Lucas Da Silva IA3 MHS – Cuban Missile Crisis

To what extent did the USSR’s placement of nuclear bombs in Cuba 1962 in
response to the US warheads in Turkey, influence the US to revert from
physical measures of control? And to what degree did it cause the retreat to
political and economic means of asserting dominance over Castro-Communist
Cuba, and thus the USSR during the Cold War?
Whilst the US, which took the role of the primary aggressor throughout the Cuban Missile Crisis in
1962 used preliminary acts of physical aggression to overthrow the Castro-communist regime in
Cuba, these measures transitioned to more passive-aggressive economic means of control towards
the end of the crisis. The Cuban Missile Crisis of October 16 th to 29th 1962 marked a significant
turning point in the Cold War, as the threat of communist expansion was high, having been
historically closer to the US than ever before following the overthrow of US-backed Fulgencio Batista
in 1959 and Fidel Castro’s rise to power in Cuba establishing a communist governance. The threat of
a communist power right at the US doorstep put the US on high alert, leading to CIA covert
operations, consisting of tentative attacks in attempt decentralise the Castro-communist
government, but to no avail. However, upon the discovery of Soviet nuclear missiles placed in Cuba
as a response to the US warheads in Turkey, the US reverted from physical means of control as the
fear of communist expansion combined with the USSR’s geographical, economic, and now military
strength gave rise to a fear of nuclear war if further provoked, thus the US transitioned to political
and economic means of asserting dominance over Cuba, causing a mutual mistrust and thus
heightened tensions between the US and USSR. These would prove effective decreasing Cuba’s
economic and military strength, leaving them vulnerable to invasion, and thus allowing the US to
gain the upper hand towards the end of the conflict. Therefore, whilst the US initially supported
tentative physical aggression against Cuba in order to prevent the spread of communism, the
Domino Theory-based threat combined with potential nuclear war led the US to revert to economic
and military means of control, which proved more effective in asserting dominance over Cuba and
thus the USSR during the Cold War.

Although the US preliminarily enforced physical aggression against Cuba as a means of decentralising
the Castro-communist government, they subsequently retreated from physical hostility upon the
discovery of nuclear weaponry in Cuba, in realisation of the possibility of provoking nuclear war. In
recognition of the potential of Cuban anti-Castro exiles, General Landsdale for the [US] Office of the
Secretary of Defence (1962) reveals initial plans for Operation Mongoose - component of the Bay of
Pigs invasion, claiming “the US is in support” (Landsdale, 1962) of Cuban Anti-Castro rebels which
would initiate the invasion, despite this then having later become an “abortive invasion of Cuba”
(Britannica, 2023). The potential of the rebels, which proved extremely effective in the 1953 Cuban
Revolution, was desired by the US to aid in the overthrow of the Castro governance, however
without drawing attention directly to the US. The excerpt by Landsdale (1962) and the Britannica
summary (2023) provide a primary US military perspective combined with a reputable - retrospective
view on the failures of Operation Mongoose and, despite bias leaning towards the US ideology,
together they are still highly useful in substantiating that the US support of anti-Castro rebels for the
Bay of Pigs Invasion was an indirect act of physical aggression to Castro-communist Cuba, as the
rebels had a known reputation for utilising physical force to achieve their goals, which aligned with
the US objective of decentralising the Castro-communist governance. Following this, however, the
need for physical aggression would be suppressed upon the discovery of Cuban nuclear artillery, and
thus the imminent threat of nuclear outbreak. John. T. Correll for the Air force Magazine (2005)
provides a military-focused analysis with insight into the utilisation of U-2 spy planes administered by
 Lucas Da Silva IA3 MHS – Cuban Missile Crisis

the CIA into Cuba, that were sent out bimonthly until October 14 th, 1962, when they “found SS-4
medium-range ballistic missiles” (Correll, 2005) in Cuba. The CIA U-2 missions played a vital role in
gathering US intelligence regarding Cuba, and the discovery of nuclear weapons in Cuban launch
sites. However, this surveillance would be perceived as invasive and potentially hostile by Cuba, and
also then the USSR, due to the presence of unannounced aircrafts in Cuban airspace. Thus, after the
sighting of Cuban missiles, all further U-2 operations were abandoned, as Cuba, which now held
Soviet-provided nuclear strength, could choose to initiate nuclear war if further provoked with spy
operations or, in fact, any means of physical aggression, leading the US to retreat from physical
provocation, with the fear of nuclear war in mind. This fear of direct conflict, and the magnitude of
its impact due to advancement in the weaponry held by Cuba, is corroborated by Jorge Dominguez
(2000) an American professor of Cuban origin, who details that the desire to overthrow the Castro
Government at the time “could have escalated to general war” (Dominguez, 2000), as the US
believed physical acts of aggression against Cuba could result in retaliation, most likely with nuclear
weaponry, thus the US fear of nuclear war led to the decision to retreat from physical means of
control. Therefore, the US did initially support physical aggressions in effort to decentralise the
Castro-communist governance in Cuba until the discovery of Cuban nuclear artillery, and thus the
threat of nuclear war, subsequently leading the US to revert to political and economic means of
control, increasing tensions between the two superpowers.

The US fear of Communist expansion based on a ‘Domino Theory’ belief that a progressive influence
of communist expansion would occur if initial submission to communism arose, was further fuelled
by Cuba’s economic, geographical, and now military strength with possession of nuclear weaponry.
Thus, the US sought to control Cuba’s economic, political, and military power – increasing tensions
and creating a mutual mistrust between each other. Whilst Sam Ord (2022) for the Socialist Worker
journal contends the US were merely aggressive, as they were “desperate to prove their dominance”
(Ord, 2022) to the other global superpowers against a smaller nation, this argument of a sole
objective of power expressed by Ord contains a political bias favouring a communist perspective,
therefore lacking scope and balance, and thus diminishing reliability in its representation of the US
motive. In contrast, Stephanie Fawcett, a senior record analysist for the National US Archives (2016)
proclaims how the Domino Theory - a fear based on the belief that “if one country fell to
communism, it’s neighbours would soon follow” (Fawcett, 2016) reigned supreme throughout the
Cuban Missile Crisis, particularly upon the verge of nuclear war. The proximity of Cuba to the US was
already perceived as a great threat, being at the US doorstep, signifying the US were at risk of
communist expansion from the beginning. Fawcett (2016) with access to a wide range of primary
sources, provides an ideological perspective on the US motive of containment aligning with the US’
actual response to the presence of Cuban missiles and, thus, is more reliable in comparison to Ord’s
(2022) highly biased and close-minded pro-communist/anti-US perspective. Hence, Ord’s more
subjective argument is disregarded, as if the US were truly attempting dominance as their central
objective, physical force and direct aggression would be involved. Thus, it is more feasible to believe
that the Cuban possession of nuclear missiles would have only increased the fear of expansion, as
the country’s military power had substantially increased, limiting US prevention of the spread due to
possible provocation of nuclear war, and thus leaving them more vulnerable to communist
expansion. Nonetheless, the US believed the control of the heightened threat of communism was
necessary, leading to the transition to economic, and military means of control, consequently
increasing tensions between the US, Cuba, and USSR. The JFK Presidential Library and Museum
(2023), an official US government administered site provides a political perspective on US intelligence
of Soviet-Cuban relations throughout the crisis, detailing that Castro-communist Cuba became
“militarily and economically dependent on the Soviet Union” (JFK-Library, 2023), which was evident
 Lucas Da Silva IA3 MHS – Cuban Missile Crisis

to the US particularly when having discovered Soviet nuclear weapons in Cuba. Although Cuba, an
economic and military superpower was at the US doorstep, it relied on the USSR for its strength
through providing military and economic overtures. Hence, if the US, which recognised the
importance of USSR funding both economically and militarily, could not control Cuba and the threat
of communist expansion physically, they would instead challenge Cuba’s economy and military with
restrictions limiting Soviet aid. Therefore, the ‘Domino Theory’ belief of communist expansion was
exacerbated by Cuba’s possession of nuclear weaponry, combined with their economic and
geographical strength, thus the US reverted to economic and military means of control, increasing
tensions as Cuba was aware and concerned of the US intent. Furthermore, the US control measures
would prove extremely effective, leaving Cuba economically and militarily weak, and open to
invasion, thus allowing the US to triumph towards the end of the crisis.

Whilst the US departed from physical means of aggression, the transition into economic and military
containment would prove extremely effective, causing Cuba to become vulnerable to invasion, and
leaving them no choice other than to surrender, thus allowing the US to gain the upper hand at the
end of the crisis. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), a US secretive organisation that played a
significant role in the covert operations leading up to the crisis leaked a previously classified
memorandum on the US-enforced blockade in Cuba (1962). The memorandum although expressing
political bias towards Cuba and the USSR, nonetheless, provides a US-insider perspective, which is
highly useful in determining the effect of their efforts of containment in Cuba, as a once-classified
primary document it aimed to provide accurate information on the blockade. It is explicitly
referenced throughout the document that on October 27 th, 1962, 16 Soviet cargo ships containing
military cargoes aimed for Cuban delivery “headed back towards the USSR” (CIA, 1962). The reason
being – the US naval blockades around Cuba enforced heavy restrictions for Cuban import and
exports, placing the Cuban economy on hold, and preventing the supply of USSR military shipments
to support Cuba. Thus, without a steady economy and a severe lack of military equipment regularly
supplied by the USSR, Cuba’s military and economic strength was depleted, leaving the country
vulnerable to invasion, hence allowing the US to gain a significant advantage towards the end of the
crisis. Consequently, this would leave Cuba no other option other than to appeal to US demands,
ultimately concluding the missile crisis with the US triumphant. The lack of alternative choices for the
USSR in the midst of the naval blockade, other than to appeal to the US demands was explicitly
referenced by Martin J. Sherwen (2020) stating the US “forced Khruschev to withdraw his missiles”, a
view corroborated by Benjamin Schwarz (2013), using similar terms of ‘force’, stating that the US
“forced a unilateral Soviet withdrawal” (Schwarz, 2013). The forceful intent of the naval blockade was
primarily due to the decrease in Cuban economic and military strength, with the US providing no
other option for Cuba to escape vulnerability, thus, ‘forcing’ the USSR to appeal to the US demand of
withdrawing nuclear missiles from Cuba – a clear indication of US triumph approaching the end of
the crisis, as Cuba and thus the USSR were clearly submissive in regard to resolving the blockade.
Therefore, the economic and military containment of Cuba allowed the US to resolve the Cuban
Missile Crisis in a dominant position, with Cuba ultimately ‘forced’ to comply with the US demand of
the removal of Soviet missiles from Cuba in order to prevent the threat of invasion.

Therefore, it was demonstrated throughout the range of sources that although the US was initially in
support of physical aggression towards Cuba in attempt to prevent the spread of communism
derived from a ‘Domino Theory’ belief that if one country falls, its neighbouring countries soon
follow, the US reverted to a system of economic and military containment through a naval blockade.
This sought the depletion of Cuban economic and military strength provided by the USSR leaving
Khruschev no choice other than to submit to the US demand of removing Soviet nuclear weaponry
from Cuba, demonstrating US dominance at the end of the crisis.
 Lucas Da Silva IA3 MHS – Cuban Missile Crisis

Word Count – 1984/2000

Bibliography
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Central-Intelligence-Agency. (1962). US National Archive. Retrieved from Memorandum-The US Naval

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