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IN THE COURT OF HON’BLE ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE, PATIALA

ARB No. 266 of 2021

Village: Jainpur

Seema Jain ...Applicants/Objectors

Versus

Union of India & Others …Respondents

Reply on behalf of Respondent No.1 & 2 to the

objections filed by the Objectors under Section 34 of

the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996

RESPECTFULLY SHOWETH:

The present reply is being filed through Prashant Dubey, presently

working as General Manager–cum-Project Director, Project

Implementation Unit, NHAI, Ludhiana with the office at Ludhiana who is

fully conversant with the facts and circumstances of the case and is

authorized to file reply on behalf of respondent no. 1 & 2. (hereinafter

referred as ‘answering respondent’). Copy of Resolution is attached

herewith.

PRELIMINARY SUBMISSIONS/OBJECTIONS:

1. That it is humbly submitted that answering respondent herein being

aggrieved by the present award in question has assailed the same and has

also filed a petition u/S. 34 of the A & C Act, 1996 for setting aside the

impugned arbitral award dated 25.01.2021 bearing case no.

ARB/309/2021 titled “U.o.I & Anr. v. Seema Jain & Ors” which is pending

adjudication before this Hon’ble Court. It is the case of the Answering

Respondent that the Ld. Arbitrator while passing the Award had wrongly

enhanced the amount of compensation on the ground that the land was

mentioned as ‘gair-mumkin’ in the Khasra Girdawari. It is submitted that

no presumption of truth is attached to the entries in the Khasra

Girdawari. It is further the case of the Answering Respondent that as per

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the Jamabandi the nature of land was Chahi. As such, the Ld. Arbitrator

has on its own changed the nature of land as against the factual position

and proceeded to grant compensation at a higher rate, thereby passing an

award which is vitiated by patent illegality and is in conflict with the

public policy of India, liable to be set aside in view of Section 34(2)(b)(ii)

and Section 34(2A) of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996. It is most

humbly submitted herein that the present reply is being filed subject to

the contents of the objection petition filed by the answering respondent,

and the grounds mentioned therein may kindly be read as part and parcel

of the present reply as well.

2. That the impugned Award dated 25.01.2021 passed by Ld. Arbitrator in

Case No. MA-13/19/LBP, whereby the Ld. Arbitrator has wrongly and

arbitrarily allowed the application filed by the Petitioners and enhanced

the amount of compensation from Rs.1195.73/ per sq. meter, as had been

granted by the Competent Authority, to Rs. 4,372.26/ per sq. meter

against the evidence on record. It is the case of the answering respondent

that the entire Award dated 25.01.2021 is wrong, perverse, patently illegal

and public policy of India, and thus, liable to be set aside in toto. Given

the illegal award dated 25.01.2021, the Respondents herein had filed an

application under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996

seeking setting aside of the Award dated 25.01.2021 on the grounds as

mentioned therein in ARB/309/2021.

3. That it is brought to the notice of this Hon’ble Court, that by way of the

present petition, the Objectors are, in essence, seeking for the

enhancement of the amount of compensation awarded by the Ld.

Arbitrator. However, the Objectors have failed to prove any violation of any

of the grounds mentioned in Section 34(2) (a) & (b) of the Arbitration Act,

1996. It is the case of the answering respondents that the scope of Section

34(2) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is limited and Court

would not be justified in re-appreciating the material on record and

substituting its own view in place of Arbitrator’s view. It is further

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pertinent to mention herein that no power is vested with this Hon’ble

Court to enhance the compensation as claimed by the objectors in the

present petition. It is well settled law that this Hon’ble Court while

exercising power under Section 34 of the A & C Act, 1996, cannot enhance

the compensation and/or modify the award of an arbitral tribunal. On a

bare reading of the provision of Section 34 of the said Act, it is clear that it

specifically deals with only the setting aside of the arbitral award, and it

does not provide any power to the Court to make any further

enhancement.It is the case of the answering respondent that this Hon’ble

Court while exercising power under Section 34 of the A&C Act, 1996

cannot modify the award. It can either dismiss the objection and uphold

the award or set aside the award if the grounds contained in sub-sections

(2) and (2A) are made out. There is no power to modify an arbitral award.

Reference in this regard may kindly be placed on the judgment rendered

by Hon’ble Supreme Court in CA No.791 of 2021DHBVN Vs. M/s

Navigant Technology Pvt. Ltd. decided on 02.03.2021 and Project

Director, NHAI Vs. M.Hakeem & Anr. [SLP (c) 13020 of 2020 decided

on 20.07.2020]

4. Reliance in further placed on the judgment rendered by Karnataka High

Court in MFA No. 23159 of 2011 NHAI v. Shankarappa and Ors., in

which the following was observed:

“A bare reading of the said Section goes to show that in an

arbitration suit filed under Section 34 (2) of the Arbitration Act,

what the Arbitration Court can do is only setting aside of the

award and nothing more, provided the party approaching the

Court through arbitration suit (arbitration application) fulfils any

one of the above mentioned five grounds as contemplated

under Section 34(2)(a)(i) to (v) and if the Court finds that the

subject matter of the dispute is not capable of settlement by

arbitration under the law for the time being in force, or the

arbitral award is in conflict with the public policy of India as

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contemplated under Section 34(2)(b)(i) and (ii). Nowhere in the

said Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, it is provided for

the Arbitration Court dealing with the application

under Section 34 for modifying the arbitral award,

particularly, in the manner of enhancement of the award

passed by the Arbitrator.”

5. It is humbly submitted that the Objectors had an opportunity to file

objections w.r.t the market rate under Section 3-G (3) of the National

Highways Act, 1956. It is brought to the notice of the Hon’ble Court that

before determining the compensation for the acquired land, the Competent

Authority had duly invited claims from the persons interested vide public

notice published in two daily newspapers. However, no such

objections/claims were filed by the Objectors. Thus, the market value and

nature of the acquired land cannot be brought into question, in the

present proceedings. The attention of this Hon’ble Court is invited towards

the judgment delivered by the Hon’ble Punjab and Haryana High Court in

the case of Renu Mehra and Others Vs. National Highways Authority

of India, [FAO No. 5104 of 2015], wherein it has been held that the

claims under Section 3-G (3) of the National Highways Act, 1956 ought to

have been made by the landowners before the Competent Authority. For

the convenience of this Hon’ble Arbitrator relevant para of the judgment is

reproduced hereunder:

“.... as no claim petition seems to have been filed by the

appellants before the CALA or, at least, a copy thereof was never

produced by them in later proceedings, it is not clear whether

the appellants raised any claim for damages under

Section 3 G(7) (b), (c) and (d) of the Act of 1956. Whether the

acquisition caused any damage due to severance of land;

whether other immovable property or earnings of the landowner

were injuriously affected by the acquisition; and whether the

acquisition compelled change of place of business and the

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reasonable expenses, if any, incidental to such change, were all

issues of fact that had to be determined by the CALA in

the first instance. However, there is no evidence of the

appellants even raising such claims before the

CALA..... There is no reason why he would not have

adverted to such claims by the appellants, had they been

made. It was only before the Arbitrator that the appellants

raised this issue but they failed to produce any documentary

proof in support of any of their claims under Section 3 G(7) of the

Act of 1956. In these circumstances, they have no sustainable

ground to complain that the Arbitral Award dated 15.11.2011

did not address such claims.”

6. That it is submitted that the Objectors, inter-alia, are asking this Hon’ble

Court to sit as a Court of Appeal and thereby re-appreciate the entire

evidence, which is not permissible. Reliance in this regard in placed on the

Hon’ble Supreme Court case of Associate Builders v. Delhi

Developmental Authority Civil Appeal No. 10531 Of 2014.It is

reiterated that it is settled position of law that a Court dealing with the

petition under Section 34 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 cannot

sit as an Appellate Court and is not empowered to appreciate or re-

appreciate the evidence.

7. That it is submitted that the Objectors had been given proper opportunity

to present the case before the Ld. Arbitrator. It is further submitted that

the plea as taken by the Objectors, by way of the present petition for

modification and enhancement in the amount of compensation, is legally

not tenable and not sustainable in the eyes of law and beyond the grounds

as mentioned in Section 34 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

Furthermore, it is pertinent to point out that the Objectors had the onus

to prove that if there were any grounds for enhancement in the amount of

compensation. The same has been discussed and settled by the Hon’ble
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Supreme Court in the case of Special Land Acquisition Officer vs.

Karigowda & Ors. [2010 (5) SCC 708], wherein it was held:

“It is settled principle of law that, the onus to

prove entitlement to receive higher compensation is upon the

claimants. In the case of Basant Kumar and Ors. v. Union of

India and Ors. [(1996) 11 SCC 542], this Court held that the

claimants are expected to lead cogent and proper evidence in

support of their claim. Onus primarily is on the claimant,

which they can discharge while placing and proving on record

sale instances and/or such other evidences as they deem

proper, keeping in mind the method of computation for

awarding of compensation which they rely upon.”

Thus, where the Objectorsare claiming enhancement of the market

value, the onus would fall upon the Objectors to prove the

existence of a ground for the enhancement of the market

value/compensation, and unless specifically proved, no

enhancement of any market value/ compensation can be done in

the present case as the Objectors failed to adduce any evidence

before the Ld. Arbitrator and now under Section 34, the Hon’ble

Court cannot sit as a court of Appeal and re-appreciate the

evidence.

8. Without prejudice to the aforementioned Arbitration petition filed by the

answering respondent, it is submitted that the present petition,filed by the

objector, is not maintainable and is liable to be dismissed. It is the case of

the answering respondents that there is no ground, much less justifiable

or tenable, which would invite and/or call for the consideration for

enhancement and/or modification of the captioned Arbitral Award as

passed by the Learned Arbitrator. Therefore, this petition is liable to be

dismissed. In this context, reliance is placed upon the following

pronouncements reported as:

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i. Venture Global Engineering LLC and Ors v Tech Mahindra Ltd.

and Ors, reported as [2017] 13 SCALE 91 (SC), wherein the

Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that :

“The Award of an Arbitral Tribunal can be set aside only on the

grounds specified in Section 34 of the A&C Act,1996 and on no

other ground. The Court cannot act as an Appellate Court to

examine the legality of Award, nor can it examine the merits of the

claim by entering into the factual arena like an Appellate Court.”

ii. P.R.SHAH, Shares and stock brokers Private limited V/s B.H.H.

Securities Private Limited , reported as (2012) 1 SCC 594,

wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in respect of a case pertaining

to the Stock Exchange bye-laws, held as under:

”21. A court does not sit in appeal over the award of an arbitral

tribunal by re-assessing or Re-appreciating the evidence. An award

can be challenged only under the grounds mentioned in Section 34

(2) of the Act. Therefore, in the absence of any ground under

section 34(2) of the Act it is not possible to re-examine the facts to

find out whether a different decision can be arrived at.”

iii. Maya Devi V/S Nirmal Chand &Anr 2002 (2) Arb. I. R. 30 (Delhi),

wherein it was held by the Hon’ble Delhi High Court that “the

arbitrator is the master of the facts and that while adjudicating

upon the objections to the award, the court would not reappraise

the evidence unless the conclusions arrived at are wholly perverse.”

iv. U.P. State Electricity Board V/S Sear Sole Chemicals Limited II

2000 (SLT) 314- (001) 3 SCC 397, the Hon’ble Apex Court was

pleased to observe that, “when the Arbitrators have applied their

mind to the pleadings, the evidence adduced before them and the

terms of the contract, we do not think, it is within our scope to

reappraise the matter as if this were an appeal and it is clear where

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two views are possible the view taken by the Arbitrator would

prevail.”

v. Puri Construction Private Limited Vs UOI AIR 1989 SC 777, it

was held that besides a court while examining the objections taken

to award filed by an arbitrator is not required to examine the

correctness of the claims on merits. It was further held that the

court cannot sit in appeal over view of the Arbitrator by re-

examining and re-assessing the materials. Thus the captioned

proceedings are liable to be dismissed, out rightly with exemplary

costs.

vi. Bharat Cooking Coal Limited v/s L. K. Ahuja 2004 (1) Arb. LR.

652 (SC) The Hon’ble Apex Court has been pleased to observe that

when the Arbitrator has applied his mind to the pleadings, the

evidence adduced before him and the terms of the contract, there is

no scope for the Court to reappraise the matter as if this were an

appeal and even if two views are possible, the view taken by the

Arbitrator would prevail.

vii. Ramchandra Reddy & Co. V/S State of A. P. 2001 (1) Arb. LR.

643 (SC) The Hon’ble Apex Court has been pleased to observe that

when there is no patent error on the face of the award, it is not open

for the Court to go into the proceedings of the award.

viii. V. K. Mittal V/S DDA and another 2001 (Suppl.) Arb. LR. 52

(DELHI) It was held that wrong or right decision of Arbitrator, is

binding if it has been reached fairly after giving adequate

opportunity to the parties.

From the perusal of the above, it can be culled out that this

Hon’ble Court has no scope, as per the provisions of the law, to

reappraise the matter once the Arbitrator has apprised the evidence
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adduced before him. Thus, the present petition, being patently illegal

and against the settled principles of law, is liable to be dismissed.

9. That it is submitted that the Objectors had filed an application u/S. 3-G

(5) of the NH Act, 1956 before the Ld. Arbitrator, inter-alia, on the ground

that the Competent Authority did not take into consideration the relevant

sale deeds, the fact that the land was commercial in nature and that the

land acquired was liable to compensated at the rate not less than Rs.

25,000 per sq. yard. Furthermore, the Objectors had also sought benefits

under the RFCTLARR Act, 2013, i.e. benefit of solatium and interest along

with compensation for severance of their land. However, no reliable

documents were attached by the Objectors in their application hence;

their claims were not considered by the Competent Authority.

10. That the Ld. Arbitrator has failed to appreciate that compensation under

the NH Act, 1956 must be paid in accordance with the settled principles of

law and that public money cannot be handed out in the form of charity.

Allowing the highly belated claims of the Objectors would lead to a grave

burden on the Central Exchequer.

11. That it is submitted that the Ld. Arbitrator has failed to appreciate that

the Doctrine of Latches and the well established legal maxims of “interest

republicae ut sit finis litium” (it is for the general welfare that a period be

put to litigation and“Vigilantibus non dormientius aequitas subvenit”, i.e.

that the equity aids the vigilant and not the ones that sleep over their

rights.

12. That the Objectors have no locus standi to file present petition.

13. That the Petitioners are estopped by their acts, conduct, acquiescence

and admissions from filing the present petition.

PARA WISE REPLY:

1. That the contents of this para are a matter of record and hence, warrants no

reply. However, if anything is found contrary to the record, the same is

vehemently denied.
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2. That the contents of this para insofar as they relate to acquisition

proceeding and arbitral award are a matter of record and hence, warrants

no reply. However, if anything is found contrary to the record, the same is

vehemently denied. Rest of the contents of this para are wrong and denied.

For convenience of this Hon’ble Court, sub-para reply is as follow:-

a) That the contetnts of this sub-para are wrong and denied. It is denied

that the land of the objector was acquired by the answering respondents.

No documentary evidence in the shape of jamabandi etc. has been

attached to show that the land of the objector was acquired by the

answering respondents.

b) That the contents of this sub-para are a matter of record and hence,

warrants no reply. However, if anything is found contrary to the record,

the same is vehemently denied.

c) That the contents of this sub-para are a matter of record and hence,

warrants no reply. However, if anything is found contrary to the record,

the same is vehemently denied.

d) That the contents of this sub-para, insofar as they relate to filing of claim

petition is a matter of record and hence, warrants no reply. It is

vehemently denied that the compensation awarded by the Competent

Authority was very less and inadequate. It is submitted that the

Competent Authority had already awarded adequate compensation in

accordance with the provisions of Section 3-G(7) of the NH Act read with

Section 26 of RFCTLARR, 2013 and the same was illegally and perversely

enhanced by the Ld. Arbitrator.

e) That the contents of this sub-para are a matter of record and hence,

warrants no reply. However, if anything is found contrary to the record,

the same is vehemently denied.

f) In reply to this sub-para, iIt is submitted that the petitioners have

attached sale deeds which are of residential property whereas the land in

question is agricultural in nature. Be it as it may, it is submitted that the

the Respondent herein had placed on record 7 sale deeds pertaining to

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village Jainpur wherein the average value of the land was Rs.1037/- per

sq. meter as against the sum of Rs.1195/- per sq. meter as has been

granted by the Competent Authority. It is submitted that the Ld.

Arbitrator had not taken into account the sale deeds produced by the

answering respondents during the Arbitration proceedings. The details of

sale deeds led by the Respondents are reproduced below in a tabular

format for the ready reference of this Hon’ble Court:

Exhibit No. Sale Deed Date Approx.

No. Rate

(Rupees Per

Sq. Meter)

Ex. RW-1/1 12370 15.11.2012 1175

Ex. RW-1/2 10863 12.10.2012 1174

Ex. RW-1/3 18364 11.03.2013 1176

Ex. RW-1/4 15403 09.01.2013 1174

Ex. RW-1/5 14446 24.12.2012 323

Ex. RW-1/6 4340 15.07.2013 1163

Ex. RW-1/7 38 24.08.2015 1076

AVERAGE RATE: Rs.1037/ sq. meter

It is reiterated that a reference of the said sale deeds was also given in

the written submissions filed by the Respondents after the completion of

the Arguments despite which, the Ld. Arbitrator has not referred to even

a single sale deed relied upon by the Respondents. It is vehemently

denied that the compensation awarded by Respondent No. 3 was very

less, inadequate as a higher compensation has already been awarded by

the Competent Authority in accordance with the provisions of law.

g) That the contents of this para are wrong and denied. It is denied that the

answering respondents did not lead evidence, but referred to sale dees so

allegedly submitted in some other case and also did not supply copy of

the said document and did not place on record the same. It is submitted
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that a perusal of Para 12 of the Award dated 25.1.2021 makes it clear

that the Answering respondents not only referred to the sale deeds but

also duly submitted the same in accordance with the provisions of law

for the consideration of Ld. Arbitrator. For convenience relevant lines of

para 12 of impugned order is reproduced below:-

“The Learned Counsel submitted 7 sale deeds, all for

agricultural land, pertaining to the same village (in case No. MA-

5/2018/LBP titled as Surinder Kaur Vs. UoI). Regarding the sale

deeds annexed by the applicant, he commented that the sale deed

No. 8925 dated 30.08.2012 does not fall within the ambit of

preceding three years from the Notification 3-A. Rest of the sale

deeds, he claimed, are not applicable to the issue at hand, as the

acquired land was of agricultural usage in his view, whereas the

sale deeds are of residential property as well as pertained to the

other villages.”

It is also vehemently denied that the sale deeds were perse admissible

being public documents. It is submitted that the sale deeds are neither

admissible nor relevant as the sale deed No. 8925 dated 30.8.2012

doesn’t fall within the ambit of preceding 3 years from the Notification 3-

A and rest of the sale deeds are of residential property whereas the

acquired land is agricultural in usage.

h) That in reply of this sub-para, it is submitted that the Ld. Arbitrator

while passing the Award had wrongly enhanced the amount of

compensation on the ground that the land was mentioned as ‘gair-

mumkin’ in the Khasra Girdawari. It is submitted that no presumption of

truth is attached to the entries in the Khasra Girdawari. It is further the

case of the answering respondents that as per the Jamabandi the nature

of land was Chahi. As such, the Ld. Arbitrator has on its own changed

the nature of land as against the factual position and proceeded to grant

compensation at a higher rate, thereby passing an award which is

vitiated by patent illegality and is in conflict with the public policy of

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India. It is reiterated that the sale deeds produced by the petitioners are

not relevant to the present case as the same pertains to residential

property whereas the land acquired is agricultural in nature.

3. In reply to this para, it is submitted that the award dated 25.01.2021 is

totally wrong, illegal and liable to be set aside. It is vehemently denied that

the award is liable to be modified and compensation is liable to be enhanced

as per prevalent market price of the acquired land and other statutory

benefits may be allowed. It is submitted that there is no power to modify an

arbitral award under Section 34 of the A&C Act. An arbitral award can only

be either set aside or remanded back as per the provisions of law and

catena of judgements. A detailed reply is already given in Preliminary

Submission and the same is not repeated here for the sake of brevity. Sub-

paras are replied herein below:-

a) That in reply to this sub-para, it is submitted that the procedure

adopted by Respondent No. 5 for deciding the claim is totally wrong,

illegal and against the statutory provisions on the grounds as

mentioned in ARB/309/2021. It is vehemently denied that since the

land of all the above stated villages was acquired by the same authority

and for the same purpose and as such, all the claim cases pertaining to

same award were required to be consolidated and decided by a common

award. It is submitted that the claim is to be decided in accordance to

the parameters laid down in Section 3-G(7) of the NH Act and the

Section 26 of RFCTLARR, 2013. It is further submitted that since the

nature of land, market value, etc. in every village in different, therefore,

the award is to be made independently in case of each village. It is

further submitted that the compensation awarded for the land acquired

at village Jainpur cannot be at parity with the compensation awarded

for land acquired at village Cholle and Jhamat as the compensation is

determined on the basis of parameters as laid down under law and the

compensation awarded to the adjoining village is no ground to ascertain

the same. Furthermore, the nature of land in village Jainpur, being

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agricultural, is different from nature of land in village Cholle and

Jhamat. It is also submitted that nowhere under the provisions of law,

the potential value of the land is a determinant while awarding

compensation under the NH Act.

b) In reply to this sub-para, it is submitted that the Answering

Respondent had brought to the notice of the Ld. Arbitrator that the sale

deed No. 8925 dated 30.08.2012 does not fall within the ambit of

preceding three years from the Notification 3-A. Rest of the sale deeds,

are not applicable to the issue at hand, as the acquired land was

agricultural in nature whereas the sale deeds are of residential

property. The objection, in this regard, was duly made by the answering

respondents at the relevant time before the Ld. Arbitrator but still the

Ld. Arbitrator passed a patently illegal, wrong and perverse award and

the same is liable to be set aside.

c) That the contents of this para is wrong and denied. It is denied that the

act of respondent No. 5 was otherwise discriminatory with the cases of

present petitioners as in the other cases, the same set of documents

were considered being produced as evidence and the compensation was

accordingly enhanced. It is submitted that no document has been

adduced in support of averments made in this sub-para. Being bereft of

any evidence the claim is liable to be rejected.

d) In regard to this para, it is submitted that the acquisition of land by the

same authority for the same purpose in the adjoining village is no

ground to claim parity with the adjoining village in regard to the

compensation. Had acquisition being made by the same authority for

the same purpose been a parameter, in that case utter injustice and

prejudice would have been caused to the public at large and would lead

to a grave burden on the Central Exchequer as agricultural land

owners would claim parity with the Commercial landowners just by the

reason of land being in the adjoining village. It is submitted that the

awards referred to in this sub-para donot pertain to the village Jainpur

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and thus, the averment made have no relevancy or merit. It is

submitted that the compensation is to be awarded to the land owners

on the basis of parameters laid down under Section 3-G(7) of the NH

Act read with Section 26 of RFCTLARR, 2013 and not the award pf the

adjoining village.

e) That in reply to this sub-para, it is submitted that as per Section 26 of

the RFCTLARR, 2013 the nature/type of the land of both the adjoining

villages should be similar for determining compensation whereas in the

present case the nature of land is agricultural while the sale deeds of

adjoining villages pertain to residential property.

f) The contents of this sub-para are wrong and denied. It is vehemently

denied that the petitioners was entitled to the same compensation

which was awarded through award 27.09.2019 and award dated

28.05.2019, particularly when the land has been acquired for the same

purpose and for adjoining villages having same potential value. It is

denied that otherwise also the awards dated 27.09.2019 and

28.05.2019 should have been relied upon and the compensation should

be given at the same rate. It is submitted that parity can only be

claimed with the awards of adjoining village if the nature and other

factors enshrined in the provisions of law are similar and at equal

footing, which is not the case in the issue at hand. It is further

submitted that nowhere under the provisions of law, the potentiality of

the land is to be looked into for the purpose of awarding compensation

for acquisition made under the NH Act. A detailed reply is already given

in the preceeding sub-paras & paras and the same may be read as a

reply to this sub-para.

g) That a detailed reply is already given in the preceeding sub-paras &

paras and the same may be read as a reply to this sub-para.

h) That in reply to this para, it is submitted that the quoted observation of

the Ld. Arbitrator in this sub-para is wrong, perverse, patently illegal

and against the substantive provisions of law. It is further submitted

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that illegality in passing of one award cannot be a ground to pass

another award which will be patently illegal and against the provisions

of substantive law.

i) In reply to this para, it is submitted that no reliable and relevant

evidence has been adduced by the Objector in support of the averments

made in this para. The master plan of Ludhiana referred herein

pertains to only show the future potentiality of the land and not the

market value of land at the time of Section 3-A notification. It is well

settled law that the future potential of land is not to be seen while

determining compensation for the land acquired under the NH Act. It is

further submitted that the parity as claimed by the petitioner is

maintainable and the potentiality of the land cannot be parameter while

awarding compensation to the landowners. A detailed reply is already

given in the preceeding sub-paras & paras and the same is not

repeated for the sake of brevity.

i. It is, firstly, brought to the notice of the Hon’ble Court that sub-para

numbering (i) has been reccured twice and the same is being replied

accordingly for the sake of convenience. In reply to this sub-para, it is

submitted that the value of the land is ascertained on the date of

passing of the S. 3A notification. It is further submitted that the market

value is determined as per S. 3-G (7) of the NH Act, 1956 r/w S. 26 of

the RFCTLARR Act, 2013 and not as per the future potentiality of the

land. It is further submitted that several legal conditions such as CLU

certificate etc. have to be complied to change the nature of the land

from agricultural to residential/commercial which the applicants have

miserably failed to produce on record. Hence, there is no merit in the

averments made in this sub-para and the same is liable to be

dismissed.

j) That in reply sub-para, it is submitted that the potential value is

nowhere a factor for consideration while awarding compensation for the

acquisitions made under the NH Act. It is also submitted that the

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averments made in this para are based on conjectures and surmises

and the same cannot be considered in the eyes of law. It is further

submitted that no documentary evidence has been adduced to show

that the land of the petitioner is either residential or commercial. Being

bereft of any evidence the claim is liable to be rejected.

k) In reply to this para, it is submitted that the Competent Authority had

rightly decided that the multiplying factor on basis of the provisions

laid down under law and the same was rightly upheld by the Ld.

Arbitrator. With regard to the notification dated 12.03.2021, without

commenting on the merits or applicability of the said notification in the

present case, it is submitted that benefit on the basis of such a

notification cannot be taken retrospectively, as the same is against the

substantive law and would tantamount to a patent illegality.

l) In reply to this para, it is submitted that the provisions of Section 3-J of

the NH Act are abundantly clear that the Land Acquisition Act, 1894

does not apply to acquisitions made under NH Act. In addition to that,

it is submitted that the Section 93(2) of Land Acquisition Act, 2013 is

also not applicable to the acquisitions made under the NH Act.

m) That in reply to this sub-para, it is submitted that the petitioners have

failed to show the severance or bifurcation of land so as to claim

damages in this regard. It is well settled principle of law that averments

are not just to be put forth but proved as well by the means of reliable

and relevant evidences. Being bereft of any evidence, the claim of the

petitioner is liable to be rejected.

4. That in reply to this para, it is submitted that the clear and unequivocal

provisions of Section 26 of RFCTLARR, 2013 is abundantly clear that sale

deeds of similar nature of land is to be considered. It is submitted that the

sale deed deed No. 8925 dated 30.08.2012 pertaining to the Village Jainpur

is barred from being taken into consideration as the same is beyond the

statutory requirement of being within 3 years from Section 3-A notification

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of the NH Act. The rest of the sale deeds produced by the Petitioners do not

pertain to the same nature of land i.e. agricultural as in the present case.

5. That the contents of this para are wrong and denied. It is denied that in

these facts and circumstances, the present award is liable to be modified

and compensation may be enhanced for the acquired land to the extent of

Rs. 25,000/- per sq. yard as claimed in the claim petition. It is submitted

that there is no power to modify an arbitral award under Section 34 of the

A&C Act. A detailed reply is already given in the preliminary submissions

and the same is not repeated here for the sake of brevity. However, it is

made clear that the impugned award is liable to be set aside on the grounds

well laid down in the Objection Petition of the Answering Respondents.

6. That the contents of this para are a matter of record and hence, warrants no

reply. However, if anything is found contrary to the record, the same is

vehemently denied.

Prayer clause is denied.

PRAYER

In light of the submissions made hereinabove, the present objections

may kindly be dismissed as no enhancement/modification of award can be

granted in the present petition, however, the award being illegal is liable to be

set aside, in light of the contentions raised by the answering respondent in the

objection petition bearing ARB/309/2021, in the interest of justice.

Place: Ludhiana
Dated: Prashant Dubey,
Project Director,
PIU – Ludhiana.

(Raghujeet Singh Madan& Avinash Bansal)

( Deepshikha Gupta & Abhishek Vashista)

Advocate
Counsel for the Respondent No.1 & 2

VERIFICATION:-
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Verified that the contents of preliminary objections/preliminary

submissions and the contents of the para-wise reply are true and correct to my

knowledge and knowledge derived from the official record. No part of it is false

and nothing material has been concealed therefrom.

Place: Ludhiana
Dated: Prashant Dubey,
Project Director,
PIU – Ludhiana.
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