Thomas Surridge

Quantum Repeater
Implementation to Increase
the Distance over which
Quantum Key Distribution is
Possible

thomas10surridge9@gmail.com
ABSTRACT
The need for quantum secure data transmission is paramount as we see quantum hardware's
advancement. Threats posed by ‘Cryptanalytically-relevant Quantum Computers’ will
devastate global cybersecurity once quantum maturity is reached, entering us into a
‘Cryptopocalypse’ period (Townsend, 2023). Dozens of businesses responsible for consumer
data will be at threat as information becomes incredibly vulnerable, so immediate action is vital.
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) will reinforce networks by preventing Quantum
Eavesdropping (Das et al., 2022), but comes with limitations that hold the industry from swift
progression. The proposal will address the core of these: the distance over which QKD is
possible across optical fibers (Wang, 2019). This will lead on from current developments in
quantum-secure networks and introduce how quantum repeaters can advance said networks.
Quantum security is crucial as the world’s data is at stake (Buchanan & Woodward, 2017).

Keywords: Quantum Key Distribution (QKD); Cybersecurity; Optical Fiber; Quantum

Security; Photon; Quantum Repeater; Optical Repeater; Telecommunications; Infrastructure

INTRODUCTION
Existing fiber optic channels use optical repeaters to extend the range over which
communication networks can transmit data (by amplifying signal strength) – these have proven
to revolutionise fiber optic technology (Hui, 2019). The issue is that optical repeaters cannot
manipulate the delicate quantum states of photons without disrupting their superposition
(causing loss/misrepresentation of the data in transit). Through Entanglement Swapping
(transfer of entanglement between two photons with initial independence) and Quantum
Memories (storage of the quantum state without disruption) the quantum-entangled state of a
photon is manipulatable by quantum repeaters (Jin R-B et al., 2015). This ‘quantum state’ is
the foundation of QKD’s high security: quantum physics as the encryption method. Quantum
security comes with urgency as mathematical-based cryptography will soon be exposable by
algorithms such as Shor’s Algorithm - ‘50% chance of this being by 2031’ (IBM, 2023). QKD
implementation is an active field of research in the telecommunications industry (by companies
such as BT and Toshiba) but is hindered by distance (Gillis, 2022) due to photon loss in optical
fiber (caused by absorption and scattering). The proposed research will aim to answer: ‘What
network architecture will be best fit for quantum repeater implementations to facilitate QKD
over large distances?’. It looks to achieve global quantum security and allow world-leading
telecommunication heavyweights to satisfy incoming quantum-based regulations.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Quantum key distribution requires a physical counterpart to be utilised: fiber optic
infrastructure serves foundational for this (Aguado et al., 2019). Telecommunication companies
actively work with said infrastructure, setting the industry as advocates of this movement with
‘BT and Toshiba recently introducing the UK’s first quantum-secure network’. This network
‘removes the need for manual transportation of data over the 6km distance between two data
sites in North Bristol’ (BT, 2020). Research into quantum repeater deployment would
supplement past (and ongoing) developments to bridge the gap towards forming larger
quantum-secure networks. Needs to ‘manually’ transport sensitive data over extensive distances
will be eliminated in tandem with this. ‘Ethical-legal’ concerns around data protection within
the International Telecommunications Union (Lian, 2020) will also alleviate.
Only 16% of a convenience sample taken (of 37 people in pre-university education) knew of
the threats their data is susceptible to by quantum computers (after conducting a survey). The
lack of general knowledge around data vulnerabilities will exacerbate the ‘Cryptopocalypse’.
Industry will find it difficult to educate users on this more intricate matter – 46% of those in the
UK Cyber Survey ‘found most information on how to be secure online confusing’ (Ipsos MORI,
2019). With the UK as the 3rd largest spender on quantum technology, providers will need to
be in line with the ethics of the National Quantum Strategy (Morrison, 2023). Quantum repeater
breakthrough will be essential: industry giants will satisfy rigorous regulations.

METHODOLOGY
Following on from ‘Research Progress Of Quantum Repeaters’ (Meng & Ruihong, 2019) a
specific network architecture will be proposed with intentions to see the use of quantum
repeaters as part of infrastructure standardise. Name this a ‘Quantum Grid Network’. Technical
complexity of quantum repeaters is likely to see costs be extortionate. To lighten the financial
demand of making large-scale quantum-secure networks, ‘Quantum Grid Networks’ would
provide a centralised route (along which the expensive quantum repeaters are concentrated) for
long-distance data transmission with many ‘branches’ spanning out. ‘Branches’ would be cost-
effective in being up to 100km of length: the maximum secure distance over which QKD is
possible (without repeaters). This method would serve best domestically. Once domestic
quantum security is achieved, progress is to be made towards overseas implementations to
ensure the plethora of cybersecurity regulations faced are satisfied. Research into this proposed
network architecture will require the analysis of data transport to create mapping for optimal
‘Quantum Grid Networks’. With demonstrated progress so far, this research would prosper.
ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY
Aguado, A. López, V. López, D. Peev, M. Poppe, A. Pastor, A. Folgueira, J. Martín, V.
(2019, June 24). The Engineering of Software-Defined Quantum Key Distribution
Networks.
<https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1907/1907.00174.pdf>
Magazine article written by group including A. Aguado, V. López, D. López, M. Peev,
A. Poppe, A. Pastor, J. Folgueira, and V. Martín. Delves into the necessity of a
'physical substrate' for QKD implementation and how restrictions have led to a lack of
integration into existing infrastructure so far. An award-winning magazine published
on a monthly occurrence.
Bäuml, S. Das, S. Winczewski, M. Horodecki, K. (2022, October 21). Universal
Limitations on Quantum Key Distribution over a Network.
<https://journals.aps.org/prx/pdf/10.1103/PhysRevX.11.041016>
Review published by a collective consisting of S. Das, S. Bäuml, M. Winczewski, and
K. Horodecki. Discussed the limitations of QKD and how these are caused including
the exponential decay of signal strength due to attenuation: the foundational limitation
of this proposal. Published by the American Physical Society: a reputable non-profit
organisation with intentions to spread knowledge of physics.
BT. (2020, October 1). BT and Toshiba install UK's first quantum-secure industrial
network between key UK smart production facilities. Bristol, United Kingdom.
<https://newsroom.bt.com/bt-and-toshiba-install-uks-first-quantum-secure-industrial-
network-between-key-uk-smart-production-facilities>
An installation that proves how the UK is taking the quantum edge. As the first of
many future developments, this source is critical to the proposal as it provides
perspective as to what said proposal will build upon. BT and Toshiba have continued
from this to launch the first commercial trial of quantum-secure services with EY in
2022 across EY’s London offices.
Buchanan, W & Woodward, A. (2016). Will quantum computers be the end of public key
encryption? Journal of Cyber Security Technology, 1-7.
<https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/23742917.2016.1226650>
Journal section written by William Buchanan and Alan Woodward expanding on the
vulnerability of public key encryption schemes due to quantum computers.
Concentrates on schemes such as RSA to explain how Shor's and Grover's algorithms
will be able to put standardised cryptography at risk (and so the array of personal
data that comes behind that).
Gillis, A. S. (2022, November). quantum key distribution (QKD).
<https://www.techtarget.com/searchsecurity/definition/quantum-key-distribution-
QKD>
An electronic source describing the way in which Quantum Key Distribution works
and how this arises the given limitations of the technology. Explores the difficulties in
implementing QKD into infrastructure helping identify the gap in which this research
would work towards filling. Gillis regularly makes publications through employment
in technical writing and editing at TechTarget.
Hui, R. (2019). In R. Hui, Introduction to Fiber-Optic Communications (pp. 155-156).
<https://www.sciencedirect.com/book/9780128053454/introduction-to-fiber-optic-
communications>
Book section written by Rongqing Hui. Illustrates the purpose of optical amplifiers
and how they work to eliminate distance as a limiting factor of (non-quantum) data
transmission across optical fiber. Has obtained 5 star reviews on Amazon.
IBM. (2023, March 27). Your Encryption Isn't Quantum Safe.
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ecvCfTPRBrI&t=329s>
Youtube video outlining some of the key vulnerabilities in modern day cryptography
introduced by quantum computers. Explores how these lead to some intimidating
statistics about the future of cybersecurity, advocating the need to pursue research into
quantum security. Posted by highly reputable computing giant IBM.
Ipsos MORI. (2019). UK Cyber Survey. Ipsos MORI on behalf of the National Cyber
Security Centre and Department for DCMS.
<https://www.ipsos.com/en-uk/uk-cyber-security-survey-2019>
Survey statistics provided in a publication from leading market research firm, Ipsos
MORI. Allowed statistical perspective to be gained regarding cybersecurity in this
pre-quantum era. Used with the intention to cause considerations of how this statistic
could worsen come quantum computers.
Jin, R.-B. Takeoka, M. Takagi, U. Shimizu, R. Sasaki, M. (2015, March 20). Highly
efficient entanglement swapping and teleportation at telecom wavelength.
< https://www.nature.com/articles/srep09333>
A Scientific Reports journal entry investigating the process of entanglement swapping
with proposal of a highly efficient method suitable for telecommunications. Focuses
on a key aspect of quantum repeater operations. A 'prestigious' journal to publish into.
Lian, P. (2020, March 26). AI, quantum technologies, and new cyber threats - are we
prepared?
<https://aiforgood.itu.int/ai-quantum-technologies-and-new-cyber-threats-are-we-
prepared/>
Blog published by the International Telecommunication Union. Provides scope
regarding the international concerns around data protection, conveying the state of
uncertainty cybersecurity is currently in. Popular blog likely to exacerbate statements
to add a 'shock factor' to publications - this is taken into account.
Meng, Y. & Ruihong, Q. (2019). Research Progress Of Quantum Repeaters. Journal of
Physics: Conference Series, 2-3.
< https://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1742-6596/1237/5/052032/pdf>
Article culminating key elements of past research into quantum repeaters to provide
clarity on the 'progress' of development. The collection of this past research allows
perspective into how far along this technology is, giving clarity towards the realism of
being able to make use of quantum repeaters in network infrastructure. Published by
the Insitute of Physics: a society looking to progress physics education in the UK.
Morrison, R. (2023, March 17). How will the UK regulate quantum computers?
<https://techmonitor.ai/hardware/quantum/quantum-computer-regulation-uk>
Recent article speaking upon the UK's National Quantum Strategy and how this will
see regulation of quantum progress in the nation. Compares UK commitment to
quantum research to that of other nations. Written by a former BBC News journalist.
Townsend, K. (2023, February 2). Quantum Computing and the Coming
Cryptopocalypse.
<https://www.securityweek.com/cyber-insights-2023-quantum-computing-and-the-
coming-cryptopocalypse/>
Source written by a Senior Contributor involved in writing about tech for decades.
Shone light upon Quantum Key Distribution and demonstrated the urgency for which
quantum security is necessary to avoid a 'Cryptopocalypse'.