Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Vol. 31, No. 1, pp.

1–15, 1998
 1998 The Regents of the University of California. Published by Elsevier Science Ltd
Pergamon Printed in Great Britain
0967-067X/98 $19.00 + 0.00
PII: S0967-067X(97)00025-1

Fascism and the New Russian Nationalism

A. James Gregor
Oppenheimer Professor, Marine Corps University, Quantico, Virginia, Department of
Political Science, University of California, Berkeley, CA 94720-1950, USA

This article provides a broad comparison between Italian Fascism and the new
nationalism that has arisen in post-Soviet Russia. The focus is on that nationalism
which has, in the immediate past, merged with what used to be the Marxism-Leninism
of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation. The ideas of Gennadii Ziuganov,
leader of the CPRF, are traced to Sergei Kurginian and Alexander Prokhanov-and
compared to those of the ideologues of historic Fascism.  1998 The Regents of the
University of California. Published by Elsevier Science Ltd

Introduction
Even before the final unravelling of the Soviet Union, there was talk of the danger of "fascism"
substituting itself as a rationale for the salvation of the senescent regime (Yanov, 1978). The
term "fascism" seems to have suggested itself because as early as the middle years of the 1960s,
a new preoccupation with "Russian nationalism" made its appearance among intellectuals in
the Soviet Union (Dunlop, 1976). More than that, the renewed nationalism was tendentially
anti-liberal1 and anti-Western (Yanov, 1987). Among the advocates of the newly resurrected
"Russian Idea," there was also a curious treatment of the "state." For the anti-Soviet nationalists
of the period, the state was conceived the only agency capable of unequivocally "expressing
the highest interests of the people" and would be, after the passing of Marxism-Leninism,
"theocratic"—a sacred institution (Dunlop, 1976p. 288). The economy that would accompany
the new regime would be "mixed," with the nation’s several "interests" collected into
"corporations" which, together with the state, would harmoniously integrate productive activi-
ties.2
The similarities with Benito Mussolini’s "corporate state" (Mussolini, 1938; Bottai, 1928)
were too striking to be overlooked. Together with the express "anti-materialism," and the

1. This was only qualifiedly true of the "Christian nationalist" opposition that appeared in the mid-1960s in the form
of the "All-Russian Social-Christian Union for the Liberation of the People." See the Program of the Union in Dunlop
(1976), pp. 243–293.
2. See particularly section 9, points 13 and 14 of the Program of the Social-Christian Union in Dunlop (1976), pp.
282–283).

1
2 Fascism and the New Russian Nationalism: A. James Gregor

restorative insistence on "heroism" and "spirituality" to salvage the nation, the affinities with
Italian Fascism seemed unmistakeable.
To add to the growing concerns, with the increasing liberties afforded by Mikhail Gorbach-
ev’s glasnost, the first black-shirted representatives of Pamiat made their appearance in the
Soviet Union (Laqueur, 1993). They brought with them copies of the anti-Semitic forgery,
The Protocols of the Elders of Zion, which quickly became the most frequently cited document
in their political repertoire. The appearance of anti-Semitism in the ideology of an emergent
new nationalism created a host of conceptual problems for those attempting to assess political
possibilities for a post-Soviet Russia.
As a consequence of the growing concern, and the evident conceptual uncertainty, there has
been a tendency among political commentators on the Russian scene to move artlessly from
"extreme right wing," to "fascism," to "nazism," to describe what has been happening since
the eclipse of Marxism-Leninism in what was once the Soviet Union (Reznik, 1996). All these
terms are employed as though they all referred to one omnibus political phenomenon, or that
the descent from the "extreme right" to "nazism" was inevitable (Yanov, 1995). To compound
the difficulties, there has been a tendency to refer to the "patriotic union" of former Communists
and current nationalists, that began in the pages of Nash sovremennik and Molodaia gvardia
in the 1970s, as the "red-brown coalition."
The "reds" in the coalition are also sometimes referred to as "conservatives" or
"communists"—and the "browns" have either "fascists" or "nazis" as referents. There is an
easy identification of fascists with nazis as though there were no distinctions between them.
To confuse analysis still further, some have recently suggested that most of the Russian
"right wing" nationalist opposition to the essentially liberal democratic and market-oriented
administration of Boris Yeltsin may not be "nationalist" at all. They may be "statists" who
have accepted "the blurring of state and nation" which has been a "special feature of Russian
history." Thus, movements like the National Salvation Front, which united communists and
nationalists, might better be described as "patriotic rather than nationalist" (Steele, 1994pp.
327, 332).
More than that, we are cautioned that the "patriotic statists" may not necessarily be anti-
Semitic (Steele, 1994p. 332). If the "red-brown coalition" is neither nationalist nor anti-Semitic,
it is hard to understand how it could be either "fascist" or "nazi." It might conceivably be
considered "conservative," if the concept "conservative" is meant to cover appeals to some
form of "traditional" statolatry.
There are, of course, several ways of dealing with this kind of conceptual confusion. One
way is to simply not use terms like "right wing extremists," "fascism," "nazism" or
"conservatism" when speaking of political developments in post-Soviet Russia. That, of course,
is very difficult to do. To discuss anything is to traffic on comparisons—if only for recall
convenience or didactic purpose. If the object of inquiry is truly unique, sharing no affinities
with anything else, it is hard to imagine how one might talk about it, much less obtain purchase
on understanding it.
The most evident problem that afflicts such a discussion is that there are no generally
accepted definitions for any of the terms employed. Neither "right-wing," "conservative," nor
"fascist" has been defined with any real precision. If we acknowledge, as well, that there is
no generally accepted definition of terms like "nationalism" (Hutchinson and Smith, 1994), we
can appreciate some of the difficulties we face in attempting to make academic sense of what
is transpiring in post-Soviet Russia. What will be suggested here is an interpretive strategy
that, commencing with treatment of the concept "fascism," may aid in resolving some of the
 Fascism and the New Russian Nationalism: A. James Gregor 3

confusion that attends contemporary discussions of the anti-liberal, anti-Western "Russian

nationalist" opposition to the present Yeltsin administration.

The Concept "fascism"

As a proper noun, the term Fascism refers to the historic political system put together on the
Italian peninsula by Mussolini and the Partito nazionale fascista during the years between the
two world wars. Generic "fascism," on the other hand, was largely a product of the political
propaganda of the Second World War.
In the course of the Second World War, the struggle against the Axis powers was charac-
terized as a "war against fascism." That was taken to mean that National Socialist Germany
and Imperial Japan were both "fascist" powers and that they shared, with Fascist Italy, some
common properties that discretely distinguished them from other authoritarian systems. It has
never been clear what those properties might have been, and recently no less a notable than
Richard Pipes has suggested that whatever those properties were, they were shared by the
Soviet regime as well (Pipes, 1994; Gregor, 1974).
In general, specialists have recognized that the term "fascism remains probably the vaguest
of the major political terms" (Payne, 1995p. 3). It remains "perhaps impossible...to define in
an operational..." fashion (Laqueur, 1996p. 6).
Like all general terms that refer to complex histories, Fascism can be, and has been, charac-
terized in a number of ways (Gregor, 1997). An argument can be made that Fascism, even if
the term has no generally accepted definition in the academic community, can be discussed
in a fashion that can show its relevance to the political realities of Russia in transition. Such
a discussion might also illuminate some of the associated and contested concepts that test the
cognitive tolerance of students.

Fascism
Whatever else it was, Italian Fascism was a Marxist heresy. Almost all its major ideologues,
Roberto Michels, Sergio Panunzio and Paolo Orano among them, had been informed and
convinced Marxists prior to the First World War. Mussolini, himself, had been a major Marxist
intellectual, accepted as such by every serious Marxist theoretician on the Italian peninsula
prior to the outbreak of the Great War.3
In fact, Mussolini and those Marxists who followed his example were not the first, and
would not be the last, Marxist theoreticians to make the transit from orthodox Marxism to
revolutionary nationalism. Half a century before, Moses Hess, the "communist rabbi" who has
traditionally been credited with making a communist of Karl Marx, transferred his allegiance
from classical Marxism—with its class warfare and cosmopolitanism—to the reactive and
developmental nationalism of the Jewish people (Hess, 1958; Avineri, 1985).
During the years before the Second World War, together with any number of European
Marxists, almost the entire leadership of the Japanese Communist Party defected to the
"national cause" (Steinhoff, 1969), and there is serious doubt whether the Communist Party
of China was ever really Marxist and "non-nationalist." It has become manifestly obvious that
China, after the death of Mao, gives every appearance of having abandoned all the substance

3. This issue has been more extensively discussed than is possible here, in Gregor (1974), chapter 5; Gregor (1968),
chapter 4; Gregor (1979), chapters 2 and 3.
4 Fascism and the New Russian Nationalism: A. James Gregor

of Marxism and Marxism-Leninism to espouse an unequivocal form of reactive and develop-

mental nationalism (Gregor, 1995).

Reactive Developmental Nationalism

In pre-World War One Italy, one of the first Marxists to move away from the orthodoxies of
nineteenth century Marxism was Filippo Corridoni, radical leader of the revolutionary workers
of Milan (Rastelli, 1940; Masotti, 1932). By the commencement of the First World War, Cor-
ridoni was convinced by the circumstances that surrounded him that Italy, as a nation, was
economically retrograde and the object of systematic imposture and humiliation at the hands
of the industrially advanced nations of the world.4
Several other important ideologues had followed the same intellectual trajectory as the "left-
wing" Corridoni. Alfredo Rocco, originally a socialist, had early abandoned its tenets to take
up the cause of the rapid economic development and industrialization of the Italian peninsula-
for precisely the same reasons subsequently advanced by Corridoni and Mussolini. Italy, as a
newly united nation, was economically retrograde and industrially backward. As a conse-
quence, it was the object of real or fancied exploitation at the hands of the more industrialized
nations-and subject to contemptuous dismissal by the "Great Powers" (Rocco, 1938).
By those who abandoned orthodox Marxism before the First World War, the economic
growth and rapid industrialization of retrograde Italy was conceived an "heroic mission" that
would lift the nation to the station of the most advanced and powerful communities (Rossoni,
1923pp. 9–11, 20, 32, 52, 56–58, 83). As early as 1914, Dino Grandi, who was to figure
prominently in the Fascist regime, wrote that the conflicts of the twentieth century would be
between "poor and rich nations, between those nations that labor...and those nations already
the masters of capital and wealth" (Grandi, 1941p. 39).
Fascists argued that "proletarian" Italy, after a millenium of inferiority and subordination,
would become, through rapid economic growth and industrial development, the equal of the
contemporary "plutocracies" that exploited and scorned her.5 The Italian political "left" and
the Italian political "right"—the Marxist "subversives" and Italy’s "new nationalists" (Papini
and Prezzolini, 1967)—had come together in revolutionary "national syndicalism." The first
Fascism emerged out of that coalition.
Throughout its subsequent history, Fascism maintained that Italy, as a proletarian nation,
had been denied the space and the resources seized by those nations that had early embarked
upon a trajectory of industrialization that provided them the political, economic and military
advantages that made them "Great Powers."6 Largely following the account of the nineteenth
century German economist Friedrich List,7 Fascists argued that the advanced industrial nations
created international trading and exchange obstacles to any efforts made by the less-developed
nations to break out of the confines of underdevelopment.
The entire rationale for Fascist involvement in the Second World War, in fact, was predicated
on the conviction that it was a conflict between the "materialist plutodemocracies" (Fontanelli,

4. There is very little in English that makes clear the early and evident transition from "proletarian internationalism"
to the notion of "class warfare" between "proletarian" and "plutocratic" nations, on the part of the Marxist subversives
in the period before the First World War. See Corridoni (1945), pp. 19–20, 23–25, 32–33, 55, 82, 110–111.
5. These themes were prominent in the writings of Fascist ideologues, and Mussolini employed them with regularity.
See Mussolini (1952–1963), 10, pp. 14, 21, 56, 277; 11, pp. 86–87, 92, 282–284, 288–290, 356–360; 13, pp. 72, 284.
6. There are expositions that are particularly direct. See the discussion in Arena (1929), particularly chapters 1 and
2; and Rocco (1938), 3, pp. 983–987.
7. List (1916) was regularly cited throughout early Fascist literature. See, for example, Rocco (1938), 1, p. 40.
 Fascism and the New Russian Nationalism: A. James Gregor 5

1941p. 243) and the have-not nations (Soprano, 1942; Messineo, 1942). More than that, and
in the last analysis, it was a cataclysmic struggle between two alternative styles of life—one
materialistic and decadent and the other spiritual and vital (Zoppola, 1928; Puccio, 1942).
In this titanic struggle, only the nation could serve as a staging area. The nation was the
largest viable unit capable of embarking on a program of rapid and sustained growth and
technological development—the necessary condition for community survival, maintenance and
ultimate prevalence. The development of the economic base of the nation was understood to
be necessary to create the power projection capabilities that would ensure the defence of the
historic community in the face of determined external opposition on the part of the advanced
industrial powers. In the course of planning such an exacting national developmental mission,
the first Fascists very quickly realized that their initial suspicions of the state8 would have to
be suppressed. If the nation was to rapidly develop, the state would have to sponsor, implement
and sustain a sacrificial program of frugality, intensive labor, and collective enterprise.9 Rapid,
sustained and technologically sophisticated productivity would require the enthusiasm of
masses, marshalled to national purpose in "heroic" commitment.10 Only the state, with all the
coercive, pedagogical and suasive instruments at its disposal, could accomplish the mobiliz-
ation and regimentation of masses.
Under the aegis of the state, all the disparate constituents of the nation-factions, strata, age
cohorts, professional communities and classes-would be integrated into a program of rapid
national development (Bottai, 1928). Hierarchically structured, all the constituents of the nation,
committed to the creation of a "Greater Italy," believed in, obeyed, and struggled at the com-
mand of the "Leader"-whose powers derived "not from a parliament, but substantially from
the nation in its organic unity" (Corsini, 1935p. 49) Anti-liberal by unalterable disposition, the
first Fascists conceived the "Head of the Government" as the unitary embodiment of all the
critical, indivisible functions of the unitary state.
Fundamentally opposed to the subtending rationale of the demoliberal state, Fascism con-
ceived the nation not an aggregate of individuals, nor the state the consequence of contractual
accommodation between them (Rocco, 1938; Spirito, 1933). The nation was understood to be
an organic unity that found its voice and its will in its Leader, and its sovereign integrity in
the state (Rocco, 1927).
By the time of the Fascist March on Rome in October 1922, nationalism in Italy had become
the "myth" of a state sponsored system of rapid economic growth and industrial development.11
For the first Fascists, Italy was a relatively homogeneous ethnic bloc that provided a "mass
of precious minerals" to be put to the service of a demanding program of national redemption.
What was required for the effective implementation of the program was a directive state.12

Nation and State in Fascist Doctrine

There is no dispute concerning the centrality of the nation in Fascist doctrine. Even before the
accession to power, Mussolini insisted that Fascists considered "the nation before and above

8. Mussolini was very explicit concerning the circumstances that prompted the general reevalulation. See Mussolini
(1952–1963), 14, pp. 396–398.
9. These are central themes in Fascism that are often neglected. They appear in abundance; see Mussolini (1952–
1963), 18, pp. 66–72, especially 258–263; Panunzio (1924b), pp. 29, 40, 52–53, 62–63.
10. The role of "heroism" in the program of rapid industrial development is explicitly made in Panunzio (1924a), pp.
102–105, 115–123; Pighetti (1924), pp. 69–90.
11. In this regard see the discussion of mythomoteurs in Smith (1995) and Gregor (1969), pp. 46–53.
12. Mussolini made such a commitment explicit; see Mussolini (1952–1963), 10, p. 87; 15, p. 214.
6 Fascism and the New Russian Nationalism: A. James Gregor

anything else..." (Mussolini, 1952–1963, 14, p. 44). Throughout the existence of the regime,
Fascist intellectuals recognized that the concept "nation" played a "central and dominant" role
in "Fascist thought and doctrine..." (Panunzio, 1933p. 7).
That Fascists were nationalists is part of the folk wisdom of political science. Fascist
nationalism, however, was a little more complicated than folk wisdom would have it. For
Fascists, the nation was a "myth," the "ideal representation of a possible future..." (Mussolini,
1952–1963, 10, p. 195), and heir to the millenial traditions of "Eternal Rome" (Spinetti, 1936p.
47). It was the inspiration for sacrificial efforts on the part of citizens. It was invoked as a
memory of an heroic past, and the dream of an alternative future, calculated to energize effort,
inform enterprise, and inspire obedience (Spinetti, 1936).
Granted the truth of all of that, what is not generally appreciated is the fact that the nation-
understood to be an organized aggregate of people, associated by territory, language, economy
as well as history, and united by a common sentiment—while serving as the "myth" of Fascism,
provided only the raw materials for which the state provided the determinate form. Fascists
argued that "nation" was a concept that was "historico-social, or more precisely, cultural and
psychological." A Gemeinschaft, united in sympathy and overt affinities, was only a potential
nation. It was the juridical state that lent the nation, in potentia, specific form (Panunzio, 1933).
For Fascists, the nation was identified as a "moral, political and economic unity that [only]
finds integral realization in the Fascist State" (Bottai, 1928p. 115). In the official "Doctrine of
Fascism," that conviction was rendered, "It is not the nation that generates the state....Rather,
the nation is created by the state which endows a people—cognizant of its moral unity—with
a will, and in so doing, with an effective existence" (Mussolini, 1952–1963, 34, p. 120). In
effect, "it is not nationality that creates the state, but the state which creates nationality, by
setting the seal of actual existence on it" (Gentile, 1960pp. 121–122).
Fascists were not simply nationalists; they were primarily and essentially statists. For Fascist
theoreticians, it was the state that forged the nation out of the natural components of territory,
history, the manner of production, and the sentiment of group consciousness.13 Often tracing
their ideological heritage back to Hegel (Gregor, 1968), Fascists were, philosophically and
politically, statists.
It was their statism that distinguished Fascism from Adolf Hitler’s National Socialism. The
foundation of the National Socialist state was biology. The state was a derivative product. For
National Socialists, anthropological race was prior to, and the ultimate source of, both the
nation and the state. It was a uniform genetic "racial core" that provided the basis for nationality
and for "charismatic" rule—with leadership sharing a heritable psychology with the led
(Schmitt, 1935).
The doctrinal distinctions between Fascism and National Socialism radically separated the
two—a difference fully acknowledged by most major Fascist ideologues (Costamagna, 1940;
Panunzio, 1939). Racism was never central to Fascist doctrine (De Felice, 1977). Statism was.
These were some of the central convictions of the first Fascism. A discernible informal logic
binds most of its traits together. The traits, themselves, provide a preliminary criterial guide
to the comparative analysis of Russia’s post-Soviet nationalism.

13. This conception was deeply rooted in Fascist ideology. It finds an express form in Costamagna (1940), pp.
172–174).
 Fascism and the New Russian Nationalism: A. James Gregor 7

Russia’s New Nationalism14

With the disintegration of Marxism-Leninism as a legitimating rationale for a decaying system,
various nationalisms made their appearance even before the disappearance of the Soviet Union.
They arose in a singular intellectual and cultural environment.
Russians have always been identified, and have often identified themselves, with statism
and autocracy. It would seem that gosudarstvennichestvo, the dominance of the state in every
aspect of social life, has forever been a feature of Russian political culture. Against all the
efforts of nineteenth century liberal political reformers, and in spite of Lenin’s initial anti-state
anarchosyndicalist notions, the autocratic state has prevailed and flourished in Russia in both
tsarist and Soviet times. Stalin took perverse pleasure in affirming that while Marxists all
expected the state to ultimately "wither away," in the interim "the dialectic" required that the
Soviet Union fashion, for its purposes, the most awesome state in history (Stalin, 1955).
For Russians, the state has always defined the nation. Russian nationalists in the nineteenth
century gave ideological form to that conviction by framing their arguments in terms provided
by West European romanticism and German idealist philosophy. "Nationality" (narodnost)—
the "people" as a natural and organic community15—was inextricably identified with the peda-
gogical, economic, religious and political institutions of the state.16
Within the tradition, the institutions of the state, themselves, were often conceived the
expression of a collective will—the product of a sense of loving community and common
freedom (sobornost). For some of the major philosophers of Russian nationalism, to obey the
institutions of the state would be to obey oneself.17 Together with a abiding belief in Russia’s
mission in the modern world, Russian nationalists left an intellectual legacy to post-Soviet
Russians rich with political implications.
That is the legacy out of which Russia’s domestic opposition to the regime of Boris Yeltsin
has fashioned its ideology. Among those in the determined opposition, Sergei Kurginian, Alex-
ander Prokhanov and Gennadii Ziuganov are perhaps the most interesting and important.18
Individually and together they have put together a collection of ideas that may very well shape
the future of Russia and significantly influence the working out of the twenty first century.

The Elements of the New Nationalism

As the Soviet Union gave increasing evidence of economic and political disintegration, intellec-
tuals from the Communist Party itself, began to mount an opposition to Mikhail Gorbachev
and his revolutionary reforms (Yanov, 1987; Kull, 1992). By the close of the Gorbachev era,
Sergei Ervandovich Kurginian was identified as both a threatening "new Rasputin" as well as

14. This section has benefitted from the substantive and linguistic assistance of Mr. Leonid Kil of the University of
California, Berkeley.
15. Ziuganov speaks regularly of the "people" as an "organic" body. See Ziuganov (1997), pp. 73–75.
16. See the discussion in Thaden (1964). The similarities with the views of Giovanni Gentile, who was a neo-Hegelian,
are striking. See particularly Gentile (1960). The same views, given juridical expression, are found in the works of
Sergio Panunzio, who was very much under the influence of German thinkers. See particuarly Panunzio (1929),
Panunzio (1934), Panunzio (1939).
17. This is essentially the rationale provided by Michels (1949) chapter 6, for "charismatic rule" in Fascist Italy. In
Gentile, similar notions are expressed in the conviction that human beings are essentially Gemeinwesen, creatures
collective in essence. Gentile, as a young scholar, analyzed the collectivistic sociophilosophical views of Karl Marx
who was a neo-Hegelian, himself, in a work (Gentile, 1955) which V. I. Lenin recommended to all his ideological
confreres (Lenin, 1930). All opposed the liberal notion that society was composed of "isolated" individuals. The
continuities that connect nineteenth century Russian nationalism, Marxism and Fascism are of ideological interest.
18. While academicians have made a great deal of the "fascism" of Vladimir Zhirinovsky, he is neither intellectually
interesting, nor is he likely to be politically important. See Solovyov and Klepikova (1995) and Kartsev (1995).
8 Fascism and the New Russian Nationalism: A. James Gregor

the purveyor of "light in the kingdom of darkness" (Nezavisimaia Gazeta, 19 February 1991,
p. 3).
By 1989, Kurginian had published his first programmatic works committed to "national
salvation" (Kurginian, 1989). In 1990, his Post-Perestroika appeared (Kurginian et al., 1990).
In those works, Kurginian argued that the Soviet Union stood upon a precipice. Both as a
historic and political community, Russia, and its incarnation as the Soviet Union, faced extinc-
tion. The "liberal" and "democratic" reforms of Gorbachev had gutted the nation’s legitimating
ideology, its economic integrity, and its international status.
The main thrust of Kurginian’s argument turned on his perception of the Soviet Union’s
accelerating technological backwardness and its increasing political uncertainty-products of the
seductiveness of foreign liberal and democratic ideas. He argued that the leadership in the
Kremlin had allowed the exemplary intellectual and political resources of the nation to decay.
In his judgment, the Soviet Union had permitted its industrial technology to steadily fall behind
not only that of the United States, but Japan as well. The pacificist internationalists, together
with a coven of traitors and kleptocrats, had employed glasnost and perestroika to undermine
the self-confidence of the people of the Soviet Union, weaken their resolve, impair their pro-
ductive potential, and, in the final analysis diminish the defensive capabilities of the Soviet
armed forces.19
For Kurginian, the declining Soviet Union faced the threat of vassalage before the unrelent-
ing material power of the "technocratic imperialists" who had already sorted out the nations of
the world into those that would serve as accomplices, and those that would remain permanently
subordinate. The advanced technocracies, the United States foremost among them, sought to
impose on the world community those "liberal democratic" rules that would ensure their per-
petual hegemony.20
Kurginian conceives the world an arena in which the strong survive and the weak perish.21
Only the total commitment of individuals to their community-inspired by its spiritually strong
and heroic gosudarstvenniki, its "men of the state"—could provide the nation the requisite
strength to resist being overwhelmed. United in patriotism, under the aegis of the state, all
classes, strata, and categories, would together restore the nation to its proper place in the world.
In a program that was "statist corporatist" (gosudarstvenno-korporativnyi) (Vujacic, 1996p.
140), an elite, in vast parastate agencies created for that purpose,22 would fashion the techno-
logies necessary to generate the capabilities that would assure the power, the survival and the
prevalence of the nation.
Kurginian has nowhere advocated international "proletarian" revolution, nor "class struggle."
He has assiduously avoided any use of the standard anti-national Marxist-Leninist rhetoric. He
has recommended an economy, informed by an interventionist "majestic state," in which there
would be place for market-adjuncts and qualified private property rights.23
Much of this surfaces and resurfaces in the literature of Alexander Prokhanov and Gennadii

19. These kinds of arguments are found among "national communist" authors; see Ziuganov (1997), pp. 6–7, and the
accounts in Gleisner (1990), and Bellis and Gleisner (1991).
20. Ziuganov makes very similar comments, see Ziuganov (1997), pp. 85–86, 122.
21. The notion of "power," in general, is important in Ziuganov’s more recent discussions, see Ziuganov (1997), pp.
82–83).
22. The Fascist regime created vast parastate entities to sustain and expand its developmental and autarkic program.
See Scagnetti (1942). Compare Kurginian et al. (1990), particularly pp. 58–78.
23. Ziuganov has accepted the principles of a qualified "free market" together with "private property," see Ziu-
ganov (1997).
 Fascism and the New Russian Nationalism: A. James Gregor 9

Ziuganov.24 Prokhanov specifically appeals to the combat veterans of the "Motherland," that
"last contingent of statists," who will rise to her defense and the defense of the state (Galeotti,
1990). He sees post-Soviet Russia a nation "toppled, vanquished and captive...in a noose
fashioned by an alien civilization...."(Yanov, 1993pp. 20–24). Russia is perceived humiliated
and diminished.25
All of this is alive with "anti-imperialist" resentment. It is animated by a restorationist irre-
dentism, a demand for the recreation of the greater Russian state. It is a cry to defend the
"national idea," renew the nation’s "spiritual integrity," resist the "dismemberment" of its
"body," and burnish the "majesty" of its state.
It has not escaped the attention of commentators that these ideas share unmistakeable affin-
ities with Mussolini’s Fascism (Lester, 1995p. 174). Prokhanov has acknowledged that he has
regularly been identified as a Fascist by his critics. He went on to argue that he took no
umbrage at the association—since he was convinced that his detractors had no clear idea of
what the term "fascist" might mean. Prokhanov spoke, unselfconsciously, of the "Harbin ver-
sion of Russian fascism,"26 and of the Fascism of Mussolini, as having very different impli-
cations than anything identified with Hitlerism.27 Prokhanov has made eminently clear that his
sole concern is the salvation of Russia, the restoration of its empire, and the renewal of its
unique and defining "spirit." Should the accomplishment of all that require either a Russian
fascism, or a chastened Stalinism, was clearly a matter of indifference to him.28
These are the ideas that have influenced Gennadii Ziuganov (Specter, 1996; Clark, 1996),
leader of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, founder of the Popular Patriotic
Union of Russia (Hockstader, 1996), and perhaps the most formidable threat to the liberal-
democratic future of Russia.29 He, and those ideas, may shape the future of Russia.

Gennadii Ziuganov
What has become perfectly clear is that "communism" and Marxism-Leninism in Russia have
been transmogrified. Ziuganov’s convictions are spoken of as a "schizophrenic ideology," and
a "nationalist-Communist melange" (Remnick, 1996p. 44). We are told that Ziuganov gives
vent to "authoritarianism, nationalism, revanchism and interventionism..." (The Economist, 16
March 1996, p. 53). Generally indifferent, if properly respectful, of Marx and Lenin, he "exudes
a sort of mystical nationalism," a "xenophobic" and "reactive nationalism" (Bivens, 1996p.
A6), that has made the privileged and advantaged West the enemy of a wounded and morally
debilitated Russia (Karatnycky, 1996).
Ziuganov has become the advocate of Russian renewal. He has called upon the nation’s
sons and daughters to restore and protect the spiritual and cultural heritage of the Russian
empire. He has called upon them to reject "mythical" freedom (Ziuganov, 1997p. 97), and

24. Prokhanov was the actual author of the Slovo k narodu ("A Word to the People") signed by Ziuganov (Sovetskaia
Rossiia, 23 July 1991, p. l). In "A Word to the People," the specific emphasis, to the total neglect of Marxist rhetoric,
is to the salvation of the "Motherland" and its "majestic state."
25. Ziuganov makes regular reference to Russia’s humiliation, see Ziuganov (1997), pp. 12–13, 17, 20, 39, 48, 118.
26. Prokhanov was apparently alluding to the "fascism" of Nikolai Ustrialov. See Agursky (1987), pp. 184–187, 240–
247, 259–266, 310–315, 331–334.
27. See the illuminating discussion between Kurginian and Prokhanov in the forum published in Den, 1–9 January
1993 and reproduced in part in "Two Patriots Debate Threat of Fascism," Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press,
45(4) 2–6.
28. See Yanov’s report of his interview with Prokhanov, which testifies to his attraction to Mussolini and Stalin.
Yanov (1995), chapter 6; see Ziuganov (1997), p. 64.
29. Kurginian’s Experimental Creative Center in Moscow regularly produced ideological materials for Ziuganov, see
Vujacic (1996), p. 134.
10 Fascism and the New Russian Nationalism: A. James Gregor

once again, make their own the "eternal values of the Russian character"-anti-individualistic
collectivism (Ziuganov, 1995e), idealism, heroism, selfless labor, and impeccable morality
(Ziuganov, 1995d pp. 46–51).
For Ziuganov, Russia is infilled with a "special historic responsibility," that of resisting the
Spenglerian decadence (Ziuganov, 1997pp. 99–100) of an "immoral and materialistic West"
(Ziuganov, 1993p. 174). The dominant West, like an "insatiable octopus or gigantic whirlpool,"
seeks to extract minerals and cheap labor from the less-developed countries in a process of
exploitation calculated to condemn them to perpetual inferiority (Ziuganov, 1997p. 108). Only
Russia can assure a "balanced world" in the "geopolitical equilibrium of....Great Spaces, civiliz-
ations, and ethno-religious ’centers of force’" (Ziuganov, 1994pp. 124, 127).
In its geopolitical, armed defense against Western hegemony, Russia is required to recon-
struct the productive base of the nation (Ziuganov, 1997p. 94; Ziuganov, 1995c). That necessi-
tates the collaboration of all "patriots," irrespective or class or category.30 In April 1994, the
Communist Party of the Russian Federation committed itself to promoting "the great idea of
patriotism" (Ziuganov, 1997p. 99)—sentiment that would act as a solvent of class and category
distinction. All would subscribe to the struggle against a "prehistoric and failed liberalism"
(Ziuganov, 1997p. 45) in the name of the entire narod—in the spirit of solidarity, selflessness
and sacrifice (Ziuganov, 1993pp. 9–14). The notion of an "organic people" and "nation" would
replace "class" as the proper object of primary loyalty (Vujacic, 1996pp. 140–141, 144–145).
The cosmopolitan "fantasy" of "world revolution" was to be definitively abandoned (Ziuganov,
1997pp. 20, 84).
Ziuganov has argued that so arduous is the enterprise that faces the nation, that only a
"majestic and powerful state" (Ziuganov, 1994) could possibility assure its accomplishment.
In the January 1995 program of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, it is affirmed
that only patriotism and the "closest mutual tie between the individual, society, and the state
(derzhavnost)" could provide the moral energy necessary for the salvation, rehabilitation and
renewal of the nation (Ziuganov, 1997p. 120).
It would appear that for Ziuganov, the state, the concrete expression of the historic union
of the Russian people, finds its true voice not in the "hollow separation of powers," by virtue
of which "traitors to the Fatherland" could carry out their "anti-national tasks," but through a
system of representation that would not impair the "collective will."31 Whatever Ziuganov’s
declarations of commitment to "true democratic" intent (Ziuganov, 1997p. 41), it is difficult
to understand how such an alternative to the traditional liberal-democratic separation of powers
might function. What seems clear is Ziuganov’s candid admiration of a neoStalinist option.
Ziuganov regularly deplores the "excesses" of the Stalinist regime, more frequently than not
because it cast Russian against Russian in fratricidal struggle (Ziuganov, 1997pp. 51, 59, 62).
Equally evident is his admiration of the Leader (Vozhd). Ziuganov has reminded his audiences
that not only did Stalin create a modern Russia capable of defeating the most formidable armed
forces in the history of the world—but that he had also been prepared to undertake a
"philosophical renewal" of the "official ideology of the Soviet Union...." Stalin fully intended,
Ziuganov insists, to "create an effective ’ideology of patriotism’" as a substitute for that collec-

30. Ziuganov speaks of the essential role of the "national enterpreneurial class" in his account of the development
of the new Russia, see Ziuganov (1994), pp. 65–69, 80f., and Ziuganov (1997), p. 19.
31. See the discussion in Zavtra, 22 June 1994, as cited Vujacic (1996), pp. 143–144. Ziuganov has spoken of an
"emergency government of popular trust" that would be seem to satisfy his understanding of how "socialist/populist"
rule might manifest itself in the modern world. See the interesting discussion in Ziuganov (1993), pp. 187–193 and
1997, pp. 8–9.
 Fascism and the New Russian Nationalism: A. James Gregor 11

tion of Marxist notions that history had shown to be so inadequate. According to Ziuganov,
if death had not intervened, Stalin’s purported reforms would have fully restored "the Russian
spiritual-state tradition" (Ziuganov, 1997p. 120).
In that "ideology of patriotism," dedication to a "strong state" and love of the Motherland
(Ziuganov, 1997p. 40) would substitute themselves for "class warfare"—uniting all Russians
in a common cause and a common sentiment. Such a new legitimating ideology would have
"fully overcome the negative spiritual consequences of the revolutionary storms" (Ziuganov,
1997p. 121) of the October Revolution. Russia would no longer have been divided by class
and category distinctions. Anti-religiosity would be abandoned together with the stultifying
materialism of the early Bolshevik period (Ziuganov, 1995a).
For Ziuganov, Stalinism shorn of its Marxist-Leninist trappings, infused with nationalist and
statist sentiments, rendered politically homogeneous, "organic" in character (Ziuganov, 1997p.
85), developmental in intent, and expansionist in practice, constitutes a political ideal.32 It is the
"white communism" described by Sergei Kurginian, and it looks very much like the Fascism of
Benito Mussolini.

Fascism and Russia’s New National-Communism

The relationship between Italian Fascism and Bolshevism has always been characterized by a
number of curiosities. Not only had many of the major ideologues of Fascism been acknowl-
edged Marxists before their "conversion," but even after Fascism’s advent, they pretended to
be able to anticipate Bolshevism’s future in Russia.
Mussolini regularly reminded the Marxist-Leninists of Italy that he had once been of their
number and had been taught that socialists could accede to power only when the "vast majority"
of any subject population was "proletarian" and the capitalist mode of production had exhausted
its potential (Mussolini, 1952–1963, 11, p. 341). Given the all but total absence of the precon-
ditions for socialism, he, like many of the revolutionary Marxists who had followed him into
Fascism (Olivetti, 1919), predicted that Bolshevism, in what was to be the Soviet Union, would
necessarily devolve into a totally unanticipated system.33
Since Russia had not completed its developmental tasks, and Fascists rejected the notion
that the world stood on the brink of "international proletarian revolution," the Bolshevik revol-
utionaries would be compelled to assume the economic and industrializing responsibilities of
a national, entrepreneurial and developmental minority. They would be compelled to create
an industrial system out of one that was essentially agrarian. They would have to do it in an
international environment in which competing "centers of power" not only threatened the very
existence of revolutionary Russia, but would use every device to suffocate its efforts (see
Grandi, 1941).
The essence of the argument was that if Bolshevik Russia was to survive, undertake rapid
economic development, and secure its place in a competitive political universe in which
resources and markets were controlled by those with industrial and military power, it would
have to abandon its artificial internationalism, surrender its suicidal notions about internal "class
warfare," reinvoke nationalism, permit the market modalities necessary to the efficiency of a
productive system in a "mixed economy," reestablish order and recreate both a hierarchical

32. See Ziuganov (1997), p. 72. Ziuganov’s entire discussion of "Eurasianism" shares this character, see Ziuganov
(1997), pp. 71–79, 119–127. For a recent account of Eurasianism, see Shlapentokh (1997).
33. Ziuganov seems to acknowledged as much, see Ziuganov (1997), pp. 72–73.
12 Fascism and the New Russian Nationalism: A. James Gregor

state as well as a disciplined military.34 In fact, by the early 1930s, Fascist and anti-Stalinist
intellectuals identified almost all those anticipated traits in Stalin’s "socialism in a single
country" (La Rochelle, 1973; Trotsky, 1937).
By the mid-1930s, many Fascist intellectuals argued that the realities of the twentieth century
had compelled Stalinism to adopt and adapt the basic fundamentals of Fascism (Ardemagni,
1934; Nasti, 1937; Napolitano, 1937; Bertoni, 1937; Panunzio, 1939). In the course of those
reflections, many Fascists came to the conclusion that Fascism and Stalinism belonged to the
same genus (Manoilescu, 1941; Spirito, 1933). In fact, early in the history of the relationship
between Fascism and Marxist socialism, Dino Grandi had argued that "Fascism is the immedi-
ate product of the... degeneration of socialism" (Grandi, 1941p. 223.) Gennadii Ziuganov seems
to have discovered as much.

Conclusions
What seems evident is that a plausible case can be made for the presence of Fascist elements
in the political ideology of some of the major opponents of the Yeltsin administration in post-
Soviet Russia. That those elements constitute the grounds for identifying its proponents as
"right-wing extremists" is, at least initially, counterintuitive. That those elements, all put
together, are "conservative" strikes one as a singular abuse of language.35 That the seeming
"fascism" of Kurginian, Prokhanov and Ziuganov is a "nazism" seems totally unconvincing.36
That some form of anti-Semitism or other is to be found among Russia’s new nationalists
can hardly be gainsaid. That it should appear at all is a matter of deep concern. Nonetheless,
distinctions should be made.
It would be hard to argue that whatever anti-Semitism might be found in the undertakings
of Kurginian, Prokhanov or Ziuganov, that it is comparable to the genocidal convictions of
Adolf Hitler. Anti-Semitism of any sort is to be deplored, but it serves no cognitive purpose
to assign pathological attributes to a political movement for which there is very little cred-
ible evidence.37
There are far too many political aspirants to power, and far too many political groups in
contemporary Russia to tar them all with the same broad brush. Among them there are those
who might, with some credibility, be identified as nazis, and others as conservatives and tra-

34. See Mussolini’s early comments (1952–1963, 16, pp. 158–159 and 18, pp. 226, 258–263. In the early years, until
at least 1925, Fascism was ambivalent about the state’s role in directing the economy of the peninsula. By the early
1930s, all that had changed. See Mussolini (1938). With respect to the changes that the Bolsheviks would have to
learn to tolerate in the course of their "anomalous" revolution, see Soffici (1923), pp. 126–137. Ziuganov has recognized
that while a traditional "communist" command economy may have had some virtues during the first, extensive growth
phase of the Soviet economy, it had outgrown its usefulness, and by the end of the 1960s had shown its major
disabilities, see Ziuganov (1997), p. 104.
35. If Ziuganov is to be identified as a "right-wing extremist" or a "conservative," it would seem that Stalin would
have to similarly qualify. That, it would seem, would test the cognitive limits of language.
36. This is not to suggest that there are no "nazis" or "nazi" sympathizers among those in the anti-democratic oppo-
sition in post-Soviet Russia. They should be identified as such, and not confused with other groups. There is very
little to support the notion that either Kurginian’s "white communism" or Ziuganov’s Patriotic Union is nazi.
37. The entire issue of political anti-Semitism is too complex and far too sensitive to deal with in the compass of so
brief an account, but now that we know that Stalin was an anti-Semite, see Vaksberg (1994) and Kostyrchenko (1995),
we can appreciate the different forms that political anti-Semitism may assume. It is necessary to make cognitive
distinctions between those various forms. One of the best books dealing with anti-Semitism in Fascist Italy is that of
De Felice (1962). See also Ledeen (1973), pp. 187–202. The Fascist regime in Italy was an "incarceration and exile
system." It undertook neither mass murder, nor genocide. See the important distinctions in Horowitz (1997), chapter
9, and pp. 223–227.
 Fascism and the New Russian Nationalism: A. James Gregor 13

ditionalists. There are others who are simply occultists and mystics,38 anti-Masonic and con-
spiracy theorists,39 religious fanatics, primitive misanthropists, or clinically disturbed. It serves
very little analytic purpose to lump them all together as "right-wing extremists" or
"conservative" elements in a "red-brown" coalition.
The political environment in an emerging new Russia will certainly remain extremely com-
plicated for the foreseeable future.
Sorting out continuities, affinities, simple mimetism, genuine distinctions, and serious polit-
ical thought from the overwhelming noise and confusion that almost always accompanies a
community undergoing revolutionary change, will require all the comparative analytic skill in
our possession.

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