STUDIES ASSOCIATION JOURNAL / 262 (FALL 2002) the text pulls him through an endless maze of fiction, full of layers, each leading to the other. The open structure of The New Life calls for a sccond- nal woods in order to discover wi become. Thus, throughout the story. Nevertheless, the empirical reader can to play along or interpret these strategies in unexpected ways. The New Life, a8 a self-conscious narra frustrates the expectations of the fi in the process, but in the story itself. It demands a reader who enjoys mul tilayered narratives and aspires to become a Model Reader. Thus, the ideal are secking one another to experience other . The empirical reader's failure or refusal to collaborate with ifs the narrative process to a halt since there is no story to be thout the transformation of the reader into the hero. of the Day Before foreground the role of the reader in t rendering him the hero of the story. As open texts, they ultimately are lazy machines that are unable to embody mul ities that come into contact only rough: the efforts of an adventurous, second-level reader who is eager to ¢ fictional woods. When Roberto and Osman leave their real- ies, they form links between disparate wor 1¢ consensual adventures of the le ways, most of which are unfore- a story. As aml land of the Day Before and The Nes ANOTHER LOOK AT PERIODIZATION IN OTTOMAN HISTORY LINDA T. DARLING UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA, ‘The publication in English of several new textbooks dealing with portions of Ottoman history, and the disappearance from print of one old standhy iat we are moving away seems to suggest that replace the old its periods were compres story of the rise histories clearly are attempting to break away from # ‘The most unsatisfactory aspect of the old pe period of over three hundred years of decline Not only was lengthy decline implausible, but the very term “decline” seemed to loss of power to their supposed social and ‘an Early Modern Barope Buel Kural Shaws The tnd Modern Turkey, Volumes 1-2 (Berkeley: University Press, 1976-77) is oto ler, Uhve footnoted the discourse ofthe Fk‘THE TURKISH STUDIES ASSOCIATION JOURNAL /262 (ALL 2002) to account for discern wit 1 political, economic and social movements that they e empire. These concepts have been derived from such varied theoretical perspectives as modernization, decentral iwes has achieved accep- None of the altern ts oF Middle East gener: systems theory and Marxis tance amoi some historians have abandoned t ‘der to concentrate on the d ‘seems to inform the ps fed to the recent emei a8 long as Ottoman history ‘or success and its absence, ly change our understa is around the year 1600 results the empire's geopolitical strength a the West. To discuss Ottoman history in its own terms, it would hel accept ‘Ottomans themselves were doing or attempting to do. Such a periodization ‘would emphasize processes of state formation and social change a would allow us to analyze the Ottoman Empire in the same terms as West- 40m modernization, see Cyril E.Hlck and L. Cae Brown, ea, Modernization in the Middle ‘eccntalaton, se Thomas Naff and Koger Owen, eds, Suudies i Eighteenth Century Iai (Carbondale Southern I : Kal K. Barbi, Ortoman Rate in 20 em Europe even when its fate was not the same. Ottoman not be ready to agree on a new paradigm for the empire's would like to propose a new periodization nonetheless, one that together some of the insights of recent Ottoman historiography, avoids the concept of decline, is more teachable and could be incorporate textbooks, links Ottoman history with reg flobal trends and provides a more neutral terminology. It may be significant that, like this periodization, which was developed several years ago, the new histories tend to make teenth century a dividing point in Ottoman histo ‘What I propose is a set of three periods comp 1550), Consolida the main characteristics of jod, This approach aims to ttomans but what they did abo between the empire's ge its internal conditions in imes of weakness, Other terms may be Substituted for these, as long as they are based on the Ottomans’ own goals and motivating forces, rather than on external forces or events, lasted from the begi of the empire ileyman’s reign. Its two suby-periods consist of a ind an imperial phase after the conquest of ple. The period, of course, did not see constant expat fact, in the first sub-period, the empire sometimes was contracting rather than expanding, especially after the defeat by ‘Timur in 1402. Nor was this 1¢ expansion occurred. But the period is labeled “Expansion” ts confines the basic orga tural, ete.—were designed and geared for expansion. Confront external enemies was the main funetion of the state. Sultans were legiti- mated by conquest, rewards went to people who worked ed conquerors for travelersSTUDIES ASSOCIATION JOURNAL 262 (FALL 2002 ‘quest proceeded along trade routes, and hand in hand with conquest went reclamation of wast \d expansion of agriculture. Incorpor new groups and harnessing their resources for the expansion project formed the business of the ‘may not sound very much different from ge of linking powor warriors and the rulers and the court culture probable changes importance of tra sub-period and the organization of th ‘The second period, 1550-171 defined as the maintenance of e: enrichment of the empire's internal This is not to say that no further expansion took place. Rather, ‘mid-sixteenth century the main energy and organization of state and society were directed toward maintenance instead of growth, deepening and regularizing the central government's penetration into the life of the provinces and expanding the institutions of economic and social exchange. ‘The Ottoman Empire had had periods of consolidation before: the reign of Bayenid 1, the later part of Murad I's reign and parts of Bayezid I lation. During this period, how: fever, resource drain, The second sub-period was to control the negative effects of a consolidation period an era of worldwide Around an expans state co-existing expansion gave were altered an empire's efforts iat coincided with an, the empire changed from force into a Great Power, a old arrangements gave place to new ones. This change profoundly affected military, administrat class, agricultural and commercial orgat Greatest rewards fiscal, dynastic, religious, ions. In this. period, n to be given to administcators rather than to warriors, while royal heirs no longer were sent out to rule provinces and lead armies. In place of semi-autonomous provinces that acknowledged the sultan’s leadership, now the central government ct provincial government and society. Large jon of support for some of the Su n period, as 1 mosque-medrese com e extensive use of ies, as well as in the expansion of trade. Internally, there was growth in urbanization and commerce, along with an increase in the mumber of roads, markets and Friday mosques. Vast resources were devoted to cultural production and the flourishing of arts and letters and the sciences. Internal development, rather than expansion oon the fringes, characterized this whole period. is not to say that efforts at consol any more than were expansion effort ion were always successful, rst period. Hand in hand idation and slowing of growth and the readjustments that followed ness of the period found further just cavalrymen and inflat meshonored way of des period of iong the heey: Univer: 28younger generation. Although sively exploited, per capi location took place, Increases in the salaried infantry forces armed ndguns were insufficient to absorb all the available manpower. Resistance to consolida- tion efforts can be seen in Celali unrest, in the allegiance of Tirkmen and Kurdish tribes to “heterodox” religious groups, in abandonment of ation and in petitions sent to the central government by people from all walks of life—peasants, nomads and merchants, as well as officials and nilitary men. If we are wrong to believe that the Ottoman Empire was s en we must concede that alterations in the Ottomans’ revenues no longer were expanded by conquest, rendering it necessa the empire to develop new methods of revenue extra society. Thus, revenue farming did not keep up mn, the direction of the sta one of Transformation. The re treated quite separately, as 4 whole new world. Perhaps history of capitalism, a new era began with the industrial revolu for the Ottoman Empire, the eighteenth and nineteenth cen totality a number of social and political transfor- t previously have been severed by tl of labor within During this period, the energies of the state and of large sectors of society were focused on the issue of transforming the empire, or of transformation, Not that the empire had never changed before, but conscious efforts to make, direct or halt change became the major public agenda throughout this period. The nature of the transformation has beon debated under the rubrics of modernization, the “ Period (1718-1730) generally is seen as the fi Tulip Period proved to the transformation in art jes. The baroque art of the eighteenth century was a real departure from the p: ‘merely an imitation of a foreign style but a merging of new t but certain imported plants began to be cultivated e, potatoes, tomatoes and tobacco. Although a new art not further se efforts were unsuccess! issary corps and many of the ulema, they successful endeavors of the nineteenth century (of in in education. The military tra up by the eighteenth century for the new model forces twentieth, throughout transforming life and society on an even broader scale, In response to Ottoman efforts at military and educational reform, the also was transformed from support of the central govern- ( its transformative goals. Aj is not to say that ‘opposed al se two in how its ie reform of ‘weight was applied. Islam and its reorganizati mn and resistance to imperi 1 fringes of the empire and co if centuries, becomingFUDIES ASSOCIATION JOURNAL /262 (AU: mn was the growth ie ensuing struggle between of provincial government and society for con’ economic and political change. Most of the people who engineered change—t and Cezzar of Palestine, the der ig agriculture and trade in their provinces.’ es were later picked up and promoted by the central , but in transforming the Ottoman economy the provinces led the way. Here, too, the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries must be considered together for this movement to be fully understood. A concomitant change was the transformation of the capital and the core region of the empire by immigration and refugee movements from the fringes of the empire and the resulting upheaval in social and communal relations. Once again, population displacements had happened before, but never on stich a large scale and over such a long period, nor with effects that transformed the very identity of the Ottomans. AAs far as the economy is concerned, scholars have found th eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the Ottom rated into the i nineteenth century was a new era, it is fhe same is true for the Ottoman economy as a whole, Tt has yet to be shown that European ficant enough in the economy to be the factor by which he dated. With resp the Képriilii reforms. Whether that is more or less critical than the changes of one hundred years later remains an open question, but there is, a strong argument against periodizing Ottoman history according to changes occurring in Western Europe. For many commentators, of cours importance in the Ottom: forms of government. However, sito aspect for us in the current the transformation of greatest of Moder istry *Kasaba, The O BD. 346-363 1an Empire and the Werld Beamomye The Nineteenth Contry %6 PERIODIZATION IN OTTOMAN HISTORY / DARLING elite. This understanding of the devel- ime, as one change among many. ple were far more ing of railroads, the century, ise of the ayan and their participation in governance, that the jon between conquerors and conquered people became blurred, and the lessening of that distinction was prerequisite to the notions of citizenship and equality introduced in the nineteenth century. "The insight of those who invented the “reform” period was correct, inasmuch as, the emergence of modern Turkey was a continuation of trends already established. ee more-or-less equal periods of bbe seen as the s tory. On the other hand, linking the eighteenth century ‘ight rescue it from its current obscurit deserves, if only as the incubation period for trends the nineteenth century or later. ‘The periodization scheme proposed here has the virtue of drawing our eyes to Ottoman agency in shaping tory, and of turning our attention away from what happened to them and toward what the Ottomans themselves did. It also allows ws to see some of the tensions and in Ottoman society that were suppressed and ignored in the ions even gain explanatory force: rather being propelled by the ex machina of decline, Ottoman society emerged as a product of effort and resistance, of diversity of goals and aIES ASSOCIATION JOURNAL /262 (ALL 2002) his is especially true for the changes of the modern 1¢ impact of the West” by itself no longer is a satisfactory explanation. These changes, rather than being suddenly im- posed on Ottoman society, emerged out of a history of coping and experimentation applied to various problems over the course of time. ‘The adoption of this periodization also would be useful for teaching purposes, It brings the chronology of Ottoman history into closer corre of Iran, India and Muslim Africa, thereby facilitating (he Consolidation period more nearly matches the mnpowder empire” concept than anything in the rise the beginning of the Transformation period may ‘more-or-less contemporaneous British domination those peoples something and the creation of modi of a larger transformation in allocation of resources and rel ‘occurring elsewhere on the globe. In relation to Buropean his the contradict looks like the impact of Western capital in the sixteenth century turns out not to lead to incorporation. Moreover, the division between Expansion and Consol jes with the normal dividing point between semesters of Western Ci , while that between Consoli dation and Transformation coincides with the beginning of the Enlighten: ment, Thus, Ottoman history could fit more easily into and be taught together with the history of the rest of Europe. ‘The current fascination in European history with the formation of Orientalist images runs the danger of engraving them permanently on people’s minds unless they are given an alternative. A vehicle must be provided for the recognition that, most of the time, O history was on a similar course to that of most of role of Tarks in global history transcended nomad conquests. The Expansion-Consolidation-Transformation model replaces the negative image of the Other with a concept emphasizing processes of development and change, and so encourages the growth of an understand: ing which, as teachers, we all hope to foster. Ottoman imperial s; yas among peoples, simi ng Europe and the 1998, pp. 221-246, IMPROPRIETY AND IMPIETY AMONG THE EARLY OTTOMAN SULTANS (1351-1451) HEATH W. LOWRY PRINCETON UNIVERSITY “The questions of the degree to which the fourteenth and fifteenth century 3 of the Ottoman polity observed Islamic precepts in general and of such practices as the imbibing of alco in unstudied. The present article ex contemporary sources to see wha yy shed on these Murad TI (1421-1451), Unfortuns which address such subjects from the reigns of two of the earlier rulers, namely, Osman (ca, 1209-1324) and Murad I (1362-1389). Because Otto- ier period could hardly be expected to openly man chronicles of the tions of specific members of ‘modern Turkey and througho types of primary sources. The first of these consists of the writings of those with whom the ns came into contact, of which the Byzant hronicles are particularly important, ‘The infrequent traveler accounts, ve survived from the period constitute the second type of source. ruler whose drinking was on such a tradition and nerves. Bayerid’s general disregard of religious observances also was discussed scholar, Miikrimin Halil Yinan« story that the famo Tigious judge) of Bursa, had refused to accept Bayezid as a “omait Hakla Veuny kaa, 1947), Volume, p.322,