Brands 2013 - Cognitive Social Structures in Social Network Research Review

Cognitive social structures in social network research: A review
Author(s): RAINA A. BRANDS

Source: Journal of Organizational Behavior , 2013, Vol. 34, No. S1, The IRIOP Annual
Review Issue (2013), pp. S82-S103
Published by: Wiley
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Journal of
Organizational
Behavior
Journal of Organizational Behavior, J. Organiz. Behav. 34, S82-S103 (2013)

Published online 6 August 2013 in Wiley Online Library (wileyonlinelibrary.com) DOI: 10.1002/job.l890
Cognitive social structures in social network

research: A review
RAINA A. BRANDS*
London Business School, Regent's Park, London, NW1 4SA, U.K.
Summary This review highlights one stream of work within the social network field, namely the work on cognitive
social structures (CSS). First, CSS research is positioned within the field of social networks, and the key
methods associated with CSS research are described. Research examining systematic biases in individuals'
perceptions of social networks is covered, as is research examining the consequences of biased network
perceptions (in terms of behaviors and outcomes). A research agenda is forwarded, suggesting three key
directions for future research: the social capital of cognitive ties, extending and challenging network accuracy
as a source of advantage and collective agency and organizational change. The overall goal is to invigorate
research that moves beyond the description of cognitive social structures to an outcome-focused research
paradigm. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Keywords: cognitive social structures; social networks; review
Although cognitions have been of long-standing importance in social network research (e.g., Lewin, 1951;
Newcomb, 1961), in the past 25 years there has been a resurgence of interest in how individuals perceive and
cognitively represent the networks of relationships around them. The cognitive monitoring of social networks is
an essential task for people: the ability to keep track of and use information about social networks underpins not only
the success of human beings as a species (Dunbar, 2008) but also our success as individuals as we strive to get along
and get ahead (e.g., Flynn, Reagans, Amanatullah, & Ames, 2006). Yet even the most astute social observers face
challenges in accurately perceiving their social networks (e.g., Janicik & Larrick, 2005; Krackhardt & Kilduff,
1999). These challenges are driven by the complexity of networks that can develop even in small groups of people
(Bossard, 1945) as well as the multiplexity (cf. Casciaro & Lobo, 2008) and dynamism of human relationships
(cf. Sasovova, Mehra, Borgatti, & Schippers, 2010).
The field of social networks is large, diverse and characterized by a lack of a joint agenda (Ibarra, Kilduff, & Tsai,
2005), making a complete review of the field difficult. This review will summarize the state of knowledge within one
specific section of social network research, that of cognitive social structures (CSS), defined as cognitive
representations of social networks (Krackhardt, 1987). Both cognitive and social network analyses (SNA) seek to
describe the patterns of interactions that circumscribe the behaviors and experiences of individuals within the social
worlds in which they live and work. But whereas SNA focuses on the actual configuration of ties surrounding
individuals, CSS research describes these patterns of interactions as perceived by individuals. Thus, rather than
focusing on a single network of relationships, CSS research examines social networks as viewed from each
members' idiosyncratic vantage point.
This review of CSS research focuses on two key questions. First, how do individuals perceive and cognitively
represent the social networks that surround them? And second, how do individuals' perceptions of their social
networks affect their behaviors and outcomes? Significantly more research explores the first question than the
second question - a state that is reflected in attention devoted to these topics in this review. Nonetheless, exploring
the downstream consequences of network perceptions is an increasingly important and popular topic for CSS
research (Burt, Kilduff, & Tasselli, 2013). This review follows others that have examined the field of organizational
♦Correspondence to: Raina A. Brands, London Business School, Regent's Park, London, NW1 4SA, U.K. E-mail: rbrands@london.edu
Received 30 April 2012

Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Revised 03 July 2013, Accepted 08 July 2013

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COGNITIVE SOCIAL STRUCTURES S83
social networks generally (Borgatti & Foster, 2003; Kilduff, Tsai, & Hanke, 2006), including some t
reciprocal links between cognition and network structure and contain summaries of the networ
(Burt et al., 2013; Ibarra et al., 2005; Kilduff & Brass, 2010). This review builds upon this prior w
CSS the focus and extends it with more recent empirical work.
Review process
Table 1 lists and summarizes the articles reviewed. To ensure the field was comprehensively surveye
search strategies were undertaken. First, searches of electronic databases (EBSCO, Proquest, Else
Scholar) were performed using the key search term "social network" coupled with key w
"cognition," "schema," "memory" and "accuracy." In addition, citation and citing searches were
seminal papers in the CSS domain (i.e., those listed in Table 1). Working papers of scholars in th
obtained to inform the research agenda. Because the field is relatively small (compared with social
generally), these searches were not restricted to papers appearing in top journals. Rather, any pape
cognitions affect the perception of networks and individuals' ensuing outcomes or behavio
(although papers examining how networks affect cognitions were excluded). The review predom
on articles appearing after Krackhardt's (1987) paper on CSS, although seminal work published b
has been included. Mindful of the goals of the International Review of Industrial and Organizat
Annual Review issue and because much of the CSS work falls within the realm of organizational
of the articles in this review examine CSS in organizational settings.
Positioning Cognitive Social Structure Research
The study of CSS grew out of contemporary social network research, which in turn evolved from
research in mathematics, physics and the social sciences (Kilduff & Tsai, 2003). There has been a
"creative tension" (Burt et al., 2013, p. 539) within SNA between the view of networks as interact
as cognitions. In exploring this frontier between the cognitive and behavioral realms of networks,
CSS research has been to compare and contrast individuals' network cognitions with the actual s
surrounding them (e.g., Kilduff, Crossland, Tsai, & Krackhardt, 2008) and trace their respective
outcomes (e.g., Krackhardt & Porter, 1986).
The key contribution of CSS research has been to broaden and deepen social network approach
attention to the cognitive dimensions of social networks. This is evident in the phenomenologic
research takes as to how we should understand individuals' network cognitions. Traditionally, so
research has been interested in individuals' perceptions of their social networks to the extent that
are representative of actual patterns of interactions (for a discussion, see Bernard, Killworth, &
contrast, CSS research sees network perceptions as phenomena of interest in their own right (K
This approach has its origins in Kurt Lewin' s field theory (1951), which casts individuals' behav
determined by their subjective experiences of their social environment.
The cognitive approach also offers a different interpretation of the constructs that social network
to measure. CSS research is interested in individuals' subjective experiences of their social environ
people to describe the social structure around them, CSS research purports to uncover underlying c
for social relationships (Krackhardt, 1987). Thus, cognitive social network research makes no ass
how the perceptions of one individual will relate to the perceptions of others (Krackhardt, 1987
differences between the perceptions of one individual and the perceptions of others in the same n
a theoretical and empirical question of interest (Krackhardt, 1987). This approach is distinct fro
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S84 R. A. BRANDS
Table 1. Articles reviewed.
Citation Methods Key findings
De Soto (1960) Paired-associates task Asymm

learning of influence networks
relations facilitated learning of
De Soto and Bosley (1962) Paired-associates task
the top and bottom of the hier
freshmen) more easily than th
sophomore and juniors).
De Soto et al. (1968) Paired-associates task Iden
in which individuals are groupe
and negative relations between g
grouping schema are more diffic
of sentiment relations rather th
Killworth and Bernard (1976) Self-report versu
behavior inaccurate, relative to who they communicated with at T2.
Bernard and Killworth (1977) Self-report versus Same as the preceding findings and: logging communication
behavior behavior does not improve individuals' accuracy; individuals
cannot judge the accuracy of their self-reports.
Killworth and Bernard (1979) Self-report versus Compared cognitive (i.e., self-report) and behavioral networks to
behavior examine agreement in higher-order network properties (namely,
triadic structures). If both behavioral and cognitive data were treated
in similar ways, there was good agreement between the two networks.
However, different decision rules for behavioral data yielded little
agreement with cognitive data. Furthermore, triad by triad, there was
little agreement between cognitive and behavioral data.
Bernard et al. (1979) Self-report versus Same as earlier findings: compared clique structures in cognitive
behavior and behavioral data. On average, cognitive networks were 160%
different to behavioral networks.
Bernard et al. (1982) Experiment Individuals had inaccurate recall of specific interactions but
accurate perceptions of overall patterns of communication.
Crockett (1982) Review Review of balance theory in perception of social relations
Krackhardt and Porter (1986) Cognitive social Individuals tend to quit organizations in Clusters' based on
structure (CSS) roster perceived role equivalence in communication networks.
Krackhardt (1987) Theoretical Formalized the study of cognitive social structures and outlined key
empirical methods.
Freeman et al. (1987) Self-report vs. behavior To the extent individuals frequently attended meetings they were
more likely to be falsely remembered as having attended specific
events by their peers. Conversely, to the extent individuals
infrequently attended meetings they were more likely to be
forgotten from meetings they had actually attended.
Regular attendees had more accurate memories of long term
attendance patterns whereas infrequent attendees had more accurate
memories of attendance at specific meetings.
Krackhardt (1990) CSS Individuals with accurate perceptions of the advice network
acquired a reputation for power; accurate perceptions of the
friendship network had no effect on reputation for power.
Freeman (1992) Paired-associates task Analyzed pattern of errors in network learning task to show th
individuals perceptually add relations to intransitive triples, thereby
imposing categories of affiliation on social interactions that are, in
reality, not categorical.
Freeman and Webster (1994) Self-report versus Analyzed patterns of affiliation and behavior in two naturalis
behavior settings. Showed that individuals group others according to patterns
of affiliation (those who interact frequently are grouped together;
( Continues )
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Table 1. (Continued)
those who interact infrequentl

form exaggerated perceptions o
Kumbasar et al. (1994) CSS roster Individuals' global views of the network broadly corresponded to
that of the group's.
Individuals tended to perceive themselves as: (1) more central than
they actually were; (2) having more friends than they actually did.
Individuals cognitively partition their network into an in-net (their
own direct ties) and an out-net (those they are not directly tied to).
Ties in the in-net are perceived to be reciprocated, transitive and
dense; actors in the out-net are perceived to be sparsely tied.
Kilduff and Krackhardt CSS roster A perceived friendship tie to a prominent friend boosted an
(1994) individual's reputation as a good performer.
Casciaro (1998a) CSS roster To the extent that individuals were higher up the organizational
hierarchy, they had less accurate network perceptions.
To the extent that individuals were more socially involved, they
had more accurate network perceptions.
Need for achievement and need for affiliation correlated with
perceptual accuracy, but self-monitoring did not.
Casciaro, Carley, and CSS roster To the extent that individuals were high in positive affect, they had
Krackhardt (1999) more accurate perceptions of their local advice network and the
global friendship network (but not the global advice network and
their local friendship network).
Krackhardt and Kilduff CSS roster Found a curvilinear relationship between perceived balance in
(1999) friendship network ties and social distance indicating that
individuals exaggerated the degree of balance in close a
ties, but not ties at an intermediate social distance.
Janicik and Larrick (2005) Ego network data Individuals with schematic knowl
Paired-associates task (i.e., those rich in structural holes) were able to
Social network training networks faster and build more appropriate coa
Coalition building task individuals without this schema.
Simpson and Borch (2005) Network learning Low-power individuals had more accu
Experiment ties than high-power actors.
Flynn et al. (2006) Paired-associates task To the extent that individuals were high self-monitors, they had
CSS roster (sample) more accurate perceptions of exchange networks and were more
likely to give than to receive help, thereby acquiring a reputation as
a generous exchange partner.
Kilduff et al. (2008) CSS roster Individuals' perceptions of organizational friendship networks
exhibited small-worldedness.
Individuals tended to exaggerate popularity and brokerage of
perceivedly-popular people.
Grippa and Gloor (2009) Self-report versus To the extent that individuals were central in communication
behavior networks, they were seen as more prominent by senior management
but had less accurate recall of their communication patterns.
Flynn et al. (2010) CSS roster (sample) To the extent that individuals were high in need for closure, they
Experiment (projective perceived more transitive ties in their network than was actually the case
task) and exaggerated the degree of racial homophily in social networks.
Simpson et al. (2011a) Experiment To the extent that low-power individuals had more accurate
network knowledge, they received higher payoffs. However,
when all low-power individuals had accurate network
knowledge, all received lower payoffs (and the power of high-
power actors was reinforced).
( Continues )
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S86 R. A. BRANDS
Table 1. (Continued)
Simpson et al. (201 lb) Paired-associates task In

of influence networks than ind
Being primed with low or high
perceptions of nonsocial netwo
Smith et al. (2012) Ego networks In the face of a job threat, low-status individuals activate
Experiment cognitively dense networks whereas high-status individuals
activate cognitively sparse networks.
research which sees individuals' reports of the relationships surrounding them as pertaining to actual patterns of
interaction (Killworth & Bernard, 1976). Accordingly, social network research has traditionally assumed that
individuals' perceptions of their social structure should be correlated with others' perceptions of the same network
(cf. Romney, Weller, & Batchelder, 1986).
Finally, the cognitive approach has added a further layer to our understanding of how individuals' outcomes are
affected by their surrounding social networks. From the social network perspective, individuals' behaviors are both
constrained and facilitated by the social structure around them (Coleman, 1988). In this view, individuals can benefit
from the social capital embedded in their surrounding relationships to the extent that they occupy favorable positions
within that structure (e.g., Mehra, Kilduff, & Brass, 2001). CSS has deepened this understanding by highlighting the
importance of individuals' perceptions of their networks. The assumption here is that individuals cannot mobilize
the social capital available in their surrounding networks unless they can accurately perceive the relations in which
it is embedded. Thus, CSS research sees advantage as stemming from perceptual acuity (cf. Burt & Ronchi, 2007).
Perceptual acuity, of course, is constrained by the information processing limits of the human mind. It is these limits,
as they affect our ability to perceive social networks, that are a key focus of CSS research.
Key methods
Cognitive social structure research seeks to describe individuals' subjective experiences of their social worlds and
catalogue the ways in which individuals' perceptions of these social worlds differ from the actual configuration of
ties surrounding them. These questions require distinct methods not only to capture network cognitions but also
to compare cognitions to networks.
Cognitive social structure roster method

The method most closely associated with CSS research is the CSS roster. Although formalized by Krackhardt
(1987), methods closely resembling CSS rosters extend as far back to the work of Newcomb (1961). In the first in-
stance, the CSS roster replicates the social network roster method in that it asks individuals to indicate their own
patterns of affiliation by choosing from a complete list of their associates within a bounded social system (e.g., an
organization or an MBA cohort). The CSS roster extends this method in that it asks individuals not only about their
own relationships but also about the relationships between those with whom they interact (i.e., their alters). These
questions generally take the form: 'Who would Josh Warren consider a close personal friend?' (for the friendship
network) or 'Who would Josh Warren go to for advice?' (for the advice network). Respondents indicate their
perceptions by choosing Josh Warren's friends or advisors from a full roster of names. This is repeated for every
person in the respondent's network.
The data generated from the CSS roster method can be treated in a number of ways to compare an individual's (k)
perceptions of, for example, the relationship between person i and person j (denoted as Xij) to the perceptions of
others in the network (i.e., Xkij). Three means of aggregation predominate: slices, locally aggregated structures
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and consensus structures (Krackhardt, 1987). A slice represents the network of relations as perc
individual (that is, their cognitive map). Thus, the relationship Xij is said to exist if it is perceive
observer. In contrast, a locally aggregated structure examines individuals' perceptions of their o
sometimes referred to as their ego networks. Here, individuals indicate all the people they direct
of tie to or who direct a particular type of tie to them (Krackhardt, 1987). Comparing individuals'
structures allows for the derivation of the actual network, so a relationship between Xij is said to e
agree on the existence and direction of the tie. Finally, a consensus structure represents the pe
individuals in the network concerning the relationship Xij. Different thresholds can be applied to
relationships exist (e.g., a relationship may be said to exist if 50 percent of individuals in the netw
Experimental methods
Experimental methods are also prominent in CSS research, with the paired-associates task being
these. De Soto introduced this method in CSS research (De Soto, 1960; De Soto & Bosley, 1962; De
& London, 1968); however, paired-associates tasks have also been used in more recent work
Larrick, 2005). Here, individuals are asked to learn a hypothetical social structure by learning th
between pairs of individuals. The dependent variable is how many trials it takes for respondents t
structure (Janicik & Larrick, 2005), although researchers have also examined the type of errors
(e.g., false remembering an absent relation versus forgetting a present relation; Freeman, 1992)
Ego network method

Rather than asking individuals to indicate ties by checking off a list of names, the ego network
individuals to list their ties, thereby avoiding prompting the respondent to think of all possible
the ego network method has been used to measure respondent's actual configuration of ties (e.g
However, recently, these have been taken to indicate network cognitions (e.g., Smith, Men
2012). The logic underlying this approach is that individuals cognitively activate only a subset o
network at any one time (Smith et al., 2012). The ties activated depend on individual and contex
these differences in cognitive activation can be gleaned by comparing the characteristics of diffe
ego networks.
Perceptions versus Reality in Social Network Research
The question of whether people can accurately perceive the complex social structures in which they
of long-standing importance to SNA research. Researchers frequently rely on individuals' repor
interactions as a measure of social structure (e.g., Burt, 1992; Newcomb, 1961). For social networ
the question of whether individuals accurately perceive their social interactions relates to whethe
a reasonable proxy for individuals' actual behaviors (Killworth & Bernard, 1976).
Answering this question was the focus of a seminal body of work by Bernard, Killworth and Sa
the 1970s (the so-called BKS paradigm). The BKS method asks individuals interacting within
network to recall and rank the frequency with which they communicate with other members
Self-reports are then compared with observations of actual communication in the time immedi
their collection. In the study of deaf communities, ham radio operators and organizational
findings of the BKS studies suggested that self-reports are extremely inaccurate proxies for ac
interaction (Bernard & Killworth, 1977; Bernard et al., 1979; Bernard, Killworth, & Sailer, 1
Bernard, 1976). The controversial conclusion of the BKS studies was that people do not know wi
communicate (Bernard & Killworth, 1977, p. 17) and that "There is no way of knowing whether
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S88 R. A. BRANDS
acquires from asking 'who do you like or who do you talk to' have any meaning beyond the
they were responses to a question asked by an experimentalist" (Killworth & Bernard, 1979
Although supported by the empirics of the BKS paradigm, the notion that people cannot accura
social interactions is highly counterintuitive given the importance of social interactions to huma
2008). The key insight into this apparent disconnect between individuals' behavior and their r
the work of Freeman and colleagues, who showed that although individuals have poor recall fo
recollections tend to accurately reflect their usual interactions (Freeman, 1992; Freeman, Rom
Freeman & Webster, 1994). Drawing on cognitive psychology, Freeman (1992) proposed that
categorization schémas to make sense of the patterns of interactions that occur around them
who they see interacting frequently together. Thus, individuals tend to exaggerate the degree of r
of interaction that they participate in, resulting in systematic bias in their perceptions of social
More contemporary CSS work has redefined accuracy. Rather than examining individuals
for their behavior, CSS research has examined how individuals' perceptions compare with oth
network (Krackhardt, 1987). Individuals are said to have accurate views of their social networ
they perceive a tie between two individuals that is confirmed by those individuals. Thus, peop
views of their own relationships (i.e., their ego network) to the extent that they report ties that
those they interact with or inaccurate views of others' relationships (i.e., their indirect ties) to t
ties that are not confirmed by the individuals concerned. Here, the focus is not on individuals' re
behavior, but on the perception of their social surrounds as a phenomenon of interest in its ow
of the focus of CSS research has been to explore and describe the ways in which individua
networks around them.
The Cognitive Organization of Social Networks
The observation that individuals' recollections of social interactions exaggerate systematic structure, relative to the
messier reality of social affiliation, provides an important insight into the cognitive processes that underlie network
perceptions. Namely, it suggests that individuals rely on schémas to organize and remember their surrounding social
networks. Schemas are cognitive structures consisting of a fuzzy set of interrelated associations that influence
individuals' perceptions of the world around them (Neisser, 1976). Schemas influence memory, providing organized
settings for past reactions and experiences that influence remembering (Bartlett, 1932). But schémas are also
anticipatory, influencing our experience of the world around us. Schemas act as a filter: we tend to retain and
assimilate incoming schema-congruent information while discarding information that is incongruent with our
schémas (Bem, 1981).
If schémas frame our experience of the world, then relational schémas frame our experience of the social world.
They describe expectations about the nature of relationships between people, defining what aspects of social
interactions individuals will pay attention to, as well as the attributes of others that are meaningful within those
interactions (Baldwin, 1992). A key distinction between different relational schémas is the degree to which relationships
are characterized by status differences between individuals (Fiske, 1992). It seems that individuals understand equal
relationships in fundamentally different ways to which they understand relationships that exhibit hierarchy.
Perception of hierarchy
Hierarchy is a ubiquitous feature of human relationships. It is the key means by which people organize themselves in
both formal (e.g., organizational) and informal (e.g., friendship) realms (Magee & Galinsky, 2008). Hierarchy
emerges quickly in groups of individuals interacting for the first time (Ridgeway & Diekema, 1989), even within
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micro structures (e.g., dyads; Markey, Funder, & Ozer, 2003). Indeed, it seems that individuals have a
preference for hierarchical relationships, expressing a greater liking for them relative to more equitable ar
(Zitek & Tiedens, 2012).
Cognitively, individuals are particularly fluent in hierarchical social arrangements. People find hierarchic
easier to perceive, understand, learn and remember than relationships where no rank ordering is prese
Tiedens, 2012). Schemas for hierarchical relationships carry an expectation that all individuals intera
arranged in an overall pecking order or hierarchy (Walker, 1976). This expectation - the linear-order s
be formally stated as the tendency for individuals to ascribe asymmetry1 and transitivity2 to influence rela
1960). Human beings are particularly attuned to status and power dynamics within their social worl
Galinsky, 2008); thus, individuals tend to learn who is at the top of the pecking order before they learn
bottom, an effect termed upward tuning (Van Kieveld & Zajonc, 1966; Walker, 1976). Counterintuitively,
to learn who is who is at the bottom of the hierarchy before we learn who is in the middle - the so-called en
effect (Van Kieveld & Zajonc, 1966; Walker, 1976). However, in real-world networks in which multip
characteristics are present, the linear-order schema may only be loosely imposed (Kahan & Poitou, 1973
Given the ubiquity and importance of influence relations in all realms of life, it is surprising that so l
CSS research has examined individuals' perceptions of hierarchical networks. Within organizations, i
individuals must negotiate dominance hierarchies in their everyday work, and the extent to which they
in navigating these relationships is an important determinant of their status (e.g., Flynn et al., 2006
research suggests that it may be low-status individuals who are most attuned to the hierarchical struc
them. In a series of studies, Simpson, Markovsky, and Steketee (2011b) showed that low-power peopl
recall learned networks that were more equivalent to the actual networks than high-power people. S
low-power individuals were less prone to transitive errors (i.e., filling in missing relations in unclosed
thus were better at perceiving absent ties (Simpson et al., 2011b). In contrast, high-power individual
readily apply the linear-order schema, assuming that the entire network was arranged into a hierar
the individual at the top was universally influential whereas the person at the bottom was universally
(Simpson et al., 2011b).
That low-power individuals have more accurate views of their networks has been attributed to uniqu
effects triggered by the experience of power. Individuals with high power tend to engage in automatic soci
associated with a reliance on heuristics and simple judgments, whereas low-power individuals tend to en
deliberative, controlled social cognition (Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003). Thus, low-power individ
likely to engage in systematic observation of their social surrounds, leading to more accurate percepti
networks. But this finding presents a conundrum when considered in relation to other work suggesting th
with more accurate views of organizational advice networks acquire a reputation for power, even after form
sources of power are taken into account (Krackhardt, 1990). The dynamic process suggested by the com
these findings is that low-power individuals have more accurate views of their surrounding networks an
a reputation for power. To the extent that a reputation for power translates into actual power, the implicati
time, individuals will lose the source of advantage (i.e., perceptual acuity) that brought them their powe
instance. This is a fascinating, albeit paradoxical, conclusion that merits further investigation.
Perception of equivalence
Although most of the networks in which we interact exhibit hierarchical ordering on some dimensi
the relationships we build and maintain within those networks exhibit equivalence on other d
Symmetry exists if whenever A "chooses" B, B also "chooses" A (Wasserman & Faust, 1994, p. 51 1).
'Transitivity is a characteristic of triads. Formally defined, transitivity is said to exist if every time A "chooses" B and B "choo
"chooses" C (Wasserman & Faust, 1994, p. 243).
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S90 R. A. BRANDS
Specifically, where relationships involve liking (i.e., positive sentiment) and a sense of shared
they entail expectations of reciprocity, symmetry and transitivity (Crockett, 1982). Togethe
form the balance schema (De Soto, 1960; Heider, 1946), relating to Heider' s balance th
Heider, 1946, 1958). The application of balance theory to social relations is depicted in Figu
of positive and negative ties between three individuals: Sandra, Isaac and George. When San
tie to George and Isaac, George also directs a positive tie to Isaac (my friend's friend is my fr
directs a positive tie to George but a negative tie to Isaac, then George also directs a negat
friend's enemy is my enemy). In contrast, when Sandra directs negative ties to George and I
rects a positive tie to Isaac (my enemy's enemy is my friend). The final case is when Sandra
Isaac and a negative tie to George, George will direct a negative tie to Isaac (my enemy's fr
(Crockett, 1982; Heider, 1958; Hummon & Doreian, 2003).
Individuals impose balance on their perceptions of the liking relationships they encounter.
inspired much research into how individuals use balance schémas to navigate the informal fr
overlay formal structure in organizations. Perhaps unsurprisingly, we tend to take a highly
surrounding friendship networks, overestimating our own prestige within them (Joh
Kumbasar, Romney, & Batchelder, 1994). Akin to a self-enhancement bias (cf. Sedikid
individuals usually see themselves as more central in their friendship network than
overestimate the extent to which those they choose as friends reciprocate their affections (K
Overall, it seems that individuals perceive their own friendship ties to be a dense network
whereas friendship networks between those who are not directly tied to them tend to be
(Kumbasar et al., 1994). This finding points to the intriguing idea that individuals' tendencie
friendship relations depend on how much those ties matter to them.
Subsequent work by Krackhardt and Kilduff (1999) supported this idea by exploring
proximity affects individuals' tendencies to rely on balance schémas in making sense of th
surrounding them at work. Individuals tend to exaggerate the degree of balance in perceivedl
distant friendships. But whereas individuals are motivated to believe that their friends recipr
and share their liking of others, they impose balance on distant relations because they lac
about the friendships of distant others. Interestingly, individuals perceive a great deal of im
relations at an intermediary distance: here, they do not have to rely on the balance schem
information but are also not personally motivated to impose balance on relations that do n
friendships (Krackhardt & Kilduff, 1999).
Perceptions of groups
Human social networks exhibit clustering: individuals collect together in groups that are cha
interaction and sentimental ties (Freeman & Webster, 1994). It follows, then, that individu
social networks around them should exhibit grouping. Individuals not only notice the grou
but also tend to cognitively exaggerate the boundaries between these groups (Cairns, Penin
Soto, 1960; Freeman & Webster, 1994; Kumbasar et al., 1994). Indeed, individuals' perception
works resemble small worlds,4 in which densely connected clusters of people are connected b
who broker between highly segregated groups (Kilduff et al., 2008). Figure 2 depicts the s
organizational friendship networks by comparing two individuals' cognitive maps with the
3Although beyond the scope of this review, it is important to note that balance theory has been applied much more w
social relations (for a review, see Crockett, 1982) and, likewise, has been applied to understand the dynamics of act
1979; and more recently, Hummon & Doreian, 2003).
Small worlds describe social networks that exhibit high local clustering and short average path lengths, two network
divergent (Watts, 2003).
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Isaac Isaac
Sandra GeorSe Sandra
Isaac Isaac
Sandra
* A
Figure 1. Balance theory applied to social relationships. Adapted from Hummon and Doreian (2003, p. 19)
positive relation, and
It is striking that although the actual social

network as forming separate clusters bridged
Social identities (e.g., gender and ethnici
Wethereil, 1987), and these social identities
2001) as well as our perceptions of affiliatio
which social groups are emergent, how do p
group or another?
The answer to this question lies in patterns o
grouped together (Freeman, 1992), whereas in
groups (Freeman & Webster, 1994). Clusters
such that we tend to overestimate the degr
and underestimate the degree of interaction
particular, are perceived to be categorical: wh
individuals will be perceived to like and be l
associate with a member of another grou
the groups around us takes time. Thus, i
affiliation tend to have the most accurat
and unsurprisingly, we are much more
affiliation groups (Freeman & Webster, 19
Individual differences in perceptual a
Although social network research has been re

1994), a key line of CSS research has shown th
around them. One important individual diff
(Snyder, 1974). Self-monitoring refers to dif
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S92 R. A. BRANDS
(a) Two individuals' perceptions of their organizational friendship network with

exaggerated small worldedness
(b) Actual organizational friendship network
Figure 2. Small- worldedness of cognitive social structures. Adapted from Kilduff et al. (2008,
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presentations, with high self-monitors being particularly reactive and adaptive to social and context
high self-monitors do not necessarily have more accurate network perceptions (Casciaro, 1998b), the
attuned to those relationships that are likely to affect their standing among their peers. In particular,
are especially attuned to the status dimensions of relationships that entail helping or favors (Flynn
self-monitors have particularly accurate perceptions of who helps whom in these type of relationships
self-monitors. Furthermore, being more likely to give than to receive help, high self-monitors a
favorable positions in exchange networks (Flynn et al., 2006).
Individuals' motivational traits also affect the accuracy of their social perceptions. Individuals
need for achievement tend to have more accurate perceptions of their surrounding advice and frie
presumably because they are keenly aware of how others may facilitate their goals (Casciaro, 19
who desire friendly and secure relations (i.e., high need for affiliation) also have accurate perce
friendship network, but this comes at the expense of accurate advice network perceptions (Cascia
for closure - the extent to which individuals prefer order and predictability and experience disco
with uncertainty or ambiguity (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996) - also plays a role in social networ
Individuals with a high need for closure seem to be prone to exaggerating the degree of networ
web of relationships surrounding them and, in particular, tend to assume that racially similar peop
social networks (Flynn et al., 2010).
The Consequences of Cognitive Social Structures: Advantage and A
Cognitive social structure research has made a great contribution to the field of social networks b
ways in which individuals' perceptions of their relationships differ from the actual patter
surrounding them. But do biased perceptions of social networks matter? The consequences of m
social networks have been largely neglected in CSS research. However, the few studies that have
"so what" question have highlighted the importance of individuals' network perceptions not onl
their abilities to harness the social capital embedded in their network but also in influencing th
behaviors.
Accuracy as a source of advantage
Implicit in the work on systematic bias in network perceptions is the assumption that accurate perceptions of
networks are somehow advantageous. This has intuitive appeal: those who have an accurate understanding of the
relationships around them are better equipped to deploy social strategies that involve, for example, playing one
individual off against another (cf. Burt, 1992) or adjusting their behavior to others according their shared
relationships with third parties (Dunbar, 2008). Although few studies have directly addressed the consequences of
accuracy, those that do support the view that accurate network perception is advantageous.
Brokers reap significant career rewards (Burt, 1992), but people have difficulty seeing the structural holes in their
surrounding networks (i.e., intransitive triads; Freeman, 1992). To the extent that individuals have acquired a
schema for unbalanced relations via experience in interacting in networks that have many structural holes, they
observe opportunities for brokerage more readily (Janicik & Larrick, 2005). These individuals are not only able
to identify brokerage opportunities more quickly than individuals without schémas for unbalanced relations but also
build more powerful coalitions (Janicik & Larrick, 2005). Motivated individuals who undergo training in how to
identify opportunities for brokerage in their social networks ultimately receive higher performance ratings and are
more likely to be retained and promoted by their employers (Burt & Ronchi, 2007). By knowing which key people
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S94 R. A. BRANDS
to reach out to, individuals with accurate network knowledge also acquire a reputation for pow
being seen as charismatic individuals who can get things done (Krackhardt, 1990).
Association as advantage
Social networks are prisms (cf. Podolny, 2001): the ties around actors inform their reputation
interpersonal judgments, the ties we perceive may be more informative than the ties that actu
the idiom that you are known by the company you keep, to the extent that we perceive individual
high performers, we tend to assume that those individuals are also high performers (Kilduff
People, therefore, can "bask in the reflected glory" of their friends, enjoying a reputational bo
association with high-performing others (Kilduff & Krackhardt, 1994, p. 103). In a similar vein
individuals are perceived to be central in their networks (that is, are perceived to send and rece
perceive them to be powerful (Krackhardt & Brass, 1994).
Cognitive social structures as a basis of action
When deciding on a course of action, we often look to others for guidance. We compare ourse
and use these comparisons to evaluate ourselves and our choices (Bandura, 2001; Festing
psychological research has tended to define similarity in terms of attributes, social network approac
on structural similarity. In defining roles as regularities in the configuration of social ties
1957), the focus has been on individuals who occupy similar roles in their surrounding networ
equivalent actors). From the structural equivalence perspective, individuals compare themsel
play similar roles in their informal networks and use the behavior and decisions of these stru
a guide as to what is appropriate for someone of their status (Burt, 1987). To the extent that tw
the same role in their surrounding network, they are likely to make similar decisions and ena
(Kilduff & Oh, 2006).
Cognitive social structure research has extended this perspective to investigate the relative i
versus perceived structural equivalence in determining career decisions. Individuals are most lik
when those whom they perceive to play similar roles to them in the communication network
Porter, 1986). In contrast, another study found that MBA students were not more likely to bid
organizations as their structural equivalents in the friendship network, although interestingly
who regarded each other as similar were more likely to bid for similar roles (Kilduff, 1990). T
findings underscore the importance of perceived rather than actual social network similarity.
been invoked in strategy literature to understand the mechanisms of competition between fir
fragmented environments, firm managers tend to select only a few, very similar organization
competitive blind spots (Porac & Thomas, 1994; Porac, Thomas, & Baden-Fuller, 1989).
Research Agenda
Individuals navigate and coordinate complex networks of relationships as a matter of course in

(Dunbar, 2008). Tasks that require this kind of social agency include, for instance, reaching ou
support (Ibarra, 1992) and privileged information (Granovetter, 1973; Seidel, Polzer, & Stewart
buy-in of others at work (Podolny & Baron, 1997) and collaborating with people in the workpl
Wayne, & Kraimer, 2001) and the community at large (Putnam, 2000). Cognitive networks ar
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individuals navigate their social worlds; thus, the CSS approach is uniquely positioned to inform o
of how people exercise social agency in their day-to-day lives. However, as is evident from the pr
the CSS literature, few studies have examined the consequences of individuals' (mis)perc
surrounding networks. Bridging the divide between CSS and their consequences should be a key
scholarly work. To this end, the following research agenda opens up three key directions for futur
offer ideas for linking network cognitions to outcomes in CSS organizational behavior research.
The social capital of cognitive ties
The central thesis of social network research is that relationships matter. Relationships are the pip
information, resources and social support flow (Podolny, 2001). Individuals forge connections with
which values, norms and common knowledge emerge, enabling people to achieve things that they
been able to achieve alone (Field, 2008). This resource - social capital - is thus constituted in relatio
2000) and acts as an invisible but potent force that influences the fates of individuals (Co
facilitating some actions and constraining others, social capital delimits social agency.
As an invisible force in the lives of individuals, empirically, scholars have inferred the existenc
by comparing the outcomes of individuals who are surrounded by different network structure
approach offers an incomplete explanation because individuals differ in the degree of advantage
similar network roles (Burt et al., 2013). Why do some individuals capitalize on the opportunities a
by their surrounding social networks whereas others do not?
Recent research has generated a key insight into this question by examining the cognitiv
social networks. The assumption here is that the social capital available to individuals by v
positions in their networks - be it social support, information or influence - is latent until ind
the relationships that link them directly or indirectly to that capital (Srivastava, 2012). Ta
(1973) seminal work on the strength of weak ties in which opportunities (e.g., news about job o
through ties between individuals who rarely interact. Researchers in the cognitive activation pe
try to understand the cognitive processes that underlie individuals bringing to mind those with
only weakly acquainted as they search for the information they need.
Individuals only activate a certain subset of their ties within the full set of contacts at their di
time and thus only access a portion of the social capital available to them (Smith et al., 2012). A
what causes some ties to become cognitively salient or activated, thereby triggering a process o
mobilization. Emerging CSS research suggests that individuals' goals affect the cognitive salience o
ments of their networks. Individuals who are primed with achievement goals tend to activate sp
whereas individuals primed with affiliation goals tend to activate dense networks (Shea, Fitzsim
2012). Goals tend to be cast in terms of gains or losses (De Dreu & McCusker, 1997). People are lo
will make great efforts to avoid losses relative to the efforts they expend to make gains (Tvers
1974). These tendencies play out in the social capital individuals mobilize in the face of loss
are primed with a loss schema (relative to individuals who are primed with a gain schema) activ
more bridging ties in order to preserve their status by accessing the social capital embedded in la
works (Srivastava, 2012). But individual differences also play a role. In the face of a job threat,
high status tend to exhibit a widening response, activating larger and sparser networks than indi
status, who tend to exhibit a winnowing response (Smith et al., 2012).
The cognitive activation perspective helps us understand differences in returns to socia
highlighting that cognitive processes render certain ties more salient than others, affecting th
individuals will mobilize the social capital available to them. This key insight has the poten
new research into even mature social network topics, such as brokerage. It is thought that, by
bridging position in the social structure, brokers have access to nonredundant information
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S96 R. A. BRANDS
able to transfer from one social world to another) and are uniquely positioned to see o
others together for gain (Burt, 1992). Brokerage research has particularly highlighted the
accrue to individuals who broker within informal networks of interaction in organ
Mehra et al., 2001; Podolny & Baron, 1997), but we know little about the cognitive pr
opportunity recognition.
One question for investigation focuses on the cognitive processes that underlie brokers' dec
certain contacts over others when they are approached by their alters for advice or assista
influence of personality (e.g., Sasovova et al., 2010) and homophily (e.g., Mehra, Kilduff, &
formation suggests that the cognitive decision surrounding brokerage is unlikely to be an en
of matching needs to contacts. Do these also affect brokerage cognitions, such that broker
activate ties to individuals who are, for example, homophilous to the brokee?
This line of investigation dovetails with existing work on the homophilous pressures enc
and minority men in organizational networks (e.g., Ibarra, 1992, 1993, 1995) to highlight a
bias against members of these groups. It may be that not only do members of these group
to broker in organizational networks as suggested in prior work (Burt, 1992) but they are
brokees because individuals tend to cognitively activate homophilous ties. In aggregate, it m
performing brokers are those who can effectively overcome these cognitive constraints to
result in particularly fruitful and generative relationships within organizational networks
drives individual differences in returns to social capital from similar network structures
question in the social network literature and one to which CSS research is well positio
Extending and challenging accuracy as the source of network advantage
To date, the main focus of the CSS literature has been on illuminating the schémas f
result in biased perceptions of social networks. In the main, scholars have compared i
held cognitive maps of their networks to maps of the same network constructed f
between pairs of individuals to identify systematic differences between the tw
assumption here is that accuracy is best (Janicik & Larrick, 2005), but this assump
untested. Indeed, the narrow definition of network accuracy (i.e., ties confirmed a
framed by assumptions about the advantages of accuracy, has left many questions
advantage unanswered.
First, we know little about the dynamic interplay of social networks and cognitive n
cognitive maps of their social surrounds are more than just abstract representations - they
reality upon which people act. We already know that individuals expect their friends
reciprocate their affections for them and assume that their friends are also friends with ea
& Kilduff, 1999). Individuals also exaggerate the popularity and brokerage of those t
social go-betweens in informal networks of friendship in organizations (Kilduff et al., 200
tions affect how individuals interact with others: "...schema use may come at the pr
belief in cliques, an over-reliance on perceived brokers, and a tendency to neglect the perc
(Kilduff et al., 2008, p. 25). Prior work has highlighted the perils associated with such fail
for the effective management of organizations (Krackhardt, 1992) and for the careers
them (Flynn & Wiltermuth, 2010).
Future research could build on observations in the SNA literature to examine the int
and reality in organizational social networks. It may be the case that in acting on exaggera
of their social networks, individuals tend to reinforce social divides between informal gro
of prominent actors within organizational social networks. But it is also likely that the re
surrounding individuals will, at times, serve to interrupt their cognitions. For ins
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approach may not have the connections to others we seek; those we thought of as f
reciprocate our affections. What happens to CSS when reality interrupts? Schemas are hi
change because discontinuing information tends to be assimilated into established knowle
(Labianca, Gray, & Brass, 2000; Rousseau, 2001). But change is not impossible. Schemas a
structures acquired via experience that serve to order our experiences: where existing sché
reality to the point where they are no longer useful in this sensemaking process, they will cha
2001). For instance, individuals with experience in networks replete with structural holes
schémas for unbalanced relations that complement schémas for closure (Janicik & Larrick,
of enquiry has the potential to provide particular insight into scholarly knowledge sur
transitions (in which network cognitions are likely to be particularly influential): the s
success of new entrants, new managers and their success as leaders, and the success of in
management teams.
Another direction for future research would be an exploration of the overlap between
social networks. Researchers have focused on whether individuals' perceptions differ fr
terms of statistical significance, but few have examined the magnitude and direction o
(for an exception, see Grippa & Gloor, 2009). Are network cognitions merely exaggerati
that exist in reality (e.g., Kilduff et al., 2008) or do individuals' perceptions of the intera
depart entirely from those reported by the people involved in those relationships (e.g.,
Kilduff, 1999)?
Individuals may not be privy to the view of the relationship privately held by the two
it concerns, but research could consider other reference points. For instance, consensus
Romney et al., 1986) has been used to discover the 'actual network' by aggregating the
everyone in the social network (that is, a tie is said to exist if most of the network perc
than merely the two individuals whom the relationship concerns). Consensus analys
perceptions as social knowledge. Thus, differences between individuals' perception
network are seen as reflective not only of idiosyncratic differences in knowledge (i.e., so
but also of differences in social realities within the same network (i.e., the existen
subcultures within the network; Borgatti & Halgin, 2011). CSS research mainly understand
tween individuals' perceptions and reality as indicative of an underlying schema for relationshi
consensus analysis would shift this focus to understand differences between cognitions
indicative of the degree to which individuals are embedded in the shared schema for that parti
A key question for research would be to examine the extent to which accurate views of the so
are beneficial when the consensus network is the reference point. This line of work would
interesting in the context of teams where there is an inherent tension between individ
outcomes (e.g., Day & Carroll, 2004; Jackson et al., 1991). It seems intuitive that teams w
shared consensus structure would be likely to outperform teams with weaker consensus st
widely shared consensus structures are indicative of widely shared network schémas an
cohesion. But in teams in which widely shared consensus structures lead to the social exclu
uals with knowledge and skills that are critical to team tasks, the opposite may also be tru
we know that social hierarchies tend to be self-reinforcing because individuals defer to t
perceive to have high status and, in turn, those whom they perceive to have high statu
expectations by exhibiting dominant behavior (Magee & Galinsky, 2008). Individuals
high-status positions in team consensus networks are therefore likely to accrue real po
term, particularly from individuals whose own perceptions of the network align closely w
sus structure. Substantial work in SNA has examined the social structure underlying hi
teams (Balkundi & Harrison, 2006), but CSS research has not yet examined how network
affect team performance. The line of work suggested here has the potential to fill this
CSS literature.
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S98 R. A. BRANDS
Another key unanswered question pertains to whether biased perceptions of social n

benefit in some way. Prior work has suggested that to the extent that individuals have accu
of instrumental networks in organizations, they tend to be more powerful (Krackhard
because accurate perceptions of relationships allow them to exert greater social contro
new research shows that individuals, and in particular low-power people, benefited individu
network perceptions (Simpson, Markovsky, & Steketee, 2011a). But when accurate netwo
shared by others, low-power individuals experienced a collective cost in that shared accu
control of high-power individuals in the network (Simpson et al., 2011a). These results
in social network research between the individual and the group in terms of benefit and ex
has yet to be carried through to CSS research.
Building on this, a key direction for future work is to explore not only the positive conse
network perceptions but also the potential costs of accurately held views of the surroundin
do so might mean exploring not only different levels of analysis (as Simpson et al., 201
ferent outcomes. For example, we know that individuals tend to exaggerate the degree of re
own organizational friendships (Krackhardt & Kilduff, 1999). However, we know little
self-enhancing misreading of relationships has positive consequences for individuals. S
Dierendonck, Schaufeli, & Buunk, 1998) and belonging (Podolny & Baron, 1997) predict
ences in organizations (e.g., bumout and stress) - perhaps biased views of friendship networ
of well-being. Do those with accurate perceptions of friendship networks at work suffer an
spite their enhanced prowess in negotiating the web of relationships surrounding them? Th
these topics should alert researchers to the rich potential of this area.
Collective agency and organizational change
Social capital enables individuals working together to achieve more than individuals acting a
Putnam, 2000). Social network research on collective action has examined how the stru
network level underpins the success or failure of these movements (Marwell, Oliver, &
as how social network ties affect individuals' participation in collective action (Passy,
psychological processes are a key stream of literature in the collective action field (Va
2009), the interest in cognitive processes has not been carried through to social network per
Theories of shared or group identities, such as social identity theory (Turner et al., 1987),
scholarly understanding of the intra-individual processes that mediate the macro-level links
works and collective action. Networks of relationships are at the very heart of these theories i
viduals tend to cognitively activate different parts of their network according to what social id
salient in helping them achieve their goals (McLean, 1998). Group identities are a kind of cogn
make certain network ties more meaningful and therefore more likely to be activated than oth
ship between group schémas and networks is bidirectional: "Rather than it being only networ
vironment in which certain schemata make more sense and are more activated than others, ce
certain network ties more meaningful and more activated than others" (McLean, 1998, pp. 8
By highlighting the link between group identities and cognitive network activation, this
potential to yield new insights into research on organizational change, which by definition
tive agency (Armenakis, Harris, & Mossholder, 1993). Prior work has highlighted that o
events may be hindered by social identity groups that are vested in maintaining the status
2000). This finding is echoed in network research showing that informal social networks af
5A slightly different take on this issue that is beyond the scope of this review is contained within the literature that exam
schémas can be inferred from, and indeed shape, the structure of actual networks, for example, Bearman, Moody, an
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organizational change events (Krackhardt, 1992). A CSS approach could bridge these perspec
uals' social identities are made more or less salient during organizational change, they are
different parts of their network, mobilizing the social capital within these ties to recruit othe
sistance to the change event. But the bidirectional hypothesis suggests that it is also likely tha
works become activated via interaction, individuals' social identities will become more or less salient,
prompting buy-in or resistance to the change. These dual processes may complement or oppose one another
and are likely to do so to different degrees for different individuals (depending on their social identities and
ego networks). Thus, the cognitive activation approach is also well positioned to add insight into questions
about the role of individual agency in organizational change events (cf. Battilana & Casciaro, 2012).
Conclusion
Research in the domain of CSS has tended to focus on how individuals' network cognitions bias their views
of the world, with little focus on the consequences of these cognitive constraints for their outcomes. By
undertaking a critical review of the former, this review has sought to invigorate research on the latter, building
a research agenda from emerging work and relevant practitioner questions. Thus, if this review has one
overriding message, it is that in order for the CSS field to remain relevant to scholars and practitioners alike,
a strict focus on not only the description of CSS but also their consequences must be maintained.
Author biography
Raina A. Brands (PhD) recently joined the Organisational Behaviour Group at London Business School. Her
research examines social networks and cognition, with a particular focus on gender and racial bias, leadership
and emotions.
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Cognitive social structures in social network research: A review

Author(s): RAINA A. BRANDS

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/44508591

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Journal of Organizational Behavior, J. Organiz. Behav. 34, S82-S103 (2013)

Cognitive social structures in social network

Keywords: cognitive social structures; social networks; review

Received 30 April 2012

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Positioning Cognitive Social Structure Research

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Table 1. Articles reviewed.

Citation Methods Key findings

De Soto (1960) Paired-associates task Asymm

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Citation Methods Key findings

those who interact infrequentl

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Citation Methods Key findings

Simpson et al. (201 lb) Paired-associates task In

Cognitive social structure roster method

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Ego network method

Perceptions versus Reality in Social Network Research

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The Cognitive Organization of Social Networks

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Sandra GeorSe Sandra

positive relation, and

It is striking that although the actual social

Individual differences in perceptual a

Although social network research has been re

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(a) Two individuals' perceptions of their organizational friendship network with

(b) Actual organizational friendship network

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The Consequences of Cognitive Social Structures: Advantage and A

Accuracy as a source of advantage

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Cognitive social structures as a basis of action

Individuals navigate and coordinate complex networks of relationships as a matter of course in

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The social capital of cognitive ties

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Extending and challenging accuracy as the source of network advantage

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Another key unanswered question pertains to whether biased perceptions of social n

Collective agency and organizational change

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