Mind Association

Belief and Acceptance

Author(s): L. Jonathan Cohen
Source: Mind, New Series, Vol. 98, No. 391 (Jul., 1989), pp. 367-389
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Mind Association
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 BeliefandAcceptance
L. JONATHAN COHEN

i. An outlineof thedistinction
Conditions fortherationality of believingthatp, and conditions forthe
ofaccepting
rationality thatp, havebeentreated indistinguishablyinmuch
of the recentphilosophical literature about rationality.1Also beliefhas
beendiscussedad nauseamin theliterature ofcognitive science,and next
to nothingsaid thereinabout acceptance.2 The result has been a
widespreadtendencyto ignorethe factthatthereare manyimportant
differencesbetweenbeliefand acceptance,whichare relevantto quitea
rangeof issuesin epistemology, thephilosophy of scienceand cognitive
science.I havetriedto articulate someofthosedifferences elsewhere,3in
thecontext ofan enquiryintothenatureofthe'intuitions' which,whether
underthatnameor another, havebeenfrequently invokedby post-1945
analyticalphilosophers on bothsides of the Atlanticas supplyingpre-
missesfortheirarguments. my thesiswas thatany such
Specifically,
intuitionbelongsto a distinctive species of belief,which I triedto
andthatthecontent
characterize, ofsucha belief-normally a proposition
aboutthevalidityofa particular argument, theabsurdity of a particular
locution,themoralrightness ofa particulardecision,etc.-may justify, or
the acceptance
help to justify, of an appropriately generalphilosophical
conclusion.WhatI wantto do in thepresentarticleis notto sayanything
more about philosophicalintuitionbut to trace out, in a similarly
exploratory fashion,the not unimportant consequencesof drawingthe
distinctionbetweenbelief and acceptancein some other areas. In
particular,I want to surveyits consequencesin regardto, first,the
implicationsof certainkindsof speech-acts; secondlytheexplanation of
purposiveaction;and, thirdly, the characterization of knowledge(and
especiallyofscientific
knowledge). Someoftheseconsequences mayseem
fairlyobviouswhentheyare stated.But I havenotseenanystatement of
themelsewhere.
1 Easayson Knowledge
Philosophical and Value,Cambridge,
E.g. I. Levi, Decisionsand Revisions,
Cambridge University Press,1984,p. 15; H. E. Kyburg,'RationalBelief',TheBehavioraland Brain
Sciences,i983, p. 236.
2 Recentexamples areD. C. Dennett,Brainstorms,Hassocks,Harvester, 1979; S. Stich,FromFolk
Psychology to CognitiveScience:TheCase againstBelief,Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press,i983; W. J.
Rapaport,'Logical Foundations forBeliefRepresentation', Science,i986, pp. 371-422; F.
Cognitive
Dretske,Explaining Behavior, Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press,i988.
3 TheDialogueofReason, Oxford,ClarendonPress,i986, pp. 9I-7. See also L. J. Cohen,'Belief,
Acceptance and Probability',TheBehavioraland BrainSciences,1983, pp. 248f.

Mind, Vol. xcviii,no. 39I, JulyI989 ? OxfordUniversityPress I989

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368 L. _onathan
Cohen
It wouldprobablybe bestto beginby rehearsing themainfeatures of
theunderlying Whatis at issuehereis notjusta difference
distinction. of
meaning, in relevantcontexts,betweenthewords'believe'and 'accept'.It
is notjusta feature ofEnglish(or French,or German)linguistic idiomor
of so-called'ordinary language'.Such features maywellvarysomewhat
fromspeakerto speaker.Indeedfifty yearsago theterm'judgement' was
oftenused by philosophers to covermuchof whatI am calling'accept-
ance'. Moreovertheterm'acceptance'is itselfoftenused nowadaysin a
sensethatis relatedto,butnotquitethesameas, theone in whichI am
usingit.Foritis oftenusedtosignify thespeech-act ofassentwhereby one
mayverballyagreeto a proposalwhetheror not thisverbalagreement
accordswithone'sactualstateofmind.Butin mysensetoacceptthatp is
to haveoradopta policyofdeeming, positing,orpostulating thatp-that
is, of goingalongwiththatproposition (eitherforthelongtermor for
immediate purposesonly)as a premissin someor all contextsforone's
own and others'proofs,argumentations, inferences, deliberations,etc.
Whether or notone assentsand whether or notone feelsit to be truethat
p. Acceptingis thusa mentalact (as whatwas called'judgement'often
usedto be), or a pattern,system, or policyofmentalaction,ratherthana
speech-act. Whata personacceptsmayin practicebe reflected in howhe
orshespeaksorbehaves,butitneednotbe. Moreover, accepting thatp is
notthesameas supposingthatp-at leastin thesenseof 'supposing'in
whichthatworddenotesan inherently temporary actofimagination or of
hypothetical reasoning.Acceptanceimpliescommitment to a policyof
premissing thatp.
Beliefthatp, on theotherhand,is a disposition to feelit truethatp,
whether or notone goesalongwiththeproposition as a premiss.Such a
feelingtakes manydifferent forms.One may feel convincedby the
evidenceofitsbeingtruethatp, onemayfeelsurprised tolearnofan event
thatis evidenceagainstits beingtruethatp, one mayfeelpleasedat its
beingtruethatp, and so on. You answerthequestionwhether youaccept
thatp bymaking orreporting a decision.You answerthequestionwhether
youbelievethatp byintrospecting or reporting whatyouare disposedto
feelaboutthematter (evenifyouhaveneverconsciously thought aboutit
before).So in distinguishing betweenbeliefand acceptanceI claimthe
conceivability of a certainnoticeabledifference in mentalreality-a
possibilityofdifferencethatdeservesrecognition irrespective ofthevariety
oflinguistic oppositionsbywhichitis markedwithinparticular languages
of idiolects.
No doubtwe oftenacceptwhatwe believeand believewhatwe accept.
No doubtit is oftendifficultto knowwhetherto classifya particular
person'sattitudetowardsa particular at a particular
proposition timeas
oneofbelief,ofacceptance,or ofboth.Butcertaingeneraldifferences
are
undeniable.

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 Beliefand Acceptance369

A personwho accepts everything that he believesis dangerously

credulous, buta personwhoacceptsnothing thathe believesis irrationally
sceptical.Moreovera personwho does not fullybelievethatp can
nevertheless acceptthatp. For example,thismayhappenwhen
justifiably
he has a hunchthatnot-p,thoughthe balanceof presently available
evidencemakesp the onlyopinionthatdeservesacceptancewithinhis
community. Or he mightacceptthatp outofsolidaritywithan old friend,
even thoughthereis no evidenceto producea beliefthatp. Or for
professional purposesa lawyermightacceptthathis clientis notguilty
eventhoughhe does notbelieveit. Thus thereasonsforacceptingthatp
need notalwaysbe epistemicones: theymightbe ethicalor prudential.
Equallya personcan fullybelievethatp withoutacceptingit. That is to
say,he couldbe convincedthatp whilenevertheless rejecting theuse of
thatpropositionas a premissfor any proofs,deliberations, etc. For
example,he mightbe givena highlyconfidential pieceofinformation after
swearing thathe willneverrelyon itas a premissin anyofhisreasonings,
evenintheprivacy ofhisownmind.Suchan oathmaybe difficult tokeep,
And myinterest
but it is at leastintelligible. hereis in thedistinguish-
abilityoftwoconcepts,notin theseparability oftwostatesofmind.
Again,thoughacceptancethatp sometimes causes or helpsto cause
beliefthatp, thefactthata personacceptsthatp is (rightly) nottakenby
himas a reasonforbelievingthatp. Otherwisehe couldmanufacture a
reasonforbelieving anything.Buthavinga beliefthatp couldnormally be
takento be some at leastprimafaciereasonforacceptingthatp, even
thoughitmaywellnotbe theonly,or thebestreason,or evena sufficient
one.This is becausethereis justa presumption, whichcan be rebutted in
appropriate circumstances,thata beliefwould not have arisenat all
without therehavingbeensomedatain itsfavour.Indeed,in decidingon
whatto accept,we oftenhave to presumethatour subconsciousbelief-
inducingmechanisms haveoperatedrationally,becausethereis oftenno
time,orno opportunity, tocheckthemconsciously. If,whiledriving along
a country road,youbelievethatthrough a gap in thehedgerow yousaw
thehelmetof a motor-cyclist ridingthecrownof theroad towardsyou
roundtheS-bend,youneed to respondimmediately to thatbelief.You
need to steerout of the way fastand withoutany pause forfurther
investigation.
Bothacceptanceand beliefcan be eitherfickleor fixed,eitherabout
whatis or aboutwhatoughtto be, and eitherforgoodreasonsor forbad
reasonsorforno consciousorevidentreasonsat all. Butacceptance thatp,
It is decidableat will,
in therelevantsenseof 'acceptance'is voluntary.
whilebeliefthatp is not.You maydecideto believea friend, thatis, to
trusthis word.You mayevendecideto believein him,thatis, to have
confidencein hisabilities.Butyoucannotdecidetobelievethatitwillrain
tomorrow, orto believethatitwillnot.You can decideonlytoacceptthat

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370 L. _onathan
Cohen
it will,or to acceptthatit willnot:thebeliefmaythenensue,butit may
not.Acceptance occursat will,becauseat bottomitexecutesa choice- the
accepter'schoiceofwhichpropositions to takeas hispremisses. Butbelief
is notnormally achievedat willbecauseitis causedin eachkindofcaseby
somthing independent of thebeliever'simmediate choice:factualbeliefs
are the believer'swilly-nilly feelingsabout physicalor mentalreality,
moralbeliefsare the welcomeor unwelcomedictatesof his conscience,
intuitive beliefsare the immediate, unreflective, and untutored deliver-
ancesofhis intellect, and so on.
It followsthatpeopleare held responsible and accountableforwhat
theyaccept,notforwhattheybelieve.A juroris culpableforrelying on
beliefsthathe has acquiredfromwhathe has heardaboutthedefendant
outsidethecourtandadoptingthosebeliefsas premisses on whichto base
conclusions aboutthedefendant's guilt.But he is notculpableforhaving
thebeliefs, ifhe couldnothelphearingwhathe did.Peoplearealso often
at faultfornot acquaintingthemselves withrelevantfactsor fornot
acquiringrelevantmentaldisciplines. But theyare hardlyto be blamed
(thoughtheymaybe subjectsforpity,contempt, admiration, orwonder)if
theystilllack the beliefthatp even afteracquaintingthemselves with
evidencethatis normally adequatetoproduceit.On theotherhand,ifthe
knownevidencethatp is quiteadequate,then,evenif a personhimself
lacksanyfeeling ofconviction thatp, he is rightlyheldresponsible fornot
accepting thatp. If thereis well-publicized medicalevidencethata certain
kindofvaccination is beneficialfora child'shealth,thentheparentswho
knowof thatevidenceare responsiblefornot drawingthe appropriate
conclusions.
WhenDescartesheldthatin humanjudgement 'thewillis muchwider
in itsrangeand compassthantheunderstanding',4 he mighthavedone
evenbetterto insiston thevoluntariness ofacceptance.Correspondingly,
to practiseCartesiandoubton a proposition is veryclose5to suspending
acceptanceofthatproposition, justas to havean ordinary, naturaldoubt
aboutitstruthis to havean involuntary reluctance tobelieveit.Andwhen
Hume wrotethat'beliefis moreproperly an act ofthesensitive, thanof
the cogitative partof our nature',6he is mostfavourably construedas
drawingattention to the passivity and involuntariness of belief.We can
controlwhatwe consider,butnotwhatwe feel.
Whilethedirectact of acceptanceinvolvesa consciousand voluntary
choiceofa premissorpremisses, a personmaybe saidto acceptindirectly
all the logicalor mathematical consequencesof any conjunction of the

4 R. Descartes,The PhilosophicalWorks(trans.E. S. Haldane and G. R. T. Ross) vol. I,

Cambridge,
Cambridge
University
Press,I93I, p. 175.
I Ibid., p. '45.
6 D. Hume,A Treatise
ofHumanNature(ed. L. A. Selby-Biggs),
Oxford,ClarendonPress,I988,
p. I83.

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 Beliefand Acceptance371
propositions that he accepts directly,whetheror not he is himself
consciousof thoseconsequencesor able or disposedto workthemout.
That is because,whenp entailsq and he decidesto adoptthe policyof
takingp as a premiss,he stayseffectively on courseby takingq as a
premiss, becauseanything thatfollowsfromq willalsofollowfrom p. So, if
he announces to otherpeoplethathe hasacceptedcertainpropositions, he
impliesacceptancealso of theirlogicallyor mathematically necessary
consequences orequivalents, andthuscreatesa presumption abouthowhe
willthinkandact.And,evenifhe doesnotannouncetoothershisdecision
to acceptthatp, thisdecisioncertainly reachesindefinitelyfar(unlesshe
changeshis mind)beyondanyconsequencesor equivalents thathe may
perceiveat themoment.Hence his indirectacceptanceof a proposition
maybe eitherintentional, ifitderivesonlyfromperceived implications,or
unintentional, ifitderivesotherwise. Indeed,a personmayunintentionally
accepttwologicallyinconsistent propositions, and thereby-according to
standardformal-logical principles-commit himself unwittingly to every
proposition. Peopleareirrational sometimes. Andsometimes inconsisten-
cies,byprovoking theirownresolution, makea fruitful contributiontothe
dynamics ofhumanthought.
Of course,thereis a senseof 'accept'in whichacceptanceis notthus
deductively closed.In thatsensea personmaybe said to acceptthatp
whenin practicehe takesp as a premissand doesnottakeq, eventhough
heknowsthatq is deduciblefrom p. In thissenseacceptance doesnothave
tobe theoutcomeofa policy-decision andinvolvesno actofcommitment.
Acceptance maythenbe justa one-off mentalevent,notan open-ended
policy.It maybe justtheuse ofp as a premisson oneparticular occasion.
Buttheconceptofacceptance withwhichthepresent paperis concerned is
one thatembracesa certainelementof commitment. This elementof
commitment providesa basis for deductiveclosurethat is partially
analogousto thewayin whichtheutterance ofa promiseprovidesa basis
forimputing, ceteris consequential
paribus, obligations.If Georgepromises
to payPeter?500 in cashat 9 a.m. nextFriday,then-his circumstances
beingwhattheyare-George therebycommitshimselfto gettingthe
moneyoutofhis bankaccountsometimeearlier,evenifhe did nothave
thiscommitment in mindat thetimeat whichhe madethepromise.And
similarly,ifGeorgenowdecidestoacceptthatp, in thesenseoftakingthe
proposition thatp as a premisswherever itis relevanttodo so,Georgenow
commits himself (byhisowndecision)to takinganyconsequence ofp as a
premissunlessor untilhe changeshis mind.Admittedly at the time
Georgetookhis decisionhe mayhavefailedto bearin mind,or evento
knowanything about,verymanyconsequences ofp. But thatdoesnotlet
Georgeoffthehookof acceptancein regardto suchconsequences, any
morethanfailureto thinkout the consequencesof his promisewould
exempthimfromthecorresponding commitment to getthemoneyoutof

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372 L. JonathanCohen

his bank.Afterall, if Georgedecidesto acceptthatp, he decideson the

policyofgoingalongwithp as a premisswhatever theconsequences ofp
maybe. Hence effectively, evenif notknowingly, he has decidedto go
alongwithanyconsequence, q, ofp, sincep is an adequatepremissforany
conclusionforwhichq is. George'simplicitcommitment is necessarily,
albeitunwittingly, embracedwithinhis explicitone.
But youarenotintellectually boundbya setofbeliefs,howeverstrong,
to anydeductiveconsequenceofthatsetofbeliefs.That is becausestates
of mindthatarisein you,or growon you,or comeoveryou,through
processesof whichyou maybe whollyor partlyunconscious, no more
imposetheirlogicalconsequences on youthando theelectoralcampaign
postersthatpeoplestickon yourwallswithoutyourconsent.Beliefsare
neitherintentional norunintentional. So the statement thatyou believe
thatp does notnecessarily implythatyoubelievethatq, evenwhereq is
quitea closelogicalconsequenceofp. If yourlogicalperception is rather
inactive,you maywellfeelit truethatp withoutfeelingit truethatq.
Admittedly, ifyoudo notbelievetheimmediate andobviousconsequences
oftheproposition thatp, itmayseemdoubtful whether youreallybelieve
p at all. If youbelievethatp, youareas a matter ofcontigent factnormally
expectedto believeitsimmediate and obviousconsequences, becauseyou
arepresumed to exercisesufficient logicalperceptiveness forthispurpose.
Butwhenyouarethought to believethatp, to believethatq andtobelieve
thatr,youarecertainly not,evenas a contingent implication, expectedto
believeall theremoter deductive consequences oftheconjunction p& q&
r. You maynotevenhaveputp and q and r together in yourmind.
This particular difference betweenbeliefand acceptanceis easyto miss
becauseanyone'ssayingthathe believesthatp certainly does normally
commithimto accepting anylogicalconsequences oftheproposition that
p. But thatcommitment stemsjust froma factaboutthespeech-actof
saying'I believethatp'. Bymakingthisaffirmative first-personconfession
one commonly expressesacquiescencein one's own beliefand thereby
affirms one's acceptancethat p, or at, least one's opinionthat the
proposition thatp deservesacceptance. Utterances inthethirdpersonmay
be contrasted here.'Johnbelievesthatp' does not imputeto Johna
commitment to accepting p's logicalconsequences, sinceJohnmayhave
made no relevantdecisionand performed no relevantspeech-acts.So
deductive closureis notimplicit in propositionsabouta person'sbeliefsin
thewaythatitis implicit inpropositions aboutwhatheaccepts.Writers on
thelogicofbeliefwhotreatbeliefas deductively closedareconfusing, orat
leastconfounding, beliefwithacceptance.
Note too how utteranceof 'I feel thatp' may suggesta certain
tentativeness in thefeeler.Butitdoesnotfollowthatnon-tentative beliefs
are therefore notto be regardedas feelings at all, sinceutterances of 'He
feelsthatp' or 'You feel thatp' do not normallyconveythe same

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 Beliefand Acceptance373

suggestion.The pragmaticsoffirst mustnotbe

personpresentindicatives
readintotheirsemantics.
fromwhatwas said aboveaboutdeductiveclosure
It followstrivially
that,ifina particular
context accepteachofthesetof
youunconditionally
propositionsp, q, r, . . ., you therebyindirectlyaccept the conjunctionof
To takep as a premiss,
thosepropositions. r as a premiss,
q as a premiss,
and . . . as a premiss,is to takep, q, r, and . . . as yourconjointpremiss.It
is oftenonlybecauseof thisthatothers,by exposingan inconsistency
withinsuchan acceptedconjunction,maypersuadeyou to changeyour
mindabouta particular But thereis nothingodd aboutthe
proposition.
descriptionof someonebothas believingeach ofp, q, r . .. and also as not
believing(or accepting)the conjunctionp & q & r . . ., since he may well
believe(oraccept)thatsomewhere orotheramonghisbeliefs-hedoesnot
knowwhere-at leastone errormaybe present.That is-notoriously-
howtheauthorofa book,ifsufficiently modest,mightdescribehimself in
thepreface.Moreover, so farfromitsbeingunreasonable fora personto
thinkthathe may have at least one mistakenbeliefit niay well be
unreasonable forhimto thinkthathe has notgotat leastone mistaken
belief,in viewofthewidespread evidencein favourofthegeneralization
thateveryone led intoerrorsofbeliefby hisown
is, at leastoccasionally,
misunderstandings, muddledassociations, wishfulthinking,
carelessness,
unperceptiveness, or mentalor physicallaziness,or by the mistakesor
deceitsofothers.So circumstances mayoccurin whichyoubothbelieve
and accept thatp, thatq, thatr and that . . ., and in whichyou therefore
acceptalso thatp & q & r & ... eventhoughit is quitereasonableforyou
notto believethatp & q & r & ...
Indeed,whiletheremaythusbe circumstances in whichitis reasonable
toacceptthatp andyetnotto believethatp, itis worthrecalling herethat
theremayalso be circumstances in whichit is reasonableto believethatp
andyetalsoreasonable nottoacceptthatp. It maybe reasonable foryouto
believethatp, becauseyouweretoldso on reliableauthority. But at the
sametime,as alreadypointedout,it maybe reasonableforyou not to
acceptthatp as a premissforyourownor others'proofs, argumentations,
inferences, etc., becauseyou have swornnot to use the
deliberations,
information in anywayat all and to tryto forget it.
It shouldbe noticed,however, thatbeliefand acceptancedo resemble
one anotherin respectof certainotherlogicalproperties. For example,
theybothlack any necessaryimplications about iteration.If a person
believesthatp, he mayor maynotdo so self-consciously. That is,he may
or maynotalso feelit truethathe belivesthatp-he mayor maynot
believethathe believesthatp. Andifa personacceptsthatp, he mayor
maynotacceptthathe acceptsthatp. For example,a personmayin fact
long since have decidedto go along withcertainpremissesabout the
culturalinferiorityof some otherracialgroup,but perhapshe failsto

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 Cohen
374 L. Jonathan
acceptthathe acceptsthosepremisses sincehe prefers toregardhimself as
unprejudiced on such issues.Again,whenconsideredoutsiderelevant
context,sentencespredicatingacceptancethat p resemblesentences
predicatingbeliefthatp in being open to both de dictoand de re
interpretations. So thatmuch-discussed ambiguity need not concernus
hereat all. The difference betweenbeliefandacceptance hasno impacton
thesubstitutivity ofidentically referringterms,onlyon thesubstitutivity
of necessarilyequivalentexpressions.Even in de dictocontextsthe
intersubstitutability of necessarilyequivalentexpressions holdsgood for
acceptance, thoughnotforbelief.
Finallyacceptance, likebelief,mayvarywiththeoccasionbut,unlike
belief,is notitselfa matterofdegree.A personmaytaketheproposition
thatp as a premissforbusinesspurposesbutnotin hisprivatelife,justas
his beliefthatp maycomeand go withthepresenceor absenceof some
persuasiveinformant. But, thougha person'sdetermination to takethe
proposition thatp as hispremiss maybe stronger thanhisdetermination so
to taketheproposition thatq, acceptancethatp (or thatq) is notitselfa
matterofdegreein thewaythata person'sbeliefthatp maybe stronger
thanhisbeliefthatq. To acceptthatp is to adoptthepolicyoftakingthe
proposition thatp as a premissin appropriate circumstances, and you
eitheradoptthatpolicyoryoudo not.Thatis whyphilosophers ofscience
have argued about the level of a theory'sprobability, confirmation,
support, etc.thatmaybe appropriate foritsacceptance.Correspondingly,
whenthe probability thatp is measuredby thelowestodds at whicha
personis preparedto bet thatp, we have to thinkof thisgradationof
probability as a gradationoftheperson'swillingness toacceptthatp rather
thanas a gradation ofthatacceptanceitself.
I shallpassnowto exploring someoftheconsequences thatflowfroma
recognition ofthedistinction between beliefandacceptance thatI havebeen
drawing.I shall beginby pointingout some not uninteresting, though
perhapsnotveryimportant, consequences in thephilosophy of language
(section2) and I shallthenpass to somedeeperissuesin cognitive science
(section3) and in epistemology and thephilosophy of science(section4).

2. Moore'sparadox
The needto reformulate
It is widelyheldthatin normaleveryday-life cases,whensomeoneutters
the sentence'It is raining',he implies(in the sense of 'givesit to be
understood' thathe believesthatitis raining-
or'createsa presumption')
and analogouslyforotherindicativesentences.Indeed thatthesis,or
somethingverylike it, is commonlyofferedas being crucialto the
understanding ofwhatis called'Moore'sparadox'.7The thesisis said to

7 See G. E. Moore,Ethics,London,Williamsand Norgate,1912, p. 125.

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 Beliefand Acceptance375

explainwhyitseemsodd oranomalousforsomeonetosay,orto be saidto

believe,
but I do notbelievethatit is raining.
It is raining,
Clearlythetwoclausesofsucha sentence arenotlogicalcontradictoriesof
oneanother, sincebothcouldwellbe true.So theintuitive odditycannot
be due to the sentence'sbeing logicallyself-contradictory. But the
intuitive oddityofthesentencecan apparently be explainedbysupposing
thatbyuttering clausethespeakerimpliesthathe believesthatit
thefirst
is raining, whereasbyuttering thesecondclausehe explicitly deniesthat
he believesthis.The implication ofthespeaker'ssayingwhathe did,in
one partof his utterance, is thussupposedto clash withwhathe said
explicitly in anotherpartofthesameutterance.
This understanding ofMoore'sparadoxneedsto be modified, however,
ifit is wrongto holdthata person'suttering thesentence'It is raining'
standardly impliesthathe believesthatitis raining.AndI shallnowargue
thatthiskindofimplication (or conversationalimplicature,ifyouprefer
thatterminology) existonlyin someeveryday casesand notin others.
We have to bear in mind here the differences betweenbeliefand
acceptance thathavealreadybeendescribed. Let us thenexaminewhether
utterance ofthesentence'It is raining'standardly impliesbeliefthatit is
raining, orwhether itmaynotinsteadquiteoftenimplyacceptancethatit
is raining.
Some familar typesof speech-act clearlytendto implybelief.That is,
thedescription of an utterance in certaintermsnormally entailsthatthe
utteranceimpliesthe corresponding belief.For example,supposethe
utterance is correctlydescribedas a 'statement'.Of course,I do notmean
thatitis describable as a statementonlyin thesenseofthatwordin which
aboutfifty or sixtyyearsago thewordbecamea technicaltermformany
philosophers, definedsometimesas signifying a truth-value bearing
sentence-in-use or sometimes as a less metaphysical-sounding substitute
fortheterm'proposition'. To describean utterance as theutterance ofa
statement in thatsensetellsus nexttonothing aboutthespeaker'sstateof
mind.But considerinsteadthe stillcurrentnon-technical senseof the
word'statement' in whichit impliestheauthoritativeness ofan utterance,
itsconformity withappropriate standards offormality, or thewillingness
ofthespeakertostandbehindit.In thissensepersonssuspectedofcrimes
are askedto providethe policewithstatements, politiciansissue state-
mentsat pressconferences or makethemin theirlegislatures, bankssend
out statements to customersabout theiraccounts,and so on. So an
utterance correctly describableas a statement in thissense is one that
wouldnormally implytheexistenceof a corresponding beliefor web of
beliefsin themindofthespeaker.If youmakean alibistatement to the
police,forexample,youimplythatyoubelievewhatyousayand thatthis

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 Cohen
376 L. _onathan
beliefis sufficiently coherentwith your otherbeliefsfor you to be
reasonably confident ofitstruth.You havenotjustdecided,perhapsfor
reasonsof yourown convenience, to takethe proposition thatp as a
premiss.Rather,you implythatyou are declaringwhatyou honestly
believeto be trueindependently of yourowndecisions.The policemay
believeyouiftheytakeyouyourself tobelievewhatyousay.Butinnormal
circumstances theywillnotbelieveyouiftheydo nottakeyouto believe
whatyousay.So sincepartofthepointofmaking a statement is,normally,
to getyourhearersto believeyou,thespeech-actofmakinga statement
normally impliesthatthe speakerpossessesthe corresponding beliefor
web of beliefs.And somethingsimilarcan be said about reports,
narrations, andtestimonies. If youtestifythatp, forexample,youareopen
to the chargeof dishonesty, or even of perjury,if you do not yourself
believethatp. Perhapsyouhaveswornto tellnothing butthetruthwhen
you testify thatp, while,if you do not believethatp, you are certainly
tellingsomething thatyouyourself do notfeelto be true.
But obviously noneofthiscan applyto speech-acts expressing accept-
ance.Whena personsays,forexample,'I herebyacceptthatp, thatis, I
takethatproposition as a premissforanyrelevantargument', he is not
implying thathe believesthatp, andthesamemusttherefore be truewhen
hisjustsayingthatp is correctly describedas a speech-act ofacceptance.
Analogously assertions,concessions, agreements, acknowledgements, and
admissionsare all speech-actsthatmay be performed, in appropriate
contexts, by theutterance ofan indicative sentencewithoutimplying the
existenceof thecorresponding belief.
Of course,I am notusing'assertion'herein anytechnicalsensethat
may,or maynot,be relevant to understanding thefunction ofFrege'sso-
called 'assertion-sign'. Rather,I am concernedwithassertionsin the
ordinary, non-technical sense of the word,in whichtheyinvolvethe
declaration ofa claimand someinsistence on itsrecognition. In thissense
theconditions warranting an assertionthatp are not the sameas those
warranting a statement thatp. So inthissensethereis no reasonat all why
an assertion thatp shouldnormally implythatthespeakerbelievesthatp.
He maywell be insisting on recognition of his claimthatp becausehe
wantspeopleto knowthathe acceptsthatp, thoughhe lacksas yetany
corresponding belief.He may even have no evidencethatp, and his
acceptanceand assertion thatp maybe justoutofloyalty to an old friend
whohas testified thatp.
Perhapsthisabsenceofanyimplication aboutbeliefis intuitivelyclearer
inthecaseofconcessions, agreements, acknowledgements, andadmissions
thanin thecase of assertions, becauseso manyphilosophers haveforso
longtakenit forgrantedthatassertions thatp implybeliefsthatp. After
all,ifin thecourseofa disputeor debateI concedethatp, I am agreeing
thattheproposition thatp maybe usedas a premissforfurther argument

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 Beliefand Acceptance377

aboutthefactin dispute.But thatfactmaywellbe quiteindependent of

myownstateofbelief.We maybe arguingaboutotherissuesthanabout
whatI believe.It mighttherefore be quiteirrelevantto implyanything
aboutmybeliefs.The conditions warrantingtheoccurrence ofconcessions
verydifferent
are thuscertainly fromthosewarranting theoccurrence of
narrations,
reports,
statements, Moreover,
ortestimonies. whenthenature
ofsucha speech-act is clearfromitscontextit doesnothaveto be made
evidentbytheperformative
linguistically use ofexpressionslike'I concede
that. . .', 'I agreethat. . .', etc. (thoughthepossibilityof thelatterformof
expression therelevant
reinforces So it is hardlydeniablethat
intuitions).
in quitea widerange of familiar utterance
speech-acts oftheproposition
thatp-that is, production of a spokenrepresentation of the factthat
p-does notimplybeliefthatp. Ratherit impliestherea mentalact of
acceptancethatp.
Whatthenshouldwe sayaboutMoore'sparadox?If whathasbeensaid
is correct, like
sentences
It is rainingbutI do notbelievethatit is raining
cannotbe quite as odd or anomalousas mostphilosophers who have
discussedthemhave supposed. Where the utterance of 'It is raining'
it
impliesacceptancethat is raining butnotbeliefthat it is raining, there
or
shouldbe no feelingof oddness anomaly. And in fact it is not at all
to
difficult imaginesuch cases,as in
Allright.Yourarguments areunanswerableandI havetoconcedeyour
point.It is raining.But, althoughI am bound to acceptthis,and
everything thatfollowsfromit, I stilldon't reallybelievethatit is
raining.
As so oftenin linguistic
analysis, us to
a largerslabofdiscourseconstrains
a
suppose speech-act thatis different
from the one thata smallerslab
suggests.Correspondingly,ifwe wantto ensurethatthetypeofoddityor
anomalyat issueis involvedin theutterance ofthesentencewe cite,we
haveto substitute somesuchsentenceas
It is rainingbutI neitherbelievenoracceptthatit is raining.
ofcourse,raisesthequestionwhether
This kindof substitution, thereis
anyothercategory ofmentalattitude, on a parwithbeliefand acceptance
and notjusta speciesofone or theother,whichmaybe impliedby the
ofindicative
utterance sentences. tosaymerely'I neither
Or is itsufficient
believenoracceptthatit is raining',alongside'It is raining',in orderto
producetheanomaly? Perhaps,forexample,taking itas a conclusionthatp
shouldbe thoughtin thiscontextto be comparablewithtakingit as a
premissthatp, andthentherewillbe a casefortreating inference thatp as
beingco-ordinatewithacceptance orbeliefthatp. Butcanyoudefinitively

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378 L. JonathanCohen
inferthatp withoutalsoacceptingthatp? In otherwords,canyouhonestly
treatp as an establishedconclusionif you are not readyto takeit as a
premissforfurther argumentation in appropriatecircumstances?If not,
acceptancehas a certainpriority,sinceone can certainly acceptthatp
withouthavinginferred thatp. ButI shallleavethesequestionsopenhere,
in orderto tacklesomeotherpoints-also arisingout of the distinction
betweenbeliefand acceptance-thatbiterathermoredeeplyintocurrent
orthodoxies.

3. The explanationof actionin termsofpurposes

It is a widelyinvokedparadigm in contemporary philosophy thatin their
everyday explanations ofone another'sactionspeoplecommonly citethe
beliefsand desiresof the agent.8Numerousothermentalstatesand
attitudes are also mentioned as capableof takingtheplaceof beliefsand
desiresin somesuchexplanations. Butamidthisbroad-minded pluralism
thecrucialdifference betweenbeliefsand belief-like on theone
attitudes,
side,and acceptanceand acceptance-like attitudes,on theother,tendsto
remainunnoticed.I wantto concentrate attentionon theimportance of
thatdistinction intheanalysisofpurposive explanation,evenifinso doing
I haveto ignorenumerous otherdistinctions thatwouldhaveto be drawn
in a morecomprehensive treatment.
Three fairlyobviouspointsneed to be made at the outset,because
someonewhogivesa purposive explanation doesnotnormally intendthat
why,say,JamesdidactA shouldbe explained justbyreference tothefact
thatJamesdesiredB andbelievedthatdoingA wouldbringaboutB. This
simplisticmodel overlooksat least threerelevantpossibilities.9 First,
Jamesmightconceivably havebeenprevented fromdoingactA. So a full
explanation has to includea mention ofthefactthathe wasnotprevented
fromdoingthis.Secondly, Jamesmightin facthaveshotGeorgein order
to killhis wife'slover,say,eventhoughJamesalso desiredthereto be a
vacancydeclaredon theparishcounciland believedthatshooting George
wouldcausesucha vacancyto be declared.So thetruepurposeoftheact
is givenbetterbysayingthatatthetimeatwhichhe diditJamesdesiredB
morethananything else thathe believeddoingA wouldbringabout.
Thirdly,byno meansall thebeliefsin suchexplanations arebeliefsabout
one thing'scausinganother.For example,Jamesmighthave visited

8
E.g. A. Morton,FramesofMind,Oxford,ClarendonPress,I980, p. 72; D. Davidson,Essayson
Actionsand Events,Oxford,ClarendonPress,I982, pp. 3-4; S. P. Stich,FromFolk Psychology to
CognitiveScience:TheCaseAgainstBelief,Cambridge, Mass.,MIT Press,I983, p. 217; G. Strawson,
Freedom and BeliefOxford,ClarendonPress,I986, p. 34; J.A. Fodor,Psychosemantics:TheProblem
ofMeaningin thePhilosophy ofMind,Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press,1987, pp. 1-26.
9 See L. J. Cohen, 'TeleologicalExplanation',Proceedings of the AristotelianSociety,I950,
pp. 255-92.

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 Beliefand Acceptance379

Burford in orderto visita typicalCotswoldvillage,and hisrelevant belief

wouldthenhavebeenjustthatBurfordis a typicalCotswoldvillage.
However,whether or notthesepoints(and perhapsothersimilarones)
are recognizedas widelyas theyshould be, thereis no doubt that
explanations in termsof beliefsand desiresare commonly thought to be
widespreadin ordinarypeople's attemptsto understandone another.
Indeed thistypeof purposiveexplanation is oftensaid to constitute a
featureof whatis called'folkpsychology'-abodyof intuitive doctrine
thatis supposed,somewhat implausibly,to constitutea primitive attempt
to solvesomeoftheproblemsthatacademicpsychology setsoutto solve.
Now considerwhat the distinction betweenbeliefand acceptance
implieshere.Clearlywe haveto recognizethatin additionto purposive
explanations involving belieftherearealso purposive explanations involv-
ingacceptance.If Jamesat lastaccepts,thoughhe at leastas yetdoesnot
reallybelieve,thatGeorgeis hiswife'slover,thenhispurposein shooting
Georgemaybe justthesameas ifhe didbelieveit.The purposeis perhaps
stilltokillhiswife'slover,justas itwouldbe ifJamesbelieved,butdidnot
accept,thatGeorgeis hiswife'slover.Nevertheless thereis an important
difference betweenthe twocases. If JamesacceptsGeorge'sguilt,he is
responsible at least forwhatone mightconveniently call the director
immediatecognitiveinputintothe mentalstatethatissues in James's
shootingGeorge.Acceptancesare at the will of the accepter,who is
therefore eligibleforwhatever praise,blame,reward,or punishment is on
offer.James'sfriends mightdispassionately commendhisrespectforthe
evidenceevenif theydeploredthe violenceof his action.On the other
hand,if Jamesbelieves,but does not accept,George'sguilt,he is not
directlyresponsible forthecognitive input,at leastso faras thatinputis
involuntary. The beliefis partof theaction'scause,nota premissfrom
whichits appropriateness is inferred.This mightbe thecase perhapsif
Jamesdiscovered Georgeinflagrante delictoand killedhimon impulse-
thatis, withoutpremeditation.
If therefore Jamesis impliednot to be directlyresponsibleforthe
cognitive inputintothesituation whenhisactis explainedin termsofhis
beliefand desire,any directresponsibility thathe has forthe act must
presumably be traceableto whatonemightconveniently call theaffective
inputintothesituation: it mustbe traceableto hisdesire.But aredesires
availableat will,anymorethanbeliefsare?Desires,it seems,growin one
gradually orcomeoveronesuddenly, muchas beliefsdo. Theyarefeelable
yearingsor likings.They may be influenced, partlyor wholly,by
subconscious processes,muchas beliefsmaybe. But we cannotforma
desireat will,anymorethanwe can forma beliefat will.Of course,a
personmaywant(or desire)to have otherdesiresthanhe does have,
especiallyif his actual desiresare perverse,say, or destructive. But,
howeverhardyoudesireto havebetterdesires,thissecond-order desire

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380 L. _onathan
Cohen
mayfailto be satisfied, justas anyotherdesiremayfailto be satisfied. So
desiresseemjustas mucha passivefeature ofthemindas beliefsare,and
to theextentthatwe are notresponsible forour beliefswe are also not
responsible forour desires.
It does notfollowfromthisthatwe are notto be heldresponsible for
any purposive actthatis explicablein termsofbeliefsand desires.For we
are indirectlyculpable,as remarked earlier,in respectof thosemistaken
beliefsthatwe havethrough notacquainting ourselveswithevidencewith
whichwe oughtto haveacquaintedourselvesor-through notacquiring
mentaldisciplines thatwe oughtto haveacquired.We also deservecredit
forthosetruebeliefsthatwe acquireas a resultofacquainting ourselves
with relevantevidenceor throughlabouringat relevantdisciplines.
Equallya persondeservescreditforactingon thegooddesiresthathe has
fostered inhimself. Andhe is blameworthy foractingon thosedesiresthat
he oughtnotto haveallowedto determine hisgoals.For he oughtto have
reflected on the conflict of thosedesireswithother,less reprehensible
desiresor policies,and resistedthe temptation to succumbto them.
Indeed,if he is quite incapableof such reflection and resistance, he is
mentally abnormaland thevictimofgenuinely urges.(In such
irresistible
a casetheexplanation ofan actbyreference totheagent'srelevant beliefs,
desires,andincapacities inan explanation byreference onlytoinvoluntary
features oftheagent'smentallifeand a purposive explanation ofthiskind
does deprivean act of its culpability. That is how psychopathic killers,
who use weaponspurposively in orderto achievetheirhorrific desires,
maynevertheless be thought devoidofresponsibility fortheiracts.)
So, whiledesiresare aboutas passiveand involuntary as beliefs,they
havea voluntary counterpart thatis analogousto acceptance. We fight or
indulgeimpulses, adoptgo'als,makeplans,formpolicies,embraceaims,or
espouseendsquiteat will,justas we selectat willthepremisses forour
proofs, argumentations, inferences, and deliberations.We cancertainly be
heldresponsible forourchosengoals,plans,policies,aims,orends,justas
forthepremisses thatwe accept.Moreover, justas we can believewithout
acceptingor acceptwithoutbelieving,so too we can desiresomething,
suchas to be a lotricher, without adoptingself-enrichment as a goal.And
one can adoptsomething as a goal,suchas reducingone's weightby a
medically recommended amount,without eitheralreadyhaving,or being
ableto develop,anyrealdesireforit;therelevant desiremaybe merely to
be healthy. Alternatively wearefreetoadoptthesatisfaction ofthisorthat
desireas ourspecific goal,justas wearefreetoacceptwhatwebelieve.To
haveonlydesires,and no goalsor policies,is to be a creature ofimpulse.
Buttohaveonlygoalsandpolicies,andno desires,is to be as cold-blooded
and emotionless as a computer.
Again,thoughadopting x as one'sgoalmaycauseorhelptocausedesire
forx,itis nota possiblereasonfordesiring x,justas accepting thatp is not

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 Beliefand Acceptance381

a reasonforbelievingthatp. But, just as beliefthatp is a primafacie

reasonforacceptingthatp, so too havinga desireforx is certainly one
possiblereasonforadoptingx as one'sgoal(thoughitmaywellnotbe the
only,or the best reason,or even a sufficient one). This mightbe, for
example,becausethereis just a presumption, whichcan be rebuttedin
appropriate circumstances, thatthedesireforx (e.g. forwater)wouldnot
havearisenat all withoutits beingfavoured by at leastsomerespectable
considerations,suchas bodilyneeds.Andthatpresumption corresponds to
thepresumption, inthecase aof that
belief, it too would&not have arisenat
all without therehavingbeenat leastsomedata in its favour.
This parallelismbetweenthe desire/goal-seeking distinction and the
belief/acceptance one extendseven further. In so faras a persondoes
adoptx as his goal,withoutanypertinent limitation, he thereby aimsat
doingwhatever is logicallyor mathematically necessary to achievex, just
as a person who accepts that p therebyaccepts all the deductive
consequences oftheproposition thatp. The former aims,intentionally or
unintentionally, at doingwhateverx entails,just as the latteraccepts
whatever p entails.Similarly, on theotherhand,havinga desireforx anda
desirefory doesnotentailhavinga desireforx andy, justas a beliefthatp
and a beliefthatq does notentaila beliefthatp & q. Thoughyoumay
desireto emptya petroltanknowand also desireto lighta cigarette now,
youdo nottherefore desiretodo boththosethingsnow.Butifyouplanto
do eachofthemyouthereby planto do bothofthem,and itis justas well
that you should be aware of this.
At thetime,admittedly, a personmaynotdiscerneverything thatit is
logicallyor mathematically necessary forhimto adoptas a partialgoalin
orderto achievehis overallgoal,justas a personwhoacceptsthatp and
thatq may not discernall the necessaryconsequencesto whichthis
acceptancecommitshim. Goal adoption,like acceptance,maythusbe
unintentional in some cases even thoughintentional in others.But the
situationis quitedifferent withdesires,as it is withbeliefs.Like beliefs,
desiresare neitherintentional norunintentional. The statesofmindthat
arisein you,or growon you,or comeoveryou,as beliefsand desiresdo,
are notcapableof imposinganyconsequential commitments on you.A
theyraiseno issueaboutyourfurther
fortiori intentions. Howeverstrongly
youdesirex, youareno morecommitted thereby to desiringwhatever is
necessary to achievex thanyourbelievingthatp and q commitsyouto
believingall thedeductiveconsequencesof theconjunction p & q. The
traditionaldoctrine thathe whowillstheendwillsthemeans,so faras he
thinksthathe knowsit,appliesto thepursuitofgoalsor policies,notthe
experiencing of desires.And justas whatI said earlieraboutacceptance
echoesa lotofwhatusedto be saidaboutwhatwascalled'judgement', so
too whatI am now sayingabout seekinga goal, following a policyor
pursuing an endechoesa lotofwhatusedto be saidaboutwhatwascalled

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382 L. Jonathan
Cohen
'willing'.Indeedwithout
thepossibility
ofsucha distinction
betweengoal-
betweenwilling,on theone side,and
seekingand desireKant's contrast
theimpulsesandinclinations on theother,wouldbe scarcely
ofsensibility,
'o
intelligible.
Heretoo,as inthecaseofthedistinction betweenbeliefandacceptance,
the choice of vocabularyto markthe needed distinction is relatively
unimportant. Whatis at issueis a conceivable in reality,
difference notjust
in idiom.No doubtin practicepeopleoftendeclaretheirgoal-
a difference
adoptions by sentences that begin 'I desire to ...', just as they often
declare theiracceptancesby sentencesthatbegin 'I believe that . . .'. But
theexistence oftheunderlying differences is notin anywaycompromised
bytheloosenessor flexibility ofthevocabulary thatis commonly usedin
thesecontexts. The conclusionto whichwe are drivenis thatpurposive
explanations of humanaction-of thekindthatwe havebeen consider-
ing-should be classifiableinto at least fourmain categories.They
perform theirtaskby citingappropriate connections betweenbeliefsand
desires,betweenbeliefsand goal-seekings, betweenacceptancesand
desires,or betweenacceptances and goal-seekings. Considered on itsown,
thefirstofthosefourcategories-which is theoneto whichprideofplace
is givenin most contemporary philosophicalliterature-treats people
ratherlikeinfantsoranimalsaretreated ineveryday life.The actionstobe
explainedareputdowntothepresenceandcausality ofcertain involuntary
mentalstates-beliefsand desires-in a standardpattern ofinterconnec-
tion.Insteadofthis,somedegreeor degreesofvoluntariness and perhaps
also ofconsciousreasoning are imputedto theexplanatory mentalstates,
and the level of responsibility thatis therebyascribedto the agentis
enhanced,so faras acceptancesare cited ratherthanbeliefsor goal-
adoptions ratherthandesires.Thatpointhasto be recognized irrespective
ofanymetaphysical arguments aboutthetruthor falsity ofdeterminism.
What I have been concernedto point out are certainconceivable
differences betweenone mentalstate and anotherthat have to be
accommodatedby any resolutionof the problemor problemsabout
determinism. Similarlythe possibilityof those differences has to be
acknowledged irrespectiveofwhether ornotwe thinkitusefulto speakof
a folk-psychologythatrecognizes and exploitsthem.
Nordo thepointsthatI havebeenmakingbearsolelyon theanalysisof
explanations-that is, on the retrospective understanding of a person's
actions.Theybearalso on anyagent'sprospective reasonings. If explana-
tions in termsof beliefsand desiresare to be construedas citing

10 I. Kant, Fundamental Principles

of theMetaphysic of Ethics(trans.T. K. Abbott),London,
Longmans,I907, p. 89. It wouldbe a further
enterpriseto discussat whatpointsone can beginto
discernfractures
in theanalogybetweenbeliefand acceptance, on theone side,and desireand goal-
adoptionon theother.For example,perhapsacceptancecanbe regarded as a speciesofgoal-adoption,
butbeliefis hardlya speciesofdesire.

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 Beliefand Acceptance383
involuntary mentalstates,we must rejectthe view that deliberation
towards a decisioncan be conducted whollyin thoseterms.For a personin
a quandaryto haveregardsolelyto his ownbeliefsand desires,as such,
wouldbe forhimtobehaveas ifhe werepredicting whatsomeoneelsewill
do ratherthandecidingwhathe himself willdo. He wouldbe lookingon
himself as an objectratherthana subject,as a passiveexperiencer rather
thanan activeagent.To thinkof oneselfas stillmakingup one's mind
whetheror not to do act A, one must have regardinsteadto the
acceptance-worthiness ofrelevant propositionsor to theadoption-worthi-
nessof relevant goalsor,ideally,to thecombination oftheseissues.So,
despiteRamsey'sunfortunate terminology,11 the conceptionof proba-
bilitythatis mostgermane to decisiontheory, as a technology ofaction,is
one thatmeasuresacceptance-worthiness ratherthanone thatmeasures
strength of belief.Correspondingly theconception of probabilitythatis
mostgermane to thepsychological descriptionorexplanation ofdecision-
makingis one thatmeasuresan agent'swillingness to acceptrelevant
propositions or adoptrelevant goals.
It is to be notedalso thatthedistinctions discussedherecastsomelight
on thesensesinwhichcommunities, associations,nations,orotherhuman
organizations maybe ascribedthepossessionof mentalattitudesor the
authorship ofmentalacts.Whena community or nationis saidto believe
or desirethatp thisis normally wayofsayingthatmostofits
a figurative
individual members ormostofitsofficial representativesbelieveor desire
thatp. Onlyon thatinterpretation can therelevant beliefbe a feeling,
or
thedesirebe feelable.If insteada community ora nationis saidto believe
ordesirethatp whileat thesametimemostofitsindividual members and
mostofitsofficial representatives aresaidnotto believeor desirethis,the
organization is beingliterally ascribeda mindof its own withinsome
appropriately metaphysical ontology. Butthepositionwithacceptance and
goal-seeking is quite different. So faras theseare actionsabout which
deliberation maytakeplaceand decisionsbe made,theycan be ascribed
equallyliterally, and withan equallycommonsensical ontology,eitherto
an organization as a wholeorto itsindividual members orrepresentatives.
Thus a companyor state can be committed(by legallyappropriate
procedures) to goingalongwiththeconsequencesofp as a basis forits
collectivedecisions,eventhoughnoneof its membersor representatives
are so committed in relationto theirprivateconduct.For example,a
companymaydecideto concludea contract withx, or a statemaydecide
to concludea treaty withy, on thebasisofan official acceptanceofx's or
y's creditworthiness, eventhoughtheindividuals involvedtakecarenotto
putanyoftheirownmoneyat riskthereby. Similarly an organizationcan

1 F. P. Ramsey,The Foundations
of Mathematics,
London,Routledgeand Kegan Paul, I98I,
p. 159.

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 Cohen
384 L. _onathan
adopta goalor policywhichmostofitsmembers
officially seekto oppose
bytheiractionsina privatecapacity.The conductoftheseindividuals may
be dishonest, irresponsible,
hypocritical, But it is by no
or inconsistent.
meansimpossibleor inconceivable, nor needs its descriptionhave any
metaphysical In moretraditional
implications. terminology,thoughstill
without anymetaphysical we can sumthisup bysayingthat
implications,
an organizedhumangroupmayexercisean activewillor judgement ofits
own eventhoughit has no possibility of havingits own passiveexperi-
ences.Correspondingly, whenwe speakliterally a group's
in explaining
actionin termsofitspurposes, orin deliberatingtowardsitsdecisions, we
shouldbe construed as havingin mindonlywhatit willsand judges,not
whatit desiresor believes.

and knowledge
4. Belief,acceptance,
Knowledgethatp, we are oftentold,12entailsbeliefthatp. Admittedly,
as Radfordshowed,thereis an intuitively plausibletypeof argument
againstthis,whichcites the possiblecase of someonewho answersa
stringof questionsabout,say,thedatesof Tudor and Stuartmonarchs
correctlybut veryhesitantly, so thatthe answerermaybe said to have
therelevantknowledge eventhoughhe does not reallybelievewhathe
says."3 But we can deal withRadford'stypeofexamplebyaskinghimto
tell us moreabout it. What would happen,we can ask, if the same
questionsare put to thesameexamineeon one or morelateroccasions?
Eitherthatpersongives more or less the same answersor he gives
substantiallydifferentones. If he givesmoreor less the same answers,
thatwouldbe a good reasonforinferring thathe did, afterall, believe
whathe said. And if he givessubstantially answersthatwould
different
be a goodreasonforinferring thathe gothispreviousanswersrightonly
by a luckyflukeand thattherefore he did notin facthave therelevant
knowledge evenbefore.In sum,theexamineeeitherbelievesas wellas
knowsor neitherbelievesnor knows.But, thoughtheseconsiderations
refuteRadford'sargument, theyobviouslydo not establishthatknow-
ledgethatp doesindeedentailbelief.Theydo notexcludethepossibility
thattheremaybe otherkindsofcase in whichknowledge withoutbelief
maybe ascribable.
Indeed,to findsucha case,we do notevenhaveto considerdegenerate
caseslikeRadford'sexaminee, whois notonlynota professional historian
but not evena good student(sincehe eitherlackstheknowledge he is
expectedto haveor at leastlacksanyconfidence thathe has it). Consider
insteadthe knowledgeof physicallaws thatwell-regarded professional

12 Oxford,ClarendonPress,I974, p. I2.
E.g. K. Lehrer,Knowledge,
13 C. Radford,'Knowledgeby Examples',Analysis,I966, pp. i-II.

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 Beliefand Acceptance385

likeEinstein14
scientists claimexplicitly to have.In suchcaseshavingthe
knowledgethatp, wherethe proposition thatp statesa physicallaw,
requiresthescientist toacceptthatp in thelightoftheevidencethatp. He
mustbe willingto go alongwiththatproposition as a premissforhis
predictions, explanations, further research, etc.,and an involuntary belief
thatp wouldnot be an adequatesubstitute forthe scientist'svoluntary
acceptancethatp sinceit wouldnotinvolvedeductiveclosure.Perhaps
thereis notmuchharmin thescientist's in theendbelieving thatp as well
as acceptingthatp. But he would do betterto school himselfinto
practising a greaterintellectual detachment. Thereis a slightdangerthat
possession ofa beliefthatp mightmakehimlessreadytochangehismind
aboutaccepting thatp ifnewevidencecropsup ora bettertheory becomes
It
available. might even make him less ready to look fornew evidence ora
bettertheory. Also, in the establishment of a belief thatp, some factors
mightbe influential in theblack-boxofthescientist's subconscious mind
whichhe wouldreject as irrelevant or prejudicial if they came up for
consideration before the tribunal of conscious acceptance.
Ideally,therefore, a scientist woulddispensealtogether withbeliefin
thetruthofhisfavoured hypotheses and restcontent with accepting them.
Andit is crtainly wrongto hold,as somephilosophers do,15 that we have
to choosebetweena realistanalysisaccordingto whichacceptanceof a
theoryinvolvesthebeliefthatit is true,and an anti-realist
scientific one
according to whichacceptance ofa scientifictheory involvesthebeliefthat
it is empiricallyadequate.Indeed,we do notevenhaveto treatempirical
adequacyas a matterforbeliefand theoretical explanation as a matter for
acceptance.So far fromits being the case that good scientistsseek
knowledge ofanykindthatinvolvesbelief,theymustbe supposedrather
alwaysto seekknowledge withoutbelief.Scientific enquiry,whetherin
pursuitofempirical uniformities oroftheoretical explanations,is nottobe
regarded as a procedure thatis consummated whenjustifiable beliefs,with
appropriatecontent,arise in or come over those engaged,who have
meanwhile beenwaiting patientlyforthistohappento them.Guessesand
hunches, wellingup fromthesubconscious, maymakea veryconsiderable
contribution to the progressof an enquiry.In some cases an early
conviction thatp mayevenusefully fortify resolution
a scientist's to seek
thoseresearchfacilities thatare necessary in orderto testwhether p. But
theculmination envisaged-theculmination thataddsto ourresources for
explanation, prediction, technology, or further research-isa conscious
and voluntary act of appropriately reasonedacceptancethatis echoed
throughout therelevant scientific
community.

of Physics,Cambridge,CambridgeUniversity
14 E.g. A. Einsteinand L. Infeld,The Evolution

Press,I938, p. 224.
Image,Oxford,ClarendonPress,I980, pp. 8 and I2.
15 E.g. B. C. Van Fraasen,The Scientific

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 Cohen
386 L. _onathan
Moreoverthereseemto be somequiteimportant situations
scientific in
whichacceptancealoneis appropriate and beliefwouldbe whollyout of
place. A majorscientific theoryoftenencounters minoranomaliesthat,
becauseno bettertheoryis available,are takennotto justify rejecting it.
Notoriously Newton'stheoryof motionwas long in thisposition. What
mentalattitude towardssucha theory is thecorrectone?Ex hypothesi we
shouldbe wrongto believethetheory, in thesenseoffeeling it to be true.
But we can certainly acceptit, in the senseof goingalongwithit as a
premiss, forall thepurposestowhichitis applicable.Similarly, evenwhen
we regarda physicalor chemicallaw as a simplification or idealization we
can use it as a premissforcalculations abouttheactualworld, ifwe make
relevant allowances andcorrections. So in thissensewe canacceptthelaw
evenwhenwe do notbelieveitto be trueoftheactualworld.Admittedly,
thesearenotcasesofknowledge, inthesenseinwhichsomeone'sknowing
thatp impliesit to be actuallytruethatp. But theynevertheless illustrate
howthedistinction betweenbeliefand acceptance helpsto elucidatewhat
is involvedin scientific progress and in thegrowthofwhatis commonly
referred to as scientificknowledge.
Whatabouttheexperimental or observational datathata scientist cites
in supportofacceptingthetheorythatp? Does he needto believethate
(wherethefactthate constitutes theevidential data),oronlytoacceptthat
e? He certainly needsin anycase to acceptthate, as thepremissforthe
theory's inductive And,ifhe haslearnedaboutthefactthate
justification.
onlyfroma reliablejournalortextbook, forhimmerely
itsuffices toaccept
thate. But,so faras he himself is to be takenas an originalauthority for
thefactthate, it is necessary forhimalso to believethate and thisbelief
should be sufficiently coherentwithhis otherbeliefsfor him to be
reasonably confident ofitstruth.Testimony, as we saw earlier(in section
2), createsa presumption ofsuchbelief.Ofcourse,whatcountsin practice
as theevidential datawillnormally be a richcomplexofmethodologically
structured and theoreticallyinterpreted observations,and clearlythe
methodological elementsin thiscomplexare stillmatters
and theoretical
foracceptance. Buttheobservational element requiresbeliefon thepartof
whoever is theoriginalauthorityforthatelement. Otherwise thecontext of
scientificknowledge wouldbe whollya matterforconvention.
Note the difference herebetweenscienceand religion.Faith (in the
everyday sense)thatGod existsis an exampleofbelief,notofacceptance.
Peoplesometimes regretthattheyhavelosttheirfaith.So it is certainly
nota stateofmindthatcan be directly achieved,restored, or maintained
by an immediately operativedecision,thoughpeopleoftentryhardto
induceitinthemselves orinothersorhopethatGod willso induceit.Nor
is religiousfaithto be confusedwithunreasoned orinadequately reasoned
acceptance,thoughit maypromotethis.Faithis oftensaid to takethe
placeofa proofthatGod exists.Butwhatitactuallyreplacesis themental

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 Beliefand Acceptance387

actofacceptance in thelightofsucha proof.Roughlyspeaking we cansay

thata religionof faithstandsto naturaltheologyas beliefto reasoned
acceptance.
Returning nowto theanalysisofnon-religious knowledge I admitthat
suchknowledge is sometimes possiblewithout simultaneous acceptanceof
whatis known.Knowledgethatthehouseis on firecan firstforceitself
upon one's involuntary awarenesswhenthe flamesbeginto flicker up
through thefloor-boards; acceptancemaycomea littlelater.My claimis
ratherthat,insteadofsayingeither'Knowledgethatp entailsacceptance
thatp' or 'Knowledgethatp entailsbeliefthatp', oneshouldprefer to say
'Knowledgethatp entailseitheracceptancethatp or beliefthatp'. At its
bestacceptance-based knowledge involvesinferencetowhatis accepted,as
in science,crime-detection, etc.,whilebelief-based knowledgeinvolves
immediate acquaintance withthefactbelieved,as in everyday observation.
But thereare degenerate cases,as in self-deception (a topicthatrequires
treatment at greater lengththanis possiblehere).Roughly,an accusation
ofself-deception impliesthatthepersonaccusedreallyknowsthatp, since
he believestrulyand on sufficient evidencethatp-how else couldhe be
said to deceive?-despitethefactthathe persistsin notacceptingthatp
becausehe wouldliketo believetrulythatnot-p.
Of course,whetherin scienceor in everydaylife,thereis moreto
knowledge thatp thanjusttruebeliefor trueacceptance. Notoriously the
beliefor acceptancehas to be evidentially warranted, and the warranty
neededhas to be characterizable in a waythatis immuneto paradox.But
philosophical controversy still rages aroundthe questionwhetherthe
elementof warranty thatis implicitin knowledgeshouldbe construed
normatively or causally,wherecausationis understoodto operatein
appropriate patterns ofuniformity. And I proposenowto arguethatthe
distinction betweenbeliefandacceptance helpstostrengthen thecasefora
normative construal, as againstthe view16thatyourbeliefis warranted
whenthe factthatmakesthe belieftrueis whatcausesyou to get that
belief.
The kind of evidentialwarranty thatis appropriateforthe act of
accepting thatp is undeniably a normative one. Sinceaccepting thatp is a
voluntary act, thosewho seriouslyentertain reasonsforacceptingthat
p-whateverthosereasonsmaybe-must be able notto acceptthatp. So
thereasonscannotbe uniform causesoftheiracceptance. The reasonsfor
acceptingthatp mustbe capableof beingput to a personquite inde-
pendently ofthetruth-value ofanypredictions, basedon causalknowledge,
about whetheror not he will acceptthatp. Any sufficiently counter-
suggestible personwill easilyrefutesuch a causality-based prediction,

16 Most recentlyadvocatedby D. H. Mellor,The WarrantofInduction, Cambridge

Cambridge,
Press,I988, p. i8.
University

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388 L. Jonathan
Cohen
ifitis putto himas a supposedwarranty forhisacceptance thatp. So the
realwarranty mustbe a normative one.It needsto statewhythepotential
knowerought to acceptthatp and wouldbe wrong notto do so, thoughhe
is freeeithertodo itornottodo it.Buthowcouldanyadequateevidential
reasonsforaccepting thatp (apartfromtherather weakkindofreasonthat
is constituted bybeliefthatp) notalsoconstitute evidential for
justification
believing thatp? It maywellbe desirablein certainareas,as I suggested
earlier,not to have any beliefsat all, becausetheymay prejudicethe
progressof enquiry.But even in those cases one can still hope to
distinguish betweenwhatwouldbe evidentially justifiablebeliefsandwhat
wouldbe evidentially ones,andthislineofdemarcation
unjustifiable needs
to coincidewiththat betweenwhat would be evidentially justifiable
acceptancesand what would be evidentially unjustifiable ones. The
evidentialstandardsthatwe applyretrospectively whenwe judge the
meritsofthebeliefsthatcomeuponus oruponothersmustbe thesameas
thosethatweapplyprospectively indebating ordeliberating aboutwhatto
accept.(Of course,thereis an ambiguity herein termslikejustification,
warranty, etc.Whatjustifies mein believingthatp maybe theexperience
thatI had, whereaswhatjustifies you in believingthatp may be the
experiencethatyou had. In such contextsthe relationbetweenthe
experience andthebeliefmustindeedbe a causalone.Butthatissuehasto
be distinguished fromthequestionhowbeliefthatp is to be warranted or
justified to theworldat large.)
It is clearthatthereis an analogousidentity betweenprospective and
retrospective standardsin normal'7 cases of passingmoral or legal
judgement on an action.The reasonswhyitcouldbe saidin advancetobe
rightforyouto givemoneyto a particular charity are normally-that is,
ceterisparibus-thesameas thosewhyitcouldbe saidaftertheeventthat
you acted rightlyin givingmoneyto thatcharity.So too we are not
confined in thecase of beliefsto evaluatingtheirjustificationwhenthey
havealreadycomeuponpeople.In facttheevidential reasonswhyitwould
be rightforJamestobelievethatp, whenhe doesnotyetdo so,arejustthe
sameas thosewhyitwouldbe rightforJamestoacceptthatp. Andweget
collateralconfirmation of thisif we look once againat the desire/goal-
seekingdualitythatbehavesanalogously in manyotherrespects,as we
havealreadyseen,tothebelief/acceptance Anyreasonsthatjustify
duality.
James'sdesireforx willalso justify James'sadoptingx as his goal.But
thesereasonscannotuniformly cause James'sadoptionof x as his goal
sinceit is quiteopento himnotto adoptx as his goal.
So-whatever otherargumentsmay exist for rejectingthe causal
analysisof the justificational elementin knowledge-itis clearthatthe
causalanalysisdoesnotsitcomfortably withtheinterconnecting relation-

17 Cases of so-called'moralluck'neednotconcernus here.

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 Beliefand Acceptance389
shipsthatexistbetweenbeliefand acceptance.Roughly,we needto say
insteadthata personwhoknowsthatp notonlybelievesor acceptsthatp
but also believesor acceptstrulycertainotherpropositions alongwith
theiradequacystraightforwardly (i.e. withoutGettier-type to
deviations)
legitimatehis beliefor acceptancethatp.

In thispaper'8 I havetriedtoshowthatthedistinction betweenbeliefand

acceptance,likethatbetweendesireand goal-seeking, has a numberof
important implications thathavetendedto be overlooked in thepastfifty
yearsor so ofanalytical philosophy. The conceptsofjudgingand willing,
as mentalacts,havebeenkeptoutoffashion bya quasi-Humean dotingon
passivementalexperience. We neednowtowelcomethoseaction-oriented
Cartesianor Kantianconceptsbackagainintoour analyses,thoughnot
necessarily in the same verbalformulations or carryingthe same meta-
physicalbaggage.
Indeed,in a moreextensive analysisone wouldhopeto showthatit is
primarily thesementalacts ratherthanany sensationsor passionsthat
needto be simulated in knowledge-engineering. The situation is different
in cognitivepsychology. In computational modelsthatare designedto
describeorexplainhowthehumanmindactuallyworksbeliefneedstobe
represented alongsideacceptanceand desiresalongsidegoal-
distinctively
adoptions.All fourstatesof mind occur,and each has its biological
function.Butan expert-system program thatis designedtoreplacehuman
activityin somearea ofrecurrent problem-solving or decision-making is
a programthatexploitsan accepteddata-basein accordancewithan
acceptedset of goals,procedures, and policies.Beliefsand desiresare
besidethepointthere.
Moreoverthereareotherissuestooaboutwhichmoreneedsto be said,
once beliefis firmly prisedapartfromacceptanceand desirefromgoal-
adoption.Amongthese,as I hopeto showelsewhere, are self-deception,
self-control,philosophical and theinterplay
scepticism, ofevidential and
non-evidential reasonsin acceptance.

The Queen's College L. JONATHAN COHEN

Oxford
18
forsomeveryhelpfulcomments
am grateful and criticisms Adler,Neil Cooper,
to Jonathan
at Illinois(Champain-Urbana),
indiscussions
andtovariousparticipants
andAlvinPlantinga, McGill,
NotreDame, Oxford,and TorontoUniversities,
Northwestern, and at the i8thWorldCongressof
Philosophy.

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