Watson 1998 - Army Officers Fight The Patriot War

Society for Historians of the Early American Republic
United States Army Officers Fight the "Patriot War": Responses to Filibustering on the
Canadian Border, 1837-1839
Author(s): Samuel Watson
Source: Journal of the Early Republic, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Autumn, 1998), pp. 485-519
Published by: University of Pennsylvania Press on behalf of the Society for Historians of the Early
American Republic
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UNITED STATES ARMY
OFFICERS FIGHT THE
"PATRIOT WAR":
RESPONSES TO
FILIBUSTERING ON THE
CANADIAN BORDER, 1837-
1839
SamuelWatson
After years of slowly buildingunrestagainstBritishcolonialrule, a
seriesof armedrebellionsbrokeoutin theprovincesof UpperandLower
Canadain December1837. The insurgentswerequicklydispersed,but
many fled to the UnitedStates,wherethey immediatelybeganto raise
moneyandrecruitsto returnto the fray. Theirmainforceassembledat
Buffalo laterthatmonthand establisheda base on Navy Islandon the
Canadianside of the NiagaraRiver. On December29 Canadianmilitia
respondedby burningthe rebelsupplyvessel Caroline,anchoredon the
American shore. An Americancitizen was killed in the raid, and
Americanpublicopinionalong the bordereruptedin angerand fear.'
PresidentVanBurenwantedto avoidwarwithBritain,so he immediately
SamuelWatsonis adjunctlecturerat the Universityof St. Thomas,currently

workingon a bookon thearmyofficercorpsin theborderlands of theearlyrepublic.The
firstversionof thisarticlewaspresented
at the Societyfor MilitaryHistoryconferencein
1994. The authorthanksMichaelA. Morrisonandthe refereesof thisjournalfor their
persistence,advice,andencouragement.
1 This incidentwas the originof the McLeodcase thatstrainedAnglo-American
relationsseveralyearslater,whenone of the leadersof theCanadian volunteershadbeen
capturedandwas triedfor murderby New YorkState. The threatof a deathsentence
arousedardentjingoismin the Britishpress, but the dangerof war was avertedby
McLeod'sacquittalin 1842. See KennethR. Stevens,BorderDiplomacy:TheCaroline
and McLeodAffairsin Anglo-American-Canadian Relations,1837-1842(Tuscaloosa,
1989).
JOURNAL OF THE EARLY REPUBLIC, 18 (Fall 1998). O 1998 Society for Historiansof the Early American Republic.

486 JOURNAL OF THE EARLY REPUBLIC
sent Winfield Scott and other army officers to reassurethe restive
borderers andmaintain Americanneutrality
by securingtheborderagainst
violationfromeitherside.
For the next four years armyofficerswere the primaryagentsof
nationalpolicyalongtheborderandbattleda seriesof attemptsby private
individualsto precipitatewar betweenthe UnitedStatesandBritainby
invadingCanada. ManyAnglophobicAmericansgave vocal supportto
the so-called"Patriots," whomtheyidentifiedwithrepublicanism andthe
revolutionary tradition.
As of
servants the federalgovernment,United
States Army officers were caught between the filibustersand their
American civilian supportersand the British authoritiesand loyal
Canadianswho wantedto pursuethe Patriotsinto the UnitedStatesto
avengetheirraids.Thearmyoftenwas frustrated by the inactionof local
civil officials,wholikethelocalpopulacefrequentlysupported thePatriot
but
cause; military commanders maintained
successfully federal authority
andcontainedincidentsthatmightotherwisehaveled to warwithBritain.2
Historianshaveexploredthe Patriotcrisesfroma varietyof angles,
butnot fromthe perspectiveof UnitedStatesarmyofficers. Thisessay
examinesregulararmy officers' attitudestowardsand relationswith
AmericanandCanadianfilibusters(the "Patriots"), Americancivilians,
civilianauthoritiesandthe militia,andCanadaand its inhabitants.The
2 Like most scholars and contemporaryobservers, I use the term "Patriot(s)"

interchangeablyto refer to the initial rebels, their American supportersin the winter of
1837-38, the CanadianRefugee Relief Association, the "Sons of Liberty," the "Hunters'
Lodges," and any other organizationsdevoted to filibusteringagainst Canadaduringthis
period. I will also refer to the filibustersas insurgents. Thoughthis usage is imprecise,
it conveys both the Patriots'motives for violating Americanneutralitylaws-the political
purpose of aiding or reviving the Canadianrebellions-and their tactics and strategy on
Americansoil, where theiroperationswere usuallyclandestine. By "local" civil officials,
I mean primarily county and municipalofficeholders, but also federally appointedlaw
enforcement officers assigned to, and often chosen from, a locality (hence their divided
loyalties), includingdistrictattorneys,customscollectors,and marshals. This essay is not
an account of the military or diplomatic history of the crisis, nor of the unrest within
Canada itself. General and military histories of the Patriot rebellions include Oscar A.
Kinchen, The Rise and Fall of the Patriot Hunters(New York, 1956); Michael Mann, A
ParticularDuty: The CanadianRebellions, 1837-1839 (Salisbury, UK, 1986); and Mary
Beacock Fryer, Volunteers,Redcoats, Rebels, and Raiders: A Military History of the
Rebellionsin UpperCanada(Toronto,1987). For accountsof the diplomacyof the crisis,
see Albert B. Corey, The Crisis of 1830-1842 in Canadian-AmericanRelations (New
Haven, 1941); Howard Jones, To the Webster-AshburtonTreaty: A Study in Anglo-
American Relations, 1783-1843 (Chapel Hill, 1977); and Howard Jones and Donald
Rakestraw, Prologue to Manifest Destiny: Anglo-AmericanRelations in the 1840s
(Wilmington, DE, 1997).

RESPONSESTO FILIBUST
ERING 487
regulars tended to sympathizewith the British, and they acted
energetically againstthe Patriotsdespitethepassivityandtacitresistance
of manylocalcivil authorities.A close examinationof the opinionsand
operationsof UnitedStatescommanders duringthe Patriotunrestreveals
something of the social and politicalattitudes of armyofficers in the
of the
practice keeping peace helps and to illuminate theirreactionsto the
democratization of Americansociety,theiremergingprofessionalism, and
theirgrowingsenseof nonpartisan subordination to the civilianauthority
of the nation-state.I want to suggest an interpretivemiddle ground
betweenthose historianswho depictofficersas an insularconservative
elitealienatedfromAmericancivil society(as SamuelP. Huntington once
didwiththepost-CivilWararmy)andthosewhobelievetheofficercorps
to have been in tune with or even aheadof Democraticadvocatesof
ManifestDestiny in expressingenthusiasmfor expansion. Given the
potentialfor tensionbetweenlocalandnationalprioritiesembodiedin the
federal system, the officers' support for the concept of national
sovereignty-particularly in thecorollaryformof centralized controlover
armedforce-emerges as the key to understanding the vigorwithwhich
they attemptedto enforcedomesticandinternational law. This essay is
thereforea studyin bothoccupational formation,or "professionalization,"
and state formationand federalism, in the assertion of national
sovereigntyover contestedsociopoliticalterrains.Giventhe salienceof
gentilityandotherclass-related attitudesto officers'professionalidentities
andthelanguagetheyused,theprocessof eliteclassformationis another,
albeitunderlying,themeof thisarticle.3
3 Huntington, TheSoldierandtheState:TheTheoryandPracticeof Civil-Military

Relations(Cambridge, MA, 1957). "Regulars" wasa contemporary termusedby andfor
the armyandits officers. Manyof thebasicelementsof my argumentin thisessaywill
be familiarto readersof WilliamB. Skelton,AnAmericanProfessionof Arms:TheArmy
OfficerCorps, 1784-1861(Lawrence,1992), to whose work I am greatlyindebted,
althoughhe sees a good deal more enthusiasmfor expansionism thanI do. See my
dissertation,"Professionalism, SocialAttitudes,andCivil-Military Accountability in the
U.S. ArmyOfficerCorps,1815-1846" (RiceUniversity,1996),forelaboration.My essay
"TheUncertainRoadto ManifestDestiny: ArmyOfficersandthe Courseof American
Territorial
Expansionism, 1815-1846,"in Christopher MorrisandSamW. Haynes,eds.,
ManifestDestinyand Empire:Essayson Antebellum AmericanExpansionism (College
Station,TX, 1997),providesa morethoroughcomparative analysisof officers'behavior
alongthenation'sbordersthroughout thisperiodthanis possiblehere.Somereadersmay
pointoutthattheConstitution assertstheprincipleof civiliansupremacy overthe military
andprovidesmechanisms for its enforcementthrough theappropriations andappointments
processes, but writinga value into the Constitution does not makeit a realityin the
behaviorof individuals,andtherewerefew strongcommanders-in-chief duringthe early

488 JOURNALOF THEEARLYREPUBLIC
Historiansof Americanforeign relationsrecentlyhave begun to
observethatforeignpolicywas notthecreationof the nation-state alone,
especiallyunderthedecentralized socialandpoliticalconditionsprevailing
in the earlyrepublic. The federalgovernmentandits agentsconstantly
were forced to reckon with the expansive-and often potentially
explosive-demandsof a mushrooming frontierpopulationthatremained
and of
largelyungovernable capable withholding its sanctionor reshaping
nationalpoliciesin pursuitof local objectives. Indeed,viewedfromthe
authoritarian perspectiveof militaryofficers chargedwith enforcing
federalsovereignty,the most immediateresultof territorialexpansion
seemedto be socialentropyanddisorder.As themostvisibleandpotent
agents of nationalpower, army officers repeatedlyconfrontedand
constrainedaggressiveprivateinitiativesalongthe borders,oftenin the
face of obstruction fromlocalpoliticiansandcriticismfromtheirnational
As
representatives. the primaryrepresentatives of federalpowerin the
field, officerseffectivelyserved as mediatorsin contests betweennational
andlocalelites,policies,andobjectives.Thishadbeenthecase alongthe
nation'snorthernfrontiersincethe 1780sand90s, whenEthanAllen and
otherVermontersengagedin separatenegotiationswith the British,a
phenomenomthat reappearedin widespreadresistanceto Jefferson's
Embargo. In addition,regularofficers always had to competewith
locallyappointedmilitiaandvolunteercommanders for controlover the
directionof militaryforce,a struggleover occupational jurisdiction,and
ultimatelyemployment. This strugglegave focus to the officer corps'
growing sense of internal cohesion, professional identity, and
to
accountability patrons paymasters-thecivilianauthorities
its and of the
nationalgovernment.4
republic.Civiliansupremacy meanstwothingsin thisarticle:1) thatthemilitary

therefore
does notdirectlyopposecivilianauthoritywhenexecutingpolicy,and2) thatit does not
takeadvantage of looseciviliancontrol,likethatexercisedby JamesMadisonandJames
MonroeoverAndrewJackson,or for thatmatterby theVanBurenadministration during
thePatriotcrises,forofficers'ownends. I havenotexploredthenuancesof accountability
to executivedirectionversusthatto congressionaloversight,mattersdealtwithat length
for the post-CivilWarera (albeitfromthe perspectiveof politicalsciencetheory)in
Huntington,TheSoldierand the State. Thereare no monographic treatmentsof this
subjectfor theperiod1800-1865.
4 SeeWilliamEarlWeeks,"NewDirections in theStudyof EarlyAmericanForeign
Relations,"DiplomaticHistory, 17 (Winter1993), 73-95, for a survey of recent
perspectivesand interpretations;MichaelA. Bellesiles,Revolutionary Outlaws:Ethan
AllenandtheStruggle for Independenceon theEarlyAmericanFrontier(Charlottesville,
1993);J. KevinGraffagnino,"'TwentyThousandMuskets!!!':IraAllen andthe Olive
BranchAffair, 1796-1800,"Williamand Mary Quarterly,48 (July 1991), 409-31;

RESPONSESTO FILIBUST1ERING 489
Peacekeeping andlawenforcement dutieswerenotat all new to army

officers, who were charged with enforcingthe nonintercourse
laws that
restrictedtradebetweenwhitesandNativeAmericans.Thenationalarmy
had been chargedwith removingsquattersfrom Indianland since the
1780s,andofficerswereemployedrepeatedlyfor thispurposeduringthe
1820s and the early 1830s. Preventingfilibusteringalso had been a
preoccupation of the nationalgovernmentanda missionassignedto the
armythroughout muchof its existence. Onlytwo yearsbeforethe Patriot
crisis the armyhadbeen orderedto patrolthe Texas borderduringthe
revolutionthere. Nevertheless,the army had no formal "rules of
engagement" or peacekeeping doctrinein themodemsense,andthedaily
conductof sensitivelawenforcement operationsandeverydaydiplomacy
was left to highlyexperiencedbut(by modemstandards) juniorofficers,
who had no civiliandiplomatsfromWashingtonon the scene to advise
them.5BrigadierGeneralWinfieldScott,who hadtactfullydirectedthe
ReginaldC. Stuart,"SpecialInterestsand NationalAuthorityin ForeignPolicy: American-

BritishProvincialLinks During the Embargoand the War of 1812," Diplomatic History,
8 (Fall 1984), 311-28; and RichardJames Mannix, "The Embargo:Its Administration,
Impact, and Enforcement"(Ph.D. diss., New York University, 1975).
5 I will not
attempt to differentiate between peacekeeping and law enforcement
operationsherein, for any rigid distinctionwould be illusory, if not opaque. Legally, the
army was enforcing the federal neutralityacts of 1818 and 1838; its actual duties bore
substantialresemblanceto peacekeepingin the modern sense, but this terminology did not
exist in the nineteenthcentury. On the other hand, the army'sjurisdictiondid not extend
across the internationalborderinto Canada,and it had to simultaneouslywork in parallel
(but not directlyin tandem)with its Britishcounterpartswhile preparingfor the possibility
of combat against them. UnfortunatelyI have not been able to find any documents by
officers comparingtheir dutiesalong the Texanand Canadianborders. Andrew Jackson's
belligerent expansionism was not uncharacteristic of his contemporaries: James
Wilkinson's involvement in the Burr conspiracy is well-known, and officers provided
substantialaid to filibustersin East and West Floridabetween 1805 and 1813, thoughoften
at the government'sbehest. See IsaacJ. Cox, The WestFlorida Controversy,1790-1813:
A Studyin AmericanDiplomacy (Baltimore, 1918); RembertW. Patrick, Florida Fiasco:
RampantRebels on the Georgia-FloridaBorder, 1810-1815 (Athens, GA, 1954); Wanjohi
Waciuma, Interventionin SpanishFlorida, 1801-1813: A Studyin JeffersonianForeign
Policy (Boston, 1976); and Skelton, An AmericanProfession of Arms, 80-85. Captain
AugustusMagee and GeneralElizurWheelockRipley resigned to lead invasions of Texas
in 1812 and 1820, and a numberof officers, includingRipley, Jackson,and MajorThomas
Sidney Jesup (Ripley's predecessor in commandat New Orleans and the quartermaster
general from 1818 until 1860), proposedseizing Cuba between 1816 and 1819. FrankL.
Owsley, Jr., and Gene A. Smith, Filibusters and Expansionists:JeffersonianManifest
Destiny, 1800-1821 (Tuscaloosa, 1997), provides an interpretivesurvey of early national
filibustering and military responses. See also Harris Gaylord Warren, The Sword Was
TheirPassport: A Historyof AmericanFilibusteringduringthe MexicanRevolution(Baton

reinforcementof Charlestonduringthe NullificationCrisis, traveledto
BuffaloandDetroitin JanuaryandFebruary1838, visitedthe Vermont
frontierin January1839, andbrieflyreturnedto the Niagaraduringthe
finalroundof PatriotactivitythatSeptember.The army'scommanding
general,AlexanderMacomb,wasorderedto theborderduringthesecond
surge of filibusteringin June 1838, and he remainedthroughoutthat
summerwhile Scott was busy with superintending the removalof the
CherokeefromGeorgia. Otherwisethe delicatepracticeof diplomacy
and civil-militaryrelationsalong the borderwas left to experienced
colonels: the army'sinspectorgeneral,ColonelJohnEllis Wool, the
seniorofficerandde factofield commander on the Vermontborder,and
regimental commanders William Worth of the EighthInfantry,who
the
supervisedoperationsalong Niagara St. Lawrencefrontiersof
and
New York,andHughBradyof the Secondat Detroit.
Scottandhis subordinates on the Canadianfrontiersaw faithfulness
to internationallaw as a matterof personalandprofessional honor,which
theyattempted to affirm by dutifullysecuringthe nation'sborderagainst
all comersin supportof federalsovereigntyandthe treatyobligationsof
the centralgovernment. Their antagonismtowardthe Patriotswas a
productof thehighvalueregularsplacedon orderandstability,a mindset
thatoriginatedin the rules-boundworldof the nation'sfirst significant
bureaucratic hierarchy.Officersfearedtheeffectthatfilibusteringcould
haveon theirstate-sponsored monopolyoverthedirectionof armedforce
andtheirabilityto commandsubordinates-rolesfromwhichtheirsocial
status as gentlemenflowed. The officer corps' quest for stability
restrainedanyenthusiasm theymayhavehadfor warwithBritainduring
the Patriotcrisis, and they almostnever referredto the possibilityof
AmericanexpansionagainstCanadaduringtheseyears. WilliamWorth
and his fellows were noticeablybetterdisposedtowardsthe rule of
internationallawon theCanadian borderthantheirpredecessors hadbeen
on the Floridabordertwentyyearsbefore.Officerswho wouldsoon be
eagerfor warover Oregonor Texasdid not supporta ManifestDestiny
of privateindividuals actingbeyondtherestraints of governmentsanction
and professionalmilitarycommand. Given the army'smixed record
concerningfilibustering againstFloridaandTexasin theJeffersonian era,
it is incumbentupon historiansof the army and Americanforeign
relationsto explainwhy officerswere so muchless sympathetictoward
Rouge, 1943). Robert W. Coakley, The Role of Federal Military Forces in Domestic
Disorders, 1789-1878 (Washington,DC, 1988), surveysthe army's involvementin civilian
political disputes like the NullificationCrisis.

RESPONSESTO FILIBUSlTERING 491
the CanadianPatriotsof 1838 thanthoseof Americanextractionin the
southernborderlands a quartercenturybefore. Indeed,this contrastto
their actions towardthe Patriotsis all the more instructivebecause
WilliamWorthhasrecentlybeencitedas a primeexampleof expansionist
sentimentdueto his supportfor filibustering
againstYucatanandCubain
1848.6
HistorianReginaldStuarthasprovidedsubstantial evidencethatby the
1830straditionalAmericanfearsof Britishaggressionby way of Canada
weredeclining.Thegrowthof Americanpopulation andself-confidence,
the gradualemergenceof Anglo-Saxonracialism,and the successful
conclusion of a numberof diplomaticagreementsled to a faith in
negotiation and the possibility of coexistence among American
policymakers.Stuartsuggeststhat"continentalism and[Canadian]self-
determinationwere compatible, not contradictory,componentsof
America'sexpansionistideology"becauseso manyAmericansexpected
thatCanadawouldmovegraduallybutinexorablytowardindependence
andpossibleunionwiththe UnitedStates.Indeed,Britishofficialsfeared
muchthe samepatternof development, andtheirCanadianpolicieswere
aimedas muchat preventing creeping assimilationas for militarydefense
per se. With this probable course of events in mind, Americansof
cautiousor conservative
temperament (suchas armyofficers)viewedthe
insurgentsand filibustersas threatsto internationallaw and domestic
order-a sortof international
mobocracy. These concernscouldonly be
6
See Skelton, An American Profession of Arms, chap. 17, concerning the officer
corps' attitudes toward foreign policy and war. See also ibid., 330-31; Tom Chaffin,
Fatal Glory: Narciso L6pez and the First Clandestine U.S. War Against Cuba
(Charlottesville, 1996), 40, 45; and Robert E. May, "Young American Males and
Filibustering in the Age of Manifest Destiny: The United States Army as a Cultural
Mirror," Journal of AmericanHistory, 78 (Dec. 1991), 879-80, regardingWorth as an
expansionistor potentialfilibuster. Chaffinobservesthat Worth agreed to resign and lead
an invasionof Cuba, but backedout upon orders from PresidentJames K. Polk; Chaffin,
Fatal Glory, 40, 45. The Oregon crisis aside, I have found no more than half a dozen
references to expansion against Canada in the papers of more than a hundredofficers
collected at West Point and the Libraryof Congress. Official documentscollected at the
NationalArchivesdiscussthis possibilitymore frequently,but usuallyin the formalmanner
appropriateto policy advice and war planning,stressingreactionto contingencyratherthan
aggressive American intent. The classic analyses of Manifest Destiny remainAlbert K.
Weinberg, Manifest Destiny: A Studyof Nationalist Expansionismin American History
(Baltimore, 1935); and FrederickMerk with the collaborationof Lois BannisterMerk,
ManifestDestiny and Missionin AmericanHistory:A Reinterpretation(New York, 1963).
See also Merk and Merk, TheMonroeDoctrine and AmericanExpansionism,1843-1849
(New York, 1966); and ThomasR. Hietala,ManifestDesign: AnxiousAggrandizementin
Late JacksonianAmerica (Ithaca, 1985).

magnified at a time when the nation was caught in the throes of
depression. Consciousof Britishpower and unable to dismiss the
Canadiansas theyhadthe Indiansof the Southeast,yet confidentin the
ultimateefficacyof the "progress"they identifiedwith the exampleof
theirfree economyandrepublicaninstitutions,mostAmericansseem to
have been willingto bide theirtime ratherthanrisk war andeconomic
devastationby attackingor subvertingBritishruledirectly.
Stuartconcludesthat"onthe whole, Americanauthoritiesbelieved
thatthe Britishactedin good faithandrefusedto manufacture incidents
outof theclaimsof citizens"on theborder.Nevertheless,manyof those
borderresidentshopedto win wealthandfameandescapethe traumaof
the Panicof 1837 throughemploymentby the filibustersor the militia,
whilemanylocalcivil officialssympathizedwiththe Patriots. The result
was localized civil-militaryconflict as army officers attemptedto enforce
federalneutralitylaw andmaintaintheirfederallysponsoredmonopoly
overtheapplication of organizedmilitaryforce. The federalgovernment
left theseofficersto act as its localrepresentatives,
effectivelysubstituting
civil-military conflict on a localized scale for federal-localconflict
betweenthe civilianauthoritiesthemselves. Indeed,given New York's
crucialpoliticalsignificanceandPresidentVanBuren'sideologyof strict
constructionandstates'rights,it is surprisingthatthe presidentdid not
place greater restrictionson the army's operationsor give greater
countenance to thePatriotcause. Thefederalgovernment hadlittlepower
or
in the formof legalauthority militaryforce to haltfilibuster activities,
yet it didnotpleadincapacityin orderto avoidresponsibility or to curry
politicalfavorwithPatriotsympathie?rs.Theexecutivebranchpermitted
substantialinitiativeby armyofficersindependent of the civil authorities
on the scene,andtheofficersseemto haveappreciated the government's
delicatesituationand reciprocatedby doingtheirbest to avoidcausing
unnecessaryembarrassment throughoverzealousacts.7
7 ReginaldC. Start, UnitedStatesExpansionismand British NorthAmerica, 1775-

1871 (Chapel Hill, 1988), 144, 105, 84; D. W. Meinig, The Shaping of America: A
GeographicalPerspective on 500 Yearsof History, Vol. 2: ContinentalAmerica, 1800-
1867 (New Haven, 1986), 57-58. Although the specifics of its timing and development
have been challenged, the concept of a rapprochementbetween the United States and
Britainhas been a stapleof diplomatichistory for decades. For examples of conservative
civilian opinion, see Corey, The Crisis of 1830-1842 in Canadian-AmericanRelations,
chap. 6; Stuart, United States Expansionism, 143; Gordon T. Stewart, The American
Response to Canada since 1776 (East Lansing, 1992), 42-44; National Intelligencer,
(Washington, DC) as cited in Jones and Rakestraw, Prologue to Manifest Destiny, 23;
"GeneralScott," a laudatoryarticlereprintedfrom the New York CommercialAdvertiser

RESPONSESTO FILIBUSTIERING 493
Mostregularofficersappearto havesharedthemorecautiousamong
civilianattitudestowardCanada,althoughtheyputfew of theirfeelings
on paperbeforeor duringthe crisis. An articulateminoritywarnedthat
Britainwas a threatto the growthof the Americanrepublic,but aside
in the Army and Navy Chronicle, VI, no. 7 (Feb. 15, 1838), 99-100; and the toasts in
"Honorto MajorGeneralScott," reprintedfrom the AlbanyArgus reprintedibid., VI, no.
11 (Mar. 15, 1838), 164-66. See Donald F. Warner, The Idea of Continental Union:
Agitationfor the Annexationof Canadato the UnitedStates, 1849-1893 (Lexington, 1960),
regardingexpansionistviews later in the century, which followed substantiallyalong the
lines Stuartsuggests. For Britishand Canadianreactions see Sydney F. Wise and Robert
Craig Brown, Canada Views the United States: Nineteenth-CenturyPolitical Attitudes
(Seattle, 1967); KennethBourne, Britain and the Balance of Power in North America,
1815-1908 (Berkeley, 1967); and Bourne, ed., McLeodand Maine, 1837-1842, Volume
I of Series C, North America, 1837-1914, in Part One of British Documents on Foreign
Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office ConfidentialPrint, ed. Kenneth
Bourneand D. CameronWatt (Frederick,MD, 1986). The works of FrederickMerk and,
more recently, Hietala, Manifest Design, stress antagonismtoward Britain and a fear
(whethercynical, as Merk suggests, or real, so Hietalahas it) of geostrategicencirclement
by Englandamong Democraticexpansionists. Yet they do not refer to Canadaas a target
of Americanrhetoricor planning, and in ManifestDestiny and Mission, 37, 49-50, Merk
notes that several prominentNew York advocates of Manifest Destiny were willing to
compromise over Oregon because they expected that British North America would
ultimatelyenterthe UnitedStates. Forthcomingwork by Sam W. Hayneswill reemphasize
fears of British intervention.Americanofficials showed little concern for the security of
the northernborder during the 1820s and early to mid-1830s. Few regulars expressed
much concern over relations with Britainuntil the end of the 1830s, when disputes with
England seemed to threatenthe United States on a numberof fronts, and senior officers
gave little detailed consideration to this border until forced to do so. American
fortificationsfell into disrepairall along the Canadianfrontier,and out of the $8.25 million
applied to fortifications between 1816 and 1829 only $200,000 were spent along the
northernfrontier. Most of the installationstherewere no more thanwooden barracks,and
in 1832 commandinggeneral AlexanderMacomb recommendedthat no furtherworks be
erectedthere. Engineercolonel JosephTotten's extensive reporton fortificationsin 1836
reiterated the common belief that Canada was unlikely to pose a substantialthreat to
American security, and he suggested that only the outlet of Lake Champlain needed
fortification. Winfield Scott was the only one of the army's generals to even mention
offensive operationsagainstCanadain their reportson the futuredirection of the army in
1821 (the only time duringthis era when detailed reportsof this naturewere submitted),
and no planningfor offensive operationswas done until the Maine crisis. See Macomb to
Secretaryof War Lewis Cass, "Statementof Fortificationsin Maine," Dec. 26, 1832, in
American State Papers: MilitaryAffairs (7 vols., Washington, DC, 1832-61), V, 127;
Totten to Chief Engineer Charles Gratiot, Mar. 29, 1836, ibid., VI, 390-91; and
Confidential Letters Received by the Secretary of War (1835-1842), Records of the
Secretary of War, RG 107 (National Archives and Record Service, Washington, DC),
which containsthe memorandaon strategyin case of a war over the Maine boundarysent
by senior officers in response to the War Department'srequest in March 1839.

fromconstantlyurginga genericdefensivereadiness,the officercorps
was remarkably quietaboutits thoughtson foreignpolicyandwar. This
reserve,along with thenonideologicalcharacterof the views officersdid
express, was due in partto an education at the MilitaryAcademythat
emphasizedengineering and mathematics to the virtualexclusionof the
liberalarts. At the sametimemuchof thissilenceshouldbe attributed to
the regularofficer corps' nascentprofessionalethic, which stressed
nationalservice in the ostensiblyneutralform of "duty"ratherthan
"mission."Theirsocialization at WestPoint-ultimatelymoresignificant
than the classes they took-inculcated a strong sense of nationality;
officers expressedallegianceto the "nationalUnion"embodiedin the
federalgovernment, butnot necessarilyto the expansionistor chauvinist
nationalism of ManifestDestinyandAmericanexceptionalism.In other
words, American officers consciously aspired to an "objective"
bureaucraticaccountabilityto the nation-statethat organized their
profession and paid them as individuals,rather than emphasizing
passionateemotionalor coherentlyarticulateideologicalallegiances,
whetherto republicanideals, conceptsof Americanmission, or the
romanticizeddestinyof the Anglo-Saxonrace. This is not to denythat
whenarousedduringthe invasionof
suchaffinitiesexisted,particularly
Mexicoa decadelater,butthereis littledocumentary evidencefor their
presence and intensityamongregular officers duringthe yearspriorto
1846. Army officers' sense of accountabilityto the civilian political
systemwas foundednot on ideologicalconvictionaboutthe glories of
"freeinstitutions"buton theprofessionalsoldier'smaterialpositionas the
employee of an organizationdependenton those institutionsfor its
and
appropriations survival.8
8 See Skelton,"Officers TheOriginsof ArmyPoliticsin the United

andPoliticians:
StatesBeforethe Civil War,"ArmedForcesand Society,6 (Fall 1979), 22-48; and
Skelton,AnAmerican Professionof Arms,chap.15, concerning thepoliticsof the officer
corps. Skeltonestimatesthat the officer corps was dividedevenly in its partisan
allegiances,buthe followsthe majorityof historiansin emphasizing the corps'non-or
antipartisanethos. I wouldstressthe Whiggishnatureof the corps' worldviewand
mentalite,notingthatantipartisanship
was one of theprimaryvaluesof theWhigsduring
the 1830sandthatofficersseemto havebeenparticularly nonpartisan duringthatdecade.
Onemightsaythattheyhadreactedto thedemocratization of politicsby withdrawing the
publicsupportfor individual
candidatesthatseniorcommanders like ScottandWoolhad
espousedin theprecedingdecade-Scottfor Calhoun(in 1824)andAdams(in 1828)and
Wool for Jackson-whenpoliticshadbeencharacterized by gentrypersonalism.By the
1840s manyjuniorofficershad come of age in the midstof partyformationand had
absorbedpartyallegiancesthattheyretainedintoadulthood.Theirlanguagewas more
partisanthan their predecessors',and they may have voted more frequentlywhere

RESPONSESTO FILIBUS
TERING 495
UnitedStatesArmyofficersseemedreluctantto thinkthe Canadian
populationsympatheticto filibusteringPatriots. At a banquetin his
honorat Houlton,Mainein September1838,Lieutenant ColonelNewman
Clarkefolloweda volunteerofficer'sbellicosereferenceto the American
victoryat Chippewain 1814by proposinga toastto "ourfriendsof the
Province of New Brunswick[a region in which there was little
unrest].... loyal to a punctilio;the love of countrybelongsto themas
to all otherpeople." Clarkeandhis familyhadbeensalutedby a Colonel
KetchumfromNew Brunswick(a visitingBritishofficer),andtheirtoasts
were followedby thatof the vice presidentof the banquetwishingfor
residency requirementsmade it possible, but they continued to espouse a non- and

antipartisanethos as professional soldiers. Partisanallegiances aside, Whiggish values
complementedthe officer corps' ethos of subordinationto civilian authorityvery well. I
would be the last to contrast Whiggish personal beliefs or affinity with dedication to
upholdingcivilian supremacy,for officers themselvescertainlydid not do so, and it is clear
that they shared the Whigs' antipartisanship,belief in (or at least desire for) a general
harmonyof interestsin society, and desire for "disinterested"statesmanlikeleadershipin
pursuit of that putatively homogeneous national interest. Above all, the Whigs were
clearlythe "national"or cosmopolitanpartyin the Madisoniansense, where the Democrats
were essentiallylocalist in orientation,however well organizedor expansionist. In other
words, even fiery Jacksonianswithinthe corps held ratherWhiggish views about the form
and intent of politics and the value of gentility, social order, and hierarchy, hence my
references to a "Whiggishness"or Whiggish affinity ratherthan partisanallegiance or
advocacy. See Daniel Walker Howe, The Political Culture of the American Whigs
(Chicago, 1979); Thomas Brown, Politics and Statesmanship:Essays on the American
Whig Party (New York, 1985); and Lawrence Frederick Kohl, The Politics of
Individualism:Parties and the American Characterin the Jacksonian Era (New York,
1989), on the Whigs andtheir worldview. See James L. Morrison, Jr., "TheBest School
in the World":WestPoint in the pre-Civil War Years, 1833-1866 (Kent, OH, 1986), and
Huntington,TheSoldierand the State, chap. 4, regardingthe "technicism"(Huntington's
word) of the West Point education. By ideology I mean a highly articulated and
interconnected system of values and beliefs with pervasive diagnostic and integrative
power, in the mannerused by CliffordGeertzand BernardBailyn, not just loose affinities
or "persuasions."For example, officers were definitelyWhiggishin affinity, perspective,
and persuasion, but they did not espouse a Whiggish ideology any more than they did a
Jacksonianone. Regulararmyofficers wrote very little aboutrepublicanismor democracy.
This is not to say thatthey didn'tbelieve in "free institutions"in a generic way, but to call
officers ideological would stretch the meaning of the word to encompass virtually any
social groupor set of attitudes. AlthoughI may be reifyingideology, the remarkablething
aboutarmyofficers-highly educatedandpoliticallywell-informedmen, in an organization
and a professiondependenton politics for survival-was the extremeraritywith which they
expressed clearly and overtly ideological sentiments of any variety. See Daniel T.
Rodgers, "Republicanism:The Career of a Concept," Journal of AmericanHistory 79
(June 1992), 11-38, for a critique of historians' eagerness to apply republicanismas an
organizing device.

continuedharmonyalong the northeasternfrontier. Several monthslater,
assistant adjutant general Robert Anderson wrote to New York
congressman GouverneurKemble that,
insteadof allowingthe Canadiansto work at the Altarof Liberty,
formingand fashioningit to suit themselves-we have attemptedto
force our plan uponthem. . . . ThatmanyCanadiansdesire some
change there can be no doubt . . . but they desire reform not
revolution-a reformbroughtaboutby the quiet, steadyactionof
publicsentimentandvirtue-not revolutionbathedin blood.
William Worth sometimes complainedthat Canadianswere abettingthe
filibusters, but on the whole he echoed Anderson's astute assessment of
the Canadianpolitical climate virtuallyto the letter.9
This is not to suggest that officers' responses to the crisis were
completely pacific. Winfield Scott's first reaction to the rebellions in
Canada, expressed early in December 1837 immediatelyafter the initial
rising, was to write to WilliamWorththat "Godgrantthem success! My
heart is with the oppressed of both Canadas." Scott engaged in some
localized brinksmanshipwith British commandersduring his initial visit
9 Clarke'stoast quotedin "Tributeof Respect,"an article reprintedfrom the Bangor

Republicanin the Armyand Navy Chronicle, VII, no. 14 (Oct. 4, 1838), 214; Anderson
to Kemble, Jan. 12, 1839, Robert Anderson Papers (Libraryof Congress, Washington,
DC); Major [brevetlieutenantcolonel] William JenkinsWorth to Secretaryof War Joel
R. Poinsett, Feb. 12, 1838, Official Letterbook,William JenkinsWorth Papers (ibid.).
Worth's letterbooks at the Library of Congress contain his official letters sent from
February 1838 through April 1839, and provide the most comprehensive source on
officers' reactions to the crisis; Edward S. Wallace, General WilliamJenkins Worth:
Monterey's Forgotten Hero (Dallas, 1953), the only scholarly biography, is thin on this
subject,as are the primarybiographiesof Scott, CharlesWinslow Elliott's WinfieldScott:
The Soldier and the Man (New York, 1937), and John S. D. Eisenhower's Agent of
Destiny: TheLife and Timesof General WinfieldScott (New York, 1997), both of which
dependheavily on the Memoirsof Lieut.-Gen. WinfieldScott, L.L.D., Writtenby Himself
(2 vols., New York, 1864). Wool's theaterin Vermontwas the least significant area of
Patriot action, and few documents survive from Brady's tenure at Detroit, so Worth's
views and actions are those I cite most widely herein. Anderson referred particularly,
thoughnot exclusively, to the Frenchof Lower Canada: "a quiet, inoffensivepeople, they
have none of that stirring love of liberty which warmedthe hearts of our ancestors; it is
folly to attemptto thrustlibertyupon them." I have not found any other comments about
the French Canadians-or the possibility of expansion into Canada-in officers'
correspondencefrom this period. Stuart, United States Expansionismand British North
America, 140-41, observes that "the French seemed unlikely recruitsfor republicanism"
to ProtestantAnglo-Americans,doubtlessly includingthe Whiggish officers (like Worth
and Scott) cited herein.

RESPONSESTO FILIBUSTERING 497
to the border,althoughit seemsprobablethathe did so to reassurethe
borderpopulacethatthegovernment woulddefendAmericansovereignty.
Later in 1838 he avowed "that[only] a good hot foreign war ... could
save theUnion& ourfreeinstitutions" frompartisanship andradicalism,
writing to influential friendsin "in
Washington express reference to the
Canadianexcitement"abouthis belief "thatif a good & sufficientcause
of foreignwar, such... as wouldsatisfythe consciencesof ourpeople,
& the enlightenedjudgmentof the world, shouldbe presented,every
American patriotought to fall upon his knees & returnthanksto
Providencefor theblessing,"becausethiswould"cure"Americansof the
"moral distempers"of "peace societies, antimasonry,nullification,
Mormondifficulties& abolitionism," whichhe damnedas the "'cankers
of a long peace.'" This belligerencewas carefullyand repeatedly
qualified,however. Scott distrustedanythingsmackingof ideological
"enthusiasm" or oppositionto establishedauthority.He fearedsectional,
social, and religiousdivision,andhe saw the Patriotsnot as legitimate
agents of American butratheras a set of undisciplined
nationality fanatics
endangering the nation's security.Filibusteringviolated
both nationaland
international law; it could hardly"satisfy the consciencesof our people,
& the enlightenedjudgmentof the world."10
By the 1830sterritorial expansionwas acceptableto the officercorps
only if it followedthe orderlyprocessesprovidedfor by nationaland
international law. (Few officersexpressedovertsupportfor aidingthe
Texas Revolution,for example.) Whenaskedto explainthe hawkish
outburstquotedabove, Scott respondedangrilythat he had "always
earnestly& solemnlyprotestedagainstbeing plungedinto war by our
borderers,wrongend foremost."Scottemphasizedthe qualifiednature
of his assertions,observingthat"warcould only be legitimatelymade
under a declarationof Congress;that if otherwisebroughtabout, we
would probablyfind our populationdivided& distracted,whichwould
superaddthe disgraceof failureto the taintof breachof treaty& the
disorderof its commencement.""Inshort,"he excusedhimself, "inall
that I have said & done I have kept strictlyin view the constitution,
nationalresponsibilities& the high obligationsof morality." As a
10 Scottto
Worth,Dec. 12, 1837,as citedin Elliott,WinfieldScott,336n;Scottto
Poinsett,Jan.12, 1839,in CharlesP. Stacey,ed., "APrivateReportof GeneralWinfield
Scotton theBorderSituation in 1839,"Canadian HistoricalReview,21 (Dec. 1940),411.
Scott'sletterincludedthe referencesto his statements
of thepreviousautumn.Thougha
minor fractionof the officercorpssometimesexpressedsentimentsfavoringwar as a
meansof unifyingAmerican publicopinionin the faceof growingsectionaltensions,this
argumentis virtuallyinvisiblein theirlettersduringthePatriotcrises.

militarycommander,Scott was obviously not opposed to war per se, but

he demandedthat it be initiatedand prosecutedaccordingto the
appropriate forms. His enthusiasmfor war had been expressedin the
midst of the Maine boundarydisputethat began with the bloodless
"AroostookWar"betweenMaineand New Brunswicklate in 1838, a
controversycarriedon by legally constitutedcivilianauthorities.This
willingnessshouldnot be confusedwitheagerness,however,for by the
followingMarchScotthadbeensentto Portlandas a peacemaker,a task
he performedwith skill, relish, and successby mediatingbetweenthe
authoritiesof MaineandNew Brunswickwhilemaneuvering bothparties
in the Mainelegislaturetowardcompromise."
Larger considerationsgenerally superseded officers' personal
emotions. All of the seniorcommanderson the Canadianfrontierhad
fought the Britishthere in 1814, when Wool and Worthboth were
wounded, but whateversympathythese men might have felt for the
Canadian rebelsor theircausewascurbedby theofficercorps'pervasive
fearof lawlessnessandsocialdisorder,mixedwitha vagueAnglophilia
derivedin partfromtheirsocial interactionsandprofessionalaffinities
with Britishofficers. Perhapsmost important,war with Britainwould
havebeentantamount to suicidefor thethinlineof regularschargedwith
holding thenation's Canadian frontier.Americanmilitaryplanningcalled
for a build-up and offensive into Canadashould war occur, but it was
balanceof forceswas
clearto theofficerson thescenethatthe immediate
utterlydisadvantageous. Britainwas not Spain, and Canadawas not
Florida.12
Worth'sfirstrecordedreactionto thePatriotcrisiswasalsosomewhat
sympatheticto the insurgents,butit containedthevaluesof law andorder
thatwouldsustainhis questto enforcethe neutralitylaws throughout his
tenureon theborder. "Theywere firmly of the that
opinion they would
earnthe proudtitleof liberatorsof Canada,"he observedof the rebels,
andhe was overcomeby emotionwhilewritingto ScottafterthePatriots'
defeat at Malden(in CanadaoppositeDetroit)in January1838: "The
flower of the young men of this city have founda bloodygrave!"he
exclaimedmelodramatically, particularlylamenting"a noble hearted
friend"who fell there. These sentimentsnotwithstanding, Worthfelt
compelled to concludethatthe incursionwas "asad affair,unquestionably
" See Michael D. Wagner, "'A Few Days Later in Coming': Major General
Winfield Scott's Role in the Aroostook War," Maine History, 34 (Winter/Spring1995),
162-77; and Jones and Rakestraw,Prologue to ManifestDestiny, 15-19.
12
Scott to Poinsett, Jan. 12, 1839, in Stacey, ed. "PrivateReport," 411.

RESPONSESTO FILIBUSIEKRING 499
a violationof law andgood order.... trulywe are littlebetterthana
nation of pirates."13
Worth's growing antagonismtowards the Patriots was almost
uniformlysharedby his fellow commandersalongthe border. Neither
officers nor civiliancommentators seem to have mademuchdistinction
among the insurgentgroups, and officers on differentsectionsof the
frontierused muchthe samelanguageto describethe filibusters,almost
withoutexceptioncontrastingthe disordertheycausedwiththe stability
and harmonyto be soughtin international relationsduringpeacetime.
The rebel "Brigands"brokethe law, federaland international, against
interveningin the affairsof anothernationwithwhichthe UnitedStates
was at peace. In responseto the burningof the CarolineWinfieldScott
assertedthat"atno time,couldanyportionof ourpeopleusurpthe right
of retaliationand revenge;that such would not be in the mannerand
forms of a civilized people, but accordingto the practiceof savage
tribes." Theevil causedby theprivateusurpationof "legitimate" (state-
sponsored)authorityover the nation's foreign relationswas also a
prominentthemein Worth'sdispatches.He warnedone subordinate that
"theview some of yourneighborstakeof the neutralitylaw is the very
ultraismof nullification."Worthwas echoedby GeneralHughBradyon
the Detroitfrontier,who spoke of "theseviolatorsof our Laws" as
"marauders"and "desperadoes."14
Army officers routinely characterizedthe rebels in socially,
psychologically, and ethically loaded terms as "disorganizers,"
"agitators,"and "miserable" and "unprincipled""adventurers."Hugh
Bradylabeledthese "disturbers of peaceandgood order""therabble,"
andWorthblamed"thefloatingpopulation thatinfeststheborderof every
country"for theunrest. Officersfrequentlydenouncedthe insurgentsas
both"recklessandunscrupulous," andtheirrhetoricsometimesvergedon
thedehumanizing, suggestingpsychological amongthePatriots.
instability
Worth characterizedthem as "insane,"while Brady warnedof the
"feverishstate"of "desperateand uneasy spirits"along the frontier.
13
Worth to Scott, Jan. 11, 1838, Winfield Scott Papers (Libraryof Congress).
14
Major Benjamin F[ranklin] Lamed [paymasterand volunteer aide-de-camp] to
Robert Anderson, Apr. 23, 1839, Anderson Papers; Scott to Poinsett, Jan. 12, 1839, in
Stacey, ed., "PrivateReport," 412; Worth to Capt. William R. Montgomery, Dec. 19,
1838 (and also to brevet brigadiergeneral AbrahamEustis, Worth's immediatesuperior
as commanderof the army's NorthernDepartment,Nov. 10, 1838), WorthPapers; Brady
to AdjutantGeneralRoger Jones, Dec. 6, 1838, Brady to Scott, Feb. 26, 1838, Brady to
Jones, June 29, 1838, all in Francis Paul Prucha, ed., "Reportsof General Brady on the
PatriotWar," CanadianHistorical Review, 31 (Mar. 1950), 56-68.

AssistantSurgeonHenryHeiskellwrotefromBuffalothathe hoped"the
reason of the people will be restored""as soon as the paroxysm
subsides."15Blamehadto be placedsomewhere,andthe officercorps'
suspicionof populardemocracyandself-direction becameapparentwhen
its membersdid so. To Bradythe filibusterswere "misguided"and
"deluded"men, deceived by their leaders' "vile and mischievous
fabrications,"whileWorthwarnedthe secretaryof warandreassuredhis
Britishcounterpart acrossthe riverthatthese "miserableyouths"were
mere "tools,""theunfortunate dupesof designingdemagogues."16
Army commanders also stigmatizedthe Patriotsas greedycowards,
menwho forsooktheirobligationsto theircountryandeach otherin the
self-interestedpursuitof wealth and personalsafety. Colonel Henry
Whitingsuggested,"theeyes of needy [and]unprincipledadventurers
beganto glistenwithrabidhope"when"theBrigandfever"caughtthem.
RobertAndersonlabeledthe leaders"cowardlyscamps"who preferred
"thelightsof the lecturerooms,andthe soundsof silverfallingintothe
hatspassedaroundfor contributions ... to theflameof thedeathdealing
gun, andthe moans of the wounded [and]dyingpatriots"at theirdefeat
at WindmillPointin November1838. Worth,who had secureda tacit
understanding withtheBritishcommander thereto allowthe filibustersto
15
"Disorganizers":Bradyto Scott, Feb. 26, 1838, in Prucha,ed., "Reportsof
GeneralBrady,"61; Anderson to Kemble,Jan. 12, 1839,AndersonPapers; "agitators":
Worth to Scott, Feb. 13, 1838, Worthto Scott, Mar. 21, 1839, Worth Papers;
"adventurers": Worthto Jones,Feb. 23, 1838, ibid.; "miserable": Worthto Poinsett,
Mar. 3, 1838, in Stacey,ed., "PrivateReports,"408; "unprincipled": Lt. Col. Henry
Whiting[deputyquartermaster general]to RobertAnderson,Mar. 14, 1840, Anderson
Papers. Regarding"disturbance of the peace;"see Bradyto Jones,June8, 1838, in
Prucha,ed., "Reportsof GeneralBrady,"63; Bradyto Scott,Dec. 8, 1838, ibid.; and
Worthto ColonelJohnWool,Feb. 14, 1838,WorthPapers.SeealsoBradyto Scott,Jan.
14, 1838,in Prucha,ed., "Reports of GeneralBrady,"58-59;Worthto Lt. Col. Newman
Clarke,Nov. 1, 1838,Worthto Scott,Feb. 9, 1839,Worthto Poinsett,Feb. 12, 1838,
WorthPapers;Bradyto Jones,June27, 8, 1838, in Prucha,ed., "Reportsof General
Brady,"64, 63; and Heiskellto AssistantSurgeonBenjaminKing, Jan. 18, 1838,
Benjamin KingPapers(Library of Congress).RobertAnderson also wroteof "thepatriot
fever";see Andersonto Kemble,Jan. 12, 1839,AndersonPapers.
16
Bradyto Scott,Feb. 2, 15, Jan. 14, Mar. 14, 1838, in Prucha,ed., "Reportsof
GeneralBrady,"59, 61, 58, 63; for WorthaccusingUnitedStatesCustomsCollector
Stillwellas "oneof the greatoffenders,"see Worthto Poinsett,Nov. 15, 1838, Worth
Papers;forWorthtransmitting a petitionfrom"gentlemen of thehighestintelligenceand
amongourcitizens"for clemencyfor someof the filibusterstakenprisoner
respectability
at thebattleof WindmillPoint,see Worthto theBritishOfficerCommanding at Kingston,
Nov. 23, 1838, ibid. See also Lamedto RobertAnderson,Apr. 23, 1839, Anderson
Papers.

RESPONSESTO FILIBUS1TERING 501
try to withdrawin hopes of defusingtensions,blamed"cowardiceand

treachery" forthePatriots'"feebleeffort"to savetheirtrappedcomrades.
Anderson,who likeWorthhadat firstfelt sympathyfor the rebels,came
to lament that "the spirit of patriotismhas fallen from its high and
honorabledesigns into the contemptible,cowardlydesire to burn &
plunderthe housesof the defenseless."17
Referencesto "miserable adventurers" and"therabble"indicatethat
class-derived understandings of behavior playedan important partin the
officer corps' responseto the Patriotmovement. It appearsfrom
circumstantialevidence that the socioeconomicstatusof the average
insurgentdeclinedover time, andthis was probablyan importantfactor
swaying the minds of Whiggishbut initiallysupportiveofficers like
Worth,Scott, andAndersonagainstthe movement. The officercorps'
disdainfor the filibusterswas sharedin "respectable" civiliansociety,the
press, and officialcirclesoutsidethe borderregion; Worth andhis fellows
expected that Patriot of
violations legal and socialnorms would end their
supportamongthe localpopulace as well. Indeed, Worth wrote to Scott
of
after the events February1838 that "thebetter,and I trustthe large
portionof the people are greatlyshockedat the developmentof their
plans,"andhe assuredthegovernorof New Yorkthat"newagitationwill
. . . be frowned down by a deceived and indignantpeople." Surgeon
Henry Heiskell believed that the Canadianrefugeeswere "living on
charity and by robbing . . . The people are heartily tired of their
'Liberator'guestsandwouldbe gladto get rid of them." Heiskelllater
reportedthattheir"army(if ever sucha rabblemeritthe title)is entirely
disbanded-somereturningto theirhomes(if any they have)," and the
restpilferingfromthelocalcivilianpopulace,whohadinitiallywelcomed
themas heroes. Indeed,Heiskellfelt "verycertainthatthe best cure for
an exuberanceof patrioticzeal is to sendamongstthema scoreor two of
modem'patriots.'Dr. Johnson'sdefinitionof this abusedword(patriot,
'the last resortof a scoundrel')has beenverifiedon this frontier."18
17
Whitingto RobertAnderson,Mar.14, 1840,Andersonto Kemble,Jan. 12, 1839,
AndersonPapers;Worthto AbrahamEustis,Nov. 20, 1838,WorthPapers.
18 Worthto
Scott,Feb. 20, 1838, Worthto Gov. WilliamMarcy,Mar.5, 1838,
WorthPapers;Heiskellto AssistantSurgeonKing,Jan. 18, 26, 31, 1838,KingPapers.
Corey, The Crisis of 1830-1842in Canadian-American Relations,70, suggeststhat
economicconditionsduringthe Panicof 1837andits aftermath"giveus the key to the
discontent"amongAmericanborderers,and he notesthatof the 140 filibusterstaken
prisonerby the BritishnearWindmillPointin November1838whosenamesare listed,
"practicallyevery man was a laborer,dependentfor the most part upon seasonal
employment" (78). Sixty-fiveactuallydescribedthemselvesas "laborers,"
andonlyone

Winfield Scott's private report to the secretary of war drew these
themes together in a tightly woven web of accusation:
I have thrown every possible legal obstacle in the way of the mad &
wicked people called American Canadian patriots . . . I have
denounced their movements & purposes as a stain upon our national
honour & faith; as dangerousto liberty at home, & destructiveof all
law & order. I have labouredto convince them thattheirprojectswere
absurd& impracticable,& that every life taken in their unauthorized
& unlawful enterprizes, would be an atrociousmurder-deserving an
ignominious execution.
The general then went on to contrastthe willful demeanorof the border

populacewith thatof the long-sufferingregularsorderedto police them:
"poorignorantsoldiers [who] only profess to be the creatures& servants
of the law, by which we live & are ready to die."19
The Patriotforces were clearly incapableof defeating the British by
themselves, so the filibusters had to count on stirring up a general
rebellionamong the Canadiansor drawing the United States into war by
provokingBritishretaliation. Secure in their supportfrom the executive
branch of the federal government, which gave them a free hand in the
everyday conductof operations,Worthand his counterpartsfaced at least
four potentialadversaries: the Patriots, suspect local authorities,public
as a "gentleman." thewagestheywereofferedby the Patriotleaderswere

Interestingly,
eightdollarsa month,virtuallythe sameas thoseof a privatein the UnitedStatesArmy
at thetime. RobertMayhasmadesomeintriguing connections betweenthesewagerates
andotherformsof compensation in his "YoungAmericanMalesandFilibustering in the
Age of Manifest Destiny" (874, 880), which argues that held
filibustering the same
emotional thatservicein thearmysometimes
attractions did,withopportunities forplunder
andlandthatoftendrewdeserters anddischarged soldiers. See alsoTomChaffin,"'Sons
of Washington': NarcisoL6pez,Filibustering, andU.S. Nationalism, 1848-1851," Journal
of the EarlyRepublic,15 (Spring1995),82. JohnJ. DuffyandH. NicholasMullerIII
stressthe socialandpsychologicaldimensionsof the Patriotmovementin An Anxious
Democracy: Aspectsof the1830s(Westport,1982),observingthatVermontprofessionals
almostuniformlyopposedthemovementfromfearof disorder,whilemanybusinessmen
supportedit, even againsttheirown economicinterests(50). DavidA. Gerber,The
Makingof AmericanPluralism:Buffalo,New York,1825-1860(Urbana,1989),provides
an excellenthistoryof Buffaloduringthisperiodbutdoesnotdiscussthebordercrises.
19 Scottto Poinsett,Jan.12, 1839,in Stacey,ed., "Private Report,"411. Bradyalso
denounced "wickedthreats";
thefilibusters' Bradyto Jones,Feb.22, 1839,in Prucha,ed.
"Reports of GeneralBrady,"67. See also Corey,TheCrisisof 1830-1842in Canadian-
AmericanRelations,chap.6.; andStuart,UnitedStatesExpansionism andBritishNorth
America,143.

RESPONSESTO FILIBUS
'IERING 503
opinion,andthe British. Armycommandersfirstdeployedtheirlimited

forces "to inspirea sense of securityin the People [and]to renewand
cultivatekind and friendlyfeelings along the border"by reassuring
frightenedAmericansthatthe federalgovernmentwouldprotectthem
againstanyfurtherraidslike thaton the Caroline. They simultaneously
solicitedthe cooperationof leadingcitizensandthe civilianauthorities.
Given"theimpossibility on thepartof themilitaryauthorityof enforcing
the laws while the mass of the people are so regardlessof their
obligations,"the officershoped"bythe exertionof moralinfluenceto
bringabouta morewholesomestateof publicopinion,and[to] stimulate
to a morevigorousexecutionof theirduties." When
thecivil authorities
this proddingfailed, Worthandhis counterparts set up an intelligence
network, seized Patriot weapons, arrested Patriotleaders, intercepted
Patriotadvances,andarrangedtheirmeagerforcesalongthe borderto
catch filibustersretreatingfrom the British. In the meantimeWorth
assuredtheBritishauthoritiesof his determination"torecallsuchof our
own citizensas have strayedfromthepathof nationalhonourandduty,
andto admonishthosewhohavesoughtthehospitality of ourcountry[the
Patriotexiles] of the dangerof violatingthe laws." Indeed, Worth
frequentlysent officersto conferwith the Britishaboutfilibusterplans
andoperations.2
20 Worthto Scott,Dec. 12, 1838,Worthto

Capt.GilesPorter[assistant
commissary
of subsistence],
Feb. 17, 1839,Worthto Poinsett,Feb. 12, 1838,Worthto Capt.Sandom
[RoyalNavy], Nov. 1, 1838,WorthPapers.For his fearsthatthe filibusterraidswere
intendedto andwouldsucceedin precipitating a conflict,see Worthto Scott,Feb. 13,
1838,andWorthto A.W. Rogers[actingUnitedStatesdistrictattorney],Feb. 14, 1838,
ibid. Worthsooncameto see regularcommunication withtheBritishas his bestmeans
of deterringretaliationagainstAmericansoil. Indeed,"havingin view the peculiar
characterandextentof ourfrontier... thepublicandprivateobligationsof everygood
citizen-the sincerity of the Government . . . and above all a proper regard for the
characterof ourcountryfor honourandgoodfaith,"Worthbelievedthatit was his duty
to informtheBritishof potentialincursions.Hetookresponsibility foranyembarrassment
thatmightresult,butwas satisfiedthathis talkswiththeBritishhad"beencharacterized
by highcourtesy,"andbelievedthattheywould"actin a corresponding spirit"to restrain
retaliation.WinfieldScotthadinitiated thisunofficialpolicyof cooperationas well as that
of domesticintelligence-gathering,
andhe reaffirmed it in a confidential
circulardistributed
in April 1839: "Shouldyou, at any time, doubtyour meansof prevention,underthe
neutralitylaws, you will (as heretoforeinstructed)not for a momenthesitateto give
immediateinformation ... to the nearestBritishcommander, in partacquittanceof our
obligationsof good faithtowardsfriendlyneighbors."Worth'saide, Lieutenant James
Prentiss,equatedadherenceto this policywith upholding"thenationalfaith[and]the
honourof the service,"interpreting the officer'sprofessionalresponsibilityto preserve
federalsovereigntyas a matterof personal,occupational, andnationalhonor. Worthto

Militaryweakness,thedelicatebalanceof Americanpublicopinion,
andthe inadequacyof federalneutralitylaw meantthatassertingfederal
controloverthenationalbordersinvolvedmorediplomacythanforce,and
Worth warned his subordinatesto exercise their "prudenceand
judgement,"recognizingthat "as much delicacy and forbearanceas
firmnesswill be necessary."Martiallaw was nevera viableoptionfor
thesecommanders.Indeed,the federalNeutralityAct of 1818provided
only for punishment,not prevention,and Secretaryof War Poinsett
initiallyinstructedScottthat"theExecutivepossessesno legal authority
to employthemilitaryforceto restrainpersons[from]makingincursions"
acrosstheborder. Thelaw was soonstrengthened, andWashington gave
the regularsgreatlatitude,butofficersremainedconstrained by theirown
belief thatany substantiveactionagainstAmericancitizensrequiredthe
legal sanctionof civil authority.The neutralityact of March10, 1838
permitted preemptivepropertyseizure(usuallyof armsandammunition)
when officials had probablecause to suspectthatneutralityviolations
wouldoccur, andit authorizedthe use of militaryforce to aid the civil
authorities in doingso; still, the latteralonecouldprovideconstitutional
warrants-legal initiativeand clearance-for searches, seizures, and
arrests. Nearlya year laterWorthimpliedthathe wouldhave likedto
detainCanadian refugeesen masseas a precaution againstfurtherunrest,
but he thought such a measure impossible "withoutfurtherlegal
enactments."21
OtherofficerssharedWorth'sdissatisfaction withthe neutralitylaws
andhopedthatthegovernment wouldsupplythemwithgreaterauthority.
Nevertheless,unlikeAndrewJacksonin FloridaandNew Orleanstwo
decadesbefore,Worthandhis counterparts maintained scrupulous respect
for civil rightsthroughout the Patriotcrises, anotherillustrationof their
accountability, howeverfrustrating theyfoundit, to civilianauthorityand
the fundamental libertiesit prescribed.Indeed,a comparisonof officers'
Scott,Feb. 25, 1838,Worthto Eustis,Nov. 16, 1838,WorthPapers; Scott'scircular,

Apr. 15, 1839,RobertAnderson Worth'sinstructions
Papers;Prentisstransmitting to Lt.
Col. BenjaminK. Pierce, notingan earlierorderfromScott, Jan. 23, 1839, Official
Letterbook,WorthPapers. Forotherexamplesof Worth'scooperation withtheBritish
see Worthto Scott,Feb. 25, Mar.5, 1838,Worthto Britishcolonel
militaryauthorities,
Cameron,Mar.5, 1838, Worthto Capt.CharlesThomas,Mar.9, 1838,andWorthto
Lt. Col. NewmanClarke,Nov. 1, 1838,WorthPapers.
21 Worthto Capt.WilliamMontgomery, Nov. 4, 1838,Worthto Lt. Homans[United
StatesNavy],Feb. 26, 1838,Worthto Capt.Porter,Feb. 17, 1839,WorthPapers. See
Corey, The Crisisof 1830-1842in Canadian-American Relations,49n, for Poinsett's
to Scott,whichwererelayedto theBritish.
instructions

RESPONSESTO FILIBUSTERING 505
interactionswithciviliansduringsquatterremovaloperationsin Georgia
and Alabamaduringthe early 1830s, the Patriotinsurgency,and the
SecondSeminoleWarshowsthattheirattentiveness to localauthoritywas
actuallygreatestduring the Canadian crisis. The officercorps'desirefor
internationalharmony and social orderboth gave way beforeallegiance
to the principleof civiliansupremacyover the militaryandthe limitsto
interventionin civil affairsthatit prescribed.2
Recognizingthelimitations to whichtheyweresubject,armyofficers
to
initially hoped sway local public opinion, especially that of the
"respectable" citizens who they expected to support the national
government'spolicy of restraint. Their observationson this score
reinforcethe pictureof an occupational groupobsessedwithpreserving
domestic and internationalorder. At a banquetheld for him in
Burlington, Vermontin February1838,InspectorGeneralWoolproposed
a toast to the citizensof thattown, "everfaithfulto the principlesof
liberty, law, and order." Significantly,"a numberof respectable
gentlemenfrom abroad"-obviouslyfrom Canada,and quite possibly
British officers, with whom the Americancommandersmaintained
amicablerelationsthroughout the crisis-attendedthe banquetin Wool's
honor. Scott spentmuchof his time on the frontierspeakingto large
crowdsaboutrespectfor law andorderandits necessityfor the survival
of republicaninstitutions,andin MarchHughBradyreported"ameeting
of the most respectablecitizensof Detroit"calledto investigatePatriot
charges of Britishoppressionin Canada. That July MajorSylvester
Churchill,a nativeof VermontandlaterWool's successoras inspector
general,notedin hisjournalthat"Gen.Macombseemswell pleasedwith
my travelingmuchamong,[andbecoming]acquaintedwiththe principal
inhabitants,as thebestmeansof exertingan influencein preservingorder
and quiet." Worth'scorrespondenceillustratesthe reasonsfor these
activities.Seeingthat"many[insurgents] areyoungmenof good family
all decentandof thehigherorderof Yeomanry,"he hadrapidlycome to
believe thatthe filibusterswere "nourishedandurgedon by personsof
highstandingin society,"buthe continuedto believethatsocialhierarchy
andrespectfor law shouldandultimatelywouldgo handin hand: "many,
22
Tommy RichardYoung II, "The United States Army in the South, 1789-1835"
(Ph.D. diss., LouisianaState University, 1973), chap. 6, discusses civil-military conflict
during squatterremoval in the early 1830s. See also James M. Denham, "'Some Prefer
the Seminoles': Violence and Disorder Among Soldiers and Settlers in the Second
Seminole War, 1835-1842," Florida Historical Quarterly,70 (July 1991), 38-54, for an
examinationof civil-military tensions duringthe war in Florida.

too late indeedfor theirreputationand standingin society, are getting
heartily ashamedof their part in the affair." Hopingto secure the
adhesionof local elites by appealingto themas social leaders,Worth
blameddisaffectionamonghis soldiersupon "thelower classes here,"
whichled himto advisetheself-proclaimed "Gentlemen of Ogdensburg"
that"ifthegoodcitizensshouldbe pleasedto exercisetheirjust influence
in societyI cannotdoubtthatvery shortlythe formerrelationsof good
neighborhood will be restoredwiththe oppositeborder."23
The shortage of troops that hamperedtheir law enforcement
operations leftofficersfeelinghelplessbeforethepossibilityof largescale
Britishretaliationor war, and they hastenedto absolvethemselvesof
responsibility for the consequences by blaming subversive or
uncooperative civilianofficials. Bradyaskedthe adjutantgeneral"what
can a MilitaryCommanderdo with a mere handfulof men, when
compelledto actin subordination to civil officers,a majorityof whomare
notoriously favorable to what is misnamedthe Patriotcause?" Though
repeatedlydisappointed, Worth continued to puthis faithin thepowerof
and
persuasion example:although fruitless as policemeasures,he hoped
thathis officers'actionswouldhave"theexcellenteffect to stimulatethe
civil authorityto theassertionof its honoranddignity,and[to] convince
ouroutragedneighbors,thatwe atleastperformourdutiesin goodfaith."
Otherwisehe thoughthimself"undereverydisadvantage, unadvised[and]
unaidedby the Civil Officerswhosemoreappropriate duty it seems to
be," and he ordered subordinates to send theircorrespondence withthe
to headquarters,
civil authorities "asampleevidencethatthe Militaryhas
not been remissin theperformance of its duties."4
Indeed, the reluctance of politicallyappointed civil officialsto enforce
thelaw was probablythe mostseriousobstaclethe regularsfaced. This
was a conflictbetweenfederaland local prioritiesfor which military
officerscouldprovideno solution,for armyofficersresponsibleto the
23
Wool's toast reportedin "Respectto Gen. Wool," an article reprintedfrom the
BurlingtonFree Press in the Armyand Navy Chronicle, VI, no. 9 (Mar. 1, 1838), 131;
Bradyto Scott, Mar. 14, 1838, in Prucha,ed., "Reportsof GeneralBrady,"63; Churchill
diary entry, July 26, 1838, Sylvester ChurchillPapers (Libraryof Congress); Worth to
Scott, Feb. 26, 1838, Worthto Eustis, Nov. 10, 1838, Worth Papers;Worth to Poinsett,
Mar. 3, 1838, in Stacey, ed., "PrivateReport," 408; Worth to Scott, Mar. 10, 1839,
Worthto "A. Baconand otherGentlemenof Ogdensburg,"Nov. 17, 1838, WorthPapers.
24 Brady to Jones, Dec. 6, 1838, in Prucha, ed., "Reportsof General Brady," 67;
Worth to Major [brevet Lt. Col.] BenjaminK. Pierce, Feb. 14, 1839, Worth to United
StatesDistrictAttorneyNathanielBenton, Feb. 17, 1838, Worthto Capt. Porter, Feb. 17,
1839, Worth Papers.

RESPONSESTO FILIBUSTlERING 507
nationalgovernmentthateducated,commissioned,and paid themhad
little sympathyfor civilian officials' sense of accountabilityto their
neighbors. WinfieldScottwarnedthe WarDepartment that"ingeneral
they are either luke warm [and] inefficientor the open [and]zealous
abettorsof the violatorsof law [and] order." Worthsuggestedthat
"many, very many civil officers along the border"stood guilty of
"criminalof participation[and] shameful neglect of duty. ... Many are
notoriously active members of the secret societies." The federal
governmenthad little effective control-or was unwilling to exert
much-over its localappointeesamidthedelicatepoliticalcircumstances,
so armyofficerswere forcedto beartheburdenof whatwas essentially
a federal-local conflict over the direction of American policy.
Consequently,Worthand his fellows often were forcedto mediateor
choosebetweencompetingimperatives of professionalresponsibilityand
to
accountability politicalauthority.25
A seriesof eventsin February1838illustratesthe mixedcooperation
anddualallegiancesWorthandhis fellow officersmet amonglocal civil
authorities.Thoughlegallyfederalofficers,thesemenwere dependent
on theirlocalpoliticalstandingto gainandretaintheirappointments, and
diplomacywas necessaryto securetheir aid in controversialactions.
Indeed,Worthoftenhadto resortto persuading subordinate legalofficers
to act whentheirsuperiorswouldnot. Forexample,he askeda federal
districtattorney,for a legalopinionto supporthis intentionto disarmand
disperse the filibustersby force if the civil authorityfailed to do so
peaceably,andhe reportedto Scottthatuponhearingof an armscacheat
Fredonia, "I gave W. Leonard[a deputyUnitedStatesmarshal]the
necessary militia force ... and said to him ' ... if you don't seize it, I
shall."' Worthwenton to praiseLeonard'szeal in doingso, andhe later
gave thecivil authorities
primarycreditfor thwartingthe Patriotadvance
againstHickory Islandand Kingstonthatmonth.26
Howeverdiplomatiche triedto be in his relationswiththe local civil
authorities,Worth'sconductwas ultimatelyguidedby his professional
principles of personaland nationalduty and honor: "In my own
judgementmy courseof Dutyis plain,andthisdutyI shallendeavourto
25 Scott to Poinsett, Jan. 12, 1839, Worth to Poinsett [marked"private"],Dec. 25,

1838, in Stacey, ed., "PrivateReport," 411, 409. Executive officials at the state level
generallysupportedthe neutralitypolicy, however, and Worthcooperatedextensively with
New York governor William L. Marcy.
6 Worth to A.W. Rogers [marked"confidential"],Feb. 14, 1838, Worth to Scott,
Feb. 17, 26, 1838, Worth Papers. See also Worth to Scott, Feb. 19, 1838, ibid.

performregardlessof [the]consequences,"he wroteto Rogers. Worth

thereforereprovedanotherdistrictattorneyfor "publiclyandofficially"
repudiatingLeonard'sactions, and wrote that "it was with infinite
surprise[that]I furtherlearnedthatyou hadcausedan orderto be issued
for the re-delivery of arms seized from persons . .. who no doubt will
feel very grateful . . . [that] their arms have been transportedto the
desiredpointfor [their]unlawfuluse." Worththenwarnedtheinterfering
civilianthat"Ihavedeemedit my dutyto presentthe whole subject...
to theconsideration of the WarDepartment."He sentthe sameletterto
UnitedStatesMarshalH.N. Garrow,Leonard'ssuperior,notingthatthe
circumstances made"itindispensibleto thepublicgood thatI shouldbe
enabledto conferandcooperatewithanU. StatesMarshalor his deputy."
Garrowhad "publiclyrepudiatedandpronounced[Leonard's]acts ...
unlawful,"rendering it "necessary,as a matterof self-defence"forWorth
to alertthe secretaryof warto Garrow'sobstruction.The colonelalso
appealedto the War Departmentregardinga customs collector at
Ogdensburg, thoughhe concededthat"ordinarily I shouldbe regardedas
in
travellingbeyondmy duty presenting your to notice the conductof a
civil functionary."Worthwas not alone in his appealsto the capital:
Winfield Scott urged the removalof the United States marshalfor
Michigan, and InspectorGeneralWool criticizeda deputy customs
collectorfor his Patriotloyaltiesandthreatened Vermontofficialsthathe
wouldinformthe presidentof theirmisdeedsunlesscorrected.27
Nationalandpersonalhonor,definedas goodfaithandintegrityin the
fulfillmentof one's dutiesandobligations,were fundamental valuesthat
the officercorpsapplied to all of the actors in the Patriotdrama. Worth
remindedLieutenantColonelNewmanClarketo tell CaptainSandom of
theRoyalNavy of "our sinceredesire to do all we be
that might expected
fromthemostfastidioussenseof nationalandpersonalhonour"to do to
27
Worth to Rogers, Feb. 14, 1838, Worth to Benton, Feb. 17, 1838, Worth to
Garrow, Feb. 17, 1838, Worth to Poinsett, Nov. 15, Dec. 25, 1838, ibid.; Scott to
Poinsett, Dec. 16, 1838, in Stacey, ed., "PrivateReport," 409; Harwood Perry Hinton,
"The Military Career of John Ellis Wool, 1812-1863" (Ph.D. diss., University of
Wisconsin, 1960), 160. Other examples of Worth's criticism of civil officials may be
found in letters to Scott, Feb., 17, 1838, concerningthe postmasterat Erie; the Adjutant
General of New York, Jan. 7, 1839, concerning a state militia colonel; United States
Customs Collector George McWhorter, Jan. 7, 1839, concerning that officer's own
collusion with the Patriotsin permittingthem to retakea cannonthat Worth had seized;
and to Capt. Porter, Jan. 24, 1839, from Worth's acting assistant adjutantgeneral,
concerning Deputy United States Customs Collector Whittmore, all in Worth Papers.
Brady was more general in his comments; see his letters to Scott, Mar. 14, 1838, and
Jones, Nov. 22, Dec. 6, 1838, all in Prucha,ed., "Reportsof GeneralBrady,"63, 65, 66.

RESPONSESTO FILIBUSTlERING 509
stop the filibusters,whileWorth,Scott, andWool frequentlycastigated

uncooperativecivil officials in the languageof personaland national
honor commonamongofficers. Scott reportedto Secretaryof War
Poinsettthat"Ihavescornfullyrefused,& shallcontinueso to refuse,to
receive or to salute, one of those traitors to a special trust ... because
I am the naturalguardianof my own personalhonour,& do not choose
that that shall be defiled by fellowship with such men." Wool
admonishedCaptainJames Platt of the Vermontmilitia that "your
standingand characteras an officer"demandedthat a stolen box of
ammunitionshouldbe returned. "If it is not you will be suspectedof
having connivedat theft. If I was in your place, I would not for a
thousandboxes of ammunitionever have the world suspectme or my
companycapableof suchan actof villainy."WhenPlattrespondedwith
excuses, Wool reiteratedhis causticthreat: "Sir. The merecost of the
ammunitionis nothingcomparedwith the loss of reputationand the
suspicionthatmustever attachitselfto you andyourcompany. I repeat
thatif you haveanyregardfor yourowncharacterandfuturestandingin
society you will havethe box returned."He hadno successwith Platt,
butsimilaraspersionsdirectedat civil officersbroughtin severalhundred
weapons. Theseattitudeswerealso sharedby morejuniorarmyofficers:
CaptainJames Duncanwrote from Clevelandabout the difficultyof
NeutralityLawprosecutions that"twoof thethreemagistratesof the city
aremostviolentpatriots,menof butlittlecharacter,& I doubtif themost
solemnobligationsof theiroathsof office wouldinfluencethemto give
a decisivecounterto theiravowedprejudices."28
Regular officers encounteredthe same sort of disaffectionand
unreliabilityin the state militia, which they tried to exclude from
participationin their operationswheneverpossible. InitiallyWorth
considered the militia "the more appropriateaid to the civil
functionaries,"buthe soon beganto blamemilitiaofficersfor allowing
the filibustersto steal weaponsfrom arsenals,and early in 1839 he
appropriated New Yorkstateartilleryto preventthe Patriotsfromdoing
so first. OntheVermontfrontierInspectorGeneralWoolhopedto avoid
callingup the militia,someof whomhadrefusedto serveunderfederal
authority,duringthecrisisof February1838,buthe felt compelledby his
28
Worth to Clarke, Nov. 1, 1838, Worth Papers; Scott to Poinsett, Jan. 12, 1839,
in Stacey, ed., "PrivateReport,"411; Wool to Platt, Mar. 12, 13, 1838, in Hinton, "The
Military Career of John Ellis Wool," 158-60; Duncan to , Jan. 2, 1839, Official
Letterbook, James Duncan Papers (United States Military Academy Library, Special
Collections, West Point, NY).

lack of manpowerto do so later in the monthwhen the Patriotsadvanced.
He nevertheless disbandedmilitia units called up by their commanders
without authorizationfrom the federal government during the Patriot
expedition, fearingthatthey would aid the filibusters. He then requested
a company of regulars to replace the militia he had called, and after a
theft in Marchhe directedhis aides to superviseall arms shipmentsto and
from local arsenals.29
The Patriotsseem to have been dependenton governmentarsenalsfor
their supply of weapons, and controlling the distributionof arms was a
basic dilemmafacing the regulars. On the DetroitfrontierGeneralBrady
withdrew a requisition for militia "from want of Confidence" in their
reliability after their officers somehow "lost" a store of arms to the
filibusters,while GeneralScott believed that as a rule the militia "would
almostcertainlygive theirarmsto the patriots,if not personallyunite with
them." In 1838 Worthdirecteda subordinateto refuse District Attorney
Benton's order to returnsome weapons seized from the Patriots, and a
year later he refused to allow an auction of condemned arms, which
would certainly have been purchased by the insurgents or their
sympathizers, without orders from higher up the chain of federal
authority. By 1839 Worth felt certain that the pervasiveness of Patriot
sympathieshad renderedthe militia useless, and he feared that a call to
arms in Marchwas drivenby Patriotsupporterswho hoped to precipitate
clashes with the British. Worth was able to prevent that call-up, and he
then secured the governor's authorizationto keep any arms sent for the
militia under army guard. Wool, who at first refused to seize weapons
because of the political uproarthat this might cause, later warned Scott
and Poinsettagainstissuing armsto citizens in northernVermont, and he
refused to honor a writ of attachmentfor capturedweapons presentedto
himby the sheriffof ClintonCounty,New York. By the end of 1838 it
9 Worthto Scott, Feb. 17, 1838, Worth to the

adjutantgeneral of New York [Brig.
Gen King], Jan. 7, 1839, Worth Papers; Hinton, "The Military Career of John Ellis
Wool," 147, 145, 156, 159. Militiaunits could only be called into active service by orders
from the stateor federalexecutive, an authoritythat was often left to the discretionof the
regularcommanderson the spot. The alacritywith which GeneralEdmundGaines called
for civilian volunteers during the Texas Revolution and in 1845 and 1846 provides an
instructivecontrastto the reluctanceof officers on the Canadianborderto do so. Gaines
was personallyquite impulsive; his potentialopponentswere Mexicans and Indians;and
he had been Andrew Jackson'schief subordinateduringthe invasion of Florida in 1818.
Nevertheless,it is worthnotingthatGainesdid not go beyondhis instructionsin 1836. See
JamesW. Silver, EdmundPendletonGaines, FrontierGeneral(BatonRouge, 1949), chap.
9, for a narrativeof Gaines's actions in 1836.

RESPONSESTO FILIBUS
1'ERING 511
hadbecomeclearto theregularsthatwithoutcentralizedcontrolover the
use of forcethecountrywouldsoonbe plungedintowarwithBritainby
the militiacommissioned to protectit. Indeed,Worthbecameconcerned
that the frontierarsenalshad been so thoroughlystrippedof armsthat
therewouldbe few weaponsavailableto armthemilitiashouldtheBritish
attackin forceacrossthe border.3
Worth and Brady did not distrustall citizen-soldiers,but their
preferencesclearlywere conditionedby class andoccupationalvalues.
They made a clear distinctionbetween the generally prosperous
volunteers-who couldbe trustedwith arms-and the "popular"militia
just as they did betweenthe filibustersand "respectable
Citizens-[the]
staunchfriendsof LawandOrder."Bradyrepeatedly praiseda company
namedafterhim as "themostrespectableyoungmenof Detroit,"while
Worth praised a New York battalionfor its "zeal, fidelity, and
discipline."Indeed,Worthwas a strongbelieverin thecivic andmilitary
benefitsof trainingunderprofessionalguidance: "[Thevolunteers]are
in a course of instruction . . . which will increase their efficiency as
soldiers,keepthemoutof idleness& sendthemhomebettercitizens,"no
doubtafterbeing lecturedon theirdutyto observethe neutralitylaws.
Shortof regulartroopsandsuspiciousof the militia,Wool reliedmostly
on civilianvolunteersin his operations
againstthe Patriotsin Vermontin
February 1838.31
It was naturalfor officers to make a sharp distinctionbetween
insurgentrabblerousers andthe "respectable"citizenswho theyexpected
30 Bradyto Scott,Feb. 15, 1838,in Prucha,ed., "Reports of GeneralBrady,"61;

Scottto Poinsett,Dec. 15, 1838, in Stacey,ed., "PrivateReport,"409-10; Worthto
Jones, Feb. 8, 1838, Worthto Scott,Feb. 17, 1838, Worthto Jones,Jan. 24, 1839,
Worth'sactingassistantadjutant generalto Capt.GeorgeWright,Feb. 1, 1839,Worthto
Scott,Mar.21, 1839,Worthto Governor WilliamSeward,Mar.28, 1839,WorthPapers;
Hinton,"TheMilitaryCareerof JohnEllisWool,"143, 146-47,156-57;Worthto Scott,
Feb.9, 1839,WorthPapers.See MichaelA. Bellesiles,"TheOriginsof GunCulturein
the UnitedStates,1760-1865,"Journalof AmericanHistory,83 (Sept. 1996),427-38,
regardingthe relativerarityof privatelyheldfirearmsin theearlyrepublic.
31 For Worthaskingthatthe volunteers be permittedto retaintheir armsas the
municipalguardof Ogdensburg, see Worthto Brig. Gen.King[adjutant generalof New
York], Jan. 30, 1839, WorthPapers;Bradyto Scott,Jan.6, Feb. 15, 1838, Bradyto
Poinsett,Nov. 23, 1838,in Prucha,ed., "Reportsof GeneralBrady,"58, 61, 66; Worth
to Gov.WilliamMarcy,Mar.5, 1838,Worthto Scott,Feb. 15, 1838,WorthPapers;and
Hinton,"TheMilitaryCareerof JohnEllisWool,"150-55. SeeWorth's"OrderNo. 12,"
Mar. 3, 1838, NathanielYoungPapers(Libraryof Congress),for an intriguingset of
largelyclass-derived
contrastsbetweenWorth'sexpectations of volunteercitizen-soldiers
andregulararmyenlistedmen.

to upholdlaw andthe socialorder,butthisjudgmentultimatelyproved
counterproductive.The army'sefforts at moralsuasionshiftedfrom
publicopinionin general,at whichScott'searlyspeecheswere aimed,to
a morenarrowfocus on securingthe supportof local civil officialsand
socialelites. WhenthelatterstrategyfailedWorthturnedagainto target
publicopinion,yet he nowdidso throughscaretacticsratherthanappeals
to popularpatriotism,indicatingan ambivalencetowarddemocracythat
haddeepenedas thecrisisworeon. WhenPatriotincursionscontinued,
armyofficersconfronted thatsupportforthefilibusterswas
therealization
notconfinedto thelowerorders,or (moreunsettlingstill)to authoritarian
leaders: ordinary people were rejecting the guidance of their
"betters"-sharp blowsto theclass-basedassumptions of the officersthat
forced them to reassess their strategiesfor overcomingthe Patriot
movement.
Surrounded by uncooperative andduplicitousofficials,by the end of
1838Worthadoptedanunofficialpolicyof avoidingassociationwiththe
local civil authoritieswheneverpossible. Indeed, Worth'sirritation
seemed directed as much at the civil authoritiesas at identifiable
filibusters,for he orderedhis officersto findevidenceof negligenceand
criminalacts by civil officialsandhe was able to securethe arrestof a
deputyUnitedStatesmarshal. Even so, the always-diplomatic colonel
remainedcautiousand hopedto avoid unnecessaryprovocations. He
warnedsubordinates thatanyarrestwouldbe "apainfulanddelicateduty
to be performed with great discretionand judgementand under the
clearestevidenceof criminaldesign,"and thatthey must "deliverthe
person arrestedto the civil authority""withall possible diligence."
Worthknewthathis confrontational methodsmightprovecontroversial,
so he stressedthe importanceof organizingevidenceso thatwitnesses
could not deny it, "for a failure to substantiatethe charges . . . would
onlyencourage[thecivil officials]to greaterexertionsin the violationof
[their]duty."32
The colonel was thus careful to appearovertly obedientto the
principleof civiliancontrol,but in doing so he actuallyabandonedthe
civil populaceto its own devicesin hopesthata rashof Patriotviolence
and thieverywouldcure themof supportfor the filibusters. When a
suspectdistrictattorneycomplainedaboutan officer'seffortsto stopan
assaulton a messengerearlyin 1839, Worthdefendedhis subordinate's
conductbut respondedthat he would give "specific orders ... under no
32
Worthto Capt.WilliamMontgomery,Nov. 4, 1838,Worthto NathanielBenton
a DeputyMarshalMalcolm],Nov. 14, 1838,WorthPapers.
[concerning

RESPONSES TO FILIBUSTIERING 513
circumstancesto permit any interferencein any brawls or civil
difficulties,unlesson the writtenrequestof a Magistrate,"a policy that
could leave the Americanshore open to Canadianretaliationwhile
superficiallyadheringto the letterof the law and the spiritof civilian
supremacy.Worth'snew approachcoincidedwiththe insurgents'turnto
arson and banditrywhile attemptingto recover from their battlefield
defeatsat WindsorandPrescott(WindmillPoint)the previousfall. He
decidedto classifysuchincidentsas "civildifficulties,"whichwas strictly
true,inasmuchas thePatriotswere not crossinginternational boundaries
or violatingtheneutralityactsat thispoint,declaringthat"theMagistracy
andpeople... arealonecompetentto thecorrectionof suchevils as now
disgraceandafflictourborder."Indeed,by thebeginningof 1839Worth
believed that responsibilityfor the Patriotproblemand its resolution
restedwith the Americancitizenryalone: "Shouldit please our good
citizensto withdrawtheircountenance[and]supportthereis not a doubt
tranquillitywill be restored." Indeed, his biting letter to Customs
CollectorGeorge McWhortersoundedas if it had been writtenby a
Britishratherthanan Americanofficer: "I feel quiteassuredthatyour
neighborhoodis in no dangerof beingdisturbedfromCan[ada]andas
certainthatanyfurtheraggressionsby yourcitizenswill be dulypunished
by the offended party. ... I have neither authoritynor inclination to
employ the troops in quellingcivil brawls." Worthwas effectively
reclassifyingthe unrestas a matterfor local law enforcement,which
dependedheavilyon the operationof publicopinion,ratherthanfederal
militaryintervention,leavingthe localityto solve its problemsin the
expectationthat it would be unable to do so withoutacceptingthe
government'sview of the situation.33
In essence,Worthfinallycameto believethatonly the fearof chaos
would fosterpublicadherenceto the normsof law and order. "[T]he
scandalousexcesses"of the Patriotshe had writtenin February1838,
"will producea very decisive,andfortunate,reactionin publicfeeling.
. . . [They] have made all true men hug closer to the laws." This
optimismprovedpremature,and a year laterhe instructedLieutenant
Colonel BenjaminPierce that if incidentscontinued"to withdrawthe
troops, and try, as a last expedient,the effects of a due sense of
insecurity." Not only did Worthcease to cooperatewith the civil
authorities,he hadby thispointdecidedto quellthe unrestby playingon
their fear-by withdrawingthe protectionhe was morallyobligatedto
33 Worthto
Bishop Perkins,Feb. 21, 1839, Worthto Lt. Col. BenjaminPierce, Apr.
10, Mar. 20, 1839, Worth to George McWhorter,Jan. 7, 1839, ibid.

provide. In doingso he turnedtheweaknessof federalneutralitylaw on
its head, showingthe localpopulacethatrigidadherenceto the letterof
the law on his part could be harmfulas well as beneficialto their
interests.Theborderers began"tolookwithseriousnessto thesematters,
as thebrandof theincendiary approaches theirown dwellings,andthere
is reason to hope that in a few days they will compel the refugees
[meaningthe Patriots]to retire,"Worthreportedto Scott;"I am firmin
thebeliefthatperseverance in keepingthe troopsbackfromthe line will
in a short time bring our people to their senses [and] induce the
Magistrates to do theirduty." In one of the manyironiesof federalism,
the armyofficers'accountability to the nationalgovernmentultimately
meantabandoningits citizensif they persistedin pursuingtheir local
objectives without regardto the decisions made for them by their
representatives in Washington.34
Worthwas willing to undertakethis apparentlyirresponsibleand
personallyriskycourseof actionbecausehe hadcome to the conclusion
that British retaliationwas unlikely, and he was careful to assure
concernedciviliansof this. Worth'scertainty-whichwas borneout by
events-was basedon his excellentrelationswithhis counterparts on the
oppositeshore and his beliefthatthey could preventCanadianretaliation.
Worth'sdiplomacypaidoff by allowingtheUnitedStatesto defenditself
cheaply,withouta massiveincreasein thearmy. His statusas an servant
of the centralgovernmentenabledhim to ignore local pressuresand
demonstratethe government'scommitmentto the principles of
international law andnationalsovereigntyto the British. Thoughthere
were certainlyotherreasonswhy the Britishexercisedforbearance,the
goodfaithandenergeticdiplomacyof Worthandhis fellowcommanders
substantiallyreducedthepossibilityof incidentsthatcouldhavemadethe
process of accommodation much more difficult. Indeed,despitehis
acerbiccommentsaboutAmericansin general,BritishAmbassador Henry
Fox consideredthe UnitedStatesregulars"so usefullyemployed"in
34Worthto Jones,Feb. 23, 1838,Worthto Pierce,Mar.21, 1839,Worthto Scott,

Mar.21, Apr. 10, 1839,ibid.SeealsoWorthto Scott,Feb.20, 1838,andWorthto Gov.
Marcy, Mar. 5, 1838, ibid. Worthalso expressedthis belief in a letterto Governor
Jenisonof Vermont,Apr. 17, 1839,ibid. IneffectWorthwasanticipating andturningon
its headMao'sdictumabouttheguerrillaas a fish in thepopularsea. Worthdisplayeda
similarimpatiencein Floridaseveralyearslater,wherehe orderedthatcivilians,including
"whohavemadethemselves
magistrates, obnoxious to themilitary"(forreasonsunstated)
be removedfromthemilitaryreservation at Ft. Brooke. See Denham,"'SomePreferthe
Seminoles,'"43, 45-47. Thequotation fromWorth,citedin Denham,apparently wasfirst
publishedin FloridaSentinel(Tallahassee), Oct. 31, 1843.

RESPONSESTO FILIBUS
TERING 515
restraining the Patriotsthathe soughtandreceiveda tacitunderstanding

thattheywouldbe kepton the frontieruntilthe Maineboundarydispute
was resolved.35
Armyofficershadnotalwaysdisplayedsuchrestrainttowardborder
crises. Thenation'sprimary"Agentsof Empire"in an era of exuberant
nationalchauvinism,thesemenmayat firstappearnaturalcandidatesfor
case studiesin expansionistattitudes.Expansionist warspromisedglory
and promotionfor the ambitiousyoung regularswho felt stifled by
sluggishpromotionin thesmallpeacetimearmy. Someofficershadgiven
rhetoricalsupportto democratic revolutionsin EuropeandLatinAmerica
during the 1810s and 20s, and more came to applaudthe conceptof
ManifestDestinyduringthe 1840s;but theirquestfor orderand their
realisticassessmentof Britishmilitarypowerledexperienced commanders
to cautionandrestraintin advocatingterritorialexpansionor warduring
the Patriotunrest. Indeed,the developmentof a senseof accountability
and subordination to the dictatesof nationalcivilianauthoritywas the
mostsignificantcharacteristic of Americanmilitaryprofessionalism in the
earlyrepublic. The Army was the firstmajoremployer undercentralized
nationalcontrolin the UnitedStates,andas such its officerscame into
constantcontact-andfrequentconflict-withciviliansantagonisticto the
policiesof the federalgovernment.Indeed,in a largersensethe officer
corps' effortsto consolidatenationalsovereigntyover the borderlands
resemblethe "comprehensive programs"of the civilianleadersRobert
Wiebe labels "nationalquids" during the 1820s and early 30s.
Nevertheless,thedisjunctures betweenofficersandciviliansthatfeature
so prominentlyin this essay can easily be exaggeratedunless we
rememberthat officers were membersof the nation's social elite
dependenton government employment for theirstatusandcareers. There
certainly were features of liberalsocietyandpoliticsthatofficersfound
repugnant, but this distastewas sharedby manyWhiggishciviliansas
well. Officersdid not lack ties to politicalelites, but theirdemandson
civiliansocietywere normallylimitedto increasesin compensationand
expansionsof thearmy(whichmeantpromotions),attelmpts to limitentry
into the officercorpsto thosewho hadundergonesocializationat West
Point,anda longingfor publicrecognitionandacclaim. The desirefor
greaterappropriations andenhancedlegal authorityduringthe Canadian
35 Worthto Eustis, Nov. 14, 16, 1838, Worthto Scott, Apr. 10, 1839, WorthPapers;
Corey, The Crisisof 1830-1842 in Canadian-American Relations, 115. GeneralBradyalso
came to doubt the likelihood of British retaliation;see Brady to Jones, June 8, 1838, in
Prucha, ed., "Reportsof GeneralBrady," 63.

crises did not lead to the sort of alienationmany officers were then
displayingin Florida,for thoseservingon the northernfrontierfelt that
theywerepreservinglaw andorderandupholdingthe nation'shonorby
maintaining inviolateborders,ratherthansecuringa swampywilderness
for the greedyfrontiersmen theyblamedfor the conflictin Florida.36
Militaryaccountability thefederalgovernment
to hadsocial,cultural,
andeconomicas well as ethicalandpoliticalsources. Althoughlargely
frommiddle-classratherthaneliteeconomicbackgrounds,armyofficers
camedisproportionately fromprofessionalandofficeholdingfamiliesand
weresocializedto upholdgenteelvaluesof socialdistanceandhierarchy
andpersonaldecorumandhonor. Theyaspiredprimarilyto securityand
reputation ratherthanmaterialwealth,andtheyespousedsocialcohesion,
nationalservice,andpersonaldisinterestedness as fundamental corporate
ideals. Officersperceivedgrowingthreatsto theirlivelihoodsandsocial
statusin the fluidityanddemocratization of Americansociety, andthey
reactedby pursuingsecuritythroughinstitutionalized careersratherthan
to
resigning pursueopportunities in the civilian
competitive marketplace.
Theymadethearmya longtermprofessioncentralto theirpersonaland
socialidentitiesratherthanthe temporaryavocationit hadbeen for most
of theirearly-national predecessors.Thisquestfor securityled officers
36
RobertH. Wiebe,TheOpeningof AmericanSociety:FromtheAdoptionof the
Constitution to theEve of Disunion(NewYork, 1986). It was alsotruethatdutyon the
Canadianborderwas mucheasierthanriskinglife andlimbin disease-ridden swamps.
SeveralofficersusedthePatriotcrisisas a reasonto criticizecivilianneglectof thenation's
militaryestablishment, butthosewho did so wereconcernedprimarilywiththe army's
inabilityto maintainAmericanneutralityratherthanwith defendingthe UnitedStates
againstthe Britishor attackingCanada,andtheydo notseemto havequestionedfederal
policyor expressedopposition to thegovernment's objectives.Compared to the freemale
population as a whole,antebellum armyofficerscameverydisproportionately fromurban
areasand fromthe familiesof governmentofficeholdersandprofessionalswho could
usuallybe considered elitesfromthestandpoint of gentilityandsocialandpoliticalpower,
andit is clearthatveryfew menfrombeneaththemiddleclasshadanychanceof becoming
officers. See the tablesin Skelton,An AmericanProfessionof Arms, 158-62. See
Huntington, TheSoldierandtheState,chap.9, for theclassicstatement of thethesisthat
Americanmilitaryprofessionalism developedin isolationfrom,andto a substantial degree
in opposition to, civiliansocietyandits values;RussellF. Weigley,Historyof the United
StatesArmy(NewYork,1967),andMarcusCunliffe,SoldiersandCivilians:theMartial
Spiritin America,1775-1865(NewYork, 1968),extendedthisthemeto the antebellum
era,andSkeltonfrequently impliesagreement.AllanR. Millett,MilitaryProfessionalism
andOfficership inAmerica(Columbus, OH, 1977),on theotherhand,stressestheparallels
between civilian and militaryprofessionalization, and doubts "thateven long-term
professionalsocializationproduceda coherentphilosophicalpoint of view that was
uniquelymilitary"(15).

RESPONSESTO FILIBUST
ERING 517
to adopt the federalgovernmentas their most reliablepatronand to
subordinatethemselvesto its serviceby extendingandconsolidatingits
sovereigntyover the borderlands.37
Officers'unenthusiasticresponsesto the Patriotinsurgencyillustrate
the close connections between institutionalmaturity, occupational
monopoly, elite class formation, and professional identity and
accountabilityin the developmentof the commissionedofficer corps
duringthe periodbetweenthe Warof 1812 and the war with Mexico.
Occupation,class, andculturewerecloselylinkedin the evolutionof the
officercorps'attitudestowardforeignanddomesticaffairsandits actions
in the borderlands,andtheseconnectionstendedto encouragemilitary
accountability to the authorityof nationalpoliticalstructures.Officers'
professional role as the principaldefenders of American national
sovereignty fostered a strong personal and institutionalinterest in
increasing the federal government'spower and legitimacy,and their
searchforpersonalandorganizational securitybreda yearningfor order
andstabilitythatregularsexpressedin theconservativeidiomof legalism
andnationalsovereignty.Likeothersamongthe nation'saspiringelites,
officers soughtauthorityand prestigeby identifyingtheirvalues with
thoseof theOldWorldandits elites. In Americandomesticsocietythis
meant a growing emphasison refinementand gentility; in foreign
37 See Skelton,An AmericanProfessionof Arms, chaps. 8, 11, concerningthe

growinglengthof officers'service.Watson,"TheUncertainRoadto ManifestDestiny,"
relatesthistransitionto the growthof newcivilianopportunities for the southerngentry
in the cottonlandsthey seizedfromthe Indiansof the Old Southwest.See RichardL.
Bushman,TheRefinement of America,1750-1850:Persons,Houses,Cities(New York,
1992), for an analysisof whatmightbe called"thegentrification of the middleclass"
duringthe early republic. Bushmanpointsout the need to recognizethe survivalof
aristocraticvaluesin the earlyrepublic,andit is clearthatarmyofficersfit muchmore
comfortably intowhatGordonWoodlabelsthe "republican society"of theearlynational
periodthanthe "democratic" or liberalone of the Jacksonian era. Armyofficerswere
generallysocializedto espousevaluesthatharkedbackward to the idealof theeighteenth-
century gentleman,while lagging behindmiddle-classand professionalcivilians in
acceptingconceptsof "self-mademanhood."Thosewho stayedin the armyfoundits
orderedpace attractive,andtheirlettersoften suggestthatthey consideredthemselves
unsuitedto the demanding tempoof businesslife. See Skelton,"TheArmyOfficeras
Organization Man,"in Soldiersand Civilians:TheU.S. ArmyandtheAmericanPeople,
ed. GarryD. RyanandTimothyK. Nenninger(Washington, DC, 1987),61-70;andE.
AnthonyRotundo'scharacterization of the firstphasein the historicaldevelopmentof
American ideals of masculinity,"communalmanhood,"in AmericanManhood:
Transformations in Masculinity from the Revolutionary Era to the Present(New York,
1993),2-3: "aman'sidentitywasinseparable fromthedutieshe owedto his community.
He fulfilledhimselfthroughpublicusefulnessmorethan[through]his economicsuccess."

relationsAmericansoldiersanddiplomatssoughtrespectability in theeyes
of theirEuropeancounterparts by adhering to thecustoms and formalities
of internationallaw. The officer corps grew more patientand less
bellicoseas a resultof thesesocialandoccupational developments,and
a spirit of conservativelegalism graduallybecame the basis of its
approach to foreignpolicyissues. Commanders constantlyreaffirmed the
inviolability of national borders and the sovereignty of the national
government overtheapplication of organizedviolence,andtheiractivities
alongthenation'sfrontiersgavetheseabstractions a concreterealitythey
hadlackedearlierin the turbulentsouthernborderlands.38
This processof attitudinal andbehavioralchangeacceleratedas the
dangers of a decentralized foreignpolicy becamemorereal to officers
during the border crises of the 1830sand40s. Historianshavetendedto
suggest that the greatmajorityof the officercorpseagerlyembracedan
aggressivelyexpansionistpolicy in NorthAmerica,butthis was clearly
not the case regardingCanada. Indeed,even in the armygatheredto
occupy Texas this expansionistsentiment was substantiallyless
enthusiastic thanprevioushistorians havemaintained.The officercorps'
enthusiasm for expansionvariedfromcrisisto crisisandofficerto officer
dependingon the specificindividual andthe situationin question,andon
the whole the personalandoccupationalsecurityprovidedby the army
encouraged accountability ratherthanlaxityor evasion. Menwithcareers
as secureas those of armyofficersdid not need to rely on aggressive
expansionismto advancethemselves: they certainlyhad a stakein the
nation'sterritorial growth,buttheydid not needto takethepoliticaland
military risks of urgingor precipitating it. In fact, it was the officers
actuallyplaced in crisissituationswho exercised themostrestraintin their
words and actions, a delicacyderivedfrom the intersectionof their
occupational valueswiththepracticaldemandsof international diplomacy
andcivil-militaryrelationsin borderlands regionswherenationalpolicy
was contestedby multipleinterests.
Armyofficersno longerlivedwithintheJeffersonianworldcivilian
expansionistswere attemptingto preserveor restore. Service within
increasingly formalized bureaucraticinstitutionsled professionalsoldiers
to a broadlyWhiggishyet institutionally nonpartisanperspectivethat
valuedorder,restraint,andstabilityin all aspectsof personalandnational
life. Officerswonhonor,reputation, andgloryby dutifullyservingtheir
as
country peacekeepers, law enforcers, or the directors-but not
38 See
StephenPeter Rosen, "AlexanderHamiltonand the DomesticUses of
International
Law,"DiplomaticHistory,5 (Summer1981), 183-98,for parallels.

RESPONSES TO FILIBUS'TERING 519
initiators-of conquest. These factors assured military subordinationto
nationalcivilian authorityand helped to sustainpeace between Britainand
the United Stateswithoutdoing substantialinjuryto the "free institutions"
of Americanborderers. Contraryto the beliefs held by most historians,
regular officers' long-term material interests in securing stable
employment and social status through a federally sponsored monopoly
over the direction of military force increasinglydictatedcaution in their
support for expansion. Officers becoming ever more sensitive to the
fragility of social order and their place within it felt that the actions of
native filibusters endangered American national security as much as
threats from European powers, and on the whole the army was
substantiallyless enthusiasticabout territorialexpansion in 1838 than it
had been twenty years before. Indeed, the officer corps' success in
maintaining and extending national sovereignty over the borderlands
suggests thatnot all of the organizingprogramsput forwardby centrally-
mindedelites duringthe generationafterthe War of 1812 failed, a caveat
that shouldbe born in mind by all historiansconcernedwith exploringthe
tensions between decentralized society and federal nation in the early
republic.39
39 I am deeplyindebtedto Lacy K. Ford,Jr., for this

insight. See Wiebe, The
Openingof AmericanSociety, for an extendedmeditationon the balancebetween
centralizationanddecentralization
throughout theMiddlePeriod,andsee RichardR. John,
Spreadingthe News:TheAmericanPostalSystemfromFranklinto Morse(Cambridge,
MA, 1995),fora monographic treatment withimplicationssomewhatsimilarto my own.
See Skelton,AnAmericanProfessionof Arms,329 and330, for a recentexampleof the
beliefthatofficerswereardentexpansionists, andHietala,ManifestDesign,concerning the
civilianexpansionists
of the 1840s. My "ManifestDestinyandMilitaryProfessionalism:
A New Perspective on JuniorU.S. ArmyOfficers'AttitudesTowardWarWithMexico,
1844-1846,"TheSouthwestern HistoricalQuarterly,99 (Apr. 1996),467-98,delineates
the limits to expansionistsentimentamongthe officersstationedin Texas beforethe
outbreak of thewar. SeeBurtonJ. Bledstein,TheCultureof Professionalism: TheMiddle
Class and the Developmentof HigherEducationin America(New York, 1976), and
SamuelHaber,TheQuestfor Authority andHonorin theAmerican Professions,1750-1900
(Chicago,1991),on thedevelopment of thenineteenth-century
professions;JohnHigham,
FromBoundlessness to Consolidation:TheTransformation of AmericanCulture,1848-1860
(Ann Arbor, 1969), on fundamental changesin Americansocial attitudeswhich the
experienceof the officercorpsseemsto haveanticipated duringthe 1820sand30s, and
RichardC. Rohrs,"American Criticsof the FrenchRevolutionof 1848,"Journalof the
EarlyRepublic,14 (Fall 1994), 359-77, on the increasingconservatismof American
responsesto liberalrevolutionsin Europe.


Watson 1998 - Army Officers Fight The Patriot War

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Society for Historians of the Early American Republic

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SamuelWatsonis adjunctlecturerat the Universityof St. Thomas,currently

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2 Like most scholars and contemporaryobservers, I use the term "Patriot(s)"

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3 Huntington, TheSoldierandtheState:TheTheoryandPracticeof Civil-Military

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republic.Civiliansupremacy meanstwothingsin thisarticle:1) thatthemilitary

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Peacekeeping andlawenforcement dutieswerenotat all new to army

ReginaldC. Stuart,"SpecialInterestsand NationalAuthorityin ForeignPolicy: American-

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7 ReginaldC. Start, UnitedStatesExpansionismand British NorthAmerica, 1775-

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8 See Skelton,"Officers TheOriginsof ArmyPoliticsin the United

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residency requirementsmade it possible, but they continued to espouse a non- and

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9 Clarke'stoast quotedin "Tributeof Respect,"an article reprintedfrom the Bangor

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militarycommander,Scott was obviously not opposed to war per se, but

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try to withdrawin hopes of defusingtensions,blamed"cowardiceand

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The general then went on to contrastthe willful demeanorof the border

as a "gentleman." thewagestheywereofferedby the Patriotleaderswere

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opinion,andthe British. Armycommandersfirstdeployedtheirlimited

20 Worthto Scott,Dec. 12, 1838,Worthto

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Scott,Feb. 25, 1838,Worthto Eustis,Nov. 16, 1838,WorthPapers; Scott'scircular,

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25 Scott to Poinsett, Jan. 12, 1839, Worth to Poinsett [marked"private"],Dec. 25,

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performregardlessof [the]consequences,"he wroteto Rogers. Worth

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stop the filibusters,whileWorth,Scott, andWool frequentlycastigated

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9 Worthto Scott, Feb. 17, 1838, Worth to the

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30 Bradyto Scott,Feb. 15, 1838,in Prucha,ed., "Reports of GeneralBrady,"61;

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34Worthto Jones,Feb. 23, 1838,Worthto Pierce,Mar.21, 1839,Worthto Scott,

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restraining the Patriotsthathe soughtandreceiveda tacitunderstanding

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37 See Skelton,An AmericanProfessionof Arms, chaps. 8, 11, concerningthe

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39 I am deeplyindebtedto Lacy K. Ford,Jr., for this

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