The Economic Role of the Greek City John Salmon Greece & Rome, 2nd Ser., Vol. 46, No. 2. (Oct., 1999), pp. 147-167. Stable URL http: flinks.jstor-org/sici?sici=0017-3835% 281999 10%292%3A46%3A2%3C 147% 3A TEROTG%3E2.0.CO%3B2-Q Greece & Rome is currently published by The Classical Association. Your use of the ISTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR’s Terms and Conditions of Use, available at bhupulwww.jstororg/about/terms.hunl. JSTOR’s Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of « journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial us. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at bhupswww jstor-org/journals/classical htm. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission, JSTOR is an independent not-for-profit organization dedicated to ereating and preserving a digital archive of scholarly journals. For more information regarding JSTOR, please contact support @jstor.org, hupuhvwwjstororg/ Fri Nov 3.02:12:52 2006Greece & Rome, Vol. xvi, No.2, October 1999 THE ECONOMIC ROLE OF THE GREEK CITY! By JOHN SALMON ‘The economic role of the state is controversial, even after the collapse of communism and the election of New Labour. The demand that governments get off the backs of wealth-creators has barely diminished since the 1980s; but some still urge control of private and corporate greed in the public interest. There is no sign of such controversy in Greek antiquity; but I shall suggest that the practice of the cities depended on political considerations which reveal comparable prin- ciples. All governments, whatever their complexion, now accept some responsibility for general economic well-being, even if their actions may amount to little more than a claim that prosperity will ‘trickle down’ from top to bottom, Numerous functions which would now be identified as economic were performed by Greek cities; after brief preliminaries to set the economic scene, I shall explore them, and try to determine why they were undertaken, ‘The commonest economic activity was the growing of food for consumption by the producer and his family: it is in this context that city economic activity must be assessed. In modern terms, overwhelm- ingly the most significant sector of production was agriculture; more importantly, the most frequent economic unit was the peasant house- hold.? Thus the most important economic factor was access to land, which the city controlled: land ownership was mainly restricted to citizens. That, however, is a political, not an economic phenomenon.” ‘The cities were enforcing a traditional practice: the communities from which cities grew were made up of those who farmed land in their territories. Even in the early period, some may have survived without plots, by crafts like pottery or metalwork; but their status is unknown; no doubt it differed from city to city. When we can investigate such issues, the landless were sometimes citizens: in 403, an unsuccessful proposal was made to restrict citizenship at Athens to landowners. It would, itis, reported, have disfranchised some 5,000. That was about a quarter of the citizen body; the context suggests that it was an overestimate.’ A quarter of citizens without land is a far higher proportion than else- where, for two reasons: many cities restricted citizenship to landowners;18 THE ECONOMIC ROLE OF THE GREEK CITY and there were far more opportunities for earning a living without land in Athens than elsewhere. ‘The norm in Athens, and probably in other cities, was that the producer owned his own plot. Tenant farming occurred, but was less ‘common.° The pattern of peasant proprietors, alongside élite owners of larger plots, severely limited the possibilities for economic change; basic peasant agriculture altered little throughout our period. Wealthier households could devise more intensive methods," but the opportunities available to the ordinary peasant household were less effective. ‘The Provider City ‘What was arguably the earliest and most extensive economic interven- tion concerns access to land: colonization in the eighth to the sixth centuries. The purpose was certainly in some sense economic; but the old explanation, that colonies were to improve conditions for trade conducted from the mother cities, is wrong in almost all cases. The trade explanation is still canvassed for Pithecusae, the earliest foundation, where there was much lively commercial activity: but here, the involve- ‘ment of the city is in question. There are many typical colonial features, especially an acropolis; but many residents were not Greek, and the excavator’s collaborator emphasizes doubts about the status of the settlement by pointedly referring to it as merely an ‘establishment’.” ‘The Greek settlers came from Chalcis and Eretria; but the formal involvement of those cities remains unclear. Nevertheless, a broadly economic motive for other foundations is evident — and not excluded at Pithecusae: the main purpose was to export from the mother cities part of a population which was growing too large. Land was therefore stolen from the inhabitants of Sicily and elsewhere; Sparta, significantly, stole instead from Greek neighbours in Messenia. In some cases, colonists were subjected to compulsion, especially at Thera when Cyrene was founded.” The export of excess population continued from the eighth century to c.500; Greek settle~ ments were scattered over most Mediterranean coasts, and even beyond. This form of action thus naturally had a much wider than merely economic effect: it considerably increased both the number of Greek cities and their geographical spread.” This is a clear example of intervention in the basic economic feature of land distribution. The city controlled inheritance patterns too:THE ECONOMIC ROLE OF THE GREEK CITY M9 normally sons inherited equal plots on the death of their father."° Details differed: in some cities, including Sparta, daughters also enjoyed (unequal) inheritance rightss'' but all cities controlled access to this, most significant economic resource, upon which at least some 50% of economic activity depended: that is the minimum Athenian figure, though it was probably usually a good deal higher than that;"? elsewhere it may sometimes ~ probably often — have exceeded 90%. After colonization, cities did not intervene to such drastic effect again; there was never such a direct and far-reaching attempt to improve the economic position of citizens by altering the balance between population and resources. Itis difficult to tell whether intervention on such a scale did not recur because there was never again such a pressing need, but there may have been something of that in it: by c.500, when colonization was largely over, there were more economic opportunities in the Greek world at large, if not in all cities, and mobility was greater. Those without viable plots could survive in other ways; but they could not always do so at home, In what follows I shall trace and try to explain two broad forms of action by the cities. The first is direct, when they provided goods or services themselves, and the second indirect, when they facilitated or intervened in the activity of those under their authority. ‘The Purchaser City ‘The most obvious direct activity of the cities was as purchasers, perhaps ‘most conspicuously of public buildings; thus craftsmen, even odd-job ‘men, were provided with employment. Cities built numerous structures: sanctuaries, with temples and other sacred buildings, public amenities such as fountains, market places, fortifications, harbours and ship sheds. ‘The scale of activity differed enormously from city to city. The building of the Periclean generation in Attica was the most impressive: it included (among other things) the Parthenon and the Propylaea, and on its own, accounted for about three times the work done in Corinth in the three centuries from 700 to 400. Put another way, between 450 and 425 Athens built 30 or 40 times as much as an average Corinthian generation; yet Corinth was more active in this respect than anywhere else in the Greek world apart from Athens."? This Athenian generation ‘was the most productive; but those before and after were not negligible: rather under half as much work was done in 480-450, and about a150 ‘THE ECONOMIC ROLE OF THE GREEK CITY quarter even during the Peloponnesian War, in 425-400. Naturally other cities undertook far less. ‘Comparisons can be made between public building and other kinds of activity. Figures for the temple at Epidaurus enable estimates of the number of craftsmen involved in that scheme to be made; the results can. be used to determine the number employed elsewhere too. They suggest that something of the order of 800 masons, quarrymen and others worked on the stone of the Parthenon, from quarry to finished building; the total work force would not have exceeded 1,000 by much, if at all."* ‘That puts the significance of such structures into proper perspective In this Athenian generation, public building was more extensive than ever again, even when some cities enjoyed the patronage of Hellenistic kings, or when much of the Greek world enjoyed that of Hadrian, Even so, the workforce was probably less than 2% of the total adult male population; at other periods it was far less.'® Athens stood out at the top Of this scale. Most other cities had defensive walls by the late fourth century, and some had considerable complements of temples and related buildings: Epidaurus began a scheme in the first half of the fourth century which lasted into the thirds" but none of this brought other cities to anything like even the Corinthian, let alone the Athenian level. Construction of naval vessels is more difficult to quantify. We do not know how long triremes lasted, and have no evidence for the total size of, the Athenian complement over a lengthy period;!” but naval construc tion must have been significant, and was probably more consistent than public building: it was presumably maintained at an even level, as far as possible, throughout the period of Athenian supremacy at sea, from the late 480s to 322 - with a gap of a decade or so after the end of the Peloponnesian War. Other coastal cities undertook some activity; but few could build a fleet even a tenth as large as Athens. Triremes, like fortifications, were military resources. Other military requirements demanded little public capital expenditure. Land warfare mainly involved the delivery of armed hoplites; normally they provided their own armour. A more important item was pay: at least in Athens both hoplites and rowers in action received it regularly."* Cities did not only purchase material items; Athens spent much on political services. This was a central feature of democracy: Thucydides has Pericles say in the Funeral Speech (2.37.2): ‘No-one, so long as he has it in him to be of service to the state, is kept in political obscurity because of poverty.’ That does not imply that wealth brought noTHE ECONOMIC ROLE OF THE GREEK CITY 151 advantages, for men of influence were always wealthy; rather, ordinary citizens who performed political tasks were paid. Our sources, wealthy contemporaries (not excluding Thucydides: cf. 8.97), saw the principle as a means of enrichment for ordinary Athenians.'? One consideration may have been self-interest; but the political purpose was important too: all citizens were equally qualified. Unless pay was provided, many would be excluded because they could not afford time away from their daily tasks of earning a living. Significantly, political tasks were established first, and pay attached to them later. The political consideration was primary; pay made the principle real” We should not rely for our judgement of political pay on exactly those wealthy contemporaries whom it deprived of political control; naturally they complained bitterly when they had to pay for its implementation, ‘The extent to which such payments were made elsewhere is unclear. We have details only for Athens; pay is recorded in other cities, and plays a significant role in Aristotle’s Polizics,”' but we cannot determine its importance elsewhere. The scale of Athenian payments cannot be calculated precisely; but it eventually became large (Ath, Pol. 62.2). At least thirty times a year, 5,000 citizens received a drachma each for attending the assembly; at ten further meetings the payment was 1% dr. Lower payments were made to jurors each day when the courts sat - that is, all days but holidays; councillors and archons, and probably other magistrates,” were paid larger amounts as often. Hansen calculates the total in the second half of the fourth century as rather under 100 talents? Payments for attendance at festivals (theorika), cannot be quantified. A standard daily wage in the early 320s was 2 dr.s* the total citizen population was perhaps some 30,000.* On these figures, political pay of 100 T would provide 5% of citizens with 400 dr. p.a. each. Naturally 5% of citizens did not receive such payments full time; they were distributed among a much greater number. It would be more accurate to suggest that over a period the average Athenian family derived 5% of its income from political pay than that 5% of Athenians derived all their income from that source. This factor alone accounts for a considerable shift away from the pattern of producer consumption as a result of city activity. Other factors are negligible in comparison, but add to the shift. Even in the Periclean generation, public building and the construction of triremes together accounted for, at most, 5% of adult males at a time of high population, when political payments were limited. Thus political pay182 THE ECONOMIC ROLE OF THE GREEK CITY supported 5% of citizens, and construction wages no more than 5% of adult males. The two percentages are of different totals and for different times, and cannot be added together; well under 10%, perhaps no more than 5%, both of citizens and of total adult males, were supported by the city at any one time. ‘There are further implications. Those Athenians who received such payments had to buy food in the market. Other city activity, again politically driven, explains the development of a market for precisely the complementary reason: the need of producers to raise cash. City expenditure was not covered by income; some of the shortfall was made up by liturgies: they were parly a means of ensuring, in the absence of progressive taxation, that the wealthy paid for city services in proportion to their wealth. Osborne draws attention to an important consequence.”* Most liturgies demanded cash expenditure; the Athen- ian élite sold produce on the market to obtain that cash. Estimates can be made for liturgies as for political pay. The total cost of agonistic liturgies was 20 T in a Panathenaic year, and rather less in others. The total for trierarchies varied with the number of vessels at sea A conservative estimate is 3,000 dr. (¥ T) each: at that rate, the 120 ships which served in 356 cost 60 talents.”” The total of 80 T is remarkably close to that of pay for conversion into food. The closeness of the two figures may be coincidence; but the total sums raised for liturgies by the wealthy and spent after political service by citizens were of the same order of magnitude. The city also devoted much effort to ensuring, as far as possible, that its inhabitants who needed imported cereals to survive could buy them fon the market, and there were even payments for those unable for various reasons to support themselves; for these further instances of provision, see below, p. 158. The Vendor City It was not only as purchasers that cities offered economic opportunities: they also sold them — mainly to the wealthy, since capital was required. Cities paid to have their various functions performed. There was little employment in a civil service; tasks were let out to contract. In Athens, the right to work silver mines was sold. Presumably that was a standard pattern: where a city’s territory enjoyed resources, especially mines, it sold the right to exploit them. Even cities without such raw materials‘THE ECONOMIC ROLE OF THE GREEK CITY 183 could sell contracts for the collection of taxes and let out, for example, shops or pitches in the agora; and public property could be rented.”* ‘The scale of sales will have varied considerably from city to city and from time to time. Alll these activities had economic consequences, sometimes major ones; but it is most unlikely that they were undertaken for economic purposes except in the obvious sense that some of them raised income. Public buildings provided jobs; but that was probably not their inten- tion, even in part. In the most active Athenian generation, no more than 2% of the adult male population was involved in the work. The status of workers also makes it unlikely that the provision of employment was a motive. Inscriptions give the status of those who worked on the Erechtheum, and they were probably broadly typical: among the work- men whose status is known, metics outnumbered citizens in every group; slaves of metics were also more numerous than those of citizens.” Since citizens gained less benefit than metics, it is improbable that any significant part of the purpose was to provide employment. The (Old Oligarch often accuses the Athenians of greed for other kinds of pay, but not for this (Ps.-Xen. Ath. Pol: see esp. i.13; ii.9). This is an argument from silence; but, given the author’s prejudices, the silence is, loud. Outside Athens, the desire to provide employment is even more improbable. Epidaurus had to import workers. The building accounts, show that the same is true of Delphi; no doubt Olympia was similar. Aristotle suggested a political reason, if an improbable one, for public buildings: he noted the works of the Cypselids at Corinth, the Peisis- tratids at Athens, and Polycrates at Samos not to mention the builders, of the pyramids in Egypt — and argued that they were designed to engage the population in work so that they had no time for political activity (1313 b 18-25). He suggests, strangely, that ‘all of these have the same consequences, both lack of leisure and poverty among the subjects? (1313 +b 24-5). It is not clear why they mean poverty. Perhaps he assumes that the work was unpaid; if so, he was probably wrong, at least for his Greek examples. Aristotle as a revealing further passage. He considers how oligarchies may best be preserved, and argues that when magistrates in oligarchies, enter office ‘they should make magnificent sacrifices and construct some public work, so that the people share in the banquets and observe that the city is made beautiful, and see the constitution maintained because they are pleased by the offerings and the buildings. At the same time154 THE ECONOMIC ROLE OF THE GREEK CITY there will be reminders of the expenditure of the wealthy. But now the members of oligarchies do not do this, but the opposite, for they want the material gains no less than they want the honour’ (1321 a 35-42). ‘That is good evidence that public buildings were more likely to be provided by democratic or (as Aristotle has already observed) tyrant régimes. There is no question here of construction in order to provide employment, even though Aristotle’s explicit intention is to explain what can reconcile the ordinary population to an oligarchic constitution. Oligarchs were ungenerous: in this respect, as often, they ignored Aristotle's sound advice.”” He never suggests that a motive for such schemes was the desire to provide employment. Aristotle was perfectly capable of ignoring the obvious; but he could not have written as he did if a commonly accepted motive for public building schemes was to provide work. ‘The reasons for public building differed from case to cases but we should follow Aristotle in characterizing them as broadly political Triremes and fortifications were military necessities. Temples and other structures for the gods were not so obviously utilitarian; but their political content is clear. Tyrants built many of the early examples. Aristotle correctly identified the motive as political, but was wrong about its nature; the tyrants were not only demonstrating the magnificence of the gods, but also their own. Athens was similar: the Periclean pro- gramme celebrated and demonstrated the city’s achievements: it was conspicuous consumption by the city. City Facilities Inall these way’ cities undertook direct economic action; but the motive was generally not to generate economic activity, but to secure desirable goods or services. They also undertook indirect action, by facilitating or intervening in the economic activity of others. Building schemes in which the city was both purchaser and facilitator provide a link between direct and indirect activity. The first examples are Corinthian: the work of Periander. The harbour he had constructed at Lechaeum was large enough to serve Corinthian needs for centuries, even though it was one of the busiest ports in the Greek mainland, He considered cutting a canal through the isthmus, but in fact built a dragway which enabled ships to be carried across it: the diolkos. In each case, he probably intended to benefit merchant shipping.” Polycrates built a harbour moleTHE ECONOMIC ROLE OF THE GREEK CITY 155 at Samos (Hdt. 3.60.3). The Peiraeus became Athens’ port when ‘Themistocles as archon observed its potential (Thuc. 1.93.3). The original motive was probably military, since it was more easily defensible than the beach at Phalerum; but facilities were provided for merchants, beginning in the second half of the fifth century or perhaps earlier.” Even inland settlements boasted comparable structures; by Hellenistic times, most cities made public provision for the convenience of market traders in the agora, the market place.” ‘These facilities may have been designed to encourage the activities which they served, from long-range merchants who could exploit the diolkos ot harbour facilities to (at the other end of the scale) retail sellers in the agora; but that conclusion would be premature. Charges could be levied for their use. By the Hellenistic period a major reason was the cities’ self-regard: it was a mean place which did not provide an agora. Pausanias looked down his sophisticated nose at Panopeus in Phocis because it possessed none of the expected facilities of a city, including precisely that (10.4.1) Corinth is a useful test: Periander did not build the dioikos to encourage trade for its own sake, It cut out the perilous journey round Cape Malea and shortened many voyages; but not only did it fail to benefit merchants who worked out of Corinthian ports, it did them positive damage. They already had access both to the Saronic and to the Corinthian Gulf; but the diolkos opened the western route to com- petition from others, including Aegina. If Periander’s purpose had been to improve conditions for merchants, he must have had those who worked out of Corinth in mind; since their interests were harmed by the diolkos, it was not built primarily to help merchants. An obvious alternative is to hand: it was to earn income. ‘The Lechaeum harbour could benefit those who worked out of Corinth; but the diolkos strongly suggests that Periander’s main motive was to earn income. That fits admirably with a fragment of the Cor. Pol. (Constitution of the Corinthians), which reports that he was content with taxes on markets and harbours (Ar. ft. 611.20 Rose). That is not strictly the same as dues for the harbour and the diolkos, though they might well be included in such a description; but it firmly identifies his commercial facilities as generators of income. The report has a special call on our credit: it emphasizes Periander’s moderation. That must reflect the general truth: it contradicts the traditional view, endorsed by Aristotle himself (Pol. 1313 a 34-7), that he was a typical repressive tyrant.156 ‘THE ECONOMIC ROLE OF THE GREEK CITY The Regulator City It was not only by providing facilities that cities intervened in economic activity. They regulated it, precisely in the facilities which they provided. Aristotle lists the essential functions of magistrates, and begins, ‘the first is control of the marketplace’.’* Sadly, what follows is unhelpful in detail: those in charge of the agora are ‘to oversee agreements and ensure ‘good order’ (1321 b 13-14). Other related matters are the maintenance of the city’s physical appearance, carried out mostly by astynomoi (city- controllers: 1321 b 18-24); more detail is revealed by the names given to offices in the more populous cities: wall-makers, guards of the harbours, and those responsible for fountains (1321 b 24-7) Economic intervention was mainly performed through agoranomoi. By the Hellenistic period, we have much evidence for their functions, mainly from inscriptions; earlier, almost everything is Athenian, pre- served by Ath. Pol. They ‘are responsible for everything that is sold, to ensure that what is on sale is pure and without blemish’ (51.1) Hellenistic evidence demonstrates that one aspect of their function elsewhere was to control the weights and measures against which goods for sale were quantified; but in Athens that was the duty of ‘metronomoi (weights and measures controllers), who ‘take care of all the measures and weights, so that the sellers use just ones’ (51.2). Such measures are not infrequently found in excavation.” ‘The astynomoi ‘take care that none of the dung-collectors leaves dung within ten stades of the city wall; they prevent the construction of buildings on the streets, of balconies above the streets, of pipes above ground level with outlets onto the street, and of windows which open onto the street; they remove those who die on the streets, for they have control of public slaves’ (50.2). The fullest information about astynomoi is given in a Pergamene law, Hellenistic in origin, which makes often highly sophisticated attempts to ensure that individuals create no nuisance to the general public or to neighbours.” Part of the duties of Athenian astynomot is surprising, but introduces an important factor: price control. “They see to it that the gir! players of the pipes, the harp and the lyre are not hired for more than two drachmae; and if quite a number of men are keen to take the same girl, they draw lots and hire her out to the successfull man’ (50.2). It was once famously asserted that you cannot buck the market; when govern- ments have tried, speculators have usually overwhelmed them. InTHE ECONOMIC ROLE OF THE GREEK CITY 137 ‘Athens, however, chance prevented the market from determining who got a desirable commodity, ‘That is a minor instance of price control, and we cannot tell how successful it was: regulations have rarely deterred the wealthy from colluding to evade them.” A much more interesting example of price control is found in the duties of other Athenian magistrates, the sitophylakes (corn-guardians: 51.3). ‘Their number reflects their import- ance. ‘The standard number of such magistrates was ten: five each for Athens and the Peiraeus (50.2-51.2: astynomoi, agoranomoi, and metro- nomoi). The same was originally true of sitophylakes, but their numbers increased to 20 for Athens and 15 for the Peiraeus.”” ‘Their functions explain their significance: ‘they take care, first, that the underground ‘com is sold justly in the agora, and then that the millers sell the barley- meal at prices which relate to those of the barley, and that the bread- sellers sell their loaves at the weights which they fix and at prices which relate to those of the wheat’ (51.3). Price control is evident: but apart from the matter of weight, which is similar to the function of metronomoi, it is control over profit margins. Athens could not control the price of imported cereals, but it was possible to ensure that what consumers were charged was related to the import price: that neither millers nor bakers made excessive profits. A speech of Lysias, Against the Corn Dealers (xxii), gives further clues. The charges are serious: they carry the death penalty. The case concerns retailers, who could not buy more than 50 phormoi (literally, baskets: possibly a measure): the purpose was presumably to stop hoarding. A maximum profit of an obol was fixed; but it is unclear whether that means an obol per phormos or per drachma: the former would mean a low, the latter a high profit” Garnsey reports that the assembly fixed cereal prices artificially low in the crisis of the 320s.*" That is accurate, but perhaps misleading: the reference is to the sale of small quantities received in dues by the sanctuary at Fleusis. It was not an attempt to fix prices for an imported commodity. ‘The importance of the control of cereal prices is not to be measured by the proportion of the inhabitants of Attica who relied on the market for their food because they received payments from the city: many others used imported cereals. In an average year, perhaps a third of the cereals consumed were imported: it may have been either more or less."? ‘The duties of sizophylakes are a specific example of attempts to ensure fair dealing in the market place in general; but because of the enormous158 THE ECONOMIC ROLE OF THE GREEK CITY importance of imported cereals for Athens, intervention was more extensive in this matter than in any other. Athens used other methods to ensure the food supply which go well beyond mere regulation; we return here to the function of the city as provider. It was a stated item of business at the principal monthly assembly meeting; beyond regular administrative and legal matters, there were only two such other items: whether the magistrates were performing their functions properly, and the defence of the territory (Ath, Pol. 43.4). What the assembly might do if difficulties arose is unclear; but attempts were made to encourage, and sometimes to require, merchants to bring cereals to the Peiraeus.*” Diplomatic and legislative methods were used. The evidence for the former is concen- trated on the Bosporan kingdom, but other efforts may have been made elsewhere. Legislation required all merchants whom Athens could control to ship cereals there, No resident of Attica might carry cereals anywhere but to the Peiraeus; and since trade was heavily dependent on maritime loans, all such loans made by residents of Attica had to issue in a voyage carrying cereals to Athens.** Again, death was the punishment for contravention, In all these ways, Athens tried to secure food supplies for her inhabitants; there is no sign of advantages for citizens except on the few recorded occasions when cereals were distributed free.“* The methods did not require major expenditure; that was only needed in times of crisis, such as the 320s, Benefactors then gave money when cor commissioners were appointed to raise funds to purchase cereals; others sold large quantities at as litte as a third of the market price. The former is the only known Athenian example of the raising of funds to buy food. ‘These measures were taken for the benefit of many in a general crisis. ‘The city made other payments regularly to fewer people, but equally as a result of crisis. Sons of Athenians who died in battle were maintained at public expense until they reached manhood; the practice was not only Athenian (Ar, Pol. 1268 a 8-11). Athens even had a rudimentary form of social security: ‘there is a law which requires the council to examine men who own less than three minae’ (thus, a means test) ‘and are so disabled in their bodies that they are unable to do any work, and to give each of them, at public expense, two obols a day’ (Ath. Pol. 49.4) Comparisons are difficult; but these rates were probably even lower than social security is now: see above, n. 24. Almost all this evidence for regulation, and sometimes more, is‘THE ECONOMIC ROLE OF THE GREEK CITY 159 Athenian; it represents the interventionist end of the spectrum in the classical period. There is Hellenistic material from many more cities. Some indirect evidence suggests price controls. The agoranomos is prohibited from fixing them for sales at a festival at Andania (SIG 736). Paradoxically, that may imply that normally he could fix them; at least it shows that price fixing was not unknown. Prices figure promin- ently in the classic statement of the virtues of an agoranomes, from Astypalaea: “he looked after the people with all enthusiasm, and took care of the affairs of the market place and saw to it that goods were sold as cheaply and justly as possible’ (SIG? 946) Some inscriptions record regulatory laws. Among the earliest is a fourth-century example from Erythrae concerning the sale of wool. It ‘must, among other things, be sold by proper measures, in the agora, and at specified times. It must not be displayed while it is raining: wet wool is heavier than dry."® Perhaps the most interesting document regulates the sale of wood and charcoal at Delos.‘” The case is comparable to that of Athenian cereal imports. Wood used on Delos had to be imported: the island can have produced little, if any, itself. If sellers were given too hard a time, they would not sell. Nevertheless, the law skilfully uses ‘market mechanisms to make conditions as favourable for purchasers as possible. Sellers must declare prices before they begin business: they are forbidden not only to raise prices after they have made their declaration, but also to reduce them. The intention will have been to fix a price, not as high as the market would bear, but as low as profit margins would allow. It may be impossible to buck the market; but regulations can influence it for the general benefit. It was in respect of the food supply that Athens intervened most extensively; Hellenistic cities shared that preoccupation. They some- times made loans to merchants to import cereals.** Agoranomoi might persuade retailers to sell below the market price.” In times of difficulty, wealthy citizens loaned or gave money to secure cereals for purchase, pethaps at a subsidized price." In Samos, a permanent fund was set up from which loans were made: the interest purchased cereals for free distribution to citizens; it might also be used to lend to merchants who wished to import cereals for the market.‘ Strikingly, these interventions reveal no attempts to encourage eco- nomic activity for its own sake. The most extensive intervention was undertaken precisely in order to stimulate imports, not exports; there is, no encouragement of exports to pay for imported cereals, No doubt in Athens silver mines provided a large proportion of what was exchanged160 for imported cereals - and for at least one other major import requirement, timber for the navy; but there is no sign that the inflow and the outflow were connected. No city is known to have discriminated between imports and exports when levying harbour taxes.®° The Athen- ian monopoly on the export of ruddle from Ceos is no doubt an example of an imperial power exploiting its position for economic advantage; but the reason for itis unclear, and again it concerns (from the Athenian point of view) imports, not exports.*° The only case known to me which might reflect modern preoccupations is that Thasian ships were not to import wine from elsewhere; but the context suggests that the possibility of adulteration may have been the problem (IG xii Suppl. 347 ii). A serious attempt to prevent competition with the local product is unlikely. ‘Thasian wine needed no protection: it was widely exported. The Just City? The activity of Greek cities had significant economic effects; but the reasons for intervention remain to be determined. Attempts to generate ‘economic activity are improbable. No Greek knew that there was such a thing as an economy. The word is Greek in origin, but has a limited meaning: it refers to the running of the household. Greeks (indeed, Aristotle himself) pursued almost every field of enquiry known to the ‘modern world - with the exception of economics: the work with that tile insultingly preserved under his name is feeble.°° In the Politics, Aristotle viewed the city as coming into existence partly for reasons which we should call economic. That is not quite explicit in the early chapters, which explain how households join together in villages, and then villages in cities, and that thus self-sufficiency is achieved (1252 b 15-30). An economic content is suggested by the notion of self-sufficiency, and is demonstrated by a closely related and explicitly economic passage. When discussing agoranomoi, Aristotle writes, ‘For it is almost necessary for all cities to buy and sell goods for each others’ requirements of necessities, and this fact is a very great encouragement to self-sufficiency, for which men seem to come together in a constitution’ (1321 b 14-18). His reconstruction explicitly identifies the city as a community which reaches self-sufficiency when its members buy and sell goods to one another. Aristotle should thus be alive to economic possibilities; but there is very little in the Politics on the subject. The explanation is partly his‘THE ECONOMIC ROLE OF THE GREEK CITY 161 interests as revealed in the opening chapters. He has argued that economic factors help to establish the city, but he is more interested in what can occur subsequently — and consequently: ‘while the city came into being in order to secure life, ° (that is what we should call the economic factor), ‘it continues in being to secure the good life’ (1252 b 29-30). It is the good life, for which participation in a political ‘community is central, in which Aristotle is interested. That interest, however, is itself determined by what Greek cities did. Just as ‘Thucydides’ account of the origins of the Peloponnesian War demon- strates that there was no significant economic content in them, so Aristotle demonstrates in the Politics that cities did not perceive themselves as having the function of encouraging growth. The primacy of politics is emphasized when Aristotle imagines a commu- nity which performs, among other things, the limited economic functions of a city but nor the political; for him, it does not deserve to be called a city.” A significant passage demonstrates the importance of political con siderations. If a city has sufficient revenues, the money ‘should be collected into a single fund and distributed to those who have no resources, especially if it is possible to collect enough to purchase a plot of land, but if not that, then to start in trade or in farming’ (1320 a 36-b 1). In modern terms, this seems like a fund for venture capitals but, the context is revealingly different. Aristotle is considering how to preserve democracies; the argument is that if prosperity can be main- tained, the constitution will be more stable. The policy is politically driven: if citizens are prosperous, the constitution will not be under threat (1320 a 32-b 17);* there is no question of a responsibility of the city to ensure or generate prosperity. Even the regulation of economic affairs has a significant political component. Aristotle defines the function of the agoranomoi as the oversight of agreements and good order; he associates them closely with the astynomoi, who perform part of the planning function (above). Both activities have an economic content; but their purpose is just one aspect of the function of regulating all forms of behaviour among. citizens. The astynomoi regulate private building activity to ensure that it does not encroach on the interests of others; the agoranomoi do the same in a different sphere. Most obviously, they control the quality of goods for sale, and weights and measures; the general case is demon- strated by the inscription from Astypalaea which praises an agoranomos because in his term of office goods were available ‘as cheaply and justly162 THE ECONOMIC ROLE OF THE GREEK CITY as possible’: if a just price is a cheap price, justice is the interest of the consumer. Public buildings were less frequent under oligarchies than other régimes, as Aristotle saw, partly for reasons of private greed (above, pp. 153-4). Similarly with economic intervention: it was undertaken by broadly democratic régimes. The purpose was to safeguard the con- sumer. That is entirely appropriate: the wealthy need no protection. In the classical period, we have evidence from almost nowhere but Athens. ‘What we have is thus democratic; but it is unclear whether oligarchies intervened similarly. There is no evidence, but such régimes were extremely unlikely to afford such protection. A chilling passage of Aristotle (Pol. 1310 a 6-10) suggests rather that oligarchs who enjoyed Political and economic power exploited both all too effectively: ‘in oligarchies the oligarchs (should act) on behalf of the demos, and swear oaths opposite to those which they swear now: for in some they now swear, “I shall be an enemy to the demos and shall plot whatever evil I can”? Hellenistic cities were not as democratic as Athens; but after Persia had controlled through oligarchies, Alexander encouraged democracies when he took Asia Minor. Democracy in this period relied less on the lot than Athens, and election for magistracies allowed the wealthy to fulfil their ambitions; but there persisted something of the accommodation between wealthy and ordinary citizens which had characterized the Athenian pattern. The wealthy enjoyed office and influence, and naturally the maintenance of their wealth, in return for expenditure: euergetism.*' In truly democratic Athens, the absence of progressive taxation did not prevent the demos from requiring their élite to spend from their deep pockets for the common good in liturgies (above, p. 152); the Hellenistic élite could not be compelled, but for some time they were successfully persuaded. We cannot trace the reasons for the shift in the balance of the relationship in favour of the wealthy, though no demos was as experienced in countering the power of wealth, and exploiting it for its own benefit, as the Athenian; but it was probably well under way when Roman power greatly increased its momentum." Attempts to improve conditions for ordinary citizens go as far back as colonization: those who could not support themselves gained new land, either in colonies or (a factor not ofien noted) from the plots which colonists left behind. Solon’s seisacheheia is another early attempt to improve conditions for members of the citizen community. The main beneficiaries were the hectemors; whatever they were, their relationshipTHE ECONOMIC ROLE OF THE GREEK CITY 163 with those to whom they owed a sixth of their produce was economic at least in the sense that it affected their ability to support themselves. Solon cut the ties by cancelling the obligations without recompense to the stronger party: a remarkably early case of intervention in favour of the weak against the strong. It was once fashionable to identify the problems of hectemors as economic too, since they could not support themselves on their plots; but that view is now most unlikely. Their obligations were probably social or political in origin - though naturally they had serious economic consequences. Something of an economic meal was once made of some of Solon’s other legislation. He offered citizenship to foreigners who settled in Athens and practised a craft, and absolved Athenian sons from the obligation to look after their fathers in their old age if they had failed to teach them a craft; and he forbade the export of all agricultural produce but olives and their oil. These measures might be interpreted as an attempt to alter the character of the economy: he saw that the land could not support its population, and tried to encourage a switch to the cultivation of olives as an export crop, and the development of crafts, to support those whose plots were too small. If true, these interpretations would make Solon unique in his attempts at economic direction; but they are extremely unlikely. Solon probably did not think Attica incapable of supporting its population: it was only in the fifth century that the territory became unable, in average years, to feed its inhabit- ants. The formulation of the rule does not imply that the export of olives and their produce was encouraged, but rather that other exports were prohibited: Solon frowned on the sale of Attic produce abroad when Attic mouths remained hungry. It was an intervention in the economy, but its purpose was again political: protection of the weak against the strong. ‘When properly interpreted, the legislation of Solon fits precisely with much other economic intervention. It protected the interests of con- sumers in a community of citizens, to prevent what was inappropriate exploitation by producers: it was control of private greed in the public interest. Most other interventions can be similarly interpreted: the encouragement of cereal imports to Athens, or the law regulating the sale of wood at Delos, were again intended to give consumers ~ that is, the citizen body ~ all the advantages the city could devise. What we do not find is attempts to encourage economic activity to provide new earning opportunities. ‘Some possibilities might be canvassed: none is persuasive. Peisistratus168 THE ECONOMIC ROLE OF THE GREEK CITY ‘made loans to the poor for their work, so that they could support themselves by farming’ (Arh. Pol. 16.2); but the purpose is doubtful. It has been suggested that the intention was to enable them to survive while they switched from cereals to olives or vines,“° but that is unlikely. It depends to some extent on a false view of Solon’s legislation concerning olive exports, and implies highly improbable reliance by peasants on cash crops. The loans were probably not intended to change the pattern of land use, but to help temporarily in making ends meet; they were not necessarily widespread. It is (hardly reliably) reported that Peisistratus supplied those who were idling in the agora with ploughing teams and seed (Ael. Var. Hist. 9.25); perhaps he lent them. Loans were crucial to Athenian commercial activity; but they were always private. Special arrangements were made in the courts for the convenience of those who engaged in commerce,®” but that was the extent of public encourage- ment ~ and it was closely related to cereal imports. City loans are often found in the Hellenistic period, but they were not to encourage economic activity: rather, they generated income in the form of interest. One fund, the interest from which financed cereal imports, might also be used to lend to merchants to import cereals. Such loans may have been imposed compulsorily on the wealthy, though I know of no evidence which quite demonstrates that. Many city schemes, for example Samian corn distributions, depended on such loan interest. Similar loans were used in Miletus and Teos to enable the city to pay for school-teachers. Sadly, education is now an economic issue: it is viewed, indeed it is skewed, as training for a life of work. No such connection was made in antiquity. Hellenistic cities took an interest in the education of their citizens: they sometimes funded prizes for good performance.” Facilities were provided at Miletus and Teos, and probably elsewhere, for the education of boys and sometimes girls.” Such schemes had no economic purpose. The notion that a well- educated citizen would be economically useful is alien: a litle learning goes nowhere in a field. Even in Athens, where basic literacy among citizens accompanied democracy,” the city played no role in the teaching of reading and writing. Significantly, where it undertook training, the purpose was military: young men served in the ephebeia for two years from the age of 18.” Greek cities intervened in economic matters less frequently than is now normal; that is largely because fewer methods of intervention were available. When cities did intervene, their purpose was broadly political,THE ECONOMIC ROLE OF THE GREEK CITY 165 and depended heavily on the nature of the régime. Democracies curbed excessive exploitation; probably the only significant interventions by oligarchic régimes were no doubt frequent judgements made by oligarchic courts in the interests of the wealthy against their victims. ‘Members of oligarchies kept off the backs of the holders of wealth; in ancient conditions, the ‘justification’ that they were also creators of wealth was even less plausible. As always in the Greek world, politics were primary. Economists have made many advances since the Greeks failed to invent their discipline, but in this respect little has changed: when states (that is ~ unlike in Athens ~ when governments) determine economic policy, politics remain primary. NOTES 1. Im is fis form this paper was piven ata conference at Delphi in September 1994 which was supported by the John Hicks Foundation and organized by Dr A. Courakis Tam very fateful to him for his invitation to explore the economic role of the Greek city for (among fthes) economists; I hope thatthe explanations of some base features ofthe Word of the Greek ‘iy remain appropriate in the new location. Iam very gratefl to al those who commented, and ‘specally to Robin Osborne. Inthe longer tem, I owe an enormous debt eo Malcolm Ercington, ‘who frst guided my ignorant atempts to explore the Hellenistic city. All remaining erors are mine alone "2. Mluminated especially by T. Gallant, Risk and Suruval in Ancient Grece (London, 1991) 3. MIL Finley, The Ancient Economy (London and Berkeley, 1983), 156. 4 Lys, 24 ised the speaker to exaggerate the number who would have suffered from the proposal. The citizen population, even in this period of extreme difficulty, is unlikely to have been less than 20,000 (belo p 151) 5. R Osborne, Chiron 18 (1988), 270-323, 6. L. Foxhall, Secking the Ancient Econom: Olive Cultivation in Anciont Grece (Oxford, forthcoming), Ch. 2 "7D. Ridgway, The Fist Wester Greeks (Cambridge, 1992); cf, R. Osbome, Grece in the Making 1200479 B.C. (London and New York, 1996), 114-1 ‘3. CE, however, Osborne, op. ct. (7), 8-15. 9. A.J. Graham, “The Colonial Expantion of Greece’, in CAH” ii3 (Cambridge, 1982), 83.162 10. R. Lane Fox in P. Cardedge and F, D. Harvey (ed), Gna: Esays presented 10 GB. de Sie Cro on his 75th biahday Cexeter, 1985), 208-32. IL. $. Hodkinson, CQ 36 (1986), 378-406. 12. P. Garnses, Famine and Food Supply in the Graze Roman World (Cambridge, 1988), aves figures for the proportion of inhabitants of AMtica who could be fed on the cereal igre S0% i for a year of normal harvest, a minimum. For argument that Gamsey may have been ‘optimist cf. M._ Whitby. “The Grain Trade of Athens in the Fourth Century B., in HE Parkins and C. Smithy Trad, Traders andthe Ancien City (London, 1998), 102-28. 13, CE A. Burford, The Greck Tomple Builder at Epidauna: a soi and economic study of ‘ning in the Asclepion sanctuary cong the fuch and early third cenunes B.C. CLiverpoel, 1969), exp, 199-200 14. T expect to jusify these conclusions on public building elsewhere. 15 1assume a total populauon of 200,000 fo 250,000 at its highest point, before the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War: Garnse, op. cit. (a. 12), 123, 16. Burford, op. ct (0.13) 17. PL}. Rhodes, Commentary on the Arisotelian Athenaon Poiteia (Oxford, 1981), 546,166 ‘THE ECONOMIC ROLE OF THE GREEK TY 18, W. K Phitchet, The Grech State at War Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1974, i 3-29, 19. CE eg. Ps-Xen. th Pal. (the Old Oligareh), 13 20, Crain cases are the councils the courts, and the assembly see Ah, Pol. 27.3-4 (courts), 43 (assembly), 62.2, with Rhodes, op. cit (9.17), ad lee. 21. GEM. de Ste Croix, CQ 28 (1975), 48-52 22.1 am not persuaded by M. H. Hansen (Symbolae Osoenses $4 (1979), $-22) that magistrates other than archons were generally unpaid in the fourth century, but there is litle evidence; see Rhodes, op. ct (8.17), 695 23. The Athenian Democracy in the Age of Denosthens (Oxford, 1991), 315-16; whether ‘magistrates were paid in the fourth century (above, n. 22) makes lite diference wo the overall figures. "24 Rates of 1%, 2, 2%, and 3 de are preserved in the Heusis accounts of the period: 1G i.2* 1672, 28-30 ete, IIT ete, 28 etc, and 160 respectively. 25. Garey, 0p. eit. (@, 12) 136-7 (20,000—80,000); Whitby, op. cit, (a. 12), 108-11 (30,000 or over 26, In J. W. Rich and A. Wallace-Hadil, City and Country inthe Ancient World (Leicester ‘Nottingham Studies in Ancient Society 2: London, 1991), 11945, 27 Osborne, op it. (26), 130-1 with references 28. Osbome, op. ce. (25) 29. RH Randall, AfA $7 (1953), 199-210, especially tbles 1 and 2; the Figures fr slaves may be somewhat skewed by the exceptional Simias: a metic mason who worked with five of his ‘own slaves 30. There suppor forthe conchsion from Corinth, Some building was undertaken there by the oligarchic régime which succeeded the tyrant, but all the large projects replaced temples ‘which had been burnt they were not new (Salmon, Weal Corinth (Oxford, 1984), 180-1). 31. Salmon, op. it (R30), 133-4, 135-9; onthe dls, G. Raepsuet and E. Tolley, BCH 117 (1993), 233-61 32. R. Gatland, The Piraeus (London, 1987) 433. RE Wychevkey, How the Grass Bull Cities (London, 1949), $0-86; more specifically, J.J, Coulton, The Grek Siaa Oxford, 1978). 34 CER. M. Cook, HS 89 (1978), 153-3 35. Poi. 1321 b 12-13; we should not conclude that this was in Aristote’'s view the most lmportnt function performed by magistrates, another list in Book 4 (1299 b 16-18) gies it ‘much les emphasis '36. A range of examples from Athens dlusuated: J. M. Camp, The Athenian Agora (London, 1986), 126-8 37M. M. Austin, The Hellmisic World from Alexander tothe Roman Conquest (Cambridge, 1981), no. 216 438. Aihenian cours cannot be discussed here, but they gave public opinion real power without subjecting itt legal niceties Ido not doubt thatthe capacity of jures t punish gave ‘hem a Signiicanly greater conuol over the dite than (for example) public opinion can now ‘evercige over ‘fat eats" or mulinaional companies. "39. That wil be less striking, but stil signitiant, if Garnsey argues correctly (op. ct (a. 12), 141) thatthe inerease was a recent development when Ath. Pol was writen, inthe 32, 140. S.C. Todd, The Shape of Athenian Lae (Oxford, 1993), 316-20, with references 41. Op. ce (a. 12), 158 42) See de works ced in n. 12 43. Garnsey, op cit (2.12), 137-425 Whitby, op. cit. (n 12), 118-27 4H. Necessities other than cereals may have been alternatives; but if so the evidence is insufficient o identify what they were: Dem. 35.51 (of. Todd, op. ct. (3.40), 321 with n. 8). 145. Garnsey, op. cit (8.12), 125-6, 189 446. HL Engelmann and R. Metkebach, Die chr con Eryhval und Klazomonai (Bons, 1972), inno. TS. '47."Ausin, op- Git. (. 37), no. 108, 48. eg. Austin, op. cit (37), no. 40. 4. Ain, op tt. (n 37}, 0 112 50. Cf Austin, op. Gt (0.37), nos. 13-18,‘THE ECONOMIC ROLE OF THE GREEK Ty 167 SL. Austin, op. cit. (0. 37), 0.116. 52, R. Meigas, Tees and Timber in she Ancient Medierancan World (Oxford, 1982). 53, Finley. op cit (n. 3), 164, 54, M.N. Toad Selection of Grek Historical Inscriptions is Prom 403 to 423 B.C. (Osford, 1948), no. 162 135. The implications of the Old Oligarch, Ps-Xen. 2.11-12 are similar ~ in @ period when ‘Athenian power was fr greater. It may be significant thatthe Cean muddle (above, m.S4) was (0 be exported to Athens in ‘a ship which the Athenians designate” (ines 12-13, 30-1), not secessariy in an Athenian ship 36. 8. Mele, dns Eeoomic Thought (Oxford, 1998); note 197, n. 31: [my te admittedly an ed one for book which argues that Arstode did no economic thought, But its handy" 57, 1280 6 17-235 of. Meikle, op. cit (n. 56), 75 58. Note that this is not necessarily evidence for the practice of Greck cites: Aristode is suggesting what in his view they ought to-do inorder to maintain a stable democracy, and may pot be reporting What they actualy did 59. Cl. G. E. M. de Ste. Croix, The Clas Sige in the Ancient Grock World (London, 1981), 287-8 60, Especially J. Ober, Mats and Ete in Democratic Athens (Princeton, 1989). G61. P. Garey and 1 Mors, in P. Halstead and J. O'Shea (eds), Bad Year Beonomics (Cambria, 1989), 98-108. De Ste Cro, op. ct (n. 59), 300-6, 5. may, Barb Gree chanden, 1993), 181-200; Osborne opt (0.7). 217-28 64. Garnsey, op. et (a. 12), 107-18, 665. Garnsey and Morn, op cit (a. 61) 66. Accepted by Rhodes, op-cit. (0. 17), 24-15, 67, Todd, op, et (40), 334-6, 668. Austin, op eit(n. 37}, no. 116 68. Above, a 5. 70. eg. SIG? 960; CIG 3088, 7. Austin, op. cit. (9.37), os, 119-20. 72. For carefull nuanced conclusions, see R, ‘Thomas, Oral Tradion and Writ Recrd i Chased Athens (Cambridge, 1989), 30-1 73. ih. Po. 42, with Rhodes, op. ct (n, 17) ad toes P. Cardedge in L. Foxhall and J. Saimon, When Mn Ware Men: Masculinity, Power and Identity in Clascal Antiquity (London and New York, 1998), 67.29.