemma, and he ran away from it. In his opinion, this behavior did not reflect
the existence of a strategy based on the use of force, but rather, the lack of any strategy
whatsoever. Sayagh claims that, in the political area, Arafat’s management is characterized by a
high level of improvisation and short-term vision. As he sees it, the same pattern was
characteristic of Arafat following Sharon’s ascent of the Temple Mount: He saw an opportunity to
improve his international status, enlist vociferous Arab support, and topple Ehud Barak.
Accordingly, he retroactively authorized the use of arms (Eldar, 2001).
II. The Basic Premises of Arafat’s Strategy
A. The existence of clear strategic goals toward which the Palestinians are aiming--the
establishment of a Palestinian state within the June 1967 borders, with Jerusalem as its
capital, and a solution for the problem of the refugees—has been a constant.
Arafat has consistently and clearly set these goals for himself and his environment. Thus, for
example, he has never stopped presenting Jerusalem as the capital of the Palestinian state (Gabai,
1992; Ha’aretz, 1989; Hess, 1998; Chalila, 1994; Ma’ariv, 1993; Shaked and Raz, 2001). By
contrast, Israel has adopted more flexible positions in this matter. At the Camp David II summit,
Israel discussed with Arafat the possibility of divided sovereignty over Jerusalem, whereas, in the
early stages of the negotiations with the Palestinians, at the Madrid Conference, Israel had not
agreed to discuss the question of sovereignty over Jerusalem.
The clarity of Arafat’s objectives serves as a spotlight to light his way. As a general rule,
Arafat supports anything that advances the cause of the establishment of an independent
Palestinian state, in the format envisioned by Arafat, and objects to anything that threatens it. His
consent so far to defer the declaration of an independent state results, inter alia, from his
estimation that such a move would be more harmful than helpful to the chances of actually
establishing such a state. In other words, to this day, Arafat has preferred to wait for the
declaration of a Palestinian state within the framework of an agreement, understanding that this
alternative is preferable from the standpoint of the probability of establishing an independent
Palestinian state to quarreling between the United States and Israel. When the situation of
inequality reverses itself, Arafat will make haste to declare an independent state, even unilaterally.
Notwithstanding the clarity of the objective with regard to the establishment of a
Palestinian state, Arafat is having a hard time deciding on the conditions for ending the
conflict with Israel that has been the purpose of his life. As was determined at Camp David II,
Arafat is having difficulty accepting the Israeli demand to sign a convention ending the conflict
with Israel as part of the permanent agreement. Palestinian spokespersons, such as Hanan Ashrawi
and Saeb Arekat, have explained, in the past, that the Palestinians made a great concession by
agreeing to establish a Palestinian state in the disputed territories only. These explanations,
however, were addressed to public opinion in Israel and the West. It appears that, notwithstanding
the Palestinians’ signature on the Oslo Agreement, Arafat finds it difficult, on both the emotional
and the strategic levels, to admit that the Palestinians have renounced their share in the Land of
Israel within the Green Line. As one who sees himself, and is perceived by his people, as the
father of the revolution, Arafat cannot admit publicly that he is giving up the dream that has been
the main motive of the Palestinian revolution. Accordingly, to date, he has refused to compromise
on his claims with regard to the “right of return,” claims which have proven to be far more
expensive than Israel originally thought. This ambiguity raises the following question: Is a
Palestinian state within the June 1967 borders the final objective of the Palestinian struggle, or is it
only an interim stage, to be followed by a struggle for the remaining territory of the Land of
Israel? It may be estimated that Arafat views the establishment of a Palestinian state within the
June 1967 borders as a realistic strategic objective that the Palestinians can attain within this
generation. At the same time, he has not closed the book on the ultimate Palestinian dream with
regard to the remaining areas of the Land of Israel.
B. The great gap between the military and political power of the State of Israel and that of
the Palestinians has also been a constant factor, dictating Arafat’s strategic choices.
This starting point has been valid ever since Arafat started his activity on behalf of the
Palestinian cause, and remains so to this day. This dictates the selection of strategies intended to
fully exploit his “weak strength”—that is, the use of the tools of violence and terror, and the
manipulative enlistment of external forces on his behalf.
C. Time is on the side of the Palestinians.
Notwithstanding the military and political power enjoyed by Israel today, Arafat identifies
Israel’s weak points, which work in favor of the Palestinians. The first weakness is the
demographic factor: The rate of natural increase among the Palestinian population is twice that of
the Jewish population of Israel (e.g., Arafat encourages high birth rate: Perry, 1985). In the course
of the years, the Palestinian power in this area will grow even further. Accordingly, there is no
reason for the Palestinians to give up on any of the essential points. A second weakness involves
the great sensitivity of Israeli society to loss of human life. A third weakness is the divisive,
fragmented nature of Israeli society. In light of all this, Arafat believes that, in the course of time,
broad cracks will appear in the Israeli armor, meaning that all the Palestinians need is patience.
III. Characteristics of Arafat’s Strategy
1. Arafat’s strategy in political negotiations with Israel

Arafat has set red lines for himself with regard to the basic issues of the negotiation for
the permanent status—borders, the right of return, sovereignty over Jerusalem, and so
forth—and has consistently maintained them throughout the years. Thus, for example, on the
question of Jerusalem, as early as September 1993, in an interview with Radio Monte Carlo,
Arafat stated: “If the prime minister of Israel, Yitzhak Rabin, has red lines with regard to the
destiny of East Jerusalem, I too have such lines, and they are very hard, because Jerusalem is
stamped within the soul of millions of Muslims and Christians throughout the world.” He
emphasized that the Palestinians would not give up one inch of the soil of Jerusalem. Arafat stated
that the Palestinian state, as he had promised in the past, was only a stone’s throw away. “At this
stage, we are getting the Strip and Jericho; later, we will gradually get the remainder of the
territories which were occupied in the June 1967 war” (Gabai, 1993b) In fact, if one compares the
red lines which the Palestinians brought with them to the negotiations at the Madrid Conference
(1991) and their positions at Camp David II (2000), one sees that Arafat has maintained the red
lines which he set for himself and has allowed himself only a very slight degree of flexibility,
compared to the erosion of Israel’s positions.
With regard to the permanent arrangement, the only essential subject on which the Palestinians
showed any flexibility at Camp David II was their willingness to enable Israel to preserve blocs of
settlements in Judea and Samaria, but only to the extent of a very small percentage of the
territories, and in return for alternative territory within the Green Line (territory in the area of the
Halutza Dunes in the Negev). In other words, Arafat has agreed to transform his demand for full
withdrawal to the June 1967 borders into a demand for withdrawal from about 95 percent of the
territories, with an exchange of territories as compensation. With regard to the interim agreement,
whose principles were set forth in the Oslo Agreement, Israel has not succeeded in getting any
flexibility out of Arafat. In this connection, Brigadier General Yaakov Amidror, former head of
the Research Division, Israel Defense Forces Intelligence Corps, stated: “It appears that what we
[the Intelligence Corps] had defined, a year before [the Oslo Agreement], as the conditions
according to which the Palestinians would agree to sign an agreement, is exactly the Oslo
Agreement. We did not manage to move the Palestinians one millimeter away from their red
lines.” Also: “There was a grave feeling of frustration at the fact that it was immediately obvious
that part of what was written in the agreement would not actually take place in the reality of the
Middle East. We immediately brought this evaluation to the attention of the minister of defense”
(Berkovitch, 1998).
Arafat tends to move the struggle onto his own playing field. Analysis of the historical
process that led to the Oslo Agreement indicates that it was not Israel that brought Arafat to Oslo;
rather, it was he who dragged Israel there. Arafat did this by creating a blind alley in the
negotiations in Washington and frustrating the Israeli-American attempt to conduct negotiations
with representatives of the territories. The move to Oslo, from Arafat’s point of view, reflected a
substantial difference in the negotiations, not only with regard to the Israeli and international
recognition granted to himself and to the PLO. In Oslo, Israel agreed, for the first time, to conduct
negotiations on the rights of all Palestinians worldwide (the “right of return”), as opposed to the
negotiations in Washington, where the representatives of the territories were supposed to represent
their own population only. Moreover, in Oslo, Israel consented to conduct negotiations with
regard to the sovereignty over East Jerusalem. This is one of the most impressive historical
achievements attained by Arafat: He succeeded in exploiting the myopia of the Israeli politicians,
who did not give the proper attention to the significance of the Palestinian demand for the “right
of return” and belittled the seriousness of Arafat’s demands in other areas of the permanent
arrangement.
It is now obvious that Israel would have done better to refrain from signing the Oslo
Agreement before the problem of the “right of return” had been solved. This is because the
realization of Arafat’s demands on Israel in this regard amounts to a threat to Israel’s existence. It
should be noted that the division of the negotiations with the Palestinians into two components—
the interim phase and the permanent arrangement—played into Arafat’s hands and reduced the
assets that could be used by Israel for bargaining purposes toward the permanent arrangement.
Arafat deflects the campaign from the political arena to the military arena, according to
his strategic requirements. This is reflected in the transition from the negotiating table at Camp
David II to the battlefield of the Al-Aqsa Intifada. His present-day ability to act against the settlers
in the disputed territories springs, inter alia, from the fact that the Israeli delegation to Oslo agreed
to leave most of the territories in Arafat’s hands, without considering the need to protect those
settlements when a crisis might arise in the negotiations on the permanent arrangement, following
which Arafat would result to terror—as, in fact, he has done.
In conducting the negotiations, Arafat is walking a thin line—and sometimes crossing it.
Arafat considers himself to be better and more shrewd than his opposite numbers and rivals. He is
not afraid to push the envelope to the limit, to change tactics at the last moment, to provoke crises
and go back on his agreed word. His behavior at the negotiating table is characterized by the
creation of crises, in a true “Oriental bazaar” style: creating bargaining sessions in which the party
with the better combination of craft and fortitude wins. At times, Arafat approaches the
negotiations with an attitude of “I have nothing to lose” (Rubinstein, 1995b). Arafat conveys to all
of the other parties to the negotiations—Israel, the United States and international entities—the
message that it is incumbent upon them to appease him; if they don’t, he just won’t play. This is
reflected in his negotiations with Israel. One of his tactics is “leaving the table”: When Arafat is
not satisfied, he walks away from the negotiating table, hoping that the remaining parties, who
want the negotiations to go on, will call him back—or, at least, he threatens to leave the table,
such as, at the Taba negotiations, (Dayan, 1995a; 1995b). Another tactic is “upsetting the
table”—that is, breaking up the negotiations, with a view to changing the rules of the game in his
favor (Perry, 1994). An additional tactic is to suggest that, if he accepts the proposals given to
him, his domestic opponents may have him killed (Horowitz, 2001).
Arafat has been “recycling” the considerations that he promised Israel in the course of
the negotiations. For example, he has promised Israel, again and again, cooperation with the
Palestinians in matters of security and defense—and, again and again, has gone back on his word.
Each time, he has made new demands in return for cooperation. This also applies to the arrest of
members of the opposition (the “revolving door,” for example: Ben-Ziman, 2001; Ya’ari, 1996a)
and other issues.
Arafat is attempting to exploit the “strength of weakness” in the negotiations. The
weakness of the Palestinians vis-a-vis Israel, with its large, strong army and developed
technology, has become one of his principal public relations tools. The strong can and should
defer to the weak, whereas the weak have no possibility of doing so. Arafat uses this tactical
maneuver on both the personal level (“they’re threatening me,” “the opposition will kill me,” “the
people in the street will never accept such a concession,” and so forth) and the national level (“the
Israelis have to understand; they have to give in”).
Arafat always leaves himself an opening for additional demands from Israel. Thus, for
example, he did not agree to complete the interim agreement and to compromise on a “third stage”
of withdrawal. As far as he was concerned, as long as the interim agreement was not completed,
he still had a basis for additional claims, even without bringing up the differences with regard to
the permanent arrangement. This is also what happened at his meeting with then Prime Minister
Ehud Barak at Camp David II: He refused to agree to commit to ending the conflict, even if a
consensus was reached on additional points of the permanent arrangement.
Arafat does not recoil from moves that might endanger his achievements at the
negotiating table. Arafat rejected the proposals advanced by Israel and the United States at Camp
David II and set off the Al-Aqsa Intifada. In so doing, he took the risk that he would lose what had
already been achieved in the negotiations. Today, he is having difficulty explaining to his people
why he sacrificed hundreds of Palestinians in this move; this difficulty makes it harder for him to
reach a decision that will lead to the cessation of violence.
Arafat objects to economic separation from Israel within the framework of the agreement
that will be reached. In a conference on December 5, 1998, in Stockholm, marking the tenth
anniversary of the PLO’s acceptance of the principle of two states, Arafat expressed his objection
to separation between the Israeli economy and the Palestinian economy. As he put it, following
the establishment of the Palestinian state, Israelis and Palestinians would be able to live, work, and
travel freely in all parts of Palestine and Israel, while respecting the law and the sovereignty of
each party. In April 2000, Palestinian sources stated that Arafat had proposed to President Clinton
the establishment of industrial zones common to Israelis and Palestinians within the June 1967
borders. Arafat’s approach to separation reflects his recognition of the dilemma of how the
Palestinians can detach from Israel politically without losing the advantages of Israel’s
economy—in the areas of employment, technology, and markets—that are essential to the
development of the Palestinian economy. At the same time, Arafat’s attitude is also marked by
political positions that are not really concerned with the purely economic aspect, such as his
attempts at achieving rapprochement with Israeli Arabs and free travel between the Gaza Strip and
Judea and Samaria, which he views as a single entity.
In contrast, Muhammad Rashid, Arafat’s economic adviser, is convinced that the Palestinians
also need economic separation. In an interview in Ha’aretz on February 6, 2000, he told the
Israelis: “First of all, we need a fair divorce, and only afterwards, a fair economic marriage.” As
he put it, Israeli politicians are admittedly speaking in terms of the right of separation, and yet, at
lower-level meetings, Israel is offering the Palestinians agreement for unified customs duties and
the establishment of free trade between the two states. In his opinion, these ideas are not
compatible with the requirements of the Palestinian economy. Rashid claims that the high customs
duties of Israel are not in line with the needs of the Palestinians, whose level of income is
significantly lower than that of the Israelis.
In this matter, Arafat has obtained the support of the United States, which is wary of economic
separation, for reasons related to the stability of the Palestinian Authority. Stuart Eisenstadt, the
United States undersecretary of finance, stated in October 1999 that it is important for Israel to
continue along the lines of the steps it has already taken: keeping the border opening, relaxation of
the restrictions on Palestinian foreign trade, and increasing the number of workers from the
territories at the expense of foreign workers (Levin, 1999). In any event, in actual practice, the
Palestinians are planning and implementing a variety of steps that will reduce their economic
dependency on Israel. Such projects are especially prominent in the Gaza Strip: the creation of an
electrical power plant, the development of Gaza Port, the establishment of a cargo terminal at
Gaza Airport, the intention to establish a fuel terminal in Gaza. These projects are important for
Arafat, not only because of their economic contribution, but because they constitute characteristics
of an independent state. Within the framework of the Al-Aqsa Intifada, the Palestinians are
boycotting Israeli goods that have a substitute (local, Arab, or foreign), such as foodstuffs, plastic,
medications and iron (Greenbaum, 2001).
2. Arafat’s strategy with regard to the use of force against Israel

Arafat is trying to grab the stick at both ends. He has chosen the way of political action and
the way of armed struggle at the same time. Arafat’s entry into the Oslo process did not motivate
him to abandon the use of violence, but rather, to choose new tools appropriate to the new
situation. His choice of diplomacy was perceived by him as a strategy for the attainment of his
objectives; when that strategy did not avail, even though for only a limited time, he brought out
the tools of violence. Arafat has two main types of tools of violence. One involves stirring up the
Arab masses—sending mobs of Palestinians out into the streets to clash with the Israel Defense
Forces. The other involves the use of terror—including refusal to cooperate with Israel on security
and defense matters, creating the conditions for terror, encouraging terror by the opposition (e.g.,
the release of Hamas terrorists, giving a “green light” to opposition members; Alon, 2001a), and
even sponsoring acts of terror by his own people (shooting ambushes, explosive charges, mortar
fire, and so forth). The Al-Aqsa Intifada was not the first time that Arafat’s own people have used
terror against Israel. On July 14, 1997, three Palestinian officers were captured; they had been sent
by the head of the Palestinian police, Ghazi Jibali, to launch a shooting attack in the Har Bracha
area (Shaked, 1997).
At the same time, at least until October 2000, Arafat was very careful not to be perceived by
the outside world as being involved in the violence. He set the tools of violence in operation by
means of an “unspoken dialogue”—that is, by giving signs and hints to the Palestinian opposition,
to lead them to understand that terror was permissible. When he began to actively incite terror, he
took pains to make it look like a spontaneous response by the Palestinian masses and looked for
grounds for such action, so as to cast the blame on Israel (such as the events around the Western
Wall Tunnel in September 1996 and Sharon’s ascent of the Temple Mount in September 2000).
Nonetheless, the more he uses the tools of violence, the more obvious his involvement is. In
March 2001, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon told the members of the Mitchell Committee that
“according to information in Israel’s possession, which originates with the intelligence services
and with statements made by senior members of the Authority, Yasir Arafat’s decision to make
use of violence was a strategic decision and was intended to attain political goals” (Hamad, 1998;
Muallem, 2001). In September 2001, Marwan Barghouthi, head of the Tanzim on the West Bank,
called on Arafat to take an open stand at the head of the armed struggle against Israel.
It should be noted that that two-stage strategy (going from violent mass demonstrations to use
of arms) is not new for Arafat, but had already been applied in the first Intifada. In January 1988,
Arafat declared, “The large popular uprising will expand and will take on a form with additional
waves, such that the enemy will not be able to suppress it even with terror and oppressive steps.”
He promised that the PLO would increase the riots in the territories and “in the future, the
residents will use arms against soldiers.” In his words, “Although we haven’t yet used arms during
the uprisings in the occupied land, the Palestinian leadership will take appropriate steps that will
guarantee the escalation of violence against the Zionist occupying forces.” Arafat’s adviser
utilized the same opportunity to say that “Arafat uses a cellular phone to stay in contact with the
youngsters in Gaza and guide them” (Alkabetz and Cohen, 1988). An additional example: On
November 15, 1998, Arafat warned, “Most of us are ready and willing to use arms against anyone
who tries to prevent us from praying in Jerusalem” (Tzezna, 1998).
Arafat’s use of terrorism and his willingness to conduct a violent struggle against Israel over a
period of years has been given ample expression in reports of security agencies in Israel, based on
sources and information collected clandestinely. As early as 1997, army intelligence warned that
the terrorist act at the Apropo restaurant in Tel Aviv in March 1997 was carried out as a result of
the “green light” that Arafat gave to the opposition parties in a meeting that he had had with them
at night (Schiff, 1997). In April 1998, army intelligence warned, “The Palestinian Authority is
prepared for an armed conflict with Israel” (Limor and Granot, 1998). This warning, in fact, came
true. The head of the investigative unit of army intelligence, Brigadier General Amos Gila’ad, at a
conference on national security, clarified that Arafat preferred a political solution, even though he
sparked the violence in the territories. He said that Arafat has not lost control of his actions, and
cynically and intelligently uses terror in an unprecedented way. Gila’ad added that the political
leadership in Israel did not grasp the importance of understanding the other side and did not refer
to the intelligence that predicted the events (Frisch, 2000). In his appearance before the Knesset’s
Security and Foreign Affairs Committee in July 2001, the chief of staff, Major General Shaul
Mofaz, said that the Palestinian Authority has turned into “a terrorist entity.” According to him,
many of those in the Palestinian security organizations take part in the terror and violence against
Israel since the Al-Aksa Intifada began (Alon, 2001b).
General Amos Malka, head of army intelligence, on June 6, 2001, gave this evaluation: “Arafat
prefers to continue the conflict with Israel rather than conduct internal conflicts with the Islamic
opposition parties, as long as he has not been promised a strategic achievement after more than
eight months of fighting.” Malka said that Arafat utilizes terrorism as his primary means of
gaining his objectives. He activates some of the Palestinian organizations directly, and they are
involved in terrorism, while he activates the Islamic organizations indirectly. In his words,
“Arafat is standing with a bomb in his hands. His playing with explosives constitutes a threat to
the region’s stability.” In his evaluation he noted, “After eight months of conflict, there is no end
in sight. Arafat is preparing his people for an extended conflict, even for one hundred years”
(Harel, 2001).
A senior officer in army intelligence who participated in the meeting Knesset’s Security and
Foreign Affairs Committee on May 14, 2001, said that Arafat was ready for a long and continuing
struggle with Israel, and was willing to bequeath the struggle to subsequent generations. Arafat’s
message to his people has been that they are only at the beginning of the fight. The officer added
that Arafat believes that a violent struggle with international support will succeed in bending Israel
and will force the acceptance of his conditions. In his words, “Arafat sees himself as the leader of
the entire Arab people, and not only of the Palestinians. He has no trouble transmitting soothing
messages to his Israeli guests, but, at the same time, the strategic message that he is transmitting to
the entire Palestinian public, is to continue to fight” (Alon, 2001a).
Avi Dichter, head of the General Security Services, said in April 2001 that Arafat’s security
apparatus in Gaza, commanded by Muhammad Dahlan, has turned into a terrorist organization in
every way. According to him, Arafat is not interested in giving orders to stop the violence now,
out of fear that it would weaken his position, and that Israel does not have a partner in the
Palestinian Authority who will prevent terrorism (Harel and Baram, 2001).
Arafat sees the Intifada as a weapon with which to pressure Israel, in order to improve
his position in negotiations and as an instrument to bring about the unilateral withdrawal of
Israel without an agreement. It is likely that his perception has been reinforced as more Israeli
voices have been raised calling for a unilateral withdrawal, and from conclusions drawn from
Hizballah’s success in bringing about Israel’s withdrawal from southern Lebanon in May 2000.
Yet this is not a new perception for Arafat either. At the height of the first Intifada, in 1989, he
said in a statement from Tunisia: “Israel is losing its lines of defense, one after the other, on every
front against the historic conflict with the uprising’s leadership. Accordingly, it will not have a
choice but to withdraw unconditionally from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.” In a statement
then, Arafat called on the Palestinian masses to escalate the uprisings “since we are now in the last
quarter of an hour of victory and of establishing an independent, democratic Palestine” (Ya’ari,
1989).
3. Arafat’s Strategy Concerning World Opinion and Israeli Opinion

Arafat is trying to mobilize world opinion to help him. In this framework, Arafat is
attempting to utilize propaganda levers and manipulation, including exaggeration and lies
concerning Israel’s actions and intentions (see the chapter that deals with analyzing his
personality). Since the outbreak of the Al-Aqsa Intifada, which he himself ignited, he presents
himself to Israeli and world public opinion as a supporter of peace, facing Israel’s cruel attacks
that prevent the Palestinian civilian population from obtaining their basic needs, lacking rescue
and defense - for example, Arafat’s meeting with the Israeli journalist Barnea, (2001c) and with
foreign consuls, (Ya’ari, 1996a). In order to create a negative image for Israel, he doesn’t flinch
from sending children to demonstrate violently against Israel, even when he anticipates the
expected suffering of the Palestinian population from the closures and actions that the IDF will
take.
Arafat attempts to affect the decision-making process in Israel by means of activities
affecting Israeli public opinion. In this matter, Arafat acts in two extreme ways: On the one
hand, he attempts to acquire the trust of the peace camp in Israel by emphasizing the steps he has
taken on the way to peace; on the other hand, Arafat acts to extract a price in Israeli blood in order
to bring about internal pressure on the Israeli leadership, making its position more flexible.
Apparently, Hizballah’s success in Lebanon reinforced this strategy. At the same time, it seems
that Arafat failed, since he did not understand the “red line” of Israeli society beyond which the
society unites and is willing to fight without compromise—for example, the consensus against his
demand to return millions of Palestinians to Israel in the framework of the “right of return” and its
resolved opposition to violence and terror.
In the matter of the “right of return,” Arafat acted late and in an unconvincing way to pacify
the Israeli public. For example, when Nachum Barnea asked him (June 2001) if there can be an
overall agreement without a million refugees using their right to return, Arafat told him a story
about Belize, a country in Central America. According to him, the prime minister of Belize is a
member of the Shumaan family, the Palestinian equivalent to the Rothschild family, from Beit
Hanina. “Do you think that Shumaan will leave Belize, and return to Beit Hanina?” Arafat asked.
After that, he took from his pocket a newspaper clipping reporting that most of the new
immigrants to Israel are not Jewish and said to Barnea, “How do you think we feel when hundreds
of thousands of non-Jews are allowed to immigrate to Israel? I believe that in the framework of the
overall agreement, creative solutions will be found for all of the things mentioned in Oslo:
Jerusalem, settlements, borders, army areas, water, refugees. With goodwill, an agreement will be
reached” (Barnea, 2001c).
Concerning violence and terror, Arafat did not take into account the negative ramifications of
the Al-Aqsa Intifada on the Israeli left, although there were expressions of it in many Israeli
surveys and in articles by political journalists. In an interview on Israeli television’s Channel Two,
on the eve of the Israeli elections, he quoted that the surveys showed that most of the adult Israeli
population supports peace, without understanding the change in Israeli public opinion. His lack of
understanding of Israeli society can be explained by his tremendous distance (both personally and
politically) from democracy and the democratic system. Arafat was never in his life exposed, not
even for a short time, to life in a democratic society. His personality traits are very far from a
democratic outlook and from understanding the complex dialectics of this type of system. At the
same time, Arafat is aided by important Arab Israelis, who advise him on how to act toward the
Israeli public and its institutions. His demands after the elections in Israel—to continue the
negotiations from the point where they had stopped—evidences his lack of understanding of the
changes in Israeli society. Only quite a while after the change of government in Israel did Arafat
understand that he had lost the trust of a large part of the Israeli public. In an interview with
Barnea in June 2001, he answered positively to the question of whether he was convinced that he
had lost the support of Israeli public opinion. “Yes,” he said, “I am not happy with that, and would
like to change it. I hope that most Israelis still want peace. Those igniting the fire are the settlers,
and they are the minority” (Barnea, 2001c).
Arafat identifies the arguments and disagreements in Israeli society as a clear sign of its
weakness and tries to take advantage of them for his benefit. This understanding contributes
to his demands becoming more extreme, since he assumes that weakness will bring about
flexibility in Israeli positions and in the end will tilt the balance into Palestinian hands. For
example, among those close to him, Yasir Arafat brags that he already “sees a picture of the
future.” He speaks of the “demographic decline” that Israel is in, and promises those loyal to him
that over time, large cracks will open up in the strong wall facing him. Only “a little patience,” he
said at the end of his speech on Nachba Day (Yaari, 2001). The obvious disagreement in Israeli
society that Arafat identifies concerns the continued Israeli control of the territories. The
impression is, therefore, that Arafat prefers to allow and even encourage terrorist acts against the
settlers and IDF forces in the territories over terrorist acts against the Israeli population within the
green line, even though he does not prevent the latter either.
Arafat attempts to influence the decision-making process in Israel through Israeli Arabs.
This is not new. For example: In May 1995, Member of Knesset Abdulwahab Darawshe from the
Mada Party (United Arab List) argued that “Yasir Arafat is not interested in torpedoing the
negotiations with Israel, and so requested of the Mada Party that we not raise or discuss the no-
confidence proposal on the issue of expropriation of land in Jerusalem.” According to Darawshe,
he spoke with Arafat’s bureau director, Dr. Ramzi Houri, who clarified that, despite Arafat’s anger
about the expropriation of land in Jerusalem, he was not interested in toppling the Israeli
government, as that might bring about a pause in the negotiations on continuing to implement the
Oslo Accords (Baron and Regev, 1995).
4. Arafat’s Strategy Concerning Foreign Countries

Arafat cooperates with the United States out of an awareness of its power and its
influence on Israel and on Arab countries, but strives to limit its involvement. From Arafat’s
position as an untouchable in the United States during the Gulf War, he transformed himself into a
desirable visitor to the White House during the Clinton presidency. He even persuaded the U.S.
government to go quite a distance in the direction of the Palestinian position during the political
process. At the time, he succeeded in convincing the Americans of his striving for peace. For
example, during Secretary of State Albright’s visit to the Palestinian Authority, he said, “Peace is
not only a Palestinian need, but an Israeli and international necessity. We have to continue the
discussions toward peace, with the aim of protecting our children and grandchildren” (Atlas, 1998;
Druker, 1998).
At the same time, Clinton’s ability to influence Arafat turned out to be limited. Despite the
heavy pressure that Clinton put on Arafat during Camp David II, Arafat was not flexible at all.
Apparently, Arafat did not have a lot of trust in Clinton, in light of his [Clinton’s] perceived
preference for the Israeli side, the difference in mentalities between the two, the age gap, and
Arafat’s perception of Clinton as being temporary and soon-to-be-replaced in government, as is
every leader of a democratic country. Arafat’s position in the United States worsened with the
change of government in Washington, and Clinton himself sobered up concerning Arafat’s
personality. At a party in the Manhattan home of Richard Holbrook, the previous U.S.
representative to the UN, former President Clinton candidly told of his frustration over the
collapse of the Middle East peace process: “Three days before I left office, Yasir Arafat called me
to say goodbye. ‘You’re an outstanding person,’ Arafat said to me. ‘Is that what you think?’ I
answered him. ‘I’m a giant failure and you turned me into that.’” Clinton added that he told Arafat
that Barak’s proposal was the best peace proposal that the Palestinians could ever achieve, and
that, by refusing the proposal, Arafat only guaranteed the election of Sharon as prime minister.
Clinton defined Arafat as an aging leader who lives with the sense of being a victim and is
incapable of reaching a final peace agreement. “He was only able to reach stage five when he had
to get to stage ten,” Clinton summarized. In Clinton’s opinion, the negotiations failed due to the
Palestinian demand for the right of return, because Arafat continued to talk about large numbers of
refugees who would be allowed to return to Israel (Yediot Aharonot, 2001).
Arafat attempts to turn the Israeli-Palestinian conflict into an international matter. In this
framework, Arafat strives to reduce the dominance of the United States in the political process. He
tries to do this by introducing European brokers, pressuring to include UN observers or observers
from foreign countries to the territories, etc. All of this is designed, in his view, to balance the
asymmetry of the U.S. support for Israel. He demands bringing in international forces to narrow
Israel’s freedom of action and to gnaw away at its sovereignty in the territories.
In the framework of his efforts to enlist forces in his favor, Arafat tries to involve the
Arab countries in the conflict with Israel. Arafat uses manipulative levers with leaders of Arab
nations as well, knowing that bloody riots in the territories and Palestinian calls for Arab help will
start internal ferment in Jordan and Egypt that will require their leaders to get in line with his
position. This is his principal pressure mechanism on them. Toward the Arab world and the
Islamic world, Arafat emphasizes the struggle over Jerusalem, considered to be the third holiest
site in Islam. It should be noted that this, too, is not new in Arafat’s strategy. In August 1989 he
said in Amman at the ceremony opening the office of the National Palestinian Fund, which funded
the Intifada, that his organization would continue the jihad until his flag flies above the Al-Aqsa
Mosque and the city of Jerusalem, capital of the democratic Palestinian state (Ha’aretz, 1989).
5. Arafat’s Strategy in the Palestinian Arena

Arafat takes into account the force that the Palestinian street exerts upon him. Arafat is
well aware of the winds blowing through Palestinian public opinion. In the year 2001, public
opinion became more extreme as a result of its disappointment with the peace process and the
continued confrontation with Israel, and the ramifications for the Palestinian population’s daily
life (see similar evaluation by Friedman, 2001). Arafat identifies pictures of Iraqi president
Saddam Hussein and the Hizballah’s flags among the Palestinian masses and understands that he
cannot swim against the stream. The IDF’s unilateral withdrawal from southern Lebanon
evidently hardened his position, since among the Palestinian population, it raised the question: If
Nasrallah can bring about the withdrawal of the IDF with an organization of 600 fighters, why
can’t Arafat? Hizballah’s demand to release Palestinian prisoners, in the framework of
negotiations over prisoners of war with Israel, exposes his helplessness and strengthens the
opposition. Saddam Hussein’s struggle for survival against the United States, which constitutes a
source of pride and identification on the Palestinian street, also makes it difficult for Arafat.
Saddam reinforces his image among the Palestinian public by means of material aid to the families
of suicide bombers and threats to attack Israel. Possibly, if the pressure on Iraq intensifies, Arafat
might harden his positions and even aggravate the confrontation to satisfy his people.
At the same time, Arafat can certainly go against the stream in the Palestinian camp. This
happens when he is convinced that it will promote the achievement of his objective, the
establishment of a Palestinian state, and that, in the end, the majority of the Palestinian public will
recognize the correctness of his position and his great wisdom. An example of his independent
action was his signing of the Oslo Accords, which were not supported by the majority of PLO
members and the Palestinian public. In other words, Arafat can make decisions concerning the
peace process, even if they are not supported by the majority in public opinion surveys. It must be
further noted that Arafat has no opposition on the left, calling for him to compromise and
accelerate the peace process, but only an opposition demanding that he harden his position
opposing Israel. In all likelihood this fact, too, contributes to his hardening positions.
Arafat uses policies of divide-and-conquer among his people. Arafat has not appointed an
heir or successor to himself, and makes sure to divide foci of power, so that, as a result of the
multiple foci in the Palestinian Authority, he better controls the whole. For example, control of the
various security forces is divided between “foreign” and “internal” leadership, and there is a clear
separation between control of the security apparatus in Gaza and control of the security apparatus
in Judea and Samaria. Arafat maximally utilizes his administrative control by calling into session
the various leaderships of the Palestinians, Al Fatah, and the Palestinian Authority, to assist him in
making decisions. Thus, for example, Arafat will not call a Palestinian forum into session without
having a majority that supports his decision, and will seek the forum and timing most appropriate
for his needs. In its time, that was how he got the Oslo Accords approved.
Arafat ensures the personal profits of people close to him. The economic activities of part of
the economy are conducted via monopolies handed over to high-ranking figures in the Authority.
The most blatant among these beneficiaries is Muhammad Rashid, Arafat’s economic adviser,
who manages his investments and those of the Authority. Together with Ramzi Houri, Arafat’s
bureau chief, Rashid directs the Al-Bahar company, which controls the cement, steel, and sand
monopolies in the Authority. Together with Hassan Atzpour, a member of the negotiating team
and Arafat’s adviser, Rashid is a partner in the firm that operates the gas monopoly. Jamil Tripi, in
charge of the Ministry of Citizens Affairs, is an owner of a building contracting and quarries
company and sells cars. Mohammed Abass (Abu Mazen) is the owner of the Sky advertising
company and of import-export agencies. Ahmed Kria (Abu A’la) is the importer of Marlboro
cigarettes and canned goods. Maher Al Matzri, minister of economics, is the owner of gas stations
and imports cars. Munrad Tzalach, minister of higher education, is a food importer in the West
Bank. Nabil Abu Radina, Arafat’s adviser is a partner with Soha in a company that imports cloth
and pharmaceuticals, and has the exclusive license to import a number of pharmaceuticals. Jibril
Rajub, head of security in the West Bank, owns a farm in the Jericho region, gets commissions
from the casino in Jericho, and is responsible for insuring the safe transport of gas. Rajub collects
a tax from the gas stations, a regular percentage of their sales. Mahmud Dahlan, commander of the
security forces in Gaza, owns many businesses in Gaza (Greenbaum, 2000; 2001). An
investigation published in Newsweek in May disclosed, “Top-ranking ministers fill their offices
with ‘their own people,’ distribute fat contracts without supervision or control, and establish their
own monopolies that crush competing companies and raise prices for the consumer.” Moreover,
“The courts are powerless, since Arafat ignores uncomfortable verdicts. His fourteen police units,
each one functioning separately, meant to protect the average Palestinian, unlawfully enforce the
wishes of the Authority’s officials” (Dagoni, 2000).
Arafat avoids direct confrontation with the opposition. He perceives himself as a leader of
all the Palestinians, above differences in opinion and outlook. Therefore, he tries to avoid, as
much as possible, direct clashes and conflicts with those in opposition, as long as they do not
directly threaten his rule. One can assume that only when he is forced to choose between
continuing his rule and conflict with the opposition will he try to reach an agreement or a
compromise as quickly as possible—after he proves that he is the leader. In addition, Arafat needs
the terror that the opposition organizations conduct as a bargaining card in negotiations with Israel
and to strengthen the Palestinian military effort. With that, Arafat is aware that opposition
organizations harm Palestinian interests, especially when the Palestinians stand to gain something
from Israel. For example: in November 1998, Arafat warned the terrorist organizations, “Do not
do anything that will give Israel an excuse to prevent implementation of the Wye agreement. Do
not allow them to get involved in our arena” (Tzezna, 1998). Due to his unwillingness to confront
the opposition and as a result of his needing them, Arafat has avoided real security cooperation
with Israel. An example of the PA’s and Arafat’s cynical disregard for acts of terror and scorn for
fulfilling the agreements for cooperation was their reaction to the terrorist act at the Dolphinarium.
Israel passed on the names of the Hamas members who sent the suicide bomber to the Palestinian
Authority. The Authority invited them in for a discussion and released them with a warning not to
do anything similar. Thus Arafat makes fools of Israel and America. None of this would have
taken place without his approval. Administratively, he makes sure he confuses and controls his
representatives on the High Security Commission. Each one of his senior representatives are
separately responsible directly to Arafat, and he thus prevents real cooperation between them
(Schiff, 2001b).
IV. Summary of the Features of Arafat’s Strategy
Party Features of Arafat’s Action

1. The Israeli Government Arafat wants to have his cake and eat it: he chooses a strategy
of political negotiation or a strategy of violence and terrorism,
according to his strategic needs and the chances of achieving
success from his perspective.
2. Israeli Public Opinion He maintains a manipulative line of propaganda, especially
vis-a-vis the left. He presents himself as a peace lover, but at
the same time employs violent measures.
3. Israeli Arabs He integrates them into the Palestinian camp and utilizes their
help to influence Israeli positions.
4. The United States He tries to bring the U.S. administration closer to his
positions, but strives to reduce American dominance in the
negotiations, because of its support for Israel.
5. Western Europe and the He works to strengthen their support for him and to involve
United Nations them as much as possible in the conflict with Israel, in order
to reduce the influence of the U.S. and to put obstacles in
Israel’s path.
6. World Public Opinion He implements propaganda moves and manipulates the
dissemination of information to advance Palestinian interests
7. Heads of the Palestinian Arafat uses tactics of “divide and rule,” granting economic
Authority benefits to his associates to retain their loyalty.
8. Palestinian Public Arafat takes into account the trends of public opinion as
Opinion expressed by the Arab man-on-the-street, but almost totally
ignores the economic distress of the population. He regards
this as a necessary sacrifice in the short term for the sake of
important political gains in the long run. He also encourages
the incitement of the population through the media and the
educational system.
9. Opposition Arafat is helped by opposition organizations to act against
Organizations Israel, but he warns them not to harm his own interests. He
refrains, as much as possible, from confronting them, but will
go to war on them if they endanger his rule or his strategic
objectives.
10. The Arab States Arafat is active in recruiting financial and political support
through the application of pressure on Arab leaders and by
indirect threats (mainly toward Egypt and Jordan) of arousing
the Arab street. He often stresses the struggle over Jerusalem
to harness the Arab and Islamic worlds to help him achieve
his ends.
V. Conclusions
1. Arafat may return to the course of negotiations when he sees that he cannot expect any
benefits from continuing the violent struggle. Therefore, Arafat must not be allowed to gain any
political achievement as a result of his violent measures. The use of violence to advance his aims
will continue to be part of Arafat’s behavioral repertoire in the future, and he will make more
frequent use of this tactic if he feels he can achieve anything in this way.
2. Spectacular military operations—such as air strikes, massive fire directed at targets in the
areas of the Palestinian Authority, etc.—have a limited effect on Arafat. He knows the limitations
of Israel’s power and in situations of confrontation feels at his best, tends to take risks, and is
willing to make sacrifices, more so than in normal circumstances. Many pinpointed actions have a
better chance of being effective, because they undermine Arafat’s sense of being in control of the
situation.
3. Economic pressure on the population—such as closures or cutting off the water and
electrical supply—will not have any significant effect on Arafat, because he has no problem in
making sacrifices and will be better able to present the distress of the Palestinian population to the
eyes of the world. Moreover, the distress of the Palestinian population encourages Arafat to
harden his position and to develop expectations that the sufferings of the population will lead to
international intervention, which is in his interest.
4. Economic pressure on Arafat in the form of withholding of tax funds collected by Israel
and curtailment of foreign aid have an effect on Arafat, if they continue over a long period. Money
is one of the means through which Arafat wields control. These funds constitute the major bulk of
the financial resources of the Palestinian Authority and are required to finance the work of
administration and the security forces. In contrast to military closures in the territories, Arafat will
find it difficult to demonstrate the damage resulting from a shortage of these funds to the
Palestinian people. At the same time, it should be taken into account that a severe damage to the
security organs is liable to undermine the stability of the Palestinian Authority.
5. It is possible to influence Arafat through Hosni Mubarak, the Egyptian president. Mubarak
is his main partner for dialogue, being a determined Arab leader of the same age as Arafat who
goes along with the Palestinian strategy of attaining Palestinian objectives by means of the
political process. Mubarak may provide legitimacy to Arafat’s concessions on certain issues, but
in many cases it was he who was behind the toughening of the Palestinian position in the
negotiations. For example, in the negotiations Arafat conducted with the Barak government at the
end of its term of office, President Mubarak made it clear to Arafat that he had no right to make
concessions on Jerusalem, because the city was holy to all Arabs and Moslems (Mubarak boasted
of this in a speech before students, which was broadcast on Egyptian television on August 28,
2001).
Arafat is also capable of identifying with Saddam Hussein, the Iraqi president, whom he
perceives as an exemplary model of a proud and staunch Arab with the ability to be steadfast.
Abdullah, the Jordanian king, and Bashar Assad, the president of Syria, have minor influence over
Arafat because of their young age and the residue of the past history of the relations between their
states and the Palestinians. At the same time, Abdullah’s position on the issue of Jerusalem could
have an effect on Arafat. Therefore, if President Mubarak and King Abdullah were to support a
compromise on the Temple Mount, this would make it much easier for Arafat to compromise.
6. American pressure alone will not bring Arafat to change his position on essential issues
(e.g., Jerusalem, the right of return, etc.). Apparently, Arafat’s attitude toward President Bush is
not very different from his ambivalent attitude toward President Clinton. Arafat prefers that the
representatives of the UN and Western European countries that support him should have places
around the negotiating table so as to weaken the American hegemony in the negotiations.
7. It is best not to utilize ultimatums in dealings with Arafat, and especially not a public
ultimatum. Arafat feels that such a demand damages his honor and is intended to humiliate him.
Therefore, there are limited chances that he will give in to an Israeli ultimatum, especially if made
public. In circumstances in which he feels his position weak, he is liable to try to work within the
gray area of the ultimatum to erode it. Therefore, it would be desirable to signal to Arafat if there
is no choice—to convey the ultimatum to him discreetly. Alternatively, it would be worthwhile to
employ a completely businesslike strategy in dealing with Arafat: “As you give, so you shall
receive,” or to present him with an equation: “If you give X, you shall receive Y”— and then
allow him to make the choice on his own.
8. It would be advisable to deal with Arafat respectfully and to demonstrate gestures of
goodwill toward him that have a bearing on his personal status. Such gestures have an effect on
his state of mind and feed his desire to be honored and to receive recognition. At the same time, he
will not make concessions on essential issues in return for such gestures.
9. The negotiation regarding the permanent settlement should be based on a final and
conclusive agreement that will not enable Arafat to make any further strategic demands from
Israel. At the same time, Arafat probably needs a longer period of time to digest the essential
issues, such as a solution to the problem of the Temple Mount and the termination of the conflict,
and to come to terms with not being able to make more demands on Israel. Therefore, if the
negotiations resume, Israel must not assert pressure upon him to reach a decision quickly, but at
the same time must not give him any more significant interim concessions, because the leverage
remaining for bargaining with him in the future might be too short to persuade him to sign an
agreement acknowledging the termination of the conflict.
10. It would be reasonable to assume that Arafat will not concede Palestinian sovereignty over
the Temple Mount. Arafat’s insistence on receiving sovereignty over East Jerusalem stems from
his vision of establishing the Palestinian capital there as he promised, and also from his wish to be
an important leader in the eyes of the Arab, Islamic, and Christian worlds. Apparently, Arafat is
not prepared to go down in history as the one who gave up the Temple Mount. At the same time, it
should not be ruled out that Arafat would agree to a compromise formula on the issue of
sovereignty over the Temple Mount (joint sovereignty, division of the area so that the mosques
will remain within his sovereignty), on condition that this arrangement be acceptable to the major
leaders of the Arab world, such as Mubarak.
11. How will Arafat react if Israel implements a unilateral disengagement, meaning
withdrawal from most of the territories under its control without arriving at an agreement,
entailing an evacuation of a large number of settlements? It can be assumed that in the wake of a
unilateral withdrawal Arafat will instruct the Palestinian Authority to take control of all the areas
that are vacated, and afterwards he might make a unilateral proclamation of an independent
Palestinian state. Arafat might assume that Israel, in relinquishing its responsibility for the
territories and for the Palestinian residents, would not be able to oppose the declaration and that he
[Arafat] would be accorded overwhelming international support for a Palestinian state. It would be
reasonable to assume that in these circumstances, Arafat would not agree to return to negotiations
with Israel under present terms, but would insist on an equal status of state vis-a-vis state—in
other words, the Palestinians would claim all the rights pertaining to an independent state, such as
the right to self-defense, water rights, etc. This would enable the Palestinian state to form an army,
maintain diplomatic relations, make treaties, and maybe even enter defense treaties with various
states including Iraq, Iran, and Libya.
12. Despite the withdrawal, Arafat would not rest as long as the core disputed issues of the
negotiations were not resolved: sovereignty over the Temple Mount, the law of return, borders,
and settlements (any not vacated in a unilateral withdrawal). Therefore, the struggle would not be
terminated by unilateral withdrawal. In these circumstances, Israel’s situation would be
complicated and even more problematic. Various Palestinian organizations, such as Hamas,
Islamic Jihad, the Tanzim, and the Palestinian security forces would continue to attack Israel and
targets within the territories. In addition to squads infiltrating Israeli territory, terrorist elements
would also be active in the utilization of artillery, antitank missiles, and anti-aircraft missiles. In
the wake of such actions, Israel would be liable to wage war against the Palestinian state, which
would then be a sovereign state and a member of the UN, and thus Israel would be exposed to
international pressure and maybe even sanctions. Following such an Israeli withdrawal, Arafat
would claim to have won an overpowering military victory over Israel, unprecedented in the
history of the Arab nation. This would have negative repercussions on the chances of terminating
the Arab-Israeli conflict by political means at a future date. It would reduce the motivation of the
Arab world to arrive at a peace agreement with Israel; the peace agreements with Egypt and
Jordan would be further compromised and the strength of the opposition within the Arab world
would be increased. Therefore, in contrast to a unilateral disengagement, it would be better for
Israel to wait until the appropriate conditions prevail to enable the implementation of an agreed-
upon disengagement—in other words, disengagement in accordance with a political agreement
with the Palestinians, either a permanent or a partial agreement. In the meantime Israel could put
into place a barrier between Israel and the territories, with the IDF continuing to maintain control
over the territories (except for the territory of the Palestinian Authority), as an interim step until a
political agreement can be reached. This might continue, except for changes in the deployment of
settlements and military bases on the basis of tactical considerations.
13. Arafat’s policy of “divide and rule” has prevented the creation of an alternative
leadership. Against this background, and due to the multiplicity of forces active in the Palestinian
arena, it is necessary to take into account the possibility of the eruption of a crisis in the
Palestinian leadership, especially if Arafat suddenly descends from the stage.
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Tzezna, S. (1998). Arafat: We Will Defend Jerusalem with Guns. Ma’ariv, November 16, p. 9.
Verter, Y. (1994). Losing Height. Ma’ariv, September 12, p. 8-11.
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May 19, p. 7.
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Yaari, E. (2001). More or Less. Globes, May 17, p. 68.

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November 23, p. 75-76 .
Yasir Arafat: Identities in Conflict
By Prof. Jerrold Post
A consummate survivor, throughout his revolutionary career, Palestinian leader Yasir Arafat
has led with his finger squarely in the wind, extremely sensitive to the tide of public opinion.
While he has consistently espoused the goal of an independent Palestinian state, an examination of
his career suggests that his highest priority has been securing his role as the leader of the unified
Palestinian resistance. On any number of occasions, by recognizing Israel’s right to exist, Arafat
could have placed unbearable international pressure on Israel for the creation of a Palestinian
entity, but Arafat’s wish to be the leader of the unified Palestinian resistance, in effect, vetoed the
absolutism of the extremist wing of the Palestinian movement.
But this was to change in 1992. When Arafat’s plane crashed in the Libyan Desert on April 4, it
was initially feared that the PLO leader had been killed. He was found the next day, dazed, by the
wreck of the private plane in which his pilot has been killed. In June, suffering from severe
headaches, he was rushed to King Hussein Hospital in Amman, Jordan, for emergency
neurosurgery to remove two blood clots pressing on the brain, a life-threatening result of the
trauma sustained eight weeks earlier. It was after this event that he entered into the secret
negotiations that were to result in the Oslo Accords, beginning the peace process that culminated
with the Wye River accords. Having confronted his mortality, and seeing that his time was
limited, he resolved to take an unprecedented step to achieve his goal of a Palestinian state, to
ensure his place in history, to ensure that history books would record Yasir Arafat as the father of
the Palestinian nation. In the process, he not only won the Nobel Peace Prize, but also incurred the
enmity of the absolutist extremist wing of the Palestinian movement for selling out the cause (for
an analysis of the effects of serious and terminal illness upon political behavior, see Robins and
Post, 1997).
The task of leading a nation in embryo is very different from leading a resistance movement
against an occupying state. When the revolution has succeeded, few revolutionary leaders succeed
in leading their new-born nations, for the leadership tasks and abilities of leading a group in
opposition against the hated enemy are very different from those required by a nation-builder. To
rouse a group against the hated establishment is very different from becoming the establishment.
Few have succeeded in making this transition—Fidel Castro being an exception to this general
rule, but Castro’s success in fending off criticism of his internal leadership has been graciously
facilitated by the U.S. economic embargo, which has permitted Castro to continue to be able to
externalize, pointing the finger of blame at the enemies in the north for his internal problems.
Arafat has not made this transition well. He has continued to demonstrate an autocratic
leadership style more congenial to a fighting revolutionary, and has been criticized by moderate
Palestinian leaders for not developing a more participatory democracy, as he strives to develop the
infrastructure. Moreover, in dealing with the negotiations during the peace process, he continued
to be absolutist in his demands, not offering any compromise in response to the extreme flexibility
shown by Israel’s Prime Minister Barak. Further, as Barak was preparing the Israeli public for the
necessity to make painful concessions and compromises to achieve the long-desired peace, Arafat
was not in parallel way preparing the Palestinian public to compromise. To the contrary, he
continued to maintain a public posture that total satisfaction of Palestinian demands for East
Jerusalem as a capital, control over the holy sites, and the right of return, the most difficult of the
issues that are in play, would be required.
At Camp David II, agreement was tantalizingly close. But Arafat’s refusal to offer any
reciprocal response to Barak’s major concessions ultimately doomed the talks to failure, although,
in the long run, putting into play the previously taboo issues of Jerusalem and the right of return
was a major accomplishment for Arafat.
And now, sadly, we are again in a state of violent conflict, a major step backward from the
accomplishments of recent years.. Shelving his Nobel medal, Arafat once again exhorts
Palestinian youth to “fight for Jerusalem” and praises the youthful “martyrs” who have lost their
lives in the conflict. It is as if “the leader of the unified Palestinian resistance” template is his
default position. Ominously, Arafat has released from Palestinian prisons radical members of
Hamas and the Islamic Jihad, some of whom were responsible for the wave of terrorist attacks in
the mid-90s, when a suicide bombing campaign claimed 57 lives in 1996. Arafat has now brought
a number of these leaders into a decision-making committee to plan and coordinate the violent
protest, leading to fear in Israel of a new wave of terrorist attacks. Despite repeated pleas to seek
to constrain the violence, Arafat has not done so, placing the entirety of the blame upon Israel,
justifying Palestinian violence in terms of a legitimate response to the Israeli occupation and
disproportionate violence by the Israeli military, with no acknowledgment of Palestinian
participation in the cycle of violence. Once again, in this competition for victimhood, each side
justifies its violence as a required response to the aggression of the other. It may be, however, that
having unleashed the genie of violence, Arafat is afraid that calls for restraint would now go
unheeded, betraying the weakness of his leadership position.
When missiles rained upon Arafat’s headquarters in Ramallah in response to a wave of suicide
bombings in which 30 were killed, Arafat was reported to be euphoric. Once again, he was in his
favored position, the underdog, the innocent victim, calling out to the international community for
support against the Israeli aggression, despite his role in precipitating the attack. His dominant
identity as leader of the unified resistance was once again firmly in place.
Arafat is ill and nearing the end of his career. In November 1998, after a conference celebrating
the twentieth anniversary of Camp David at Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, with original
participants in the Camp David negotiations, we traveled under armed guard to Arafat’s
headquarters in the occupied territories to have an audience with Arafat. While I knew he had been
ailing and was suffering from Parkinson’s disease, I was shocked by his appearance. His eyes
deeply sunk in his head, he appeared exhausted, and displayed a major tremor around his mouth.
Yet, when he spoke, his rhetoric was fiery, as he indicated, “I have kept my promises. The reason
for the failure of the peace negotiations is him, Netanyahu. He cannot be trusted and has broken
his promises.” (We then had an audience with Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu, who apparently
had the same speechwriter, for he stated, “I have kept my promises. He [referring to Arafat]
cannot be trusted and has broken his promises.”)
The ill-fitting garb of peacemaker has been replaced by the much more familiar battle
fatigues of the revolutionary fighter. Can Arafat again return to the path of peace? Each morning
as Arafat looks into the mirror, and is confronted with his aging tremulous visage, he is reminded
that his time is short and that his goal of achieving a Palestinian state has not yet been
accomplished. Thus for Arafat, two clocks are ticking. While the auguries are pessimistic at the
present time, in that career-long wish to be the father of the Palestinian state lies the hope that
Arafat will yet move back from the brink and return to the role of peacemaker.
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Yasir Arafat: Psychological Proﬁle and Strategic Analysis

Book · January 2002

Shaul Kimhi Shemuel Even

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Psychological Profile and Strategic Analysis

Dr. Shaul Kimhi

The International Policy Institute for Counterterrorism

The Interdisciplinary Center, Herzliya

The American Jewish Committee

About the Authors

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ......................................................................................................................... 5

Psychological Profile and Strategic Analysis

5. On the Verge of the Realization of the Dream....................................................................... 311

YASIR ARAFAT: IDENTITIES IN CONFLICT

PSYCHOLOGICAL PROFILE AND STRATEGIC ANALYSIS

Shaul Kimhi and Shemuel Even

Methodology: Behavioral Analysis

2. Independence at All Costs

4. Need to Demonstrate Excellence and Superiority

6. Authenticity: Dramatic ability, double-talk, exaggerations, and lies

7. Symbol of the Palestinian Revolution

8. Honor Above All

10. Determination and Tenacity of Purpose, Ability to Survive

II. Characteristics of Arafat’s Functioning

3. Lifestyle and Work Habits

4. Health and Age

5. Functioning under Pressure

III. Leadership Style

3. Personal Appointments and the Policy of Divide-and-Conquer

4. Establishment of Dual and Triple Governmental Systems

5. Global Air Travel: “The Frequent-Flyer Club Member”

IV. Developmental Background and General Psychological Hypotheses

1. A Difficult Childhood: An Orphan

2. Betrayal and Sense of Victimization

3. Arafat as a Survivor: In Constant Struggle

5. On the Verge of Realization of the Dream

6. Summary of Personality Attributes

Strategic Analysis of Arafat

I. Is Arafat a Strategist or a Leader Acting on Instinct?

II. The Basic Premises of Arafat’s Strategy

III. Characteristics of Arafat’s Strategy

1. Arafat’s strategy in political negotiations with Israel

2. Arafat’s strategy with regard to the use of force against Israel

3. Arafat’s Strategy Concerning World Opinion and Israeli Opinion

4. Arafat’s Strategy Concerning Foreign Countries

5. Arafat’s Strategy in the Palestinian Arena

IV. Summary of the Features of Arafat’s Strategy

Party Features of Arafat’s Action

Aichner, A. (2001). Israel Destroyed the Hope. Yediot Aharonot, July 1, p. 2.

Granot, A. (1993b). Arafat: Was He Derailed? Ma’ariv, December 17, p. 10-11.

Greenbaum, L. (2000). Arafat’s Corrupted People,” Globes, November 23, p. 4.

Yaari, E. (2001). More or Less. Globes, May 17, p. 68.

Yasir Arafat: Identities in Conflict

By Prof. Jerrold Post

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