Consistent histories

In quantum mechanics, the consistent

histories[1] (also referred to as decoherent
histories)[2] approach is intended to give a
modern interpretation of quantum
mechanics, generalising the conventional
Copenhagen interpretation and providing a
natural interpretation of quantum
cosmology.[3] This interpretation of
quantum mechanics is based on a
consistency criterion that then allows
probabilities to be assigned to various
alternative histories of a system such that
the probabilities for each history obey the
rules of classical probability while being
consistent with the Schrödinger equation.
In contrast to some interpretations of
quantum mechanics, particularly the
Copenhagen interpretation, the framework
does not include "wavefunction collapse"
as a relevant description of any physical
process, and emphasizes that
measurement theory is not a fundamental
ingredient of quantum mechanics.
Histories
A homogeneous history (here labels
different histories) is a sequence of
Propositions specified at different
moments of time (here labels the
times). We write this as:

and read it as "the proposition is true

at time and then the proposition is
true at time and then ". The times
are strictly
ordered and called the temporal support of
the history.
Inhomogeneous histories are multiple-time
propositions which cannot be represented
by a homogeneous history. An example is
the logical OR of two homogeneous
histories: .

These propositions can correspond to any

set of questions that include all
possibilities. Examples might be the three
propositions meaning "the electron went
through the left slit", "the electron went
through the right slit" and "the electron
didn't go through either slit". One of the
aims of the approach is to show that
classical questions such as, "where are my
keys?" are consistent. In this case one
might use a large number of propositions
each one specifying the location of the
keys in some small region of space.

Each single-time proposition can be

represented by a projection operator
acting on the system's Hilbert space (we
use "hats" to denote operators). It is then
useful to represent homogeneous
histories by the time-ordered product of
their single-time projection operators. This
is the history projection operator (HPO)
formalism developed by Christopher
Isham and naturally encodes the logical
structure of the history propositions.
Consistency
An important construction in the
consistent histories approach is the class
operator for a homogeneous history:

The symbol indicates that the factors in

the product are ordered chronologically
according to their values of : the "past"
operators with smaller values of appear
on the right side, and the "future" operators
with greater values of appear on the left
side. This definition can be extended to
inhomogeneous histories as well.

Central to the consistent histories is the

notion of consistency. A set of histories
is consistent (or strongly
consistent) if

for all . Here represents the initial

density matrix, and the operators are
expressed in the Heisenberg picture.

The set of histories is weakly consistent if

for all .

Probabilities
If a set of histories is consistent then
probabilities can be assigned to them in a
consistent way. We postulate that the
probability of history is simply

which obeys the axioms of probability if

the histories come from the same
(strongly) consistent set.

As an example, this means the probability

of " OR " equals the probability of "
 " plus the probability of " " minus the
probability of " AND ", and so forth.

Interpretation
The interpretation based on consistent
histories is used in combination with the
insights about quantum decoherence.
Quantum decoherence implies that
irreversible macroscopic phenomena
(hence, all classical measurements)
render histories automatically consistent,
which allows one to recover classical
reasoning and "common sense" when
applied to the outcomes of these
measurements. More precise analysis of
decoherence allows (in principle) a
quantitative calculation of the boundary
between the classical domain and the
quantum domain. According to Roland
Omnès,[4]

[the] history approach, although

it was initially independent of
the Copenhagen approach, is in
some sense a more elaborate
version of it. It has, of course,
the advantage of being more
precise, of including classical
physics, and of providing an
explicit logical framework for
indisputable proofs. But, when
the Copenhagen interpretation
is completed by the modern
results about correspondence
and decoherence, it essentially
amounts to the same physics.

[... There are] three main

differences:

1. The logical equivalence

between an empirical datum,
which is a macroscopic
phenomenon, and the result of a
measurement, which is a
quantum property, becomes
clearer in the new approach,
whereas it remained mostly
tacit and questionable in the
Copenhagen formulation.

2. There are two apparently

distinct notions of probability in
the new approach. One is
abstract and directed toward
logic, whereas the other is
empirical and expresses the
randomness of measurements.
We need to understand their
relation and why they coincide
with the empirical notion
 entering into the Copenhagen
rules.

3. The main difference lies in the

meaning of the reduction rule
for 'wave packet collapse'. In the
new approach, the rule is valid
but no specific effect on the
measured object can be held
responsible for it. Decoherence
in the measuring device is
enough.

In order to obtain a complete theory, the

formal rules above must be supplemented
with a particular Hilbert space and rules
that govern dynamics, for example a
Hamiltonian.

In the opinion of others[5] this still does not

make a complete theory as no predictions
are possible about which set of consistent
histories will actually occur. In other
words, the rules of consistent histories,
the Hilbert space, and the Hamiltonian
must be supplemented by a set selection
rule. However, Robert B. Griffiths holds the
opinion that asking the question of which
set of histories will "actually occur" is a
misinterpretation of the theory;[6] histories
are a tool for description of reality, not
separate alternate realities.

Proponents of this consistent histories

interpretation—such as Murray Gell-Mann,
James Hartle, Roland Omnès and Robert
B. Griffiths—argue that their interpretation
clarifies the fundamental disadvantages of
the old Copenhagen interpretation, and
can be used as a complete interpretational
framework for quantum mechanics.

In Quantum Philosophy,[7] Roland Omnès

provides a less mathematical way of
understanding this same formalism.
The consistent histories approach can be
interpreted as a way of understanding
which sets of classical questions can be
consistently asked of a single quantum
system, and which sets of questions are
fundamentally inconsistent, and thus
meaningless when asked together. It thus
becomes possible to demonstrate
formally why it is that the questions which
Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen assumed
could be asked together, of a single
quantum system, simply cannot be asked
together. On the other hand, it also
becomes possible to demonstrate that
classical, logical reasoning often does
apply, even to quantum experiments – but
we can now be mathematically exact
about the limits of classical logic.

See also
HPO formalism

References
1. Griffiths, Robert B. (1984). "Consistent
histories and the interpretation of quantum
mechanics". Journal of Statistical Physics.
Springer Science and Business Media LLC.
36 (1–2): 219–272.
Bibcode:1984JSP....36..219G (https://ui.ads
abs.harvard.edu/abs/1984JSP....36..219
G) . doi:10.1007/bf01015734 (https://doi.or
g/10.1007%2Fbf01015734) . ISSN 0022-
4715 (https://www.worldcat.org/issn/0022-
 4715) . S2CID 119871795 (https://api.sem
anticscholar.org/CorpusID:119871795) .

2. Griffiths, Robert B. "The Consistent

Histories Approach to Quantum Mechanics"
(http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qm-consi
stent-histories/) . Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy. Stanford University. Retrieved
2016-10-22.

3. Dowker, Fay; Kent, Adrian (1995-10-23).

"Properties of Consistent Histories".
Physical Review Letters. 75 (17): 3038–
3041. arXiv:gr-qc/9409037 (https://arxiv.or
g/abs/gr-qc/9409037) .
Bibcode:1995PhRvL..75.3038D (https://ui.a
dsabs.harvard.edu/abs/1995PhRvL..75.303
8D) . doi:10.1103/physrevlett.75.3038 (http
s://doi.org/10.1103%2Fphysrevlett.75.303
 8) . ISSN 0031-9007 (https://www.worldca
t.org/issn/0031-9007) . PMID 10059479 (ht
tps://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/1005947
9) . S2CID 17359542 (https://api.semantics
cholar.org/CorpusID:17359542) .

4. Omnès, Roland (1999). Understanding

Quantum Mechanics (https://archive.org/d
etails/understandingqua00omne) .
Princeton University Press. pp. 179 (https://
archive.org/details/understandingqua00om
ne/page/179) , 257. ISBN 978-0-691-
00435-8. LCCN 98042442 (https://lccn.loc.
gov/98042442) .

5. Kent, Adrian; McElwaine, Jim (1997-03-01).

"Quantum prediction algorithms". Physical
Review A. 55 (3): 1703–1720. arXiv:gr-
qc/9610028 (https://arxiv.org/abs/gr-qc/96
 10028) . Bibcode:1997PhRvA..55.1703K (ht
tps://ui.adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/1997PhRv
A..55.1703K) .
doi:10.1103/physreva.55.1703 (https://doi.
org/10.1103%2Fphysreva.55.1703) .
ISSN 1050-2947 (https://www.worldcat.or
g/issn/1050-2947) . S2CID 17821433 (http
s://api.semanticscholar.org/CorpusID:1782
1433) .

6. Griffiths, R. B. (2003). Consistent Quantum

Theory. Cambridge University Press.

7. R. Omnès, Quantum Philosophy, Princeton

University Press, 1999. See part III,
especially Chapter IX
External links
The Consistent Histories Approach to
Quantum Mechanics (https://plato.stanf
ord.edu/entries/qm-consistent-historie
s/) – Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy

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