The Rise of Hermeneutics

Author(s): Wilhelm Dilthey and Frederic Jameson

Source: New Literary History, Vol. 3, No. 2, On Interpretation: I (Winter, 1972), pp. 229-244
Published by: The Johns Hopkins University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/468313 .
Accessed: 18/06/2014 10:34

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

The Johns Hopkins University Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to
New Literary History.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 185.2.32.90 on Wed, 18 Jun 2014 10:34:36 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 The Rise of Hermeneutics
Wilhelm
Dilthey

Note fromthe translator: In the "existentialhistoricism"of Wilhelm

Dilthey(1833-1911) we seemto touchtheveryfonset origoof thatgreat
Germanhistoriography, withitsaccompanyingdevelopments in philology
and art history, withwhichhis workwas contemporaneous: 1 therecan
indeedbe no history worthyof the name thatdoes not breathesomething
like his spiritualenthusiasmfor the traces that life has leftbehind it,
somethingof his visionaryinstinctfor all the formsof living activity
preservedand stillinstinctwithinthe monumentsof the past. Dilthey's
own voluminousand oftenfragmentary writingsturnalmostexclusively
aroundthe suprememystery of the historiographical
act: that Verstehen
or understanding which, far from being subjectiveor purelyintuitive
a
leap, implies a whole complex procedureof intellectualreconstruction
(Nachbildung,Nachfiihlung,Nacherleben,Nachverstdindnis, to use his
characteristicterminology).2
In his life-longeffort,not only to solve, but also and essentiallyto
define,the problem,Diltheycounted among his predecessorsand pre-
cursorsthe forgotten theoreticians of the ancient traditionsof classical
and Biblical hermeneutics, as well as the practitionersof that modem
philologythatreacheditsclimaxin thesystem of FriedrichSchleiermacher
(1768-I834). "The Rise of Hermeneutics"(1900), originatinglargely
fromDilthey'sresearchinto the life and work of Schleiermacher, still
constitutes one of the mostsatisfactory briefaccountsof the historyand
significance of hermeneutic theory.3It may also be read as an introduc-
tion to Dilthey'sown conceptof Verstehen,now seen as the unification
of the two main rival tendencies-grammatical and psychological-that
dominatedthehistoricaldevelopmentof thattheory.
Dilthey's thought,for all its suggestivepower and subsequentin-
fluence,cannotbe said to have achievedultimatephilosophicalcoherence
I For an account of Dilthey's relationshipto rival theories of historyand culture,
see Rudolf A. Makkreel, "Wilhelm Dilthey and the Neo-Kantians: The Distinction
of the Geisteswissenschaftenand the Kulturwissenschaften,"Journal of the History
of Philosophy,VII, 4 (October, 1969), 423-40.
2 In Das Verstehen, 3 vols. (Tiibingen, 1926-1933), Joachim Wach provides a
historyof the developmentof thisconcept beforeDilthey.
3 Dilthey is least adequate in his account of patristic and medieval exegesis; the
reader is referredto such modern studies as the monumental Exe'gse mddidvale
of Henri de Lubac, 4 vols. (Paris, 1959-I964).

This content downloaded from 185.2.32.90 on Wed, 18 Jun 2014 10:34:36 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
230 NEW LITERARY HISTORY

or systematization;4nor is it difficult
to formulate seriousobjectionsto it.
Profoundly anti-Hegelianand anti-dialectical, it maybe understoodas an
attemptto forgesome workablenon-relativistic alternativeto Marx's
unnamablehistoricalmaterialism.Yet in doing so, Dilthey,for all his
to positivism,
hostility findshimself obligedto cometo termswithhisto~rical
varietythroughthe hypothesis of a typology of the Weltanschauungen-
a hypothesis whichends up subsuminghistoryas a disciplinebeneaththe
newlyemergent scienceof psychology.We mayalso measurethelimitsof
his understanding of the historicalunderstanding by pointingout that,
unlikehis contemporary Nietzsche,Diltheyfailed to make a place for
false consciousness,and for all thosedeviousmechanismsof censorship
and mauvaisefoi that interposethemselvesbetweenour own conscious-
nessand therealitiesof thepast.
Even the doctrineof Verstehenitselfis not withoutits own short-
comings;and we maywell feeltodaythatthusconstrued, the dilemmais
insoluble;thatwherethesubjectis thusinitiallyand irrevocably separated
fromitsobject,or the understanding monad fromthemonad understood,
no amount of theoreticalor descriptiveingenuitycan put them back
togetheragain. Any successfultheoryof understanding must in other
wordsbegin afterthe fact,in the presenceof an understanding or an
interpretation already realized. Yet even Dilthey'sfalse start remains
indispensibleto anyadequate statement of theproblem;and therevivalof
interestin our own timein the phenomenonof historicalunderstanding
and interpretation is enoughto demonstrate that the issuesthatDilthey
believedto be centralhave not been supersededbut at best temporarily
adjourned.

HAVE ELSEWHERE* discussedthe representation of individuation

in art and particularlyin poetry. We have now to deal with the
problemof the scientificknowledgeof individualsand indeed the
principal formsof singular existencein general. Is such knowledge
possible,and what means are at our disposalto attainit?
It is a problemof the greatestsignificance.Action everywherepre-
supposesour understandingof otherpeople; much of our happinessas
human beings derivesfromour re-experiencing [Nachfiihlen]of alien
statesof mind; the entirescience of philologyand of historyis based
H. A. Hodges, in The Philosophy
4 Without minimizingits conceptual difficulties,
of Wilhelm Dilthey (London, 1952), makes a better case for a Diltheyan system
than any individual workof Dilthey himself.
* In "Die Kunst als erste Darstellung der menschlich-geschichtlichenWelt in
ihrer Individuation," Gesammelte Schriften,V (Stuttgart, x957), 273-303 [Trans-
lator's note].

This content downloaded from 185.2.32.90 on Wed, 18 Jun 2014 10:34:36 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
THE RISE OF HERMENEUTICS 231

on the presuppositionthat such recomprehension[Nachverstiindnis]

ofindividualexistencecan be raisedto objectivevalidity.The historical
consciousnessconstructedon this basis has enabled modern man to
hold the entirepast of humanitypresentwithinhimself: across the
limitsof his own time he peers into vanished cultures,appropriating
theirenergiesand takingpleasure in theircharm, with a consequent
increasein his own happiness. And if systematically organizedhuman
studies [Geisteswissenschaften] are able to go on to derive more gen-
eral laws and moreinclusiverelationships fromthisobjectiveapprehen-
sion of individuallife,nonethelessthe preliminaryoperationsof under-
standingand interpretation formthe basis. Thus, thesedisciplines,like
history itself,depend for theirmethodologicalcertaintyupon whether
or not the understandingof individualexistencemay be raised to gen-
eral validity. So at the thresholdof human studies we encountera
problem specific to them alone and quite distinct from anything
involvedin the apprehensionof nature.
Human studieshave indeed the advantage over the naturalsciences
that theirobject is not sensoryappearance as such, no mere reflection
of realitywithin consciousness,but is rather firstand foremostan
innerreality,a coherenceexperiencedfromwithin. Yet the veryway
in which this realityis experiencedwithinus raises the gravestdiffi-
culties as to its objective apprehension. It is not the purpose of the
present essay to deal with those difficulties.Moreover, any inner
experiencing,throughwhich I become aware of my own disposition,
can neverby itselfbringme to a consciousnessof myown individuality.
I experiencethe latteronlythrougha comparisonof myselfwith other
people; at that point alone I become aware of what distinguishesme
from others,and Goethe was only too rightwhen he said that this
mostcrucial of all our experiencesis also one of the mostdifficult,
and
that our insightinto the extent,nature,and limitsof our powers re-
main at best incomplete. But the existenceof otherpeople is given us
only fromthe outside,in sensoryevents,gestures,words, and actions.
Only througha processof reconstruction[Nachbildung] do we com-
plete this sense perception,which initiallytakes the formof isolated
signs. We are thus obliged to translateeverything-theraw material,
the structure,the most individual traitsof such a completion-out of
our own sense of life. Thus the problem is: how can one quite
individuallystructuredconsciousnessbring an alien individualityof a
completelydifferenttype to objective knowledge through such re-
construction?What kind of processis this,in appearance so different
fromthe othermodes of objectiveknowledge?
Understanding[Verstehen]is what we call thisprocessby which an

This content downloaded from 185.2.32.90 on Wed, 18 Jun 2014 10:34:36 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
232 NEW LITERARY HISTORY

inside is conferredon a complex of externalsensorysigns. Such is

ordinaryusage; and that precisepsychologicalterminology which we
so desperatelyneed can come into being onlyif such carefullydefined,
clear and usefullydelimitedexpressionsare respectedby all writersto
the same degree. The understandingof nature-interpretationaturae
-is a metaphor. Yet even the intuitionof our own inner realitycan
only be looselytermeda formof Understanding. To be sure, I say:
"I can't understandhow I could have acted thus," and even, "I don't
understandmyselfanymore." Yet what I mean by this is that an
expressionof my own being in the externalworld now comes before
me as that of a strangerand that I am unable to interpretit, or
alternatively that I suddenlyfindmyselfin a mood which I look upon
as somethingalien to me. We must thereforecall Understandingthat
processby which we intuit,behind the sign given to our senses,that
psychicrealityof which it is the expression.
Such understandingrangesfromthe comprehension of the babblings
of childrento Hamlet or the Critique of Pure Reason. From stones
and marble, musical notes,gestures,words and letters,from actions,
economic decrees and constitutions, the same human spiritaddresses
us and demands interpretation.Indeed, the processof understanding,
insofaras it is determinedby common conditionsand epistemological
instruments, must everywherepresentthe same characteristics.It is
thus unifiedin its essentialfeatures. If, forinstance,I wish to under-
stand Leonardo, my interpretation of his actions, paintings,sketches
and writingworkstogetheras a singlehomogeneousand unifiedprocess.
Yet understandinghas various degrees. These are determinedfirst
of all by interest.If our interestis limited,so also is our understanding.
How impatientlydo we listento many arguments;merelyextracting
the point that happens to be importantto us practically,withoutany
interestin the inner life of the speaker; while at other times we
passionatelyattemptto seize the innermostrealityof a speakerthrough
his everyexpression,his everyword. Yet even the most attentivecon-
centrationcan develop into an orderlyand systematicprocedure-one
by which a measurable degree of objectivitycan be reached-only
where the expressionof lifehas been fixed,so thatwe can returnto it
again and again. Such orderlyand systematicunderstandingof fixed
and relativelypermanentexpressionsof lifeis what we call exegesisor
interpretation.In thissensethereis also an artof exegesiswhose objects
are statues or paintings,and Friedrich August Wolf called for a
hermeneuticspecificallydesignedforarcheology.Welckeragreed with
the need for such a hermeneutic,and Preller tried to work it out.

This content downloaded from 185.2.32.90 on Wed, 18 Jun 2014 10:34:36 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
THE RISE OF HERMENEUTICS 233

Yet Prellerhimselfhad alreadypointedout that such interpretation of

mute worksis everywheredependenton literatureitselfforits elucida-
tion.
That is indeed the immeasurablesignificanceof literaturefor our
understandingof spirituallife and of history,for only in speech does
the inner life of man find its fullestand most exhaustive,most ob-
jectivelycomprehensible expression.That is whythe artof understand-
ing centerson the exegesisor interpretation of thoseresiduesof human
realitypreservedin writtenform.
The exegesis of such residues,along with the critical procedures
inseparable fromit, constitutedthe point of departurefor philology.
Philologyis in its essencea personalskilland virtuosity in the scrutiny
of written memorials. Other types interpretation monumentsor
of of
historically transmitted actions can prosper only in association with
philology and its findings.For we can always make mistakesabout the
motivationof the principal actors in history;theythemselvescan in-
deed spread misconceptionsabout their own motives. But the work
of a great poet or innovator,or a religiousgenius or a genuine phi-
losophercan neverbe anythingbut the true expressionof his spiritual
life; in that human communitydeliveredfrom all falsehood,such a
work is ever true and unlike everyothertype of expressionregistered
in signs; it is susceptibleof completeand objectiveinterpretation;in-
deed, it is onlyin the lightof such worksthat we begin to understand
the othercontemporaryartisticmonumentsand historicalactions.
Such an art of interpretationhas developed as gradually and as
methodicallyand slowly as the experimentalinvestigationof nature
itself. It originatedin the individual virtuosityof the philologistof
genius,where it continuesto flourish.Thus its traditionis predomi-
nantlyhanded down throughpersonal contact with the great practi-
tionersof exegesisor with theirworks. Yet everyart is conducted ac-
cordingto rules. The latterteach us how to overcomedifficulties. They
bequeath the results of the practice of others. Hence there develops
very early out of the practice of exegesis an expositionof its rules.
And fromconflictabout these rules,fromthe struggleof various ten-
denciesin the interpretation of fundamentalworksand the subsequent
need to establisha basis for such rules, the science of hermeneutics
itselfcame intobeing. The latteris the theoreticalbasisforthe exegesis
ofwrittenmonuments.
Since hermeneuticsderivesthe possibilityof universallyvalid inter-
pretationfromanalyzingUnderstandingin general,it ultimatelyaims
at a solution to that more general problem with which the present

This content downloaded from 185.2.32.90 on Wed, 18 Jun 2014 10:34:36 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
234 NEW LITERARY HISTORY

essaybegan. The analysisof Understandingtakes its place beside the

analysisof inner experience,and both demonstratethe possibilityand
thelimitsof the validityof human studiesin general,to the extentthat
thesedisciplinesare governedby the way psychicfactsoriginallycome
before us.
I would now like to demonstratethisorderlyevolutionthroughthe
historyof hermeneutics: how philologicalvirtuosity developed out of
the need for deep and universallyvalid understanding,whence
a promulgationof rules, and the orderingof those rules towards a
goal conditionedby the state of knowledgein the period in question,
until finallyan adequate foundationfor the codificationof rules was
discoveredin the analysisof Understandingitself.

II

In Greece systematicexegesis(hermeneia) of the poets developed out

of the requirementsof the educational system. In the age of the
Greek enlightenment, the interpretationand criticismof Homer and
other poets was a favoriteintellectualpastime whereverGreek was
spoken. A more solid foundationarose when exegesiscame in contact
with rhetoricamong the Sophistsand in the schools of rhetors. For
rhetoricencompassed the general principlesof literarycomposition
insofaras they pertainedto eloquence. Aristotle,the great classifier
and dissectorof the organicworld,of the state,and of literaryproduc-
tions,taught in his Rhetoric how to divide a literarywhole into its
parts,how to distinguishthe various stylistictropes,how to judge the
effectsof rhythm, periods,metaphor. The Rhetoricaad Alexandrinum
expressesthesefundamentaldefinitions of rhetorically
effective
elements
in yet simpler form, under the headings of Example, Argument,
Maxim, Irony,Metaphor and Antithesis.And the AristotelianPoetics
took as its expresssubject matterthe inner and outer formand the
affectiveelementsof poetry. These are deduced from poetry'ssub-
stantiveor finalpurposeand fromits varieties.
The artof interpretation and itscodificationtooka secondimportant
step forwardwith Alexandrian philology. The literaryheritage of
Greece was broughttogetherin libraries,editionswere prepared,and
criticalresultswere inscribedthereinthroughan ingenioussystemof
criticalnotation. Spuriousworkswere removed,and inventories of the
remainingcollectionsmade. Henceforthphilologyexistedas the art of
textual verificationbased on intimate linguisticknowledge, higher

This content downloaded from 185.2.32.90 on Wed, 18 Jun 2014 10:34:36 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
THE RISE OF HERMENEUTICS 235

criticism,exegesis,and evaluation. It was one of the last and most

characteristiccreationsof the Greek spirit,for from Homer onward
joy in human discoursehad been one of its mightiestimpulses. And
the greatAlexandrianphilologistsbegan to grow aware of the rulesin-
herentin theirintuitivepractice. Aristarchusconsciouslyfollowedthe
principleof determiningHomeric usage in as strictand thoroughgoing
a fashionas possibleand basing his elucidationsand textualdetermina-
tions upon it. Hipparchus deliberatelygrounded objectiveinterpreta-
tion upon literaryand historicalresearch,by discoveringthe sourcesof
the Phaenomena of Aratus and interpreting that poem on the basis
of that research. Unauthentic poems were recognized among those
traditionallyattributedto Hesiod; a great number of verses were
excised fromHomer's epics and the last book of the Iliad; and, even
more unanimously,a part of the penultimateand the last book of the
Odysseywere found to be of more recentorigin; all of these findings
weremade possiblethroughthevirtuosouse of theprincipleof analogy.
Accordingto that principle,fora givenwork,a canon of usage, intel-
lectual content,inner conformityand estheticvalue was established,
allowing everythingthat contradictedthis canon to be excised. The
practiceof such an ethico-esthetic canon by Zenodotusand Aristarchus
may be quite clearly deduced from the basic principle of Athetesis
[editorialdeletion], derived from them: "dia to aprepes" ["because
or in otherwords,"quid heroumvel deorumgravitatem
it is unfitting"],
minus decere videbatur" ["if somethingseemed to be less suitable to
the dignityof heroes or gods"] Aristarchusalso appealed to the au-
thority ofAristotle.
This methodologicalawarenessof the propermethodsforinterpreta-
tionwas strengthened in the Alexandrianschoolby theirhostility to the
philologyof Pergamum. A contestof hermeneutic tendencies which
has world-historical significance! For it returnedagain in a new form
in Christiantheology,and two great and historicalviews on poets and
religiouswriterswere founded on it.
From the Stoics, Crates of Mallos introducedthe principleof alle-
gorical interpretation into the Pergaminianphilology. The lastingin-
fluenceof this interpretative methodcame firstand foremostfromits
ability to resolve the contradictions between inheritedreligioustexts
and later,more abstractand purelyphilosophicalworld-views.Hence
its need for the interpreters of the Vedas, or of Homer, of the Bible
and the Koran-an art as indispensableas it was futile. Yet this
activitywas nonethelessbased on a profoundinsightinto literaryand
religiousproductivity.Homer was a seer,and the contradictionin him

This content downloaded from 185.2.32.90 on Wed, 18 Jun 2014 10:34:36 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
236 HISTORY
NEWLITERARY

between profoundinsightsand sensuallycrude imagerycan only be

explained by apprehendingthe imagerysimplyas the instrumentof
literaryrepresentation.And when this relationshipwas conceived as
a deliberateshroudingofpneumaticmeaningsin images,the allegorical
methodcame intobeing.

III

If I am not mistaken,the same oppositionreturnsin a new formin

the strugglebetweenthe theologicalschoolsof Alexandriaand Antioch.
A common principleof both was naturallythat an inner relationship
of prophecyand fulfillment linksthe Old to the New Testament. Such
a relationshiphad indeed been implied by the use of prophecyand
prototypein the New Testamentitself. Now insofaras the Christian
church developed on the basis of such a presupposition,it became
involvedin a complicatedstrugglewith its adversarieswith respectto
the interpretation of Holy Scripture.Againstthe Jewsthe Churchused
allegoricalinterpretation to introducethe theologyof the Logos back-
wards into the Old Testament;but on the otherhand it had to defend
itselfagainsttoo thoroughgoing an applicationof allegoricalinterpreta-
tion by the Gnostics. Followingin the footstepsof Philo, both Justin
and Irenaeus triedto develop rules forthe limitsand proper applica-
tion of the allegoricalmethod. Tertullianadopted theirstrategyin his
own struggleagainstthe Jews and the Gnosticsand at the same time
worked out fruitfulrules for a betterkind of interpretiveprocedure,
to which he did not always remaintrue. The most consistentworking
out of the opposed tendenciescame in the Greek Church. Theodorus
of Antiochsaw in the Song of Songs nothingbut an epithalamium.He
understoodJob as nothingmore than the literaryreworkingof a tra-
ditional storythat actually happened. He dismissedthe titlesof the
Psalms and denied any applicationto Christin a considerableportion
of the messianic prophecies. He did not accept a double meaning
in thetextsthemselves, but onlysome morespiritualrelationshipamong
the various eventsinvolved. On the otherside, Philo, Clement, and
Origen were distinguishing pneumaticand literalmeaningwithinthe
textitself.
There now took place yet anotherstep forwardin the development
frominterpretative practice towards that hermeneuticscience which
gives practice a scientific
formulation,and fromthisstruggleemerged
thefirstfullyworkedout hermeneuticaltheorieswhichhave come down
to us. There alreadyexistedin Philo's traditionkanonesand nomoi tes

This content downloaded from 185.2.32.90 on Wed, 18 Jun 2014 10:34:36 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
THE RISE OF HERMENEUTICS 237

allegoriaswhichwereappliedto theOld Testament and servedas the

consciousbasis forits interpretation.This is the contextin which
Origen,in thefourthbookof his Peri Archon,and St. Augustine, in
thethirdbookofhisDe DoctrinaChristiana, workedout a systemati-
cally arguedhermeneutic theory.In refutation of it, the schoolof
Antiochpresented twoworkswhichhave unfortunately beenlost: the
Tis diaphoratheoriaskai allegoriasofDiodorus,and theDe Allegoria
et HistoriacontraOrigenemof Theodorus.

IV
Interpretationand itscodification entereda newstagewiththeRenais-
sance. Henceforth peoplewereseparatedbytheirlanguage,livingcon-
ditions,and nationality fromclassicaland Christianantiquity.Inter-
pretation thusbecameevenmorethanin ancientRome a matterof
translatingan alienspirituallifethrough thestudyofgrammar, monu-
ments,and history.And in manycases thisnew philology, learning,
and criticism had to workwithmeresecond-hand reportsand with
fragments. So it had to be creativeand constructive in a new way.
Fromthisperiod,a considerable hermeneutic literaturesurvives.It is
dividedintotwocurrents, sinceclassicaland biblicalwritings werethe
twogreatest forceswhichmenofthattimesoughtto appropriate.The
classicaland philologicalcodification was knownby the termars
critica.Suchworks,including thoseofScoppius,Clericus,and theun-
finished one of Valesius,alwaysincludeda hermeneutic doctrinein
theiropeningsections.Countlessessaysand prefacesgave instruction
de interpretatione.But theultimate codification ofhermeneutics stems
ratherfrombiblicalinterpretation. The firstimportant workof this
kind,and perhapsthemostprofound, wastheClavisofFlacius( 1567).
Here forthe firsttimethe essentialrulesforinterpretation which
had alreadybeen workedout wereconnectedwitha systematic doc-
trine,and thiswas done under the postulatethat a universallyvalid
comprehension was to be reachedthroughtheorderlyand systematic
applicationofsuchrules.Flaciuscame to thissystematic view,which
thenceforth dominatedhermeneutics, his
through experienceswith
the strugglesof thesixteenth century. had to fighton twofronts.
He
BoththeAnabaptists and post-reformation Catholicswereinsisting on
the obscurityof Holy Scripture.In opposingthesepositions, Flacius
leanedpredominantly on Calvin'sexegesis, in whichtherewas a con-
stantmovement frominterpretation to itstheologicalbases. The most
urgentmissionof a Lutheran scholar of that day was to refutethe

This content downloaded from 185.2.32.90 on Wed, 18 Jun 2014 10:34:36 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
238 NEW LITERARY HISTORY

Catholic doctrineof Tradition,which had been just newlyformulated.

The claim of Traditionto governthe interpretation of scripturecould
be upheld against the Protestantprincipleof the Bible's supremacy
onlyby denyingthat a valid interpretation could be workedout on the
basis of scripturealone. The Councils of Trent,whichmet from1545-
1563, dealt with this problembeginningwith its fourthsession. The
firstauthorizedpromulgationof its decrees then took place in I564-
In 1581, somewhatafterthe appearance of Flacius' works,the most
characteristicrepresentativeof Tridentine Catholicism, Bellarmin,
mountedthe most astute attack on the comprehensibility of the Bible
in a polemicwork,in whichhe soughtto provethe need of completing
scripturalinterpretation with tradition. In connectionwith thesecon-
flicts,Flacius undertook to prove the possibilityof universallyvalid
interpretation through hermeneutics. And in his attemptto do justice
to thisproblemhe became consciousof the techniquesfor its solution
in a way that no earlierhermeneuticshad done.
If the exegetecomes up againstdifficulties in his text,he overcomes
themby referring to the contextprovidedby the actual lived experience
of Christianity.If we now translate this concept out of its dogmatic
mode of thoughtinto our own, the hermeneutic value of religious
experiencebecomes an individualinstanceof a more generalprinciple,
according to which everyinterpretive procedurecontains as a factor
exegesis from the objective [sachlichen] context. Alongside this
religious principle of interpretationthere exist other, more prop-
erly rational ones. The firstof these is grammaticalinterpretation.
But besides this,Flacius understandsthe meaning of a psychological
or technical principle of interpretationas well, according to which
individual passages are to be interpretedin the light of the intent
and formof the whole. And forthe firsttime, applyingthistechnical
principle,he methodicallydraws on rhetoricaljudgment as to the
innercoherenceof a literarywork,its form,and its most effectiveele-
ments. The reworkingof Aristotelianrhetoricby Melanchthon pre-
ceeded him in this. Flacius is fullyconsciousof having thus applied,
forthe sake of an unambiguousdetermination of individualpassages,a
criterioninherentin the work's context,its purpose, its proportion,
and in the coherenceof its separate parts. He evaluates such a her-
meneuticcriterionfromthe pointof view of methodin general: "And
indeed the individualpartsof a whole everywheredraw theircompre-
hensibilityfrom their relationshipto that whole and to the other
parts." He searchesforsuch innerformin the verystyleand individual
elementsof the work,and draftswhat is forthisperiod a mostsensitive
characterizationof the Pauline and Johanninestyles. It was indeed

This content downloaded from 185.2.32.90 on Wed, 18 Jun 2014 10:34:36 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
THE RISE OF HERMENEUTICS 239

progress,even if it remainedwithinthe limitsof the rhetoricalview-

point. For Melanchthonand Flacius, each writtenwork is composed
according to rules, and is afterwardsunderstoodaccording to rules.
It is a kindoflogical automaton,clothedwithstyle,images,and figures.
The formaldeficienciesin the workof Flacius were overcomein the
hermeneutics of Baumgarten. But in the lattera second greattheologi-
cal-hermeneuticaltendencybegan to make its presencefelt. Through
Nachrichten
Baumgarten's thoseEng-
voneinerHallischenBibliothek,
lish freethinkers and scholarswho examined the Bible in the light of
anthropology began to take theirplace beside the Dutch exegetesin the
Germanculturalrealm. Semlerand Michaeliswere influencedby their
contactwithBaumgartenand tookpart in his work. Michaeliswas the
firstto apply a unifiedhistoricalview of language, history,nature,and
law to an interpretation of the Old Testament. Semler,the predecessor
ofthegreatChristianBaur, demolishedtheunityof theNew Testament
canon, set up the requirementthat each individual sectionbe under-
stood in its own local context,reunitedthemonce again into that new
unitywhich was implicitin the living and historicalconceptionof an
initialstrugglein the Church betweenJudaizingChristiansand those
followinga more liberal dispensation,and then,in his propadeuticto
theologicalhermeneutics, peremptorily derivedhermeneuticscienceas a
whole fromtwo basic elements:interpretation based on linguisticusage
and on historicalcircumstances.At thispointthe liberationof exegesis
from dogma was complete; the grammatico-historical school was
founded. The sensitiveand carefulmind of Ernestithen providedthe
classictextforthisnew hermeneutics in his Interpres. It was stillbeing
read as late as Schleiermacher, who developed his own hermeneutics
fromit. To be sure, even thesegains were made withincertainfixed
limits. In the hands of theseexegetesthe formand the intellectualcon-
tentof all the writingsof a given centuryresolvedthemselvesinto the
same leading threadsof locally and temporallyconditionedideas. In
thispragmaticconceptionof history,human nature,ever self-identical
in its religiousand ethicalformation,is limitedby place and timein a
merelyexternalfashion. Such a conceptionis non-historical.
Up to this point,classical and biblical hermeneuticsdeveloped side
by side. But shouldn'tthey have been understoodas applicationsof
some more generalmode of interpretation?Wolff'sdiscipleMeier took
thisstep in his essayon the general art of exegesis,publishedin 1757-
He definedthe idea of his science in as general a way as possible,as
thatsciencewhichwas to draftthe rulesto be observedin any interpre-
tationof signs. But the book only proves,once again, that one cannot
founda new scienceon the basis of architectonics and symmetry.That

This content downloaded from 185.2.32.90 on Wed, 18 Jun 2014 10:34:36 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
240 NEW LITERARY HISTORY

way onlyendsup constructing blindwindowsthroughwhichno one

can see. An effectivehermeneutics could only developin a mind
wherea virtuoso of
practice philological was unitedwith
interpretation
a genuinecapacityforphilosophical
thought. Such a onewas Schleier-
macher.

V
The intellectual environment in whichhe worked: Winckelmann's
interpretation of worksor art; Herder'scongenialempathywiththe
innersoulofotherpeoplesand ages;thenewphilology whichdeveloped
fromthisnew esthetic attitude, thatof Heyne,of F. A. Wolfand his
disciples,amongwhomHeindorf, whoworkedon Platostudiesin the
closestcommunion withSchleiermacher himself-allofthiswas united
in him withthe characteristic approachof Germantranscendental
philosophy, whichsought,behindthe contentsof consciousness, for
somecreativepowerthat,working unconsciously butin unified fashion,
broughttheentireformof theworldintobeingwithinus.Out ofthe
conjunction ofthesetwomoments, theartofinterpretation to
specific
Schleiermacher as well as thedefinitive foundation of a scientific
her-
meneutics was developed.
Untilthenhermeneutics had been at besta systemof ruleswhose
parts, the individual
rules themselves, wereheldtogether bytheaim of
an of
giving interpretation generalvalidity. Hermeneutics had been
able to distinguish the various functions-grammatical, historical,
and material[sachlich]-whichworkedtogether
esthetico-rhetorical,
in theinterpretativeact. And,aftercenturies ofphilological virtuosity,
it had becomeconsciousoftherulesaccording to whichsuchfunctions
had tooperate.Schleiermacher nowsoughtforan analysis oftheunder-
that
standing lay behind these rules,or in other words for a formula-
tionofthegoaloftheactivity as a whole,and fromsucha formulation
he derivedthepossibility ofvalidinterpretation in general,alongwith
its conceptualinstruments, limitsand rules. He was, however,only
ableto analyzeUnderstanding as a re-experiencing or reconstructionin
itsvitalrelationshipto theprocessofliterary production itself.In the
livingapprehension of the creativeprocessby whicha literary work
comesintobeing,he saw the basic conditionforgraspingthe other
procedure, whichunderstands thewholeof theworkout of theindi-
vidual letters,and the spiritualtendencies of its creatorout of that
whole.
In orderto solvetheproblemthusposed,however, he neededa new
psychologicaland historicalmode of awareness. We have traced the

This content downloaded from 185.2.32.90 on Wed, 18 Jun 2014 10:34:36 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
THE RISE OF HERMENEUTICS 24I

opposition in questionherefromthatearliestconnection whicharose

betweenGreekinterpretation and the productiverhetoricassociated
witha determinate literarygenre. Yet the apprehension of the two
kindsofprocedures had alwaysbeenformulated in logicaland rhetori-
cal terms.The catagoriesunderwhichtheywere formulated were
always the mechanical ones of and
logicalrelationship logicalorder,
and thena coveringof thislogicalproductwithstyleand figureand
image. Now, however, whollynew ideas wereappliedto the under-
standing of the literaryproduct.Now, a unifiedand creativepower,
unconscious of itsownshapingforce,is seenas receiving thefirstim-
pulsestowards the creation of the work and as forming them. Re-
ceptivityand autonomous shaping indistinguishablethisforce.
are in
Such a poweris individualized to theveryfingertips, to the separate
wordsthemselves. Its highestexpression is the outerand innerform
of the literary work. And now thisworkcarriesan insatiableneed
to complete itsownindividuality through contemplation byotherindi-
vidualities.Understanding and Interpretation are thusinstinctand
activein lifeitself,and theyreachtheirfulfillment in the systematic
exegesisof vitalworks interanimated the
by spirit oftheir creator.Such
was the form whichthis new mode ofthought took in Schleiermacher's
mind.
Schleiermacher's greatsketchfora generalhermeneutics was, how-
ever,further influenced bythefactthathiscontemporaries, and he him-
self,had developedthe new psychological and historicalmodes of
thought intoa newphilological artofinterpretation. WithSchillerand
WilhelmvonHumboldt, withtheSchlegelbrothers, theGermanspirit
had turnedits attention fromliterary production to a comprehension
of thehistorical world. It was a movement of greatbreadth;Bdckh,
Dissen,Welker,Hegel,Ranke and Savignywereall influenced by it.
Friedrich SchlegelbecameSchleiermacher's mentorin philology.The
conceptsdevelopedbytheformer inhisbrilliantessayson Greekpoetry,
Goetheand Boccaccio,werethoseoftheinnerformof a work,of the
evolutionof a givenwriterand of Literature as a systematic whole.
And behindsuch individualachievements of an intuitivephilology
therelay forSchlegeltheplan fora scienceofcriticism, an ars critica,
whichwould be based on a theoryof a productiveliterarypower.
How closethisplanis to Schleiermacher's hermeneutics and criticism!
And fromSchlegelalso came the plan fora translation of Plato.
Here thetechniques ofthenewinterpretation wereworkedoutwhich
were thenappliedby B6ckhand Dissen to Pindar. Plato mustbe
understood as a philosophical artist.The goal of theinterpretation is
the unity between the character of Platonic philosophizingand the

This content downloaded from 185.2.32.90 on Wed, 18 Jun 2014 10:34:36 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
242 NEW LITERARY HISTORY

artisticformof Plato's works. Philosophyis here actual life,lifeinter-

mingled with conversation,and its literaryrepresentationis only a
way of settingit down forfurtherreference.So it had to be dialogue,
and a dialogue of such a carefullyconstructedkind that it forcedits
readersto re-createthe livingtransactionsbetweenthe thoughts. Yet
at the same time,in the strictunityof Platonic thought,each dialogue
mustbe a continuationof somethingearlier,mustpreparesomethingto
come, and thus spin out the threadsof the various parts of the phi-
losophy. When one followsthe relationships of the variousdialoguesto
each other,therecomes into view an overall structurewhich reveals
Plato's innermostintentions.Accordingto Schleiermacher,a genuine
understandingof Plato can onlybe achievedthroughthe apprehension
of thissystematically constructedwhole. The chronologicalsuccession
of the variousworks,althoughoftencoincidingwiththislogical struc-
ture,is of less moment. B6ckh was laterto remarkin his reviewarticle
that this masterfulstudymade Plato available to philologicalscience
forthefirsttime.
In Schleiermachersuch philologicalvirtuositywas uniquely joined
with a philosophicaldispositionof genius. For he had been formed
by transcendentalphilosophy,which providedthe firstadequate con-
ceptual instruments for the general apprehensionand solutionof the
problem of hermeneutics. Out of thisthe generalscience and doctrine
of exegesisemerged.
Schleiermacherworkedout a firstdraftin the autumnof 1804, upon
a readingof Ernesti'sInterpres,as an openinglectureforhis courseon
exegesisat Halle. We possess this hermeneuticin very fragmentary
formonly. A studentof Schleiermacher'sfromthe period in Halle,
Bdckh,gave formto thisversionof the theoryin the splendidlectures
on the subject in his Enzyklopiidie.
I now outlinethose pointsin Schleiermacher'shermeneuticswhich
seem to me crucial forfurtherdevelopment.
All exegesis of writtenworks is only the systematicworkingout
of that general process of Understandingwhich stretchesthroughout
our lives and is exercisedupon everytype of speech or writing. The
analysisof Understandingis therefore the groundworkforthe codifica-
tionof exegesis. The lattercan be realized,however,onlyby analyzing
the productionof literaryworks. Only upon thisrelationshipbetween
Understandingand literaryproductivitycan that ensemble of rules
be foundedwhichwill determinethe means and limitsof exegesis.
The possibilityof generallyvalid interpretation
can be derivedfrom
thenatureofUnderstanding.In Understanding,theindividuality of the
exegeteand that of the author are not opposed to each otherlike two

This content downloaded from 185.2.32.90 on Wed, 18 Jun 2014 10:34:36 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
THE RISE OF HERMENEUTICS 243

incomparablefacts. Rather,both have been formedupon the sub-

stratum ofa generalhumannature,and it is thiswhichmakespossible
thecommunion ofpeoplewitheachotherin speech.Heretherelatively
formalistic terminology of Schleiermacher can be further elucidated
psychologically. Individualdifferences are not in the last analysis
determinedby qualitativedifferences betweenpeople, but rather
througha difference in the degreeof development of theirspiritual
processes.Now inasmuchas the exegetetentatively projectshis own
senseof lifeintoanotherhistorical milieu,he is able withinthatper-
spective, tostrengthen and emphasize certainspiritual processes in him-
selfand to minimize others,thusmakingpossiblewithinhimself a re-
experiencing of an alienformof life.
If we now examinethe logicalside of thisprocessclosely,we see
it as the recognition of a holisticinterrelatedness formedon thebasis
of onlypartlydetermined or definedindividualsigns,underthe con-
stantparticipatory influence ofpreviousgrammatical, logical,and his-
toricalknowledge.In present-day local terminology, therefore, this
of
logicalaspect Understanding involves both the inductive application
of generaltruthsto particularcases,and a processof comparison or
analogy. The next step would be the definitionof the particular forms
takenbysuchlogicaloperations and theirinteraction.
It is at thispointthatthecentraldifficulty in all exegeticalpractice
makesitselffelt. The wholeof a workis to be understood fromthe
individualwordsand theirconnections witheach other,and yetthe
fullcomprehension of the individualpart alreadypresupposes com-
prehension of the whole. This circleis thenreduplicated in the re-
lationship betweentheindividual workitself and thespiritual tendencies
ofitscreator, and it returns againin the relationship between thework
and itsliterary genre.Schleiermacher resolved this difficulty
practically
in themostelegantwayin hisprefaceto Plato'sRepublic,and I find
manyotherexamplesofthesameprocedure in themanuscripts forhis
exegeticallectures.(He would begin with a review of the various
divisions, whichmay be comparedto a firstrapid reading;thenhe
wouldslowlyblockoutthebroadoutlinesofthewhole,and illuminate
the variousdifficulties, pausingreflectively at all thosespotswhich
afforded specialinsight intotheform.Onlythendid theactualinter-
pretation begin.) Theoretically we herereachthelimitsofall exegesis,
whichis ableto realizeitstaskonlyup to a certainpoint.For all under-
standingremainspartialand can neverbe terminated.Individuum
estineffabile.
He denouncedthe separationof the interpretative act into the
grammatical,historical,esthetic,and material modes, which had be-

This content downloaded from 185.2.32.90 on Wed, 18 Jun 2014 10:34:36 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
244 NEW LITERARY HISTORY

cometraditional in Schleiermacher's day. These distinctions onlyre-

flectthefactthatgrammatical, esthetic
historical, and materialknowl-
edgemustbe thereif thereis to be interpretation, and thattheyare
able to influenceit at everymoment.But interpretation itselfcan only
be resolvedintothetwoaspects[grammatical and psychological-tr.]
oftheprocessofapprehending actin linguistic
a spiritual signs.Gram-
maticalexegesis worksitswayup through thetextfromindividualcon-
nections to thoselargerrelationships thatdominatethewhole.Psycho-
a
logicalexegesisbeginsby projection intothe creativeinnerprocess,
and proceedsonwardto the outerand innerformsof thework,and
beyondthatto an intuition of its unitywiththe otherworksin the
spiritualstanceof itscreator.
This is the place whereSchleiermacher masterfullylaysdown the
rulesforthe art of exegesis.His doctrineof innerand outerformis
basic,and thereare particularly profound observationsabouta general
of
theory literary production from which an for
organon literary history
can be inferred.
The ultimategoal of the hermeneutic processis to understand an
authorbetterthan he understood himself.This is an idea whichis
thenecessary consequence ofthedoctrine ofunconscious creation.

VI
Let us conclude. Understanding can attaingeneralvalidityonlyin
relationship to writtendocuments. Even if hermeneutics shouldmake
interpretation consciousof its modes of procedure and of itsjustifica-
tion, F. A. Wolf would be rightnot to deem the usefulness of sucha
theoretical as in
discipline verygreat comparison with its livingprac-
tice. Butaboveand beyonditspracticalmeritforthebusiness ofinter-
pretation, there seems to me to be a further purpose behind such
theorizing, indeed itsmain to the
purpose: preserve generalvalidity of
interpretation againstthe inroads of romantic caprice and skeptical
subjectivity, andtogivea theoretical justificationforsuchvalidity, upon
whichall thecertainty ofhistoricalknowledge is founded.Seenin the
contextof thetheoryof knowledge, of logic,and the methodology of
the humanstudies,the theoryof interpretation becomesan essential
connecting linkbetweenphilosophy and the historical disciplines,an
essentialcomponent in the foundation of thehuman studies themselves.

(TRANSLATED BY FREDRIC JAMESON)

This content downloaded from 185.2.32.90 on Wed, 18 Jun 2014 10:34:36 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions