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fully edited. Content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI 10.1109/TII.2019.2955739, IEEE
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IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INDUSTRIAL INFORMATICS
Distributed Resilient Finite-Time Secondary Control
for Heterogeneous Battery Energy Storage Systems
Under Denial-of-Service Attacks
Lei Ding, Member, IEEE, Qing-Long Han, Fellow, IEEE, Boda Ning, Member, IEEE,
and Dong Yue, Senior Member, IEEE,
Abstract—This paper addresses the problem of distributed
resilient finite-time control of multiple heterogeneous battery
energy storage systems (BESSs) in a microgrid subject to denial-
of-service (DoS) attacks. Note that DoS attacks may block
information transmission among BESSs by preventing the BESS
from sending data, compromising the devices and jamming a
communication network. A distributed secure control framework
is presented, where an ACK-based attack detection strategy
and a communication recovery mechanism are introduced to
mitigate the impact of DoS attacks by repairing the paralyzed
topology graphs caused by DoS attacks back into the initial
connected graph. Under this framework, a distributed resilient
finite-time secondary control scheme is proposed such that
frequency regulation, active power sharing and energy level
balancing of BESSs can be achieved simultaneously in a finite
time, meanwhile, operational constraints can be satisfied at any
control transient time. Moreover, based on theoretical analysis,
the impact of the duration time of DoS attacks on the convergence
time of the control algorithm can be explicitly revealed. Finally,
validity and effectiveness of the proposed control scheme are
demonstrated by case studies on a modified IEEE 57-bus testing
system.
Index Terms—Distributed resilient finite-time control, denial-
of-service attack, active power sharing, frequency regulation,
energy level balancing, battery energy storage system.
I. I
Due to widespread penetration of renewable energy sources
such as wind generation and photovolatic panels, and rapid
advances in communication and computation technology, a
traditional power network has been experiencing a huge rev-
olution towards a smart grid, which can significantly enhance
reliability and efficiency of power networks, and alleviate
environmental pollution [1], [2]. Meanwhile, a microgrid has
been proposed as a solution of smart grids to overcome
intermittent characteristics of renewable energy sources. Gen-
erally, a microgrid consists of distributed generations, energy
This research work was supported in part by the program of Jiangsu
Specially-Appointed Professor under Grant RK043STP19001, the fund of
high-level talents at NJUPT under Grant XK0430919039, the Australian
Research Council under Grant DP160103567, the National Key R&D Program
of China under Grant 2018YFA0702202 and the key project of National
Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant 61833008. (Corresponding
author: Qing-Long Han, Dong Yue).
L. Ding and D. Yue are with the Institute of Advanced Technology, Nanjing
University of Posts and Telecommunications, Nanjing 210023, P. R. China (e-
mails: dl522@163.com (L. Ding); medongy@vip.163.com (D. Yue)).
Q.-L. Han and B. Ning are with the School of Software and Electrical
Engineering, Swinburne University of Technology, Melbourne, VIC 3122,
Australia (e-mails: qhan@swin.edu.au (Q.-L. Han); bdning.ecust@gmail.com
(B. Ning).
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1
storage systems (ESSs) and loads, and it can be operated in a
grid-connected or islanded mode. In a micrgrid, introduction
of ESSs can improve power quality and network reliability
by providing a balance between intermittent generations (for
example, wind and Photovolatic) and varying loads.
For a microgrid, fundamental control issues to be addressed
are to ensure power quality and frequency/voltage stability,
and so on. With the integration of battery energy storage
systems (BESSs) into a microgrid, energy levels or the state
of charge (SoC) levels of BESSs should be coordinated
properly to guarantee that the BESSs will not prematurely
run out of energy or be overloaded. In [3], the estimation
of SoC levels was carried out effectively by a Lebesgue-
sampling-based extended Kalman filter. Besides, traditionally,
a hierarchical control structure microgrids with BESSs is
utilized widely with three levels: a primary control level, a
secondary control level and a tertiary control level [4]. The
primary control level is to achieve power/load sharing and
maintain frequency/voltage stability. In the primary control
level, one commonly used method is decentralized droop
control, which is based only on local information of BESSs
without requiring any communication [5]–[9]. Note that the
standard f − P and V − Q droop control is not suitable
for BESSs since it does not consider SoC levels of BESSs
at all. Hence, SoC based droop control was used in [10]
to adjust the nominal frequency/voltage of microgrids. It is
commonly acknowledged that the droop control introduces
frequency/voltage deviations from their desired values, thereby
degrading accuracy of power sharing and frequency/voltage
regulation. To compensate for the deviations caused by the
primary control, a secondary control level is employed. The
tertiary control level is responsible to perform economic and
optimal management of power dispatch.
In this paper, an issue of secondary control of micgrogrids
with multiple BESSs is addressed. In general, secondary
control strategies for microgrids are categorized into three
types: centralized [11], decentralized [12], and distributed
[13]. A centralized secondary control requires a central station
which is responsible to collect all information of units through
communication networks and then to implement algorithm
computation. In this case, any single point of failure in the
processing of information transmission and computation will
seriously cause migrogrid instability. In contrast to the central-
ized secondary control scheme, a distributed secondary control
scheme using only local neighborhood information is more
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desirable due to its advantages in improving efficiency and

Inner Current Voltage Loop Droop "#! Secondary Neighbors
reliability of microgrids without much increasing complexity Loop Control Control Control Control Information
!"
of design and installation.
! !
Note that multi-agent system based distributed consensus Primary Control Distributed
Power Local
control has been tailored for a microgrid with BESSs [14]– PWM Calculation Information
Secondary
Control
[19]. In [14], a distributed consensus-based optimal control
algorithm was introduced to achieve dynamic energy level # !# !"
balancing between BESSs. Based on a simplified dynamics of !" #!" #!"
!"
BESS, Reference [15] proposed a distributed control scheme %#&$ $!# $!" MG
#( $' !"
to synchronize energy levels of BESSs. It is shown that the )*+,, Busi
controller gains in [14], [15] have a lower bound depending Output
Battery Converter LC Filter Connector
on the smallest nonzero eigenvalue of Laplacian matrix of
communication topology. Different from [14], [15], a fully Fig. 1. Hierarchical control structure of a BESS
distributed consensus control strategy without requiring any
information of communication topology was designed for
droop-based microgrids with BESSs in [16], where indepen- This paper aims to perform integrated control and manage-
dent control inputs for energy levels and power sharing were ment for energy level, active power and frequency of heteroge-
used. Note that all the aforementioned results only focus on neous BESSs in a microgrid subject to DoS attacks. The main
the case that the dynamics of all the BESSs are identical, but contributions of this paper are summarized as follows: i) A
they cannot apply to the heterogeneous BESSs. Based on this resilient control framework integrating an ACK-based attack
observation, the control method in [16] was extended in [17] detection strategy and a communication recovery mechanism
to deal with the case of heterogeneous BESSs. Considering is first established, where DoS attacks are modeled by commu-
the heterogeneous nature of BESSs, a multi-agent cooperative nication topologies which are switching between the connected
control strategy was proposed in [18] to ensure the SoC initial graph and some paralyzed graphs; ii) Different from
balancing between heterogeneous BESSs. It is worthwhile to the control schemes in [14]–[19], a distributed attack-resilient
mention that the distributed control schemes proposed in [14]– finite-time control scheme is proposed to achieve frequency
[18] just ensure asymptotic stability convergence. In practice, regulation, energy level balancing and active power sharing
it is more desirable and significant to develop a distributed simultaneously, while satisfying physical constraints in any
finite-time control scheme due to its fast convergence, better control transient time; and iii) Theoretically, the effects of DoS
performance and robustness [20]. In [19], a distributed finite- attacks on convergence time of the proposed control algorithm
time control scheme for heterogeneous BESSs in a droop- are characterized explicitly. It is shown that the expected
controlled microgrid was presented. convergence time can be ensured provided that the duration
While adoption of communication networks facilitates dis- time of DoS has an upper bound. Finally, case studies on a
tributed control strategies, it leads to vulnerability of systems modified IEEE 57-bus testing microgrid system are conducted
to malicious cyber attacks that can be injected in a stealthy to show effectiveness, resilience and reliability of the proposed
and unpredictable way. Cyber attacks are regarded as a serious control schemes.
threat in security and resilience of networked systems [21],
since they can disrupt data transmission in medium channels II. P F
by inserting some malware (e.g. viruses and worms) and
A. Battery Energy Storage Systems
destroy normal system operation by illegally invading moni-
toring centers. Roughly, cyber attacks can be categorized into: In this paper, we consider an AC microgrid in which N
deception attacks and DoS attacks. The deception attack is to battery energy storage systems are connected to the main grid.
modify integrity of transmitted data packets, while the DoS In the AC micgrogrid, each unit includes a BESS, a voltage
attack is to make data transmission unavailable by jamming source converter, an LC filter and an output connector. The
shared network mediums. For smart grids, a few results converter is used to convert DC signals to AC ones and then
have been reported to investigate cyber security issues [22], transmit them into the grid. Fig. 1 shows a basic hierarchical
[23]. In [22], a distributed energy management algorithm was control structure for a BESS in the AC microgrid. According
proposed in presence of misbehaving generation units caused to [15], a simplified BESS model is established as
by malicious cyber attacks. The resilient event-triggering H∞ ηi
Ėi = − Pi (1)
load frequency control problem for multi-area power systems 3600
with energy-limited DoS attacks was investigated in [23]. where Ei and Pi are the energy level and the active power
However, little research work has been conducted to take into of battery i, respectively; ηi is the heterogeneous parameter
account the effects of DoS attacks on coordination of multiple of battery i associated with its size. In practice, such battery
BESSs in a microgrid. Therefore, it is of significance to design parameters can be well estimated [24].
a distributed resilient secondary control scheme which can Remark 1: In this paper, a simplified battery model (1) is
achieve energy level balancing, accurate power sharing and used, which has been widely employed in existing literature
frequency regulation in a finite time for BESSs under DoS [15]–[17], [19]. Moreover, it is shown in [15] that, by ignoring
attacks, which motivates the current study. the fast dynamics of internal voltage and current controllers,

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IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INDUSTRIAL INFORMATICS
the simplified BESS can be employed to model a large-scale
power systems with multiple BESSs. It is true that, in more
practical and accurate battery modeling, the battery model
includes more complex dynamics such as nonlinearity and
uncertainty, which may be caused by its internal inherent
structure and external environment conditions. For such a
complex battery model, a robust and more complicated con-
troller will be required to ensure the performance of battery.
Obviously, it is an interesting and challenging issue to extend
the algorithms proposed later in the paper into the model with
nonlinearity and uncertainty, which will be further take into
account in our future work.
B. Primary Droop Control and Secondary control
As shown in Fig. 1, the control structure of each battery
includes primary control and secondary control. Generally, the
aim of the primary control is to ensure frequency synchro-
nization and voltage stability as well as active/reactive power
sharing. In doing so, a conventional primary droop control is
commonly used, which can be described as [9]
wi = wni − mi Pi
Vi = Vni − ni Qi
where wi and Vi are the frequency and voltage magnitude
of BESS i, respectively; wni and Vni are the nominal set
points of frequency and voltage of BESS i, respectively, to
be determined in the secondary controller; Pi and Qi are the
active and reactive power of BESS i, respectively; mi and ni
are the droop coefficients.
It is well acknowledged that the decentralized droop control
results in the deviations of frequency and voltage from their
reference values. To compensate for the deviations and realize
accurate frequency and voltage regulation, a secondary control
scheme is introduced. Taking the derivative of (2a) yields
p distributed secondary controller ensuring that control operation
ẇni = ẇi + mi Ṗi = uw
i + ui
where uw
is the auxiliary control input of ẇi ;
i is the
auxiliary control input of mi Ṗi . Then, the nominal set point
is determined by
Z
p Based on the discussion above, the objective of the paper is
wni = (uw i + ui )ds (4)
Besides, in order to make full use of capacity of distributed
BESSs, their energy levels should be dispatched to loads
in a fair and reasonable way. One feasible strategy is to
Transactions on Industrial Informatics
3
C. Operational Constraints
In a microgrid, operational capacity of each unit is usually
limited, which should be incorporated into designing control
algorithms for the microgrid. In this paper, the following
physical constraints are included
(
Eimin ≤ Ei (t + ∆t) ≤ Ei (t) ≤ Eimax if discharging
(6a)
Eimin ≤ Ei (t) ≤ Ei (t + ∆t) ≤ Eimax if charging
Pimin ≤ Pi (t) ≤ Pimax (6b)
wimin ≤ wi (t) ≤ wimax (6c)
where Eimin and Eimax are the minimum and maximum limits
of energy level for battery i, respectively; Pimin and Pimax are
the minimum and maximum limits of active power output for
battery i, respectively; wimin and wimax are the minimum and
maximum limits of frequency for battery i, respectively.
According to [25], it is well acknowledged that a battery’s
lifespan is highly dependent upon its operation mechanism
and frequent charge-discharge cycling might cause an extra
cost for depreciation of BESSs, especially when fast regula-
(2a)
tion is implemented. Note that, when the constraint (6a) is
(2b) satisfied, the energy levels of BESSs will be decreasing (or
increasing) strictly in a discharging (or charging) mode, which
can effectively avoid frequent switches between discharging
and charging modes in the process of control implementation.
Thus, from the perspective of battery’s lifespan, it is prac-
tical and reasonable to take into account the constraint (6a)
when designing control algorithms. Obviously, (6) is the hard
constraints on energy levels, active power and frequency of
batteries, providing their allowable operational ranges. If the
hard constraints are violated at any transient period, it may
result in instability of microgrids. Therefore, different from
the existing literature [15]–[19], in this paper, we will design a
(3)
of batteries is under such the constraints (6) at any times.
upi
D. Control Objectives
that, under the constraints (6), designing distributed secondary
p
controllers uE w
i , ui and ui in (5) to achieve:
• Frequency regulation: to regulate the frequency of each
BESS to the reference point in a finite time, namely,
synchronize all the rated energy levels of batteries. Based  
on the consideration of frequency regulation, energy level lim∗ wi (t) − wref  = 0, ∀i (7)
t→tw
synchronization, and power sharing, the combined dynamics
incorporating the dynamics of BESSs (1) and the secondary wi (t) = wref , ∀t ≥ t∗w , (8)
control (3) can be given by [15]
where wref is the reference frequency of microgrids and
ηi
Ėi = − Pi + uE
i (5a) t∗w is the settling time for frequency regulation.
3600 • Active power sharing: to ensure proportional active power
mi Ṗi = upi (5b) sharing among BESSs, namely,
w
ẇi = ui (5c)
lim |mi Pi (t) − mj Pj (t)| = 0; ∀i ̸= j (9)
where uE i is the control input of energy level. According to t→t∗
p

the results in [15], it is proved that adding the control input uE

i mi Pi (t) = mj Pj (t); ∀t ≥ t∗p (10)
into the dynamics of energy level (5a) is beneficial to enhance
the convergence rate. where t∗w is the settling time for active power sharing;

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• Energy level balancing: To synchronize the rated energy

Battery 1 Battery 1 Battery 2
levels of BESSs, namely, Battery 2 Battery 3 Battery 3
 
 Ei (t) Ej (t) 
lim  −  = 0; ∀i ̸= j (11)
t→t∗E ∆Ei ∆Ej  DoS attack
Ei (t) Ej (t)
= ; ∀t ≥ t∗E (12)
∆Ei ∆Ej
where ∆Ei ≜ Ei (0) − Eimin for discharging or ∆Ei ≜
Eimax −Ei (0) for charging with initial energy level Ei (0),
and t∗E is the settling time for energy level balancing.
Remark 2: Different from [17], [19], the issue of energy
level balancing considered in this paper is involved with
the remaining or demanding energy of BESSs, namely, the
energy levels of BESSs are synchronized proportional to their
remaining or demanding energy. As a result, the strategy
designed in this paper can avoid any of BESSs to run out
of energy or get full of energy in an earlier time.
III. D S C S U
A
In this section, we design distributed resilient secondary
controllers to achieve frequency regulation, active powering
sharing and energy balancing under DoS cyber attack. First, a
description of DoS cyber attack is presented. Then, theoretical
analysis is conducted to prove the convergence of the proposed
control algorithms.
A. Communication Topology
To facilitate the design of distributed secondary controllers,
suppose that each BESS can communicate with its neighbors
via a communication network. The communication topology
is described as an undirected graph G = (V, E), where V =
{1, 2, · · · , N } is the set of nodes and E ⊆ V × V is the set
of edges. Node j is a neighbor of node i if there is an edge
defined as εij ≜ (i, j) ∈ E. Ni ≜ {j| εij ∈ E} represents the
set of neighbors of node i. A = [aij ] ∈ RN ×N is a weighted
adjacency matrix, where aii = 0 for all i, and aij = 1 if
εij ∈ E, otherwise, aij = 0. The degree matrix of graph G is
D = diag{d1 , d2 , · · · P, dN }, where the diagonal elements are
represented as ϖi = j∈Ni wij . The Laplacian matrix L of
the graph is defined as L = D − A. A path is a connected
edge in a graph. The graph G is connected if there exists a
path between any nodes. The matrix L of a connected graph
is symmetric and has a simple zero eigenvalue and all other
eigenvalues are real and positive [26].
Assumption 1: The communication topology graph G is
undirected and connected when DoS attacks are absent.
Remark 3: In this paper, for analysis brevity, suppose that
the transmission of all the state information such as frequen-
cies, active power and energy levels of BESSs uses a common
communication topology graph G. In a practical microgrid,
however, it is possible that the information is shared through
different communication networks (denoted by Gw , Gp and
Gp , respectively) like [27]. It should be emphasized that, the
control method proposed later in this paper can be extended
to accommodate the case of different topologies.
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Battery 4 Battery 5 Battery 6 Battery 7 Battery 4 Battery 5 Battery 6 Battery 7
ࡳ૙ ࡳ૚
Battery 1 Battery 2 Battery 3 Battery 1 Battery 2 Battery 3
DoS attack
DoS attack DoS attack
DoS attack
Battery 4 Battery 5 Battery 6 Battery 7 Battery 4 Battery 5 Battery 6 Battery 7
ࡳ૛ ࡳ૜
Fig. 2. Communication topologies under DoS attacks
D S
B. DoS Attack Modeling
Generally, DoS attacks refer to a class of attacks which
make certain or all components of a control system inac-
cessible. The adversaries attempt to jam the communication
channels, compromise the devices, block data sending and
distort the routing protocols by imposing the DoS attacks on
both the system and communication network. As a result,
the occurrence of DoS attacks may seriously affect both
system measurement and data transmission, causing loss of
data and failure of control actions [28]. According to different
attacked targets, DoS attacks on a networked system can be
roughly categorized into: 1) node-based DoS attacks, which
aim to prevent a node from sending its measurement data
to any of its neighbors; 2) link-based DoS attacks, which
aim to remove or damage the communication link between
neighboring nodes. Note that, under the node-based attack, the
connectivity of communication topology must be paralyzed
since some or all of nodes are completely isolated from
the communication network. Unfortunately, it is devastating
for distributed control algorithms requiring necessary support
of connected communication topology, probably resulting in
degrading or even destroying the convergence of control
algorithms. While, under the node-based attack where some
communication links among nodes are removed, it is possible
that the communication topology is kept either connected
or unconnected. It is clear that the former case only slows
down the convergence of distributed control algorithms, while
the latter case is in fact regarded as a case of the node-
based attack. In contrast to the link-based attack, the node-
based attack may probably result in relatively more serious
degradation or even damage of control performance. Thus,
in this paper, we focus more on the case of node-based DoS
attacks, where each battery is suffering from DoS attacks such
that its measurement is blocked to be transmitted to all of its
neighbors through a communication network. As a result, the
battery under such DoS attacks gets isolated in communicating
with others. It should be mentioned that the control framework
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designed later can also accommodate link-based DoS attacks. making of network repairment. Similarly, with the cyberse-
1) Impacts of DoS attacks: Obviously, the DoS attacks curity framework [29], [30], a reliable and secure channel is
considered in the paper will break communication connection employed to transmit the attack detection report between each
among neighbors, leading to paralysis of graph connectivity battery and the SCMC. When detecting the event of attacks,
of communication topology. To explain this more clearly, batteries will send a report massage to the SCMC. Then, the
Fig. 2 illustrates the impacts of DoS attacks on changes of SCMC will promptly activate operation of network repairment
communication topologies. It is emphasized that, graph G0 is to reinitialize or recover the entire communication topology
the original communication topology among batteries when of batteries. It should be mentioned that there have been
attacks are absent, while some batteries in graphs G1 , G2 many well-studied approaches to reinitialization or recovery of
and G3 are under DoS attacks. For example, in graph G1 , broken communication topology in the existing literature such
the adversary launches a DoS attack on Battery 1 such that as [31]–[33]. The details on these communication recovery
its measurement data cannot be delivered to Battery 2 and mechanisms can be referred to [31]–[33] for interested readers,
Battery 4, or vice versa. In this case, the Laplacian matrix of which are beyond the scope of this paper. In practice, the
communication topology becomes processing of communication network repairement will take a
  finite period of time, which closely depends on the numbers
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 3 −1 0 −1 −1 0  of attacked nodes and broken communication links.
  4) Model of DoS attacks: Based on the observation above,
0 −1 2 0 0 0 −1
  the DoS attacks can be modeled by a set of communica-
L= 0 0 0 1 −1 0 0
0 −1 0 −1 2 tion topologies which are swiching between the connectivity-
 0 0
0 −1 0 paralyzed graphs and the initial connected graph. To be more
0 0 2 −1
specific, the communication topology without any attacks
0 0 −1 0 0 −1 2
and after repairment is set by G0 with its weights a0ij and
It is noted that the all the elements in both the first row its Laplacian matrix L0 . Here, it is assumed that, the kth
and column of L are zero, which implies that Battery 1 has attacks happening to the microgrid can be detected at the
no any communication with others. According to [26], it is time sequence tak (k = 1, 2, · · · ), and the time when the
theoretically not possible for Battery 1 to achieve cooperative communication topology is recovered from the kth attack is
control. More specially, all the communication links in graph denoted by tk (k = 0, 1, · · · ) with t0 = 0 being the initial time.
G3 are broken although only three batteries are subject to the Thus, it is easy to know that the duration intervals without and
DoS attacks. Therefore, the presence of DoS attacks signifi- with attacks are [tk−1 , tak ) and [tak , tk ), respectively. In fact, the
cantly paralyzes the connectivity of communication topology, attacked time length of [tak , tk ] is the mount of attack detection
leading to failure of control algorithms in terms of frequency time, message transmission time and network recovery time.
regulation, active power sharing and energy balancing. Let δij represent the status of communication links at node
2) Detection of DoS attacks: Due to the negative impact of i, where δij (t) = 0 for any j if node i is attacked during
DoS attacks on control performance, how to efficiently detect t ∈ [tak , tk ), otherwise, δij (t) = 1. Then, the communication
DoS attacks becomes critical in the microgrid, especially when topology under attack can be described as a time-varying graph
δ (t)
attackers can continuously put the jamming on nodes. In Gδ(t) with its weights aijij = δij (t)a0ij and its Laplacian
order to mitigate the impact of DoS attacks, an ACK-based matrix L . δ(t)
attack detection approach is introduced in this paper, which
is simple to implement in practice. More specifically, Battery
i sends its data information at time t to its neighbors j, and C. Distributed Finite-Time Secondary Frequency Controller
then its neighbors that have access to the data information Under DoS Attacks
will immediately send an acknowledgment message back to To simplify presentation, let P̂i (t) = mi Pi (t) and Êi (t) =
Battery i. Here, it is assumed that every ACK-message can be Ei (t)/∆Ei , and we drop t from the states. Then, regarding
successfully transmitted through secure channels with different the effects of DoS attacks, the following distributed secondary
protocols from communication channels among batteries. Such controllers are proposed:
implementation is practical and commonly used in the area of
No attacks i.e. t ∈ [tk−1 , tak )
cybersecurity framework for electrical grids [29], [30]. Thus,  X 
if Battery i does not receive the ACK-message in a period
ab
uE
i (t) = Π βi
−k 1 ∆E i a0
ij Êi (t) − Êj (t) (13a)
[t, t + τ ack ] with τ ack being the maximum time for receiving j∈Ni
the ACK-message, then it implies that Battery i is suffering  X 

a
from the DoS attacks with time t being time instant of the upi (t) = ProjPi −k2 a0ij P̂i (t) − P̂j (t) b (13b)
kth DoS attack, denoted by taik . When there are multiple DoS 
j∈Ni
attacks on different nodes before the network recovery, one X
a
uw
i (t) = Projwi −k3 a0ij wi (t) − wj (t) b
has the kth attack instant tak = inf{t|taik , i ∈ N }.
j∈Ni
3) Communication recovery mechanism: To ensure security 

ab
and reliability of network communication, a smart communi- − k3 gi wi (t) − w ref
(13c)
cation management center (SCMC) is employed to perform
the monitoring of communication environment and decision- Under attacks i.e. t ∈ [tak , tk )

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 X δ (t) 

ab 2b
uE
i (t) = Π βi
−k1 ∆E i a ij
Ê i (t) − Ê j (t) the adjacency weights ã0ij = (a0ij ) a+b and its corresponding
ij
j∈Ni Laplacian matrix be L̃0 . Denote by λi (·) the ith smallest
(14a) eigenvalue of a matrix.
 X 
δ (t)
a Now, we establish the following theorem.
upi (t) = ProjPi −k2 aijij P̂i (t) − P̂j (t) b (14b) Theorem 1: Under Assumption 1, for given scalars kl > 0
ηj
 i j∈N
(l = 1, 2, 3) and parameters miη∆E i
= mj ∆E , ∀i, j ∈ V,
X δ (t)
a i j

ui (t) = Projwi −k3

w
aijij wi (t) − wj (t) b using the distributed secondary controllers (13) and (14), the
j∈Ni
BESSs in a microgrid can simultaneously achieve energy level
 balancing, active power sharing and frequency regulation in a

ab
− k3 gi wi (t) − wref (14c) finite time. Moreover, the upper bound of total settling time
ηi P̂i is estimated by
where βi = 3600m i
; a and b are positive odd integers with
a < b; kp > 0(p = 1−3) are controller gains; gi is the pinning T ∗ = max{Tp , TE , Tw } + Ta (18)
gain for battery i, where gi = 1 if the battery i can have
access to the reference frequency wref ; gi = 0, otherwise. It where Ta is the total duration time of attacks and
is assumed in this paper that at least one battery can access to b−a
b∥ep (0)∥ b
wref . The projection operator Πβ is to ensure the constraint Tp = a+b , (19)
a
(6a) can be satisfied, which is defined by (b − a)k2 2 b λ22b (L̃0 )
 b∥eE (0)∥
b−a


 β if x = xmin or x = xmax TE =
b
, (20)

 a
a+b
or v > β (discharging) (b − a)k1 2 b λ22b (L̃0 )
Πβ (v(x)) ≜ (15)

 or v < β (charging) b∥ew (0)∥
b−a


 Tw =
b
(21)
a+b
v otherwise a
(b − a)k3 2 b λ12b (M̃ 0 )
The projection operator Projx is used to constrain the magni-
with M̃ 0 = L̃0 + diag{gi }N .
tude of frequency and active power in control actions
 max
Proof: Based on the definition of epi (t) and the con-

0 if v > 0 & x = x trollers (13b) and (14b), one has
Projx (v(x)) ≜ or v < 0 & x = xmin (16)
 1 X ˙
N

v otherwise ėpi (t) = P̃˙ (t) − P̃ (t)
N i=1
where xmax and xmin are the upper and lower bounds of x,   X 

ab
respectively. According to the definition of Projx (·), it is easy 
 Proj −k a0
e (t) − e (t) for t ∈ [tk−1 , tak )


2 ij pi pj
to obtain its following characteristics j∈Ni
=  X δ (t) 


ab
(x − x∗ )Projα ∗
x (v(x)) ≤ (x − x )v(x) (17) 
 Proj −k a ij
e (t) − e (t) for t ∈ [tak , tk )
 2 ij pi pj
j∈Ni
for any x∗ ∈ [xmin , xmax ]. It should be pointed out that,
introducing the projection operator Proj(·) in controllers (13) Choose a Lyapunov function as Vp (t) = 12 eTp (t)ep (t) =
PN 2
and (14) is to ensure that the hard constraints (6) can be 1
2 i=1 epi (t), and then taking a time derivative of Vp (t)
satisfied at any transient time. yields:
Remark 4: Different from the control algorithms in [14]– Case I: for t ∈ [tk−1 , tak )
[17], [19], the control algorithms (13) and (14) in this paper
include some new properties: i) the projection operators are X
N

introduced to ensure the constraints (6) can be satisfied at any V̇p (t) = epi (t)ėpi (t)
i=1
control transient time; and ii) the communication topologies  
are switching among the initial connected graph and a set of XN X
a
= epi (t)Proj −k2 a0ij epi (t) − epj (t) b
connectivity-paralyzed graphs caused by DoS attacks. Conse-
i=1 j∈Ni
quently, they lead to some difficulties in theoretical analysis X 
and the estimate on the settling time of the algorithms, which X
N

ab
≤ −k2 epi (t) aij epi (t) − epj (t)
0
will be dealt with in the next subsection.
i=1 j∈Ni

k2 X
N X
2
 a+b
2b
D. Stability Analysis =− ã0ij epi (t) − epj (t)
2 i=1 j∈Ni
In order to conduct convergence analysis of controllers
N  a+b
(13) and (14), we define the error variables epi (t) = P̃ (t) −
PN k2 X X 0
2 2b
1
[e (t), ep2 (t), · · · , epN (t)]T , ≤− ãij epi (t) − epj (t) (22)
N i=1 P̃ (t) with ep (t) = PN p1 2 i=1
eEi (t) = Êi (t) − N j=1 Êj (t) with eE (t)
1
= j∈Ni

[eE1 (t), eE2 (t), · · · , eEN (t)]T , and ewi (t) = wi (t) − wref where the first inequality is based on the projection character-
with its vector ew (t) = [ew1 (t), ew2 (t), · · · , ewN (t)]T . Let istic (17).

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0
Since Assumption 1 holds, one knowsPN that P L̃ has a simple In what follows, we will prove the finite-time convergence
eigenvalue of zero. Then, we have i=1 j∈Ni ã0ij epi (t) − of the energy balancing control algorithms (13a) and (14a) for

2
epj (t) = 2eTp (t)L̃0 ep (t) ≥ 2λ2 (L̃0 )eTp (t)ep (t). Thus, from BESSs. By solving (5a), one can obtain
(22), one can obtain Z t
ηi
  a+b Êi (t) = Ēi (t) − P̂i (s)ds (30)
k2 2b 3600mi ∆Ei 0
V̇p (t) ≤ − 0 T
2λ2 (L̃ )ep (t)ep (t)
2 ˙
where Ēi (t) is the solution of Êi (t) = uE i /∆Ei with the
a+b
= −c̃1 Vp 2b
(t) (23) control algorithms PN (13a) and (14a).
a+b
Let VE = 12 i=1 e2Ei (t). Recalling the proof of active
a
where c̃1 = k2 2 b λ22b (L̃0 ). Based on (23), we have power sharing above, it is known that Ēi (t) = Ēj (t) =
PN ′
i=1 Ê(0), ∀i, j ∈ V for t ≥ tE = TE + Ta . Given
1
b−a
′ b − a − a+b N
Vp 2b (t) = Vp 2b (t)V̇p (t) ≤ −c1 (24) parameters miη∆E i ηj
= mj ∆E = κ, ∀i, j ∈ V, it is concluded
2b i j
∗ ∗ ′
c̃1 (b−a) that, for t ≥ tE = max{tp , tE }
where c1 = . Integrating
both sides of (24) on the inter-
2b
Rt
′ Rt PN
1 X
b−a N
val t ∈ a
Vp 2b (t) dt ≤ − tk−1 c1 dt,
[tk−1 , tk ) leads to tk−1 κ i=1 P̂ (0)
Êi (t) = Ê(0) − · t, ∀i ∈ V (31)
which implies that, for t ∈ [tk−1 , tak ), N i=1 N 3600
b−a b−a
Vp 2b (t) ≤ Vp 2b (tk−1 ) − c1 (t − tk−1 ) (25) which means that the energy level balancing can be achieved
within a prescribed time t∗E .
Case II: for t ∈ [tak , tk ) Next, we will prove that the frequencies of BESSs can
Let L̃δ(t) denote the Laplacian matrix with its adjacency be regulated to the reference value in a P finite time. Define
weights ã0ij δij . Since at least one battery is attacked at the N
a Lyapunov function candidate Vw = 21 i=1 e2wi . Follow-
time tak , the matrix L̃δ(t) has more than two eigenvalues of 0, ing the similar lines to the proofs above, one obtains that
which implies that λ2 (L̃δ(t) ) = 0. wi = wref , ∀i ∈ V for t ≥ t∗w = Tw + Ta , which means
Following the similar lines of (22) and (23), one can get that frequency regulation of BESSs can be achieved within a
  a+b prescribed time t∗w .
k2 2b
V̇p (t) ≤ − δ(t) T
2λ2 (L̃ )ep (t)ep (t) =0 (26) Finally, according to Theorem 4.2 in [34], it is straightfor-
2 ward to conclude that the projection operator can ensure that
which implies that, all the trajectories of Pi (t), Ei (t) and wi (t) stay within the
b−a b−a hard constraints (6) if their initial conditions satisfy (6).
Vp 2b (t) ≤ Vp 2b (tak ) for t ∈ [tak , tk ) (27) From the observation above, it is concluded that the estima-
Based on Case I and Case II, we have: tion of total convergence time is T ∗ = max{t∗p , t∗E , t∗w }, which
1) if t ∈ [tk−1 , tak ), is rewritten as (18). The proof of Theorem 1 is complete.
b−a b−a
Remark 5: It should be pointed out that, Theorem 1 ex-
Vp 2b (t) ≤ Vp 2b (tk−1 ) − c1 (t − tk−1 ) plicitly reveals the relationship between the duration time Ta
b−a of DoS attacks and the convergence time T ∗ of the proposed
≤ Vp 2b (tak−1 ) − c1 (t − tk−1 ) control algorithms (13) and (14). More specifically, given the
b−a
≤ Vp 2b (tk−2 ) − c1 (tak−1 − tk−2 ) − c1 (t − tk−1 ) control gains, system parameters and initial conditions, the
b−a longer duration time of DoS attacks will result in the slower
= Vp 2b (tk−2 ) + c1 (tk−1 − tak−1 ) − c1 (t − tk−2 ) convergence rate. If an expected convergence time Texp ∗
is
≤ ··· preset, then the attack duration time Ta is required to be
∗
b−a less than Texp − max{Tp , TE , Tw }, which is meaningful for
≤ Vp 2b (0) + c1 Ta − c1 t (28) practical implementation.
2) if t ∈ [tak , tk )
b−a b−a IV. C S
Vp 2b (t) ≤ Vp 2b (tak )
b−a
In this section, case studies with a modified IEEE 57-
≤ Vp 2b (tk−1 ) − c1 (tak − tk−1 ) bus testing system are conducted to show effectiveness and
b−a efficiency of the proposed control scheme. As shown in Fig.
= Vp 2b (tk−1 ) + c1 (t − tak ) − c1 (t − tk−1 ) 3, the testing system includes 7 lithiumion BESSs and 42
≤ ··· loads which are connected to the micrigrid. The BESSs have
b−a
heterogeneous capacity, where the capacities of Batteries 1-3,
≤ Vp 2b (0) + c1 Ta − c1 t (29)
Batteries 4-6 and Battery 7 are 200kWh, 150kWh and 250
Obviously, when t ≥ t∗p
= Tp + Ta , Vp (t) will converge kWh, respectively. BESSs are connected to the main grid
to 0, which implies that ep (t) → 0 after t∗p . Therefore, it is through the Point of Common Coupling (PCC), which is used
concluded that the active power sharing can PN be achieved in a to determine the operation of the microgrid.
prescribed time t∗p , namely, P̂i = P̂j = N1 i=1 P̂ (0), ∀i, j ∈ The desired output frequency and voltage of BESSs
V for t ≥ t∗p . are f ref = 50Hz (wref = 2πf ref ≈ 314.15rad/s)

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Battery 2 Battery 1
Battery 3
2 1
17
Battery 5
3 15 16
4 45 14
5 13
44 46 12
Battery 4
18 49
19
38
20 48
6 26 21 37 47
27 22 39
57
28
23 56
24
29 36
35 40 42
25
7 34 33 50

52 10
30 32
31
11 51
53 43
54
55 41
Fig. 5. Energy level balancing, active power sharing and frequency regulation
8 9
without any attack detection and communication recovery mechanisms
Battery 6 Battery 7

Fig. 3. A modified IEEE 57-bus testing system

1.45 Battery 1
Battery 2
1.4 Battery 3
Battery 4
1.35 Battery 5
4
Battery 6
1.3
3.5 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Battery
10 7
t(s)
3
Topology states under attacks

0.6
2.5
0.4
2 0.2
0
1.5 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
t(s)
1 50.5

0.5 50

0 49.5

49
-0.5 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
t(s)
-1
0 2 4 6 8 10
t(s)

Fig. 6. Energy level balancing, active power sharing and frequency

Fig. 4. Topology switching under DoS attacks: the states of 0, 1, 2, 3 on the restoration under an ACK-based attack detection and communication recovery
y-axis correspond to the topologies Gi of Fig. 2, respectively mechanisms

and V ref = 20kV , respectively. The upper and

lower limits of output power generation at BESSs are i.e. g1 = g5 = 1. Suppose that the microgrid is subject to
P max = [50, 80, 45, 100, 60, 50, 70]T (kW) and P min = DoS attacks. When there is no any communication recovery
[10, 20, 15, 10, 15, 5, 7]T (kW), respectively. The range of fre- mechanism (after the first attack in Fig. 4), the simulation
quency is given by fi ∈ [49, 51](Hz). In order to pro- results for all the BESSs are given in Fig. 5. Obviously, the
tect the lifetime of batteries, they should work between control scheme fails to realize the objectives of frequency
80% and 20% of total energy. Thus, it is easy to know restoration, active power sharing and energy level balancing of
that E min = [40, 40, 40, 30, 30, 30, 50]T kWh and E max = batteries. Under the communication recovery mechanism, the
[160, 160, 160, 120, 120, 120, 200]T (kWh). switching of communication topology can be shown in Fig.
4. Using the distributed control schemes (13) and (14), the
simulation results are shown in Fig. 6. Based on (19)-(21), we
A. Performance Evaluation can calculate Tp = 31.6317s, TE = 77.4694s, Tw = 2.3871s,
We first verify the validity and effectiveness of the and then Ta = 7s. It can be observed from Fig. 6 that, the
proposed distributed control scheme. It is assumed that frequency regulation, the active power sharing and the energy
all the BESSs of the microgrid operate in a discharg- level balancing can be achieved approximately in 4s (which
ing mode. Let the initial energy levels of batteries be is smaller than Tw + Ta = 9.3871s), 4s (which is smaller than
E(0) = [160, 150, 155, 105, 110, 100, 195]T , and the total Tp + Ta = 38.6317s) and 7s (which is much smaller than
loads be 310 kW. We choose the control gains k1 = TE + Ta = 84.4694s), respectively. Thus, it is concluded that
0.25, k2 = 0.45, and k3 = 1. Let the parameters η = the energy level balancing, frequency regulation and active
[1, 1, 1, 0.75, 0.75, 0.75, 1.25]T , and set a = 3 and b = 7. It power sharing can be eventually achieved in a finite time T ∗ .
is assumed that BESSs can communicate with their neighbors It should be pointed out that the estimates on the upper bounds
via a communication network. In addition, it is assumed that of the settling time are effective, but such the estimated upper
battery 1 and battery 5 can access to the reference frequency, bound is theoretically conservative.

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Fig. 7. Energy level balancing, active power sharing and frequency Fig. 8. Distributed control scheme without operational constraints
restoration in a grid-connected mode

B. Grid-Connected Mode
In this case, it is assumed that the microgrid is working in
a grid-connected mode, which means that all the BESSs are
charging. Set the initial energy levels of batteries E(0) =
[60, 50, 55, 45, 30, 40, 95]T . Let k1 = 1.25 and all other
parameters be same as the case of Section IV-A. Applying
the control algorithms (13) and (14), we plot the evolution of
energy levels, active power sharing and frequency regulation
in Fig. 7. It is clear to see that the proposed control algorithms
(13) and (14) are effective for both the grid-connected and
islanded modes.

C. Comparison Results
Fig. 9. Comparison of convergence rates using different a/b
In this subsection, we will make a set of comparisons to
show the efficiency of the proposed control schemes.
1) Functions of projection operators: In order to guarantee
to achieve frequency regulation, active power sharing and
the operational constraints (6) in control actions, we introduce
energy level balancing in a finite time. In the control design,
the projection operators Π and Proj in the controllers (13) and
a communication recovery mechanism has been used to repair
(14). Fig. 8 shows the simulation results without projection
the connectivity-paralyzed communication topology so as to
operators. From Fig. 8, it is clear to see that the energy levels
ensure robustness of the proposed control scheme against DoS
of some batteries are increasing in the beginning period time,
attacks. Theoretical analysis has been conducted to verify
which is not reasonable in the discharging mode. Alternatively,
the convergence of the proposed control scheme. Finally,
the energy levels in Fig. 6 are non-increasing in the entire
simulation case studies on a modified IEEE 57-bus testing
control process. In this sense, it is clarified that the projection
system have been performed to demonstrate effectiveness of
operators are effective to ensure the operational constraints (6)
the proposed methods.
are satisfied in any control transient instants.
2) The effects of parameters a/b on convergence rates: In
this case, comparison results of convergence rate using dif-
R
ferent parameters a and b are given. To show the comparison
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From November 2010 to November 2012, he
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4118, 2017.
Australia. From January 2015 to January 2016, he
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parameters and state-of-charge joint estimation based on h-infinity and University, Australia. From May 2016 to January 2017, he was a Post-
unscented kalman filters,” IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology, doctoral Associate at Wayne State University, USA. From February 2017
vol. 66, no. 10, pp. 8693–8701, 2017. to March 2019, He worked as a Research Fellow at Swinburne University
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strategy of battery storage in power markets considering performance- of Posts and Telecommunications, where he is currently a full professor
based regulation and battery cycle life,” IEEE Transactions on Smart with Institute of Advanced Technology. His research interests include event-
Grid, vol. 7, no. 5, pp. 2359–2367, 2016. triggered control and distributed cooperative control of multi-agent systems
and their applications to smart grids.

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Transactions on Industrial Informatics

IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INDUSTRIAL INFORMATICS 11

Qing-Long Han (M’09-SM’13-F’19) received the Boda Ning (S’14-M’17) received the B.Eng. de-
B.Sc. degree in Mathematics from Shandong Normal gree in automatic control from the East China
University, Jinan, China, in 1983, and the M.Sc. and University of Science and Technology, Shanghai,
Ph.D. degrees in Control Engineering and Electrical China, in 2011, the M.Sc. degree with distinc-
Engineering from East China University of Science tion in control systems from the University of
and Technology, Shanghai, China, in 1992 and 1997, Manchester, Manchester, U.K., in 2012, and the
respectively. Ph.D. degree in Electrical and Electronic Engineer-
From September 1997 to December 1998, he ing under Vice-Chancellor’s Research Scholarship
was a Post-doctoral Researcher Fellow with the (2013?2017), from the Swinburne University of
Laboratoire d’Automatique et d’Informatique In- Technology, Melbourne, Australia, in 2017.
dustielle (currently, Laboratoire d’Informatique et Since September 2017, he has been a Research
d’Automatique pour les Systémes), École Supérieure d’Ingénieurs de Poitiers Fellow with the Swinburne University of Technology. From 2010 to 2011, he
(currently, École Nationale Supérieure d’Ingénieurs de Poitiers), Université was an Exchange Student with the University of Dundee, Dundee, U.K. His
de Poitiers, France. From January 1999 to August 2001, he was a Research current research interests include cooperative control of multi-agent systems
Assistant Professor with the Department of Mechanical and Industrial Engi- and its applications to smart grids.
neering at Southern Illinois University at Edwardsville, USA. From September
2001 to December 2014, he was Laureate Professor, an Associate Dean
(Research and Innovation) with the Higher Education Division, and the
Founding Director of the Centre for Intelligent and Networked Systems at
Central Queensland University, Australia. From December 2014 to May 2016,
he was Deputy Dean (Research), with the Griffith Sciences, and a Professor
with the Griffith School of Engineering, Griffith University, Australia. In Dong Yue (SM’08) received the Ph.D. degree in
May 2016, he joined Swinburne University of Technology, Australia, where control science and engineering from the South
he is currently Pro Vice-Chancellor (Research Quality) and a Distinguished China University of Technology, Guangzhou, China,
Professor. His research interests include networked control systems, neural in 1995.
networks, time-delay systems, multi-agent systems and complex dynamical He is currently a Changjiang Professor and the
systems. Dean of the Institute of Advanced Technology, Nan-
Professor Han is a Highly Cited Researcher according to Clarivate Analytics jing University of Posts and Telecommunications.
(formerly Thomson Reuters). He is a Fellow of The Institution of Engineers His research interests include analysis and synthesis
Australia. He is an Associate Editor of a number of international journals, of networked control systems, multiagent systems,
including the IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INDUSTRIAL ELECTRONICS, optimal control of power systems, and the Internet
the IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INDUSTRIAL INFORMATICS, the IEEE of Things.
TRANSACTIONS ON CYBERNETICS, and Information Sciences. He is currently an Associate Editor of the IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON
INDUSTRIAL INFORMATICS, the IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON NEURAL
NETWORKS AND LEARNING SYSTEMS, Journal of the Franklin Institute,
International Journal of Systems Science, and the IEEE Control Systems
Society Conference Editorial Board.

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