9

The Third Military Regime

The military takeover was swift and peaceful. Bhutto, his cabinet colleagues
and the leading opposition leaders were arrested and kept in the `protective
custody' of the Army until 28 July. Martial law was imposed and the Chief of
Army Staff, General Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq, designated himself as the Chief
Martial Law Administrator (CMLA). Though President Fazal Illahi Chaudhry
was allowed to continue as the titular head of state, the executive authority
was vested in the CMLA, whose advice and recommendations were binding
on the President. The federal and provincial governments were dismissed
and national and provincial assembles were dissolved. The 1973 constitution
was suspended (described as held in abeyance) and it was provided that the
country would be run as closely as possible to the suspended constitution,
subject to the overriding powers of the CMLA. The country was divided into
five martial law zones,1 each with a Martial Law Administrator, directly
responsible to the CMLA. The Chief Justices of the provincial High Courts
were appointed acting Governors of the respective provinces as nominal
heads of civilian administration. A host of martial law regulations, inherited
from the earlier martial law regimes, were reimposed with necessary mo-
difications. Special and summary military courts were established to deal
with the cases under martial law regulations and orders and had the power to
impose various punishments including the death sentence, life imprison-
ment, confiscation of property, fines and imprisonment for various terms,
and lashing. Their judgements could not be challenged in regular courts but
the High Courts and the Supreme Court managed to exercise a limited
review power until March 1981.
The CMLA was assisted by a Military Council which included the Chair-
man, Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, the Chiefs of the Navy and the Air
Force, Chief of Staff to the CMLA, and Ghulam Ishaq Khan, a bureaucrat
who was designated as the Secretary General-in-Chief of the government.
Another important body was the Martial Law Administrators Conference,
which met periodically under the chairmanship of the CMLA, and included
the Martial Law Administrators of various zones, senior Army commanders

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H.-A. Rizvi, Military, State and Society in Pakistan

© Hasan-Askari Rizvi 2000
166 Military, State and Society in Pakistan

holding key positions, and some senior bureaucrats. Still another important
body was the Council of the Federal Secretaries (senior bureaucrats) who
headed different departments of the government and were responsible for
the implementation of the decisions of the other two bodies and looked after
the day-to-day affairs of the government. An Election Cell was set up in
August, headed by Lt.-General Faiz Ali Chishti, to deal with election-related
affairs. It also held regular consultations with different political leaders and
prepared position papers for the CMLA on politics and elections; it contin-
ued to function until March 1980.2 In January 1978, the Secretaries stopped
meeting as a body and a Council of Advisers was set up which included
civilians and some Army commanders. In July, this was reconstituted as
cabinet and the representatives of one of the PNA parties, the PML-Pagara,
were added. In August, when the cabinet was reconstituted to accommodate
other PNA parties, the serving Army officers were dropped. The induction of
a purely civilian cabinet did not change the dynamics of power manage-
ment. The cabinet was nothing more than a public relations exercise and it
had very little role in decision-making on key domestic and foreign policy
issues. Like the previous martial laws, a combination of the top brass of the
Army and the senior bureaucrats ruled the country. Several Army officers
were appointed to key civilian posts in the administration to reinforce the
dominance of the military.

Political Priorities

Zia-ul-Haq projected himself as a reluctant ruler who had assumed power

because the political leaders had failed to resolve the political crisis. That his
regime's agenda included the restoration of law and order, reduction of
political tension among the competing groups, holding of free and fair
elections and the transfer of power to the elected representatives. This was
to be a 90-day operation.3 In a statement, he declared: `I will not accept [any]
political office because I do not think I am fit for that.'4
However, as Zia-ul-Haq entrenched himself and outmanoeuvred his adver-
saries, he expanded the goals of the coup from elections to accountability,
Islamization of the polity and induction of decency in politics. He developed
a `saviour' or `messiah' complex and ruled the country with an aura of a God-
ordained mission to transform Pakistani society on Islamic lines. Claiming
that he was only accountable to God for his actions,5 Zia-ul-Haq maintained
that nobody could challenge a ruler in an Islamic state (e.g. Zia in Pakistan) if
he performed his duties in accordance with the Quran and the Sunnah,6
although he never gave an operational criterion for evaluating the perform-
ance of a ruler in an Islamic state. He minced no words in emphasizing that
he would not hand over power as long as the mission of Islamization and
moral renewal of the country was not completed. `We have no intention of
leaving power till the accomplishment of our objectives of Islamization of