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Review Essay: China’s Engagement in Cyberspace

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Review Essay

China’s Engagement Journal of Asian Security

and International Affairs
in Cyberspace 3(2) 245–259
2016 SAGE Publications India
Private Limited
SAGE Publications
sagepub.in/home.nav
DOI: 10.1177/2347797016645456
http://aia.sagepub.com

Francis C. Domingo1,2

William C. Hannas, James Mulvenon and Anna B. Puglisi. 2013. Chinese Industrial Espionage:
Technology Acquisition and Military Modernization. New York, USA: Routledge. 302 pp.
ISBN 978-041-582-1421.
Greg Austin. 2014. Cyber Policy in China. Cambridge & Malden, MA: Polity Press. 232 pp.
ISBN: 978-0-7456-6979-3.
Jon R. Lindsay, Tai Ming Cheung and Derek S. Reveron (Eds.). 2015. China and Cybersecurity:
Espionage, Strategy, and Politics in the Digital Domain. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
398 pp. ISBN: 9780190201265.

Introduction
The emergence of cyber-enabled technologies has profoundly influenced the inter-
actions between different actors in the international system. Networked computers
have allowed for transactions that are more efficient in global commerce, civil
society and government services but have also created unique challenges that affect
the national security of states. The dilemma of how to gain advantages from cyber-
space is more pronounced in the case of China, which has one of the fastest growing
Internet economies and a regional power with comprehensive military capabilities in
the cyber domain (Lindsay, 2015a, p. 1). Furthermore, the discourse on China and
cybersecurity has generally been confounded with different issues such as political
censorship, unfair competition and Internet governance that involve similar informa-
tion technologies but do not necessarily conform to the same dynamics and strategic
logic (Lindsay, 2015b, p. 7). Despite these nuances, concerns about China’s compe-
titive advantage in cyberspace as well as increasing fears about massive attacks
against digital infrastructures continue to aggravate the mistrust and confusion
between China and other powerful states in cyberspace (Brito & Watkins, 2011).
In this context, the three books reviewed in this essay offer different perspec-
tives regarding China’s engagement in cyberspace. Chinese Industrial Espionage

1
De La Salle University, Manila, Philippines.
2
University of Nottingham, United Kingdom.

Corresponding author:
Francis C. Domingo, De La Salle University, Manila, Philippines.
E-mail: francis.domingo@dlsu.edu.ph

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246 Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs 3(2)

takes a critical perspective by emphasizing the role of espionage in diminishing the

technological advantages of the United States. Cyber Policy in China follows a
moderate viewpoint by highlighting the value of leadership values and ethics
in influencing the development of an information society in China. Meanwhile,
China and Cybersecurity provides a balanced contribution by presenting a range of
contending views that highlight the strengths and vulnerabilities of China’s utiliza-
tion of cyberspace. While each work explores a specific aspect of China’s cyber
activities, the books, considered collectively, contribute to the limited knowledge
regarding the methods and objectives of China in establishing itself as a dominant
actor in the cyber environment.
This essay contributes to the literature on cybersecurity and China in two
ways. First, it discusses the dominant discourses that influence the existing litera-
ture. Second, it reviews the scholarly quality of the three books and explicates
how these works are located within the main discourses in literature. The essay
consists of four sections and a conclusion. The next section discusses the major
themes that shape the literature on cybersecurity and China. The subsequent three
sections review the books individually and discuss the contribution of each to the
literature. It concludes by identifying opportunities for future research in the field
of cyber studies.

China as a Cybersecurity Threat: Key Debates

China’s complex activities in cyberspace have influenced the development of
more research that focuses on its international relations and cybersecurity. This
interest has manifested in a steady increase in the number of articles published in
leading journals and books that explore the impact of Chinese actions in cyber-
space during the past five years (cf. Lindsay, 2015b; Reardon & Choucri, 2012).
Given these new works, it is useful to delineate the main themes in the literature
to understand how China’s involvement in cyberspace is viewed in the main-
stream literature of international relations. In evaluating the debates, this essay
follows the framework developed by Lindsay (2015b, pp. 9–13) that identifies
four cyber threat narratives that dominate the discourse on cybersecurity and
China: political, espionage, military and institutional. Lindsay’s work was adopted
because it offers the most systematic analysis of the literature on cybersecurity
and China. This essay builds on his framework by using the narratives as organi-
zing themes to structure the survey of the literature. The following subsections
will briefly explore the main debates within each theme.

Political
The first theme concerns China’s exploitation of cyberspace for political control.
Two debates are central to this theme. The primary debate focuses on the efforts
of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to censor the content of the Internet
(Lindsay, 2015b, pp. 13–15). One perspective within this debate postulates that

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the CCP has been effective in controlling and censoring information accessed
through the Internet (Shambaugh, 2007). This argument is supported by other
authors who attribute the CCP’s success to its technical counterstrategies
‘including blocking of web sites, e-mail monitoring and filtering, denial, decep-
tion, disinformation, and even the hacking of dissident and Falun gong web sites’
(Chase & Mulvenon, 2002, p. xii). Another study suggests that the CCP censor-
ship and control strategy is effective because it is well targeted. The CCP allows
criticism about the state, its policies and its leaders but censors ‘comments that
represent, reinforce, or spur social mobilization, regardless of content’ (King,
Pan, & Roberts, 2013, p. 326).
In contrast, there are authors who are sceptical about the CCP’s efforts. One
interpretation is that the policies of the CCP are conflicting therefore, the measures
employed to control the Internet are not productive. The stringent suppression poli-
cies adopted by the CCP contradict equally assertive economic policies ‘designed
to facilitate the penetration and extension of new information and communication
technologies’ into all sectors of society (Deibert, 2002, pp. 154–155). A reinforcing
argument meanwhile, points to the uncontrollable number of Chinese internet
users and the ‘increasingly sophisticated means of averting police surveillance’ as
justifications for the failure of the CCP to prevent the negative effects of the Internet
(Endeshaw, 2004, p. 52).
The secondary main debate has to do with the impact of the Internet develop-
ment on the democratization of China. Proponents of technology expect the
growth of Internet users, the unrestricted flow of information and active participa-
tion of the civil society groups to contribute to democratization and threaten the
power and authority of the CCP (Kluver, 2005). Moreover, the Internet has been
instrumental in the development of civil society through the encouragement of
public debate, the emergence of virtual communities and the introduction of new
elements into the dynamics of protest (Yang, 2003, p. 453). Other authors disa-
gree, arguing that the Internet is unlikely to influence political age in China
(Kalathil & Boas, 2001, p. 42). There are several conditions that are necessary for
democratization hence, it is doubtful that technological determinism or the strong
dependence of technology by itself could initiate a democratic or mass movement
in China (Wacker, 2003, p. 73).

Espionage
The second theme considers the impact of China’s cyber espionage activities on
western states. The main debate within this theme is level of threat posed by
Chinese computer network exploitation. A prevailing perspective contends that
China’s exploitation capabilities are considerable therefore making cyberspace a
contested environment. The uncertainty about the sophistication of China’s capa-
bilities for espionage has influenced states’ insecurity in cyberspace; given that
strategic logic dictates that extensive military preparations are required in times of
uncertainty (Hjortdal, 2011, p. 4). A related but more pessimistic view suggests that
Chinese capabilities in computer network operations are sufficiently developed to

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248 Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs 3(2)

threaten US military operations in the event of a conflict (Krekel, Adams, & Bakos,
2012, p. 8). In addition, the authors also reveal that China’s intelligence collection
is not only limited to a state’s sensitive national security and policymaking infor-
mation but also includes economic and competitive data to assist business (Krekel,
Adams, & Bakos, 2012, p. 12).
In opposition, some authors assert that the threats surrounding Chinese cyber
espionage are exaggerated. Although China is stealing information from and
exploiting the weaknesses of other states through cyberspace, the vulnerabilities
caused by the Internet are also consequential for the China’s internal security and
political cohesion (Inkster, 2010, p. 56). In this sense, threat narratives regarding
China’s espionage activities tend to be inflated since it is unclear whether the
Chinese can actually benefit from their aggressive actions in cyberspace (Inkster,
2012, p. 203). More significantly, the process of acquisition, absorption and appli-
cation of data from other states is complicated and takes time, expertise and
resources to develop. Transaction costs at every phase caused by ‘information
overload, analytic misinterpretation or bureaucratic silos’ can challenge the trans-
formation of stolen data into new production knowledge that enables successful
competition in the marketplace (Lindsay, 2015b, p. 24).

Military
The third theme focuses on the ability of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)
to conduct warfare through cyberspace. The key debate concerning this theme
is the consequences of the PLA’s offensive cyber capabilities on the US as well
as other states in the region. One view contends that the PLA’s offensive cyber
capabilities are sophisticated enough to inflict significant damage against
powerful states. In this sense, the Chinese military considers cyberwarfare to
be an inexpensive, long-range and highly effective counter measure to a supe-
rior adversary (Mulvenon, 2009, pp. 257–261). Given the PLA’s considerable
cyber capabilities, a critical component of its strategy is to control the enemy’s
information flow, targeting China’s enemies that are presumably highly
dependent on cyber-enabled technology. The ability to damage the flow of
information would enable them to secure an advantage in the physical battle-
field (Siboni, 2012, p. 51).
The favourable assessment of the PLA’s offensive cyber capabilities are
contested based on three grounds. First, PLA’s strategy of ‘integrated network
electronic warfare’ has been tested against real enemies and in a complex
warfighting environment (Lindsay, 2015b, p. 32). Second, there is no evidence
that the PLA can infiltrate highly secure networks or secretly steal or falsify
critical data. It is therefore uncertain if the Chinese military is actually capable of
systematically sabotaging selected command and control, defence and intelli-
gence networks and databases of advanced adversaries (Ball, 2011, p. 101).
Third, the advantages afforded by sophisticated cyber capabilities can be reduced
by weaknesses triggered by computer networks. China’s efforts to develop supe-
rior cyber capabilities make it increasingly vulnerable to the same weaknesses it

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is supposedly trying to exploit: civilian technological infrastructure and military

command and control networks (Lindsay, 2015b, pp. 34–35).

Institutional
The fourth theme involves the regulation and governance of the Internet. The
primary disagreement in this literature is developing a favourable arrangement for
governing the cyberspace. China’s proposed code of conduct for information
security disputes the status quo of a free and open Internet by emphasizing new
mechanisms to manage the Internet: state sovereignty and non-interference in
cyberspace (Hsu & Murray, 2014, p. 2). Due to the increasing threats caused by
the use of computer networks, states have the right ‘to protect, in accordance with
relevant laws and regulations, their information space and critical information
infrastructure from threats, disturbance, attack and sabotage’.1
Another justification for a state-centric approach to Internet governance is to
challenge US leadership of the Internet. China is working with other powerful
states such as Russia and Brazil as well as other sympathetic states, in advancing
a more centralized and top-down approach to Internet governance (Nocetti, 2015,
p. 120). There are two points to this argument. First, China and Russia consider
the stance of the US towards cyber politics as mainly hypocritical: Americans
advocate for a denationalized Internet but monitor and exploit mass surveillance
data without any control (Farell & Finnemore, 2013). Second, the Chinese and
Russians also find it problematic that the US has control over Internet infrastruc-
ture (root name servers for example) and that the American companies dictate the
management of the Internet (Nocetti, 2015, pp. 120–121).
The argument of western states against China’s proposal is that cyberspace
should be governed by ‘multi-stakeholders’ and through existing governance
frameworks and processes (Cornish, 2015, p. 161). Multi-stakeholder govern-
ance is a framework that follows on ‘a constantly shifting balance of powers
between private industry, international technical governance institutions,
governments, and civil society’ (DeNardis, 2014, pp. 226–227). The framework
can replace state governance since it is suitable for cross-border environments
such as the Internet, and is a stimulus for promoting democratic processes around
the world (DeNardis, 2014, p. 229). Another suggestion based on this argument,
is the creation of a treaty for cyberspace. A multilateral agreement on cyber-
space, that follows the principles of law of armed conflict, should be created to
define the parameters of state behaviour, institute protocols for mitigating cyber
conflicts (Hughes, 2010, p. 533–535).

China’s Intelligence Collection System

The book Chinese Industrial Espionage by William Hannas, James Mulvenon
and Anna Puglisi explores how China comprehensively collects and exploits
foreign technology and innovation from different states, most prominently the

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250 Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs 3(2)

US. The book makes a provoking argument: China’s unconstrained efforts to

transfer technology and expertise are reducing the advantages of the US. This
argument is based on the assumption that China has reached a high level of
economic development through the appropriation of other states’ technology.
Chinese Industrial Espionage starts by discussing the historical evolution of
China’s technology transfer practices, focusing on its dependence on foreign
technology from states like the Soviet Union, Japan and the US. The authors
observed that each time period is distinctive and faced with different types of
challenges, but a consistent factor throughout is the acquisition of foreign techno-
logy. The subsequent chapters of the book explicate the different intelligence
collection approaches employed by the Chinese to acquire expertise and techno-
logy from the US.
The first approach involves collecting public information. The massive exploi-
tation of foreign open sources has allowed Chinese researchers to stimulate inno-
vation, reduce the research and development (R&D) process and, more notably,
contribute to the state’s intelligence network (Hannas et al., 2013, pp. 18–20).
Organizations such as the Institute of Science and Technical Information and the
China Defence Science and Technology Information Centre play an instrumental
role in constructing and maintaining an interconnected open-source collection
system. The second approach involves establishing favourable conditions for
enticing foreign R&D centres to invest in China. The consistent growth of foreign
R&D infrastructure in China is not coincidental and has contributed to the state’s
objective to collect foreign technology and expand local innovation. However, the
authors claim that the existence of foreign R&D centres in China signifies a
national security threat because it increases the risk of unwanted technology and
knowledge transfers (Hannas et al., 2013, pp. 70–72).
The use of technology transfer in organizations is the third approach. Government
organizations such as the Ministry of Science and Technology enable extensive
technology transfers by hiring foreign experts and sending capable Chinese
nationals overseas (chapter 4). Moreover, organizations based in the US such as
professional and alumni organizations are also transferring foreign technology
directly by promoting technology-oriented businesses and indirectly by maxi-
mizing their relationships with US-based China advocacy groups (chapter 5).
Foreign education is the fourth approach. Sending students overseas is an essential
element for China’s national development and technological modernization.
During the period of 1978 and 2011, it is estimated that 2.24 million Chinese have
pursued advanced degrees abroad and 818, 400 or more than a third returned after
finishing their degrees (Hannas et al., 2013 p. 138). More significantly, the Chinese
government has been reported to exploit student associations based in American
universities. Even though these organizations primarily exist for cultural and social
activities, the authors’ main concern is the level of influence of the Chinese govern-
ment on these associations (Hannas et al., 2013, pp. 143–144).
The last approach is espionage. The book examines into two approaches to
Chinese espionage: conventional and cyber. In terms of conventional espionage,
the authors contest what they consider as outmoded ideas that dominate literature
on Chinese intelligence. For instance, one disputed principle is that the Chinese

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Domingo 251

favour to use a large number of amateur intelligence assets (‘thousand grains of

sand’) rather than trained intelligence operatives (chapter 8). In terms of cyber,
the authors argue that cyber espionage is the most devastating approach because
of its operational advantages and the difficulty of attribution (chapter 9).
Chinese Industrial Espionage is a valuable contribution to the literature on
cybersecurity and is a practical book for scholars and policymakers who want to
understand China’s intelligence machinery. The book contributes two main
themes that make up the literature on cybersecurity and China. First, it advances
the literature on espionage by explaining how the various intelligence collection
approaches of the Chinese systematically support their objective of enhancing
economic competitiveness and developing technological innovation. Although
cyber espionage is just one approach in China’s operations, the authors are clear
that it can be the most consequential source of intelligence due to the vulnerabili-
ties associated with cyberspace. A fair amount of studies describe the threat of
covert intelligence operations but few explore the various tactics employed by
China (cf. de Silva, 2015; Ventre, 2014; Wise, 2011). Second, the book also
contributes military theme of the literature since it provides context to China’s
objectives and methods in acquiring advance military technology from western
states. Since military modernization is a key objective of computer network intru-
sions against defence establishments and contractors, it is likely that these inci-
dents will continue. Whereas China’s cyber capabilities are still underdeveloped,
the book suggests that the continuous transfer of technology and expertise will
eventually enable China to enhance their military capabilities in cyberspace.
As I have discussed elsewhere (Domingo, 2014), this book could be improved
in two areas. First, the book would have been more analytical if the authors made
use of a clear theoretical framework to guide the study. The framework could have
been based on intelligence or even strategic theories that were developed based on
a solid base of academic literature. Second, the book’s recommendations for
addressing Chinese industrial espionage seem limited. The authors could have
been more thorough if they discussed the existing barriers to countering Chinese
espionage before proposing recommendations (Domingo, 2014).

China’s Quest for an Information Society

In Cyber Policy in China, Greg Austin explores China’s efforts to develop an
advanced information society by thoroughly analyzing its national policies and
the values of its leaders. The book argues that leadership values and ethics shape
the advancement of an information society in China. This is based on the author’s
assessment that the predisposition of China’s leaders is instrumental in influ-
encing the direction of the state’s modernization.
The first chapter discusses China’s aspiration for developing an innovative
information society. The chapter draws on the ideas articulated in the Chinese
government’s National Informatization Plan 2006–2020 and the document
Information Science and Technology in China: A Roadmap to 2050 to evaluate the
status of modernization. The author then presents the framework centred on nine

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252 Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs 3(2)

ideal policy values essential to building an information society. A comparison in

the actual versus ideal values of China’s leaders is made to determine the trajec-
tory of China’s efforts. The second chapter examines the development of China’s
efforts to reform its information technology policies to adhere to the ideal policy
values. Furthermore, the chapter evaluates the existing ‘legacy settings’ or ‘legacy
values’ during the start of the twenty-first century, when China’s leaders decided
to build an information society. The author contends that towards the end of the
century, China’s leaders displayed contradictory values towards the informatiza-
tion of their economy and society.
Following the framework, the succeeding three chapters (chapters 3–5) juxta-
pose the leaders’ policy values with the ideal values to assess the direction of
China’s modernization efforts. The third chapter describes the development lead-
ership values that favour the information ecosystem: trusted information, protec-
tion of information exchange and freedom of information exchange. In comparing
the values, the author postulates that while China’s leaders are still persistent in
suppressing certain forms of information exchange, the scope and scale of
communications between different actors can weaken the power of the authori-
tarian state. The fourth chapter considers the second set of leadership values in the
area of information innovation economy: innovator class, innovation system and
transformation intent. In analyzing these values, the author observes the inclina-
tion of Chinese leaders towards progressive liberalization in industry policy,
stronger commitment to expeditious reform of institutions and improving the
social environment for innovation.
The fifth chapter examines Chinese leadership values regarding the security of
the global infoSphere: military divide, interdependent ‘informatized’ society and
strategic stability. The chapter illustrates how China’s leaders were forced to
change its leadership values and policies based on the exigencies arising from the
rise of cyber-enabled technologies. The last chapter analyzes China’s growth in
the three policy domains and provides a short assessment of the future trajectory
of its cyber policy. The author concludes that while China’s leaders aspire for a
transformational information society, the policy values they are espousing are
conflicting. In this sense, Chinese leaders are situated ‘in a mixed bag of competing
ambitions, where the priority attached to individual elements changes all too
often’ (Austin, 2014, p. 173).
Cyber Policy in China makes an important contribution to the literature in
international relations and is also a decent resource for scholars and students
interested in the evolution of Chinese politics and technology. The book contri-
butes to the political and institutional themes in the literature on cybersecurity
and China. First, it adds to the literature on Internet censorship and control by
providing substantial insights regarding the domestic factors that influence the
outlook of Chinese leaders towards building an information society. Since tradi-
tional leadership values and ethics are not necessarily compatible with techno-
logical change, Chinese leaders are inclined to protect the existing ideals by
restricting access to information exchanges through cyberspace. Second, in
relation to the institutional theme, the book analysis of China’s cyber policy
explains why it is advancing state sovereignty as a new mechanism to govern

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the Internet. In this context, China has no choice but to continue to oppose the
ideal of an open and free Internet if it wants to preserve political stability, sover-
eignty and national cohesion.
There are three key areas where the book could improve (Domingo, 2015).
First, the discussion regarding the framework of the study (ideal policy values)
seems inadequate. This limitation makes the book less comprehensible for people
not oriented with the literature on information society and international ethics.
Second, the book does not consider the role of external factors in analyzing
China’s leadership values. Does this imply that external factors such as distribu-
tion of power and external threats do not influence China’s desire to develop an
information society? The third point relates to the book’s contribution. The study
could have been more noteworthy if linked to China’s efforts to develop informa-
tion society to its ambition towards achieving a stronger regional presence in the
Asia-Pacific (Domingo, 2015).

China’s Cybersecurity Challenges

The book China and Cybersecurity edited by Jon Lindsay, Tai Ming Cheung
and Derek Reveron offers a comprehensive and balanced view of how China
generates and manages insecurity in cyberspace. The book’s central argument
is that China is not the cyber threat it is perceived to be. Given the hype and
exaggeration regarding cyber threats, the book was developed with the objec-
tive of providing alternative interpretations of China’s impact of cybersecurity.
In this sense, an interdisciplinary and international set of authors was selected
to contribute to the book. The book is organized into four sections: espionage
and cybercrime, military strategy and institutions, national security policy and
practical and theoretical implications.
The first section clarifies the hype about Chinese espionage and exploitation
and cybercrime. Chapter 2 by Nigel Inkster traces the development of Chinese
intelligence machinery and explains how cyberspace has enhanced the collection
capabilities through computer network exploitation. He argues that cyberspace
has undoubtedly improved China’s collection capabilities, but what is uncertain is
whether Chinese top leaders have an effective policy grip on the activities of its
intelligence agencies (Lindsay et al., 2015, p. 47). Chapter 3 by Jon Lindsay and
Tai Ming Cheung challenges the prevailing discourse on Chinese economic espio-
nage through evaluating how China exploits stolen information and transforms it
into an alternative output that is used to compete against western states. The
authors suggest that the allegations of economic espionage against China are
accurate since there is ‘no credible alternative explanation for the individually
circumstantial but collectively significant evidence for Chinese (and the PLA)
responsibility’ (Lindsay et al., 2015, p. 65). They contend, however, that even if
China manages to obtain and absorb secrets efficiently, there is no guarantee that
it can benefit from these secrets economically (Lindsay et al., 2015, p. 75).
Chapter 4, by Zhuge Jianwei, Gu Lion, Duan Haixin and Taylor Roberts,
presents China’s problems with cybercrime by providing comprehensive and

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254 Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs 3(2)

multi-method investigation of its online underground economy. The authors note

that China has underdeveloped and poorly enforced legal and regulatory mecha-
nisms for protecting cybercrime. Based on the observations in the chapter, China
has yet to develop a comprehensive system of monitoring the online underground
market; therefore, the threat of cybercrime seems to be against China rather than
western states.
The second section considers contending perspectives about China’s military
doctrines and capabilities in the cyber environment. Chapter 5 by Ye Zheng
discusses the different categories of cyberwarfare based on the PLA’s interpreta-
tion of the concept. He then explains the principles of cybersecurity by high-
lighting the relationship between cyber freedom, cyber sovereignty and cyber
defence and how concepts ideas are applied by China. In conclusion, the author
argues that cooperation between China and Asia-Pacific states is necessary to
address the insecurity and misinterpretation regarding cybersecurity issues.
Chapter 6 by Kevin Pollpeter looks into the role of cyberwarfare in military
strategy through an evaluation of Chinese military documents. Pollpeter observes
that whilst Chinese computer operations have been limited to espionage, docu-
ments reveal several doctrinal and culture factors that indicate that computer
networks operations can provide advantages in warfighting and coercion against
adversaries. He concludes that China’s strategy of ambiguity gives it an opportu-
nity to hide its cyber capabilities without having to commit to measures that
restrict development and use (Lindsay et al., 2015, p. 157).
Chapter 7 by Mark Stokes investigates the capabilities and organization of the
PLA in conducting computer network operations. He explicates the comprehen-
sive role of the PLA’s Third Department in executing network exploitation and
defence, but challenges the claim that the Fourth Department is primarily respon-
sible for undertaking network attacks. Stokes suggests that the appropriate way to
mitigate challenges posed by Chinese cyber capabilities is to diminish the value
of information through thoughtful deception, superior counterintelligence and
strong cooperation with international partners such as Taiwan.
Chapter 8 by Robert Sheldon and Joe McReynolds looks into Chinese civil-
military cooperation in the context of cyber operations, particularly focusing on
the development the cyber capabilities of militia forces. The authors reveal that,
in terms of cyber operations, civilians working in the educational and business
sectors in China mainly support the PLA. Sheldon and McReynolds make two
notables assertions. First, there is no evidence linking information warfare militia
units to involvement in peacetime espionage activities (Lindsay et al., 2015,
p. 200). Second, there is also no evidence that suggest information warfare militia
units operate differently from China’s other traditional militia units.
The third section examines the challenges in developing national cyber poli-
cies for China and the US as well as the issues with international cooperation.
Chapter 9 by Li Yuxiao and Xu Lu describes the domestic issues affecting cyber
policy development and how these relate to disagreements between China and the
US. The authors point out that the tension between the two powerful states is
partly caused by the ambiguity in cybersecurity management as well as the lack
of mechanisms for cooperation. To improve the two countries’ addressing the

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Domingo 255

conflict, the authors offer three recommendations: the development of mecha-

nisms for cybersecurity cooperation at the highest level, the clarification of basic
principles and basis for bilateral cooperation and the establishment of mecha-
nisms for civilian cooperation such as research exchanges and expert groups.
Chapter 10 by Xu Jinghong surveys the existing legal frameworks that protect
the right to privacy on the Internet. The author clarifies that the absence of the
western notion of ‘right to privacy’ in traditional Chinese society and culture can
be attributed to the fact that the Chinese consider privacy a family affair (Lindsay
et al., 2015, p. 243). Xu points out that existing Chinese laws and regulations that
have articles directly protecting right to privacy on the Internet. However, there
are several challenges for internet privacy such as the statues are not specific in
defining specific contents of citizen’s electronic information and these laws are
unsystematic and hard to implement (Lindsay et al., 2015, p. 252).
Chapter 11 by Sarah McKune probes into China’s activities and policies rele-
vant to cyberspace from the human rights-based viewpoint. The author notes that
China’s massive online censorship efforts focus on maintaining political control
by targeting information relating to social mobilization more than content that is
critical towards the government. In this context, the government regulates the
Internet to protect its citizens against ‘foreign hostile forces’ or ‘Western anti-
China forces’ that challenge the CCP doctrine and authority. McKune concludes
that genuine progress in cybersecurity cooperation will require acknowledgement
and disclosure of the fundamental disagreements between states, regarding
ideology and human rights, not only on the part of China but also on the part of
the US (Lindsay et al., 2015, p. 280).
The fourth section is composed of two chapters. The first reviews the policy
responses of the US and the second expounds on the general theoretical implica-
tions of the whole book. Chapter 12 by Fred Cate identifies three main policy
responses of the US to cyber threats: the vast collections of data for national secu-
rity purposes, the rapid and widespread development network databased control
systems and the increased complexity between the relationships of the US with
China due to cybersecurity issues. The author identifies a number of issues facing
policymakers, the most crucial of which are the need for appropriate incentives
for cybersecurity, the need for a competent central authority for cybersecurity, the
need for clear statutory protection for privacy and finally, the need to engage
China and other states more effectively. The last chapter by Jon Lindsay and
Derek Reveron presents a framework that organizes the different debates on
cybersecurity and China into four categories that is useful for developing more
general claims. Furthermore, the authors analyze three broad approaches to
explaining cyber phenomena: technologist, liberalist and realist. Technologists
view information technology to be a transforming force in political economic
affairs. Liberalists focus on domestic constraints as well as trade and governance
to interpret state behaviour using information technology. Realists, on the other
hand, emphasize structural constraints to explicating state behaviour using infor-
mation technology.
China and Cybersecurity makes an exceptional contribution to the literature on
international relations and a must read for scholars and policymakers concerned

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256 Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs 3(2)

with cybersecurity issues. The book advances the literature in all the main themes
in the literature. Chapters 4, 9–11 contribute to the political theme since they
provide comprehensive accounts of the criminal, commercial, societal, techno-
logical, legal and political issues, and confront the CCP in their effort to maintain
control and authority over the Internet. Chapters 2 and 3 of the book develop the
existing literature on the second theme of espionage by delineating the impact of
information technology on the Chinese intelligence machinery and, more signi-
ficantly, by breaking down the effectiveness of China’s espionage operations.
Chapters in the section on military strategy and institutions make two signi-
ficant contributions to the military theme in the literature. First, since western
perspectives mainly dominate the literature, the concepts and ideas articulated
in chapters 5 and 6 are valuable for refining current knowledge on Chinese
military strategy and cybersecurity. Second, the extensive details about organi-
zations and capabilities are not typically disclosed in an academic publication;
therefore, chapter 7 provides good insights about the status of China’s cyber
capabilities. Finally, the book enhances the literature on the institutional debates
about China and cybersecurity by clarifying the issues that affect cooperation
and the development of cyber norms. In chapter 12, Cate contends that ‘petty
nationalism’ compromises rather than improves cybersecurity; therefore, states
need to be more pragmatic in their engagements with each other (Lindsay et al.,
2015, p. 323). Lindsay and Reveron note in chapter 13, that international coopera-
tion on cybersecurity is a desirable objective; however, the actual cyber activities
and interests of governments seem to contradict efforts towards achieving this
objective.
The scope of the book is comprehensive, although more analysis regarding the
impact of China on the cyber interactions between states in Asia-Pacific could
have enhanced the policy relevance of the book. Since East Asia is the most active
region for cyber conflict (Valeriano & Maness, 2015), it is crucial to understand
the strategic implications of these conflicts on China. Another area of develop-
ment that the authors could have considered is the link between the PLA’s cyber
and conventional military capabilities. Despite the fact that there has been some
work on this area, few studies have looked into the actual utility of cyber capabili-
ties as a force multiplier for the PLA (cf. Chase et al., 2015; Kamphausen & Lai,
2015; Mulvenon, 2009; Mulvenon & Yang, 1998).

Conclusion
A review of the various debates, including three recent books, reveals that China’s
cyber engagement is not as threatening as portrayed by some academics and poli-
cymakers. The contentious political debates about China’s censorship and control
of cyberspace will continue to persist as part of the CCP’s strategy for maintaining
power and authority. The CCP has struggled to address the challenges of informa-
tion age; however, it is unlikely that the Internet will be a driving force for poli-
tical change in China because it is a necessary but not sufficient condition for
democratization. The debates regarding the espionage tend to be overstated.

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Domingo 257

Whilst the prevailing discourse frames China as the significant cyber threat, it is
still unclear whether China can make use of stolen data to create concrete and
competitive hardware.
Debates about the military are also exaggerated since there is no definitive
evidence that China can deliver massive computer network attacks against an
adversary. More importantly, the advantages afforded by sophisticated cyber capa-
bilities are contradicted by vulnerabilities caused by exposure to computer network
attacks. Institutional debates suggest bleak prospects for any type of agreement on
Internet governance. Conflicting interests between democratic and authoritarian
states, regarding value of Internet freedom and appropriate measures to secure
cyberspace, make the development of agreements and norms improbable.
There are three opportunities where scholars can pursue further research on
China and cybersecurity. The first is to systematically assess the cyber power of
China. Existing studies (Clarke & Knake, 2010; Nye, 2010; Spade, 2012; Thomas,
2009) consider China as a cyber power based on an assessment of its material
capabilities, although these studies do not account for the domestic challenges and
technological vulnerabilities of China. It is therefore necessary to re-evaluate
China’s cyber power in light of new research on the topic. The second opportunity
is the study of China’s impact on the cyber strategies of other states in the Asia-
Pacific. The literature mainly focuses on the impact of China on cybersecurity but
studies on the responses of secondary states are limited (Burton, 2013; Chong,
2012). The third is to explore the prospects of ‘cyber spill over’ (Valeriano &
Maness, 2015) involving cases of territorial disputes between China and other
states in East Asia. A recent study by Gompert and Libicki (2014) argues that
conflict escalation due to cyber incidents is unlikely between China and the US.
Nonetheless, it is uncertain if this scenario can apply to the disputes involving
Taiwan, Vietnam and Japan.

Acknowledgments
The author thanks Izzanie Domingo, May Pei Lee, Stephen Westcott and the editors of the
journal for their comments and suggestions.

Note
1. U.N. General Assembly, 66th Session. (2011, 14 September). Letter dated 12 September
2011 from the Permanent Representatives of China, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan
and Uzbekistan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (A/66/359).
Official Record.

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