SPECIAL ARTICLES

The Governance Agenda

Making Democratic Development Dispensable
Niraja Gopal Jayal

Democracy and development must be seen as intimately relatedjunctioning under similar constraints, and equally
subject to political negotiation. Thus for instance, social inequality in India both retards balanced development
and distorts the logic of democracy. It is precisely this distorting logic of democracy in an unequal society that
necessitates state welfare for the protection of the vulnerable, for the concerns of distributive justice cannot be
fulfilled by governance alone. The answer therefore is not to look towards the state but at different ways of
approaching and defining democracy and development.

I but that development assistance today is show the extent to which governance is a
increasingly suffused with the discourse of component in its lending operations (see
THIS paper seeks to examine the ideology governance. Table).
and politics of the p r o j e c t of ' g o o d It becomes necessary, at this point, to
governance' that has, in recent years, quite examine the rationale offered for the project TABLE

insidiously infiltrated into the discourse and
practice of development assistance. As part
of the project of globalising democracy, this
agenda also has an important bearing on the
ways in which questions of development and
democracy are currently being understood
and conceptualised. In the post-cold war era,
the imperative to subsidise, for geopolitical
reasons, the d e v e l o p m e n t of markedly
undemocratic third world states has receded.
The thawing of the ideological frost between
east and west has, however, been replaced
by the logic of another cold reason - wearing
the mantle of virtue - which now dictates
that development aid be tied to political
reform in order to effectuate the project of
the "new i n t e r n a t i o n a l o r d e r ' . If the
suspension or withdrawal of such aid was
once used punitively, it is now sought to be
deployed proacti vely through the instrument
of 'political conditionally' [Landell-Mills
and Serageldin 1992: 308].
Though the IMF has for long used political
conditionality as a lever of control over debtor
governments, the World Bank's Articles of
Agreement formally rule out interference in
the affairs of recipient nations. 1 This explains
why the project of 'good governance' appears,
on the Bank's definition of it, to be a chiefly
technical instrument. T h e more political
definition of it is to be found in the aid and
foreign policies of theOECDcountries. Very
much a creature of its times, the European
Bank of Reconstruction and Development,
established in 1991, is the first multilateral
financial institution which is statutorily
obliged to take governance criteria into
account. Not merely the European Com-
munity, but even the Commonwealth, the
OECD and theOAU have sent out the clarion
call of governance. There is thus little doubt
of governance in recent years, and the
definitions - both managerial/technical as
welll as political - of the term, preliminary
to unpacking its contents. 2 Governance was
first problematised in a World Bank document
of 1989 on Sub-Saharan Africa, which
suggested that the Bank's programmes of
adjustment and investment in that area were
being rendered ineffective by a 'crisis of
governance'. Good governance, on this
account, came to be equated with "sound
development management", and was defined
as "the manner in which power is exercised
in the management of a country's economic
and social resources fordevelopment" [World
Bank 1992:3]. Its four key dimensions were,
further, specified as follows:
- public sector management (capacity and
efficiency)
- accountability
- the legal framework for development
- information and transparency
In its discussion of the symptoms of 'poor
governance', this document identified the
following: the failure to make a separation
between public and private, thereby faci-
litating the appropriation of public resources
for private gain; the failure to establish a
predictable framework of law and govern-
ment conducive to development; excessively
regulatory rules which impede the functioning
of markets; misallocation of resources
following from priorities not consistent with
development; and non-transparent decision-
making [ibid:9].
While an evaluation of the governance
capacities of individual countries form a part
of the confidential Country Assistance
Strategy documents, the World Bank has
compiled data f r o m 4 5 5 projects across three
regions during the fiscal period 1991-93, to
Legal framework 6
Participation 30
State-owned enterprises reform 33
Economic management 49
Capacity building 68
Democratisation 68
Source: World Bank (1994) xv.
T h e specifically political meaning of
governance came to be elaborated in the
policy pronouncements of leaders of OECD
countries, and there is enough evidence to
show that the US, France and Japan have
explicitly built political conditionality into
their policies of bilateral assistance [Uvih
1993:65-67]. The documents of the OECD
Development Assistance Committee draw
upon the World Bank's definition of govern-
ance and proceed to link it with the partici-
patory development, human rights and demo-
cratisation. This conception of governance
enjoins legitimacy of government; account-
ability of political and official elements of
government; competence of governments to
make policy and deliver services; and respect
for human rights and the rule of law. The
last category includes individual and group
rights and security, a framework for economic
and social activity, and participation [World
Bank 1994:xiv],Within this framework, good
governance refers to a liberal-democratic
state, with a pluralist polity, in which repre-
sentatives to the legislature are chosen by
regular, free and fair elections. Further, such
a system should protect and guarantee human
rights, and exemplify the doctrine of the
separation of powers, with legislators having

407
M-30 Economic and Political Weekly February 22, 1997 M-11
the capacity to check executive excesses.
These political requirements are, of course,
assumed to subsist within economic
structures that are essentially capitalist, and
the "democratic capitalist regime, presided
over by a minimal state...is also part of the
wider governance of the New World Order"
[Leftwich 1993:611].
It is no surprise that the governance agenda
should express, and be perfectly consistent
with, neo-liberal principles of politics and
economics. At the heart of these lies a strong
case for the 'rolling back of the state', and
its withdrawal from distributive
commitments which are seen to be morally
unacceptable. It is not a coincidence that the
1980s were also the years when the neo-
liberal agenda in politics and economics -
as expressed in the writings of political
philosophers like Robert Nozick and
economists like Milton Friedman and Murray
Rothbard - was the regnant influence on
public policy in more than one advanced
capitalist society of the western world.
Richard Falk has appropriately described, as
a powerful type of contemporary funda-
mentalism, the tendency of "market-driven
interpretations—to reduce democratisation
to empty forms of state/society constitu-
tionalism in contexts of enthusiasm by pre-
vailing elites for the unbridled logic of
capitalism" [Falk 1995:112].
On the neo-liberal account, the withdrawal
of the state should make way for the voluntary
sector(viz, non-governmental organisations),
on the one hand, and free market forces, on
the other. The shift to NGOs has frequently
been justified as an expression of the emphasis
on 'popular participation' or 'participatory
development', and has been much favoured
by multilateral agencies. The parallel
emphasis on the market has,of course, tended
to satisfy the demands of global capital and
transnational corporations, even as it has
been consistent with the demand for the
retreat of the state within western societies.
This two-pronged strategy of the state making
way, simultaneously, for NGOs and market
forces, is noticeably coherent with the
argument in the Approach Paper to the Eighth
Five-Year Plan in India, which makes a
strong, though apparently contradictory, plea
for a greater role for the voluntary sector -
through strategies of decentralisation and
people's participation - as well as for market
forces [Government of India 1990].
The widespread recognition of India as a
democracy, with regular elections, high voter
participation and a multi-party representa-
tive system, has meant that India has enjoyed
relative immunity from political condi-
tionally. The programme of economic
reforms has also entailed changes in the
regulatory regime, better known as the
408
licence-permit raj. On the question of human
rights, however, it has come to be regularly
pilloried, especially in the annual reports of
Amnesty International, and even the Euro-
pean Community has entered a human rights-
based caveat in its commercial negotiations
with India {Federsen 1993:102].
II
In what follows, we shall attempt an
evaluation of the ideology and politics of the
project of good governance, in terms of its
implications for the role of the state; the
understanding of politics; democracy and
development; and issues of participation and
citizenship. These themes will be explored
through the resources of political theory,
which suggest that the agenda of 'good
governance' is inescapably burdened by four
internal contradictions, the first of which is
methodological, while the remaining three
are emphatically political in nature.
( I ) UNIVERSAL G O A L S , PARTICULAR
CONSTRAINTS
The first, essentially methodological,
contradiction is that between the universa-
lising and particularising elements of the
governance discourse. Good governance, as
a condition of development, is recognised
as a universally valid project, rather like
modernisation was in the development theory
of the 1960s. This follows from the conviction
that failures in development efforts have
largely been the result of poor governance,
i e, political factors that are uncontrollable,
and democratic processes that induce
inefficiency.
In one rather more enlightened account,
the idea of cultural relativism is invoked to
argue that the modern state has undergone
processes of both univcrsalisation and
indigenisation in non-European societies,
processes that have been significantly
influenced by cultural factors, and ethics of
values, which account for the differing state
forms to be found in Africa, India and Japan.
It follows that good governance cannot be
introduced from the outside, but must address
itself to questions such as: What do people
consider good? Does the law embody the
idea of good? What are the most trusted and
effective types of social organisation? What
is the basis of local ideas of accountability?
How should those seeking good governance
deal with the pervasive distrust of power and
the state? [Martin 1992:336-39].
This argument, even as it recognises
cultural diversity and specificity, does not
radically interrogate the project of good
governance, or its relationship with deve-
lopment (viewed as synonymous with and
equivalent to economic performance). By
reducing the question of political constraints
Economic and Political Weekly
on development to differences of culture, it
needs to address itself merely to the task of
working out the content of good governance
in a culture-specific way. That culture (a
shared ensemble of ethical values) is sought
to be related to political culture, but culture
itself is treated as a static given, rather than
one that changes in its dynamic interaction
with modern political processes. In
attempting to make the project of gover-
nance more sensitive to particularities in
the form of cultural differences, it fails to
question whether cultural specificity also
demands different ways of conceptualising
development.
There is a striking continuity between this
discourse of the aid regime, and the con-
struction of 'otherness' that feeds into com-
mon sense western understandings of the
third world and its 'problems'. In a penetrating
analysis of some such cultural processes,
John Gabriel has shown how, underlying the
western media's coverage of the Bhopal
disaster (or indeed of famine in several
African countries) is a pervasive myth about
the third world, viz, that "it is peopled by
victims, rather than by active participants in
struggle" [Gabriel 1994:134]. Further, such
victims are inevitably constructed in 'mass'
terms, rather than as individuals. This is in
sharp contrast to media coverage of disasters
in the west, where viewers are encouraged
to individualise suffering. It is hardly
surprising then that redress should take the
form of charity, rooted neither in rights-
claims nor in a sensitivity to potential rights-
claims, but rather in a neocolonial sense of
philanthropy. If these popular western images
of the third world can be said to constitute
a form of orientalism, the recent discourse
of development aid - with the project of
'good governance' at its core - may be seen
as constituting an attempt to institutionalise
orientalism.
( I I ) PUTTING THE STATE O U T A G A I N
The second contradiction this paper seeks
to identify relates to the conception of the
state in the project of 'good governance'.
Even as it favours market-oriented societies,
the World Bank endorses the role of
governments in providing two sorts of public
goods: (i) the creation and enforcement of
rules to make markets work efficiently, in
the absence of which production and invest-
ment would be deterred and development
consequently hindered; and (ii) compensa-
ting market failures through corrective
interventions which includes, where neces-
sary akey role in providingeducation, health
and essential infrastructure. The rationale
offered is that a well-educated labour force
and good infrastructure are crucial to the
quality of private investment. In order to
February 22, 1997
provide these public goods, the state needs
to raise revenues and deliver services, and
it is these that necessitate accountability,
transparency, clarity about rules, and
a d e q u a t e i n f o r m a t i o n [ W o r l d Bank
1992:6].
The argument for governance introduced
an element of messiness in the otherwise
neat fit between the advocacy of neo-liberal
principles of politics and economics for the
countries of the developed as well as
developing world. The source of this
messiness was the simultaneous insistence
on the minimal state and on good governance.
Of course, good governance was not treated
as being important in its own right, but only
instrumentally, as a means to the achievement
of better economic performance. Thus, the
reforms entailed by structural adjustment
programmes included a retreat of the state,
to be effectuated - ironically and para-
doxically - by the state personnel. It also
implied that while a scaling down in the
size and scope of the state was required,
an expansion in state capacity was
necessary to give effect to the reforms
process. This in turn required a measure
of state autonomy from powerful interest
g r o u p s in s o c i e t y , to p r e c l u d e the
possibility of its 'capture'.
The governance agenda's account of the
state thus recommends a model found in
classical liberal politicaltheory,3with a strong
Weberian overlay in the emphasis on rules,
institutions, and an efficient bureaucracy, all
characterised by impersonality, motivated
by considerations of efficiency, and divorced
from any normative concerns. Such an
exercise of political model-building was
faced, however, with the embarrassing
challenge of the 'developmental states' of
east Asia, which had sustained efficient and
productive economies in combination with
essentially authoritarian governments, some
of which have enjoyed the requisite autonomy
from social interests.
In sum, the conception of state-society
relations advanced with the package of
governance is, in one authentic version, as
follows:
positive governance in developing countries
depends on the state's capacity to provide
a meta goat or meta idea that serves as the
organisingprincipleofachanged society and
endows the state with the power to withstand
capture from private interests. This
conception of governance suggests that the
capacity to enforce law and order and promote
effective policy is contingent on state
autonomy, which in turn is contingent on
sources of state power distinct from those of
the major economic players in society, which,
finally, is contingent on the state's ability to
project a culturally bound vision of a
reorganised society [Frischtak 1994:25].
Economic and Political Weekly February 22, 1997
This conception is manifestly governed by
the efficiency criterion. It demands a lean
state, with expanded governance capacity,
though without expanded government. Even
as it recognises society as the only latent
source of power, and recognises also the
embeddedness of the state in society, it
suggests that governance is premised on the
state's capacity to deploy power from society,
and therefore ultimately on its autonomy.
Only transcending societal constraints can,
on this account, create state capacity and
render governance possible.
There are, thus, two contradictions here,
one internal and the other external. The
internal contradiction is the paradox between
a reduced state, in terms of size as well as
scope of intervention, and greater state
capacity. The external contradiction
expresses itself in the consequences of this
formula for the project of democracy. At one
level, the good governance package explicitly
includes democratisation, respect for human
rights, a plural polity, a multiparty system,
and accountability and transparency. But
how does autonomy relate to the minimal
requirements of accountability and
transparency? Indeed, the east Asianexample
provides a good illustration of this. Abstrac-
ting core elements from the developmental
states of cast Asia - a high degree of state
autonomy, an effective ruling bureaucracy,
control of labour, non-interference by popular
groups in the setting of development
priorities, and the outlawing of political
pluralism - it has been argued that these
states exemplify a non-democratic bias. On
this basis, then, it may even be possible to
conclude that" 'soft authoritarianism' is the
optimum political form for the developmental
state" [Sorensen 1993:13-14]. For those to
whom such a political solution is anathema,
good governance carries with it the suspicion
of providing the shell of democracy, without
its substance.
A final aspect of the conception of
state contained in the project of good
governance is the role envisaged for non-
state players, chiefly non-governmental
organisations. Though NGOs are more
central to World Bank policies on poverty
and the e n v i r o n m e n t , than to its
governance agenda, it is appropriate to
point out that, between 1988 and 1991,
NGOs were involved in 27.6 per cent of
alt new approved projects. This contrasts
sharply with the corresponding figure of
5 to 6 per cent for the earlier period
between 1973 and 1988[gIddion 1993:57-
58]. Using and idealising NGOs as having
"state-substitutive capacities, has a certain
i d e o l o g i c a l and practical value for
multilateral agencies that cannot be
underestimated. 4
( i n ) POLITICS OUTLAWED
The flaws in the account of the state offered
by the governance agenda are anchored in,
and premised on, its definition of politics,
and our third contradiction therefore is that
between governance and politics, which are
implicitly posited as mutually exclusive. Even
as cultural specificities are recognised as
playing a role in giving effect to the project
of governance, perhaps even allowing for
indigenous definitions of governance[Martin
1992:326], it appears to preclude the pos-
sibility that the demand for good governance
be seen to emerge from the political process,
its form and definition politically articulated
by the citizens of a particular society.
While some accounts of political condi-
tionality do enumerate the practical con-
straints on the effectiveness of such condi-
tionality, there is relatively little normative
and political interrogation of the governance
agenda. Arguments against external inter-
ference have taken a variety of forms.
Recipient nations have mostly defended their
case by invoking arguments of national
sovereignty, economic and political. In India,
this argument of the moral unjustifiability
of political conditionality has been appro-
priated equally by political parties of the
right and left. Some other developing
countries have either followed the strategy
of finding alternative donors, or have evaded
conditionality by enacting some policies that
appear to fulfil it even as they take other
measures to subvert it. On the donors' side,
the principle of interdependence of members
of the community of nations, with mutual
and legally binding obligations, is sometimes
invoked to argue that constraints on
sovereignty, as embodied in international
conventions, do not constitute infringements
of sovereignty, and that governance may be
seen to belong to this category of constraints
[Landell-Mills and Serageldin 1992:308].
Hence, it is said, the development community
can and should persuade and assist countries
in improving governance without intruding
on their sovereignty. 5 An additional
argument, ostensibly couched in moral terms,
is that if the citizens of a country are poor
but badly or undemocratically governed,
holding back assistance on account of the
poor governance record of their rulers,
unjustly punishes them.
It is being argued here that the project of
good governance is simultaneously a project
for the elimination of politics, for its
banishment from the nation-state. It is guilty
not only of seeking to uni versalise a particular
set of choices of regime form, but also of
ruling out the generation of a governance
agenda that is a product of democratic politics,
rather than a condition of it. The question
409
of whether governance can be effectively
imposed from the outside has been asked
[Leftwich 1993; Uvin 1993]. Butthequestion
of whether demands for governance - good
or efficient or equitable - should emanate
from the citizens of a polity, and exclusively
from them, is not generally raised. This
paper is concerned to argue that governance
criteria are both culturally and politically
specific; that the definition of good
governance in a particular society must be
the product of consensus - or perhaps even
the outcome of effectuating a project of
good governance and sustaining it requires
a certain kind of political negotiation,
which can only be the product of democratic
politics, In the absence of such a view, an
emphasis on governance will provide
nothing more than "an analysis of a dys-
functioning elite system" (Kothari 1995:627].
As such, it will ignore the mismatch between
the institutions of governance and genuine
social demands.
( I V ) DEMOCRACY, DEVELOPMENT AND G O O D
GOVERNANCE
A restrictive definition of democracy - in
terms of formal institutions and procedures
alone - necessarily follows from the out-
lawing of politics. Governance without
politics forces us to question the centrality
accorded to audit and accountability. Does,
that is, good governance entail account-
ability to the citizens of a democratic
policy, or are the lending institutions its
chief auditors? Conversely, if the formal
conditions of democracy are fulfilled - as,
say, in India- does good governance logically
follow?
It is outside the scope of this paper to
consider the question of the extent to which
good governance i s - factually or empirically
- the or even a critical variable impacting
economic performance in developing
countries. There are, however, two important
challenges to the assumptions that link this
triad of concepts; democracy, development
and good governance. The first challenge
relates to the relationship between democracy
and development, while the second pertains
to the value - instrumental or intrinsic - of
governance as a goal
It is apparently no longer assumed, as it
was perhaps in the 1960s, that democracy
is an inevitable consequence of processes of
modernisation and development. In fact, as
already noted, the east Asian experience has
presented an embarrassing challenge to the
proponents of good governance, showing
that there is no necessary or inevitable
relationship between democracy and
development. If the weak patrimonial and
undemocratic states of A f r i c a were
developmentally ineffective, the equally
410
undemocratic, 'soft authoritarian' states of
east Asia were highly effective in bringing
about economic development (the notion of
development that lay at the heart of these
debates being,of course, an uncomplicatedly
derivative one).
The obvious counter-example to this is
that of states like India which enjoy the
conditions of formal democracy - a pluralist
polity with an elected legislature, regular
elections, a free press, and so on - but without
realising a spectacular record of economic
growth. Indeed, the uniquely democratic
mechanisms of accommodation and com-
promise have been effectively deployed by
political elites to prevent demands for
radical economic change from acquiring
greater political charge. Sarwar Lateef, one
of the chief authors of the World Bank
publication Government and Development,
has elsewhere commented on Indian
democracy as follows:
The experience of India illustrates the
difficulties facing even flourishing
democracies. It also illustrates that no clear
relationship exists between the form of
government and the attributes or dimensions
of good government: accountability,
predictability and the rule of law.
Accountability exists in the formal sense in
India. We have the option to "throw the
rascals out", and frequently do. But
accountability is eroded by the lack of true
choice for voters; the high cost of elections,
which makes elected representatives
dependent on the corporate sector and is at
the heart of much of the corruption in
government; the cynicism of the elite; the
nexus between criminals and politicians; a
vast bureaucracy pursuing its own agenda;
and over-centralised political structures that
put a distance between the rulers and the
ruled [Lateef 1992:297],
To assume, further, that economic
liberalisation is the key to democratisation
is also problematic. As Atul Kohli has argued,
this may result in the creation of "two-track
polities", which restrict democratic practices
to the political (i e, electoral) arena, even as
they insulate governmental decision-making
from popular pressures. This cannot but
render economic policy devoid of social
content, an exercise in technical efficiency,
conducted behind closed doors [Kohli
1993:683]. The unimpeded logic of
democracy, on the other hand, and surely its
very rationale, should be to undermine class
and other forms of social inequality, and
nudge or even bush policy in a redistributive
direction.
Secondly, if the value of good governance
is seen to lie exclusively in its instrumental
purpose - of facilitating a better economic
performance - then the east Asian states
meet the requirement more than adequately,
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and the task of governance is reduced to its
technical component (as per the WorldBank's
definition of it). If, on the other hand, good
governance is inherently valuable, it is a
political value which must be negotiated by
the political community in question, and
speak to the relations between citizen and
state. To accomplish this independently of
democratic political processes is impos-
sible. The maintenance and consolidation
of democracy, moreover, requires not ex-
ternal assistance or pressure, but indigenous
initiatives for democracy. Such a concep-
tion of democracy will, of course, be less
than meaningful unless it is part of an
egalitarian strategy, in both economic and
political terms.
An allied concept which frequently makes
its appearance in World Bank discourse is
that of participation. Participation, in this
literature, is to be treated both as a means
and as an end. Its inherent desirability is seen
to lie in the fact that it enlarges human talents
and potential which is the goal of development
[Uphoff 1992:135]. But its more practical
advantage, for project effectiveness and
sustainability, is the fact that it gives people
a stake in the project, makes them willing
to support it, and thereby reduces waste in
resources. There are, however, certain costs
entailed by participation, viz, it is time-
consuming, difficult, allows for free riders
to take more than their share, and so forth
[Dichter 1992:89].
In this perspective, then, participation in
development is a component of project
design, and as such confined to the details
of project implementation. By implication,
it is outlawed from democratic discussion
about the model of development, the
determination of development priorities
(local or national), the acceptability or
o t h e r w i s e of particular development
initiatives, and so on. It is also, as a compon-
ent of externally-assisted development
projects, d e f i n i t i o n a l ^ insulated from
political processes and political concerns.
In this sense, it is entirely coherent with
the agenda of 'good governance' which,
as we have seen, is also concerned to
marginalise politics.
Despite its apparent affinities with the
western liberal-democratic model of govern-
ment, therefore, the governance agenda
appears to espouse definitions of politics, of
democracy and of participation that are quite
distinct from those that have historically
evolved in western societies. Thus, the citizen
is transformed into a subject: a passive
recipient of rights, enjoyer of governance,
beneficiary of development. At best, s/he
is a citizen-in-the-making of a well-
governed society, equally in the process
of becoming.
February 22, 1997
 Ill similar trap. Possibly the most significant search for the factors which optimise
critique of this kind has been developed by developmental outcomes and possibilities,
The arguments thus far suggest not only Adrian Leftwich, over several important democracy becomes a purely instrumental
that governance is objectionable as a com- essays (1993,1995a, 1995b). Leftwich argues criterion. What is important is the factors
ponent of aid conditionality, but also that its that what matters for development is not that make development happen, and the
content is contradictory, and deserves inter- the system of government, but the type of presence of even some elements of formal
rogation from both the methodological and state, irrespective of whether it is democratic democracy are sufficient to approve the
the political standpoints. Implicit in this paper or not (!995a:5). It is in this sense that model. Thus, Leftwich argues, democratic
is the idea that an alternative conception of development is political, rather than ad- developmental states may be thought of as
governance is possible, but that such a ministrative or managerial, as the World "authoritarian democracies", because they
conception can only be the product of political Bank and IMF assume it to be. This is why fall short in some respects of the full
contestation and negotiation within a society. even the success or failure of structural requirements of liberal democracy (ibid:290).
A well-ordered society, in which (a) the adjustment programmes has varied across Such states are led by determined
political framework is determined and different countries. developmental elites, and these elites and the
sustained by popular consent, with adequate ...good governance and democracy are not state institutions they command enjoy a
avenues for the free expression of rational mere components which can be inserted into relative autonomy from special interests.
disagreement and dissent on particular any society at any point in its development, Consequently, these states have powerful
issues; (b) economic organisation provides like a sprocket or valve. On the contrary, both and competent bureaucracies who can shape
for the creation and equitable distribution good governance and democracy depend development policy. Civil society is often
of wealth; (c) the individual and group crucially on the character and capacity of a weak or controlled by the state and human
rights of citizens - regardless of religion, state which, alone, can institute and insist on rights records may therefore be very poor
region, caste, and gender differences - are it. And the capacity of a state to deliver good (ibid: 28510-
governance and protect democracy is in turn
respected, with these differences not for- Even as Leftwich argues passionately for
a function of its politics and its developmental
ming the basis of discrimination in either determination...The only social process that putting politics into development, for
society or public policy. The role of the state can both institute and sustain both good recognising the importance of politics as a
(in the sphere of welfare for instance) and governance and democracy is the process we factor determining development, he shies
the nature and extent of citizens' participation know as politics which I defined earlier as away from any explicit reference to the need
must also be coherently integrated into such consisting of all the processes of conflict, co- to democratise development. He seems to
a conception. operation and negotiation involved in the take as given the politics of a society, as it
In a third world context, the idea of use, production and distribution of resources impacts the nature of the state which in turn
governance as a more or less technical [Leftwich 1995a: 17]. influences the success of the developmental
facilitator of development, delinked from The capacity of the state is here highly project. He fails to consider the possibility
conceptions of democracy and welfare, is a parasitical on a particular definition of that there are multiple ways of conceiving
highly impoverished notion. The western politics, which in turn has a purely descriptive development, not merely through measurable
recognition that the simple equation between character, completely isolated from any indicators like the GDP. It is precisely because
governance and democracy, and of both these normative conception of its substance. It is the costs of development are different in
with economic prosperity, is belied in the precisely this profound absence of norma- different societies, that it becomes both
experience of many countries of the third tivity that sustains the emphasis on the necessary and desirable that the nature and
world, has led to the application of adifferent facticity of politics, allowing for it to be substance of development be subject to
set of standards for the latter, whereby democratic or non-democratic, as the case political contestation, and determined by
democracy and development are seen as may be. Politics is a given, a factor that will it. Any delinking of politics and democracy
possibly incompatible, and democracy is determine the character of the state, and is artificial. Thus, while Leftwich's critique
sought to be substituted by governance. This together with it the capacity of the state to of Fukuyama for suggesting that liberal-
notion of governance partakes of some of effect development as well as provide democracy is the ideological terminus of
the elements of classical liberal-democracy, governance. history is entirely apposite, the same
incorporated into a mimimalist institutional Leftwich clearly privileges development searchlight needs to be turned on Leftwich's
design. In fact, development appears to above any other goal, such as democracy or notion of development, which conforms to
require more g o v e r n a n c e , and less welfare. He isolates developmental states the western industrial model, and suggests
democracy. This assumption suggests not from the non-developmental states of the an economic (but not for that reason any
only a restrictive view of democracy, but third world, explicates their features, then the less ideological) terminus of human
also an uncritical acceptance of the priority examines more closely such of these as are history.
of developmental goals, defined in a democratic, in howsoever limited a fashion. Privileging development - whether as
universalistic manner In this perspective, His most preferred option is for democratic explanation or as policy prescription - may,
then, development is not open to political developmentalist states (even with limited as we have seen, result in having to accept
contestation. Both d e v e l o p m e n t and democracy, such as Botswana and Malaysia); non-democratic outcomes. On the other hand,
democracy (in the minimalist sense, his second preference is for non-democratic the cost ofexclusively privileging democracy
encapsulated in the idea of good governance) developmental states, such as Korea,Taiwan, may arguably be development (as
are implicitly defined in ways that ensure China and Indonesia; and his third and final conventionally defined). If democracy cannot
conformity with an essentially western preference is for democratic but non- be made to order, nor can development. The
ethos. developmental states, such as Jamaica and literature on governance had at least realised
Even those scholars who are critical of the Costa Rica [Leftwich 1995b:282}. The this much. They must be seen as intimately
World Bank's project of good governance decisive, and normatively preferred, variable related, functioning under the same or at
on the grounds that it purges development for which explanation is being sought is thus least similar constraints, and equally subject
of its political content, tend to fall into a development, rather than democracy. In the to political negotiation. Thus, for instance,

411
Economic and Political Weekly February 22, 1997
social inequality in India both retards
balanced development and distorts the logic
of democracy. It is precisely this distorting
logic of democracy in an unequal society that
necessitates state welfare for the protection
of the vulnerable, f o r the c o n c e r n s of
distributive justice cannot be fulfilled by
governance alone. The answer therefore is
not to look towards the state, but at different
ways of approaching and defining both
democracy and development: a view of
democracy, for instance, that goes beyond
the procedural to seek the substantive
democratisation of not only the state, but
also society and social relations; and a
view of development that possibly departs
from the conventional ways of measuring
this goal by focusing not on G D P and
GNP, but on the enlargement of human
capabilities and the enhancement of the
quality of life for all citizens. The multiple
meanings these concepts have acquired in
particular societies have emerged out of rich
histories of political practice and discourse.
Concerns of governance must necessarily be
deeply imbricated in these meanings and
definitions.
Notes
1 Currie (1996) suggests that there is some
ambiguity about the extent to which the World
Bank's articles of agreement actually disallow
interference in the interna! politics of a country,
as the Bank generally justifies its exercise of
the right to advise borrower countries on policy
intermsof'good economics1 rather than political
principles, to ensure the success of the projects
it finances.
2 Crook and Manor have argued that the
emphasis on 'good government' was initially
associated chiefly with the bilateral aid
policies of particular western countries,
which insisted on multi-party democracies
replacing the corrupt and inefficient regimes
which were seen as obstacles to the
emergence of free-market capitalist
economies in the third world. The shift to
the term ' g o v e r n a n c e ' , adopted by
multilateral agencies such as the World Bank,
was intended to be a more apolitical,
technical term descriptive of the institutional
factors involved in managing development
(1995:310). The term 'good government',
however, continues to be in active use. Thus,
a recent statement of British policy on
overseas development states that, among
the four key aims of the Overseas
Development Administration, is
"encouraging sound development policies,
efficient markets and good government"
(Foreign and Commonwealth Office 1996].
3 It has been argued that the World Bank
constructs governance at least partly from
liberal theory, and in doing so reproduces
the ambiguities and tensions inherent in that
theory, e g, the problematic distinction
412
between the right and the good which is
echoed in the supposed neutrality of
the reforms process, or the assumption of
the universal liberal self that is necessary
for the kind of civil society that is sought
to be fostered [Williams ?nd Young
I994:92ff].
4 On the limited usefulness of developmental
NGOs financed by donor agencies, and on
the relationship between NGOs, on the one
hand, and the state and local society on the
other, see Hadenius and Uggla (1995).
5 One attempt to address this question has
taken the rather peculiar form of suggesting
a contractarian basis for governance as a
conditionality, such that donors and
recipients are equally seen to be parties to
a contract intended to enhance the benefits
of social co-operation between their citizens.
On this account, "each party may reasonably
ask the other to consider conditions it
believes to be conducive to this end, and
some of these conditions may be political"
[Hawthorn and Seabright 1995:81]. This
argument does not, however, take cognisance
of the obvious inequalities of status and
power between the so-called contracting
parties.
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