Third World Quarterly

ISSN: (Print) (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/ctwq20

Martyrs as a conduit for legitimacy – explaining

Iran’s foreign policy towards Syria

Hanlie Booysen

To cite this article: Hanlie Booysen (2021) Martyrs as a conduit for legitimacy – explaining
Iran’s foreign policy towards Syria, Third World Quarterly, 42:10, 2469-2485, DOI:
10.1080/01436597.2021.1952067

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2021.1952067

Published online: 02 Aug 2021.

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Third World Quarterly
2021, VOL. 42, NO. 10, 2469–2485
https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2021.1952067

Martyrs as a conduit for legitimacy – explaining Iran’s

foreign policy towards Syria
Hanlie Booysen
Religious Studies, School of Social and Cultural Studies, Victoria University of Wellington, Wellington, New
Zealand

ABSTRACT ARTICLE HISTORY

What explains the Islamic Republic of Iran’s considerable financial, mil- Received 8 June 2020
itary and diplomatic support for the nominally secular Bashar al-Asad Accepted 1 July 2021
government in the wake of the 2011 Syrian uprising? Iranian foreign KEYWORDS
policy is subject to realist considerations (security and power). However, Iran
realism does not adequately explain Iran’s Syria policy since 2011, given Iranian foreign policy
the price Iranian citizens are paying in casualties on the Syrian battle- Iran and Syria
field. This paper uses a constructivist framework to examine the role of Eid al-Ghadir
identity in Iran’s foreign policy towards Syria. Moreover, it sketches Eid martyrdom
al-Ghadir as an identity marker for Twelver Shia Muslims. The aim of this constructivism
paper is to show that Iranian martyrs are not only a consequence of
Iran’s foreign policy towards Syria, but that martyrdom serves as a con-
duit for legitimacy.

Introduction
What explains the Islamic Republic of Iran’s considerable financial, military and diplomatic
support for the nominally secular Syrian Ba’th government in the wake of the 2011 Syrian
uprising? To answer this question, many scholars would argue that the Islamic Republic of
Iran’s foreign policy is subject to realist considerations; that is, state behaviour is determined
by material power or interest.1 For example, the existing scholarship notes that in the Middle
East, Iran seeks ‘strategic depth’,2 which is a rational goal. To this end, Iran arms and funds
Hezbollah,3 supports its ally Bashar al-Asad in Syria and maintains the ‘axis of resistance’
against Israeli and US hegemony.4 Furthermore, security, also a rational objective, drives
Iranian military operations against Sunni extremist or takfiri groups, such as Islamic State
(formerly ISIS) and al-Qaeda, both at home and abroad.5 However, in view of the considerable
human and economic cost to Iran,6 a realist framework falls short in explaining how the state
maintains both a costly foreign policy towards Syria and domestic legitimacy. Legitimacy,
here, refers to society’s acceptance of the actions and policies of the political authority, in
this case the Iranian government, as desirable or appropriate.7
This article will aim to address the realist framework’s shortfall by holding a constructivist
lens to Iran’s Syria policy. Constructivism has it that the actions of nations are influenced not

CONTACT Hanlie Booysen Hanlie.Booysen@vuw.ac.nz

© 2021 Global South Ltd
2470 H. BOOYSEN

only by material power and interests, but also by identity, norms and culture.8 Thus, con-
structivism offers an opportunity to focus on religion (Twelver Shi’ism), which is central to
Iranian state identity. Material interests will therefore be considered in conjunction with
Iranian state identity, based on the notion that identity shapes states’ conception of their
interests.9 The article’s central argument follows on from here: that is, Iranian martyrs are not
only a consequence of Iran’s Syria policy, but martyrdom serves as a conduit for legitimacy.
However, before I proceed in explaining my argument, I would like to clarify my use of
the concept ‘identity’.10 Martyrdom, in the Karbala paradigm (more later),11 goes to the very
foundation of Shia Islam and, therefore, Iranian state identity post-1979. Mindful of Brubaker
and Cooper’s critique against using the concept ‘identity’ for analytical purposes, because
it often means ‘too much’, ‘too little’ or ‘nothing at all’,12 I will demarcate the concept ‘identity’
as state identity.
State identity is linked to the ‘state apparatus’, while national identity is relevant to a group
of individuals ‘who aspire to or have a historical homeland, share a common myth and his-
torical memories, have legal rights or duties for all its members, and have markers to distin-
guish themselves from others’.13 This distinction is important, but unnecessary for my
argument, based on the notion that state identity, shaped by the political elite post-1979,
drives foreign policy in Iran. I will further use ‘identity’ and ‘ideology’ interchangeably, as do
many scholars in international relations (IR) who work on the Middle East.
The article will proceed in three parts. First, I will review scholarship on Iran’s foreign policy
towards Syria. Second, I will interrogate how the concept ‘martyrdom’ became key to Iranian
state identity. Third, with the help of two case studies, namely the martyrdom of Mohsen
Hojaji and that of Qassem Suleimani, I will show that martyrdom justifies Tehran’s Syria policy
from 2011 onwards. In doing so, Iran will be used as a test case to show that specific elements
of religious feeling and historical experience are relevant to our understanding of interna-
tional relations.

Iranian identity and foreign policy

As noted above, most scholars working on Iranian foreign policy emphasise Iran’s material
interests to account for policy decisions.14 Brenda Shaffer takes an assertive view in her study
of the Islamic Republic’s foreign policy towards Central Asia, the Caucasus and Russia, after
the breakup of the Soviet Union.15 She posits that in this region, Iran’s Islamic culture has
had little influence on its foreign policy choices and that material rather than cultural and
ideological goals determine Iran’s foreign policy. Wastnidge agrees with Shaffer that material
interests trump identity, if identity is narrowly defined as Islam.16 However, he posits that
notions of ‘justice and countering oppression’ have been key themes in the foreign policies
of different Iranian governments post-1979.17
Akbarzadeh and Conduit also focus on Iran’s material interests in their interrogation of
the Iranian–Syrian alliance during the Ahmadinejad (2005–2013) and Rouhani (2013–2021)
presidencies.18 In identifying a driver of foreign policy, these authors moved away from
focusing on a ‘religious’ similarity between the al-Asad ruling family in Syria, who are from
the minority Alawi sect, which is associated with Shia Islam, and the Shia Islamic Republic
of Iran. Instead, Akbarzadeh and Conduit focus on the ‘pragmatic political and military alli-
ance’ between Iran and Syria. In doing so, they convincingly illustrate the importance of the
 Third World Quarterly 2471

‘Resistance Axis’, and Syria’s role therein, to Iran. Moreover, they show that by 2015 Iran’s
Syria policy was the domain of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC),19 overseen
by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.20 My second case study, Qassem Suleimani, the late IRGC
Quds (Jerusalem) Force commander, steered the Iranian military campaign in Syria and at
the time, according to members of the Syrian opposition, had more power in Syria than
Bashar al-Asad.21
Ansari, in contrast to Shaffer, argues that cultural (ideological) and material determinants
function in conjunction,22 or ‘identity and interests intermingle’, as Maloney puts it.23
Wastnidge agrees that a combination of ideology and realpolitik informs Iranian foreign
policy.24 In the context of Iran’s facilitation of Shi’i volunteer fighters to Syria, Wastnidge gives
the following example: In 2016, IRGC head Mohammad Ali Jafari said: ‘[T]he formation of
Daesh and Takfiri groups … are paving the ground for the emergence of Imam Mahdi’, after
which he added that Iran has trained local and foreign fighters to protect the axis of resis-
tance.25 The rhetoric used here comprises both Shi’i eschatology where the Mahdi will pre-
cede the end of the world as well as Iran’s material interest supporting the Bashar al-Asad
government in Syria to thwart American and Israeli influence in the region.
Elsewhere, Wastnidge steers the discussion on Iran’s foreign policy decisively towards
identity.26 Of particular importance to this article is his observation that identity may not be
the sole driver of foreign policy, but has an important role to justify the state’s actions. In
support of his argument, Wastnidge quotes Barnett (2002) – ‘identity makes some foreign
policy actions legitimate and intelligible’ – and Halliday (2005), who argues that states have
to justify their foreign policy internally, given the costs involved, and that foreign policy
should serve to ‘justify the state to its own population’.27
Akbarzadeh and Barry show that Iranian state identity is not a monolith and argue that
Iran’s corporate identity,28 based on ‘Iranism, Islam and Shi’ism’, helps to explain its foreign
policy.29 ‘Iranism’ is presented as broader than ‘Persian nationalism’, potentially encompass-
ing language, culture, history, geography and religion.30 Moreover, the authors state that
while the 1979 revolution informs Iran’s political ideology, Iranism, Islam and Shi’ism give
the revolution an ideational context.31 Akbarzadeh and Barry conclude that Iranian identity
consists of several elements, which are linked together by the 1979 revolution.
Elsewhere, Barry posits that the division between an ethnic–linguistic element of Iranism,
which is mostly associated with the rule of the Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi (1919–1980),
and the religious–sectarian Islamism of post-revolutionary Iran is dynamic and exists on a
continuum, as opposed to existing across a definite divide.32 Holliday supports Barry’s notion
that Iranian identity is fluid, to which he adds that Iranian identity is socially constructed
and contested.33 Such diversity offers various layers of identity, which, Maloney posits, offer
various avenues for state action.34
In sum, Iran’s material interests remain a prominent frame of analysis for scholarship
on Iranian foreign policy. However, the majority of scholars do not consider Iranian foreign
policy to be determined by only material or only cultural (ideological) factors, as reflected
in the crafty quote ‘identity and interests intermingle’. Important for my argument is
scholars’ focus on the role of identity in justifying state behaviour and/or actions. Existing
scholarship further shows Iranian identity consists of various elements and is fluid, socially
constructed and contested. However, none of these scholars has applied identity to
explain the Islamic Republic’s support for Syria in the context of the 2011 Syrian uprising
turned civil war. This article aims to contribute to scholarship on identity and foreign
2472 H. BOOYSEN

policy by exploring how Iran uses state identity to create a foreign policy narrative that
justifies its Syria policy. In doing so, this article will focus on martyrdom as a conduit for
legitimacy.

Martyrdom: from dogma to identity

Shia Muslims, like believers in any other religion, imagine their past and present. Martyrdom
and injustice play an important part in this imagination, in which Shia believe all Imams have
been martyred, except the Twelfth Imam, Muhammad al-Qa’im (the Mahdi).35 However, the
martyrdom of Shia Imams was not always part of Shia doctrine, but became a ‘matter of
faith’ over time.36 In illustrating how martyrdom became an essential part of the Shia doctrine,
I will first discuss Eid al-Ghadir as an important identity marker in Shia Islam, after which I
will consider the evolution of martyrdom from a passive to active role, as utilised by the
post-1979 Iranian state.

Eid al-Ghadir – an identity marker

The Iranian celebration of Eid al-Ghadir is an important identity marker for Imami or Twelver
(Ithna ‘ashari) Shia.37 In Iran, Eid al-Ghadir honours the Prophet Muhammad’s designation
of his cousin and son-in-law, Ali ibn Abi Taleb, as his successor. Not much detail about this
event can be found in the Qur’an, other than the Qur’anic verse (Qur’an, 5:67) that addresses
the events on 18 Dhu ‘l-Hidjdja 10 (632) – that is, when the Prophet Muhammad revealed
an important message to his companions at Ghadir Khumm, a place between Mecca and
Medina. Sunni and Shia (authentic) ahadith or traditions report the Prophet to have said
that God is his mawla (master) and that of whom he is the mawla (master), Ali is his mawla
(master).38 Shia sources further describe a scenario in which the Prophet Muhammad held
up Ali’s hand, saying: ‘To whomsoever I have been a Mawla, Ali is his Mawla. O Lord! Befriend
whoever befriends him, and be an enemy of whoever sets himself as his enemy, and let the
right follow him wherever he goes’.39 Though Sunni sources support the Shia understanding
that the Prophet Muhammad singled Ali out on the occasion of Ghadir Khumm, they differ
in the details thereof, and therefore in its relevance to the Prophetic succession.
Another related tradition, Hadith al-thaqalayn, also supported by both Sunni and Shia
sources, narrates:
I leave in your midst the two weighty things (al-thaqalān): the first is the book of God (kitab
‘llāh), which contains correct guidance and light …. Cling therefore to the book of God and
hold fast to it … and my family.40

This hadith originated from the Prophet’s sermon at Ghader Khumm. It confirms that the
ahl al bayt or family of the Prophet includes Ali and Fatima, and their descendants, including
the Imams. Moreover, this hadith has an important part in the Imami principle that the Imams
have the authority to interpret the Qur’an.41 Thus, religious and temporal authority belongs
to the family of the Prophet in general and, after the death of the Prophet, the Imams.
For Shia, a great calamity with long-lasting implications came about upon the Prophet’s
death. The Imami narration of Prophet Muhammad’s actions at Ghader Khumm and its under-
standing of hadith al-thaqalayn have it that the Prophet appointed Ali and his descendants
 Third World Quarterly 2473

to the ‘temporal and religious leadership of the Muslim community’.42 However, upon the
Prophet Muhammad’s death, Abu Bakr, his long-time companion, and not his cousin, son-
in-law and designated successor Ali ibn Abi Taleb, became the first Rightly Guided (Rashidun)
Caliph of the Muslim community. This transgression occurred when Fatima, the prophet’s
daughter, her husband Ali ibn Abi Taleb and their supporters ‘withdrew’ to her house to
prepare the Prophet’s body for burial.43 The rest of the muhajirun – members of the early
Muslim community who emigrated with the Prophet to Medina – were with Abu Bakr and
Umar, while the ansar or ‘helpers’ – native to Medina – congregated to elect a new leader
and, in doing so, usurp power from the muhajirun.44 Abu Bakr and Umar became aware of
the meeting of the ansar and intervened to ensure authority remains with the Quraish social
group. Umar’s judicious pledge of allegiance to Abu Bakr prevented a split between the
muhajirun and the ansar, and thus secured the unity of the early Muslim community.45 For
Shia, the partisans of the Alids,46 this dispossession of Ali as the rightful successor to the
Prophet Muhammad set in motion a series of events in which Shia Muslims became a dis-
possessed and persecuted minority.
In sum, for Twelver Shia Muslims, Eid al-Ghadir points first to the centrality of the family
of the Prophet to Shia Islam.47 Second, and important for my argument, it is a reminder of
the injustice done to the Alids in robbing Ali of his succession to the Prophet, and the sub-
sequent martyrdom of all the Shia Imams, except the twelfth, Imam Muhammad al-Qa’im
(the Mahdi). Having established the relationship between Ghadir Khumm and injustice/
suffering for Twelver Shia Muslims, the next section will consider the relationship between
the Imami doctrine and martyrdom.

The Imams – victims to victors

In an early biography of Imam ‘Ali al-Rida, entitled ‘Uyun akhbar al-Rida’, Ibn Babawayh
al-Qummi (d. 381/991) – an early Shia scholar who contributed to the Shia hadith canon –
narrates the Eight Imam to have said:

By God, al Husayn certainly was killed. Not only that, but men better than he were killed as well,
namely, the commander of the Faithful [‘Ali] and his son al-Hasan. Not one of us goes unmur-
dered (ma minna illa maqtulan). I myself, by God, shall die by poison, assassinated by certain
someone. I know this because of the covenant vouchsafed me by the Prophet of God, who had
it from Gabriel, who had it from God Almighty.48

In a treatise on Twelver Shi’ism, Ibn Babawayh further declared it a matter of faith that
the Prophet, Ali, Husayn, Hasan and all the Imams, except the last, were murdered.49 ‘To deny
any of this … is to contradict the Imams’ own declarations on the matter, and is tantamount
to renouncing Islam’, said Ibn Babawayh.50 In this instance, the objective of the argument
was to rebut the ghulah or groups who believed Imams, other than the Twelfth Imam, were
immortal, and therefore not martyred.51 In doing so, the martyrdom of the first 11 Imams
became central to the Twelver Shi’ite doctrine. In addition, the martyrdom of the fourth to
eleventh Imams follows the precedent set by the epic assassinations of Imams Ali and
Husayn. Moreover, it emphasises murder and betrayal, which implies that the Imams posed
a threat to illegitimate authorities.52
Politically, the Shia suffered as a persecuted minority, first under Umayyad rule (41/661–
132/750), especially after Husayn’s martyrdom at Karbala, as well as under the Abbasids
2474 H. BOOYSEN

when the Abbasid caliphs realised that the Shia will not accept any authority other than the
authority of those who come from the Prophet’s family.53 Ali Ibn Abi Talib’s loss of the Muslim
community’s leadership to Abu Bakr and his martyrdom two years after he became the
fourth successor to the Prophet Muhammed therefore started a trend of Shia victimhood,
as discussed earlier. Other than the Buyuds’ rule of the Levant between 934 and 1055 CE,54
the Shia loss of temporal authority was only turned around under the Safavids in the six-
teenth century, when Shia Islam took on a dominant role.55 Moreover, the Shia religious
establishment in Iran only gained political power after the revolution and defeat of
Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi in 1979,56 based on Ayatollah Khomeini’s philosophy of vilay-
et-i faqih or ‘guardianship of the jurist’. With Shi’ism a key component of Iranian state identity,
post-1979, the conceptualisation of martyrdom was renewed to serve the current political
context.
Kaur posits that with the Iranian revolution, Husayn’s martyrdom underwent a shift from
passive to active.57 The classical understanding of a martyr or shahid is to bear witness and
sacrifice oneself in the path of God.58 During Ashura, Shia annually commemorate Husayn’s
trauma at Karbala through public displays of weeping, mourning and, in some instances,
self-flagellation.59 Pre-1979, scholars understood Husayn’s desecrated body and his help-
lessness in relation to the stronger military force against him by focussing on religious sal-
vation in their analysis of Muharram rituals.60 The Karbala paradigm was therefore generally
understood as suffering and sacrifice, which ‘become God’s sovereign act performed on
chosen bodies’.61 But Husayn is not only a victim; he is said to have had foreknowledge of
his violent end and the demise of his party.62 Thus, it is his self-sacrifice that sets his martyr-
dom above all others. Ali Shariati (1933–1977), an Iranian intellectual and critic of the
Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi regime, understood Husayn’s martyrdom as ‘active rebellion
against corrupt rulers’.63 In the Iranian revolution, the pro-Western Muhammad Reza Shah
Pahlawi was presented as a contemporary Yazid (second Ummayad caliph and rival of the
Prophet Muhammad’s grandson Husayn) who oppressed his own people with the help of
foreign powers. Khomeini’s description of Husayn’s martyrdom as a ‘manual of action’ saw
Iranian revolutionaries fighting and defeating oppression, as opposed to witnessing and
self-sacrifice.64 Subsequently, martyrdom was not only grounded in Shi’ite Islam with impli-
cations for the afterlife,65 but became ‘an indelible part of the politics of revolution’ to be
recognised and rewarded by the state as such.66
In sum, the martyrdom of all the Imams, except the Twelfth Imam, became central to Twelver
Shia doctrine in the first few centuries after the Prophet’s death. A corresponding perception of
suffering and victimhood was supported by the persecution and minority status of Shia Muslims
through most of history. However, the 1979 Iranian revolution empowered martyrs with revolu-
tionary zeal to become a tangible asset to the state. In the remainder of this article, I will consider
how the Iranian state imagines and ritualises martyrdom to serve as a conduit for legitimacy.

Imagining and ritualising martyrdom in Iran

In this section, I will illustrate how martyrdom legitimises Iran’s Syria policy. In doing so, I will
illustrate that it is not the occurrence of death that produces legitimacy for Iran’s Syria policy,
but how the dead body is imagined and ritualised by the Iranian state. My two case-studies
 Third World Quarterly 2475

consider the martyrdom of a young Iranian soldier Mohsen Hojaji in August 2017, and that
of Iranian General Qassem Suleimani in January 2020.
In Iran, martyrdom is carefully and purposefully imagined and ritualised.67 Striking to any
visitor is the public presence of martyrs through thousands of poster-size photographs on
buildings, walls and fences, on billboards, in markets and as part of IRGC exhibitions.68 In
her study of the commemoration of martyrs from the 1980–1988 war between Iran and Iraq,
Rose Wellman shows that through the act of martyrdom ‘the blood and bodies of martyrs
are considered purifying, healing and spiritually nourishing to the citizens, the land, and the
territory of the Islamic Republic’.69 By interrogating the state-sanctified exhumation and
re-burial of martyrs’ remains, Wellman illustrates that the blood and bodies of martyrs evoke
the martyrdom of Imam Husayn, the 1979 Revolution and the Iran–Iraq war.70 Moreover,
Kaur posits that martyrdom post-1979 is rewarded by the Iranian government as chosen by
God and in the service of safeguarding the revolutionary state.71 Thus, the Iranian state
reaffirms its legitimacy by converting corporeal remains into martyred bodies.72

Martyr Mohsen Hojaji

In August 2017, local and foreign media outlets reported the beheading of Mohsen Hojaji,
an IRGC soldier who hailed from Najafabad in Esfahan province. The IRGC is said to have
deployed Hojaji on multiple occasions in Syria to fight Islamic State (formerly ISIS) and
protect the Sayyidah Zaynab shrine in the southern suburbs of Damascus.73 Islamic State
captured Hojaji on 7 August 2017, and beheaded him two days later.74 Hojaji’s body was
returned to Iran through an exchange between Iran’s Lebanese ally Hezbollah75 and Islamic
State. However, the body was not laid to rest as soon as possible (within three days), which
is the norm for Muslims. As a martyr, Hojaji continued to serve his country and people in
death, and was therefore taken to the city of Mashhad and the shrine of the eighth Shia
Imam.76 Then a large public funeral took place in Tehran, where Supreme Leader Ali
Khamenei prayed over his coffin,77 after which the body was laid to rest in Hojaji’s home-
town Najafabad.
Islamic State created a public persona of Hojaji when the organisation captured the IRGC
fighter in Syria and recorded his beheading for propaganda purposes. But this is not how
Hojaji’s family or the state imagined his death. Mohsen Hojaji’s widow, Zahra Abbasi,
described Hojaji’s image in the IS video as follows: ‘Look at the photo, there is no sign of
weakness despite him being shot and captured … there is not fear in the eyes. It is all bravery,
courage. He is like a mountain’.78 The same sentiments are reflected in Supreme Leader
Khamenei’s statement, which was issued in response to the photo:
Peace be upon this proud martyr, who in the most sensitive and most crucial moments of his
life, symbolized the victorious and obvious truth against the declining falsehood. God bless
him, who glorified himself and his whole nation by his sincere jihad and brave martyrdom.79

Zahra Abbasi met her husband during the annual commemoration of the Iran–Iraq war
and is said to believe that they were brought together, on that day, by the martyrs of the
war.80 In a documentary film about Hojaji’s life, Moajazeyeh Enghelab (The Miracle of the
Revolution), Hojaji’s mother says Hojaji asked for her blessing to become a martyr, before his
final mission to Syria.81 Both the family and the state therefore affirmed Hojaji’s bravery and
his martyrdom.
2476 H. BOOYSEN

Hassan Rouholamin, an Iranian artist, affirmed the official image of Hojaji, namely as a
brave and celebrated martyr. He took a photo from the Islamic state video and added sacred
Shia imagery to it.82 In Rouholamin’s painting, Imam Husayn and his sister, Sayyidah Zaynab,
welcome the martyr Hojaji to paradise.83 The fact that Hojaji was beheaded, similar to Imam
Husayn, is captured in the artistic presentation where a decapitated Imam Husayn meets
the decapitated Hojaji. This reimagining of Hojaji as a hero-martyr, who is welcomed to
paradise by sayyid al-shuhada or the lord of the martyrs, served the transformation of Hojaji’s
corporal remains into a martyred body.
Iranian politicians validated Hojaji’s martyrdom by calling him a shrine defender. In August
2017, the Supreme Leader addressed the families of the martyrs who defended the Ahl
al-Bayt (a.s.) or family of the Prophet (peace upon them) shrines on his official website. Next
to the text is a caricature of Hojaji, his wife and young son with ‘Ya Zeinab’ printed on the
boy’s t-shirt.84 Similarly, Foreign Minister Javad Zarif ‘greeted’ Hojaji and all the martyrs who
defended the ‘sanctity of the Ahl al-Bayt’.85 These references to the Ahl al-Bayt shrines are
relevant to Hojaji’s declared mission, namely to defend and protect the Sayyidah Zaynab
shrine on the outskirts of Damascus from desecration by Sunni extremists. Here the key is
Sayyidah Zaynab as an important figure in Shia Islam. She is a member of the family of the
Prophet; that is, Sayyidah Zaynab is the granddaughter of the Prophet and the daughter of
Ali and Fatimah, and therefore the sister of Hasan and Husayn. Sayyidah Zaynab is also
revered by Shia Muslims for her heroic role in the Karbala myth.86 Not only was she a witness
to Karbala and Husayn’s martyrdom, but her subsequent challenge to the Umayyad caliph
Yazid ibn Mu’awiyah secured Sayyidah Zaynab’s place in Imami doctrine.87 Thus, in linking
Hojaji to the Sayyidah Zaynab shrine in Syria, the state-controlled media established a rela-
tionship between Hojaji’s martyrdom, the Imami doctrine and Iran’s strategic military pres-
ence in Syria.
Hojaji’s martyrdom further served to justify Iran’s strategic military deployment in Syria.
By 2012, a year into the conflict, Iran had a confirmed military presence in Syria,88 and by
April 2016, between 6500 and 9200 IRGC and paramilitary personnel were active in the Syrian
conflict.89 The IRGC also enlisted foreign fighters from Afghanistan, Pakistani and Iraq to join
the Iranian military operation.90 When, by 2018, more than 2100 Iranian and Iran-backed
Afghani and Pakistani fighters were reported to have died in Syria,91 official rhetoric linked
the losses to the Imami doctrine, the threat of takfiri terrorism, and the safety of the country
and Islam.92
Given the role of foreign fighters under Iranian command in Syria, Hojaji’s martyrdom was
also imagined to enhance and venerate non-kinship cooperation. On 3 October 2017, whilst
visiting Hojaji’s family, Khamenei praised Hojaji’s ‘jihad’ and ‘martyrdom’, and described him
as ‘a sign of God and a spokesman for martyrs’.93 The Supreme Leader further said: ‘All the
young men who were martyred – from Iran, Afghanistan, Iraq, and other regions – in the fight
against the Takfiri groups … are reflected in this young man, and God has made him an
emblem of sincere and courageous martyrdom’.94 Thus, in establishing a relationship between
non-Iranian fighters in Syria and the martyr Hojaji, the Supreme Leader justified the IRGC’s
facilitation of foreign fighters to Syria as well as sanctified their sacrifices in the Syrian war.
In sum, by imagining Hojaji’s brutal beheading in Syria as martyrdom, the martyr Hojaji
continues to serve his country and people subsequent to his death. In doing so, Iran’s military
deployment in Syria and the IRGC’s facilitation of foreign fighters to the Syrian arena are not
only justified to fight takfiri terrorists, but are sanctified by its martyrs.
 Third World Quarterly 2477

Martyr Qassem Suleimani

The United States’ assassination of Quds Force commander Qassem Suleimani on 3 January
2020 provides another telling example. As mentioned, Qassem Suleimani played a leading
role in Iran’s military campaign in Syria. Like Hojaji’s, Suleimani’s martyrdom was officially
imagined by the Iranian state through the establishment of a relationship between the
martyr and the Imami doctrine. Moreover, this case study reveals the state’s use of ritual to
justify its foreign policy.
Smith describes ritual as ‘an ordinary activity placed in an extraordinary setting’.95 Our
understanding of rituals to produce group cohesion has been developing since Durkheim’s
introduction thereof in 1915.96 In more recent years, scholars have come to appreciate the
role of rituals in bringing about unity and solidarity in society.97 Similarly, in neurotheology,
rituals are posited to ‘drive the automic nervous system, and then the brain, to experience
a deep sense of oneness or connectedness with something else: another animal, God, or
the universe’.98 Important for my argument is Geertz’ link between ritual genre and legiti-
macy,99 as reflected in the link between the ritualisation of Suleimani’s martyrdom and the
justification of Iran’s Syria policy.
Like Hojaji, Suleimani was attached to the IRGC. He led the IRGC’s Quds (Jerusalem) Force,
which is responsible for foreign military operations. Suleimani was therefore the ‘public face
and arbiter’ of Iran’s foreign policy in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Lebanon and Afghanistan.100 Though
the assassination took place in Baghdad, Suleimani’s role in the Syrian conflict makes his
martyrdom relevant to Iran’s Syria policy. The ritualisation of Suleimani’s martyrdom started
with a visit to the important Shia shrine cities of Karbala and Najaf in Iraq, because he died
in Baghdad. Next, the martyr was flown to the city of Ahvas in Iran, from which the funeral
procession went north-east to Mashhad, then south to the capital Tehran, next to Qum,
south of Tehran, and finally farther south to Suleimani’s hometown, Kerman. Each of these
destinations had a part to play in the ritualisation of Suleimani’s martyrdom and, therefore,
the production of legitimacy. This ritualisation of Suleimani’s martyrdom is best viewed
against the anti-government demonstrations in Iran in November 2019.
Protests erupted across Iran in November 2019, sparked by a sudden increase in fuel
prices. Already suffering from the renewal of American sanctions on Iranian oil sales in May
2018, the overnight increase sent up to 200,000 Iranians into the street.101 Though Iran has
seen significant public protests after the 2009 presidential elections, and particularly in
2017/18, the November 2019 protests were described by some as the largest seen in the
country since the fall of the Shah.102 The violent crackdown that followed curtailed the public
protests,103 but would not have eliminated the underlying discontent. It is against this public
display of disunity and disgruntlement that we view the sea of mourners who, in the cities
of Ahvas, Mashhad, Tehran, Qum and Kerman, participated in the ritualisation of Suleimani’s
martyrdom.104 These mourners transcended the social upheaval of November 2019 to pres-
ent a nation united in mourning.
In Iran, Suleimani’s body, along with the bodies of five other members of the IRGC and
that of Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, a commander of the Hashd al-Sha’abi or Iraqi Popular
Mobilisation Forces, was met by thousands of mourners at the airport in the southwestern
city of Ahvaz.105 The circumstances of his death would have warranted Suleimani’s martyr-
dom status. However, Supreme Leader Khamenei, even before Suliemani’s death, referred
to him as ‘a living martyr of the revolution’.106 Still, the Iranian authorities emphasised his
2478 H. BOOYSEN

martyrdom in an official statement, in which the Foreign Minister condemned the American
‘brutality’ and ‘stupidity’ and described Suleimani as a ‘heroic martyr and commander of the
fight against terrorism and extremism’.107
From Ahvas, Suleimani’s body was moved to Mashhad and the shrine of Imam Reza, the
Eighth Imam, which symbolically links Suleimani with the Imami doctrine of suffering and
martyrdom, but also with betrayal. The notion of betrayal is particularly pertinent in the case
of Suleimani, as witnessed in former President Rouhani’s comments to the martyr’s family.
In giving his condolences to Suleimani’s family, Rouhani mentioned both the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA)-engineered coup in 1953 and the downing of an Iranian passenger
plane by the US Navy in 1988.108 In naming the USA’s previous deceitful acts against Iran,
Rouhani linked the deadly missile strikes on Baghdad airport that killed Suleimani and his
military colleagues with the Abbasid Caliph Ma’mun’s (r. 813–833) betrayal of Imam Reza.
Earlier, I showed how martyrdom permeates the Shia biographies of the Imams.
Furthermore, I noted that the murder and betrayal of the Imams imply that the Imams posed
a threat to illegitimate authorities. A modern interpretation of these events presents Iran as
the bulwark against (illegitimate) US and Israeli hegemony in the Middle East region. Tradition
has it that Imam Reza was poisoned at the directive of the seventh Abbasid Caliph, Abu
al-Abbas Abdallah ibn Harun al-Rashid, better known as Ma’amun. Though it is Ma’amun’s
betrayal of Imam Reza that is relevant here, it is worth recapturing the initial betrayal, namely
of the Prophet’s wish to have Ali succeed him. Shia biographers have it that the Prophet, on
numerous occasions, gave instruction that Ali should be his successor as leader of the com-
munity of believers (amir al-mu’minin).109 The Prophet’s address at Ghadir Khumm, as touched
upon earlier, is the most well-known of these. The betrayal of the Prophet occurred at
Saqifa,110 where Umar pledged allegiance to Abu Bakr, while Ali and Fatima were at home
preparing the Prophet’s body for burial.111 Pierce posits that Ali’s washing of the Prophet’s
body as developments at Saqifa unfolded accentuates the intimacy and bodily connection
between the two men, which in turn designates the boundaries of the community.112 Here,
boundaries serve to distinguish between those who truly loved the Prophet – that is, the
shi’at Ali (the party or partisans of Ali) and the rest who betrayed the Prophet and his family.113
Tradition further has it that Ma’mun intended to transfer power to the descendants of
the Prophet by appointing Imam Reza’s as his heir.114 This would have restored power to the
legitimate heirs of the Prophet, namely the Imams who trace their ascendancy through Ali.
Ma’amun’s treachery is therefore amplified by the notion that justice would have been
restored. Thus, Ma’amun is guilty of betraying both Imam Reza and the Shia as the rightful
successors and leaders of the believers.
Suleimani’s targeted assassination strongly resonates with the betrayal and martyrdom
of Imam Reza. Ruhani’s reference to prior American acts of betrayal and aggression against
Iran would have found a receptive audience amongst thousands of Iranians who are suffering
the brunt of American sanctions.115 In 2018, the US unilaterally withdrew from the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and later the same year re-imposed economic sanc-
tions against Iran. The International Atomic Energy Agency’s confirmation in February 2018
that Iran was compliant with the original agreement116 presents the US as a modern-day
Ma’amun. Suleimani’s prominent role in Iran’s fight against Islamic State, which would put
him and the American administration at least nominally on the same side,117 further amplifies
the USA’s most recent betrayal. Thus, from an Iranian perspective, the targeted assassination
of Suleimani was a truly deceitful act.
 Third World Quarterly 2479

The next phase in the ritualisation of Suleimani’s body included the country’s capital
Tehran, and Qum, the centre of Shia Islam in Iran, before the body was finally laid to rest in
Kerman, Suleimani’s hometown. In Tehran, hundreds of thousands of mourners followed
the funeral procession to Tehran University, where, in the presence of representatives of
various centres of power, Supreme Leader Khamenei prayed over the martyr’s body.118 Then
the funeral procession moved south of Tehran to the holy city of Qum, the burial place of
Imam Reza’s sister, Fatima. By walking the body around the Fatima Masoumeh shrine,
Suleimani’s body was once more linked with the Imami doctrine of suffering and martyrdom,
before the martyr was laid to rest.
In sum, the national unity and solidarity on display in the streets of Ahvas, Mashhad,
Tehran, Qum and Kerman in January 2020 were in stark contrast with the public protests
just two months earlier. The imagining and ritualisation of Suleimani’s martyrdom legitimise
Iran’s foreign involvement in fighting Sunni extremism as well as maintaining the resistance
axis against the US (and Israel) as an illegitimate and untrustworthy opponent. In sacralising
these strategic objectives, Suleimani’s martyrdom legitimises Iran’s foreign policy towards
the nominally secular Syrian Ba’th government.

Conclusion
In accentuating a constructivist framework, this article presented an extensive under-
standing of Iran’s Syria policy. The focus on identity, as constructed by the post-1979
political elite, further allowed me to interrogate the state’s use of martyrdom in pursuit
of legitimacy.
In contemporary Iran, martyrdom is central to state identity. This identity is socially con-
structed with elements of injustice and suffering, which Shia Muslims trace back to Ghader
Khumm. Moreover, the murder and betrayal of all the Shia Imams, except the Mahdi, adds
an element of unlawfulness to the Imams’ opponents. Iranian state identity therefore evokes
suffering and victimisation, based on a historic narrative that intertwines with Twelver
Shia dogma.
With the 1979 revolution, martyrdom obtained an additional meaning in service of active
resistance against an illegitimate authority. Moreover, post-1979, martyrdom became rec-
ognised and rewarded by the Iranian state to safeguard the revolution, and reaffirm the
legitimacy of the Iranian state. Soon after, the Iran–Iraq war produced more martyrs, who
are ritualised to ‘heal, unify, and nourish’ the country and its people. Iran’s current military
involvement in Syria delivers a similar scenario.
Thus, by imagining and ritualising martyrdom, contemporary Iran sanctifies strategic
interests in Syria, which enhances its domestic legitimacy. In doing so, casualties from the
Syrian conflict are cast as martyrs, who in death continue to serve the country and
its people.

Acknowledgements
I am grateful to the editor and anonymous referees for their comments and constructive feedback. I
also thank Warren Searell, Jaco Jooste, Dr Ayca Arkilic and an Iranian colleague for their assistance in
proofreading this article.
2480 H. BOOYSEN

Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes on contributor
Hanlie Booysen is Adjunct Research Fellow in the Religious Studies programme at Victoria University
of Wellington and a founding member of the Middle East and Islamic Studies Aotearoa (MEISA) net-
work. Her research interests include the relationship between Islam and politics, the Syrian Muslim
Brotherhood and Muslim communities in Aotearoa New Zealand. She served as a diplomat in Jordan,
Palestine and Syria.

Notes
1. Akbarzadeh and Barry, “State Identity in Iranian Foreign Policy,” 614.
2. Strategic depth is obtained through ‘diversified, multual relationships in multiple arenas’, as
explained by Vakil, “Understanding Tehran’s Long Game,” 111, 17; see also Goodarzi, Syria and
Iran Diplomatic Alliance, 5.
3. Stein, “Ideological Codependency and Regional Order,” 677.
4. Akbarzadeh and Conduit, “Charting a New Course?,” 134; Wastnidge, “Iran’s Own ‘War on Terror,’”
107–08.
5. Wastnidge, “Iran’s Own ‘War on Terror’,” 108; Vakil, “Understanding Tehran’s Long Game,” 114.
6. Juneau, “Iran’s Costly Intervention in Syria,” 8–9.
7. Hurd, “Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics,” 381.
8. Haynes, “Religion and International Relations,” 6.
9. Ibid., 8.
10. I am grateful to Associate Professor Alexander Maxwell for drawing my attention to Brubaker
and Cooper’s argument on identity.
11. Aghaie, Martyrs of Karbala.
12. Brubaker and Cooper, “Beyond ‘Identity.’”
13. Telhami and Barnett, Identity and Foreign Policy in the Middle East, 8.
14. Ansari and Tabrizi, “View from Tehran,” 3–9; Akbarzadeh and Conduit, “Charting a New Course?,”
133–54.
15. Shaffer, “Islamic Republic of Iran,” 219–39.
16. Wastnidge, “Transnational Identity Claims,” 611.
17. Ibid.
18. Akbarzadeh and Conduit, “Charting a New Course?,” 133–54.
19. The IRGC was established in 1979 as a praetorian guard to protect the Iranian revolution.
20. Akbarzadeh and Conduit, “Charting a New Course?,” 148.
21. Phillips, Battle for Syria, 150.
22. Ansari, “Civilizational Identity and Foreign Policy,” 243.
23. Maloney, “Identity and Change in Iran’s Foreign Policy.”
24. Wastnidge, “Iran and Syria: An Enduring Axis.”
25. Ibid., 156.
26. Wastnidge, “Transnational Identity Claims.”
27. Ibid., 612.
28. Akbarzadeh and Barry, “State Identity in Iranian Foreign Policy,” 614.
29. Ibid., 628.
30. Ibid., 617.
31. Ibid., 616.
32. Barry, Armenian Christians in Iran, 52.
33. Holliday, “Politicisation of Culture,” 15.
 Third World Quarterly 2481

34. Maloney, “Identity and Change in Iran’s Foreign Policy.”

35. Halm, Shi’a Islam, 25.
36. Cooperson, Classical Arabic Biography, 90.
37. Eid al-Ghadir is celebrated as a national holiday in Theocratic Iran, but not in nominally secular
Syria.
38. Jami’at Tirmidhi, Vol. 1, Book 46, Hadith 3713 (English), https://sunnah.com/urn/635920; Tafsir
Al-Qummi, Vol. 1, p. 255 (Arabic).
39. http://english.bayynat.org.lb/temp/temp_OnAl-Ghadir.htm#.XZvmEuTr2Uk
40. Bar-Asher, Scripture and Exegesis in Early Imāmī-Shiism, 94.
41. Ibid., 93.
42. Brown, Hadith: Muhammad’s Legacy, 112.
43. Cooperson, Classical Arabic Biography, 24.
44. Ibid.
45. Ibid.
46. Alids are the descendants of Ali.
47. See Bar-Asher, Scripture and Exegesis in Early Imāmī-Shiism, 95 for the Shia use of hadith
al-thalaqalyn, which originated from the Prophet’s sermon at Ghader Khumm, ie that the term
ahl al-bayt includes only Ali, the Imams, the descendants of Fatima, and the exclusive exegeti-
cal role of the family of the Prophet – that is, the Imams – in interpreting the Qur’an.
48. Cooperson, Classical Arabic Biography, 83.
49. Ibid., 90.
50. Ibid.
51. Ibid., 83.
52. Pierce, Twelve Infallible Men, 52–53.
53. See Bar-Asher, Scripture and Exegesis in Early Imāmī-Shiism, 2–3.
54. Szanto, “Shi’a Islam in Practice,” 4.
55. Salamey and Othman, “Shia Revival and Welayat Al-Faqih,” 200; also see Nasr, Shia Revival, 72–
75.
56. For a vivid description of the Iranian revolution, see Bakhash, Reign of the Ayatollahs.
57. Kaur, “Sacralising Bodies on Martyrdom,” 447–51.
58. Ibid., 447.
59. For an argument showing self-flaggellation is not the norm, see Szanto, “Beyond the Karbala
Paradigm.”
60. Ibid., 78.
61. Kaur, “Sacralising Bodies on Martyrdom,” 448.
62. Ibid.
63. cf Aghaie in Szanto, “Beyond the Karbala Paradigm,” 78.
64. Kaur, “Sacralising Bodies on Martyrdom,” 449.
65. For an alternative argument that Muharram rituals can be both salvific and revolutionary, see:
Szanto, “Beyond the Karbala Paradigm.”
66. Kaur, “Sacralising Bodies on Martyrdom,” 451.
67. See Gruber, “Message is on the Wall”; Gruber, “Martyrs’ Museum in Tehran”; Wellman,
“Regenerating the Islamic Republic.”
68. Numerous public depictions of martyrs in various formats were observed and documented
during the author’s study tour in Iran in August 2019.
69. Wellman, “Regenerating the Islamic Republic.”
70. Ibid., 564.
71. Kaur, “Sacralising Bodies on Martyrdom,” 444.
72. Ibid.
73. Saeidi, “Hojaji’s Gaze,” 359.
74. “Comic Strip on Martyr Mohsen Hojaji Published.”
75. Akbarzadeh, “Why Does Iran Need Hizbullah?”
76. “Iran/Syria: Iranian Soldier Beheaded by IS.”
77. Ibid.
2482 H. BOOYSEN

78. Karimi, “Iran/Syria: Iranian Soldier Beheaded by Islamic State.”

79. “Mohsen Hojaji Gave Iranian Nation Dignity.”
80. Saeidi, “Hojaji’s Gaze,” 359.
81. Ibid.
82. Ibid., 358.
83. Karimi, “Iran/Syria: Iranian Soldier Beheaded by Islamic State”; Saeidi, “Hojaji’s Gaze,” 358.
84. “Families of Martyrs Also on Front Lines Defending Islam.”
85. Javad Zarif, Instagram.com, 11 August 2017.
86. Newberg, Neurotheology, 9, describes ‘myths’ as stories that incorporate a set of beliefs.
87. Osman, Female Personalities in the Qur’an and Sunna.
88. Dehghan, “Syrian Army Being Aided by Iranian Forces.”
89. Ansari and Tabrizi, “View from Tehran.”
90. Smyth, “Iran’s Afghan Shiite Fighters in Syria.”
91. Dagres, “Questioning Iran’s Regional Ambitions.”
92. Esfandiari, “Iran Praises ‘Martyrdom’ of Fighter.”
93. “Mohsen Hojaji Gave Iranian Nation Dignity.”
94. Ibid.
95. Smith, To Take Place, 109.
96. Durkheim, Elementary Forms of the Religious Life.
97. Stephenson, Ritual: A Very Short Introduction, 38–40.
98. Newberg, Neurotheology, 818.
99. Geertz, Local Knowledge, 124.
100. Vakil, “Qasem Soleimani’s Assassination.”
101. Fathollah-Nejad, “Islamic Republic of Iran Four Decades on,” 4.
102. Ibid.
103. Ibid. Fathollah-Nejad reports that at least 1500 protesters were killed and more than 2000 in-
jured.
04.
1 Fassihi, “Mourners Throng Iran’s Streets.”
105. Ahvaz hosted a crucial Iranian air base during the Iran–Iraq war, because of the city’s close
proximity to Iraq.
06.
1 Filkins, “Shadow Commander.”
107. “Iran Foreign Ministry Statement on Martyrdom.”
108. Bozorgmehr and Cornish, “Iran Draws Parallels with Suleimani Assassination.”
109. Pierce, Twelve Infallible Men, 74.
110. Lecomte, “al-Sakifa.”
111. Pierce, Twelve Infallible Men, 76. Vaglieri, “Fatima.”
112. Pierce, Twelve Infallible Men, 76.
113. Ibid., 76; Mandelung, “Shia.”
114. Pierce, Twelve Infallible Men, 77.
115. “Six Charts That Show How Hard.”
116. Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran.
117. Arango, Bergman, and Hubbard, “Qassim Suleimani, Master of Iran’s Intrigue.”
118. Faghihi, “Supreme Leader Khamenei Weeps.”

ORCID
Hanlie Booysen http://orcid.org/0000-0001-9058-5759

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