Introduction

The work of Local Government (LG) is vital in establishing a democratic political atmosphere
and developing participatory scopes. The body of LG has to have financial, existential, and
functional independence with the power of managing resources and authority of making own
decisions (Mawhood, 1985). But in reality and constitutional liability emphasized reform
initiatives of the central government and others over local government instead which is vibrant
through the former events.

With the guidance of the Committee for Administrative Reorganization/Reform (CARR), the
local government faced signifying pro-people moves in the time of the Ershad regime though
only a few propositions were conducted by the martial law government. But the structural-
functional role hampered it to succeed then discontinued in BNP-led government. In this regime
Local Government Structure Review Commission (LGSRC) intended grassroot level
institutionalization to ensure democracy but remained unimplemented (Khan and Obaidullah,
2003). Thus, the exigence was build and leaded to the formation of Local Government
Commission (1997).

Local Government Commission (LGC) Formation & Proposals

After 21 years when Awami League re-elected in 1996, bold changes were happening with that
power which resulted the formation of Local Government Commission in September, 1996.
Member of the Parliament, Advocate Rahman Ali as the head. In May, 1997 LGC proposed the
layout of LG harmonious with a democratic ethos in sustainable level. LGC considered past
affairs with constitutional provisions and the devotion of all political parties also developing
intention of the administration to the LG system (Siddiqui, 2005). This commission
recommended a four-tiered system (Khan, n. d.:10). Also, provisions were to restructure LG in
three hill districts.

Gram Parishad (GP) : Each union should be divided into nine wards, according to the
commission. A GP was constituted for each ward, with nine members, three female members,
and one chairman. The voters of the ward directly elected all members. The GPs' chairman was
an elected member of the UP. Provision for the representation of marginalized groups was also
kept. Members of the GPs who worked in government at the ward level did not have voting
rights. This body carried out its duties through six distinct committees (Khan and Obaidullah,
2003).

Union Parishad (UP) : The commission, like its predecessors, kept UP as a primary tier of local
government. However, it was demoted in the hierarchy. The commission suggested that a UP
consist of nine members from nine wards, three women members, and one chairman. The UP
was given 22 functions.

Upazilla Parishad (UZP) : The commission recommended that UPZ maintain the same
organizational structure as envisioned in the CARR Report of 1982. Except for the police and
judicial ministries, all government officials were placed on deputation under the direct
supervision of UPZ. Promotion, transfer, and the production of annual confidential reports
(ACRs) remained in the hands of the UPZ’s elected chairman and the MPs roled as advisor of
the UPZ. The commission proposed that the UZP enhance its revenue earning from various
leased property and tax from land transfer and land revenue (GOB, 1997).

Zilla Paroshad (ZP) : This is the highest layer in the local government structure, has been
dormant. Following the passing of the District Administration Act and the fourth amendment to
the Constitution, an administrative council was formed, and the district was placed under the
administration of a district governor selected by the president. However, the project was
abandoned due to government changes. It was placed under direct bureaucratic authority in 1990,
and the deputy commissioner was appointed as its ex-officio chairman. The Local Government
Commission (LGC) of 1997 also proposed that ZP be democratized. The ZP chairman held the
rank of state minister, while the deputy commissioner served as chief executive officer under
him, with MPs serving as advisors (GOB, 1997).The ZP Act of 1988 established eight revenue
streams for the ZP(Khan and Obaidullah, 2003).

The Democratic Governance era of Administrative Reforms &

Effects
This timeline mainly focused on “Good Governance” like foreign concepts due to outside’s
pressure. Although the Hasina government accepted the recommendations of LGC and took
steps to fulfill significant recommendations, the government's tenure was terminated. Other
papers were developed by various aid partners during this phase to promote an open, transparent,
responsible, and performance-oriented administrative system to enhance parliamentary
democracy (CPD, 2001; Kim and Monem, 2009). Various studies dqiscovered multiple flaws
that vastly outnumber the virtues. These include an insufficient mechanism for specifying
functions, inappropriate resource allocation, and a slow and complex system. Decision-making
processes, excessive centralization, a lack of information bases, a lack of experience with good
civil-service-politician relations, and awkward central-local relationships (Haque, 1996; CPD,
2001; Sarker, 2004; Kim and Monem, 2009). Despite the fact that the sector study
recommendations were based on NPM and post-NPM governance principles to overhaul a
contemporary public administration in Bangladesh, all previous governments failed to apply
them for various reasons. ADB Report (2007) identified the following issues: (1) outside
interference in administrative decision making; (2) politicization of the civil service; (3)
nepotism and favoritism; (4) a lack of delegated authority by mid-level and local level public
officials; (5) a lack of public scrutiny of public administration; and (6) a paucity of citizen
demand for improvements in public administration. Strong bureaucratic resistance also made this
difficult to imply (Khan, 2009).

LGC Sequel in Present Administration

In few worlds, in the time of LGC situated Major - Party responsiveness combined with
bureaucratic self-interest with a semi-neutral personality (Azizuddin, 2011). Now, the national
government exerts great control over the LG system via its bureaucratic institutions. Because of
the existence of such a stringent supervision structure, LG entities have few opportunities to
utilize their own initiative. LG reforms continue to be a focus of national policymakers, donor
agencies, NGOs, and civil society organizations. The discussions have centred on the role of the
state in improving the efficiency and effectiveness of public-sector resource management. The
need for constituting a LGC independent of executive control, like the Election Commission, has
been advocated for approximately a decade by national policy makers whom also believe that the
commission should eventually be given the right to hire local government workers. The proposed
commission is intended to protect the autonomy of local governments (Khan and Obaidullah,
2003).
Conclusion
Lack of political commitment and bureaucratic resistance prevent local representative function.
The idea of Establishment of an independent Loeal Govemment Commission (LGC) is
revolutionary the possibilities of it seeing the light of reality remains uncertain.

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