Introduction: A few months ago I spoke with Carl Schwamberger regarding one of my favorite games TAC AIR.

I told him I have

both articles he wrote for The General Magazine and that I really enjoyed reading them. They were well put together and helped
me with game play. He told me there was a third article that he was writing but it never got published. I asked him if I could see it
and he graciously said yes. Here is the re-write of the article from Mr. Schwamberger. I have tried to check everything in the article
for accuracy. Any mistakes should be directed to me. Enjoy.

TAC AIR
Original draft by Carl Schwamberger
Aircraft Descriptions by Dennis Sieg
Revision by Dan Stueber

While the fundamentals of military strategy and tactics remain the same, the technique of warfare, or the application of strategy
and tactics, are in a constant flux. The circumstances of every war and battle are different. Personalities change, geography differs,
and technology evolves. This application of the technology of tactical air support and defense against it would probably be the most
significant change since 1939. The technology applied to air weapons has usually represented the cutting edge of change. Using the
game TAC AIR we can study some of the applications of air weapons and the subsequent changes on the battlefield. Although the
bulk of our ideas in this text are applicable to TAC AIR games in general, it is written with the application of limited intelligence
rules in mind.

First lets take a look at the aircraft of TAC AIR which flew over the armies of Europe in the last decade. The fixed wing aircraft of
the TAC AIR game are straight forward representations of the aircraft used. For detailed technical data, I would refer the reader to
publications such as the Janes Reviews.

Mirage 2000: Entered French service in the early 1980’s. Roughly equivalent to the F-16 in mission and performance. It is a return
to the delta wing design of the 1950’s. The totally new air frame, electronics, etc. means a high price tag. It does allow the French to
buy French, along with others who could or would not buy elsewhere.

 F-104 Starfighter: Flown by the West Germans, it is a contemporary of the Phantom. Originally developed in the United States to
intercept Soviet bombers, it was foisted off on the hapless Germans who really wanted a tactical bomber. It is to the Germans credit
that they were able to make this supersonic fighter serve in a low altitude role it was never designed for. Unfortunately quite a few
pilots died in the effort
.

Alpha Jet: It resulted from a joint Franco German project to develop an inexpensive trainer/tactical bomber and was a example of
effective inter-allied cooperation. Unlike the F-104 it was east to fly at tree top level. It carries roughly the same payload as the
Su-17. Although a useful weapons load can be carried there isn’t much capacity left for electronics or armor, so it is best confined to
low threat situations.

 Tornado: Another inter European cooperative effort. A more capable and costly aircraft than the Alpha. It is intended for the more
demanding missions where navigation aids and target designating systems are critical to success.

Jaguar: A UK/France joint project which entered service in the 1970’s. Hi tech navigation and targeting systems with a wide choice
of air to ground weapons.

 CF-18: For whatever reason the Canadians chose to buy a plane originally designed for naval operations. Theirs is not carrier
capable. The targeting electronics can be changed quickly from bombing to air combat modes allowing the same air frame to be
used for either type of mission. While not superlative at any single task the F-18 types are quite adequate for the tactical bombing,
air combat, ECM, and reconnaissance roles assigned. The critical limitation is fuel capacity. Definitely a step up from the F-55 for
the Canadians.

F-4F Phantom: Unbelievably successful would describe this aircraft. The Phantom and its variants are still in the air. Nearly thirty
years after its appearance it is still effective and should be around as lond as the airframes can be held together. These birds are
large with room for plenty of add-on electronics. Originally designed as a missile armed interceptor, it turned out to be a success as
a bomber, fighter, ECM, recon, and functions equally well in naval or land operations. One of the largest production runs of post
WWII combat planes, these are available in large numbers.

 A-10 Thunderbolt II: Like the Ju-87 Stuka of the 1930’s and 40’s it is ugly, slow, and is considered very effective. Built around a
30mm cannon its mission is to destroy Soviet armored formations, much like Stuka pilot Erich Rudel did in 1943 and 44.
Approximately the size of a WWII B-25 bomber, it carries a lot of armor, massive bomb and rocket load, and electronic fit, in
addition to the large 30mm GAU cannon. It is also designed to be highly maneuverable so as to operate at extremely low altitudes.
While this will protect it from the high threat weapon systems it places them in range of the lesser weapons. To compensate for this
threat it is of more rugged construction than usual and has more armor than anything else in the air. In the Desert Storm air
campaign it proved to be the only allied aircraft that could survive at low altitudes against the light but numerous anti-air cannons
of Iraq.

F-16 Falcon: Developed as a lightweight, inexpensive, daylight fighter. Its success in this role might be attributed to its development
outside the Pentagon procurement bureaucracy. Of course, good enough could not be left alone. The F-16 has had a variety of high
tech components added on with the object of making it do what the F-15 could do. Success in this regard was not certain, but the
price was definitely increased.

 F-15 Eagle: The Eagle came into operational use in the mid 1970’s. the large airframe, high thrust engines, and state of the art
electronics make for a very potent Mig killer. The large electronic suite allows it to fight under weather conditions that leave most
aircraft useless. Of course, the procurement and maintenance cost are enormous so there are not a huge number of these around. If
a TAC AIR player gets one shot down he should not be allowed to roll for replacement. Having it strictly configured as a superior
air-to-air fighter wasn’t good enough for the USAF. Ground attack variants have been developed using the large airframe to install
the electronics for ground targeting as well as the thrust and lift capacity to carry impressive payloads of bombs. The ground attack
configured Eagles retain most of their air-to-air capability.

F-111 Aardvark: It acquired a negative reputation during the Vietnam War, largely because it was rushed into production before
development was complete. Presently, it is an effective medium bomber and fits into a role in the US doctrine of the Deep Battle.
That is the engagement and destruction of maneuver units before they reach the ground battle.

 It was difficult to separate fact from myth with Soviet aircraft during the previous decades. Despite that several western pilots have
flown the modern aircraft of the defunct Soviet Union and published their observations, much information is still suspect. Previous
to 1992 examples of Soviet aircraft inspected by the NATO intelligence services proved to be simpler in design than equivalent
NATO aircraft. There also seemed to be quality control problems during manufacturing. Finally, Soviet aircraft capabilities fit only
the missions they were designed for. None seem top be the jack of all trades like the Phantom, but they are quite capable of the
missions intended for them. All this applies to the aircraft produced before the early 1970’s. The new generation of Soviet aircraft
appear to be more capable but they have not been tested in combat. While the late model aircraft examined since 1991 contain
many systems reflecting technology of the 1950’s or 60’s, the components are mush refined from the items then available. The
bottom line is these newer aircraft are very formidable in their roles. Unlike the earlier models, the post 1970 generation are said to
be copies of US, or NATO, aircraft. If the critics of current US hardware are to be believed, then the Soviets might have done better
with original designs. Actually, the descriptions I have seen of these aircraft show little in common with NATO aircraft. Enormous
resources were invested in the Soviet design bureaus, enough to enable them to create original designs. Also, Soviet air doctrine
differed significantly from that of the US and NATO, so that often foreign designs were inappropriate for the needs of the Soviet
military.

Mig-21: The best known of the older generation would be this one. Americans, Israelis, Iranians, and others have had the
opportunity to destroy these planes by the dozens. Although considered less sophisticated than its opponents, its defeats are more
due to inept tactics than inferior machinery. Evolutionary best describes this series. Capabilities roughly parallel the US F-5 types.
It has been built in large numbers and in a variety of weapons and electronics fit. But, most of these are far beneath modern
standards. Few of the MST ground attack versions were built. The air-to-air version while having good performance potential
continues the Soviet tradition of minimum acceptable useful range.

Mig-23 Flogger: A variable geometry (swing wing) fighter evolved during the late 1960’s and produced in large numbers in the 70’s.
Better performance than the Mig-21, they require more training. Larger payload allows more weapons and electronics. They are
often compared with Vietnam era US Phantoms.

Mig-27 Flogger: Specialized ground attack version of the Mig-23. Evidently Soviet airmen are as prone to “improving” perfectly
good aircraft as the Americans. The Mig-27 uses slick laser range finder/target designator like the US bombers, which is not any
more likely to work right outside of laboratory conditions than the US versions.

Mig-29 Fulcrum: An air superiority plane roughly equivalent to the F-16 or Mirage 2000. Adequate maneuverability, has a high top
speed and good payload. As with most Soviet fighters, the final question is the quality of the electronics.

Mig-31 Foxhound: This is the revised Mig-25 Foxbat, it entered into service in quantity in the early 1980’s. Improvements included
strengthened frame for maneuverability, newer electronics including “look down/shoot down” capability, and a backseater to flip
all the extra switches. Like the Mig-25, it is designed to close at high speed and attack with rockets. Like the Mig-25 it probably
does not have much maneuverability or fuel reserve.

Su-17 Fitter: A 1970’s improvement over the 1950’s Su-7. Swing wings eased the long runway problem and the evolutionary design
resulted in a fairly reliable aircraft. However, many of the other problems remain. High fuel consumption results in division of the
(not overly impressive) bomb load to fuel drop tanks to achieve a rather moderate range. This also limits afterburner use, which
combined with a slow reset of the variable wings cramps air-to-air capability.

Su-24 Fencer: Heavily shrouded in secrecy the performance of this F-111 look-alike is obscure. Close to the Tornado in size and
capacity, this unknown aircraft is greatly feared and capabilities equal, or greater, then NATO planes are ascribed to it, including
all weather capability. If it can actually live up to its reputation, squadrons of this type could eschew the traditional mass assault
waves of Soviet air doctrine for more flexible tactics.

Su-25 Frogfoot: Strongly resembles the Northrop A-9 and fills a similar close support role to the Warthog. It depends more on
conventional high speed passes and the ordinary assortment of bombs or cannons. Would probably be better used in a low threat
environment where its high payload and ability to loiter for repeat passes could be exploited.

Su-27 Flanker: Big and bad looking, like a oversized F-18, the Flankers display rather good maneuverability for their size. As with
most Soviet fighters, the question is, “Would it be available in larger enough numbers to offset potential inferiority in electronics?”
Entering service in the 1980’s, it can be assumed to be state-of-the-art in air frame and engine. It also has reasonably good range.
The Su-27 has 12 hard points for carrying a variety of air-to-air weapons, including beyond visual range missiles.

 Aircraft Use

Reconnaissance

In TAC AIR, air power comes in several flavors: reconnaissance, ground attack, air defense, and ECM. Reconnaissance was the
earliest successful application of aircraft. In an ordinary FTF game, its application is rather artificial and players usually neglect it.
Rule section 21 is the basic section for air reconnaissance. Additionally, rule 20.1.1, 20.1.4, and 20.1.5 affect reconnaissance aircraft.
There are three important points to these rules:
Information is only available for hexes the reconnaissance aircraft passes through.
The route for the piece is preplanned in the Air Allocation Step. This route must be followed whatever else happens in the interim.
Once a reconnaissance aircraft piece is aborted, no more information is derived from it.

As might be expected, the information provided by the reconnaissance flight can not be used to identify targets until the following
turn. In the preferable case when blind, or limited intelligence, rules are used the reconnaissance aircraft become critical.
Complaints arise that there are not enough available. With the deadly environment in which the reconnaissance must usually
operate it is often the case that the player (or real life commander) ends up with none. Given the limits on operating these pieces,
and their scarcity it is glaringly evident careful planning is required for their use.

The first and fundamental error is to try for too much coverage. This temptation leads to overexposure and all but guarantees the
loss of the piece. While there are situations where a broad view is desirable, it is best to identify a narrow focus for the
reconnaissance. With a clear objective identified, concentration of support for the reconnaissance effort can be had. The next thing
to remember is reconnaissance aircraft does not do its thing in a vacuum. Enemy air defenses need to be neutralized. There are a
variety o options for suppressing enemy air defenses. Escorts are the obvious method for dealing with the enemy CAP. But, do not
neglect the possibility of your ground anti-air weapons providing cover against interceptors. ECM (Electronic Counter Measures,
rule 15.2) are by for the preferred method for suppressing ground anti-air weapons. SEAD (Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses,
rule 10.3.3) works best when started a turn ahead of the reconnaissance mission. This increases the proportion of defense systems
neutralized, and may reveal previously unknown anti-air pieces. The final thing is, intelligence on the enemy becomes stale quickly.
Be prepared to act on the information immediately.

Ground Attack

TAC AIR describes three basic types of air to ground attacks. The Direct Air Support (DAS), the Air Interdiction (AI), and the
Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD). Each has some differing considerations. I’ll discuss the common traits first.

The type of aircraft available will influence your mission choice. The more types you have which can withstand anti-air attacks the
less risk there is in making attacks deep within enemy territory. At first glance the NATO side, particularly the US, would appear to
have the advantage, since all but the most modern Soviet aircraft have significantly lower B factors. But this is relative. The Soviet
player has many more anti-air weapons to use and can damage the NATO through sheer persistence. Next, consider the target type.
The higher the B factor of the target the more A factors you will need. As with the reconnaissance mission the ground attack
mission must be supported to be effective. SEAD missions and EW support are a critical part of the ground support effort.

AI and DAS represent two entirely different philosophies on how to win wars with aircraft. AI allows the airmen greater
independence in planning, and especially in conducting the attack. DAS places the aircraft under tight control of the ground
commander, through his representative the Forward Air Controller (FAC). For whatever reason most pilots dislike this and prefer
the AI type of mission. In the TAC AIR game most players should prefer to commit aircraft to DAS. The most important advantage
with DAS is the intelligence available for planning it. Since it is against enemy pieces in contact with yours you definitely know the
target is there, what it is, and something about it’s strength. The AI attack depends on reconnaissance information that may be
obsolete or intuitive. A second critical factor in the choice between AI and DAS is the anti-air threat. It is less when prosecuting a
DAS attack. Approaches to the DAS target are likely to be in friendly hands, it is possible for ground pieces to neutralize enemy
anti-air weapons, and the aircraft does not have to penetrate as far into the enemy air defense zone. In summary, a much easier task
than a AI mission.

So where might the AI mission be preferable? When there are no useful targets for the DAS. This assumes you have suitable AI
targets. A better definition would be where an AI targets value for outweighs and DAS target values. This would be an HQ, a
reinforcement threatening your success, or some key ability of the enemy to influence the battle, a EW or artillery unit for example.

Choosing targets for DAS and AI missions efficiently requires one to have a clear priority for targets. Establish a target type
priority at the start of the game. It may be necessary to modify it later, but having a priority list which supports your battle plan
helps greatly in easing the decision process as the battle heats up.

Rule section 10.3.3 is the only part labeled as SEAD. But, the earlier section 9.5 “Wild Weasels” comprises the major part of the
rules for executing attacks on ground air defense weapons. Technically Air “EC” (15.2) is not part of the SEAD rules. But it is a
powerful component of the battle against air defenses. Consider it as part of the air to ground battle. Section 10.3.3 refers to attacks
which can be made against pieces which are in clear terrain. Unfortunately many air defense weapons are hidden away. So the TAC
AIR player must hope, pray, and sacrifice whatever necessary to gain the support of the Wild Weasels and the ECM. The
determination of priority must be applied to SEAD missions as well. Simply running them indiscriminately is unproductive.

Again anti-air defenses are a critical consideration for planning any mission. Rules 20.4.1 and 20.4.2 are central to this. Much
depends on which rule the players use. Most will prefer the second version. In the first case an unsuccessful strike has a high
probability of a aircraft loss. So the best thing to do is stack the counters together to obtain a greater chance of success. Of course
this will result in a lesser availability of aircraft for other missions. If, instead, rule 20.4.2 is used the best solution is exactly the

 opposite. In this case it is better to send the units singly to maximize air cover and present dispersed targets to the enemy anti-air
units (hoping for a earlier lack of ammo for them). To reduce the almost inevitable losses for the “first echelon” of aircraft, have
them enter the board two or three air rounds after a “Wild Weasel” missions enters. It is possible to concentrate the entire air effort
of the first two or three turns only against air defenses; above all the air defense HQ’s. this tactic must be applied with care or losses
will be tremendous, and the ground forces will be without indispensable support. However the surviving aircraft will have a easier
life in subsequent turns. In any case don’t hesitate to attack towed AA units that were just moved, even if this means taking away
some air units from other more appetizing targets. The NATO player should pay attention especially to the SA-4 units due to their
range that allows them to cover virtually the entire map. These tactics are better applicable to the NATO player than the PACT.
The low number of air units and their low value force the PACT player to use a different and simpler theory. The best chance can
be obtained making the “Gorilla”: flying all available aircraft in the same turn and assign all of them to the same mission to
increase their capability to hit something hard. With the Gorilla tactic the planes should be stacked together to minimize losses and
maximize strike capability (remember the combat factors of the PACT air units are usually smaller than their NATO counterpart).

Air Interception

Since the first military aircraft were produced air defense has never been far behind. Modern air defense comes in two flavors;
Combat Air Patrols (CAP), and ground anti-air weapons. The CAP has evolved steadily since the patrols of WWI which used only
uncelebrated eyeballs for target acquisition. From the late 1930’s the CAP has been controlled over large areas using a network of
command posts, radar equipment, and observation stations. These items are unseen in the TAC AIR game. Neither does TAC AIR
simulate the subtleties of air combat like Flight Leader. But, some of the basics of air to air combat do apply.

Rule #1: Turn toward your opponent. Not only does this reduce the possibility of the attacker getting the modifier for a tail shot but
he also uses up his loiter time if he tries to do so.

Rule #2: Look for friends. Keeping close to your own air to air interceptors helps them in their job. My own practice is to keep the
bombers and escorts not more than about five hexes apart. But, I don’t like to tie the escorts directly to the bombers, as flexibility is
lost. Friends also include ground anti-air weapons. The IFF rules favor the friendly aircraft so look for the opportunity to lead the
pursuer into a trap.

Rule #3: Try to get the enemy between two groups of interceptors. Consider the dilemma of a flight caught between two enemy flights.
Whatever direction he turns there is the possibility of a pursuer gaining the advantageous six o’clock position.

There is one extremely important, and very artificial consideration for the CAP in TAC AIR. Will the ground support aircraft (the
CAP targets) fly more than halfway across the map board? If so, it is likely to be intercepted. If not, then it is very difficult to get
the CAP mission piece across the map before the ground support mission piece makes its attack and is on the way home. Keeping
CAP “on station” is not part of this game. So if the enemy’s likely DAS or AI targets are across the centerline then assigning pieces
to CAP missions is a low payoff option.

The existing air rules make air escort virtually useless. Units making ground attacks are perfectly able to defend themselves. It is
very hard for a Mig-23 to shoot down a F-111 without taking a loss. It is better to leave the interceptors close to the friendly border
and use them only for radar homing interceptions. This is the best manner to minimize the dangers of the enemy AA units. For the
NATO player there is a greater chance to penetrate deeply into the enemy air defenses with interceptors able to shoot radar homing
missiles. I suggest stacking a F-15 with a CF-18. Their relatively high “B” value (5) should allow them to fly long enough to make
their attack. Of course these units must be used very carefully due to their limited number and importance.

The F-19, or F-117, stealth fighters are a special case. Like the F-15 this unit should not be replaced with a die roll, their number is
too limited. These aircraft are really the Factotum of the game. They can be used to strike at any key unit anywhere it can be found.
Also their laser designator can increase considerably the strength of other striking planes. Be careful of enemy Infrared (IR)
missiles. Do not move these stacked together, it is a waste of resources.

Ground Anti-air Defense

From the late 1930’s, the CAP has been controlled over large areas using a network of command posts, radar equipment, and
observation stations. Similarly ground weapons were integrated with a communication network, HQ’s, observation posts, and
radar. At the start these were of course machine gun and cannon, they also included balloons with cables dangling beneath,
searchlights, and smoke screens to obscure targets.

The introduction of missiles caused a very large increase in the range, and effectiveness, of ground based air defenses. So much so
airmen came to believe that the only by flying at extreme low level, at the tree tops or below, could the aircraft survive in acceptable
numbers over enemy controlled territory. Two significant conflicts caused this view. In the late 1960’s the Soviet Union moved two
of it’s regional, or frontal, air defense organizations to North Vietnam and Egypt. In the first case the United States Air Force and
Naval air forces were nearly driven from the sky. Against Egypt the Israelis with fewer resources were unwilling to continue the
War of Attrition of 1970-71, and ceased their air attacks. When the Yon Kippur War began the Israeli Air Defense Force took severe
losses in brave but doomed attacks directly into the teeth of the Egyptian air defense.

Every weapon can be countered in some way. The US was able to continue attacking Communist Vietnam first through the use of
evasive tactic. By attacking only with the swiftest and most maneuverable aircraft many of the enemy missiles could be evaded. The
second counter was, and continues to be, the development of destructive and electronic technology. Obviously the destruction of the
enemy weapons is the most desirable counter. But, this proved extremely difficult to accomplish against a well developed anti-air
system. In 1973 neither the Israelis nor the US could operate at medium or moderate altitude over the enemy without severe losses.
For the next eighteen years the doctrine of extreme low level attack was seen as the primary method to avoid enemy missile
defenses.

 Guns are presently mostly light weapons designed for mobile defense. Perhaps because of their relatively low technology there was
a lack of consideration for anti-air guns in the low level attack doctrine of NATO. While airmen express respect for weapons such as
the ZSU-23-4 there was the expectation that such weapons could be suppressed or avoided. But in Vietnam two decades earlier the
US took severe losses from guns while making precision low altitude attacks against such targets as the Ham Rong bridge. When
used in mass the light cannon and machineguns can still be very effective. The most recent example is the wart against Iraq. There,
low altitude tactics practiced for the NATO battlefield resulted in unexpected and unacceptable losses in the first few days of the air
attacks. The excuse has been made that the open desert terrain gave the defenders adequate warning time since the aircraft could
not conceal their approach by flying nap of the earth. Like the Vietnamese, the Iraqis created fire traps with large numbers of light
and medium weapons around targets they anticipated their enemy would attack. The NATO battlefield was expected to be a fluid
encounter where planned massing of anti-air guns would not occur. But, considering the quantity of large caliber machineguns
mounted on vehicles, and that there was at least one multi barrel anti-air cannon per battalion there was in fact a real threat to the
low flying aircraft in the hypothetical European battlefield. These small caliber weapons are in fact what the air defense value of
one that each ground unit in TAC AIR possesses. The other part being the hand held anti-air missiles which are commonly
available. The novice may consider this a trivial threat, but the player soon finds his aircraft are running a gauntlet. One which
turns air attacks into a stream of aborted jets headed home.

There is really only one effective way to avoid the effects of the small arms. Aircraft must be routed to avoid passing over
unnecessary enemy pieces. The cannon batteries represented by the ZSU, Gepard, etc can be suppressed. Moving friendly ground
pieces adjacent to them can turn the trick. A SEAD attack, either air or artillery, is even better.

The air battle depicted in TAC AIR is a very low altitude battle. The rules allow aircraft to use the terrain to conceal themselves
from enemy ground anti-air weapons. But, they are vague about lines of sight between aircraft. Some players assume all aircraft
locations are known and ther is no blocking terrain between aircraft. Others assume terrain blocks LOS between aircraft, the same
as between aircraft and anti-air units. And some differentiate between aircraft that are flying on the terrain and those above it. The
last is probably the best solution. Flying at medium rather than very low would place the aircraft out of range of the machine guns
and cannons represented in TAC AIR. But, every missile launcher in range would have a clear shot. Search radars both on the
ground and in the air would have a clear view as well. Any aircraft that comes up out of the brush will be immediately spotted, and
its location and heading quickly passed to ground anti-air units and interceptors. Obviously an aircraft at any altitude is not in a
healthy situation. The differences are not well represented in TAC AIR. Both pilot fatigue and fuel consumption decline at medium
altitude vs. flying on the terrain. The latter translates into increased loiter time, a important factor when the tactic of keeping
bombers airborne at a waiting station is practiced.

There are significant differences between the NATO and Soviet anti-air defenses in TAC AIR. NATO anti-air defense largely means
the Hawk missile system. The Gepard and M-163 weapons are not very plentiful and their short range limits them to point defense.
On the Soviet side there is a wide variety of missile systems available.

Each counter represents a battery of multi missile launchers or guns, detection radars, and fire control computers carried in a little
under a dozen vehicles.

M-163 Vulcan: This Self Propelled Anti Aircraft Gun (SPAAG) is assigned in mixed groups composed of two batteries, each with 12
Chaparral SAM launchers, and two batteries each with 12 Vulcan. The M-163 is composed of the same chassis as the M-113 with a
electronic powered turret. The cannon is the 20mm caliber and is the multibarrel rotating design like the Gatling Gun of the
previous century. The aiming system is adopted from the US Navy Mk20 combined with the HEMTECH radar. The turret rotates
at 60 degrees per second and the gun changes elevation at 45 degrees per second. Two rates of fire are available; 1000 rounds per
minute, and 3000 rounds per minute. Crews are trained to use the first on ground targets and the higher rate against air targets.
Burst rates of 10, 30, 60, and 100 rounds are available. 1100 rounds are available in the magazine, and another 1000 are in reserve.

M-48 Chaparral: Deployed for use in the early 1970’s. The missile is the Sidewinder developed by the US Air Force, and adapted for
the ground defense. Uses infrared seeker, so the fire control system can begin the launch sequence again as soon as the first missile
fires. Its extremely short range makes it useless for anything but point defense. Twenty-four launchers are paired with the M-163
Vulcan anti-air cannon.

M-23 Hawk: Developed for the US Army, the first test launch of this system was made in 1956. Operational units were fielded in
1960. With a maximum range of 40 kilometers (22 hexes) and altitude of 11,580 meters this can be classified as a medium range
weapon. Its minimum altitude is not clear, but it is supposed to be able to engage targets at very low altitude. Used by the Israelis in
the 1973 Yom Kippur War.

M-104 Patriot: This weapon had a extremely long time from initial development to formation of operational units. Development
first began in 1956, and test launches started in 1970. But, it was another thirteen years before the first battalion size formations
appeared. This long period illustrates the extreme which politics, doctrinal changes, and bureaucratic ineptitude can reach.
Fortunately the Patriot was not actually need by the US military. Aside from a lack of air attack on the US ground forces, the M-23
Hawk was regularly improved to retain its usefulness. Originally developed to replace the Hawk and the longer range Nike
Hercules systems as a anti-aircraft weapon. In the early 1980’s the US Army gained “Star Wars” research money by convincing the
Department of Defense the M-104 could be improved sufficiently to intercept ballistic missiles. There was a need for a theater
defense weapon of this type. The success of the effort can be judged by the performance against Iraqi ballistic missiles in the Gulf
War of 1991.

Gepard: This flak panzer is composed of two guns, turret mounted, over a chassis adopted from that of a Leopard 1 MBT. Much
thinner armor is carried than the MBT. Two radars are used, search and following. The cannon are 35mm with a theoretical rate of
fire of 550 rounds per minute. Each of these guns has 310 AA rounds available, and 20 armor piercing (APDST) as well. The

 Gepard has a complete system of manual and electronic fire control, a ground navigation system, and NBC protection. 430 Gepard
are on service in the Bundeswehr.

Roland: This missile defense system was developed by France and Germany as a highly mobile surface to air defense system. The
missile system can be fitted to tracked chassis like the Marder or AMX-30, or placed on the bed of a truck. The missiles range is
6,300 meters but this has been improved to 8,500 meters. The system has both tracking and surveillance radars and carries a total
of ten missiles.

ZSU-23-4: This SPAAG was developed in the 1960s. After being adopted in large scale by the USSR it was exported to almost all the
countries “served” by the USSR. It took part in the Vietnam War, and the Yom Kippur War. In the Soviet army each division had
sixteen ZSU systems. Generally these act in pairs and operate closely with the short range SAM launchers. The chassis is adopted
from that used by the PT-76 light tank. The main armament is composed of four 23mm caliber cannons each with a theoretical rate
of fire of 800 to 1000 rounds per minute. The gunner may choose bursts of 35 to 50 rounds. 500 rounds are available for each gun.
The maximum elevation is 85 degrees and minimum is 4. The turret rotates 360 degrees and has a maximum range of 2500 meters.
Radar is available for fire control, and a computer as well. Targets can be engaged while the vehicle is moving.

SA-4 Ganef: This surface to air missile system was developed in the late 1950’s and was first displayed publicly in 1964. Designed to
attack targets at medium and high altitude it ahs a maximum range of 72 kilometers (40 hexes). There is also a minimum range of 8
kilometers (6 hexes) inside which the missile cannot effectively engage targets. These ranges are the optimal horizontal distance the
missile can reach its target. Vertical range is quite different. The minimum altitude for the SA-4 is 11000 meters and the maximum
is 22000 meters. Obviously this is not a point defense weapon system. It is deployed in autonomous brigades with eighteen to twenty
four launchers divided between three battalions of three batteries each. Eight ZSU-23-4 weapons are part of each battalion as well.
The SA-4 brigades are assigned to Army and Front HQ’s for covering their rear echelons. Like most Soviet designed anti-air
weapons it uses several radar systems to acquire targets and guide the missile.

SA-6 Gainful: This first appeared publicly in 1967. It is organized into regiments of twenty launchers grouped in five battalions.
The maximum range is 22 kilometers (12 hexes) and the maximum altitude is 9000 meters. This was one of the weapons used by the
Egyptians against the Israelis in the War of Attrition in the early 1970’s, and again in the Yom Kippur War of 1973. In both cases
serious losses were inflicted on the Israeli aircraft.

SA-8 Gecko: This is a short range system and has the radar, fire control computer, and launcher mounted on the same vehicle. This
makes it considerable more mobile, as separate components do not have to be linked during set up. It also means each launcher
must be destroyed before the battery is out of action. Intended to defend the tank or motorized division it has a maximum range of
twelve kilometers (eight hexed). Appeared among Soviet army units in the mid 1970’s. Is deployed in the typical regiment of five
batteries of four launchers each.

SA-9 Gaskin: a product of the 1960’s it was first displayed publicly in 1970. It is deployed along side the ZSU-23-4 in tank or
motorized regiments. Unlike the larger missile systems this uses a broad spectrum infrared seeker rather that an illuminating
radar. This make counter measures less effective. The short range of eight kilometers (four hexes) and lack of all weather causes the
SA-13 to be designated to replace it. Its first use in Lebanon in 1981 resulted in a missed Israeli aircraft and a subsequent air attack
destroying the launcher.

SA-11 Gadfly: Used to replace the SA-4 and SA-6. A product of the late 1970’s it was first seen in public in 1983. A division weapon
it is organized in the typical regiment of five batteries with four launchers each. A range of 28 kilometers (15 hexes) enables it to
defend a division size area. But, there is a minimum range of three kilometers, which requires additional planning in battery
placement.

SA-13 Gopher: Maximum range of eight kilometers (4 hexes) and maximum altitude of 9500 meters. Began appearing in 1977 it is
used along side the ZSU-23-4 like the SA-9 it replaces.

As history TAC AIR falls under the category of “What might have been”. As a war game it is a excellent simulation of modern
combined arms warfare. The air rules are a significant part of TAC AIR’s success, and they are a major part of the player’s
arsenal. But, only it used efficiently. By applying the principles of Objective, Mass, Support, and Synchronization the player will
gain an effective air and air defense arm.