Emotion and Regulation Are One

Emotion Review
Emotion and Regulation are One!

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Journal: Emotion Review
Manuscript ID: EMR-09-149.R1
Manuscript Type: Original Manuscript

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Date Submitted by the

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Author:
Complete List of Authors: Kappas, Arvid; Jacobs University Bremen, School of Humanities and
Social Sciences
er
Area/Discipline: social < psychology
Keywords: emotion regulation, facial expression, facial feedback
I argue that (1) emotions often are actively auto-regulating. The

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behavior implied by the emotional reaction bias to the eliciting

event or situation modifies or terminates the situation. (2) Certain
emotion components are likely to habituate dynamically, modifying
the emotional states. (3) Emotions are typically intra- and
interpersonal processes at the same time and modulating forces at
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Abstract: these different levels interact. (4) Emotions are not just regulated –
they regulate. Important conclusions of my arguments are that the
scientific analysis of emotion should not exclude regulatory
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processes and that effortful emotion regulation should be seen

relative to a backdrop of auto-regulation and habituation and not
the ideal notion of a neutral baseline. For all practical purposes
unregulated emotion is not a realistic concept.
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/emotion-review
Page 1 of 33 Emotion Review
Running head: EMOTION/REGULATION 1

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13 Emotion and Regulation are One!
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16 Arvid Kappas
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Jacobs University Bremen
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Author Note
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52 Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Arvid Kappas, School of
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54 Humanities and Social Sciences, Jacobs University Bremen, Campus Ring 1, 28759 Bremen,
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Germany; email: a.kappas@jacobs-university.de
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Emotion Review Page 2 of 33

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3 Abstract
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7 Emotions are foremost self-regulating processes that permit rapid responses and adaptations
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9 to situations of personal concern. They have biological bases and are shaped ontogenetically
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11 via learning and experience. Many situations and events of personal concern are social in
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14 nature. Thus, social exchanges play an important role in learning about rules and norms that
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16 shape regulation processes. I argue that (1) emotions often are actively auto-regulating. The
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18 behavior implied by the emotional reaction bias to the eliciting event or situation modifies or
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21 terminates the situation. (2) Certain emotion components are likely to habituate dynamically,
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23 modifying the emotional states. (3) Emotions are typically intra- and interpersonal processes
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at the same time and modulating forces at these different levels interact. (4) Emotions are not
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28 just regulated – they regulate. Important conclusions of my arguments are that the scientific
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30 analysis of emotion should not exclude regulatory processes and that effortful emotion
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regulation should be seen relative to a backdrop of auto-regulation and habituation and not the
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35 ideal notion of a neutral baseline. For all practical purposes unregulated emotion is not a
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37 realistic concept.
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Keywords: emotion regulation, facial expression, facial feedback
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6 Emotion and Regulation are One!
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9 I argue that it does not make sense to consider unregulated emotion and emotion
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11 regulation as two separable processes. Instead the nature of emotion always implies
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regulation at various physical and psychological levels. I discuss the relationship of emotion
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16 theory and concepts of emotion regulation, and how these might affect how emotion and
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18 emotion regulation are studied.
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My first argument relates how current views on emotion regulation are often linked to
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24 the outdated historical separation of emotion and reason. Specifically, the classical focus on
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26 the disruptive nature of emotion, implicitly or explicitly, suggests that emotions are regulated
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because of a desire to return to an “unemotional baseline”. However, in my second argument I
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31 outline that responding to the situation that elicited the emotion in the first place leads to the
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33 regulation of emotion without such a motivation. I refer to this process as emotional auto-
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36 regulation. In the case of negative stimuli the emotion tends to lead to its self-termination,
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38 whereas in the case of positive stimuli, the emotion tends to lead to its reinforcement.
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40 Emotion eliciting stimuli and the organism interact in creating a temporary system that
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43 involves a cascade of events, the emotion process, which leads to the functional modification
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45 of that system to address the affordances of current needs and goals. Rather than rationality
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trying to reassert itself, as suggested by the classical view, it is a matter of a system
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50 responding to a destabilization by creating a dynamic adaptation that creates again a steady
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52 state. I also discuss the role of habituation in reaching stability of the system.
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The social environment can take the role of the agent in a behavioral cascade that leads
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58 to the auto-regulation of emotions. This is particularly relevant for young infants that have
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60 limited means of acting on situations, but continues to be relevant in adulthood. Auto-
regulation is not only an intra- but also an inter-personal process.

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3 I close my contribution with a discussion of the implications of a systems view on an
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6 interpretation of experimental paradigms used to study emotion and emotion regulation.
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9 The historical assumption of the non-emotional baseline of psychological functioning
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12 Given how prominent and intense emotions can feel to us and how apparently
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emotional our social environment can be, it is not surprising that philosophers, artists, poets,
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17 and playwrights have tried to tackle this facet of human experience for thousands of years
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19 (Gross, 1998; Lazarus & Lazarus, 1994; Power & Dalgleish, 2008; Solomon, 2000).
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22 Particularly in western thought, passion has, for the longest time, been understood to clash
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24 and tussle with reason, the latter being supposedly the better guide for decisions or behavior.
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26 It would appear that emotions can get us into trouble – and this is true for the negative ones,
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29 for example, when we are provoked, or the positive ones, when we do something in a moment
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31 of passion. As a consequence, western folk-psychology, as well as many emotion scientists,
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assume that the natural baseline affective state of the adult human is non-emotional or neutral
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36 and that once an emotion has been elicited, it needs to be actively wrangled back to that
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38 baseline – because emotions are perceived, as Averill (1994a, p. 265) put it, as being
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“unruly”.
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44 Not all researchers assume that we strive for the neutral, unemotional stance. In a
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46 slight variation, some authors, would argue that there is the need or want to reach and
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maintain a desired state that typically is somewhat positive – even though there are likely
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51 cultural (“ideal affect”, Tsai, 2007) and possibly idiosyncratic differences. In summary,
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53 according to these views emotions are switched on by some elicitor and the “victim” is then
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56 required to switch them back off or change them to a desirable state to avoid the negative
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58 consequences of the emotional state.
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Consider the following quote

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3 [Emotions] can hurt us as well as help us (Parrott, 1993). They do so when they are of
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6 the wrong type, when they come at the wrong time, or when they occur at the wrong
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8 intensity level. At times such as these, we may be highly motivated to try to regulate
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our emotions. (Gross, 2008, p. 498).
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14 Who, i.e., which psychological entity decides when emotions are of the wrong type, at
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16 the wrong time, or at the wrong intensity level? I do not intend to argue that there are
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18 situations, particularly associated with pathology, where emotions are associated with
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21 suffering and dysfunction. However, I suggest that in everyday life it is more the norm that
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23 emotions regulate and are regulated according to the affordances they imply, rather than
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modulated via executive. I am referring to this process as the auto-regulation of emotion.
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29 The auto-regulation of emotions
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32 It is rarely acknowledged that emotions are self-regulating in nature. In other words,
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34 emotions typically have properties that lead to their self-termination (i.e., regulation) via the
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37 behavioral biases that the associated action tendencies introduce. They are not triggered and
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39 then wait until they are switched off. For example, if being afraid of a spider leads me to step
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on and kill it, then, the agent provocateur (spider) of the specific emotion episode is removed
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44 and the fear cascade will come to an end by returning to some steady state. The same is true
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46 for evasive behavior in the case of fear (see Power & Dalgleish, 2008). It is well known that
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some fears are resistant to change, if they lead to the systematic evasion of the eliciting
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51 situation. While this avoidance might be problematic if it interferes with the daily life of the
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53 person – for example, professional problems might arise if someone refuses to take an
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56 airplane – the other side of the coin is that, such evasive behaviors are indeed successful in
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58 reducing confrontation with the anxiogenic stimulus orsituation. However, such fears are
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60 usually seen as unwanted or even pathological and dysfunctional. As Franklin D. Roosevelt

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3 stated in his first inaugural address in 1933: “So, first of all, let me assert my firm belief that
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6 the only thing we have to fear is fear itself (Roosevelt, 1989, para 1).”
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9 Of course, Roosevelt was likely referring to (a) a nation faced with economic turmoil,
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11 rather than individuals grappling with spiders or snakes, and (b) a catastrophic paralysis1 that
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14 is perhaps more typical of the possum than the typical fear episode in humans not suffering
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16 from clinical fear/panic (see Power & Dalgleish, 2008). Nevertheless, his concern regarding
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18 fear might resonate with researchers focusing primarily on the adaptive value that emotions
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21 might provide to a species in the long run. In other words, many scientists appear to assume
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23 that it is good that we have emotions, because otherwise our species, might not be here at all,
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but most of the present time emotions are useless at best, or harmful at worst and need to be
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28 regulated (see also Averill, 1994b). But is it really true that fear is merely a great invention of
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30 evolution but is dysfunctional in the here-and-now? This depends on who or what the unit of
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analysis is. Consider the formalized hypothetical scenario:
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36 (1) If stimulus situation X leads organism O to avoid X via a cascade of processes,
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(tuning attentional processes; facilitating recall of relevant situations and action
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43 scenarios, biasing the likelihood of certain behaviors, facilitating action by shifting
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48 deal with potential injury) and
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52 (3) the E-cascade was functional in terminating itself.
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56 Whether, to pick a concrete example, avoiding the dentist might lead to further tooth
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58 decay and negative consequences for O is a different question, at a different time scale.2
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60 However, seen from the point of view of a negative emotion as the subject or actor, then its
primary goal of self-termination is functional3. I have argued elsewhere that auto-regulation is

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3 part of the defining properties of emotion and analyzing emotion without this intrinsic
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6 property to regulate itself would appear short sighted (Kappas, 2008). It is important in this
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8 context not to confuse auto-regulation (literally self-regulation) with automatic regulation,
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i.e., automatic processes in emotion regulation that act outside of awareness and without
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13 effort (e.g., Mauss, Bunge, & Gross, 2008).
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16 Of course, one could argue that this type of process (auto-regulation) is part of what
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18 current emotion scientists view as emotion regulation anyway and thus there would be little
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21 new or different to this argument. However, that is not the case. Gross explicitly excludes the
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23 emotion-as-regulator scenario from the definition and scope of his analysis of emotion
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regulation (e.g., Gross & Thompson, 2007; see Kappas, 2008). His views are typical for the
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28 field and I do not want to imply that his views are unique in this respect, but he puts the
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… it isn't clear whether [emotion regulation] refers to how emotions regulate
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emotions). Both usages have currency, but the problem with the first usage (regulation
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43 by emotions) is that one of the functions of emotion is the coordination of diverse
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45 response systems (Levenson, 1999). Thus emotion regulation in this first sense is
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48 redundant with emotion, in that all instances of emotion would constitute emotion
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50 regulation. I therefore find the second usage more sensible (regulation of emotions), in
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52 which emotion regulation refers to the heterogeneous set of processes by which
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55 emotions are themselves regulated. (Gross, 2008, pp. 499-500)
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58 There are reasons for this stance. Possibly, one could worry that including the
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60 consequence of an emotion terminating itself is circular and difficult to clearly separate from
other processes. I believe indeed that there is circularity in this, as I view emotion as being

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6 and effects. Circularity in this sense is design and not a flaw in dynamic self-organizing
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8 systems (Kappas & Descôteaux, 2003; Mayne & Ramsey, 2001). Furthermore, I agree that
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emotion and regulation are difficult to separate from each other conceptually. In fact, the goal
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13 of the present contribution is to make the point that they should not be separated when trying
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15 to analyze or to understand emotions (see also Campos, Frankel, & Camras, 2004). It is
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important to emphasize that this distinction is not just of theoretical relevance. There are
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22 regard to how one might interpret the experimental paradigms that are typically used to study
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this process, as I will outline further later.
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28 The fear example demonstrated that emotions might terminate themselves. However,
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emotion theorist’s favourite emotion because it seems so vital and functional when it works
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35 and so dysfunctional and disabling when it goes awry” (Power & Dalgleish, 2008, p. 172).
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40 terminates them will be reinforced using simple learning mechanisms that are well studied
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42 and documented. Thus, as soon as an infant is able to direct its attention away from a
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44 negative stimulus, a reinforcing feedback loop leads to shaping behavior with regard to the
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47 specific stimulus. Diverting visual attention means for the infant that the threatening object
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49 can be controlled. If object permanence has not yet been established, then “out of sight”
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means indeed “out of mind”. More generally, regulatory skills are reinforced that are tuned
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54 with every successful (and unsuccessful) episode (e.g., Rueda, Posner, & Rothbart, 2005).
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56 Does this argument hold for other negative emotions? Surely, disgust is related to avoiding –
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59 or even expelling stimuli – self-regulating in the process, but the same could be said of more
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social emotions such as shame and embarrassment (Lewis, 2000a). Anger would appear to

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3 involve unblocking an obstacle, social or otherwise, typically without aggression, but
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6 involving some sort of confrontation (Averill, 1982; see also Cornelius, 1996).
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9 Without implying that any analysis of the motivational thrust of emotion and the
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11 implications for auto-regulation needs to follow a basic emotions view, I have chosen discrete
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14 emotions to facilitate the discussion. However, I believe that any negative state will have the
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16 tendency to self terminate. Even sadness that typically is characterized by withdrawal (Barr-
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18 Zisowitz, 2000) can be interpreted as a powerful motivator for others for social support in
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23 others in interpersonal emotion regulation. More recently, Rimé (2009) emphasized that in
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discussions on emotion regulation there is a tendency to focus too much, if not exclusively, on
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28 the individual and her means of dealing with a situation in the sense of a Lone Ranger
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layered network structure of interpersonal emotion. The crying infant is calling for – and
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35 typically receiving – support (see Fridlund, 1994 for a discussion of the meaning of
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45 While negative emotions are prone to lead actively via negative feedback loops to their
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48 own termination, positive emotions are desirable and, again by definition, pleasurable. The
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50 absence of positive states leads to a quest for them (appetite/desire) and their presence leads to
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52 attempts to prolong or reinforce them. While there appears to be less clarity concerning
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55 specific action tendencies associated with many of the positive affective states (see
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57 Fredrickson & Levenson, 1998), there is little ambiguity that there is a push, urge, or
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motivation to search and amplify them (Oishi, Diener, & Lucas, 2007). At the risk of stating
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the obvious: It feels good to feel good; anticipating feeling good is exciting. Why are we not

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3 then constantly chasing that positive feedback loop to remain in positive emotional states? It
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6 is long and well known that positive states have two phases: an appetitive activity and a
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8 consummatory response (e.g., Tinbergen, 1951, in Arnold, 1960). The latter terminates the
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former and is associated with refractory periods that terminate the appetitive behavior after
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13 consumption, for example, after having eaten or, another example, in the context post-
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15 orgasmic sexual satiety (see Georgiadis & Kortekaas, 2010). The neural mechanisms of these
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two processes often referred to as wanting/reward and pleasure/liking are now well studied
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20 (e.g., Berridge, 2009; see also Panksepp, 1998). The disjunction of these two processes is
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22 crucial in understanding addictions and various compulsive behaviors (e.g., Kringelbach &
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Berridge, 2009) and provides the necessary termination of the positive feedback loop to avoid
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27 the organism getting stuck. There is experimental evidence from humans and from rats that
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excessive brain self-stimulation via implanted electrodes can render individuals basically
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32 dysfunctional (Smith, Mahler, Pecina, & Berridge, 2010). Thus, it is not surprising that a
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34 two-stage process design of positive emotion is in place that avoids individuals getting stuck
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in an infinite positive feedback loop. Note that Berridge argues that most likely even more
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39 complex positive emotional states might use circuits derived from sensory pleasure – an
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important notion when considering whether satiety might also apply to states such as pride, or
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aesthetic enjoyment (see Frijda, 2007, pp. 80-81). It should also be noted that when people
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46 are asked how happy they feel in general, there appears to be an average somewhat above
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48 neutral in the positive range (Oishi et al., 2007). Tsai (2007) argues that there might be
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51 cultural differences in the ideal (positive) affect with regard to the level of arousal desired as
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53 the ideal state.
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56 It should also be noted that there are situations, that seem to contradict the simple rule
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59 that positive emotions are desired and negative emotions are avoided. Why would people pay
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money to see horror movies? Why would they ride a roller coaster if unpleasant emotions
occur at times? In media psychology the question of why people voluntarily search out

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3 negative affect “for entertainment” is a frequently discussed topic (see Sparks & Sparks,
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6 2000; Hoffner & Levine, 2007). In fact,Andrade and Cohen (2007) suggest that there might
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8 be concurrent activation of negative and positive emotions. Similarly, people might engage in
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tedious and unpleasant activities if they will at a later point be associated with delayed . Here
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13 top-down regulation is involved to tolerate either a negative situation, or the absence of a
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15 positive stimulus in the here-and-now, with view to later positive rewards (see Tamir, 2005;
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Mischel & Ayduk, 2004; however, on the thwarting of delay of gratification for short term
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20 hedonic gain see Tice, Baumeister, & Zhang, 2004).
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23 In summary, there is a tendency of emotional states to self terminate – in the case of
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negative emotions this is a consequence of a negative feedback loop, where following the
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28 natural action tendencies implied by the emotion leads to active self-termination. In the case
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positive reward is associated with a tendency for a satiety that interrupts the positive feedback
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35 loop. Any theory dealing with emotion and regulation should take these processes into
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37 account. Emotions are not something that switches on and stays on until some dedicated
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40 emotion regulation system leads to a return to a neutral steady state or homeostasis.
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43 Social auto-regulation
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46 Young infants have few means to directly affect their environment apart from
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regulating attention. I already mentioned the acquisition of self-control via effortful shifts of
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51 visual attention in early childhood (Rueda et al., 2005). Campos et al. (2004) make a similar
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53 point concerning the influence of locomotion and object manipulation on emotion and
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56 emotion regulation. As the infant is able to confront or avoid the anxiogenic stimulus
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58 different means of regulation are available, changing the means of coping dramatically.
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3 However, social context provides a rich environment for interindividual exchange and
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6 regulation even for very young infants (see also Campos et al., 2004; Holodynski &
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8 Friedlmeier, 2006; von Salisch, 2008). Thus, expressive behavior is a route to (a) achieve a
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modification of the eliciting stimulus and (b) the emotional state, via imitation and feedback.
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14 Firstly, expressions of distress are likely to solicit external help. Caregivers are alerted
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16 to the need for intervention and will act to remedy the cause of distress (e.g., Campos et al.,
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18 2004). In this sense, the expression is part of a response cascade that transcends the
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23 conceive of the emotion terminating itself as the regular case. In this sense schemata are
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likely to develop that are targeted at the link between caregiver and the solution of certain
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28 problems (Tarabulsy, Tessier, & Kappas 1996). Positive expressions are also likely to solicit
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Secondly, there is likely a moderation of the infant’s emotional state via imitation and
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36 feedback. Already Darwin (1872) clearly stated that he believed that an attenuation of
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38 expression would yield an attenuation of the underlying emotional state. In that sense, he was
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one of the first to state a facial feedback hypothesis explicitly. However, it is obvious, that
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43 today there are contradictory results as regarding the effect of facial modulation on emotions
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45 (see Kappas, 2008). Particularly, studies from James Gross and his colleagues repeatedly
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48 found that facial suppression leads to augmented physiological arousal and thus potentially, a
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50 negative health impact, as well as social costs (see Gross & Thompson, 2007; Butler & Gross,
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52 2009). Other, earlier, studies had strongly suggested that an attenuation of expressive
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55 behavior does indeed lead to a concordant down-regulation of the emotion system (see
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57 McIntosh, 1996; Smith, McHugo, & Kappas, 1996). Research is needed to explain this
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divergence of findings.

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3 There is no question that expressive feedback systems in the sense of a monotonicity
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6 effect (attenuation leads to down-regulation; amplification to up-regulation) would be highly
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8 consistent with an interpersonal regulation process where empathy is associated with mimicry
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and imitation (Kappas & Descôteaux, 2003). In light of recent findings with regard to a
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13 mirror system in the human brain (e.g., Iacoboni, 2009) and the tendency to imitate facial
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15 expressions (e.g., Dimberg, 1982), such an architecture would make much sense consistent
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with Lipps’ (1905) mechanism of imitation driven empathy proposed a century ago. Lipps
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20 had assumed that we understand how another person feels by imitating the expressions of an
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22 interaction partner and then being influenced by our own expression.
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It is likely that in adulthood social processes continue to play a role in the auto-
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28 regulation of emotion. Assume that someone overcome with grief regarding the death of a
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Thinking of such processes as an extension of early externalized auto-regulation processes
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35 suggests that their function might not only to receive comfort, but to also address specifically
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37 the origin of the emotion, feelings of loss and loneliness, confusion, and dealing with concrete
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40 problems that can be addressed in social interaction.
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43 In summary, there is a social layer of emotion that permits the auto-regulation of
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45 emotions using the immediate social network. Others can to achieve solutions that the
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48 individual might not be able to reach on their own, particularly in early childhood. Given
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50 these means it is again not necessary to assume that an emotion will remain active until
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52 specific regulation processes kick in. This does not exclude that individuals will attempt to
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55 modify their emotional state rather than the eliciting situation. However, again, a
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57 consideration of emotion regulation requires all aspects of the dynamics of emotions,
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including social and non-social auto-regulation.

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3 Reconsidering the experimental situation in the light of theoretical issues regarding
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6 emotion and regulation
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9 Given the importance of motivational aspects in emotional processes, it is not
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11 surprising that changes in action tendencies or action readiness have been consequently seen
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14 by some researchers as central features of emotions. For example, the founder of modern
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16 appraisal theory Magda B. Arnold (1960), or more recently Nico Frijda (1986, 2007) discuss
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18 these action related aspects of emotions in detail. For these theorists there is no emotion
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20
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21 without an impact on motivational tendencies. Arnold stated:

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24 As soon as we appraise something as worth having in an immediate and intuitive way,
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26 we feel an attraction toward it. As soon as we instinctively judge that something is
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29 threatening, we feel repelled from it, we feel urged to avoid it. The intuitive appraisal
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31 of the situation initiates an action tendency that is felt as emotion, expressed in various
32
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bodily changes, and that eventually may lead to overt action (Arnold, 1960, p. 177).
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35
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37 Similarly, Frijda holds that “[i]f an event has no repercussion on an individual’s
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39 inclinations to act, one will hesitate to call it an emotion, except perhaps in the case of
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emotions evoked by art” (2007, p. 4). However, not all theorists focus primarily on the tight
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44 coupling of emotions, actions, and action tendencies. In their often-cited comparison of over
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46 100 theoretical statements defining emotions, Kleinginna and Kleinginna (1981) identified 11
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topical clusters regarding the primary or secondary emphasis of the core element(s) of
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51 emotions. Some definitions would focus for example, on the cognitive processes involved in
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53 emotion, particularly the generation of emotion, or on expressive behavior. Of course, it is
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56 these foci that define research agendas, including the experimental paradigms used to study
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58 emotions. I believe that the strong focus on expressive behavior, or on cognitive processes
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60 overshadowed the importance of behavior and action tendencies and thus has favored a

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3 passive (solitary) participant in emotional research with consequences for bodily and
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6 psychological processes.
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9 For example, many emotion researchers, inspired by Darwin’s (1872) seminal work
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11 The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals, are primarily interested in the facial
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14 expressions humans show when they are in a particular emotional state (see Russell,
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16 Bachorowski, & Fernández-Dols, 2003; Parkinson, Fischer, & Manstead, 2005). Similarly,
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18 the implications of William James’ arguments regarding the specificity of emotions have
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20
Fo
21 triggered interest in emotional responses other than expressive behavior, such as peripheral
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23 physiological activity (see Cornelius, 1996), or more recently, brain activity. Typical research
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goals in the field involve demonstrating that there is an intrapersonal coherence or correlation
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28 between changes in emotional response systems (e.g., expressive behavior, peripheral
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30 autonomic nervous system manifestations, subjective experience; see Kappas, 2003, Russell
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32
et al. 2003), and that there is similarity of such patterns between different individuals (see
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35 Mauss & Robinson, 2009).
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37
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38 In a typical experimental paradigm in this context, participants are asked to take a seat
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in front of some sort of display that will show still images (e.g., Cacioppo, Petty, Losch, &
iew
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43 Kim, 1986; see Bradley & Lang, 2007) or films (e.g., McHugo, Smith, & Lanzetta, 1982;
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45 Philippot, 1993; Gross & Levenson, 1995; see Rottenberg, Ray, & Gross, 2007) that have
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48 been pre-tested to elicit specific emotional reactions. If the dependent variables include
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50 physiological responses, the seat is often a reclining seat and subjects are connected with a
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52 variety of wires and cables and often enough it is made clear to them that they are not to move
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55 much in order not to create recording artefacts.4 What, however, does such a setting do to the
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57 participant? Firstly, the setting counteracts spontaneous action tendencies. Despite all
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reaffirmations in consent forms that subjects are free to terminate their participation at any
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time, for any reason, and without any penalty, it is clear that the threshold to walking out on

1
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3 an experimenter is higher than to change the channel on your TV at home if one finds a show
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6 objectionable. Even looking away or covering one’s eyes with a hand (see Kappas, 2008)
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8 runs counter to the experimental instructions or even physical possibility if both hands are
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connected to devices. Thus, rather than an instance where the experimenters’ design results in
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13 reducing error variance by simplifying and standardizing the experimental situation, as
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15 intended, one could see this as a complication, where natural action tendencies are blocked.
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18 A comment should be made also to the issue of social isolation. Of course the idea to
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20
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21 have participants isolated is an attempt to control for the effect of “display rules” by socially
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23 isolating the participant (see also Keltner & Haidt, 2001). However, as there are well
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established effects of implicit sociality that are functional even in social isolation, the
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28 paradigm opens the door to various uncontrolled implicit sociality effects and in effect
29
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30 transforming the participant into a free monadic radical ready to connect to any explicit or
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implicit social context (Kappas, 2004) –
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36 Considering these issues, the stimulus condition that is appraised in a typical
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38 experiment becomes actually an interaction of three entities: Firstly, the selected stimulus
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itself is a key component, say, an excerpt from a horror movie. Secondly, the experimental
iew
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43 situation, which might be rather complex. Consider the example of being in a small room, tied
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45 to equipment, with student assistants of the opposite sex potentially watching via hidden
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48 cameras and no way to look away from the screen. Thirdly, the meaning and interpretation is
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50 complicated by effects of the physical position in the reclining chair (Stepper & Strack, 2003;
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52 see also Harmon-Jones & Peterson, 2009).
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54
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56 Arguably, this complication of what constitutes the actual stimulus, in this
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58 hypothetical laboratory situation, does not necessarily invalidate existing findings. This
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60 depends on the questions the researchers ask. If, for example, the subject would get angry at
the experimenters for putting her into such an unpleasant situation, but would correctly

1
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3 indicate feeling angry, then the observed bodily changes could be related to the self-report and
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5
6 contribute to answering the original research question. Of course, one could not state in one’s
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8 research report that, as a rule, horror films are necessarily linked to getting angry, as in a
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10
different situation the same film stimulus might have elicited quite different affective
11
12
13 responses (Richard Lazarus’ early research on physiological responses to stressful films is
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15 certainly very informative regarding the complex relationship between a physical stimulus
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17
18
and the interpretation; e.g., Lazarus & Alfert, 1964).
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20
Fo
21 Much of the present laboratory research on emotion regulation is using the same
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23 situational context as the passive reaction paradigm described above in typical “coherence”
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26
research with the added modification of asking participants to employ a particular strategy,
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28 such as not showing anything on their face, performing a secondary task, or trying to
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30 cognitively focus on a particular aspect of the stimulus (Kappas, McHugo, & Lanzetta, 1989;
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32
Gross & Levenson, 1993). There are two problems here. Firstly, does it make a difference to
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35 the participant whether s/he is in control of the choice of regulatory mechanism or whether an
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37 experimenter dictates how an arousing situation needs to be dealt with (see Tamir & Mauss,
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40 in press)? Potentially, this lowers confidence and appraisals of emotion focused coping
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42 potential, or, phrased consistent with a self-regulation perspective, change the belief that the
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44 emotion can be successfully regulated. However, this is not the critical issue I want to
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47 address here, but the second issue which relates to the comparison of regulation and baseline,
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49 respectively spontaneous condition. In fact, there is reason to doubt that comparison
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52
conditions without any control instructions are indeed baseline conditions that would not
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54 involve regulatory processes. Instead, such an experimental situation is a condition that is
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56 characterized by taking habitual coping strategies away by counteracting spontaneous action
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59 tendencies, whereas the experimental emotion regulation conditions then would consist,
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according to this logic, of counteracting spontaneous action tendencies + taking habitual

1
2
3 emotion regulation strategies away + forcing a specific emotion regulation strategy. Needless
4
5
6 to say, this complicates the interpretation of the results.
7
8
9 In summary, researchers habitually create highly artificial situations that have little to
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11 do with spontaneous regulation of emotional states in everyday life in social- and task
12
13
14 contexts. This is largely due to concepts of emotions in which action tendencies play a minor
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16 role. The problem is confounded with the belief that social influences on emotions could be
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18 controlled by having participants performing tasks in solitary conditions (see also Kappas,
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20
Fo
21 2003)..
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23
24 What happens to unregulated emotions? Habituation?
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27 There are different ways how emotions might decay or be terminated. We can consider
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30 auto-regulation, as described above as an active self-termination. It is active in that the

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32 organism acts to do something that changes the situation and this the emotion. A passive
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34 process that modulates emotion is habituation. Habituation is pervasive in most bodily
35
36
37 systems, both at the physiological and at the psychological level (e.g., Breiter et al., 1996;
ev
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39 Dawson, Schell, & Filion, 2007; Janssen, Prause, & Geer, 2007). It can be found at a cellular
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41
iew
level and even in primitive organisms, such as the flatworm (Koopowitz, 1975). As Frijda
42
43
44 puts it in his Law of Habituation: “Continued pleasures wear off; continued hardships lose
45
46 their poignancy” (Frijda, 2007, p. 10). Thus, not only is there considerable spontaneous
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48
49
recovery when emotional stimuli are terminated (Fredrickson & Levenson, 1998), habituation
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51 will, in many cases, lead to a reduction of physiological and psychological responses to
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53 ongoing stimuli, as long as there is not continual, or at least frequent, change in either the
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56 stimulation, or their appraisal, or both.
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59 In typical research paradigms in the emotion regulation context, there are many
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attempts to avoid habituation – for example, stimuli are typically brief and varied. However,

1
2
3 this creates again an artificial situation that likely has an impact on the engagement of the
4
5
6 participant. What are the conditions in the real world in which automatic or top-down
7
8 regulation occur (see Philippot, Baeyens, Douilliez, & Francart, 2004; Power & Dalgleish,
9
10
2008)? How frequent is it that in the real world one is being confronted with a rapid sequence
11
12
13 of positive and negative stimuli (while being immobilized; in a strange social situation; with a
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15 fixed and externally determined regulation strategy prescribed)?
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17
18 Habituation is a second order adaptation mechanism that leads to a decrease of
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20
Fo
21 emotion in the natural world faced with ongoing stimulation. Its effects are likely additive to
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23 the effects of auto-regulation, particularly to avoid lingering effects. An example of an
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exception to such processes are pathological states that are characterized by rumination –
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28 specifically in depression (Gotlib & Joormann, 2010). In this case habituation seems to be
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30 compromised.
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There is so far little attempt to develop models of the various habituation processes
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35
36 involved in the emotion cascade. Given that cognitive processes related to novelty, relevance,
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38 as well as mainly sensorial processes have very different dynamic properties, this is not a
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trivial enterprise. It is known that certain dependent variables, such as electrodermal
iew
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43 responses habituate much faster than event related potentials of the brain. Having this
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45 knowledge would allow for proper baseline procedures against which regulation attempts,
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47
48 spontaneous or prompted could be tested. More research is needed.
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51 Two questions arise from the conclusion that emotions are intrinsically self-regulating
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53 and subject of habituation processes. Firstly, what are the conditions that would require
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55
56 additional regulatory processes? Secondly, if regulation is part and parcel of emotion, is there
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58 any possibility to distinguish emotion from regulation?
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60

1
2
3 As regards the question of additional regulatory processes – I have already mentioned
4
5
6 that pathological conditions might motivate volitional regulatory processes. However, even in
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8 everyday situations individuals may wish to modulate their affective states as Gross and
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10
colleagues have frequently argued. I do not deny the existence of such volitional regulation.
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12
13 Yet, these processes are a) interacting with other regulating mechanisms and b) occur as a
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15 foreground to concurrent processes such as auto-regulation and habituation. Thus, it would
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appear strange to divorce these processes and exclude auto-regulation and habituation from an
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20 analysis of emotion regulation.
Fo
21
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23 Distinguishing emotion from regulation depends in part on the underlying emotion
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theory as I will outline in the conclusion. However, it can be pointed out that the structures
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28 and processes involved in emotion regulation are also involved in “emotion-without-
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30 regulation”. Thus, I do not believe it useful to analyze one without considering the other.
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Conclusion: One!
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37 Whether emotion and regulation appear better conceptualized separately or as part and
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39 parcel of the same system depends on the underlying emotion theory. For example, theories
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that assume the existence of affect programs appear to be consistent with the notion of
42
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44 separating emotion and regulation. The notion of affect programs, developed by Silvan
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46 Tomkins has influenced popular emotion theorists, particularly Paul Ekman (e.g., 2003; see
47
48
49
also Cornelius, 1996). Generally, the idea of affect programs involves coordinated response
50
51 cascades in different response modalities. Something triggers the affect and then a relatively
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53 stereotypical package of responses ensues. Here one could distinguish between the “pure”
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56 case where the affect program takes its undisturbed course and the case where the individual
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58 attempts to modify the course or the outcome of the program.
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60

1
2
3 A second class of theories can be traced back to William James (e.g., Damasio, 2000).
4
5
6 James focused on subjective experience, or in other words the feeling component, as the
7
8 essence of emotion. In contrast to the affect program view, it appears not necessary to make
9
10
strong assumptions regarding how strictly physiological and expressive responses are
11
12
13 coupled, because the analytical emphasis of the theories is on what causes feeling specifically.
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15 To proponents of this view it might also appear logical to separate the “uncontrolled” from the
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18
“controlled” case – in consequence divorcing emotion and regulation.
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20
Fo
21 In contrast, systems approaches that focus on the existence of regulatory loops

22
23 between emotional components imply that there is no emotion without regulation of some sort
24
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26
(e.g., Kappas & Descôteaux, 2003; Lewis, 2000b; Campos, Frankel, & Camras, 2004). This
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28 is not to say that there are different ways and levels of emotion regulation. Such a view is
29
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30 perfectly compatible with the notion that an individual might try to influence his or her
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32
subjective state using techniques such as reappraisal, or modulation of expressive behavior.
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35 However, the reason these effortful regulation strategies work is, according to a systems view,
36
37 because of the highly interdependent architecture of the emotion system. As this architecture
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40 is at work whether conscious regulation efforts are or are not in place, it makes more sense to
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42 consider regulation a part of the emotion process.

43
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45 I believe that specific research into the nature of how different emotional components
46
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48 are coupled, such as studies on facial feedback (e.g., Laird, 1974; Lanzetta, Cartwright-Smith,
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50 & Kleck, 1976; Zuckerman, Klorman, Larrance, & Spiegel, 1981; Ekman, Levenson, &
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52 Friesen, 1983; Strack, Martin, & Stepper, 1988; see also McIntosh, 1996), should influence
53
54
55 our understanding of emotions. We have to come to terms with the consistent finding that
56
57 emotional components do not typically exhibit highly coherent and correlated responses (see
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59
Mauss & Robinson, 2009). Rather than assume that there is an ideal emotional process, it
60
would be more productive to specify which factors influence inter-component coherence. It is

1
2
3 clear that the mutually regulatory influences between components should, or better must, be
4
5
6 part of a theory that tries to unify these findings.
7
8
9 The different regulation mechanisms that I have discussed in this contribution (and
10
11 others that I have not touched upon) whether they are “by evolutionary design”, by
12
13
14 implication, by top-down modulation, or otherwise, whether they are intra- or interindividual,
15
16 are, I believe, part of what most contemporary emotion scientists would call emotional (see
17
18 also Campos et al., 2004 for a related argument). They continuously modulate and trigger
19
20
Fo
21 moment-to-moment changes in all of the dependent variables that we take as criteria for
22
23 “emotion”. Thus, in this clearly specified sense, I consider the attempt of separating analyses
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of emotion and emotion regulation unproductive and hence emotion and regulation are one!
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3 Footnotes
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7 1
8 While the first part of the quote is often cited, the continuation is less known. “—nameless,
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10 unreasoning, unjustified terror which paralyzes needed efforts to convert retreat into advance”
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(Roosevelt, 1989, para 1)
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14 2
15 An estimated 5 to 20% of the adult population suffer from high dental anxiety which may
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17 lead to phobic avoidance behavior (Berggren, Hakeberg, & Carlsson, 2000).
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19 3
20 It may appear unusual to refer to the self-interest of emotions, as if psychological states
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22 themselves had intentions. However, many do not consider unusual to regard the interest and
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24
fate of ideas in the context of discussions on “memes” (Dakwins, 1976). In both cases,
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27 intention, or interest, are but metaphors that relate to the evolutionary success or failure of a
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concept rather than the physical hardware upon which emotions or ideas rely.
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31 4
32 My own research has often enough used such an experimental setting. Thus, my critical
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34 remarks also apply to some of my own research.
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Emotion Review

Emotion and Regulation are One!

Manuscript ID: EMR-09-149.R1

Manuscript Type: Original Manuscript

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Area/Discipline: social < psychology

Keywords: emotion regulation, facial expression, facial feedback

I argue that (1) emotions often are actively auto-regulating. The

behavior implied by the emotional reaction bias to the eliciting

processes and that effortful emotion regulation should be seen

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regulation is not only an intra- but also an inter-personal process.

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38 which for the sake of convenience we may call E

primary goal of self-termination is functional3. I have argued elsewhere that auto-regulation is

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30 argument very eloquently. Consider the following quote:

38 (regulation by emotions) or to how emotions are themselves regulated (regulation of

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42 processes in the next section.

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21 without an impact on motivational tendencies. Arnold stated:

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30 auto-regulation, as described above as an active self-termination. It is active in that the

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21 In contrast, systems approaches that focus on the existence of regulatory loops

42 consider regulation a part of the emotion process.

would be more productive to specify which factors influence inter-component coherence. It is

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emotion. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.

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42 directions. Annual Review of Clinical Psychology, 6, 285-312

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21 anger evocation. Psychological Science, 20, 1209-1210. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-

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30 Kappas, A. & Descôteaux, J. (2003). Of butterflies and roaring thunder: Nonverbal

lation of emotional experience. Psychophysiology, 26, S37.

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42 (pp. 623-636). New York, NY: Guilford.

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30 Motivation and Emotion, 20, 121-147.

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25 Emotion Review, 1, 60-85. doi: 10.1177/1754073908097189

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Social Psychology, 54, 768-777.

infancy. Psychological Bulletin, 120, 25-41.

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