Professional Documents
Culture Documents
II. Eliminate language that trivializes or diminishes the stature of persons of another gender
and/or people with diverse SOGIESC
4. The use of outdated honorifics and forms of address which obscure women and trivialize
their achievements.
• Use Ms. Instead of Mrs. When the woman’s marital status is irrelevant; or if the woman’s
preferred form of address is unknown.
• Use a married woman’s name instead of her husband’s
• Use gender-neutral honorifics or terms;
o Dear Editor, Manager, Colleague instead of Dear Sir; Dr. Fronda instead of Dra.
III. Eliminate language which disparages and marginalizes persons of another gender and/or
persons of diverse SOGIESC
1. Distracting, pointless and gratuitous language which perpetuate stereotypes and double-
meanings.
ANG LADLAD
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
• Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society,
and this freedom applies not only to those that are favorably received but also to those
that offend, shock, or disturb.
• Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society,
and this freedom applies not only to those that are favorably received but also to those
that offend, shock, or disturb. Any restriction imposed in this sphere must be proportionate
to the legitimate aim pursued.
• This position gains even more force if one considers that homosexual conduct is not illegal
in this country. It follows that both expressions concerning one’s homosexuality and the
activity of forming a political association that supports LGBT individuals are protected as
well.
EQUAL PROTECTION
• The equal protection clause guarantees that no person or class of persons shall be
deprived of the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes
in the same place and in like circumstances.
• From the standpoint of the political process, the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender
have the same interest in participating in the party-list system on the same basis as other
political parties similarly situated. State intrusion in this case is equally burdensome. Hence,
laws of general application should apply with equal force to LGBTs, and they deserve to
participate in the party-list system on the same basis as other marginalized and under-
represented sectors.
Second, petitioner’s interest as a sector, which is basically the legal recognition of its members’
sexual orientation as a right, cannot be reasonably considered as an interest that is
traditionally and historically considered as vital to national interest. At best, petitioner may cite
an emergent awareness of the implications of sexual orientation on the national human rights
agenda. However, an emergent awareness is but a confirmation of lack of traditional and
historical recognition.24 Moreover, even the majority admits that there is no "clear cut
consensus favorable to gay rights claims."25
Third, petitioner is cut off from the common constitutional thread that runs through the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors under the party-list system. It lacks the vinculum,
a constitutional bond, a provision in the fundamental law that specifically recognizes the LGBT
sector as specially significant to the national interest. This standard, implied in BANAT, is
required to create the necessary link of a particular sector to those sectors expressly
mentioned in Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and Section 5 of RA 7941.
KAGANDAHAN CASE
• Ultimately, we are of the view that where the person is biologically or naturally intersex
the determining factor in his gender classification would be what the individual, like
respondent, having reached the age of majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex.
Respondent here thinks of himself as a male and considering that his body produces
high levels of male hormones (androgen) there is preponderant biological support for
considering him as being male. Sexual development in cases of intersex persons makes
the gender classification at birth inconclusive. It is at maturity that the gender of such
persons, like respondent, is fixed.
• The current state of Philippine statutes apparently compels that a person be classified
either as a male or as a female, but this Court is not controlled by mere appearances
when nature itself fundamentally negates such rigid classification.
FALCIS
petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention, as professed homosexuals, gays and lesbians, assert
a fundamental right to enter into same-sex marriage. They argue that the legal requirement
that marriage be a union between a male and a female violates their rights to due process
and the equal protection of the laws. On the former, they claim that there is no rational nexus
between limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples and the state interest of protecting
marriage as the foundation of the family. They assert that: homosexuals can fulfill the essential
marital obligations, heterosexuals are no better parents than homosexuals, and homosexuals
can raise children well in the same manner that heterosexuals can. With respect to their equal
protection claim, petitioner asserts that classification on the basis of sexual orientation is
suspect, because, among others, sexual orientation is an immutable trait. Since the
classification is suspect, strict scrutiny review must be resorted to. Petitioner further argues that
even applying the rationality test, no substantial distinction can be made between same-sex
and opposite-sex couples, because gay couples can do everything that opposite-sex couples
are required to do by the Family Code, even if they cannot by themselves procreate.
To my mind, however, these conflated claims to violations of due process and equal rights are
uniformly anchored on assertions that present triable questions of fact, the resolution of which
needs the reception of evidence. These questions, among others, include: (a) whether
homosexuals, gays and lesbians can fulfill the essential marital obligations; (b) whether or how
procreation is an essential marital obligation; (c) whether homosexuals, gays and lesbians can
raise children in a manner as well as heterosexuals can; (d) whether Filipino tradition can
accommodate/accept same-sex marriage; and (e) whether homosexuals are, and should
be, treated as a separate class.
Petitioner alleges that even if only the rational basis test is applied, the assailed provisions will
fail since there is no substantial distinction between opposite-sex couples and same-sex
couples respecting marriage. Both can perform the essential marital obligations under the
Family Code. These are: (a) the obligation to live together, observe mutual love, respect, and
fidelity, and render mutual help and support; (b) fix the family domicile; and (c) support the
family and pay the expenses for such support and other conjugal obligations. To reiterate, this
argument still requires the presentation of documentary and testimonial evidence. It cannot
be assumed especially since there are conflicting claims on these assertions.
With respect to petitioner's claim that same-sex couples can raise children as well as opposite-
sex couples, We note that the intervenors-oppositors expressed a strong contrary view and
argue that children raised by heterosexual couples fare better than those who are not. The
reception of scientific and expert opinion is probably necessary to assist the Court in resolving
this issue.