SSRN Id3352600

Choice of E-Waste Recycling Standard Under
Recovery Channel Competition

∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ⋆
Gökçe Esenduran , Yen-Ting Lin , Wenli Xiao , Minyue Jin
∗
Krannert School of Management, Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN 47907,
∗∗
School of Business Administration, University of San Diego, San Diego, CA 92110,
⋆
School of Economics and Business Administration, Chongqing University, Chongqing, 400044, China
⋆
School of Management, University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei, China, 230026
gesendur@purdue.edu, linyt@sandiego.edu, wenlixiao@sandiego.edu, helenjin@mail.ustc.edu.cn
Problem definition. We consider two competing electronic waste (e-waste) recovery channels, each of
which consists of a collector and a recycler. Collectors obtain donated e-waste and sell the collected items
to recyclers or in the secondary market, while recyclers process e-waste and sell the recycled material in the
commodity market. Each recycler chooses for certification of one of two standards: e-Stewards or Responsible
Recycling (R2). E-Stewards requires comparably more responsible handling, thus a higher processing cost,
but attracts more e-waste from environmentally conscious donors.
Academic/practical relevance. Despite the rapid growth of e-waste, the operations management com-
munity still understands little about e-waste processing supply chains. We add to this body of knowledge by
capturing three salient features in the e-waste recovery industry: the existence of two recycling standards,
the secondary market, and competition both within and between recovery channels.
Methodology. We model the problem as a Stackelberg game and characterize the firms’ equilibrium deci-
sions, deriving managerial insights through sensitivity analysis and numerical studies.
Results. Competition between recovery channels is a key factor motivating e-Stewards adoption, whereas
a recycler always chooses R2 in its absence. Interestingly, when competition exists both within and between
recovery channels, recyclers with strong e-waste processing scale economies choose e-Stewards when incurring
significantly higher processing costs than with R2. Furthermore, both the total environmental benefit and
welfare might be higher when recyclers choose R2.
Managerial implications. Policy makers who aim to encourage e-Stewards adoption should (1) lower entry
barriers for new recyclers to induce competition and (2) offer incentive programs to alleviate e-Stewards’ cost
disadvantage, though only when recyclers have weak scale economies. Policy makers and non-governmental
organizations, however, should exercise caution in endorsing e-Stewards because R2 actually may generate
a higher environmental benefit because of higher recycling volumes.
Key words : E-waste recycling, recycling standards, channel competition, secondary market
1. Introduction
Electronic waste (e-waste) is the fastest-growing stream of waste in the world (Kitsara 2014),
global consumers generating almost 45 million tons in 2017, according to the United Nations
(Baldé et al. 2017). Nevertheless, e-waste is becoming an increasingly valuable commodity as an
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Author:
2 Article submitted to Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
alternative source for valuable metals (e.g., silver, gold, lanthanum) commonly used in electronics
manufacturing (Kitsara 2014). As a result, the global e-waste recovery market is expected to grow
approximately 20% annually to reach $5 billion by 2020 (Markets and Markets 2015).
In a traditional e-waste recovery channel, independent collectors offer individuals, households,
and businesses free e-waste drop-off (and, sometimes, pick-up). After sorting the items, collectors
either sell them to recyclers or in the secondary market. For example, the Electronics Recycling
Center at the University of San Diego (USD), one of the largest e-waste collectors in the region,
takes donations of any unwanted electronics and resells 17% of collected items (in poundage)
through its own retail shop or online via eBay and Craigslist. Based on our interviews with this
center and another major e-waste collector in San Diego, resale operations now account for more
than half of their revenue, the rest coming from recyclers. This is because the recycling value of a
hard drive, for example, is below $1 but its resale value likely is significantly more.
Recyclers, meanwhile, purchase e-waste from collectors, process it (e.g., through disassembly
and smelting), then sell recycled materials such as metal, glass, and plastic in the commodity
market. E-waste often contains hazardous materials such as lead, mercury, arsenic, and cadmium,
which can pose harm to human health and the environment unless treated properly (Julander
et al. 2014). Recyclers, therefore, can gain competitive edge by obtaining certification from one
of two recycling standards assuring responsible e-waste handling and processing. E-Stewards is a
standard created by the Basel Action Network, while Responsible Recycling (abbreviated as R2 )
is owned by another non-governmental organization (NGO), the Sustainable Electronics Recycling
International. E-Stewards, unlike R2, forbids exports of non-functioning devices and hazardous
materials, e-waste incineration, open-system shredding of hazardous materials, and the use of prison
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labor. However, e-Stewards’ higher processing stringency also comes at a higher cost. For instance,
a major California-based recycler estimated in our interview that switching from its current R2
certification to e-Stewards would increase its cost by about 10%.
While e-Stewards’ restrictions drive up recyclers’ processing costs, its greater stringency has led
to support from environmentalists and NGOs (ETC 2010). Furthermore, environmentally conscious
donors may be more likely to supply e-Stewards-certified recyclers. Many corporate and government
agencies, for example, are more inclined to give their e-waste to collectors who work with an e-
Stewards-certified recycler. Boeing, Wells Fargo, Samsung, Nestlé, and the city of Seattle, among
others, joined the “e-Stewards enterprise” by committing to make the best effort to ensure e-
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Stewards-certified recyclers process their e-waste. The University of California and Staples also
pledged to do the same (Greene 2013). Despite the trade-off between higher processing cost and
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Article submitted to Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 3
increased quantity and revenue, it nonetheless remains unclear which standard recyclers should
choose. As of February 2018, the United States was home to 78 e-Stewards- and 229 R2-certified
3
recyclers.
The above discussion leads to the following important research questions: (i.) Which recycling
standard should a recycler adopt? (ii.) How much should a collector recycle or sell to the secondary
market? and (iii.) What are the environmental and societal impacts of the two recycling stan-
dard choices? To address these, we use a game theoretic model considering two competing e-waste
recovery channels, each of which has a recycler and a collector. In each channel, the recycler first
chooses a recycling standard (e-Stewards or R2), then determines the wholesale price to offer the
collector. The recycler experiences scale economies in processing the e-waste (i.e., unit process-
ing cost decreases as e-waste quantity increases) and sells recycled materials in the commodity
market. The collector, on the other hand, accepts e-waste donations of varied quality, which it
then allocates between the recycler and the secondary market. On the supply side, some e-waste
donors are environmentally conscious and prefer to have an e-Stewards-certified recycler handle
their e-waste. As a result, our model features two types of competition: (i.) Internal competition
within a recovery channel, where a recycler competes with the secondary market for the collector’s
e-waste; and (ii.) external competition between recovery channels, where collectors compete both
in obtaining e-waste donations and in reselling e-waste in the secondary market. Hereafter, we refer
to such external competition as channel competition. We also study two benchmark scenarios: A
single recovery channel without channel competition, and two competing recovery channels with-
out internal competition (i.e., in the absence of a secondary market). Our analysis leads to several
insights for both policy makers and recovery-channel firms.
First, we find that a recycler chooses e-Stewards only when facing channel competition. In its
absence, the single recovery channel receives all the e-waste, so the recycler never chooses e-Stewards
in order to avoid higher processing costs. Hence, our finding implies that policy makers seeking to
encourage e-Stewards adoption should lower entry barriers for new recyclers to induce competition.
Interestingly, we show that when both channel and internal competition exist, standard strin-
gency should be increased to drive e-Stewards adoption when recyclers have strong scale economies.
More specifically, recyclers’ choice of standard depends on the strength of scale economies and
the additional processing cost under e-Stewards. If recyclers realize strong scale economies, they
choose e-Stewards only when processing costs are substantially higher than with R2. When scale
economies are low, however, e-Stewards would be chosen when the additional processing cost is
sufficiently low.
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While many environmentalists and NGOs advocate for e-Stewards, we find that choosing R2
may, in fact, lead to greater environmental benefits and social welfare. E-Stewards’ stringency may
imply a higher per-unit environmental benefit than R2, but its higher processing costs drive down
recycling quantities. As a result, the total environmental benefit as well as social welfare may be
lower under e-Stewards adoption.
Our analysis also demonstrates how firms’ decisions and profitability depend on two key market
characteristics: the total e-waste quantity and the strength of scale economies in e-waste processing.
We find that an increase in e-waste quantity may hurt collector profits. This occurs when recyclers
with weak scale economies offer lower wholesale prices for e-waste, overshadowing collectors’ gains
from increased quantity. Achieving scale economies is vital for the recycling business (Tsamis and
Coyne 2015). Indeed, we find that stronger scale economies increases a recycler’s profit in the
absence of channel or internal competition. When both channel and internal competition exist,
however, they undermine the value of stronger scale economies by forcing recyclers to pay higher
wholesale prices for e-waste. This implies that process efficiency improvement initiatives may not
be always beneficial, a factor recyclers should weigh when considering such investments.
Finally, we extend our model by allowing (1) a recycler to work with multiple collectors and (2)
recyclers to have different processing scale economies or different additional processing costs under
e-Stewards. We confirm our main findings in these extensions, also discovering that asymmetry
in additional e-Stewards processing cost or in scale economies may explain recyclers’ divergent
standard choices in practice.
The paper is organized as follows. We review relevant literature in § 2 and describe our model
setup in § 3. We analyze two benchmark scenarios (i.e., no channel competition, no internal com-
petition) in § 4. In § 5, we analyze firms’ equilibrium decisions considering competing recovery
channels, and in § 6 we consier the welfare and environmental implications of firm decisions. Finally,
we study several model extensions in § 7, offering concluding remarks in § 8. All proofs are relegated
to Online Appendix A.
2. Literature Review
Our work contributes to the literature streams that study reverse supply chain design, product
resale, and product recovery. Although these topics have been studied extensively, recyclers’ choice
of e-waste recycling standard has not been explored in the extant literature to the best of our
knowledge. Below, we review each stream and highlight our contributions.
Papers examining reverse supply chain design generally focus on who should collect and/or
recycle used items and the role of collection cost structure (e.g., Savaskan and Van Wassenhove
Author:
2006, Toyasaki et al. 2011). Savaskan et al. (2004), for example, found that an original equipment
manufacturer (OEM) maximizes its profit when subcontracting collection to a retailer. Toyasaki
et al. (2011) showed that contracting with recyclers directly instead of relegating the decision
to a nonprofit yields higher profits for both recyclers and OEMs when products are not highly
substitutable and recycling cost exhibits weak scale economies. In a related work, Tian et al. (2014)
investigated the formation of recycling coalitions, finding that, amid intense sales-market and when
OEMs organize recycling, cooperation is unattractive. Finally, the extant literature also studied
optimal reverse logistics network design by comparing different reverse supply chain structures and
their facility locations (e.g., Fleischmann et al. 2001, Salema et al. 2007). In this paper, we do not
seek to find an optimal reverse supply chain structure; instead, we focused on a common recovery
channel structure observed in practice where independent collectors sell e-waste to recyclers and
in the secondary market.
Secondary-market product resale is receiving growing attention in the literature. One substream
assumes each potential consumer chooses between new and remanufactured/refurbished products,
the latter of which are classified as the secondary market. Oraiopoulos et al. (2012), for example,
found that a durable goods OEM would benefit from the existence of refurbishers when consumers’
willingness to pay for their products is high. Alev et al. (2018), on the other hand, showed that the
OEM would interfere with the secondary market by collecting used products only when extended
producer responsibility (EPR) regulations govern the market. Another substream in this literature
considers a separate secondary market where consumers only purchase used/refurbished products.
Robotis et al. (2005), for example, found that remanufacturing maximizes profits of a non-OEM
that procures used products and resells them in the secondary market. An example of this is
Michigan-based ReCellular Inc., which acquired used cell phones in the U.S., then resold them in
developing economies such as South America or Africa. We similarly consider a separate secondary
market and contribute to this stream by analyzing two factors: competition between two e-waste
collectors selling items therein, and the effect of this competition on associated recyclers’ optimal
choice of recycling standard.
Our work also relates to the product recovery literature, where Atasu et al. (2008a) and Souza
(2013) offered thorough reviews. Many papers in this stream have considered an OEM’s compe-
tition with other OEMs and/or independent remanufacturers (IR) (Guide and Wassenhove 2001,
Majumder and Groenevelt 2001). Ferguson and Toktay (2006), for example, investigated OEMs’
use of recovery strategy to deter IR market entry. Atasu et al. (2008b) found remanufacturing
an effective market strategy for a competing OEM to defend market share. Debo et al. (2005)
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studied OEM joint pricing and production technology selection decisions, finding that the opti-
mal remanufacturability level decreases amid increasing competition. While these studies focus on
OEM and/or IR competition, we focus on the competition between electronics recovery channels,
aiming to identify recyclers’ optimal choice of standard.
Many papers in this literature examine product take-back regulations and their impact on OEMs
and total welfare (e.g., Atasu et al. 2009, Jacobs and Subramanian 2012, Gui et al. 2015). As we
primarily seek to analyze recyclers’ and collectors’ decisions, which are not subject to these regu-
lations, we do not specifically model them. However, several papers in this stream have provided
interesting insights worth noting: Atasu et al. (2009) showed that EPR-type regulations may not
lead to improved welfare outcomes. Esenduran and Kemahlıoğlu-Ziya (2015) found that individual
compliance might yield superior environmental outcomes to collective compliance. Jacobs and Sub-
ramanian (2012), meanwhile, demonstrated that suppliers and manufacturers sharing responsibility
for product recovery can improve supply chain performance.
Our paper also relates to the literature on eco-labels. A large body of research in this stream
focuses on the impact of certification design on eco-label adoption (Rysman et al. 2015, Lim et al.
2017) and credibility (Harbaugh et al. 2011, Castka and Corbett 2016). There is also literature
that considers competition between eco-labels. For example, Murali et al. (2016) consider two firms
with self or external eco-labels and asymmetric credibilities competing on the positioning of their
environmental qualities. They find that external certification improves both firms’ environmental
quality. Heyes and Martin (2016) consider the competition between labeling schemes of NGOs from
both vertical and horizontal dimensions. To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first to
examine firms’ eco-label adoption decisions in the e-waste recycling industry facing both internal
and channel competition.
In sum, our research bears several distinct features. First, focusing on e-waste recovery channels,
we examine independent recyclers’ and collectors’ decisions in the presence of the secondary market.
The aforementioned literature, by contrast, has focused on manufacturers’ and/or remanufacturers’
decisions, ultimately simplifying recovery channel dynamics. Second, we are the first to examine the
impact of recyclers’ choice of standard. Third, we consider internal competition within a recovery
channel (i.e., between the secondary market and recyclers) as well as external competition among
different recovery channels. The extant literature largely has focused on new- and remanufactured-
product competition in the sales market.
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3. Model Set-up and Assumptions

We consider two competing e-waste recovery channels (i=1,2), each of which consists of a recycler
(referred to as “she”) and a collector (referred to as “he”), as shown in Figure 1. Next, we present
each player’s decisions and the sequence of events. We summarize notations in Table 1.
Figure 1 Competing E-waste Recovery Channels
3.1 Collectors
Collectors refers to entities that obtain e-waste from donors. A collector sorts e-waste and sells
it either in the secondary market (e.g., e-Bay and Craigslist) or to a recycler. Collectors cannot
dispose of e-waste with regular trash as it is illegal in many U.S. states (Willard 2015, Meoli 2016).
A collector i receives Qi donated units, which are heterogeneous in quality, a common assumption
in the literature (Guide et al. 2003, Ferguson et al. 2009). Some items may be broken or not
functional, thus not resalable in the secondary market, whereas the remaining resalable items may
vary in quality (due to different levels of functionality or wear). Let k = {I, II, III} denote these
quality levels, where k = I is high quality, k = II is low quality, and k = III is the not resalable.
Denoting the fraction of resalable items by τ ∈ [0, 1] and the fraction of high-quality resalable items
by β ∈ [0, 1], collector i receives Qi =βτ Qi (Qi =(1 − β)τ Qi ) units of high- (low-) quality items. Each
I II
collector i determines the fraction of e-waste at each resalable quality level to sell in the secondary
market, denoted by φi ∈ [0, 1] for i = 1, 2 and k = I, II. As a result, the amount of high- (low-)
k
quality e-waste collector i sells in the secondary market is qSi = φi Qi (qSi = φi Qi ) for i = 1, 2.
I I I II II II
In the secondary market, a consumer’s valuation for a high-quality item (k = I) is v, whereas her
valuation for a low-quality item (k = II) is αv. Here, α ∈ (0, 1) shows the difference in valuation
between a high- and low-quality item. We assume that v is uniformly distributed between [0, κ]
with unit density, therefore κ also represents the number of potential secondary-market consumers.
A secondary-market consumer who purchases a high- (low-) quality e-waste item generates utility
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Table 1 Summary of Notations
Symbol Definition
ti Recycling standard chosen by recycler i
wi Per-unit wholesale price recycler i pays to collector i
k
φi Fraction of e-waste of quality level k collector i sells in the secondary market
Q Total amount of e-waste donation
k
Qi (Qi ) Total amount of e-waste (of quality level k) received by collector i
qRi Amount of e-waste collector i sells to recycler i
k
qSi Amount of e-waste of quality level k collector i sells in the secondary market
k
p Secondary market price for items of quality level k
κ Potential secondary market size
α Consumers’ relative valuation of low-quality items as a fraction of high-quality items’ valuation
τ Fraction of resalable e-waste donation
β Fraction of resalable e-waste donation that is of high quality (k = I)
r Recyclers’ per-unit revenue
η Fraction of environmentally conscious donors
i Recycler i’s additional marginal processing cost for the chosen standard
e Cost differential between recycling standards
a Per-unit processing cost in the absence of scale economies
b Scale economies factor
πRi , πCi Recycler i’s, Collector i’s profit
I II I II
U = v − p (U = αv − p ), where p and p are the secondary-market prices of the high- and low-
quality items, respectively. Each consumer in the secondary market purchases the item, if any, that
4
gives her the highest positive utility. This results in the following inverse demand functions:
2 2
I I II
p = κ − ∑ qSi − α ∑ qSi (1)
i=1 i=1
2 2
= α (κ − ∑ qSi − ∑ qSi )
II I II
p (2)
i=1 i=1
Collector i sells the remaining e-waste, including the fraction that is not resalable in the secondary
market, to recycler i, i.e., qRi =∑k=I (1 − φi )Qi + Qi =(1 − φi )βτ Qi + (1 − φi )(1 − β)τ Qi + (1 − τ )Qi ,
II k k III I II
at per-unit wholesale price wi . We assume collector i exclusively works with recycler i, a common
k
industry practice to secure the e-waste supply. In sum, each collector i sells φi fraction of quality
level k e-waste for k={I, II} in the secondary market and the rest to his recycler to maximize his
profit:
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πCi (φi , φi ) = p qSi + p qSi + wi qRi

I II I I II II
I
maxII
(3)
φi , φ i ∈ [0, 1]
The first two terms in (3) represent secondary-market revenue, while the last is the revenue
collected from the recycler. Without loss of generality, we assume each collector’s e-waste collection
and handling marginal costs are zero; allowing for non-zero cost does not change our insights. This
assumption also aligns with practice, where collectors primarily collect e-waste free of charge either
5
at events (i.e., e-waste drives) or drop-off locations.
3.2 Recyclers
Recycler i purchases e-waste from collector i at a unit wholesale price wi , then processes it and
sells the output as a commodity or raw material, generating revenue r from each unit. According
to a major recycler in southern California, recyclers typically do not directly collect e-waste from
donors, as this is not their core business. While the quality level of e-waste can affect its secondary-
market price, it does not affect a recycler’s e-waste recovery value (e.g., the amount of precious
metal that can be recovered from a computer is the same regardless of whether it is dented). In our
model, therefore, neither the wholesale price nor recycling revenue depends on the quality level,
consistent with industry practice.
Each recycler chooses to be certified with either e-Stewards or R2, but not both. This is consistent
with our observation that less than 4% of recyclers are certified with both standards, largely due
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to the significant administrative burden. Let ti denote the standard recycler i adopts; ti = H
indicates that recycler i adopts e-Stewards, and ti = L indicates R2. Given their relative stringency,
we hereafter refer to e-Stewards and R2 as the high and low recycling standards, respectively.
Recycling usually entails a significant investment, thus significant quantity is necessary to achieve
scale economies (Hageluken 2006, Tsamis and Coyne 2015). Following earlier literature (e.g., Toy-
asaki et al. 2011, Jacobs and Subramanian 2012, Esenduran and Kemahlıoğlu-Ziya 2015), we
assume marginal processing cost declines as quantity increases, exhibiting scale economies. Specif-
th
ically, recycler i incurs the following marginal processing cost for recycling the x unit of e-waste:
e if ti = H
g(x) = a − 2bx + i , where i = { , for i = 1, 2. (4)
0 if ti = L
Here, a is the unit processing cost in the absence of scale economies, b captures the strength of scale
economies, and i is recycler i’s additional processing cost to comply with the chosen standard.
When b is larger, indicating stronger scale economies, the marginal processing cost declines more
in quantity. Without loss of generality, we assume that i =0 when recycler i chooses R2 (i.e., ti =L)
and i =e > 0 when she chooses e-Stewards (i.e., ti =H). This reflects the fact that e-Stewards is a
Author:
more stringent standard, thereby inducing a higher processing cost than R2. For example, a major
recycler in California who adopts R2 estimated in our interview that switching to e-Stewards would
increase its processing cost by about 10%. Hereafter, we refer to e as the cost differential between
the recycling standards. Finally, our communication with recyclers revealed that they almost never
encounter capacity shortage, hence we assume accordingly.
To summarize, each recycler first chooses ti , the recycling standard, then wi , the wholesale price
she pays to collector i, to maximize her profit:
qRi
max πRi (wi , ti ) = (r − wi )qRi − ∫ g(x)dx (5)
0
= (r − wi − a − i )qRi + bqRi
2
for i = 1, 2 (6)
The first term in (5) is the revenue from selling recycled materials in the commodity market,
netting the wholesale price paid to collector i. The second term is the total processing cost. The
recycler’s profit can be rewritten as in (6), where the first term represents the recycler’s profit
without scale economies, and the second term captures the benefits of scale economies. We do not
consider the fixed cost for adopting the standards (e.g., paperwork, one-time application/initiation
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fee) because it will not qualitatively alter our insights.
3.3 E-waste Donors

There are a total of Q e-waste donors, each of whom owns one unit of e-waste and chooses to donate
it to a collector. Some individuals are more environmentally conscious (De Pelsmacker et al. 2005),
and some businesses donating electronics seek to protect their brand by ensuring their e-waste is
processed under stringent standards. For instance, being members of the “e-Stewards Enterprise,”
Boeing, Wells Fargo, Samsung, Nestlé and the city of Seattle, among others, have signaled their best
efforts to ensure their waste is treated by e-Stewards-certified recyclers. Knowing this, collectors
often announce their chosen recycler’s adopted standard. For example, Greencitizen and Green
E-waste Recycling advertise that they work with e-Stewards-certified ECS Refinery, while the USD
recycling center and Civicorps Recycling show on their websites that they work with Cal Micro,
an R2-certified recycler.
Hence, we assume that η ∈ [0, 1] fraction of donors is environmentally conscious and they prefer
to have their e-waste processed by high-standard recyclers, if available. Therefore, if recycler i
chooses e-Stewards while the other chooses R2, η fraction of donors donates e-waste to collector i.
The remaining (1 − η) fraction of donors is indifferent, splitting e-waste evenly between the two
collectors. Specifically, when ti =H and t(3−i) =L, where i=1, 2, the collection quantities are given by
1 1
Qi = Q(1 + η) and Q3−i = Q(1 − η). (7)
2 2
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When both recyclers adopt the same recycling standard (i.e., t1 = t2 = H or t1 = t2 = L), all donors
are indifferent between the collectors. As a result, the two collectors split the e-waste evenly, i.e.,
Q
Q1 = Q2 = 2
. Essentially, we assume collectors achieve different market shares only when their
associated recyclers adopt different recycling standards. This assumption allows us to focus on the
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impact of recycling standards rather than ex-ante differences in market shares.
3.4 Sequence of Events

Recyclers first simultaneously choose their recycling standards, ti , then determine wholesale
prices, wi , to pay the collectors. Finally, collectors simultaneously decide the fraction of e-waste in
k
each resalable quality level k, φi , to sell in the secondary market. We apply backward induction
to characterize the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. In our analysis, we require recyclers’ unit
revenue r and scale economies factor b to be bounded so that the cost of processing e-waste and
wholesale prices are positive. The parametric assumptions are given in Online Appendix A.
4. Benchmark Scenarios
The presence of secondary-market (i.e., internal competition) and channel competition are two
salient features of our model. In this section, we study two benchmark scenarios by muting each
feature one at a time.
4.1 Benchmark 1: Absence of Channel Competition

This benchmark removes the channel (external ) competition between the recovery channels by
considering one collector and one recycler, i.e., a single recovery channel, but preserving internal
competition between the recycler and secondary market. Here, we drop the subscript i for brevity.
4.1.1 Equilibrium Decisions

In this case, all Q donors donate their e-waste to the sole collector. The collector chooses the
I II
fraction of resalable items of each quality level, φ and φ , to sell in the secondary market, leading
to the following result:
II∗
Lemma 1. Devoid of channel competition, regardless of the recycler’s choice of standard, φ >0
I∗
only if φ =1.
Lemma 1 shows that the collector would not sell any low-quality e-waste (k = II) in the secondary
market unless he first sells all his high-quality e-waste (k = I) to avoid cannibalizing those higher-
margin sales. In the proof of Lemma 1 we show that when the total e-waste quantity is sufficiently
κ
high (i.e., Q > 2βτ
) the collector sells some, but not all, of his high quality e-waste in the secondary
∈ (0, 1)). According to National Center for Electronics Recycling, approximately
I∗
market (i.e., φ
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43 lbs of e-waste is generated per capita per year (Allied Market Research 2015). Furthermore,
the e-waste market is growing at an unprecedented rate, exceeding 20% annually (Markets and
Markets 2015). Motivated by this market trend, we confine our attention in the remainder of this
section (§ 4.1) to the case where the total e-waste quantity is high (i.e., Q > κ
2βτ
). At the end of
κ
this section, we discuss the findings when Q ≤ 2βτ
.
As we show next, the recycler always chooses the low standard in the absence of channel com-
petition. Choosing the high standard would increase processing cost without affecting the e-waste
9
quantity received from the collector.
Proposition 1. Devoid of channel competition, the recycler always chooses the low standard,
∗ ∗ r−a+(1−b)(κ−2Q) I∗
i.e., t = L. The recycler sets the wholesale price w = 2−b
and the collector sells φ =
a+κ−r+2Q(1−b) II∗
2Qβτ (2−b)
(φ = 0) fraction of his high- (low-) quality e-waste in the secondary market.
4.1.2 Impact of Exogenous Factors We now consider how various exogenous factors influ-
ence the firms’ equilibrium decisions and profitability. Specifically, we focus on the impact of two
factors: total e-waste quantity (Q) and recycler scale economies (b), each of which influences firms’
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equilibrium decisions in different ways.
A growing number of U.S. states is banning disposal of electronics in municipal waste (Willard
2015, Meoli 2016), driving an increase in total e-waste donated to collectors (Allied Market Research
2015, Markets and Markets 2015). In Corollary 1, we examine how this affects (i.) resale and
11
recycling quantities, (ii.) secondary market and wholesale prices, and (iii.) profits.
Corollary 1. Devoid of channel competition:

I∗ ∗
∂qS ∂qR
i. ∂Q
> 0 iff b < 1 and ∂Q
> 0;
I∗ ∗
∂p ∂w
ii. ∂Q
< 0 iff b < 1 and ∂Q
< 0 iff b < 1;
∗ ∗
∂πC ∂πR r−a+(3−b)(1−b)κ
iii. ∂Q
< 0 iff b < 1 and Q > Q, whereas ∂Q
> 0, where Q = 2(3−b)(1−b)
.
From the collector’s perspective, an increase in Q implies receiving more high- and low-quality
e-waste. He continues to sell all the low-quality e-waste to the recycler but divides the increase in
high-quality e-waste between the recycler and the secondary market. Corollary 1 shows that this
allocation and the resultant profit hinge upon the strength of the recycler’s scale economies (b).
A recycler with weak scale economies (b < 1) is less capable of reducing her marginal processing
cost by purchasing and processing more e-waste. She, therefore, cannot justify an increase in whole-
sale price and offers the collector a lower wholesale price as Q increases. The collector nonetheless
sells the recycler some of the increase in high-quality e-waste in addition to all the increase in low-
∗
quality e-waste (i.e., qR increases). This is because selling all the increase in high-quality e-waste
I∗
to the secondary market would significantly drive down the price p in the secondary market.
Author:
When scale economies are strong (b > 1), on the other hand, the recycler can significantly reduce
her marginal processing cost by processing more e-waste. Hence, as Q increases, she offers a higher
wholesale price. In response, the collector increases his sales to the recycler more than the increase
I∗ I∗
in Q. This implies lower resale quantity (qS ) and higher secondary-market price (p ).
Though, intuitively an increase in Q would suggest higher collector profit, Corollary 1(iii.) indi-
cates the contrary when recycler scale economies are weak (b < 1) and total e-waste quantity is
sufficiently high (Q > Q). When scale economies are weak, the collector faces a trade-off between
I∗ ∗ I∗ ∗
decreased prices (p and w ) and increased quantities (qS and qR ) (Corollary 1(i.) and (ii.)). The
12
effect of decreased prices dominates when Q is sufficiently high, thereby lowering collector profit.
Considering the internal competition for e-waste between the recycler and the secondary mar-
ket, stronger scale economies (i.e., larger b) certainly give the recycler a competitive advantage
(Esenduran and Kemahlıoğlu-Ziya 2015, Gui et al. 2015). The next corollary confirms this intuition.
Corollary 2. Devoid of channel competition:

I∗ ∗
∂qS ∂qR
i. ∂b
< 0 and ∂b
> 0;
I∗ ∗
∂p ∂w
ii. ∂b
> 0 and ∂b
> 0;
∗ ∗
∂πC ∂πR
iii. ∂b
> 0 and ∂b
> 0.
Ceteris paribus, stronger scale economies lower the recycler’s cost, allowing her to offer a higher
wholesale price. This benefits both firms because the recycler receives more e-waste, while the col-
lector’s profit margin increases. Notably, we find that as b increases, the increase in wholesale price
∂(a−bqR )
∗ ∗
equals the decrease in the recycler’s average unit processing cost (i.e., ∣ ∂w
∂b
∣=∣ ∂b
∣). Specifically,
the recycler passes her entire reduction in processing cost to the collector in exchange for higher
quantity. This, however, changes in the presence of channel competition, as we will demonstrate.
κ
The above discussion focused on the case when Q> 2βτ . The full characterization of the solution
κ
when Q≤ 2βτ is omitted here for brevity (available from the authors). In that case, we find that the
∗
optimal choice of recycling standard remains the same (i.e., t =L) and our results on exogenous
factors directionally carry over. In addition, when the recycler’s per-unit revenue r is high, the
I∗ II∗
equilibrium remains the same (i.e., φ ∈(0, 1) and φ =0). When r is sufficiently low, the collector
I∗ II∗
also sells some low-quality items (i.e., φ =1 and φ >0) in the secondary market. Here, we find
that as the fraction of high-quality e-waste β increases, the collector sells more high-quality items in
the secondary market, increasing profit. The total quantity of e-waste sold to the recycler, however,
remains unchanged in β. Therefore, the wholesale price and the recycler’s profit are invariant in β.
Author:
4.2 Benchmark 2: Absence of Internal Competition

In this benchmark, we consider two competing recovery channels devoid of a secondary market,
thereby removing the internal competition between the recycler and the secondary market.
4.2.1 Equilibrium Decisions Without a secondary market, each collector sells all his e-waste
of any quality to his recycler, given that trash disposal is banned (Willard 2015, Meoli 2016). Facing
no secondary-market competition, the recyclers set wholesale prices to zero, leaving no profit for
the collectors. The following lemma formalizes this result:
∗
Lemma 2. Devoid of internal competition, recycler i sets wholesale price wi = 0 and collector i
k∗
sells all the donated e-waste to recycler i (i.e., φi = 0 for k = I, II) for i = 1, 2 regardless of the
recyclers’ equilibrium recycling standard choice.
In the next proposition, we characterize recyclers’ equilibrium choice of standard.

η(2r−2a+bQ(2−η))
Proposition 2. Devoid of internal competition, two thresholds e1 = 2
and e2 =
η(2r−2a+bQ(2+η))
2(1+η)
exist s.t. the recyclers’ equilibrium choice of standard is as follows:
i. If e ≤ min{e1 , e2 } then (t1 , t2 ) = (H, H),
∗ ∗
ii. If e ≥ max{e1 , e2 } then (t1 , t2 ) = (L, L),

∗ ∗
then (t1 , t2 )={(H, H), (L, L)} and otherwise (t1 , t2 )={(H, L), (L, H)}.
2(r−a) ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
iii. Otherwise, if b≤ ηQ
Recall that e shows a recycler’s additional per-unit processing cost when she chooses the high
standard. Thus, Proposition 2 and Figure 2 show that both recyclers choose the high standard
in equilibrium only when e is sufficiently low. In that case, a recycler unilaterally choosing the
low standard enjoys a lower processing cost at the expense of receiving less e-waste than under
the high standard. The disadvantage dominates when e is sufficiently low, hence (H,H) becomes
equilibrium. When e is sufficiently high, however, both recyclers choose the low standard and (L,L)
arises as equilibrium.
For moderate levels of cost differential e, the recyclers’ choice of standard depends on the strength
2(r−a)
of scale economies. Specifically, when they are weak (b ≤ Qη
), both (H,H) and (L,L) arise as
equilibria. The former, however, is Pareto-dominated by the latter because both recyclers achieve
2(r−a)
higher profits under the (L,L) outcome. When the scale economies are strong (b> Qη
), (H,L) and
(L,H) arise as equilibria. In this case, choosing the low standard helps one recycler in lowering cost
because she does not pay the cost differential e. On the other hand, choosing the high standard
allows the other recycler to leverage both strong scale economies and a higher e-waste quantity to
mitigate the adverse impact of the cost differential e.
Author:
Figure 2 Illustration of recyclers’ equilibrium choices of recycling standards in the absence of internal competition
4.2.2 Impact of Exogenous Factors As total e-waste donations (Q) increase, the recyclers –
facing no secondary-market competition – receive all units, thus earn higher profits. For the same
reason, the strength of scale economies (b) have no effect on the recycling quantity. As expected,
however, the recyclers’ profits increase with it. These results are formalized below. Lastly, neither Q
nor b affects the wholesale prices or collector profits (cf. Lemma 2).
Corollary 3. Devoid of internal competition, under each equilibrium choice of recycling standard
∗ ∗
∂qRi ∂qRi
i. ∂Q
> 0 and ∂b
= 0,
∗ ∗
∂πRi ∂πRi
ii. ∂Q
> 0 and ∂b
> 0, for i = 1, 2.
Finally, in the absence of both internal and external competition, we show that a recycler always
13
chooses the low standard. These benchmark scenarios show that the competition type (channel
or internal) affects the recycling standard choice as well as the impact of the exogenous factors.
How do firms’ decisions change in the presence of both recovery channel competition and internal
competition from a secondary market? We address this question in the following sections.
5. Competing Recovery Channels with Secondary Market

In this section, we analyze the model described in § 3 with two recovery channels (channel compe-
tition) and a secondary market (internal competition). These two elements jointly lead to several
new findings.
5.1 Equilibrium Decisions

We derive the firms’ equilibrium decisions using backward induction. First, we identify the rela-
tionship between the sales of different quality levels in the secondary market.
Lemma 3. Under both channel and internal competition, regardless of the recyclers’ choice of
II∗ I∗
standard, φi > 0 only if φi = 1 for i = 1, 2.
Author:
As with our finding in the absence of channel competition (Lemma 1), we show that a collector
would not sell any low-quality e-waste (k=II) in the secondary market unless he first sells all his
high-quality e-waste (k =I). In the proof of Lemma 3, we also show that when the total e-waste
2κ
quantity is sufficiently high (Q > βτ (1−η)
), each collector sells some, but not all, of his high-quality
e-waste in the secondary market (i.e., φi ∈ (0, 1)). Hence, no low quality e-waste is sold in this
I∗
II∗
market (i.e., φi =0). In the remainder of this section, we confine our analysis to the case of high
14
e-waste quantity (i.e., Q > βτ2κ
(1−η)
), given real-world trends. First, we characterize the subgame
perfect equilibrium decisions for each possible choice of recycling standard.
Proposition 3. Under both channel and internal competition, equilibrium decisions are as follows:
i. When both recyclers choose the same standard (t1 =t2 ), for i=1, 2, recycler i sets wholesale price
∗ 12(r−a−i )+(3−4b)(2k−3Q) I∗ 4(a+κ+i −r)+(3−4b)Q II∗
wi = 2(9−4b)Q
, and collector i sells φi = (9−4b)Qτ β
(φi = 0) fraction of high-
(low-) quality e-waste in the secondary market, where i =e if ti =H and i =0 otherwise;
ii. When one recycler chooses the high standard while the other chooses the low standard (ti =H and
∗ θ1 −θ2 −16(3−2b)e ∗ θ +θ2 −4(3−4b)e
t3−i =L, for i=1, 2), the recyclers set wholesale prices wi = 2(9−4b)(5−4b)
and w3−i = 12(9−4b)(5−4b) ;
I∗
2 3 θ +θ +4(7−4b)e I∗ θ3 −θ2 −8e
the collectors sell φi = (9−4b)(5−4b)Qτ β(1+η)
and φ3−i = (9−4b)(5−4b)Qτ β(1−η)
fractions of high-quality e-
II∗ II∗
waste and φi = φ3−i = 0 fraction of low-quality e-waste in the secondary market, where θ1 =
(5 − 4b)(12(r−a)−(3−4b)(3Q−2κ)), θ2 =(9−4b)(3−4b)Qη, and θ3 =(5−4b)(Q(3−4b)−4(r−κ−a)).
From Proposition 3, when both recyclers choose the high standard (t1 = t2 = H), they incur
additional unit processing costs i = e, thus set lower wholesale prices. In response, collectors sell
more e-waste in the secondary market than they would have were both recyclers to have chosen
the low standard (t1 = t2 = L). This finding implies that high-standard adoption entails a decrease
in recycling quantity but an increase in secondary-market sales.
To facilitate our understanding of recyclers’ equilibrium choice of standard, as characterized in
Proposition 4, we first examine how the cost differential (e) affects the quantities and wholesale
price when the recyclers choose different recycling standards.
Corollary 4. When each recycler chooses a different standard (ti = H and t3−i = L, for i =
1, 2), the recycling quantities and wholesale price change in cost differential e as follows:
∗ ∗ ∗
∂wi ∂qRi ∂qR(3−i)
{ ∂e
> 0, ∂e
> 0, and ∂e
< 0} iff b > 54 .
As the cost differential (e) increases, a high-standard recycler logically would pass on this increase
to her collector by offering a lower wholesale price. The above corollary, however, shows this not to
be the case when scale economies are strong (i.e., b > 54 ). Under this condition, the high-standard
∗ ∗
recycler is incentivized to increase her wholesale price (wi ) to gain more e-waste (qRi ) and offset
Author:
the increase in e. The collector, in turn, sells less to the secondary market. As a result, secondary-
market sales become more attractive to the competing collector who works with the low-standard
∗
recycler. The e-waste quantity the low-standard recycler can purchase from her collector (qR(3−i) )
thus decreases as e increases.
Next, we use the firms’ decisions given in Proposition 3 to determine recycler profits and charac-
terize equilibrium recycling standard choices. Interestingly, we find that both recyclers may choose
the high standard when the cost differential (e) is high.
(9−4b)Qη
Proposition 4. Under both channel and internal competition, a threshold ē = (14−8b)
exists such
∗ ∗
that the recyclers’ equilibrium choice of standard (t1 , t2 ) is as follows:
(H, H) if e < ē
i. If b < 54 , then (t1 , t2 ) = {
∗ ∗
(L, L) if e > ē
(L, L) if e < ē
ii. If b > 45 , then (t1 , t2 ) = {
∗ ∗
(H, H) if e > ē
iii. If e = ē, then there are multiple equilibria: (t1 , t2 ) = (t1 , t2 ) where t1 , t2 ∈ {H, L}.
∗ ∗
Lastly, the recyclers encounter a prisoner’s dilemma when (t1 , t2 ) = (H, H).
∗ ∗
Proposition 4 and Figure 3 show that when recyclers’ scale economies are strong (b > 54 ), the
impact of the cost differential (e) on recycling standard choice is the opposite of that under weak
scale economies (b < 54 ). We call this structural property #1 of the equilibrium and it is driven by
the reversed impact of e on firms’ decisions under the asymmetric outcome (i.e., (H,L)) as Corollary
15
4 shows. We elaborate on this finding below.
Figure 3 Illustration of recyclers’ equilibrium choices of recycling standards
Proposition 4(i.) shows that when recyclers’ scale economies are weak (b < 54 ) and the cost
differential is sufficiently low (e < ē), both recyclers choose the high standard (i.e., (t1 , t2 )=(H,H))
∗ ∗
Author:
despite its higher cost. This is because a recycler – recycler 2, for example – in unilaterally choosing
the low standard receives less e-waste than were both recyclers to choose the high standard (as
Equation (7) shows). As e increases, however, recycler 2 finds unilateral deviation to the low
standard more attractive. This is because, in the outcome (H,L), the decrease in her e-waste
∗
∂qRi
quantity is mitigated (as shown in Corollary 4 that ∂e
> 0 iff b < 54 ). Hence, when e is sufficiently
high (e > ē), both recyclers choose the low standard, and (L,L) outcome becomes equilibrium.
In stark contrast, Proposition 4(ii.) shows that when the scale economies are strong (b > 54 ),
both recyclers choose the high standard if the cost differential is high (e > ē). Here, a recycler
unilaterally deviating to a low standard receives less e-waste. This decrease in e-waste quantity is
∗
∂qR2
more pronounced when e is high ( ∂e
<0 if b> 54 from Corollary 4). Under a low cost differential
16
(e<ē), this decrease is mitigated, making deviation to the low standard attractive.
This discussion ultimately implies that recyclers with strong scale economies (usually large orga-
nizations) would be more likely to adopt e-Stewards when it is more stringent (i.e., has a higher cost
differential e). On the contrary, recyclers with weak scale economies (usually small and medium-
sized firms) would adopt e-Stewards when it has a lower cost differential. Our findings, therefore,
imply that subsidizing such recyclers by alleviating the cost differential might effectively encourage
17
e-Stewards adoption.
Another interesting property of the equilibrium is that the threshold on cost differential ē (given
in Proposition 4) is increasing in scale economies factor b (see Figure 3). We call this structural
5
property #2 and it implies the following: When b < 4
(b > 54 ), as b increases a recycler is less (more)
likely to deviate from the (H,H) outcome, making it more (less) likely to be equilibrium. Consider
5
a recycler – recycler 2, for example – deviating from the (H,H) outcome. When b < 4
such deviation
becomes less attractive as b increases, because the decrease in her e-waste quantity would be more
5
pronounced. However, when b > 4
the decrease in her e-waste quantity is mitigated as b increases.
That is because, in the resulting (H,L) outcome recycler 2, having a substantially lower wholesale
price than recycler 1, has more room to increase her wholesale price as b increases, mitigating the
decrease in e-waste quantity procured.
Note that when the cost differential e has a moderate value (see Figure 3) the two structural
properties combined lead to a non-monotonic transition in the equilibrium as scale economies
factor b increases (i.e., the equilibrium moves from (L,L) to (H,H) and then to (L,L) again). This
finding has an interesting implication for the policy makers: When the cost differential is moderate,
incentivizing recyclers to achieve stronger scale economies may cause them to adopt R2 instead of
e-Stewards.
Author:
It is also worth nothing that the threshold on cost differential ē increases with η, the fraction of
environmentally conscious donors. Therefore, recyclers with weak scale economies (b < 54 ) are more
likely to choose the high standard (i.e., in a larger parametric space) as η increases. This is because,
as η increases, deviating to the low standard results in a higher decrease in e-waste procured. In
contrast, recyclers with strong scale economies (b > 54 ) are less likely to choose the high standard
(i.e., in a smaller parametric space) as η increases. Suppose recycler 2 deviates from the (H,H)
equilibrium: She would receive a lower e-waste quantity under the resulting (H,L) outcome, but this
reduction is mitigated as η increases. This is because the high-standard recycler’s wholesale price
decreases with η (cf. Proposition 3), resulting in her collector selling more e-waste in the secondary
market. This incentivizes the competing collector (i.e., collector 2) to increase sales to her recycler
(i.e., low-standard recycler). Hence, as η increases, deviating to the low standard becomes more
appealing for recyclers.
Finally, Proposition 4 also shows that recyclers face a prisoner’s dilemma when they both choose
the high standard. Here, profits are strictly higher under the (L,L) outcome than under the (H,H)
outcome (due to a lower processing cost in the former). Under the (H,H) equilibrium, however,
neither recycler would unilaterally deviate to the low standard, seeking to avoid a decrease in
e-waste quantity.
5.2 Impact of Exogenous Factors

We now analyze the impact of total e-waste quantity and recyclers’ scale economies on (i.) resale
and recycling quantities, (ii ) secondary market and wholesale prices, and (iii.) profits.
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
Corollary 5. Under the equilibrium choices of recycling standard (t1 =t2 =H or t1 =t2 =L):
I∗ ∗
∂qSi 3 ∂qRi
i. ∂Q
> 0 iff b < 4
and ∂Q > 0;
I∗ ∗
∂p ∂w
ii. ∂Q
< 0 iff b < 34 and ∂Qi < 0 iff b < 34 ;
∗ ∗
∂πCi 3 ∂πRi
iii. ∂Q
< 0 iff b < 4
and Q > Q, whereas ∂Q
> 0, for i=1, 2.
Comparing Corollary 5 with our benchmark results (i.e., Corollaries 1 and 3 in the absence
of channel and internal competition, respectively), we observe that the impact, if any, of higher
e-waste quantity Q directionally remains the same amid both channel and internal competition.
While an increase in total e-waste quantity Q does not affect collector profit in the absence of
internal competition (a collector always earns zero profit), a collector is more likely to benefit under
both channel and internal competition than in the absence of channel competition. This is evident
18
as collector profit decreases in a smaller parameter range.
Intuitively, stronger scale economies can increase recycler profitability. The next result, however,
shows that they may harm recyclers in the presence of both channel and internal competition.
Author:
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
Corollary 6. Under the equilibrium choices of recycling standard (t1 =t2 =H or t1 =t2 =L):
I∗ ∗
∂qSi ∂qRi
i. ∂b
< 0 and ∂b
> 0;
I∗ ∗
∂p ∂wi
ii. ∂b
> 0 and ∂b
> 0;
∗ ∗
∂πCi ∂πRi
iii. ∂b
> 0, whereas ∂b
< 0 iff b > 34 , for i = 1, 2.
Corollary 6(iii.) shows that an increase in b lowers a recycler’s profit when the scale economies
are sufficiently strong (b> 34 ). This is in direct contrast to the finding under the benchmark scenar-
ios, where stronger scale economies always increase a recycler’s profit (Corollaries 2 and 3). We,
therefore, observe that the presence of both channel and internal competition undermines the ben-
efits of scale economies. Specifically, as b increases, both recyclers increase wholesale prices more
than they would in the absence of either competition. Consequently, the wholesale price increase
∂(a−bqR )
∗ ∗
is higher than the reduction in recyclers’ unit processing cost (i.e., ∣ ∂w
∂b
∣>∣ ∂b
∣). The overall
impact on recycler profit, therefore, depends on the tradeoff between per-unit margin decrease and
e-waste quantity increase. The former dominates when b is sufficiently high.
6. Recycling Standard Choice: Welfare Implications

In this section, we adopt a social planner’s perspective and examine how the choice of recycling
standard affects social welfare. Following the literature (e.g., Atasu et al. 2009, Esenduran et al.
2016), we define social welfare as W = Π + E + S, where Π = ∑i=1 (πCi + πRi ) is the total recovery
2
channel profit, E is the total economic value of environmental benefit from recovery channel activ-
ities, and S is the total consumer surplus. First, we analyze these welfare components individually,
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
then compare them under the equilibrium choices of recycling standards (t1 = t2 = H or t1 = t2 = L).
Environmental Benefit. Using life-cycle analysis, a classic approach for assessing the environ-
mental impact of a product, we can identify the environmental benefit from end-of-life treatment
alternatives such as recycling, donation, and disposal of e-waste (Huisman et al. 2001). Further-
more, the economic value of this environmental benefit can be calculated (Atasu et al. 2009),
which we refer to as “environmental benefit” hereafter for brevity. We follow the literature (e.g.,
Atasu et al. 2009) and assume that the environmental benefit from each recycled waste unit is
constant and known, which is denoted by λH (λL ) for recycling one item at an e-Stewards (R2)
certified recycler. Given the more stringent requirements of e-Stewards certification, we assume
that λH > λL . Sales of used electronics in the secondary market – compared to disposal– also help
with resource and raw material conservation (EPA 2013). We, therefore, assume the environmental
benefit achieved by resale of each item in the secondary market is λS ≥ 0.
To sum up, the total environmental benefit the recovery channels achieve through recycling and
secondary market use is as follows:
Author:
2 2 ∗
(t1 ,t2 )
∗ ∗ λH if ti = H
= ∑ λi qRi + λS ∑ (qSi + qSi ) where λi = {
∗ I∗ II∗
E ∗ (8)
i=1 i=1
λL if ti = L
The next lemma identifies the difference between environmental benefits achieved under the
recyclers’ choices of a low or high standard.
. Then ∆E >0 if and only if 2e(λL−λS ) > (λH −λL )(3Q−2a−2κ+2r−2e).

LL HH
Lemma 4. Let ∆E =E −E
Interestingly, Lemma 4 shows that the environmental benefit may be higher when both recyclers
choose the low (R2), as opposed to high (e-Stewards), standard. Under the low standard, recyclers
purchase and recycle more e-waste because of higher wholesale prices (cf. Proposition 3) than
under the high standard. This implies that less e-waste is sold in the secondary market. When
the per-unit environmental benefit from recycling under the low standard is higher than that from
secondary market use (i.e., λL − λS > 0), this recycling increase results in an environmental gain
under the low standard. This is captured by the left-hand side of the condition in Lemma 4. On
the other hand, recycling under the low standard results in a loss in environmental benefit due to
the amount of e-waste that would be recycled even under the high standard (because λH > λL ).
The right-hand side of the condition in the lemma denotes this loss. When the gain is higher than
the loss, higher environmental benefit is achieved under the low-standard choice.
Environmentalists and NGOs generally support e-Stewards as it has stricter recycling require-
ments (ETC 2010). Although the per-unit environmental benefit is higher under e-Stewards than
R2, our results show that R2 may indeed yield a higher total environmental benefit because of the
higher recycling volume achieved.
Consumer Surplus and Recovery Channel Profits. In our context, consumers are those in
the secondary market, and their surplus S is the surplus of high-quality e-waste buyers (k = I) plus
the surplus of low-quality e-waste buyers (k = II):
I II
p −p
κ
(t1 ,t2 )
∗ ∗ 1−α
= ∫ pI −pII (v − p )dv + ∫ pII (αv − p )dv
I II
S
1−α α
(∑i=1 qSi ) + α(∑i=1 qSi ) + 2α(∑i=1 qSi )(∑i=1 qSi )

2 I∗ 2 2 II∗ 2 2 I∗ 2 II∗
= (9)
2
When both recyclers choose the low standard, the total secondary-market sales quantity is lower,
thus prices are higher. Therefore, secondary-market consumers achieve a lower surplus.
Turning our attention to recovery channel profits, we know that the recyclers earn higher profits
when both choose the low standard (cf. Proposition 3). The same holds, we find, for the collectors.
This is intuitive as both secondary-market and wholesale prices are higher under the low-standard
choice. The following lemma formalizes these observations.
Author:
LL HH LL HH
Lemma 5. Let ∆S = S −S and ∆P = Π −Π . Then ∆S < 0 and ∆P > 0.
Next we ask ourselves whether higher recovery channel profits under the low-standard choice
compensate for the lower consumer surplus. In the proof of Lemma 5, we show that this is the case
(i.e., ∆S + ∆P > 0) when the secondary market size κ is sufficiently small, as would be the loss from
secondary-market transactions.
Social Welfare. Finally, we combine all welfare components and identify how social welfare com-
pares under different equilibrium recycling standard choices. Our next result shows that total
welfare might indeed be higher when recyclers choose the low standard.
LL HH
Proposition 5. Let ∆W = W −W . Then ∆W > 0 iff 2e(λL −λS ) > (λH −λL )(3Q−2a−2κ + 2r −2) −
(9−4b)
2
(∆S + ∆P ).
Naturally, we find that the condition for higher welfare under the low standard (similar to that
for higher environmental benefit) requires the per-unit environmental benefit from low-standard
recycling to be higher than that from secondary-market use (i.e., λL −λS >0). The additional per-
unit environmental benefit achieved under the high standard (i.e., λH −λL ), moreover, must be
sufficiently low. When the higher profits compensate for a lower surplus under the low-standard
choice (i.e., ∆S + ∆P > 0), the condition in Proposition 5 is more lax than that under Lemma 4.
This implies that, even when the environmental benefit is lower under the low-standard choice,
total welfare might be higher.
7. Extensions
In this section, we extend the model given in § 3 in several directions. We confirm that all of
our key insights continue to hold in these extensions, so the following discussion will focus on the
additional insights. As before, we confine our discussion to the case in which Q is sufficiently large,
hence collectors sell only some of their high-quality items in the secondary market.
7.1 Each Recycler working with Multiple Collectors

In practice, a recycler generally acquires e-waste from multiple collectors. In this section, we extend
our model given in § 3 by allowing each recycler to purchase e-waste from a mutually exclusive
set of n collectors (as discussed before, a collector generally works only with one recycler). Since
n identical collectors work with one recycler and e-waste donors are indifferent between these
k
Qi Qi
collectors, each collector receives n
units of e-waste donation (with n
units for quality level k,
k ∈ {I, II, III}). As in the base model, each collector i chooses the fraction of e-waste at each
resalable quality level to sell in the secondary market. We provide further details of the model,
Author:
including the firm’s profit functions in Online Appendix B. Full characterization of the equilibrium
is available from the authors upon request. Note that the model in § 3 is a special case with n = 1.
While the structure of the equilibrium remains the same as shown in Figure 3 – naturally with
more intricate thresholds on b and e (available from the authors) – we find that both thresholds
decrease with n. In other words, as the recyclers work with more collectors, they are more likely to
choose the low (high) standard when scale economies are weak (strong). In addition to our earlier
insights for n = 1, we find that the value of having stronger scale economies deteriorates as each
recycler works with more collectors. Recall that an increase in scale economies (b) might benefit
the recyclers when n = 1 (Corollary 6). However, we find that it always hurts the recyclers when
n ≥ 2. This is because, with more collectors (i.e., larger n), as b increases, the recyclers offer higher
wholesale prices, thereby lowering equilibrium profits. We also show that as n increases, an increase
in Q becomes less likely to hurt collector profits.
7.2 Asymmetric Recyclers

Thus far, we have assumed that competing recovery channels have the same cost structure. Recy-
clers in practice, however, may have different cost structures. Scale economies, for example, may
vary across recyclers depending on the scale of operations and employee experience. The additional
cost of processing under e-Stewards may be different across recyclers because their processes may
start off with different environmental efficiencies. In this section, we numerically investigate sce-
narios in which recyclers either have different scale economies (§ 7.2.1) or cost differentials when
choosing e-Stewards (§ 7.2.2).
Consistent with § 5, we consider in our numerical studies only practically relevant cases in which
a recycler incurs a positive cost in processing e-waste and pays a positive wholesale price. When
available, we use parameters based on practical data and/or literature. Specifically, the cost of e-
waste recycling is reported to range between $500 and $1500 per ton (e.g., ERP 2005). Expressing
the cost values in $/kg, we use processing cost a∈[0.5, 1.5]. We also choose the same range for the
recyclers’ revenue, r ∈ [0.5, 1.5], because revenue depends on commodity price, which can exceed
or lag processing cost (Szczepanski 2016). For any given r, we consider κ ∈ [r, 5r] to reflect our
practical observation that an item’s secondary-market sales value is higher than its recycling value.
Empirical data show that approximately 21% of the U.S. population has adopted eco-friendly
behaviors (NMI 2013). We consider η ∈[0, 0.4] to allow for up to twice as many environmentally
conscious donors. No public data exist on the cost differential e for adopting the costlier e-Stewards
standard. However, a recycler estimated in our interview that its processing cost would increase by
approximately 10% were it to switch from R2 to e-Stewards. We allow for a larger range for such a
Author:
cost increase, thus we assume that e is up to 40% of the highest unit processing cost a, translating
to e∈[0, 0.6]. We also consider scale economies factor b∈[0.01, 1.49] and the total amount of e-waste
I∗
Q∈[0.5, 1.5] so that interior solutions exist (i.e., φi ∈(0, 1)) and marginal processing cost is positive.
7.2.1 Asymmetric Scale Economies In this section, we allow for different levels of recycler
scale economies. A recycler, for example, might observe stronger scale economies if her facilities are
more capital intensive than a competitor’s. Specifically, let bi denote recycler i’s scale economies
for i = 1, 2, where b1 and b2 can take different values. Our analysis in § 5, therefore, is a special case
of this extension with b1 = b2 = b. We numerically solve the recyclers’ and collectors’ problems and
confirm that the key insights in §5 continue to hold.
Figure 4 Equilibrium Choices of Recycling Standards when (a) bi < 5/4 and (b) bi > 5/4 for i = 1, 2; and e = 0.05,
r = 1.4, Q = 0.9, κ = 1.7, a = 0.8, β = 0.9, τ = 1 (The figure only shows the regions where interior solutions
exist and the marginal processing cost is positive).
Figures 4(a) and (b) provide the recyclers’ equilibrium choice of standard under weak (i.e.,
bi < 5/4) and strong (i.e., bi > 5/4) scale economies, respectively (note that 5/4 is the threshold
19
value for b identified in Proposition 4). Figure 4 clearly shows that recyclers with asymmetric
scale economies may choose different standards in equilibrium.
In Figure 4(a), if b1 and b2 are sufficiently low, low scale economies cannot justify the cost of
the high standard, leading to low-standard adoption. When one recycler has significantly higher
scale economies by comparison, we find, surprisingly, that the other recycler would choose the high
standard (e.g., (H,L) equilibrium arises when b2 ≫b1 ). This is because the recycler with low scale
economies cannot match her competitor’s wholesale price, thus she adopts the high standard to
attract e-waste from environmentally conscious donors. Finally, when both recyclers have moderate
Author:
scale economies (approaching the 5/4 threshold), both choose the high standard. In this case,
unilaterally deviating to the low standard is not attractive as received e-waste quantity would
decrease significantly.
Figure 4(b) depicts the equilibrium when both recyclers have relatively strong scale economies.
With scale economies approaching the 5/4 threshold, as in the lower-left quadrant, both choose
the high standard, as explained above. When one recycler has significantly higher scale economies,
the other (with relatively lower scale economies) chooses the low standard (e.g., (L,H) equilibrium
arises when b2 ≫ b1 ) to avoid paying the cost differential and leverage high wholesale prices for
e-waste intake. Here, stronger scale economies than in Figure 4(a) make offering a higher wholesale
price a better strategy than choosing the high standard. For the same reason, both recyclers choose
the low standard when they have significantly strong scale economies. Finally, we also find the
impact of cost differential e on equilibrium consistent with Figure 3: When b < 1.25 (b > 1.25) both
recyclers are more (less) likely to choose the low-standard as e increases.
7.2.2 Asymmetric Cost Differential for Choosing the e-Stewards Standard Firms’
management policies and operational processes may lead to different additional processing costs for
adopting e-Stewards. In this section, we consider such a differential. Specifically, we denote recycler
i’s cost differential when she chooses the high standard with ei , and assume e1 > e2 without loss
of generality. Choosing the low standard still does not incur any additional processing cost. We
numerically solve the recyclers’ and collectors’ problems and characterize the recyclers’ equilibrium
standard choices. As in § 7.2.1, we find that recyclers may choose different standards in equilibrium.
Therefore, we identify asymmetric cost for choosing the high standard as another potential driver
for the different standard choices observed in practice.
As shown in Figure 5, a key distinction from § 7.2.1 is that only three equilibrium outcomes
occur in this case. Outcome (H,L) never emerges as an equilibrium because recycler 1 incurs a
comparably higher cost for choosing the high standard than recycler 2, resultantly never choosing
20
it when her competitor finds it unattractive. When the cost differentials for adopting the high
standard are sufficiently small for both recyclers, they both choose it. When e1 is high, recycler 1
chooses the low standard regardless of her competitor’s choice. When e1 is high but e2 is relatively
low, recycler 2 chooses the high standard to attract more e-waste from environmentally conscious
donors. When e2 is high, however, the high standard becomes unattractive.
8. Conclusions
We examine recyclers’ choice between two standards, e-Stewards and R2, in the presence of a
secondary market and two types of competition. While the secondary market offers collectors an
Author:
Figure 5 Equilibrium Choices of Recycling Standard when e1 > e2 , b = 0.3, r = 1.4, Q = 0.9, κ = 2, η = 0.3, a = 0.2,
β =0.8, τ =1 (showing only the regions where interior solutions exist and the marginal processing cost is
positive).
alternative source of revenue, it also creates competition for recyclers seeking e-waste. This inter-
nal competition within a recovery channel is generally accompanied by an external competition
between recovery channels (i.e., channel competition). We investigate the impact of these compet-
itive dynamics on recyclers’ pricing strategy, collectors’ e-waste allocation decisions, and recyclers’
equilibrium choice of standard, as summarized in Table 2. Our findings lead to several insights for
policy makers and NGOs, as well as recovery-channel firms.
8.1 Insights for Policy Makers and NGOs

Policy makers and NGOs generally support e-Stewards as it imposes more stringent requirements
on recyclers (ETC 2010). Our findings show that channel competition is a key factor motivating
e-Stewards adoption; a recycler always chooses R2 in its absence (see Table 2). Otherwise stated,
channel competition can drive recyclers to adopt a more stringent standard, resulting in more
responsible e-waste handling. Policy makers seeking to encourage e-Stewards adoption, therefore,
should focus on lowering entry barriers for new recyclers to induce channel competition.
Channel competition alone, however, is insufficient to promote e-Stewards adoption. We find that,
amid channel competition, the existence of internal competition becomes a key factor in driving the
choice of standard (see Table 2). Specifically, when recyclers face no internal competition (i.e., no
secondary market), they choose e-Stewards only when its cost disadvantage (i.e., cost differential)
is low. When internal competition exists, however, the result is reversed if the recyclers’ scale
economies are strong: They choose e-Stewards only if its cost disadvantage is high. Therefore, the
impact of cost on the choice of standard may be opposite depending on the recyclers’ strength of
processing scale economies. Policy makers should note that incentive programs and subsidies aiming
Author:
Table 2 Summary of Recyclers’ Choice of Recycling Standards

Without Channel Competition With Channel Competition
Without
R2 e-Stewards iff
Internal
- its cost disadvantage is low
Competition
e-Stewards iff
- its cost disadvantage is low and processing
With Internal R2 scale economies are weak or,
Competition
- its cost disadvantage is high and processing
scale economies are strong
to encourage e-Stewards adoption by alleviating its cost disadvantage would be most effective when
no internal competition exists or when recyclers have weak scale economies.
We observe that in some U.S. states, including Minnesota, Virginia, and Kentucky, their recyclers
21
choose the same standard. In states such as Maryland, New Jersey, Ohio, and Illinois, however,
their recyclers choose different standards. Through a numerical extension, we find that differences
in recyclers’ scale economies or the cost disadvantage in adopting e-Stewards may influence such
divergent choices. Interestingly, we observe that when both recyclers enjoy strong scale economies,
the one with stronger scale economies would choose R2. That is because she can offer a higher
price and attract more e-waste even without adopting e-Stewards. This observation implies that
recyclers with relatively smaller capacities, hence lower scale economies, would be more likely to
adopt e-Stewards than their larger competitors.
While e-Stewards is more stringent than R2 and generates higher environmental benefit from
each recycled item, we find that a higher total environmental benefit and improved welfare may
be achieved when recyclers choose R2 over e-Stewards. By incurring lower costs, these recyclers
can afford to purchase and recycle more e-waste than they would under e-Stewards. This leads to
lower secondary-market sales and a higher total environmental benefit when recycling under R2
has a sufficiently higher environmental benefit than secondary-market use. Taken together, these
findings should encourage NGOs and environmentalists to exercise caution in favoring e-Stewards.
The impact of total recycling volume and relative environmental impacts achieved from recycling
versus secondary market use should be taken into consideration before doing so. Furthermore, our
findings show that even when the environmental benefit achieved under e-Stewards adoption is
higher, total welfare may be higher under R2 adoption.
8.2 Insights for Firms

Our results offer a number of useful insights for recovery-channel firms. Global e-waste volumes
have risen to a record 45 million tons in recent years (Baldé et al. 2017). Would this unprecedented
Author:
growth be profitable for recovery-channel firms? We find that an increase in e-waste quantity may,
indeed, hurt collector profitability. This occurs especially when the e-waste quantity in the mar-
ketplace is already large and recyclers’ scale economies are weak. In this case, both wholesale and
secondary-market prices drop as e-waste quantity continues to grow, ultimately hurting collectors.
Recyclers, on the other hand, always benefit from growth in e-waste quantity.
Considering a recycler’s processes in isolation, scale economies are vital for reducing recycling
cost (Tsamis and Coyne 2015). It is unclear, however, if stronger scale economies always yield higher
recycler profits. We find this is the case only with internal or external (channel) competition. The
value of scale economies for recyclers, however, erodes when both internal and channel competition
exist. When recyclers have strong scale economies, intense competition results in significantly higher
wholesale prices, harming recycler profits. Our findings thus suggest that recyclers should exercise
caution and account for competition when investing in process efficiency improvements.
Acknowledgements: The first three authors were equal contributors to this work, and their names are listed
in alphabetical order. The authors are grateful to the department editor, Professor Hau Lee, the anonymous
associate editor, and three anonymous reviewers. Their constructive comments significantly improved the
paper. The authors also thank Professor Cheryl Gaimon, seminar participants at Hong Kong University
of Science and Technology, Early Career Sustainable Operations Management Workshop, the University
of Tennessee, and Georgia Institute of Technology, for their helpful comments and suggestions. The last
co-author has been supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China [Grant 71631006].
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Notes
1
A detailed comparison of the two certification programs is available at http://e-stewards.org/learn-more/
for-enterprises/overview/the-e-stewards-difference/.
2
A comprehensive list of the e-Stewards enterprise is available at http://e-stewards.org/learn-more/
for-enterprises/overview/current-enterprises/.
3
According to data retrieved from the e-Stewards (http://e-stewards.org/find-a-recycler/) and R2 websites
(https://sustainableelectronics.orgrespectively.) on February 2, 2018. For e-Stewards, our search includes
facilities providing recycling services. For R2, our search includes facilities providing “commodity/raw material pro-
cessor” and “separated electronic components” services.
4
Similar inverse demand models capturing competition between a product and its lower-quality substitute are
common in the closed-loop supply chain literature (e.g., Ferguson and Toktay 2006, Örsdemir et al. 2014).
5
We consider collectors who accept donations of any electronics. We acknowledge that some specialized collectors,
mostly online (e.g., Gazelle, NextWorth, MaxBac, Swappa) and some retailers (e.g., Best Buy and Amazon) pay
consumers for used electronics. However, they accept limited categories/models (e.g., cellphones, tablets and smart
watches) or relatively new products (e.g., newer than iPhone 4). The existing literature studying this type of collector
(e.g., Guide et al. 2003, Cole et al. 2017) primarily focuses on remanufacturing/refurbishing, the operations of which
are quite different and outside the scope of our problem.
6
Our interviews with recyclers revealed they generally are certified by one of the two standards to stay competitive.
Although our model is general enough to capture cases in which each recycler chooses whether to be certified at all,
or to be certified with both, we focus only on the choice between the two standards for brevity.
7
The impact of the fixed cost on recyclers’ equilibrium choice of standard is intuitive. Specifically, we find that
the recyclers will choose a standard in a smaller parameter range if its fixed cost is higher than the other standard.
Nevertheless, considering the fixed cost does not alter the structure of the equilibrium or the direction of other results.
Author:
8
In fact, we numerically observe that all our key findings continue to hold directionally, even under asymmetric
ex-ante market shares. We do not report these results as they do not generate additional insights.
9
The fraction of environmentally conscious donors η does not affect the recycler’s pricing and the collector’s e-waste
allocation decision because, absent channel competition, all e-waste is donated to the single collector.
10
We also analyzed the impact of potential secondary-market size κ on firms’ decisions, both with and without
channel competition, found that the firms’ profits can be lower as κ increases.
11 II∗
Note that low-quality items’ secondary market price (p ) is not relevant because, at the optimality, no low-
II∗ κ
quality items are sold in the secondary market, i.e., qS = 0 in the region of interest where Q > 2βτ
. When we analyze
κ II∗
the case where Q ≤ leading to qS > 0, we also show
2βτ
the impact of exogenous factors on the low-quality items’
II∗ II∗
secondary-market resale quantity (qS ) and price (p ). The details are available from the authors.
12
Collectors typically list products they accept but nonetheless do not refuse any e-waste. Based on our communi-
cation with collectors, including the electronics recycling center at USD and EnviroGreen Electronic Recycling, this
is largely driven by concern over their reputation and the perceived risk of hurting future business by refusing donors.
13
As this scenario is trivial, we do not report the results, but they are available from the authors upon request.
14 2κ
When Q ≤ βτ (1−η)
, we find that collectors also may sell low-quality items in the secondary market (the analysis
is available from the authors upon request). In that case, in addition to the results reported in § 5, we find that a
collector sells more high-quality e-waste in the secondary market and achieves a higher profit as β increases.
15
Note that an asymmetric outcome ((H,L) or (L,H)) never arises as equilibrium here but it might in the absence
of secondary market (cf. Proposition 2). This is because amid a secondary market, when a low-standard recycler in
an asymmetric outcome deviates, she can increase her procured quantity further in the resulting (H,H) outcome by
raising her wholesale price. This makes such deviation always attractive. In contrast, without a secondary market,
a recycler does not have the opportunity to use wholesale price as a lever to adjust her e-waste quantity, making
deviation from an asymmetric outcome sometimes not attractive.
16
The threshold on b in Proposition 4 is independent of other problem parameters, because b is the only parameter
that determines the slope of a recycler’s best response wholesale price. In the (H,L) and (L,H) outcomes the recyclers’
best response wholesale prices are parallel to each other, hence equilibrium does not exist at b = 5/4 whereas they
intersect and hence equilibrium exists when b < 5/4 or when b > 5/4.
17
We extend the analysis to n identical recovery channels and confirm that our findings in Proposition 4 direc-
1+2n 5
tionally carry over. Specifically, we find that the threshold on the scale economies factor b is 2n
(and hence 4
when
2
Qη(1−2bn+n +2n)
n=2) and the threshold on the cost differential e is n(1−2bn+n2 +n)
(and hence ē when n=2). Both thresholds decrease
with n. In other words, as the number of competing channels increases, recyclers with weak (strong) scale economies
are more likely to choose the low (high) standard.
18 3
That is, comparing to Corollary 1, in Corollary 5 the threshold on b is smaller (i.e., 4
< 1) while the threshold on
Q is higher (i.e, Q > Q) under both channel and internal competition.
19
We find that interior solutions do not exist when b1 > 5/4 and b2 < 5/4, or vice-versa.
20
As expected, we observe that (L,H) outcome never emerges as equilibrium when we solve the problem with e2 > e1 .
21
Obtained from the list of certified recyclers from e-Stewards (http://e-stewards.org/data/list-recyclers/)
and R2 (https://sustainableelectronics.org/recyclers) websites in June 2016.

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Choice of E-Waste Recycling Standard Under

Recovery Channel Competition

gesendur@purdue.edu, linyt@sandiego.edu, wenlixiao@sandiego.edu, helenjin@mail.ustc.edu.cn

3. Model Set-up and Assumptions

Figure 1 Competing E-waste Recovery Channels

Table 1 Summary of Notations

πCi (φi , φi ) = p qSi + p qSi + wi qRi

3.3 E-waste Donors

3.4 Sequence of Events

4.1 Benchmark 1: Absence of Channel Competition

4.1.1 Equilibrium Decisions

Corollary 1. Devoid of channel competition:

Corollary 2. Devoid of channel competition:

4.2 Benchmark 2: Absence of Internal Competition

In the next proposition, we characterize recyclers’ equilibrium choice of standard.

ii. If e ≥ max{e1 , e2 } then (t1 , t2 ) = (L, L),

5. Competing Recovery Channels with Secondary Market

5.1 Equilibrium Decisions

Figure 3 Illustration of recyclers’ equilibrium choices of recycling standards

5.2 Impact of Exogenous Factors

6. Recycling Standard Choice: Welfare Implications

. Then ∆E >0 if and only if 2e(λL−λS ) > (λH −λL )(3Q−2a−2κ+2r−2e).

(∑i=1 qSi ) + α(∑i=1 qSi ) + 2α(∑i=1 qSi )(∑i=1 qSi )

7.1 Each Recycler working with Multiple Collectors

7.2 Asymmetric Recyclers

8.1 Insights for Policy Makers and NGOs

Table 2 Summary of Recyclers’ Choice of Recycling Standards

8.2 Insights for Firms

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EPA (2013) Common wastes & materials - ecycling Available at www.epa.gov/osw/conserve/materials/

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Esenduran G, Kemahlıoğlu-Ziya E, Swaminathan JM (2016) Take-back legislation: Consequences for reman-

ETC (2010) Electronics recycling standards compared: R2 and e-Stewards. www.electronicstakeback.

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Huisman J, Stevels A, Middendorf A (2001) Calculating environmentally weighted recyclability of consumer

Majumder P, Groenevelt H (2001) Competition in remanufacturing. Production and Operations Management

NMI (2013) Generate breakthrough insights in sustainability. NMI, available at https://bit.ly/2P63qjo.

Örsdemir A, Kemahlıoğlu-Ziya E, Parlaktürk AK (2014) Competitive quality choice and remanufacturing.

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