Rainer Hampp Verlag

Rainer Hampp Verlag
Strategy Implementation Tactics as Response to Organizational, Strategic, and Environmental

Imperatives
Author(s): Johannes Lehner
Source: Management Revue, Vol. 15, No. 4, Special Issue: New Directions in Organizational
Behaviour (2004), pp. 460-480
Published by: Rainer Hampp Verlag
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460 Lehner:Strategy
Johannes Tactics
Implementation
Johannes Lehner*
Strategy Implementation Tactics as Response to

Organizational, Strategic, and Environmental Imperatives**
Based on previousliterature in the fieldsof strategyimplementation and leadershipre-

search tactics for strategy
implementation are identified.
Three categoriesproved em-
piricallyvalidin thisstudy:autocratictactics,participative tacticsand tacticswhichrely
on the givencultureof the organization.The paper is based on the assumptionthat
implementation in generalis dependenton environmental, strategicand organizational
variables.In thissense implementation tacticscan be interpreted as genuineorganiza-
tionalbehaviour.Based on a discussionof associationsof implementation tacticswith
thesevariablesit is hypothesizedthattheperceptionof environmental threatswilllead
to more autocratictactics,whereasthe existenceof a formulatedstrategy will rather
lead to moreparticipative tactics.No such relationshipsare predictedforculturaltac-
tics.A questionnaire-based measureof implementation tacticsis testedin a sampleof
136 Upper-Austrianfirmsby referring to implementation projectsor strategy related
issues. For a sub-sample(n=60) a moderatedregressionanalysison implementation
tacticswithmeasuresof organizationalstructure, the environment, the strategy,and
the interactionbetweenenvironmentand strategyas independentvariableswas per-
formed.It shows thatthe use of autocratictacticsis significantly explainedby envi-
ronmentalvariableswhereasparticipative explainedby theexis-
tacticsare significantly
tenceof a formulated strategywithin the organization. For Culture as an implementa-
tion tacticonly the interactionbetweenenvironmental and strategicvariableswas a
significant predictor.Implicationsfor futuretheorybuildingand empiricalresearch
into organizationalbehaviourin the contextof strategyformulation and strategy im-
plementation are discussed.
Key words: StrategyImplementation; Implementation Tactics, Organizational

Centralization,Uncertainty,Equivocality
* Prof.Dr.Johannes Lehner,
Johannes KeplerUniversität fürUnternehmens-
Linz,Institut
fiihrung,SchloßAuhof, A - 4040 Linz, Phone
Austria, ++43 732 2468 9127,Fax ++43
732 24688418.E-Mail:Johannes.lehner@jku.at.
** This fundedbythe"Jubiläumsfond Na-
derÖsterreichischen
studyis basedon research
tionalbank",ProjectNr.6585.
Article 15.2.2004
received:
Revisedversionacceptedafterdoubleblindreview:23.8.2004.
revue,vol 15,issue4, 2004
management 461
Manystudiesin thelong traditionof organizationalbehaviourresearchcould be quali-

fiedas generalbehaviouralresearch,as long as theydo not referto idiosyncratic con-
ditionswithintheorganization.Ratherthenpresentingnew methodologiesof research
the aim of thispaper is to seek new directionsby explicitly linkingbehaviouralinquiry
to relatedfieldsin organizationalresearch,in particularto organizationaltheoryand to
strategicmanagement.This linkis representedhere throughtacticsof strategy imple-
mentationas behaviouralpatterns,which are dependenton environmental, organiza-
tional,and strategic conditions.
There is stilllittleresearchon strategy implementation, comparedto the bulk of
literatureon the formulation and decisionpartsof the strategicprocess. Strategyim-
plementationinvolvesmultiplelevels of analysiswhich hindersthe developmentof
closed frameworksand of coherentstreamsof research.Consequently,researchers
have takena largediversity of perspectiveson implementation (Noble, 1999). It has
mainly been researched in regard to the fit between strategyand structure(e.g.
Galbraith/Kazanjian1986; Hrebaniak/Joyce 1984), buildingon the seminalwork of
Chandler(1962). This has been supplementedthroughstudiesof environmental and
organizationalcontingencies for strategies(Damanpour 1996). A different research
streamaddressesimplementation as a variantof leadershipprocesseson a conceptual
level (Bourgeois/Brodwin1984) or empirically(e.g. Nutt 1986). The lattertype of
studieslacks explicitreferencesto strategy content,withthe exceptionof an empirical
studyusingmultiple case studies by Waldersee and Sheather(1996). Some studieslink
strategytype (Hambrick/Mason 1984; Miller/Toulouse 1986; Miller/Ketsde Vries/
Toulouse 1982; Szilagy/Schweiger1984) or implementation(Gupta/Govindarajan
1984; Govindarajan1989; Nutt 1995) to managerialcharacteristics. However,thereis
a growingliteratureon the resource-basedview (Wernerfelt 1989; Barney 1991) or
competence-based view (Gorman/Thomas1997) of the firm,emphasizingtheimpor-
tanceof organizationalprocessesand capabilitiesforsustainedcompetitiveadvantage.
Barneyand Zajac (1994), forexample,called forresearchinto competitiveorganiza-
tionalbehaviour,whichshould linkbehaviouralprocesseswithinorganizationsto the
typeof strategy or to competitivebehaviourof the firm.Other authorscriticizetradi-
tionaldistinctions betweenstrategy formulation and implementation and rathersee it
as interwovenaspects of the strategy process (Chakravarthy/Doz1992; Floyd/Lane
2000). However,despitesuch earlycalls forresearchinto behaviouralaspectsof strat-
egymaking,progressin thisarea is stillratherlimited.
This paper triesto contributein this regardby conceptualizingstrategyimple-
mentationas the locus wherebehavioursurfacesas trulyorganizationaland competi-
tive,and by referring to organizationaland strategicconditions.Because of the men-
tionedpaucityof studieson strategy implementation, such a directionof researchis
new, even if it calls forrather traditionalmethods. There is some researchon behav-
ioural processes in the context of strategicmanagement(Schreyögg1984; Mitroff
1983; Shrivastava/Nachman 1989). These studiesidentify a limitedset of behavioural
patterns which can be observedin all contextsof the strategy process.In the following
firstsectionI willdistinguishfivepatterns,sometimescalled models or tacticsforim-
plementation, whichwillbe reducedto threeempirically distinguishable tactics.
462 Lehner:Strategy
Johannes Tactics
Implementation
As introducedalreadyabove, behaviouralpatternsshall be qualifiedhere as or-

ganizationalbehaviour,if they can be shown to be dependent on strategicand
organizationalconditions.For this, I will describe in the second section strategy
typesthat seem to be most descriptivein regardto implementationtactics.In the
thirdsectionpossible environmentaland organizationalvariableswill be postulated
to influencethe use of implementationtactics.This will be the basis forformulating
hypothesesabout the link between strategytype,organizationaland environmental
variablesand implementationtactics,which will be testedin the empiricalpart of
thepaper.
Implementation tactics
The firstattemptto explicidylink behaviouralpatternsto the contextof strategic
managementhas been the distinctionof implementation tacticsthroughBourgeois
and Brodwin(1984). However,theseauthorsneithertriedto connectto otherconcep-
tualizationsof organizationalbehaviour,especiallyin regardto organizationalleader-
ship,nor did thisframework lead to anyempiricalstudies.The firstgap shallbe closed
in thissection.The tacticsidentifiedby Bourgeoisand Brodwin(1984) willbe the ba-
sis forthis,because theycover the rangeof implementation tactics,identifiedin all
otherpreviousstudies.To describerelevanttactics,however,I will not onlyreferto
studiesof implementation, but to all parts of the strategicprocess which includes
strategyformulationas well. Therefore,these tacticswill be describedin regardto
theirunderlying paradigmof strategy analyses,in regardto theused leadershipbehav-
iours,and in regardto dominantcriteriaof efficiency.
Command
Manyviewson strategic planningare based on the assumptionof a rationalactorwho
is able to implementa once chosen strategy throughcommand (Bourgeois/Brodwin
1984) or edict (Nutt 1986). Command as an implementation tacticparallelsrational
modes of organizational decisionmakingin general(e.g.Allison 1971) and forstrategy
formulation in particular(Bailey/Johnson1995; Lyles/Thomas1988). A similarde-
scription is used by Godard (1999), who examinedreformsin regardto the degree
they have been implementedmethodologically. This includes especiallythe use of
planned step-by-step processes and extensive support fromtop-management. Pure
methodological tacticsare equivalent to command because both avoid participation
throughsubordinates.Methodologicaltacticsonly substitutethe autocraticdecision
makerthroughan impersonalor bureaucratic process (Türk1995).
To implementby commandsome source of strongpower is needed,whichis ei-
ther provided through a machine-likebureaucratichierarchy,through exclusive
knowledge,or throughcontrolover boundaries(French/Raven1959). In the latter
case, managerstryto get complianceby referring to externallydeterminedrulesof the
if
marketor thelaw. The use of commandis likely managers have strongpersonalin-
terestin a chosen course of action,ifit seems to be of utmostimportanceforthe or-
ganization,and if alternativesto the course are not availableor perceivedto be of sig-
nificantlowervalue (Nutt 1989b). Command is dominantin two leadershippatterns
identifiedby Shrivastavaand Nachman (1989) in regardto strategyformulation. The
management 463
strategyprocess is of entrepreneurialnatureif the strategyis primarily formedby one

person,whichis the case most frequently in smallorganizationswitha simplestruc-
ture.In largerorganizationsit becomes bureaucratic, where the focus is on internal
processes and internal efficiency.The dominant aim in all of these cases and in all
stagesof the strategicprocess is to reactto threats.The more threatsare enactedor
the higherthe competitivepressuresthe more methodologicaland planned strategic
implementation processeswillbe utilized(Godard 1999).
Politics / Change Model
Command and implementation throughedict assume a splitof the organizationinto
thinkersand doers (Bourgeois/Brodwin1984). This is associatedwith a strongem-
phases on strategy formulation comparedto implementation, withthelatterviewedas
a subordinateproblem.In contrast,therelationship betweenstrategy and implementa-
tion is reversedwhen the organizationis construedas a politicalsystem(e.g. March
1962). Bourgeoisand Brodwin(1984) stresstheneed forpoliticalskillsof managersin
theimplementation model whichtheylabel "changemodel". I use the term"politics",
because it seemsmoredescriptiveforits core ingredients. The underlying principlesof
the change model and of politicalmodes of organizationaldecision makingare the
same. In such a view,eitherstrategiesemergefromchosen courses (Mintzberg1973)
or strategiesare evaluatedprimarily based on the likelihoodof implementation suc-
cess. Implementationin the sense of politics or the change model is characterized
throughisolated interventions, by changingsingleaspects of planning,information
systemsor incentivesystems.Most efficient in thisregardare changesof performance
standardswhich are used forevaluation,because theyencouragedesiredbehaviours.
For this,especiallyin politicalcontexts,implementation and evaluationare strongly
linked (Pressman/Wildavsky 1973). Similarly, Maitlis and Lawrence (2003) interpret
as of
strategicprocesses sequences political and discursive stages,wherethe latterin-
cludes the definitionof evaluationstandards.However,theseauthorsuse the concept
of "politics"in a sense,whichincludesa widerset of behaviourscomparedto its tra-
ditionaluse as an implementation tactic(similarly Buchanan/Badham1999). Conse-
quently,theyderivepropositionsabout the linkbetweenthe skillsof agentsin regard
to politicalbehaviourand strategicsuccess or failure.
Organizationalmembersplay different roles in command compared to politics.
Because subordinatemembersof the organization,representedthroughopinions,in-
terests,and goals,have a much strongervoice in politicsthanin command,a political
tacticmay be applied in a broaderset of organizationalor environmental configura-
tions.Still,thereare some conditionswhichincreasethe likelihoodof politicalbehav-
iour forimplementation. Especiallytwo conditionsshould be presentsimultaneously.
The firstconditionis the availability of at least two alternatives, whichare not signifi-
cantlydifferent in regardto theiroverallinstrumentality forthe strategicgoals (equifi-
nality).The second conditionis the utmostimportanceof acceptanceof a selectedal-
ternative.If, forexample,a certaingoal is not acceptableforpowerfulgroups,an al-
ternative willbe chosen whichleads to an acceptable,but different goal, and whichat-
tainsthe originalgoal as a side-effect (Yanow 1993). Instead of searchingforthe op-
timalalternative, a course is chosen thatfulfills all criteriato a satisfying (or satisfi^ing)
464 Lehner:Strategy
Johannes Tactics
Implementation
degreeand forwhichthe acceptanceby all relevantstakeholdersis likely.To increase

the likelihoodof acceptancesome formof participation will be observedbeforeand
during formulation or Frequendy
implementation. this will resultin the formingof
coalitions,pacts (Chakravarthy/
Gargiulo1998), and in informal cooptation(Selznick
1966). However,underpolitics,participationis limitedto providinginformationfor
decisionmakersor to eliminatesourcesof opposition(Selznick1966). It does not in-
clude an influenceon the outcome of the decisionbeyondthe selectionof informa-
tion.
Collaboration
More thanin politics,participation playsa keyrole forcollaboration.The difference
in
betweenparticipation politics and in collaborationlies againin therole of organiza-
tionalmembers.Whereasboth commandand politicsassume a differentiation within
theorganizationbetweenthinking membersand actingmembers,thisdistinction is re-
laxed in the collaborativemodel (Bourgeois/Brodwin1984). This providesparticipa-
tionwitha different meaning.Participation undercommandor politicsis autocraticin
the sense thatcoursesare not chosen dependingon the qualityof a course as it is per-
ceived by subordinates.Instead,the only motivationforparticipationis acceptance.
Withcollaboration,both acceptanceand qualityare focused,as it is suggestedin the
model of Vroom and Yetton(1973).
Implementationin the sense of collaborationinvolves the whole organization.
Thereforeit is similarto approachesthatare discussedby Tichy (1983) forstrategic
changeor by Beer and Eisenstat(2000; 2004) forstrategy implementation. There,fre-
quendylaboratories, retreatsand seminars with external consultants are used, because
of theirpotentialto facilitateorganicprocesses and change (Greiner/Bhambri 1989).
Further, taskforcesare created,withoutlinesof authority, as an additionto the formal
organizationalstructure. The goal is to arriveat a consensualimplementation. Such
processes have been found to lead to the fulfillment
of objectives which are set by the
managers with a high likelihood. But they do not necessarily meet economic criteria
(Godard 1996).
Market
Both forformulation and forimplementation of strategies,the idea of emergent(e.g.
Mintzberg 1973; Quinn 1980) or growing (labeled "crescive"by Bourgeoisand Brod-
win 1984) coursesof actionhas attractedresearchersand practitioners.In such a view
the organizationis seen as a marketof ideas, of possible strategies, or of alternative
implementation courses of which one
eventually particular alternative is selected.The
organizedanarchy(Cohen/March/Olson1972) as a for
paradigm strategy analysisfol-
lows similarprinciples.Stillolder is the idea of VilfredoPareto (1897, citedin Vohra
1984) to createa procedureforplanningwhich simulatesmarketforces.Instead of
seekingacceptanceof a previouschosen course,as it is thecase withpolitics,withcol-
laboration,and witha cultureorientedtactic(see below), the marketwaitsforemerg-
ingalternativesforimplementation. Eventuallya particular alternative is selectedout.
By referring to principal-agent theory,Bourgeois and Brodwin (1984) consider
thispattern(the crescivemodel in theirterminology) as most successful.A second-
management 465
best alternative
chosen by theagentis morelikelyto be implementedsuccessfully than
a first-best
solutionselectedby the principal,forwhichthe riskof effortavoidanceis
higher.This patternis seen to be similarto incrementalapproachesto strategy mak-
ing. Therefore,it seems to overcome problems with planningin an uncertainworld.
If,however,thereare no higher-level criteriaforevaluatingemergingalternatives,
then
the dangerof divergingcourseswhichdo not resultinto a coherentpatternof strate-
gic behaviouris high.Thereforeit seems thatthe marketof ideas has to be controlled
throughleadershipand by comprehensively formulatedstrategieswhichallow the se-
lectionof a cohesivepatternof implementation courses.
Culture
Beyond the continuumbetween autocraticand participativemodes of implementa-
tion,manyauthorsidentifya behaviouralpatternwhich mightbe summarizedunder
the label culture.Still,participation of organizationalmembersis importantfora cul-
turalmodel of implementation. However,hereit is onlyone possibilityamong others
to convincemembersthata chosen courseis thebest alternative forthemand forthe
whole organization.This approacheitherbuildson an existingculturewhichsupports
a strategy and its implementation withinthe whole organizationor it triesto change
the culturein orderto receivethe desired support.In the lattercase a core part of
strategy implementation is seen in the creationof an organizationalculturewhich fits
the strategy (Denison 1990). As partof theculture,sharedvalues maysignificantly de-
terminethe success of implementation efforts(Badovick/Beatty1987). For thisit is
importantthatthesevalues are compatiblewiththeintentionsof the strategy. A study
of Fox-Wolfgramm, Boal and Hunt (1998) describeshow a givenculturemayhinder
implementation of change.In particular, the identityof a defenderbank and its image
made it impossibleto implementthe requiredchange. Similarly, Fiol and O'Connor
(2002) show that "inside-out approaches", where members of a culturedefinethe
problems to be solved themselves, tend to lack initiative and thereforeare unable to
drivesignificant departures from existingidentity In
perceptions. contrast,identity and
imageof a prospectorbank in the Fox-Wolfgramm et al. (1998) studywere consistent
withtheimplementation need.
Somewhatdifferent is the idea thatany culturecan be systematically used to im-
a
plement strategy. In this sense, the label "culture" as an implementation tacticsub-
sumes all behaviourswhich tryto create or use a given cultureforimplementation.
Such behavioursare internalmarketingforimplementation, persuasionthroughthe
referenceto highervalues, to generalideas, to norms,or to personal friendship and
loyalty(Falbe/Yukl 1992). This has much in common with transformational leader-
ship (Bass 1985). Culturallyorientedtacticsare frequently used in conjunctionwith
other tactics.An example is the descriptionof a "culturallysensitive"approach
throughBate, Kahn and Pye (2000), whereculturein the sense used hereis onlyused
in the firststage of the process ("culturalframing"),whereasthe remainingprocess
utilizesmainlycollaborativeimplementation tactics.Despite the differencebetween
viewing the culture as a condition versus as a tactic,thesetwo viewsconverge,because
the useof cultureas an implementation tacticalmostalwaysdriftsinto a change of cul-
tureas partof a strategic changeprocess.
466 Lehner:Strategy
Johannes Tactics
Implementation
Culturallyorientedtacticshave been criticizedbecause of theirtotalitarian flavour

(Bourgeois/Brodwin 1984), which means that much effort is spent on persuading all
involvedpartiesto believe in the effectiveness of a course of action. In thisrespect
cultureresemblespersuasionas an implementation tacticwhichhas been identified by
Nutt (1986) as themost frequent, although not the most successfultactic.For persua-
sion, expertstake a major role. They provideargumentsfora course and induce an
impressionof rationality. Both persuasionthroughexpertsand a strongculturecan
harmorganizationaleffectiveness if eitherthepressuretowardsa homogenousorgan-
izationalcultureor rationalitybeliefsdiscouragememberswhichare importantto the
organizationbut thatdo not fitintothecultureor whichfollowa different paradigm.
The descriptionof implementation tacticsin thissectionshows thatthe firsttwo
tactics,thatis commandand politics/changeare both ratherautocratic.They can be
subsumedunder the label "tell/sell" (a termborrowedfromLocke/Latham1990) ,
because in both cases participation has the limitedpurpose of providinginformation
and of increasingthechance of acceptancefora decisionwhichwas made solelybyei-
theran autocraticdecisionmakeror by a rationalmethodology.In contrast,both col-
laborationand the marketas implementation tacticsutilizeparticipationto a highde-
gree in a way which gives subordinate a
groups strong voice and the possibilityto in-
fluencethe selectionof courses of action.Therefore,the fiveimplementation tactics
describedhere can be viewed as firstorderfactorsand autocraticversusparticipation
as second orderfactorsforimplementation tactics.This distinctionis fruitful
because
manyof thevariablesproposed in the nextsectionto influencetheuse of implemen-
tationtacticswillreferto these second orderfactorsratherthanto firstorderfactors.
Further,the continuumbetweenautocraticor directiveversusparticipative behaviour
is well establishedin leadershipresearch(e.g. Heller/Yukl1969). Only cultureas an
implementation tacticremainsas a singlecategory,which formsan independentdi-
mensionby being close to transformational leadership(Bass 1985), on the one hand,
and, on the other hand,by possiblyincorporating aspectsof both autocraticand par-
ticipativetactics,dependenton the organization. Table 1 summarizesthe above char-
acterizationof implementation tactics.
Table 1: Implementation Tactics
AutocraticTactics, Tactics
Participative
"Teli& Sell"
Command Change/ Culture Collaboration Crescive/
Politics Market
Description, Edict, Intervention,Conviction, Participation, Pareto-
underlying rational power process process process,
organic
paradigms actor games, orientation organized
secure anarchy
control
Basisof Pressure, Coalition Reference Consultation Owner-ship
acceptance legitimate tovalues, exchange, byagent,
power norms, bargaining pilot
projects
friendship,
loyalty,
history
management 467
The context of implementation tactics

Buildingon the framework of Keats and Hitt (1988), I view strategy implementation
in generaland the choice of implementation tacticsin particularas a consequence of
the perceptionof the environment, of the organizationalcontextand of the chosen
strategy(see Figure1). In this section I will presentargumentsthatautocraticversus
participative and
tactics, the use of cultureas a tacticare dependenton the organiza-
tionalcontext,and eitherare responsesto environmental perceptionsor to strategic
imperatives.For this,I describein the followinga minimumset of organizational, en-
vironmental and strategiccontextvariables.
Figure1: The contextofstrategy
implementation fromKeats/Hitt,
(modified 1988)
Organizational context
Despite the much discussed shortcomingsof the classical contingencyframeworks
and the configuration approachesto organizationaldesign (Mintzberg1979) theyal-
low to conclude thatmanagerialbehaviourin generaland the choice of implementa-
tion tacticsis dependenton the structuralconditionswithinthe organization.First,
almost all organizationalcharacteristicsare to some extentinfluencedby the size of
the organization,especiallythe degreeof centralization and the degreeof formaliza-
tion (e.g. Damanpour 1992; Pugh/Hickson1976). Usuallyformalization is seen as a
substituteforleadership(Gutenberg1958; Kerr/Jermier 1978). However, formaliza-
tionis alwaysrestricted to routinetasks.Strategy implementation reachesbeyondrou-
tine,because, by definition, existingrules and program, to which formalizationis re-
ferring to, have to be changed. Therefore formalizationwill not reduce the need to
apply implementation tactics.Rather, their applicationmay lead to new formalized
rules,which subsequentlymay substituteleadership.Similarly, any typeof divisionof
468 Lehner:Strategy
Johannes Tactics
Implementation
labor withinthe organizationand a high degree of specializationwill increase the

complexity of thetaskof implementation. In organizationswithveryspecializedfunc-
tionalunitsimplementation projects have to cross boundariesbetween existingde-
partments and between groups.Therefore,any formof specializationand of division
of laborwillincreasetheneed to coordinateimplementation efforts.
This need will surfacein variousforms.An implementation projectin a largeand
will
complexorganization require much use of standard tools of projectmanagement,
will frequendy utilizethe help of externalconsultants,and willinvolvea higherabso-
lutenumberof organizationalemployeesthanin a simplestructure. Althougheach of
these conditionsmay be used in associationwith each singleimplementation tactic,
the merequantityand varietyof conditionsmake it ratherunlikelythata singletactic
will be used. There are severalreasons forthe use of a combinationof different im-
plementation tacticsunderthe conditionsdescribedhere.First,the standardmodel of
project management(e.g. Project ManagementInstitute's1996, PMBOK) contains
methodswhichdiffer in regardto theimplementation tactictheysupport.For example,
rationalaspectsand formalization tools suggestautocratictactics,whereastools forteam
worksupportparticipative tactics.Second, externalconsultantsdifferin regardto their
background and their favourite managementstyles.Thereforethe emphasisof one or
theotherimplementation tacticis largelydependenton thechoiceof consultants. Third,
the higherthe numberof organizational membersinvolvedin the process,the higher
thelikelihoodthatdifferent tacticswillbe used,becausewithmoreorganizational mem-
bersthediversity of preferences forimplementation tacticswillincrease.
In summary, althoughorganizational size willbe themostimportant correlate,it is
onlyvia the need forhigherorganizational complexity that size will be followedby an
increaseduse of a varietyof implementation tactics.We expectmore use of all imple-
mentationtacticswithincreasingdivisionof labouror decreasingcentralization of tasks.
More generally, anyincreaseof organizational complexity willincreasetheneed to utilize
implementation tacticsfora non-routine tasksuchas strategy implementation.
• Hypothesis 1: The use of all implementation tacticsis positivelyassociatedwith
organizational
complexity.
Environment and Strategy Formulation
The organizationis not thesole sourceof complexity. Environmental conditions,such
as uncertainty,dynamism,hostility, the numberof relevantcomponentsin the envi-
ronment,and the interrelationships betweenthese components,all increasethe per-
ceivedcomplexity or theperceivedthreatformanagement.Here, I willnot go intothe
detailsof potentialreactionsto such conditionsin termsof organizationaladaptation.
Rather,I will focus on the role of strategyformulation and strategy implementation
fordealingwithenvironmental threats.Strategyformulation and strategycontentas a
resultof the formulation is
process part of the contextfor implementation because
thereare basically two which
possibilities, produce fundamentally different
impera-
tivesforimplementation: Eithera strategyis explicidyformulatedor it emerges.
FirstI willdeal withthe lattercase, whichcan be foundin organizationswithan
incrementalmode of adaptation(Quinn 1980, Mintzberg1973) or in reactorfirms
(Miles/Snow1978). In such organizationsmanagersresponsibleforstrategicprojects
management 469
will have to respond to environmental conditionsdirectly.They will choose imple-

mentationtacticsaccordingto theirperceptionof the environment. This has a cogni-
tiveand a motivationalaspect,both formanagementand forall othermemberswhich
are involvedin the implementation process.The cognitiveaspect is reflectedthrough
the problemswhich are perceivedto be dominant.Both managersin chargeof the
strategic process as well as involvedsubordinateswillprimarily drawtheirattentionto
the environment if it is perceivedas highlyuncertainor highlydynamic.Theywill en-
act the controllingof environmental circumstancesas instrumental fortheirpersonal
motives.Any such attemptwillbe accepted.Because implementing managerswillalso
enactthisinstrumentality, theywillsee litdeneed to involveorganizational membersin
theirdecisions.Rathertheywilluse implementation tacticsto increasetheircontrolover
the flowof events.For this,autocratictactics,such as commandand politics,will be
more appropriatethanparticipative tacticsand culturaltactics.First,autocratictactics
usuallywork fasterthan participativeor culturaltactics,therebyallowingquickreactions
to new situations(Vroom/Yetton1979). Second,autocratictacticsguaranteethatthose
decisionsare implementedwhich the managerin chargeperceivesto be required.By
definition, no compromisesare necessary.Althoughthelatterholds always,thisadvan-
tagewillbe weightedhigherin situationswithpressingdemandsfromtheenvironment,
thanin situations whereinternal requirements of theorganization aredominant.
The motivationalaspect of autocratictacticsrefersto the need forreducingun-
certaintyon the side of subordinates.It has been argued that conditionsof envi-
ronmentaluncertaintywill increase the need for any type of leadership (House/
Spangler/Woycke 1991) and thatthe interactionbetweendifferent formsof leader-
ship with environmental uncertainty contributes to
significandy organizationalper-
formance(Waldman/Ramirez/House 2001). All of thesestudies,by inquiringtransac-
tionaland charismaticformsof leadership,referto ratherautocraticformsof leader-
ship.Autocratictacticshave instrumentality forthismotivationalaspect. These argu-
mentslead to the followinghypothesis.
• Hypothesis2: (a) Autocratictacticswill be used dependenton the existenceof
theenvironmental conditionsof uncertainty and equivocality.
Basically the reversed argumentationapplies to participativeforms of leadership.
Those can not servethe need to reduceuncertainty, because underparticipation sub-
ordinatewould stillhave to deal withconditionsof uncertainty. Especiallyuncertain
and equivocal conditionslikelylead to long discussionswhen participative or cultural
tacticsare used,because interpretations of theseconditionswillvarylargely.Therefore
the outcome of participative or culturally orientedprocessesis hardlypredictableun-
der such circumstances. Consequendy,implementing managerswillavoid such tactics.
Still,participation, especially as it is representedthroughintensivegroup discus-
sions,may be functional to reduce uncertainty and equivocality.But the considerations
discussedfortheuse of autocratictacticsmaykeep implementing managersawayfrom
participativetactics.Because of theexistenceof thesetwo opposingforces,no explana-
torypowerof environmental conditionsforparticipative tacticscan be expected.
• Hypothesis2 (b) Participativetacticsand culturaltacticswill not be explained
throughenvironmental conditions.
470 Lehner:Strategy
Johannes Tactics
Implementation
Implementation and Strategy Content

Havingdescribedhow environmental conditionsaffecttheuse of implementation tac-
tics,I will turnnow to the impact of strategycontentin this regard.Generally,the
formulation of a strategymay be viewed as a reactionto environmental conditions
through a dominant coalition (Huff/Huff/Thomas 1992; Miles/Snow 1978). It has
been shownthatperceivedenvironmental hostilityincreases the degreeof analytically
formulatedstrategies(Miller/Friesen1983). By reactingto environmental threatsor
opportunities withthe formulation of a strategy top managementsets a new context
forsubsequentmanagerialactionssuch as strategy implementation. As a consequence,
formanagersresponsibleforstrategy implementation the formulated strategyis more
relevantas a guidelinethanenvironmental conditions.
To examinetherole of strategy contentas a contextforstrategy implementation,
we will concentrateon the continuumbetweenefficiency orientedstrategieson the
one hand, comprisingdefenderstrategies(Miles and Snow 1978) or cost leadership
(Porter1980), and innovationorientedstrategieson the otherhand,comprisingpros-
pectorstrategies, entrepreneurial qualitystrategiesor otherformsof growth
strategies,
stratégies.There is some evidence (Waldersee/Sheather 1996) thatautocratictactics
are preferred to implementefficiency orientedstrategies. If a defenderstrategy is cho-
sen and if uncertainty is high,commandwillmost likelybe used to reducethisuncer-
tainty.Waldersee and Sheather (1996) found a significantly strongeremphasis of
commandand controlin firmswithdefendingstrategiescomparedto firmswithen-
trepreneurial strategies.This view is partiallysupportedthroughSchneider(1997),
who also findsincreasedautocratic("controlling")approachesin a defenderbank,but
in a rathercertainenvironment, comparedto a prospectorbank in a more uncertain
or dynamicenvironment.
Despite the found associationbetween efficiency orientedstrategiesand auto-
cratictactics,strategy implementation always triesto move the organizationbeyond
the statusquo (Huffet al. 1992). For this,autocratictacticsmightbe dysfunctional,
because significant change requiresacceptancefromvariousinterestgroups.For ex-
ample, importantinstrument
an of politicsis the buildingof coalitionsamonggroups
of stakeholders. But coalitionshold onlyas long as the stakesstayconstant.Any ex-
plicitlyformulatedstrategy, on the other hand, poses a possible threatto existing
stakeswithinthe organizationby changingprioritiesof projects,or by alteringthe
relativeimportanceof departments(Guth/MacMillan1986; Collier/Fishwick/Floyd
2004). Therefore,when a formulatedstrategyexists,participation will be used most
likelywhenevertop managementor middlemanagementtriesto changethe organiza-
tionto some extent.This is the case forall kindsof innovationstrategiesor forpros-
pectorstrategies, because innovationneeds freeinformation flow,highintrinsic moti-
vation,highacceptanceof chosen courses,emphasison communication, participation
in decisionmaking,and a developmentof humanresourcesforinnovation.Jointdeci-
sion makingand pilot studieshave been foundto be associatedwithprospectiveor
entrepreneurial strategies(Waldersee/Sheather 1996). But even if thegoal is to reduce
costs,participative approaches will be used. First,if the need to reduce costs can not
be legitimized throughenvironmental threats,but has to be derivedfroma formulated
strategy,thenmanagementwillhave to convinceorganizationalmembersof its neces-
management 471
sity.Whereaspoliticaltacticsmayplay some role forthis,a highdegreeof participa-

tionand, possibly,a sharedvision (Collieret al. 2004) willbe necessaryforthe accep-
tanceof strategiesand theirassociatedimplementation measures.Also, withparticipa-
tion it is more likelyto identify the best options to reduce costs withoutthreatening
core functionswithinthe firmand withoutsacrificing too much of the qualityof its
productsand services.Thereforewe assume thatanyformulated strategywilllead to a
use of participative implementation tactics.
• Hypothesis3 (a) Participativetacticswill be used to the extentthat formulated
strategies exist.
Neitherenvironmental conditions,nor the strategy contentallow a clearpredictionof
a preferencefor a culturalmode of implementation. Ratherwe assume thatculture
willbe used deliberately or as a supplementto othertacticsif those tacticsappear not
to be sufficient to reactto environmental conditionsor to the formulatedstrategy.For
example, the simultaneous of
perception high environmental threatsand the existence
of a formulatedstrategy could lead to the use of cultureforimplementation. Because
of thelack of a theoreticalfoundationforthis,no explicithypothesisis formulated in
thiscase.
Similarly, forthe use of autocratictacticsno associationwith formulatedstrate-
gies can be expected.On the one hand,because of the above arguments, participative
tacticswillbe favouredwiththepresenceof formulated On the otherhand,
strategies.
because of the fearof long delaysthroughdiscussions,or the prospectof potential
conflicts, managersmaystillapplyautocratictacticsto some extent.
• Hypothesis3 (b) Autocraticand culturaltacticswillnot be used dependenton the
existenceof formulated strategies.
Method
Previous empiricalresearchon implementation tacticsused multiplecase studyde-
signswithcases providedthroughinterviewsof managers.Subsequendy,these cases
have been classifiedinto implementationtactics (Nutt 1986, 1987, 1989b, 1995).
Waldersee and Sheather(1996), who also performeda multiplecase studydesign,
ratedthe use of seven leadershipstylesproposed by Mitroff(1983) on Likertscales.
The presentstudyis the firstfieldstudyinto theuse of implementation tactics.In par-
we
ticular, examined behaviour in actual implementation projects which were going
on at thetimeof thestudy.The studywas cross-sectional byincluding a broad rangeof
organizations.Given the lack of previouscomparablestudies, no standardized meas-
urementinstruments have been availableforimplementation tacticsand itwas necessary
to developa questionnaireinstrument to represent
thefiveimplementation tactics.
Sample and Field Procedures

Data are based on questionnairesto executivesin 135 firmsof the Upper Austrian
Machineand EngineeringIndustry, Bankingand the Food Industry.This heterogene-
ous set of industrieshas been chosen to produce a rangeof implementationprojects
as wide as possible. Data have been collected as part of a largerempiricalproject
throughinterviewsconductedby a researchassistantduringa four-month period in
1997 and 1998. As part of the interviewsrespondentsansweredthe questionnaire
472 Lehner:Strategy
Johannes Tactics
Implementation
itemsforthisstudy.The interviewsfollowedthe followingsequence: At the startof

theinterviewa singleprojector issue was identified whichfulfilled the followingcrite-
ria: To be of significantimportance for the organization as a whole and to be non-
routine.Throughthisit should be ensuredthatthe projectwas partof a strategy im-
in
plementationeffort,withoutdirectlyaskingquestions regardto the strategy. The
majorityof implementation projectsidentifiedthroughthisprocedurewere relatedto
the implementation of information technology(IT; 20%), followedby reorganization
or
projects processimprovements (16%), productdevelopments(11%), directinvest-
mentin foreigncountries(8%), and expansionof existingplants(6%). Afterthisiden-
tificationstepa questionnairehas been answeredby the same executivewiththe scales
forimplementation tactics.Furtherquestionnaireitems containedthe measuresfor
organizationalstructure and environmental variables.
To minimizecommonsourcebias,in additionto thefirstinterview a secondexecu-
tiveat the same or a higherhierarchicallevelhas been givena questionnaire withopen
endedquestionsin regardto thestrategy of thefirm.Questionshave been coded by the
authorand answersweregroupedinto the strategy categoriesforthispaper (see below
fordetails).The finalsample forthetestof hypothesesconsistsof thosefirms(n=60) in
whichwe were able to conductboth interviews. Validationof measuresis based on a
largersampleof 135 firms, forwhichthefirst interview has been conducted.
Measures
Organizationalcomplexity is measuredthroughitemsforstandardization (a =.89) and

formalization(a=.67) (Pugh/Hickson 1976). For environmental uncertainty two
itemsfromMillerand Toulouse (1986) have been translatedinto German. additionIn
to uncertainty,whichyieldeda ratherlow reliability (a=.67), a three-item measurefor
dynamism(a=.62) and fouritems measuringequivocal demands fromthe environ-
ment(equivocality, a=.81) have been constructed.All itemsare listedin the Appen-
dix.As a controlvariablethe size of the organizationin termsof numberof employ-
ees has been assessed also. The literature on strategicmanagementpresentsmanydif-
ferentconceptualizationsof strategycontent or formulatedstrategies.Instead of
measuringthe existenceof formulated strategiesby lookingon documentscontaining
explicitformulationsof strategy, we chose to classifythe contentsof competitive
strategy.This was done by the author,based on the information givenby the execu-
tivein thequestionnaire. A colleagueof the authordid thisclassification fora random
subset of 30 firms,which resultedin the same classificationin all of the cases. For
classificationpurposes,the frameworkof Miles and Snow (1978) proved sufficient,
which distinguishes Defender,Prospector(Analyzeras a combinationhas not been
identified)and Reactor firms.Two dummyvariableshave been createdforDefender
and Prospectorstrategy. Accordingto Miles and Snow theReactortypeis treatedas the
residualcategory,signifying theabsenceof a formulated For thepurposeof test
strategy.
of hypothesesonly the latteris of which
interest, is eitherthe presenceof a strategy(De-
fenderor Prospector)or its absence (Reactor).However, additionalanalysisthedis-
for
tinctionbetweenDefenderand Prospectorstrategies has also been used.
management 473
Althoughits frequentcitationin the literature no measureshave been available

forimplementation tactics.For examplePrasa (1999), who uses Bourgeoisand Brod-
win's (1984) classification,employs a self-typing instrumentwith five measures.
Therefore,as measures for implementationtacticstwo items have been newlycon-
structedforeach of theabove describedfivepatterns.Englishtranslations are givenin
theAppendix.Itemshave been ratedon Likert-type scales.
five-point
Results
To confirmthe questionnaireitems as measuresfor implementation tacticsa factor
analysishas been performed on the 10 items.I compareda fivefactorsolution(forthe
fivetacticsdescribedabove) witha three-factor solutionwhichdistinguishes onlybe-
tweenautocratic, participativeand culture oriented In
tactics. terms of confirming the
proposed factorsthe factoranalysis and the subsequent VARIMAX-rotation suggested
a clearpreferenceforthe threefactorsolution,confirming the measuresforautocratic,
participative,and culturaltactics.The loadingson the proposed factorsare shown in
Table 2. Reliability
in termsof Cronbach-a (bottomlinein Table 2) is above .65 forall
items.Althoughthe reliability is acceptableforthe purposeof thisstudy,it should be
kept in mind thatlow likelyleads to underestimation
reliability of theinfluenceof multi-
plicativeconstructs (Dunlap/Kemery1987), for
like, example, interactionterms.
Table 2: RotatedComponentMatrixforThree-FactorSolution:Factorloading
(n=135;75% ofvariance explained; Loadings<.30 areommitted; loadingson
proposed factorare bold)
ofFactor
Interpretation Autocratic Participative Culture
ItemNr.1 ,54
J J5
_3 JO
_4 JO
J M
_6 ,86
J_ J8
_8 ,68
_9 ,80
10 ,50
Cronbach a .65 .66 75
Because the hypothesespredictthe use of implementation tacticsthroughenviron-

mentaland organizationalvariables,as well as strategycontentand the interactionbe-
tweenenvironment I chose a step-wiseregressionanalysisas the appro-
and strategy,
priatetechniqueforanalysis.More specifically, foreach of the threeimplementation
tacticsas dependentvariablea regressionhas been performed, witheach group of in-
dependent variables into
enteringsequentially the regression.By this,the explanatory
effectof each group of variablecan be examinedthroughthe increaseof explained
variance.Withhighlycorrelatedindependentvariables,as in thiscase, theexamination
of estimatesfor individualregressioncoefficientswould be unreliable.Results are
shownin Table 3.
474 Lehner:Strategy
Johannes Tactics
Implementation
Table 3: ModeratedRegression1 on Three Implementation Tactics

VarianceatEach Step)
(Explained
Autocratic Participation Culture
Entered
Groupof R F R F R F
Variables
Independent Square Change Square Change Square Change
Change Change Change
Organization2 ,18 3,47* ,12 2,29+ ,05 ,79
Strategy3 ,01 ,21 ,13 4,16* ,03 ,81
Environment4 ,20 4,70** ,074 1,61 ,04 ,74 ~
EnvironmenťStrategy5 ,06 4,38* ,12 8,96** ,10 5,40*
Hypothesis1 predictsthatall of theimplementation tacticswillbe used morewithin-

creasingorganizationalcomplexity.Examinationof incrementalexplainedvariance
(AR2) shows thatorganizationalvariablesexplainthe use of autocratictacticsand -
weaklysignificant - the use of participation.Examinationof the influenceof single
variables,whereothercorrelatedindependentvariableshave been omitted(Table 4),
revealsthatespeciallywithdecreasingcentralization(or increasingspecialization)the
autocraticimplementation tacticsare used more.On theotherhand,theuse of culture
is not influencedby any of the organizationalvariables(thereforeno resultsare re-
portedin Table 4). Thus, Hypothesis1 receivesonly partialsupport.Afterentering
organizationalvariablesin the regressionmodel,the use of autocraticimplementation
tacticsis explained furtherto a significantextentthroughenvironmental variables
(Hypothesis2), whereas thisis not the case forparticipativetactics.For the latter,the
inclusionof strategyvariablesleads to a significant increase in the amount of ex-
plained variance (Hypothesis3). Thus, hypothesis2 and 3 are supported.None of
thesevariablesexplaina significant amountof variancein the use of culturaltactics.
Only the interactionterm formed throughenvironmental and strategy variablespro-
increasein explainedvarianceforcultureorientedtactics.It did af-
duces a significant
fectautocraticand participativetacticsas dependentvariablessignificantly as well.
To examinewhetherthe directionof influenceis as predicted,the influenceof
each constructhas been examinedthroughestimatedregressioncoefficients, where
onlysignificantcoefficientshave been entered into the equation to avoid problemsof
Since
multicollinearity. no significantvariables have been identifiedfor cultureas a
dependent variablethis regression has been omitted in this step analysis.Table 4
of
shows resultingstandardizedregressioncoefficients. All significantcoefficients are in
the expecteddirection.They show thatautocraticas well as participative tacticsare
1 Basedon a subsetofn=60
2 centralization
Log ofsize,formalization,
3 Dummy VariablesforDefender-Strategy,
Prospector-Strategy
4 Dynamism,
Uncertainty, Equivocality
5 Products variable
ofeachenvironmental variable
witheachstrategy
**p<0.01
*
p<0.05
+ p<0.10
management 475
chosen more with decreasingcentralization(or increasingspecialization)of the or-

ganization,which reflectsthe increasingneed forcross-functional controland cross-
functionalcoordinationto implementstrategies.Again, this partiallysupportsHy-
pothesis1. In regardto environment, the strongestimpacton the use of autocratic
tacticsappears to come fromequivocality,which is in the expected direction(Hy-
pothesis2). Uncertainty neverproducesa significant regressionestimate,whichmight
be due to thelow reliabilityof its measure.The patternof significantinfluencesof the
dummyvariablesfor defenderand prospectorstrategieson the use of participative
tacticsis exactlyas predictedthroughHypothesis3.
Table 4: EstimatedRegressionCoefficients6 on Three Implementation Tactics
coefficients
(non-significant areomitted)
Autocratic Participation
Variables
Independent
Centralization -,31** -.31*
Defender 13*T
Prospector ¿6*
Equivocality ,2V
Discussion
This studyis a step towardsmore systematicresearchinto behaviouralaspects of
strategyimplementation. It startswiththe notionthatit is not sufficientto character-
ize any behaviour as organizational,only if it can be observed in organizations.
Rather,organizationaland/or strategicconditionshave to be shownto make a signifi-
cant difference forbehaviour.This has been triedin thispaper. However,the dimen-
sions identifiedhere do not cover all behaviouralaspects. For example,Bailey and
Johnson(1995) took a broaderview on strategy developmentprocesses by including
typesof analyticapproaches (planningversusincremental).Beside this,theyarriveat
threeinterpersonal dimensions(command,political,and cultural)whichare also cov-
eredby the typologyused here.Furtherextensionswould be possible throughlooking
on strategyimplementation as a processin time,forwhichtheliterature has identified
differentstages withinthis process (e.g. Lehner 1996). This would show thatimple-
mentationtacticsare used to a varyingextenton different stages.This studyfocused
insteadon interpersonal behaviourand employeda cross-sectionalapproach,thereby
excludingall of theabove mentionedaspects.
Strategyimplementation maybe also viewed as a process inducingvariousforms
of organizational because
learning, both environmental threatsand strategicresponses
are a prime triggerfor organizationallearningprocesses. Crossan and colleagues
(Crossan/Lane/White1999; Vera/Crossan 2004) linkindividual,groupand organiza-
tionallearningthroughfeed-forward and feed-backprocesses.They postulateeffects
6 Basedon a subsetofn=60
**
p<0.01
*
p<0.05
+ p<0.10
476 Lehner:Strategy
Johannes Tactics
Implementation
of transformational versustransactional leadershipfortheseprocesses,dependenton

strategic and environmental conditions (Vera/Crossan2004). These authorsempha-
size those aspects of transformational leadershipwhich inspiremembersof the or-
ganization for criticalquestions,creativity and open-mindeddiscussions.Such is im-
for
portant organizationallearning in times of strongstrategicchange.In the classifi-
cation of implementation tacticsused here,ratherparticipativetactics(collaboration
and market)mayfacilitate such behaviours.In contrast,when changehas to be institu-
tionalized,Vera and Crossan (2004) postulatetransactional leadershipto institutional-
ize learningwithinthe organization.Because such leadershipfocuses on control,
standardization and formalization more autocratictactics(command,politics)willplay
a stronger role forthis.
In contrastto such conceptualattempts,the main intentionof thispaper is an
empiricalcontribution and to provideevidencethatbehaviourin the contextof strat-
egy implementation indeed dependenton organizational,strategic,and environ-
is
mentalimperatives.For this we had firstto develop measures for implementation
tactics,because so faronlyconceptualpapersand case studyworkexistedin the field.
Based on the seminaldescriptionof fivetacticsby Bourgeois/Brodwin(1984), the
measuresdevelopedforthisstudyallowedto distinguish threefactorsforimplementa-
tion tactics:autocratic,participative and cultural Surely,in termsof traditional
tactics.
criteriathese measuresneed further development.Nevertheless,because theyshould
lead to ratherconservativeresults,theyservethe mainpurpose of thisstudy,whichis
to confirmor rejecthypothesesabout the associationof implementation tacticswith
environment, and
strategy organization.
The presentstudyconfirmstheoreticalnotions (e.g. Miles/Snow 1978) and pre-
vious empiricalresults(Waldersee/Sheather 1996) thatprospectorstrategiesare asso-
ciatedwithparticipative tactics.In contrastto thesestudies,however,hereit is shown
that defenderstrategiesare also implementedwith participativetactics.For culture
orientedtacticsonlya significant interactionbetweenstrategy and environment could
be detected,which does not allow any clear interpretation. I
Further, proposed that
strategy alone can not predict the choice of implementation tactics.Rather,anytactic
has to be treatedas genuineorganizational behaviour in the sense thatbehaviouris
dependenton organizationaland environmental conditions. Confirmingthis notion,
the studyshows thatan autocraticimplementation tacticis employedas a responseto
perceivedenvironmental threats,especiallyto reactto equivocal demandsin the envi-
ronment.Further, loweredcentralization, whichis associatedwithmore specialization,
inducesan increasedutilizationof autocratictactics.The resultsalso indirecdyconfirm
the decreasinginfluenceof environmental imperativesthroughthe formulation of a
strategy, because autocratic versus participative tactics are discriminatively de-
used
pendent on the existence of a clear strategy. Autocratic tactics are used as responsesto
environmental imperatives, whereas participative tactics are used to align to internal
as are
imperatives they giventhrough a formulated strategy.In other words,if a strat-
egy is formulated to set the context within the organization, then the autocratictactic
loses its functionas a means forcoping with environmental threats. This could be in-
terpretedas a substituting relationshipbetweenstrategy formulation and implementa-
tion.On the otherhand,a formulated strategy increasesthe need forparticipative tac-
management Ml
tics,because it induce threatsto existingstakeswithinthe organization, whichcan be

dealtwithonlybyparticipation of relevantgroupswithintheorganization.
Once more,the call foran abandoningof the isolatedtreatment of formulation
and implementation is issued here,because an underlying themeof thispaper is that
the meaningof implementationis completelychanged if a strategyis formulated.
Withinthenew contextset to either,forexample,a prospectoror a defenderstrategy,
participativetacticsare more appropriatethanautocratictactics.In the othercase, the
environment and the need to controlthe organizationremaindominant.This is done
throughautocratictactics.In contrastto theratherclearpredictionsforautocraticand
participativetactics,culturaltacticstake a somewhatisolatedrole. As it is suggested
throughpreviousstudies(Nutt 1986), it is used to a similaror even higherextentthan
othertactics(overallmeans differonlyslightly in thisstudy).However,the studysug-
gests thatcultural tacticsare hardly used in a contingentway,because of the absence
of a clear associationto organizational,strategicor environmental imperatives.Be-
cause culturaltacticsare close to conceptualizationsof transformational leadership
(Bass 1985), the presentresultshave also relevanceforthe recentrevivalof thiscon-
ceptin thecontextof strategy and organizational learning(Vera/Crossan2004).
A generalshortcomingof quantitativestudiesis the necessityto restrictthe re-
searchto a rathersmall set of variables.A fullerpicturemightbe achievedin future
studiesby employinga qualitativeapproach.Such work should capturetemporalpat-
ternsof the proposed relationshipsand thereforeshould be designedas longitudinal
studies.Ratherthanbeingfinalresults,thepaper shallbe one buildingblock forfuture
theorybuildingand empiricalresearchinto organizationalbehaviourin the contextof
formulation and implementation of strategiesand its relationship
withenvironmental,
and
organizational, strategic imperatives.
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Appendix: Items forImplementation tactics, environmental

and organizational variables (translatedfromGerman)
Implementation Tactics
"Topursue themainproject /themainissue...14 agree,2= highly
scales:1=perfectly
(5-point-Likert-type
agree,3=somewhat agree,4=highly 5=totally
disagree, disagree)
Hierarchy
1. .. appropriateguidelineswillbe submitted
tosubordinate
levels.
2. .. pressurewillbe put,ifnecessary.
Politics
3. ..coalitions
willbesought, tofightagainstresistance.
4. .. solutionsforconflicts willbe sought
ofinterests
Culture
5. .. referencetocommon valueswillbe made.
6. ..itwillbe referred
toloyalty tothefirmorthedepartment
Organism
7. .. theopinion ofrelevantemployees issought.
8. .. acceptance issought.
Market
9. .. proposals ofemployees /subordinates
areusedas oftenas possible
10. .. theproject/mainissuewillbe basedonproposals ofemployees /subordinates.
Environment
(5-point-Likert-type agree,2= highly
scales:1=perfectly agree,3=somewhatagree,4=highly
disagree,
5=totallydisagree)
Uncertainty
1 .. Movesofourcompetitorsareeasytopredict
2 .. Demandandpreferences ofourcustomersareeasytopredict
Dynamism
1 .. Themarket hastobechanged
strategy permanently
2 .. Production
andservice changepermanently
technologies
3 .. Lifecycles
ofourproducts andservices
arevery short
(1=doesnotexist,
Equivocality 3=inpart,
2=hardly, 4=toa high 5=toa very
extent, highextent)
1 .. Towhatextentistherea clearwaytohandle issues?
present
2 .. Towhatextentisthereclearlydefined
knowledgeforhandling issues?
present
3 .. Towhatextentistherea comprehensiveproceduretohandle issues?
present
4 .. Towhatextentisoneabletorely onwellestablished forpresent
rulesandprocedure issues?
complexity
Organizational
Specialization
Whoisdealing with
thefollowing
functions
exclusively noother
(with (1=alargedepart-
assignments)
ment, 3=afull-time
2=a smalldepartment, 4=a part-time
employee, employee,5=nobody)
PR,advertisements,
Sales,Logistics, Personal
Recruitment, SocialIssues,
Development,
Procurement,
Facility
Management, Workflow
Accounting, Control,
Quality Produc-
Control,
Product
tionPlanning, Development, LegalIssues,Market
Development,
Organization Re-
search
Formalization
Which documents
ofthefollowing doexistinyour
organization?
WrittenBusiness Manual,
Organizational
Strategy, Manuals,
Operations OrganizationChart,
Written Brochures
JobDescriptions, with Measures
Security andWorkingConditionsetc.

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Strategy Implementation Tactics as Response to Organizational, Strategic, and Environmental

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Strategy Implementation Tactics as Response to

Based on previousliterature in the fieldsof strategyimplementation and leadershipre-

Key words: StrategyImplementation; Implementation Tactics, Organizational

Manystudiesin thelong traditionof organizationalbehaviourresearchcould be quali-

As introducedalreadyabove, behaviouralpatternsshall be qualifiedhere as or-

strategyprocess is of entrepreneurialnatureif the strategyis primarily formedby one

degreeand forwhichthe acceptanceby all relevantstakeholdersis likely.To increase

Culturallyorientedtacticshave been criticizedbecause of theirtotalitarian flavour

The context of implementation tactics

labor withinthe organizationand a high degree of specializationwill increase the

will have to respond to environmental conditionsdirectly.They will choose imple-

Implementation and Strategy Content

sity.Whereaspoliticaltacticsmayplay some role forthis,a highdegreeof participa-

Sample and Field Procedures

itemsforthisstudy.The interviewsfollowedthe followingsequence: At the startof

Organizationalcomplexity is measuredthroughitemsforstandardization (a =.89) and

Althoughits frequentcitationin the literature no measureshave been available

Because the hypothesespredictthe use of implementation tacticsthroughenviron-

Table 3: ModeratedRegression1 on Three Implementation Tactics

Hypothesis1 predictsthatall of theimplementation tacticswillbe used morewithin-

chosen more with decreasingcentralization(or increasingspecialization)of the or-

of transformational versustransactional leadershipfortheseprocesses,dependenton

tics,because it induce threatsto existingstakeswithinthe organization, whichcan be

Chackravarthy, B./Gargiulo, M. (1998):Maintaining leadership legitimacyinthetransition toneworgan-

Locke,E. A./Latham, G. P. (1990):A Theory ofGoalandTaskPerformance. Prentice-Hall:

Appendix: Items forImplementation tactics, environmental

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