PREDICATE COGNITION IN SEMANTICS

AGNES BR. SIMBOLON

2121150064

UNIVERSITAS KRISTEN INDONESIA

JAKARTA

JUNE 17, 2023

INTRODUCTION
Cognition is defined as ‘the mental action
or process of acquiring knowledge and
understanding through thought, experience,
and the senses.’ At Cambridge Cognition we
look at it as the mental processes relating to
the input and storage of information and
how that information is then used to guide
your behavior. It is the ability to perceive
and react, process and understand, store and
retrieve information, make decisions, and
produce appropriate responses. The modern
word ‘cognition’ has its roots back to Latin,
‘cognoscere’ which is to ‘get to know’. With
that in mind, cognitive functioning is
therefore critical for day-to-day life,
governing our thoughts and actions. We
need cognition to help us understand
information about the world around us and
interact safely with our environment, as the
sensory information we receive is vast and
complicated: cognition is needed to distill all
this information down to its essentials.
Cognition has a physical basis in the brain
with over 100 billion nerve cells in a healthy
human brain. Each of these can have up to
10,000 connections with other nerve cells
called neurons. All of this makes it an
incredibly complicated organ. To begin to
understand the brain we sometimes rely on
simplified scientific models, some of which
have been developed using studies in
rodents and non-human primates. These
studies help us better understand certain
parts of our cognition, such as how we learn
language and have also been the basis for
many breakthroughs in treatments for
common disorders of cognition such as
Alzheimer’s disease.
Cognition fundamentally controls our
thoughts and behaviors, which are regulated
by discrete brain circuits underpinned by
several neurotransmitter systems. Several
brain chemicals play major roles in
regulating cognitive processes; including
dopamine, noradrenaline (norepinephrine),
serotonin, acetylcholine, glutamate, and
GABA. To better understand what drives
certain behaviors, in both healthy and
diseased states, it is important to consider
cognition and the underlying neurobiology
that underpins these behaviors. Our distinct
cognitive functions arise because of
processes occurring within certain parts of
our brain, but only some of these, end up
entering our conscious awareness.
This chapter discusses meaning as it is
viewed in cognitive linguistics. The term
“cognitive linguistics” will be used here as a
cover term to refer to several related
theories, such as Cognitive Grammar,
(Radical) Construction Grammar,
Conceptual Metaphor Theory, etc. that each
has its specifics, but essentially adheres to
the same general cognitive functional,
usage-based perspective on language. One
of the basic tenets of these cognitive theories
is that language does not constitute a
separate innate faculty of mind (cf.
Langacker 1987: 13). Undeniably, human
beings have an innate (i.e. genetically
determined) predisposition that allows them
to learn language; however, the full
articulation of the linguistic system depends
on experiential factors (physiological as well
as cultural) and cognitive abilities that are
not unique to language. Nor is it necessarily
so that grammatical structure, at a very
abstract level, is innate and (thus) universal.
The innate, universal nature of grammar
(which is an empirical question rather than
the theoretical a priori which it often is taken
to be, cf. also Tomasello 1995 or Levinson
2003a) is not an issue that is relevant to the
current chapter, but grammar’s interaction
with experiential factors and cognitive
abilities is at the heart of what “cognitive
semantics” is.
The term “cognitive semantics” is
somewhat misleading, as it may suggest that
semantics is a separate module within the
linguistic model, next to “cognitive syntax”,
“cognitive morphology”, “cognitive
pragmatics”, etc. However, cognitive
linguistics does not adopt a modular view of
language: all structures in language, ranging
from morphemes to words to syntactic
patterns, are considered inherently
meaningful and as being of the same kind,
i.e. symbolic form-meaning pairings, called
“symbolic units” (Langacker’s Cognitive
Grammar) or “constructions” (Construction
Grammar). More specifically, grammar is
defined as a structured inventory of such
form-meaning pairs. For lexical items and
morphemes, assuming such a form-meaning
pair is quite uncontroversial, as it goes back
to de Saussure’s basic insight on the
arbitrariness of the link between the
significant (signifier) and the signifié
(signified). However, de Saussure and later
(mainstream) linguistic theories (of which
generative linguistics is the most salient
representative) held the view that idiomatic
constructions notwithstanding, the meaning
of compositional structures, such as in
polymorphemic words or syntactic
structures, is not arbitrary since it is
derivable from the meanings of the parts. In
other words, speakers know how to figure
out the meaning of compositional words
such as woodstove or windmill based on (i)
the meaning of the parts (wood and stove,
wind and mill) and (ii) the meaning(s) of the
N-N compounds in English.
The cognitive definition of grammar as an
inventory of form-meaning pairs goes
against such a view, saying not only those
grammatical patterns are inherently
meaningful, but also that the existence of a
more general pattern (a “rule”) does not
exclude storage of instances of these
patterns with their (possibly particular)
meaning. Langacker has called this the
rule/list fallacy: it is not necessarily so that
because something is regular or computable,
it is not, or cannot be, stored. Quite the
contrary; it turns out that full
compositionality is rare and that speakers
store much more than is often assumed,
including such compositional structures,
some of which may be partially filled with
specific lexical items (e.g. Jackendoff’s
(2008) constructional idioms, such as an N
of a man or N by N), whereas others are
fully schematic (e.g. the ditransitive
construction, such as Maarten gave Nick a
book). While in other models, the latter
would be considered as the products of a
grammatical rule devoid of meaning, in
cognitive linguistics they, too, would be
considered as inherently meaningful. In
short, any linguistic unit, be it a morpheme,
a lexical item, or a larger (grammatical)
pattern, is a symbolic unit linking a
particular form to a particular meaning
(which Langacker calls the semantic pole).
There will be differences between the
semantic structure of lexical items, which
will be more content-specific, and that of
more syntactic patterns (such as the
ditransitive construction, the caused-motion
construction, or the setting construction: see
Chapter 24) which will have a more
schematic meaning. In cognitive linguistics,
meaning is defined as conceptualization:
“Semantic structure is conceptualization
tailored to the specifics of linguistic
convention. Semantic analysis, therefore,
requires the explicit characterization of
conceptual structure” (Langacker 1987: 99).
At first sight, the cognitive view may not
seem to be fundamentally different from
other theories which consider meanings to
be concepts or conceptual representations.
In cognitive grammar, grammatical
oppositions like that between nouns and
verbs also receive a semantic definition
involving profile and base; for example, the
verb kill and the noun killing are both
characterized concerning the same base, but
each imposes a different profile: the noun
profiles a thing (a region in one domain)
whereas, being a relational predicate, the
verb profiles a temporal sequence of
interconnections between entities.
grammatical difference relates to
cognitive capacity for conceptual reification,
i.e. our ability to conceive of an array of
temporal states as a single unified (abstract)
entity. As Lakoff and Johnson (1980) have
shown, such conceptual reification underlies
much of our metaphorical thinking, as we
treat non-discrete abstract entities as if they
are discrete and tangible. For example,
conceptualizing events, which in the real
world may not always have a clear
beginning and end, as entities with clear
boundaries allow us to qualify them, taking
or thinking about different aspects just as we
would examine different aspects of a
concrete object.
METAPHOR AND METONYMY
In cognitive (lexical) semantics, metaphor
and metonymy play a major role in
structuring
principles in the semantic category.
Importantly, these are not seen as purely
linguistic relations, but as conceptual
principles. Lakoff and Johnson’s (1980)
book Metaphors We Live By, which laid the
basis for Metaphor Theory (and later
Blending Theory, cf. Fauconnier (1994),
The Coulson and Oakley (2001)), is probably the
our publication that popularised the idea of the
cognitive nature of (particularly) metaphor
which is said to structure the way we talk,
think and act, an idea that had, however, an
important precedent in an article from 1954
by the philosopher Max Black.
In cognitive linguistics, the difference
between metaphor and metonymy is
typically defined in two ways.
First, the underlying mechanisms are
different: metaphor builds on (perceived)
similarity where one entity is said to be
understood in terms of another (e.g.
ARGUMENT IS WAR, LOVE IS A
JOURNEY, CHANGE IS MOTION,
ANGER IS HEAT IN A CONTAINER,
etc.). Metonymy, in contrast, is defined in
terms of reference, where one entity is used
to refer to another, usually because it is
(conceptually) contiguous to it. Physical
contiguity motivates the metonymy
underlying the use of a door in walking
through the door (the aperture in the wall)
versus painting the door (the board covering
that aperture), or between the container and
contained (e.g. drinking a glass of beer).
Conceptual contiguity could be argued to be
the motivation for the metonymy
POSSESSOR-POSSESSED as the two need
not be physically contiguous.
The second difference between metaphor
and metonymy that is often invoked (which
follows logically from the preceding) is that
metaphor concerns a mapping across
different domains (or, more accurately,
frames), whereas metonymy implies a shift
within the same domain. For example, the
meanings of kill in the uses kill a human
being and kill life on the planet can be seen
as metonymically related, involving a shift
of an instance (a living being) to the larger
process (life) yet the relationship is not
metaphorical since they are both still
characterized vis-à-vis the domain of killing
proper. Usage such as kill the peace process
is, however, metaphorical, as it is no longer
the domain of taking away a life that is at
issue. Notice that the same metonymical
shift of profile as in the source domain is
possible here as well, e.g. Under economic
pressure, Ford decided to kill the production
of the car (process) vs. Under economic
pressure, Ford decided to kill the car
(product).
A metonymy can thus be defined as a shift
of profile within the domain: “the ability of
the speaker to select a different contextually
salient concept profile in a domain or
domain matrix than the one usually
symbolized by the word” (Croft and Cruse
2004: 48). Such shifts are often motivated
because one is focusing on a particular
aspect in a given context; for example, if I
say I see there are some new faces in class
today, I am using faces metonymically as it
is part of a person that allows me to
recognize them (or not, in this case).
Similarly, a helping hand focuses on the part
of the body that we stereotypically use when
helping others. In an earlier study on the
verb abort (Lemmens 1998: 211ff), I pointed
out that ideological reasons may also
motivate metonymical shifts: pro-lifers will
typically focus on the end-point and thus say
abort a baby/child whereas pro-choicers
often downplay this aspect and use fetus or
zygote. While the difference between
metaphor and metonymy will mostly be
clear enough, the latter example shows that
this may not be so. Even if pregnancy and
fetus/baby can be argued to be
metonymically related, aborting a pregnancy
could equally be regarded as a metaphor
since it is an instantiation of aborting a
process (a metaphorical usage), just like
aborting a mission or aborting a takeoff. The
criterion of domain boundary crossing that is
often used in cognitive linguistics may not
be so helpful either, given the difficulty of
defining what a domain is (see, for instance,
Clausner and Croft (1999) on this issue); it
seems that the decision of boundary crossing
is often post hoc, i.e. after one has already
decided that usage is metaphorical. But even
then, such a decision may not always be
easy to make.
CONSTRUCTIONAL
SEMANTICS
The discussion has focused on lexical
meaning; it will be recalled that in cognitive
linguistics also grammatical structures are
considered as inherently meaningful. Given
the more general nature of these
constructions, their semantic structure will
be considered to be more general or, in the
more technical terms introduced above, to
be more schematic. The cognitive principle
driving the schematization is the same, viz.
that of analogy. Let us illustrate that with
one of Jackendoff’s pet examples of
constructional idioms, the [V one’s X PRT]
construction, as instantiated by expressions
such as work one’s head off, sing one’s
heart out, or cry one’s eyes. Jackendoff
correctly points out that these expressions
are idiomatic, as the NP and particle are
typically selected from a quite constrained
class (see, however, Capelle (2005: 46ff;
453ff) for an interesting discussion). In
Construction Grammar, this phenomenon is
called coercion; cf. Michaelis (2004, 2006),
Goldberg (2006). Also, the semantics of
these expressions is to some extent idiomatic
(i.e. more than just the sum of the meaning
of the parts), as they invariably mean that
the action expressed by the verb (working,
laughing, crying, etc.) is done to a high
degree or even to some excess. In other
words, the construction incorporates a
particular evaluative (affective) judgment
that can be paraphrased as “do X intensively
or excessively”. In addition, the object NP is
not licensed by the verb as one cannot say
*he sang his heart or *he worked his head;
in other words, it is the entire construction
with the particle that allows for the
integration of an object NP, thereby
overruling the verb’s typical intransitive
nature Just like lexical categories, these
expressions can be seen as building a
schematic network where analogy and
schematization are the structuring principles.
Two of the obvious schematizations concern
the possessive pronoun and the body part
where usages such as He worked his ass off
and They worked their heads off are both
regarded as instantiations of the more
schematic structure <NPi> work <POSSi
> <BODY PART> off.
The above discussion has focused on a
particular constructional idiom, or rather a
family of related idioms, that can be
captured under the general schema V one’s
X PRT; one might argue that this could still
be regarded as a supra-lexical unit rather
than a grammatical structure (see Chapter
24). While indeed the V one’s X PRT
construction remains somewhat more
specific in some respects, it should be clear
that a similar analysis can be suggested for
more general grammatical patterns, such as
the Ditransitive construction, e.g. John gave
Mary a book, the Caused Motion
construction (e.g. She put the book on the
table) or the Intransitive motion construction
(e.g. He went into the room). These are also
considered symbolic form-meaning pairs
where a particular form is paired with a
particular (highly schematic) meaning. For
example, given the close association
between singing and (possibly effortful)
breathing, singing one’s lungs out is quite
interpretable as doing intensive singing;
similarly, given the conventional link
between singing and the expression of
emotions, singing one’s heart out is fairly
transparent given the metonymy of heart as
a seat for the emotions. However, to say sing
one’s arms out/off is quite difficult (if not
impossible) to interpret, given the absence
of any transparent link between arms and
singing. Surely, repeated use might lead to
semantic bleaching which is what has
happened to V one’s {head/ ass off} where
the choice of verb no longer seems to be
constrained by the body part. This takes us
back to salience within the category: some
instantiations turn out to be more salient
(more prototypical instances) than others.
Notice that here also the meaning of the
construction may change the meaning of the
verb that occurs in it (a case of coercion).
For example, the verb break is a lexical
causative referring to a change of state
where motion is backgrounded (if
considered part of the verb’s meaning at all),
yet it saliently refers to a motion event in
She broke the eggs into the bowl (caused
motion) or in the sun broke through the
clouds (see Lemmens (2006b) for some This point fits with modularity-based
discussion of these uses of break and other accounts of perception and was fittingly
lexical causatives). The meaning of the made by Fodor in his discussion of input
construction also guides the interpretation of modules as “subsidiary systems” that must
novel verbs; if one were to say of the author “provide the central machine with
of the present chapter that He immersed into information about the world; information
the room, it will be clear, thanks to the expressed by mental symbols in whatever
meaning of the Intransitive Motion format cognitive processes demand of the
construction, that the verb refers to a representations that they apply to” (Fodor,
particular manner of motion even if it may 1983, p. 40). Similarly, Mandelbaum argues
not be clear what that manner is (nor would that the outputs of modular perceptual
we care to specify that here). systems ought to be conceptualized to
In its ambition to prove that such “actually guide action by entering into other
grammatical schemas are also meaningful, cognitive processes” (2018, p. 271). It is an
the cognitive linguistic literature (especially underemphasized explanatory virtue of
in Construction Grammar) may have modularity that it allows for a system to be
overemphasized the quest for, or the distinctly perceptual (in virtue of its
existence of, highly schematic constructions modularity) while outputting representations
that unify all the members of the category. that are immediately consumable by
However, as with lexical semantic cognition (in virtue of their format).
categories, it need not be the case that such Modularity-based versions of conceptualism
high-level schemas exist; in fact, some thereby avoid full-fledged versions of the
recent studies (see, among others, Perek “interface problem” in interactions between
(2015), Lemmens and Perek (2009)) show perception, cognition, and action (Burnston,
that it may be more accurate to pitch the 2017b; Butterfill & Sinagaglia, 2014;
constructional generalizations at a lower Mylopoulos & Pacherie, 2017; Shepherd,
level. 2018; 2019).
However, perception is older than cognition.
One might object that our perceptual
systems evolved from creatures who lacked
cognition, therefore there was no
CONCEPTUALISM
evolutionary pressure for concepts to figure
in perception. In what follows, I’ll sketch a
version of conceptualism that posits
concepts in perception independently of
stimulus-independent cognitive abilities. I’ll
argue not only those adult humans have
conceptually structured perceptual
representations, but also that these
conceptual outputs of perception constitute a
natural representational kind found in
children and animals alike. Perceptual object
representations function to segment out
particulars, track them, and predicate
features of them, including conceptual
categories. These object representations
constitute an evolutionarily ancient and
developmentally early source of predicate-
argument propositional structure that is
useful for (1) tracking individuals, (2)
subsuming them under categories, and (3)
distinguishing reference-guiding elements
from pure attributions. These structures can
function as evidential inputs to inferential
processes in creatures that have the requisite
inferential abilities.
It is fully compatible with this modularity-
based conceptualism that some perceptual
processes output representations in
nonconceptual (e.g., iconic) formats. Instead
of insisting on conceptual structure as a
transcendental epistemological requirement,
modularity-based conceptualists can be
pluralists about perceptual representation
(Quilty-Dunn, 2019b). As long as some
significant component of perception is
conceptual and feeds immediately into
cognition, there is room for other perceptual
representations to have other formats with
other functional advantages. For example,
perhaps iconic representations allow for
richer, messier content to be encoded in
perception, while sparse conceptual
representations provide neatly packaged
categorizations to central cognition. I will
first argue against stimulus independence as
a constitutive condition on conceptuality
(Prinz, 2002, p. 197; Beck, 2018; Burge,
2010b; Camp, 2009) in favor of a Cartesian
view that concepts are simply
representations of a certain sort that, in
principle, require no particular mental
abilities for their instantiation in human and
animal minds (Fodor, 2004). I’ll then use
empirical evidence to argue that perceptual
object representations are conceptualized
propositional structures that develop (and
likely evolved) before creatures’ abilities to
use them in inference. The resulting picture
preserves much of the letter—if not exactly
the spirit—of traditional conceptualism.
I will discuss two forms of stimulus-
independent use: re-combinability and
logical inference. However, I propose to
grant in general that there is some notion of
stimulus (in)dependence that’s coherent
enough to figure in a candidate condition on
concept possession. What matters for
present purposes is the following claim:
concepts are the sorts of mental phenomena
that can only occur in creatures that can
deploy them independently of what their
transducers are doing at the moment. It is
not entirely clear how we ought to
understand stimulus dependence. Lots of
mental activity might happen to be prompted
by a pattern of stimulation and happen to
end when stimulation ends, but this wide net
might capture a messy variety of mentation
rather than a natural kind. One could
reasonably demand well-defined, testable
characterizations of stimulation and
dependence thereupon, and difficulties will
surely arise in trying to provide them (see
Beck (2018) for careful discussion of the
details).
I’ll also put aside a particularly strong form
of the claim at issue. Beck (2018) argues
that perception and cognition are
distinguished using stimulus independence:
a state/process is
perceptual if it is stimulus-dependent and
cognitive if stimulus-independent.
This formulation runs into a
counterexample: perception-based
demonstrative thought, which is stimulus-
dependent but cognitive (Beck, 2018, pp.
328–329). Beck’s way of responding to this
A counterexample is to add the condition
that every element of a representation must
be stimulus-dependent for the representation
(and the process that produces it) to be
perceptual (2018, p. 330). Since
demonstrative thoughts have concepts as
elements—e.g., the concept red is the
predicative element in the thought that is red
—and concepts are redeployed able
elsewhere, demonstrative thoughts fail this
additional criterion. However, this additional
criterion simply rules out the possibility of
deploying concepts in perceptual systems by
fiat. It seems like a largely empirical
question of whether humans can deploy
concepts perceptually (Jacobson & Putnam,
2016; Mandelbaum, 2018). Our theories
shouldn’t build on the impossibility of this
scenario to avoid counterexamples.
One available move for Beck’s view would
be to distinguish states and processes:
concepts are stimulus-independent states,
but they can be deployed via stimulus-
dependent perceptual processes. On this
relaxed condition, however, perception-
based demonstrative thoughts again
represent a counterexample. Thus, Beck’s thinkable thoughts (e.g., Chomsky,1986).
version of the stimulus-dependence criterion The requirement of recomb inability has
faces a dilemma: avoid demonstrative roots in Evans’ Generality Constraint: “If a
thought as a counterexample but render subject can be credited with the thought that
perceptual deployment of concepts a is F, then he must have the conceptual
impossible by Viator allow for the resources for entertaining the thought that an
perceptual deployment of concepts but isG, for every property of being Gof which
succumb to the counterexample. My main he has a conception” (1982, p. 104). The
target is not the thesis that perception should Generality Constraint is regularly taken as a
be analyzed in terms of stimulus constitutive condition on concept
dependence, but instead, the hypothesis that possession.
having concepts constitutively requires the
ability to use them in a stimulus-independent
way—call that hypothesis stimulus- OBJECTS, PREDICATION, AND
independence. THE SYNTAX OF PERCEPTION
It’s compatible with stimulus independence
that perception is constituted by something
In the context of language and cognitive
completely unrelated, such as proprietary
processes, "objects," "prediction," and "the
representational formats or modularity. It’s
syntax of perception" are all relevant
even compatible with this hypothesis (so
concepts. Let's break them down:
stated) that concepts could be deployed via
stimulus-dependent processes. As long as a Objects: In language and perception, objects
creature with the concept of red can deploy refer to entities or things that can be
that concept independently of stimulation, perceived or conceptualized. They can be
the creature might have some stimulus- concrete physical entities, such as a book or
dependent means of deploying it as well. a chair, or abstract entities, such as love or
The striking creativity and freedom of justice. Objects are typically referred to
human thought suggest that concepts are the using nouns or noun phrases in a sentence.
sorts of mental states that can be freely Prediction: Prediction is a fundamental
recombined into novel structures, forming aspect of language that involves making
the finite basis of indefinitely many statements or attributing properties to
objects. It is the process of using a predicate perception, and "the sound of birds singing"
(verb or verb phrase) to describe or provide is the object of perception.
information about an object. Predicates can
In summary, objects are the entities or things
express actions, states, or qualities of objects
being referred to, predication is the process
and are used to form complete sentences.
of describing or attributing properties to
For example: objects using predicates, and the syntax of
perception involves the grammatical
"The cat is sleeping." Here, "is sleeping" is
structures used to express sensory
the predicate that describes the action/state
experiences or perceptions in language.
of the object "the cat."
It’s important to distinguish prediction as an
"She is intelligent." In this sentence, "is
aspect of content (a structural feature of a
intelligent" is the predicate attributing the
proposition) and as an aspect of the format.
quality of intelligence to the object "she."
One might argue that a picture expresses
The Syntax of Perception: The syntax of predication in that its content predicates a
perception refers to the grammatical and property of some individual, but the
syntactic structures used to express predicate-argument structure is not explicit
perception or sensory experiences in in the structure of the vehicle (i.e., its
language. It involves describing what one format). Minimally, the predicate-argument
sees, hears, smells, tastes, or feels. structure requires that “some sort of
Perception-related sentences typically functional relation among syntactic
involve verbs or verb phrases that indicate constituent’s maps onto some sort of logical
the sensory experience, and objects that or metaphysical relation among the semantic
represent the things being perceived. values of those constituents” (Camp, 2007,

For example: p. 157). In a sentence like ‘This is a fish’,

“the syntactic relation of function
"I see a beautiful sunset." Here, "see" is the
application mirrors a metaphysical relation
perception verb, and "a beautiful sunset" is
of instantiation” (ibid.); the constituent
the object being perceived.
‘This’ corresponds to the individual, ‘fish’
"He heard the sound of birds singing." In corresponds to the property fish, and the
this sentence, "heard" represents the syntactic relation between them functions to
express the instantiation of fish by the predicted if the hammer were a constituent
individual. This sort of structure is a of the POR.
canonical example of predicate-argument
structure (where ‘fish’ functions as predicate
and ‘This’ as argument). Furthermore, at CONCLUSION
least some of the constituents of PORs This paper has provided a sketch of one
behave like ordinary predicative concepts form conceptualism might take that is
that denote categories like a hammer. grounded in perceptual, developmental, and
Explaining results such as Gordon and comparative psychology. In this sketch, our
Irwin’s (1996; 2000) and Jordan et al. most primitive capacities to track and
(2010)) (discussed above) requires positing enumerate objects employ conceptualized
discursive representations of categories like propositional structures. These structures
a hammer in PORs that (i) represent kinds later come to constitute a form of perceptual
independently of low-level features, (ii) evidence based on which we draw
transcend individual sensory modalities, and inferences about the perceptible world.
(iii) are mapped to lexical items. These Conceptuality is not constitutively
features are characteristic of concepts like a dependent on stimulus-independent
hammer. A salient alternative explanation is cognitive abilities but rather provides a
that the initial pre-viewed feature (e.g., representational basis out of which those
‘hammer’) simply triggers associations with abilities grow.
other features such as related word forms,
If one were pushed to summarize cognitive
images, and sounds. In that case, wordforms
semantics in several keywords, some proper
like ‘hammer’ should activate associated
candidates would be conceptualization
wordforms like ‘nail’. But while those
(which entails encyclopedic), construal (the
associations are triggered, they do not yield
cognitive capacity to conceptualize
any object-specific benefit (Gordon & Irwin,
experience in alternate ways), image
1996). Instead, the object-specific benefit is
schemas (schematic patterns of bodily
limited to information that falls under the
experience), and prototype-structured
concept of the hammer (e.g., the sound and
categorization. These principles are not
appearance of hammers), just as would be
restricted to lexical items, but underlie
linguistic structures at all levels, ranging
from morphemes, lexical items, and semi- Language learning relies on both innate
open idioms to semantically highly predispositions and experiential and
schematic grammatical patterns. cognitive abilities. Cognitive semantics
considers all linguistic structures as
The conclusion provided discusses various
inherently meaningful. Grammar is defined
aspects of cognitive semantics, including the
as a structured inventory of form-meaning
role of cognition in language and the
pairs, including morphemes, lexical items,
relationship between meaning and grammar.
and syntactic patterns. The cognitive view
Here is a summary of the main points
challenges the notion that compositional
covered in the text: Cognition is the mental
structures have purely derived meanings. It
process of acquiring knowledge and
suggests that speakers also store instances of
understanding through thought, experience,
compositional structures with their specific
and the senses. It is essential for perceiving,
meanings. Metaphors and metonymy are
processing, and understanding information,
fundamental cognitive processes that
making decisions, and producing
structure semantic categories. Metaphor
appropriate responses.
involves understanding one entity in terms
The brain is the physical basis of cognition, of another based on perceived similarity,
with billions of nerve cells and complex while metonymy involves using one entity
connections between them. Studies in to refer to another based on conceptual
rodents and non-human primates have contiguity. Metaphor involves mapping
contributed to our understanding of across different domains or frames, while
cognition and its disorders. Cognition is metonymy implies a shift within the same
controlled by discrete brain circuits domain. Metonymy can be motivated by
regulated by neurotransmitter systems. physical or conceptual contiguity, and it
Several brain chemicals, such as dopamine, allows speakers to focus on specific aspects
noradrenaline, serotonin, acetylcholine, in a given context. Cognitive linguistics
glutamate, and GABA, play important roles considers grammatical structures as
in cognitive processes. inherently meaningful. Constructional

Meaning in cognitive linguistics is viewed idioms, such as "work one's head off" or

as a product of cognitive processes rather "sing one's heart out," are viewed as

than a separate innate faculty of the mind. idiomatic expressions with both lexical and
grammatical constraints. Schematization and
analogy are driving principles in the
formation of more general grammatical
patterns. These patterns incorporate
evaluative or affective judgments and allow
for the integration of specific lexical items.
Overall, the text introduces cognitive
semantics, highlighting the role of cognition
in language and the interconnectedness of
meaning and grammar.
REFERENCE

Lemmens, Maarten 1998. Lexical Perspectives on Transitivity and Ergativity. Causative

Constructions in English. [Current Issues in Linguistic Theory 166]. Amsterdam and
Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
Lemmens, Maarten 2002. The semantic network of Dutch zitten, staan, and liggen, In John
Newman (ed.) The Linguistics of Sitting, Standing, and Lying. Amsterdam and Philadelphia:
John Benjamins, 103–139.
Lemmens, Maarten 2006a. Caused posture: experiential patterns emerging from corpus
research. In A. Stefanowitsch and S. Gries (eds) Corpora in Cognitive Linguistics. Corpus-Based
Approaches to Syntax and Lexis. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 261–296.
Michaelis, Laura A. 2006. Construction grammar. In K. Brown (ed.) The Encyclopedia of
Language and Linguistics, Second edition, Volume 3. Oxford: Elsevier, 73–84.
Newman, John (ed.) 2002. The Linguistics of Sitting, Standing, and Lying. Amsterdam and
Philadelphia: John Benjamins
Bays, P. M., Wu, E. Y., & Husain, M. (2011). Storage and binding of object features in visual
working memory.
Neuropsychologia, 49(6), 1622–1631. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2010.12.023
Beck, J. (2012). The generality constraint and the structure of thought. Mind, 121(483), 563–
600. https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzs077
Beck, J. (2018). Marking the perception-cognition boundary: The criterion of stimulus
dependence. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 96(2), 319–334.
https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2017.1329329
Beck, J. (2019). Perception is analog: The argument from Weber’s Law. Journal of Philosophy,
116(6), 319–349. https://doi.org/10.5840/jphil2019116621
Fodor, J. A. (2007). The revenge of the given. In B. McLaughlin & J. Cohen (Eds.),
Contemporary debates in philosophy of mind (pp. 105–116). Oxford: Blackwell. Fodor, J. A., &
Pylyshyn, Z. (1988). Connectionism and cognitive architecture: A critical analysis. Cognition,
28, 3–71. https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/2103.003.0002