6.

Authorship
Section 174, 176, 178-179, IPC

SECTION 174. Published Edition of Work. - In addition to the right to publish granted by the
author, his heirs, or assigns, the publisher shall have a copyright consisting merely of the right
of reproduction of the typographical arrangement of the published edition of the work. (n)

SECTION 176. Works of the Government. - 176.1. No copyright shall subsist in any work
of the Government of the Philippines. However, prior approval of the government
agency or office wherein the work is created shall be necessary for exploitation of such
work for profit. Such agency or office may, among other things, impose as a condition
the payment of royalties. No prior approval or conditions shall be required for the use
for any purpose of statutes, rules and regulations, and speeches, lectures, sermons,
addresses, and dissertations, pronounced, read or rendered in courts of justice, before
administrative agencies, in deliberative assemblies and in meetings of public
character. (Sec. 9, first par., P.D. No. 49)

176.2. The author of speeches, lectures, sermons, addresses, and dissertations

mentioned in the preceding paragraphs shall have the exclusive right of making a
collection of his works. (n)

176.3. Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions, the Government is not precluded from
receiving and holding copyrights transferred to it by assignment, bequest or otherwise;
nor shall publication or republication by the Government in a public document of any
work in which copyright is subsisting be taken to cause any abridgment or annulment of
the copyright or to authorize any use or appropriation of such work without the consent
of the copyright owner. (Sec. 9, third par., P.D. No. 49)

SECTION 178. Rules on Copyright Ownership. - Copyright ownership shall be governed

by the following rules:

178.1. Subject to the provisions of this section, in the case of original literary and
artistic works, copyright shall belong to the author of the work;

178.2. In the case of works of joint authorship, the co-authors shall be the original
owners of the copyright and in the absence of agreement, their rights shall be
governed by the rules on co-ownership. If, however, a work of joint authorship consists
of parts that can be used separately and the author of each part can be identified, the
author of each part shall be the original owner of the copyright in the part that he has
created;
178.3. In the case of work created by an author during and in the course of his
employment, the copyright shall belong to:

(a) The employee, if the creation of the object of copyright is not a part of his regular
duties even if the employee uses the time, facilities and materials of the employer.

(b) The employer, if the work is the result of the performance of his regularly-assigned
duties, unless there is an agreement, express or implied, to the contrary.

178.4. In the case of a work commissioned by a person other than an employer of the
author and who pays for it and the work is made in pursuance of the commission, the
person who so commissioned the work shall have ownership of the work, but the
copyright thereto shall remain with the creator, unless there is a written stipulation to
the contrary;

178.5. In the case of audiovisual work, the copyright shall belong to the producer, the
author of the scenario, the composer of the music, the film director, and the author of
the work so adapted. However, subject to contrary or other stipulations among the
creators, the producer shall exercise the copyright to an extent required for the
exhibition of the work in any manner, except for the right to collect performing license
fees for the performance of musical compositions, with or without words, which are
incorporated into the work; and

178.6. In respect of letters, the copyright shall belong to the writer subject to the
provisions of Article 723 of the Civil Code. (Sec. 6, P.D. No. 49a)

SECTION 179. Anonymous and Pseudonymous Works. - For purposes of this Act, the
publishers shall be deemed to represent the authors of articles and other writings
published without the names of the authors or under pseudonyms, unless the contrary
appears, or the pseudonyms or adopted name leaves no doubt as to the author’s
identity, or if the author of the anonymous works discloses his identity. (Sec. 7, P.D. 49)

Article 722 and 723, Civil Code

ARTICLE 722. The author and the composer, mentioned in Nos. 1 and 2

(1) The author with regard to his literary, dramatic, historical, legal, philosophical,
scientific or other work;

(2) The composer, as to his musical composition;

of the preceding article, shall have the ownership of their creations even before the
publication of the same. Once their works are published, their rights are governed by the
Copyright laws.

The painter, sculptor or other artist shall have dominion over the product of his art even
before it is copyrighted.

The scientist or technologist has the ownership of his discovery or invention even
before it is patented. (n)

ARTICLE 723. Letters and other private communications in writing are owned by the
person to whom they are addressed and delivered, but they cannot be published or
disseminated without the consent of the writer or his heirs. However, the court may
authorize their publication or dissemination if the public good or the interest of justice
so requires. (n)

Article 520 of the Civil Code

ARTICLE 520. A trade-mark or trade-name duly registered in the proper government bureau or
office is owned by and pertains to the person, corporation, or firm registering the same, subject
to the provisions of special laws. (n)

1. Sole Authorship
Lindsay v.The Wrecked and Abandoned Vessel R.M.S. Titanic, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d 1609 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)

RULE:

The Copyright Act of 1976 provides that copyright ownership vests initially in the author or
authors of the work. 17 U.S.C.S. § 201(a). Generally speaking, the author of a work is the
person who actually creates the work, that is, the person who translates an idea into a fixed,
tangible expression entitled to copyright protection. In the context of film footage and
photography, it makes intuitive sense that the "author" of a work is the individual or
individuals who took the pictures, i.e. the photographer.

The duty to provide an accounting from profits obtained runs only between co-owners of a
copyright.

FACTS:
Alex Lindsay was an independent documentary filmmaker engaged in the business of
creating, producing, directing, and filming documentaries. RMS Titanic, Inc. (RMST) was
awarded exclusive status as salvor-in-possession of the Titanic wreck site and is therefore
authorized to carry on salvage operations at the vessel’s wreck site. RMST allegedly agreed to
maintain all the artifacts it recovered during the salvage operations for historical verification,
scientific education, and public awareness. Lindsay, under a contract with a British TV
company, filmed and directed the British documentary film, “Explorers of the Titanic,” a
chronicle of RMST’s third salvage expedition of Titanic. Lindsay sailed with RMST and the
salvage expedition crew to the wreck site. He alleged that during and after the filming, he
conceived a new film project for the Titanic. Lindsay agreed to join RMST to raise money not
only for the film project, but for other aspects of the 1996 salvage operation. The contract was
to include terms of Lindsay’s compensation. However, no contract was ever executed.
Lindsay was never compensated for his work. Plaintiff Lindsay filed a lawsuit that sought
damages based upon his share of the revenues generated by the salvage operations
conducted. RMST moved for the dismissal of the case. Lindsay amended his complaint to add
copyright infringement. The district court granted Lindsay’s motion to amend his complaint
to add copyright infringement claims against RMST and to join Discovery Communications.

ISSUE:

1. Was plaintiff the author of the claimed footage?

ANSWER:

1. Yes.

CONCLUSION:

1. The Court held, based on Lindsay's allegations that he exercised such a high degree of
control over the film operation and content such that the final product duplicated his
conceptions and visions of what the film should have looked like, Lindsay could be found to
be an "author" within the meaning of the Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C.S. § 102 et seq., and
did not intend any defendant to be a co-author. Lindsay was the author of the claimed
footage. Lindsay's alleged storyboards and the specific directions he provided to the film
crew regarding the use of the lightowers and the angles from which to shoot the wreck all
indicated that the final footage would indeed be the product of Lindsay's "original
intellectual conceptions."

2. The Court held that Lindsay was not entitled to an accounting of profits as defendants were
not co-authors of the copyright. Because DCI was only a licensee of a putative joint owner of
the copyright at issue here, Lindsay's claim for an accounting failed as a matter of law.

Erickson v. Trinity Theatre, Inc. - 13 F.3d 1061 (7th Cir. 1994)

RULE:

A "joint work" is defined as a work prepared by two or more authors with the intention that
their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole.

FACTS:

Plaintiff Karen Erickson was one of the founders of Defendant Trinity Theatre d/b/a/ Trinity
Square Ensemble (Trinity). Between 1981 and January 1991, Erickson served Trinity in various
capacities: as playwright, artistic director, actress, play director, business manager, and
member of the board of directors. The subject of the present case were the rights to three
plays: (i) Much Ado About Shakespeare (Much Ado); The Theatre Time Machine (Time
Machine); and Prairie Voices: Tales from Illinois (Prairie Voices). As regards the script
Much Ado, Erickson, together with others, made decisions as to what would be included in
the texts. Moreover, Erickson received a copyright registration for Time Machine in 1988.
Erickson then started producing the play independently of Trinity in 1984 with two other
actors, Paddy Lynn and Will Clinger. Erickson claimed that she worked to develop the scenes
alone; however, the evidence shows that the actors were involved in the development of the
melodrama and improvisational scenes. In 1990, Erickson developed Prairie Voices, a play
based on tales from Illinois history. As with Time Machine, Erickson worked with the actors in
the improvisational format; however, Erickson controlled what eventually was put in the
script.

In 1987, Trinity began paying Erickson royalties for its performances of her plays. On July 5,
1988, Ms. Erickson entered into a two-year licensing agreement with Trinity that designated
her as a "playwright" entitling her to royalties for performances of two of her plays, Much Ado
and Time Machine. Erickson was also subject to an actors’ agreement with Trinity, wherein, it
was stipulated that Erickson agreed that Trinity reserved the right to any recording, audio,
video, or both of the Production. Eventually, Erickson left Trinity in January 1991. Shortly
thereafter, she applied for and was issued copyright registration for Much Ado and Prairie
Voices. Erickson's attorneys wrote Trinity a letter demanding that Trinity discontinue
performing the plaintiff's plays. Trinity refused to comply with the request.

Erickson then filed a 17-count complaint against Trinity, members of Trinity's

management, and individual Trinity actors seeking injunctive and legal relief in which she
alleged copyright infringement, unfair competition, and other related tortious activity. The
magistrate judge recommended enjoining the performance of the plays but not the use of the
videotapes. Both parties filed objections. The district court sustained Erickson's objections to
the portions of the recommendation addressing the videotapes but denied Trinity's
objections to the portion of the recommendation addressing performance of the plays.
Accordingly, the district court prohibited Trinity from using either the plays or the videotapes.
Trinity appealed, contending that several of its members were joint authors of the three plays
with Ms. Erickson; that these joint authors gave Trinity the right to produce the plays, and
therefore that Trinity and its member joint authors share rights to the plays and videotapes.

ISSUE:

Is there joint authorship of the subject works?

ANSWER:

No

CONCLUSION:

The Court determined that other members of defendant theatre company were not joint
authors of the works in question because the parties did not intend to be joint authors at the
time the work was created and contributions to the works were not independently
copyrightable. According to the Court, actors making suggestions, ideas, and refinements
standing alone were not independently copyrightable materials, and therefore, these other
individuals did not qualify as authors of a joint work.

CCNV vs Reid case (Works made for hire)

In the fall of 1985, petitioners -- the Community for Creative Non-Violence
(CCNV), a Washington, D.C. organization dedicated to eliminating homelessness,
and one of its trustees -- entered into an oral agreement with respondent Reid,
a sculptor, to produce a statue dramatizing the plight of the homeless for
display at a 1985 Christmas pageant in Washington. While Reid worked on the
statue in his Baltimore, Md. studio, CCNV members visited him on a number of
occasions to check on his progress and to coordinate CCNV's construction of the
sculpture's base in accordance with the parties' agreement. Reid accepted most of
CCNV's suggestions and directions as to the sculpture's configuration and
appearance. After the completed work was delivered to Washington, CCNV paid
Reid the final installment of the agreed-upon price, joined the sculpture to its
base, and displayed it. The parties, who had never discussed copyright in the
sculpture, then filed competing copyright registration certificates. The
District Court ruled for CCNV in its subsequent suit seeking, inter alia, a
determination of copyright ownership, holding that the statue was a "work
made for hire" as defined in the Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 101, and was
therefore owned exclusively by CCNV under § 201(b), which vests copyright
ownership of works for hire in the employer or other person for whom the
work is prepared, unless there is a written agreement to the contrary. The Court
of Appeals reversed, holding that the sculpture was not a "work made for hire"
under the first subsection of the § 101 definition (hereinafter § 101(1)), since it was
not "prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employment" in
light of Reid's status as an independent contractor under agency law. The court
also ruled that the statue did not satisfy the second subsection of the § 101
definition (hereinafter § 101(2)), since sculpture is not one of the nine categories of
"specially ordered or commissioned" works enumerated therein, and the parties
had not agreed in writing that the sculpture would be a work for hire. However, the
court remanded for a determination whether the statue was jointly authored by
CCNV and Reid, such that they were co-owners of the copyright under § 201(a).

Issue: WON the statue was a work for hire

Page 490 U. S. 731

Held:
2. The sculpture in question is not a "work made for hire" within the meaning
of § 101. Reid was an independent contractor, rather than a § 101(1)
"employee," since, although CCNV members directed enough of the work to
ensure that the statue met their specifications, all other relevant
circumstances weigh heavily against finding an employment relationship.
Reid engages in a skilled occupation; supplied his own tools; worked in Baltimore
without daily supervision from Washington; was retained for a relatively short
period of time; had absolute freedom to decide when and how long to work in
order to meet his deadline; and had total discretion in hiring and paying assistants.
3. However, CCNV nevertheless may be a joint author of the sculpture and, thus, a
co-owner of the copyright under § 201(a), if, on remand,

Article 7

(1) The term of protection granted by this Convention shall be the life of the author
and fifty years after his death.

(2) However, in the case of cinematographic works, the countries of the Union may
provide that the term of protection shall expire fifty years after the work has been
made available to the public with the consent of the author, or, failing such an
event within fifty years from the making of such a work, fifty years after the making.

(3) In the case of anonymous or pseudonymous works, the term of protection

granted by this Convention shall expire fifty years after the work has been lawfully
made available to the public. However, when the pseudonym adopted by the
author leaves no doubt as to his identity, the term of protection shall be that
provided in paragraph (1). If the author of an anonymous or pseudonymous work
discloses his identity during the above-mentioned period, the term of protection
applicable shall be that provided in paragraph (1). The countries of the Union shall
not be required to protect anonymous or pseudonymous works in respect of which
it is reasonable to presume that their author has been dead for fifty years.

(4) It shall be a matter for legislation in the countries of the Union to determine the
term of protection of photographic works and that of works of applied art in so far
as they are protected as artistic works; however, this term shall last at least until the
end of a period of twenty-five years from the making of such a work.

(5) The term of protection subsequent to the death of the author and the terms
provided by paragraphs (2), (3) and (4), shall run from the date of death or of the
event referred to in those paragraphs, but such terms shall always be deemed to
begin on the 1 st of January of the year following the death or such event.

(6) The countries of the Union may grant a term of protection in excess of those
provided by the preceding paragraphs.
(7) Those countries of the Union bound by the Rome Act of this Convention, which
grant, in their national legislation in force at the time of signature of the present
Act, shorter terms of protection than those provided for in the preceding
paragraphs, shall have the right to maintain such terms when ratifying or acceding
to the present Act.

(8) In any case, the term shall be governed by the legislation of the country where
protection is claimed; however, unless the legislation of that country otherwise
provides, the term shall not exceed the term fixed in the country of origin of the
work.

SECTION 213. Term of Protection. - 213.1. Subject to the provisions of Subsections

213.2 to 213.5, the copyright in works under Sections 172 and 173 shall be protected
during the life of the author and for fifty (50) years after his death. This rule also applies
to posthumous works. (Sec. 21, first sentence, P.D. No. 49a)

213.2. In case of works of joint authorship, the economic rights shall be protected
during the life of the last surviving author and for fifty (50) years after his death. (Sec.
21, second sentence, P.D. No. 49)

213.3. In case of anonymous or pseudonymous works, the copyright shall be protected

for fifty (50) years from the date on which the work was first lawfully published:
Provided, That where, before the expiration of the said period, the author’s identity is
revealed or is no longer in doubt, the provisions of Subsections 213.1. and 213.2 shall
apply, as the case may be: Provided, further, That such works if not published before
shall be protected for fifty (50) years counted from the making of the work. (Sec. 23,
P.D. No. 49)

213.4. In case of works of applied art the protection shall be for a period of twenty-five
(25) years from the date of making. (Sec. 24(B), P.D. No. 49a)

213.5. In case of photographic works, the protection shall be for fifty (50) years from
publication of the work and, if unpublished, fifty (50) years from the making. (Sec. 24(C),
P.D. 49a)

213.6. In case of audio-visual works including those produced by process analogous to

photography or any process for making audio-visual recordings, the term shall be fifty
(50) years from date of publication and, if unpublished, from the date of making. (Sec.
24(C), P.D. No. 49a)
SECTION 214. Calculation of Term. - The term of protection subsequent to the death of
the author provided in the preceding Section shall run from the date of his death or of
publication, but such terms shall always be deemed to begin on the first day of January
of the year following the event which gave rise to them. (Sec. 25, P.D. No. 49)

Carol Barnhart Inc. v. Econ. Cover Corp. - 773 F.2d 411 (2d Cir.
1985)

RULE:

The law refuses copyright protection for works of applied art or industrial design which have
aesthetic or artistic features that cannot be identified separately from the useful article. Such
works are not copyrightable regardless of the fact that they may be aesthetically satisfying
and valuable.

FACTS:

Plaintiff Carol Barnhart Inc., which was selling display forms to department stores,
distributors, and small retail stores, filed a complaint against defendant Economy Cover
Corporation, alleging that defendant has infringed its copyright and engaged in unfair
competition by offering for sale display forms copied from four original "sculptural forms" to
which Barnhart held a copyright. The district court granted Economy's motion for summary
judgment on the ground that plaintiff's mannequins of partial human torsos used to display
articles of clothing were utilitarian articles not containing separable works of art, and thus
not copyrightable. Plaintiff appealed. 

ISSUE:

Were the plaintiff’s mannequins of partial human torsos utilitarian articles, and therefore, not
copyrightable?

ANSWER:

Yes.

CONCLUSION:
On appeal, the court stated that, since the aesthetic and artistic features of plaintiff’s forms
were inseparable from the forms’ use as utilitarian articles, the forms were not copyrightable.
The court stated that it found no support in the statutory language or legislative history for
the claim that merely because a utilitarian article fell within a traditional art form, it was
entitled to a lower level of scrutiny in determining its copyrightability. Accordingly, the court
affirmed the judgment of the lower court.

RULE:

The statutory definition of pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works states that the design of a
useful article, as defined in this section, shall be considered a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural
work only if, and only to the extent that, such design incorporates pictorial, graphic, or
sculptural features that can be identified separately from, and are capable of existing
independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article.

FACTS:

David Levine, the chief owner of appellant Brandir International, Inc., created “RIBBON Rack,”
a bicycle rack made of bent tubing that was said to have originated from a wire sculpture.
Upon discovering that another company, Cascade Pacific Lumber Co., was selling a similar
product, appellant placed a copyright notice on all RIBBON Racks before shipment.
Thereafter, appellant submitted five copyright applications for registration to the Copyright
Office. The Copyright Office refused registration by letter, stating that the RIBBON Rack did
not contain any element that was “capable of independent existence as a copyrightable
pictorial, graphic or sculptural work apart from the shape of the useful article.” An appeal to
the Copyright Office was denied. In the subsequent suit brought in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York, the district court granted summary judgment on
both the copyright and trademark claims to defendant Cascade Pacific Lumber Co., d/b/a
Columbia Cascade Co., manufacturer of a similar bicycle rack. Appellant challenged the
district court’s decision.

ISSUE:

1. Was the appellant’s RIBBON Rack copyrightable?

2. Did the district court err in granting summary judgment on appellant’s trademark and
unfair competition claims to defendant Cascade?
ANSWER:

1) No. 2) Yes.

CONCLUSION:

The Circuit Court of Appeals applied the Denicola test to determine if the rack was
copyrightable. To state the Denicola test in the language of conceptual separability, if design
elements reflect a merger of aesthetic and functional considerations, the artistic aspects of a
work cannot be said to be conceptually separable from the utilitarian elements. Conversely,
where design elements can be identified as reflecting the designer's artistic judgment
exercised independently of functional influences, conceptual separability was said to exist. In
the case at bar, the Court found that the form of the rack was influenced by utilitarian
concerns and that any aesthetic elements were not conceptually separable from the
utilitarian elements; therefore, the rack was not copyrightable.

Regarding the second issue, the Court held that the district court erred in dismissing
appellant’s trademark and unfair competition claims. According to the Court, the design of a
product itself may function as its packaging or protectable trade dress which may be
protected under either section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), or New York State
unfair competition law. As such, the Court reversed and remanded the district court's
decisions on appellants trademark and unfair competition claims. On remand, the issue of
functionality should be viewed in terms of bicycle racks generally and not one-piece
undulating bicycle racks specifically.

9. Acquiring and Transferring Copyright

a. Deposit and Notice

Section 191, 192, IPC;

SECTION 191. Registration and Deposit with National Library and the Supreme Court
Library. - After the first public dissemination of performance by authority of the
copyright owner of a work falling under Subsections 172.1, 172.2 and 172.3 of this Act,
there shall, for the purpose of completing the records of the National Library and the
Supreme Court Library, within three (3) weeks, be registered and deposited with it, by
personal delivery or by registered mail, two (2) complete copies or reproductions of the
work in such form as the directors of said libraries may prescribe. A certificate of
deposit shall be issued for which the prescribed fee shall be collected and the copyright
owner shall be exempt from making additional deposit of the works with the National
Library and the Supreme Court Library under other laws. If, within three (3) weeks after
receipt by the copyright owner of a written demand from the directors for such deposit,
the required copies or reproductions are not delivered and the fee is not paid, the
copyright owner shall be liable to pay a fine equivalent to the required fee per month of
delay and to pay to the National Library and the Supreme Court Library the amount of
the retail price of the best edition of the work. Only the above mentioned classes of
work shall be accepted for deposit by the National Library and the Supreme Court
Library. (Sec. 26, P.D. No. 49a)

SECTION 192. Notice of Copyright. - Each copy of a work published or offered for sale
may contain a notice bearing the name of the copyright owner, and the year of its first
publication, and, in copies produced after the creator’s death, the year of such death.
(Sec. 27, P.D. No. 49a)

Section 227-229, IPC;

SECTION 227. Ownership of Deposit and Instruments. - All copies deposited and
instruments in writing filed with the National Library and the Supreme Court Library in
accordance with the provisions of this Act shall become the property of the
Government. (Sec. 60, P.D. No. 49)

SECTION 228. Public Records. - The section or division of the National Library and the
Supreme Court Library charged with receiving copies and instruments deposited and
with keeping records required under this Act and everything in it shall be opened to
public inspection. The Director of the National Library is empowered to issue such
safeguards and regulations as may be necessary to implement this Section and other
provisions of this Act. (Sec. 61, P.D. No. 49)

SECTION 229. Copyright Division; Fees. - The Copyright Section of the National Library
shall be classified as a Division upon the effectivity of this Act. The National Library
shall have the power to collect, for the discharge of its services under this Act, such
fees as may be promulgated by it from time to time subject to the approval of the
Department Head. (Sec. 62, P.D. 49a)

Rule 5, Copyright Safeguards and Regulations

RULE 5 Registration and Deposit of Work

SECTION 1. Who May Apply. — The owner or assignee of the copyright or his duly authorized
agent or representative, may apply for a certificate of registration and deposit of the work:
Provided, That if an author could not claim the benefit of copyright protection, his assignee or
agent cannot claim it. If the applicant is not the owner or author or assignee of the work, he shall
be required to submit his authority to apply. An assignee is a person to whom an author may
assign copyright in whole or in part. The assignee is entitled to all the rights and remedies which
the assignor has with respect to the copyright. Although no copyright should subsist in any work
of the government, any employee may claim it by submitting for registration any work that has
been created during the time of his employment but which does not form part of his regularly
prescribed official duties.

SECTION 2. Identification of Author or Authors. — An application for copyright certificate

shall identify the author or authors, as far as practicable, without prejudice to the provisions of
Sections 171.2 and 179 of the IPC.

SECTION 3. Non-Resident Applicant. — A non-resident applicant shall appoint a resident

agent, by special power of attorney (SPA), who shall be authorized to pursue the copyright
application for his/her/its behalf with TNL and/or the SCL and to receive service of notice or
other legal process relating to the application and the copyright. In the event of death, absence or
incapacity of the resident agent, the applicant shall appoint a new resident agent, by SPA with
revocation of the prior SPA, and file notice and a copy thereof with TNL and/or the SCL.

SECTION 4. Works That Shall Be Registered and Deposited. — Two (2) copies or
reproductions of the following classes of works, and transfers and assignments related thereto,
shall be registered and deposited with TNL Copyright Division and another two (2) copies with
the SCL: • Books, pamphlets, articles and other writings; • Periodicals and newspapers; •
Lectures, sermons, addresses, dissertations prepared for oral delivery whether or not reduced in
writing or other material form; • Letters; • Musical compositions with or without words.

SECTION 5. Replicas and Pictures. — For practical purposes, only replicas and pictures of the
following classes of works, shall be registered and deposited with TNL Copyright Division: •
Works of drawing, painting, architecture, sculpture, engraving, lithography or other works of art,
models or designs for works of art; • Original ornamental designs or models for articles of
manufacture, whether or not registerable as an industrial design, and other works of applied art; •
Illustrations, maps, plans, sketches, charts and three-dimensional works relative to geography,
topography, architecture or science; • Drawings or plastic works of a scientific or technical
character.

SECTION 6. Works that May be Registered and Deposited. — The following works may be
registered and deposited: • Dramatic or dramatic-musical compositions, choreographic works or
entertainment in shows; • Photographic works including works produced by a process analogous
to photography, lantern slides; • Audiovisual works and cinematographic works and works
produced by a process analogous to cinematography or any process for making audio-visual
recordings; • Pictorial illustrations and advertisements; • Computer programs; • Other literary,
scholarly, scientific and artistic works; • Sound recordings; • Broadcast recordings.

SECTION 7. When to Register and Deposit. — The registration and deposit of copies or
reproductions of the work or works, using the prescribed form, shall be made personally or by
registered mail within three (3) week

b. Transfer of Copyright
Sections 180, 181, 182, 183, IPC;

SECTION 180. Rights of Assignee. - 180.1. The copyright may be assigned in whole or in
part. Within the scope of the assignment, the assignee is entitled to all the rights and
remedies which the assignor had with respect to the copyright.

180.2. The copyright is not deemed assigned inter vivos in whole or in part unless there
is a written indication of such intention.

180.3. The submission of a literary, photographic or artistic work to a newspaper,

magazine or periodical for publication shall constitute only a license to make a single
publication unless a greater right is expressly granted. If two (2) or more persons jointly
own a copyright or any part thereof, neither of the owners shall be entitled to grant
licenses without the prior written consent of the other owner or owners. (Sec. 15, P.D.
No. 49a)

SECTION 181. Copyright and Material Object. - The copyright is distinct from the
property in the material object subject to it. Consequently, the transfer or assignment of
the copyright shall not itself constitute a transfer of the material object. Nor shall a
transfer or assignment of the sole copy or of one or several copies of the work imply
transfer or assignment of the copyright. (Sec. 16, P.D. No. 49)

SECTION 182. Filing of Assignment or License. - An assignment or exclusive license

may be filed in duplicate with the National Library upon payment of the prescribed fee
for registration in books and records kept for the purpose. Upon recording, a copy of the
instrument shall be returned to the sender with a notation of the fact of record. Notice
of the record shall be published in the IPO Gazette. (Sec. 19, P.D. No. 49a)

SECTION 183. Designation of Society. - The copyright owners or their heirs may
designate a society of artists, writers or composers to enforce their economic rights
and moral rights on their behalf. (Sec. 32, P.D. No. 49a)

Section 4.2 in relation to Sections 87 and 88, IPC

4.2. The term “technology transfer arrangements” refers to contracts or agreements involving
the transfer of systematic knowledge for the manufacture of a product, the application of a
process, or rendering of a service including management contracts; and the transfer,
assignment or licensing of all forms of intellectual property rights, including licensing of
computer software except computer software developed for mass market.

SECTION 87. Prohibited Clauses. - Except in cases under Section 91, the following
provisions shall be deemed prima facie to have an adverse effect on competition and
trade:

87.1. Those which impose upon the licensee the obligation to acquire from a specific
source capital goods, intermediate products, raw materials, and other technologies, or
of permanently employing personnel indicated by the licensor;

87.2. Those pursuant to which the licensor reserves the right to fix the sale or resale
prices of the products manufactured on the basis of the license;

87.3. Those that contain restrictions regarding the volume and structure of production;

87.4. Those that prohibit the use of competitive technologies in a non-exclusive

technology transfer agreement;

87.5. Those that establish a full or partial purchase option in favor of the licensor;

87.6. Those that obligate the licensee to transfer for free to the licensor the inventions
or improvements that may be obtained through the use of the licensed technology;

87.7. Those that require payment of royalties to the owners of patents for patents which
are not used;

87.8. Those that prohibit the licensee to export the licensed product unless justified for
the protection of the legitimate interest of the licensor such as exports to countries
where exclusive licenses to manufacture and/or distribute the licensed product(s) have
already been granted;

87.9. Those which restrict the use of the technology supplied after the expiration of the
technology transfer arrangement, except in cases of early termination of the technology
transfer arrangement due to reason(s) attributable to the licensee;

87.10. Those which require payments for patents and other industrial property rights
after their expiration, termination arrangement;
87.11. Those which require that the technology recipient shall not contest the validity of
any of the patents of the technology supplier;

87.12. Those which restrict the research and development activities of the licensee
designed to absorb and adapt the transferred technology to local conditions or to
initiate research and development programs in connection with new products,
processes or equipment;

87.13. Those which prevent the licensee from adapting the imported technology to local
conditions, or introducing innovation to it, as long as it does not impair the quality
standards prescribed by the licensor;

87.14. Those which exempt the licensor for liability for non-fulfilment of his
responsibilities under the technology transfer arrangement and/or liability arising from
third party suits brought about by the use of the licensed product or the licensed
technology; and

87.15. Other clauses with equivalent effects. (Sec. 33-C (2), RA 165a)

SECTION 88. Mandatory Provisions. - The following provisions shall be included in

voluntary license contracts:

88.1. That the laws of the Philippines shall govern the interpretation of the same and in
the event of litigation, the venue shall be the proper court in the place where the licensee
has its principal office;

88.2. Continued access to improvements in techniques and processes related to the

technology shall be made available during the period of the technology transfer
arrangement;

88.3. In the event the technology transfer arrangement shall provide for arbitration, the
Procedure of Arbitration of the Arbitration Law of the Philippines or the Arbitration Rules
of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) or the Rules
of Conciliation and Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) shall
apply and the venue of arbitration shall be the Philippines or any neutral country; and

88.4. The Philippine taxes on all payments relating to the technology transfer
arrangement shall be borne by the licensor. (n)

Section 92, IPC; Section 237, IPC

SECTION 92. Non-Registration with the Documentation, Information and Technology Transfer
Bureau. - Technology transfer arrangements that conform with the provisions of Sections 86
and 87 need not be registered with the Documentation, Information and Technology Transfer
Bureau. Non-conformance with any of the provisions of Sections 87 and 88, however, shall
automatically render the technology transfer arrangement unenforceable, unless said
technology transfer arrangement is approved and registered with the Documentation,
Information and Technology Transfer Bureau under the provisions of Section 91 on exceptional
cases. (n)

SECTION 237. Notification on Berne Appendix. - The Philippines shall by proper compliance with
the requirements set forth under the Appendix of the Berne Convention (Paris Act, 1971) avail
itself of the special provisions regarding developing countries, including provisions for licenses
grantable by competent authority under the Appendix. (n)