G.R. No.

102858 July 28, 1997

THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS and TEODORO ABISTADO,
substituted by MARGARITA, MARISSA, MARIBEL, ARNOLD and MARY ANN, all surnamed
ABISTO, Respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Is newspaper publication of the notice of initial hearing in an original land registration case mandatory or
directory?
Statement of the Case
The Court of Appeals ruled that it was merely procedural and that the failure to cause such publication
did not deprive the trial court of its authority to grant the application. But the Solicitor General disagreed
and thus filed this petition to set aside the Decision 1 promulgated on July 3, 1991 and the subsequent
Resolution 2 promulgated on November 19, 1991 by Respondent Court of Appeals 3 in CA-G.R. CV No.
23719. The dispositive portion of the challenged Decision reads: 4
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment of dismissal appealed from is hereby set aside, and a
new one entered confirming the registration and title of applicant, Teodoro Abistado, Filipino, a resident
of Barangay 7, Poblacion Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro, now deceased and substituted by Margarita,
Marissa, Maribel, Arnold and Mary Ann, all surnamed Abistado, represented by their aunt, Miss Josefa
Abistado, Filipinos, residents of Poblacion Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro, to the parcel of land covered
under MSI (IV-A-8) 315-D located in Poblacion Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro.
The oppositions filed by the Republic of the Philippines and private oppositor are hereby dismissed for
want of evidence.
Upon the finality of this decision and payment of the corresponding taxes due on this land, let an order for
the issuance of a decree be issued.
The Facts
On December 8, 1986, Private Respondent Teodoro Abistado filed a petition for original registration of
his title over 648 square meters of land under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529. 5 The application was
docketed as Land Registration Case (LRC) No. 86 and assigned to Branch 44 of the Regional Trial Court
of Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro. 6 However, during the pendency of his petition, applicant died.
Hence, his heirs - Margarita, Marissa, Maribel, Arnold and Mary Ann, all surnamed Abistado -
represented by their aunt Josefa Abistado, who was appointed their guardian ad litem, were substituted as
applicants.
The land registration court in its decision dated June 13, 1989 dismissed the petition "for want of
jurisdiction." However, it found that the applicants through their predecessors-in-interest had been in
open, continuous, exclusive and peaceful possession of the subject land since 1938.
In dismissing the petition, the trial court reasoned: 7
. . . However, the Court noted that applicants failed to comply with the provisions of Section 23 (1) of PD
1529, requiring the Applicants to publish the notice of Initial Hearing (Exh. "E") in a newspaper of
general circulation in the Philippines. Exhibit "E" was only published in the Official Gazette (Exhibits "F"
and "G"). Consequently, the Court is of the well considered view that it has not legally acquired
jurisdiction over the instant application for want of compliance with the mandatory provision requiring
publication of the notice of initial hearing in a newspaper of general circulation.
The trial court also cited Ministry of Justice Opinion No. 48, Series of 1982, which in its pertinent portion
provides: 8
It bears emphasis that the publication requirement under Section 23 [of PD 1529] has a two-fold purpose;
the first, which is mentioned in the provision of the aforequoted provision refers to publication in the
Official Gazette, and is jurisdictional; while the second, which is mentioned in the opening clause of the
same paragraph, refers to publication not only in the Official Gazette but also in a newspaper of general
circulation, and is procedural. Neither one nor the other is dispensable. As to the first, publication in the
Official Gazette is indispensably necessary because without it, the court would be powerless to assume
jurisdiction over a particular land registration case. As to the second, publication of the notice of initial
hearing also in a newspaper of general circulation is indispensably necessary as a requirement of
procedural due process; otherwise, any decision that the court may promulgate in the case would be
legally infirm.
CA - Unsatisfied, private respondents appealed to Respondent Court of Appeals which, as earlier
explained, set aside the decision of the trial court and ordered the registration of the title in the name of
Teodoro Abistado.
The subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied in the challenged CA Resolution dared November
19, 1991.
The Director of Lands represented by the Solicitor General thus elevated this recourse to us. This Court
notes that the petitioner's counsel anchored his petition on Rule 65. This is an error. His remedy should be
based on Rule 45 because he is appealing a final disposition of the Court of Appeals. Hence, we shall
treat his petition as one for review under Rule 45, and not for certiorari under Rule 65. 9
The Issue
Petitioner alleges that Respondent Court of Appeals committed "grave abuse of discretion" 10 in holding
-
. . . that publication of the petition for registration of title in LRC Case No. 86 need not be published in a
newspaper of general circulation, and in not dismissing LRC Case No. 86 for want of such publication.
Petitioner points out that under Section 23 of PD 1529, the notice of initial hearing shall be "published
both in the Official Gazette and in a newspaper of general circulation." According to petitioner,
publication in the Official Gazette is "necessary to confer jurisdiction upon the trial court, and . . . in . . . a
newspaper of general circulation to comply with the notice requirement of due process." 1
Private respondents, on the other hand, contend that failure to comply with the requirement of publication
in a newspaper of general circulation is a mere "procedural defect." They add that publication in the
Official Gazette is sufficient to confer jurisdiction. 12
In reversing the decision of the trial court, Respondent Court of Appeals ruled: 13
. . . although the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette and in a newspaper of general
circulation is couched in mandatory terms, it cannot be gainsaid that the law also mandates with equal
force that publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court.
Further, Respondent Court found that the oppositors were afforded the opportunity "to explain matters
fully and present their side." Thus, it justified its disposition in this wise: 14
. . . We do not see how the lack of compliance with the required procedure prejudiced them in any way.
Moreover, the other requirements of: publication in the Official Gazette, personal notice by mailing, and
posting at the site and other conspicuous places, were complied with and these are sufficient to notify any
party who is minded to make any objection of the application for registration
The Court's Ruling
We find for petitioner.
Newspaper Publication Mandatory
The pertinent part of Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 requiring publication of the notice of
initial hearing reads as follows:
Sec. 23. Notice of initial hearing, publication, etc. - The court shall, within five days from filing of the
application, issue an order setting the date and hour of the initial hearing which shall not be earlier than
forty-five days nor later than ninety days from the date of the order.
The public shall be given notice of initial hearing of the application for land registration by means of (1)
publication; (2) mailing; and (3) posting.
1. By publication. -
Upon receipt of the order of the court setting the time for initial hearing, the Commissioner of Land
Registration shall cause a notice of initial hearing to be published once in the Official Gazette and once in
a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines: Provided, however, that the publication in the
Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court. Said notice shall be addressed to
all persons appearing to have an interest in the land involved including the adjoining owners so far as
known, and "to all whom it may concern." Said notice shall also require all persons concerned to appear
in court at a certain date and time to show cause why the prayer of said application shall not be granted.
xxx xxx xxx
Admittedly, the above provision provides in clear and categorical terms that publication in the Official
Gazette suffices to confer jurisdiction upon the land registration court. However, the question boils down
to whether, absent any publication in a newspaper of general circulation, the land registration court can
validly confirm and register the title of private respondents.
We answer this query in the negative. This answer is impelled by the demands of statutory construction
and the due process rationale behind the publication requirement.
The law used the term "shall" in prescribing the work to be done by the Commissioner of Land
Registration upon the latter's receipt of the court order setting the time for initial hearing. The said word
denotes an imperative and thus indicates the mandatory character of a statute. 15 While concededly such
literal mandate is not an absolute rule in statutory construction, as its import ultimately depends upon its
context in the entire provision, we hold that in the present case the term must be understood in its normal
mandatory meaning. In Republic vs. Marasigan, 16 the Court through Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.
held that Section 23 of PD 1529 requires notice of the initial hearing by means of (1) publication, (2)
mailing and (3) posting, all of which must be complied with. "If the intention of the law were otherwise,
said section would not have stressed in detail the requirements of mailing of notices to all persons named
in the petition who, per Section 15 of the Decree, include owners of adjoining properties, and occupants
of the land." Indeed, if mailing of notices is essential, then by parity of reasoning, publication in a
newspaper of general circulation is likewise imperative since the law included such requirement in its
detailed provision.
It should be noted further that land registration is a proceeding in rem. 17 Being in rem, such proceeding
requires constructive seizure of the land as against all persons, including the state, who have rights to or
interests in the property. An in rem proceeding is validated essentially through publication. This being so,
the process must strictly be complied with. Otherwise, persons who may be interested or whose rights
may be adversely affected would be barred from contesting an application which they had no knowledge
of. As has been ruled, a party as an owner seeking the inscription of realty in the land registration court
must prove by satisfactory and conclusive evidence not only his ownership thereof but the identity of the
same, for he is in the same situation as one who institutes an action for recovery of realty. 18 He must
prove his title against the whole world. This task, which rests upon the applicant, can best be achieved
when all persons concerned - nay, "the whole world" - who have rights to or interests in the subject
property are notified and effectively invited to come to court and show cause why the application should
not be granted. The elementary norms of due process require that before the claimed property is taken
from concerned parties and registered in the name of the applicant, said parties must be given notice and
opportunity to oppose.
It may be asked why publication in a newspaper of general circulation should be deemed mandatory when
the law already requires notice by publication in the Official Gazette as well as by mailing and posting, all
of which have already been complied with in the case at hand. The reason is due process and the reality
that the Official Gazette is not as widely read and circulated as newspapers and is oftentimes delayed in
its circulation, such that the notices published therein may not reach the interested parties on time, if at
all. Additionally, such parties may not be owners of neighboring properties, and may in fact not own any
other real estate. In sum, the all-encompassing in rem nature of land registration cases, the consequences
of default orders issued against the whole world and the objective of disseminating the notice in as wide a
manner as possible demand a mandatory construction of the requirements for publication, mailing and
posting.
Admittedly, there was failure to comply with the explicit publication requirement of the law. Private
respondents did not proffer any excuse; even if they had, it would not have mattered because the statute
itself allows no excuses. Ineludibly, this Court has no authority to dispense with such mandatory
requirement. The law is unambiguous and its rationale clear. Time and again, this Court has declared that
where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for interpretation, vacillation or
equivocation; there is room only for application. 19 There is no alternative. Thus, the application for land
registration filed by private respondents must be dismissed without prejudice to reapplication in the
future, after all the legal requisites shall have been duly complied with.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision and Resolution are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The application of private respondent for land registration is DISMISSED without
prejudice. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Melo and Francisco, JJ., concur.
Narvasa, C.J., is on leave.
G.R. No. 84240 March 25, 1992
OLIVIA S. PASCUAL and HERMES S. PASCUAL, petitioners,
vs.
ESPERANZA C. PASCUAL-BAUTISTA, MANUEL C. PASCUAL, JOSE C. PASCUAL, SUSANA C.
PASCUAL-BAUTISTA, ERLINDA C. PASCUAL, WENCESLAO C. PASCUAL, JR., INTESTATE
ESTATE OF ELEUTERIO T. PASCUAL, AVELINO PASCUAL, ISOCELES PASCUAL, LEIDA
PASCUAL-MARTINES, VIRGINIA PASCUAL-NER, NONA PASCUAL-FERNANDO, OCTAVIO
PASCUAL, GERANAIA PASCUAL-DUBERT, and THE HONORABLE PRESIDING JUDGE
MANUEL S. PADOLINA of Br. 162, RTC, Pasig, Metro Manila, respondents.
PARAS, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to reverse and set aside: (a) the decision of the
Court of Appeals 1 dated April 29, 1988 in CA-G.R. SP. No. 14010 entitled "Olivia S. Pascual and
Hermes S. Pascual v. Esperanza C. Pascual-Bautista, Manuel C. Pascual, Jose Pascual, Susana C.
Pascual-Bautista, Erlinda C. Pascual, Wenceslao C. Pascual, Jr., et al." which dismissed the petition and
in effect affirmed the decision of the trial court and (b) the resolution dated July 14, 1988 denying
petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
The undisputed facts of the case are as follows:
Petitioners Olivia and Hermes both surnamed Pascual are the acknowledged natural children of the late
Eligio Pascual, the latter being the full blood brother of the decedent Don Andres Pascual (Rollo, petition,
p. 17).
Don Andres Pascual died intestate on October 12, 1973 without any issue, legitimate, acknowledged
natural, adopted or spurious children and was survived by the following:
(a) Adela Soldevilla de Pascual, surviving spouses;
(b) Children of Wenceslao Pascual, Sr., a brother of the full blood of the deceased, to wit:
Esperanza C. Pascual-Bautista
Manuel C. Pascual
Jose C. Pascual
Susana C. Pascual-Bautista
Erlinda C. Pascual
Wenceslao C. Pascual, Jr.
(c) Children of Pedro-Bautista, brother of the half blood of the deceased, to wit:
Avelino Pascual
Isoceles Pascual
Loida Pascual-Martinez
Virginia Pascual-Ner
Nona Pascual-Fernando
Octavio Pascual
Geranaia Pascual-Dubert;
(d) Acknowledged natural children of Eligio Pascual, brother of the full blood of the deceased, to wit:
Olivia S. Pascual
Hermes S. Pascual
(e) Intestate of Eleuterio T. Pascual, a brother of the half blood of the deceased and represented by the
following:

Dominga M. Pascual
Mamerta P. Fugoso
Abraham S. Sarmiento, III
Regina Sarmiento-Macaibay
Eleuterio P. Sarmiento
Domiga P. San Diego
Nelia P. Marquez
Silvestre M. Pascual
Eleuterio M. Pascual
(Rollo, pp. 46-47)
Adela Soldevilla de Pascual, the surviving spouse of the late Don Andres Pascual, filed with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 162 (CFI of Rizal, Br. XXIII), a Special Proceeding, Case No. 7554, for
administration of the intestate estate of her late husband (Rollo, p. 47).
On December 18, 1973, Adela soldevilla de Pascual filed a Supplemental Petition to the Petition for
letters of Administration, where she expressly stated that Olivia Pascual and Hermes Pascual, are among
the heirs of Don Andres Pascual (Rollo, pp. 99-101).
On February 27, 1974, again Adela Soldevilla de Pascual executed an affidavit, to the effect that of her
own knowledge, Eligio Pascual is the younger full blood brother of her late husband Don Andres Pascual,
to belie the statement made by the oppositors, that they were are not among the known heirs of the
deceased Don Andres Pascual (Rollo, p. 102).
On October 16, 1985, all the above-mentioned heirs entered into a COMPROMISE AGREEMENT, over
the vehement objections of the herein petitioners Olivia S. Pascual and Hermes S. Pascual, although
paragraph V of such compromise agreement provides, to wit:
This Compromise Agreement shall be without prejudice to the continuation of the above-entitled
proceedings until the final determination thereof by the court, or by another compromise agreement, as
regards the claims of Olivia Pascual and Hermes Pascual as legal heirs of the deceased, Don Andres
Pascual. (Rollo, p. 108
The said Compromise Agreement had been entered into despite the Manifestation/Motion of the
petitioners Olivia Pascual and Hermes Pascual, manifesting their hereditary rights in the intestate estate of
Don Andres Pascual, their uncle (Rollo, pp. 111-112).
On September 30, 1987, petitioners filed their Motion to Reiterate Hereditary Rights (Rollo, pp. 113-114)
and the Memorandum in Support of Motion to reiterate Hereditary Rights (Rollo, pp. 116-130).
On December 18, 1987, the Regional Trial Court, presided over by Judge Manuel S. Padolina issued an
order, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court resolves as it is hereby resolved to Deny this motion
reiterating the hereditary rights of Olivia and Hermes Pascual (Rollo, p. 136).
On January 13, 1988, petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration (Rollo, pp. 515-526). and such
motion was denied.
Petitioner appealed their case to the Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. No. 14010 (Rollo, p. 15.).
On Aril 29, 1988, the respondent Court of Appeals rendered its decision the decision the dispositive part
of which reads
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 38)
Petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration of said decision and on July 14, 1988, the Court of
Appeals issued its resolution denying the motion for reconsideration (Rollo, p. 42).
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari
After all the requirements had been filed, the case was given due course.
The main issue to be resolved in the case at bar is whether or not Article 992 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, can be interpreted to exclude recognized natural children from the inheritance of the
deceased.
Petitioners contend that they do not fall squarely within the purview of Article 992 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines, can be interpreted to exclude recognized and of the doctrine laid down in Diaz v. IAC
(150 SCRA 645 [1987]) because being acknowledged natural children, their illegitimacy is not due to the
subsistence of a prior marriage when such children were under conception (Rollo, p. 418).
Otherwise stated they say the term "illegitimate" children as provided in Article 992 must be strictly
construed to refer only to spurious children (Rollo, p. 419).
On the other hand, private respondents maintain that herein petitioners are within the prohibition of
Article 992 of the Civil Code and the doctrine laid down in Diaz v. IAC is applicable to them.
The petition is devoid of merit.
Pertinent thereto, Article 992 of the civil Code, provides:
An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his
father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate
child.
The issue in the case at bar, had already been laid to rest in Diaz v. IAC, supra, where this Court ruled
that:
Article 992 of the Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a succession
ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother
of said legitimate child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law for the
purposes of Article 992. Between the legitimate family and illegitimate family there is presumed to be an
intervening antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate child is disgracefully looked down upon by
the legitimate family; the family is in turn hated by the illegitimate child; the latter considers the
privileged condition of the former, and the resources of which it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn,
sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin, palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life;
the law does no more than recognize this truth, by avoiding further grounds of resentment.
Eligio Pascual is a legitimate child but petitioners are his illegitimate children.
Applying the above doctrine to the case at bar, respondent IAC did not err in holding that petitioners
herein cannot represent their father Eligio Pascual in the succession of the latter to the intestate estate of
the decedent Andres Pascual, full blood brother of their father.
In their memorandum, petitioners insisted that Article 992 in the light of Articles 902 and 989 of the Civil
Code allows them (Olivia and Hermes) to represent Eligio Pascual in the intestate estate of Don Andres
Pascual.
On motion for reconsideration of the decision in Diaz v. IAC, this Court further elucidated the
successional rights of illegitimate children, which squarely answers the questions raised by the petitioner
on this point.
The Court held:
Article 902, 989, and 990 clearly speaks of successional rights of illegitimate children, which rights are
transmitted to their descendants upon their death. The descendants (of these illegitimate children) who
may inherit by virtue of the right of representation may be legitimate or illegitimate. In whatever manner,
one should not overlook the fact that the persons to be represented are themselves illegitimate. The three
named provisions are very clear on this matter. The right of representation is not available to illegitimate
descendants of legitimate children in the inheritance of a legitimate grandparent. It may be argued, as
done by petitioners, that the illegitimate descendant of a legitimate child is entitled to represent by virtue
of the provisions of Article 982, which provides that "the grandchildren and other descendants shall
inherit by right of representation." Such a conclusion is erroneous. It would allow intestate succession by
an illegitimate child to the legitimate parent of his father or mother, a situation which would set at naught
the provisions of Article 992. Article 982 is inapplicable to the instant case because Article 992 prohibits
absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and
relatives of the father or mother. It may not be amiss to state Article 982 is the general rule and Article
992 the exception.
The rules laid down in Article 982 that "grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit by right of
representation" and in Article 902 that the rights of illegitimate children . . . are transmitted upon their
death to their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate are subject to the limitation prescribed by
Article 992 to the end that an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate
children and relatives of his father or mother. (Amicus Curiae's Opinion by former Justice Minister
Ricardo C. Puno, p. 12). Diaz v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 182 SCRA 427; pp. 431-432; [1990]).
Verily, the interpretation of the law desired by the petitioner may be more humane but it is also an
elementary rule in statutory construction that when the words and phrases of the statute are clear and
unequivocal, their meaning must be determined from the language employed and the statute must be
taken to mean exactly what is says. (Baranda v. Gustilo, 165 SCRA 758-759 [1988]). The courts may not
speculate as to the probable intent of the legislature apart from the words (Aparri v. CA, 127 SCRA 233
[1984]). When the law is clear, it is not susceptible of interpretation. It must be applied regardless of who
may be affected, even if the law may be harsh or onerous. (Nepomuceno, et al. v. FC, 110 Phil. 42). And
even granting that exceptions may be conceded, the same as a general rule, should be strictly but
reasonably construed; they extend only so far as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be
resolved in favor of the general provisions rather than the exception. Thus, where a general rule is
established by statute, the court will not curtail the former nor add to the latter by implication (Samson v.
C.A., 145 SCRA 654 [1986]).
Clearly the term "illegitimate" refers to both natural and spurious.
Finally under Article 176 of the Family Code, all illegitimate children are generally placed under one
category, which undoubtedly settles the issue as to whether or not acknowledged natural children should
be treated differently, in the negative.
It may be said that the law may be harsh but that is the law (DURA LEX SED LEX).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the assailed decision of the
respondent Court of Appeals dated April 29, 1988 is AFFIRMED
SO ORDERED
G.R. No. L-22301 August 30, 1967
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MARIO MAPA Y MAPULONG, defendant-appellant.
Francisco P. Cabigao for defendant-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General F. R. Rosete and Solicitor O.
C. Hernandez for plaintiff-appellee
FERNANDO, J.:
The sole question in this appeal from a judgment of conviction by the lower court is whether or not the
appointment to and holding of the position of a secret agent to the provincial governor would constitute a
sufficient defense to a prosecution for the crime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition. We hold
that it does not.
The accused in this case was indicted for the above offense in an information dated August 14, 1962
reading as follows: "The undersized accuses MARIO MAPA Y MAPULONG of a violation of Section
878 in connection with Section 2692 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Commonwealth
Act No. 56 and as further amended by Republic Act No. 4, committed as follows: That on or about the
13th day of August, 1962, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there wilfully
and unlawfully have in his possession and under his custody and control one home-made revolver
(Paltik), Cal. 22, without serial number, with six (6) rounds of ammunition, without first having secured
the necessary license or permit therefor from the corresponding authorities. Contrary to law."
When the case was called for hearing on September 3, 1963, the lower court at the outset asked the
counsel for the accused: "May counsel stipulate that the accused was found in possession of the gun
involved in this case, that he has neither a permit or license to possess the same and that we can submit
the same on a question of law whether or not an agent of the governor can hold a firearm without a permit
issued by the Philippine Constabulary." After counsel sought from the fiscal an assurance that he would
not question the authenticity of his exhibits, the understanding being that only a question of law would be
submitted for decision, he explicitly specified such question to be "whether or not a secret agent is not
required to get a license for his firearm."
Upon the lower court stating that the fiscal should examine the document so that he could pass on their
authenticity, the fiscal asked the following question: "Does the accused admit that this pistol cal. 22
revolver with six rounds of ammunition mentioned in the information was found in his possession on
August 13, 1962, in the City of Manila without first having secured the necessary license or permit
thereof from the corresponding authority?" The accused, now the appellant, answered categorically: "Yes,
Your Honor." Upon which, the lower court made a statement: "The accused admits, Yes, and his counsel
Atty. Cabigao also affirms that the accused admits."
Forthwith, the fiscal announced that he was "willing to submit the same for decision." Counsel for the
accused on his part presented four (4) exhibits consisting of his appointment "as secret agent of the Hon.
Feliciano Leviste," then Governor of Batangas, dated June 2, 1962;1 another document likewise issued by
Gov. Leviste also addressed to the accused directing him to proceed to Manila, Pasay and Quezon City on
a confidential mission;2 the oath of office of the accused as such secret agent,3 a certificate dated March
11, 1963, to the effect that the accused "is a secret agent" of Gov. Leviste.4 Counsel for the accused then
stated that with the presentation of the above exhibits he was "willing to submit the case on the question
of whether or not a secret agent duly appointed and qualified as such of the provincial governor is exempt
from the requirement of having a license of firearm." The exhibits were admitted and the parties were
given time to file their respective memoranda.1äwphï1.ñët
Thereafter on November 27, 1963, the lower court rendered a decision convicting the accused "of the
crime of illegal possession of firearms and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from one year and
one day to two years and to pay the costs. The firearm and ammunition confiscated from him are forfeited
in favor of the Government."
The only question being one of law, the appeal was taken to this Court. The decision must be affirmed.
The law is explicit that except as thereafter specifically allowed, "it shall be unlawful for any person
to . . . possess any firearm, detached parts of firearms or ammunition therefor, or any instrument or
implement used or intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms, or ammunition."5
The next section provides that "firearms and ammunition regularly and lawfully issued to officers,
soldiers, sailors, or marines [of the Armed Forces of the Philippines], the Philippine Constabulary, guards
in the employment of the Bureau of Prisons, municipal police, provincial governors, lieutenant governors,
provincial treasurers, municipal treasurers, municipal mayors, and guards of provincial prisoners and
jails," are not covered "when such firearms are in possession of such officials and public servants for use
in the performance of their official duties."6
The law cannot be any clearer. No provision is made for a secret agent. As such he is not exempt. Our
task is equally clear. The first and fundamental duty of courts is to apply the law. "Construction and
interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate
without them."7 The conviction of the accused must stand. It cannot be set aside.
Accused however would rely on People v. Macarandang,8 where a secret agent was acquitted on appeal
on the assumption that the appointment "of the accused as a secret agent to assist in the maintenance of
peace and order campaigns and detection of crimes, sufficiently put him within the category of a "peace
officer" equivalent even to a member of the municipal police expressly covered by section 879." Such
reliance is misplaced. It is not within the power of this Court to set aside the clear and explicit mandate of
a statutory provision. To the extent therefore that this decision conflicts with what was held in People v.
Macarandang, it no longer speaks with authority.
Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro and
Angeles, JJ., concur.