INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES REPRESENTED BY ITS NATIONAL PRESIDENT, JOSE ANSELMO I.

CADIZ, H. HARRY L. ROQUE, AND JOEL RUIZ BUTUYAN, PETITIONERS, VS. HONORABLE MANILA
MAYOR JOSE "LITO" ATIENZA, RESPONDENT. 
G.R. No. 175241. February 24, 2010
 Facts: On June 15, 2006, Petitioner Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) filed with the Office of the City Mayor
of Manila a letter application for a permit to rally at the foot of the Mendiola Bridge on June 22, 2006 from 2:30
p.m. to 5:30 p.m. to be participated by IBP officers and members, law students and multi-sectoral organizations.
 Respondent issued a permit dated June 16, 2006, allowing IBP to rally on given date but indicated the venue as
Plaza Miranda instead of Mendiola Bridge. IBP received the permit only on June 19, 2006.
 Aggrieved, petitioners filed on June 21, 2006 with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari against the Manila
City Mayor. When the petition was unresolved within 24 hours, they filed a petition for certiorari before the
Supreme Court on June 22, 2006, assailing the CA’s inaction with the period provided under the Public Assembly
Act of 1985.
 Meanwhile, the rally pushed through on June 22, 2006 at Mendiola Bridge. On June 26, 2006, the Manila Police
District (MPD) instituted a criminal action against IBP President Jose Anselmo Cadiz for violating the Public
Assembly Act in staging a rally at a venue not indicated in the permit.
 In the meantime, the CA finally ruled on the petition, dismissing it for being moot and lacking merit. The motion
for reconsideration filed by petitioners was also denied. For its part, the Supreme Court also denied the petition
before it for being moot and academic and resolved not to hear the petition on its merits in view of the pendency
of the CA case. The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.
ISSUES:1. Whether or not the CA erred in holding that the modification of the venue in IBP’s rally permit does not
constitute grave abuse of discretion
2. Whether or not the partial grant of application runs contrary to the public assemble act and violated their constitutional
right to freedom of expression and public assembly

RULING:
THE OUTRIGHT MODIFICATION OF THE PERMIT TO RALLY BY THE LGU IS GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AND CONTRARY TO THE PUBLIC ASSEMBLY ACT AND VIOLATES THE RIGHT TO
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND PUBLIC ASSEMBLY.
In the present case, the question of legality of a modification of a permit to rally will arise each time the terms of an
intended rally are altered by the concerned official, yet it evades review, owing to the limited time in processing the
application where the shortest allowable period is five days prior to the assembly. The susceptibility of recurrence
compels the Court to definitely resolve the issue at hand.
Freedom of Assembly is not to be limited, much less denied, except on  showing of a clear and present danger of a
substantive evil that the state has a right to prevent.
In Bayan, Karapatan, Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP) v. Ermita, the Court reiterated:
x x x Freedom of assembly connotes the right of the people to meet peaceably for consultation and discussion of matters
of public concern. It is entitled to be accorded the utmost deference and respect. It is not to be limited, much less denied,
except on a showing, as is the case with freedom of expression, of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the
state has a right to prevent. Even prior to the 1935 Constitution, Justice Malcolm had occasion to stress that it is a
necessary consequence of our republic institutions and complements the right of free speech.
Modifying the permit without giving IBP the opportunity to be heard first is grave abuse of discretion.
In modifying the permit outright, respondent gravely abused his discretion when he did not immediately inform the IBP
who should have been heard first on the matter of his perceived imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil that may
warrant the changing of the venue. The opportunity to be heard precedes the action on the permit, since the applicant may
directly go to court after an unfavorable action on the permit.