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What if….?

Felix Leder, Tillmann Werner

©2009 Felix Leder, Tillmann Werner


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There’s a botnet!

• 4 – 5 million IPs / day counted at C&C


• Around for more than two years

5000000
4500000
4000000
3500000
3000000
2500000
2000000
©2009 Felix Leder, Tillmann Werner

1500000
1000000
500000
0
Stuxnet This Botnet

Copyright © 2010 Felix Leder & Tillmann Werner, Honeynet Project, Giraffe Chapter, Germany
Most IT Experts agree...

“…size does NOT matter”


(some exceptions):

©2009 Felix Leder, Tillmann Werner


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What if …

This botnet is far from harmless…


• Military equipment
• Hospitals
©2009 Felix Leder, Tillmann Werner

Copyright © 2010 Felix Leder & Tillmann Werner, Honeynet Project, Giraffe Chapter, Germany
C&C Communication

• Communication is signed
• C&C domains change
• Possible to get hold of some domains

C&C

©2009 Felix Leder, Tillmann Werner


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Mission Impossible

C&C Server Takedown

• Different approaches
– Take down (physical) C&C server
– Unplug network cable
– Block all (known) domains
– Arrest Botherder

• Problems
– There’s not a single (physical) C&C server - replacable
– The C&C domain address changes every day
©2009 Felix Leder, Tillmann Werner

(switch between arbitrary networks)


– For how long do registrars cooperate (for free)?
(6 months, 1 year, 5 years)
– Why is it so hard to arrest the botherder?
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Copyright © 2010 Felix Leder & Tillmann Werner, Honeynet Project, Giraffe Chapter, Germany
What if…

…there’s a cure for the


infected machines

©2009 Felix Leder, Tillmann Werner


It’s a remote buffer overflow…

• Exploit a flaw to “break into” the infected system


• Needs to be tailored to
– Windows version & service pack
– Locale
• Potential to crash systems
• Not every infected machines can be reached
©2009 Felix Leder, Tillmann Werner

Copyright © 2010 Felix Leder & Tillmann Werner, Honeynet Project, Giraffe Chapter, Germany
Estimating success rate
• We control some C&C domains but can’t issue commands
(signing)
• Approach: Wait for contact and scan
(scanning possible without risk)

C&C

©2009 Felix Leder, Tillmann Werner


NAT / Proxy

Estimated success rate

• Time span: August – now


• Random samples
• World-wide average: 2.6% (~ every 40th computer)

Cleanup Ratio (global)


0.1
0.09
0.08
0.07
0.06
0.05
0.04
©2009 Felix Leder, Tillmann Werner

0.03
0.02
0.01
0

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Copyright © 2010 Felix Leder & Tillmann Werner, Honeynet Project, Giraffe Chapter, Germany
Success rate varies

• Some countries have more open systems (up to 25%)


(no firewalls?, no NAT (more IPs)?, no proxies?)

Cleanup Ratio (world)


0.3
0.25
0.2
0.15
0.1
0.05

©2009 Felix Leder, Tillmann Werner


0
MD VC MY AF KZ TW ME GE KN

Success-rate Openport-rate
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Success rate varies

Cleanup Ratio (EU)


0.12

0.1

MX = 2.6%
0.08

0.06

0.04

0.02
©2009 Felix Leder, Tillmann Werner

0
LT LV RO HU FI BG IT LU NL IE SK SE PL PT AT DE FR GB ES DK CZ EE GR CY MT SI BE

Success-rate Openport-rate

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Copyright © 2010 Felix Leder & Tillmann Werner, Honeynet Project, Giraffe Chapter, Germany
What about your network?

• Within network, higher success rates:


– Less firewalls
– No NAT
– No proxies

• Possible partners
– Governments
(governmental networks)
– ISPs

©2009 Felix Leder, Tillmann Werner


– Companies
End-users

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What about the “crashes” and “tailored stuff”?

• Reliable “exploit” has to be fit to:


– OS version
– OS locale
• Wrong version will crash 

Reliable exploit development


• Research on shared properties among versions
• Well tested
Cooperation: Test Matrix of some organisation
©2009 Felix Leder, Tillmann Werner

• Query infected host for version


• Only fire countermeasure if 99% sure
(what about the remainder?)
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Copyright © 2010 Felix Leder & Tillmann Werner, Honeynet Project, Giraffe Chapter, Germany
Well tested!

All software
• Exploit
• Disinfection Tool

• Use of Test Matrix


– Different OS versions
– Service Packs
– Patch Levels

©2009 Felix Leder, Tillmann Werner


– Locales

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Query infected host ©2009 Felix Leder, Tillmann Werner

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Copyright © 2010 Felix Leder & Tillmann Werner, Honeynet Project, Giraffe Chapter, Germany
Guarantees

What about the remaining 0.x% of uncertainty?

• There are no guarantees for things that can go wrong with


software

• Does Microsoft give guarantees for bug-free software?


• Does open-source guarantee for less security holes?
• Does your AV vendor guarantee for 100% detection?
• Does your spam-filter work w/o false positives / false

©2009 Felix Leder, Tillmann Werner


negatives?

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What if something breaks?

• Nobody wants to take responsibility

• What if…
– … the botnet infects a hospital and medical devices stop working?
– … the botnet infects a (nuclear) power plant / critical infrastructures?
– … the botnet infects military equipment?

Who is responsible if the botnet breaks something major?


©2009 Felix Leder, Tillmann Werner

What if this could have been prevented?

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Copyright © 2010 Felix Leder & Tillmann Werner, Honeynet Project, Giraffe Chapter, Germany
AFTER BREAKING IN…

©2009 Felix Leder, Tillmann Werner


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after breaking in…

Install antidote

• Remove infection
• Patch original security hole
(no re-infection)
• Install vaccine
• Remove self
©2009 Felix Leder, Tillmann Werner

install and run software without user’s permission

Copyright © 2010 Felix Leder & Tillmann Werner, Honeynet Project, Giraffe Chapter, Germany
Software Complexity

• Such an application is much more complex than an exploit


• More complexity, more bugs

• What if something breaks?

©2009 Felix Leder, Tillmann Werner


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Well tested but no guarantee ©2009 Felix Leder, Tillmann Werner

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Copyright © 2010 Felix Leder & Tillmann Werner, Honeynet Project, Giraffe Chapter, Germany
Is it Ethical?

• Is it ethical to break into someone’s computer and to take


away his autonomy

• Is the computer still under the user’s control?


(autonomy is broken anyway)
• Is the user able to take care himself?
(Why do we need anti-botnet customer care centers?)
• Is it ethical to let an infected machine attack others?

©2009 Felix Leder, Tillmann Werner


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Is it legal?
• Hmm, actually not … to run software without the user’s
permission

Where is it legal, today?


• Some countries are very liberal: “good intentions”
NL: [Cybercrime and Jurisdiction. A Global Survey, BJ Koops]
• Legal if performed within a company

Possible ways to make it legal (geek point of view):


• Countries make more liberal laws (for this situation)
©2009 Felix Leder, Tillmann Werner

• ISP EULA
• A “service” for customers (Microsoft, Adobe, …) - EULA
• Military, NATO – “defensive measure”
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Copyright © 2010 Felix Leder & Tillmann Werner, Honeynet Project, Giraffe Chapter, Germany
NATO?

©2009 Felix Leder, Tillmann Werner


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Locality? ©2009 Felix Leder, Tillmann Werner

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Copyright © 2010 Felix Leder & Tillmann Werner, Honeynet Project, Giraffe Chapter, Germany
What about locality?

• Attackers may use multiple hops


(only last hop is seen)
• C&C servers have better uptimes in CN, RU, UK, …
• What about (terrorists) provoking a counterstrike against e.g.
China?

©2009 Felix Leder, Tillmann Werner


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What does that mean for disinfection?

• An infected host may be situated somewhere else


(VPN, multi-tier structure in the botnet, …)
• The disinfected host may look like NL but data modifications
happen in US  NSA, CIA, FBI, …
• Tensions on diplomatic level
©2009 Felix Leder, Tillmann Werner

What if local information is very reliable for our botnet?

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Copyright © 2010 Felix Leder & Tillmann Werner, Honeynet Project, Giraffe Chapter, Germany
Conclusions
What if we take active measures? What if we just pretend that we
can’t do anything?
• Is it ethical? • Is it ethical?
We can do something and
prevent further damage!

• Is it legal?
• Who is responsible if something
really bad happens?

• What about liability? • Who is liable for any damage?


• What about responsibility?

©2009 Felix Leder, Tillmann Werner


• Progress in arms race • A black-market without risks is
growing fast

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What if …

• … the botnet is real?

• … we are about to prototype and are looking for partners to


cooperate and test within their realm:

• … you are a country, ISP, company, … with infections


©2009 Felix Leder, Tillmann Werner

Talk to us!

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Copyright © 2010 Felix Leder & Tillmann Werner, Honeynet Project, Giraffe Chapter, Germany

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