Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Volume 18 | Number 3
April 1958
Repository Citation
Philip E. Henderson, Conflict of Laws - Rules on Marital Property, 18 La. L. Rev. (1958)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol18/iss3/7
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19581 COMMENTS
Conclusion
The court has evidenced a general tendency to view expro-
priation not so much as a taking of corporeal property as a situa-
tion involving injury to an owner through a destruction of his
rights which he holds in relation to his property.3 51
Apart from the differences relative to forced sales and assess-
ment value, Louisiana is generally in line with other jurisdictions
on matters of eminent domain. The litigation has come about
for the most part in simple factual situations. Thus the extensive
judicial refinement and elaboration of rules which is found in
certain other states is not found in Louisiana. The existing rules
are, however, quite practically workable and generally sufficient.
Joseph G. Hebert
Ante-Nuptial Contracts
Obviously, problems in the law concerning marital property
would be considerably simplified if all property of a husband and
wife were governed by the law of some single jurisdiction. It
was early realized that this convenient state of affairs could be
achieved by a valid ante-nuptial contract which would determine
all present and future property relations of the spouses wherever
they might go.
Express ante-nuptial contracts became common in parts of
Europe. In fact, the ease of determination of property rights
made these contracts so popular with the Continental courts that
they began to find "tacit" contracts on the part of marrying
1. MARSH, MARITAL PROPERTY IN CONFLICT OF LAWS 94 (1952).
2. There is controversy among the legal writers as to whether the forum should
,:hoose the law of one of the jurisdictions involved and apply it in its entirety, or
whether the forum should choose the result that would be granted in one juris-
diction and then achieve that result through the most similar laws of its own
jurisdiction, or, third, whether the forum should meld parts of both laws and thus
apply a new body of law found only in conflict of laws cases. Of course, in the
interest of uniformity and predictability, established conflict of laws rules are to
be followed in stereotyped cases. See 1 RABEL, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS: A Co -
PAEuATivE STUDY 47-60 (1945).
1958] COMMENTS
Movables
In recognition that movables are likely to be taken to the
domicile of the acquirers, the rule has been formulated that the
law of the domicile at the time of acquisition governs interests
in movables. 14 This rule embodies the policies of unity of laws
and convenience at the forum; the court need apply only one set
of laws, that of the domicile, to any number of movables ac-
quired in any number of jurisdictions so long as a single domi-
cile has been retained. When the domicile is changed, however,
another single set of laws, that of the new domicile, is applied
to all movables acquired while that new domicile is retained.
Thus the conflict of laws rule for movables has not only a par-
ticular geographical factor, the domicile, but also a time factor,
the time of acquisition. It is through this time factor that the
laws of the subsequent domicile are applied; without it, Ameri-
can courts would be recognizing a rule having the same effect,
including the difficulties, of the tacit contract theory previously
discussed, i.e., the law of the first matrimonial domicile would
govern all future acquisitions. The leading case disclaiming the
tacit contract effect and proclaiming that property acquired
after a change in domicile is governed by the laws of the new
domicile is Saul v. His Creditors. 5 In that case Saul and his
wife were first domiciled in Virginia, a separate property state,
but Saul acquired the property in question after they changed
their domicile to Louisiana. The wife died and the children
claimed one-half of it as community property against the credi-
tors of the husband, who relied on the theory that the law of the
first domicile, Virginia, would govern all acquisitions. The de-
cision of the court in favor of the children, and Mr. Justice
Story's comments on the case, 16 have firmly established the "par-
14. GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 124 (3d ed. 1949) ; STUMBERG, CONFLICT
OF LAWS 313 (2d ed. 1951) ; RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 290 (1934).
15. 5 Mart.(N.S.) 569 (La. 1827).
16. STORY, -CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 157-58 (5th ed. 1857). There Story said that
marital property laws have only territorial effect, being statutes real and not
statutes personal, i.e., they can only extend to the domiciliaries while the doci-
ciliaries are within the jurisdiction. That this view is not entirely correct will be
562 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. XVIII
Immovables
A state as a unit of power has as its very purpose the proper
provision of law and order. As the enunciator of policies chosen
for the good of its jurisdiction, the state must provide its own
law and carry it out, whether or not it is at variance with
the general rule in other states. States establish systems of
recordation consistent with their own pattern of property laws.
Purchasers and creditors in a state depend on its particular
system being carried out. Stated negatively, if a state were not
able to insure that its law concerning its own property would be
carried out, the uncertainty on the part of prospective creditors
and purchasers would result in a lower valuation of property
throughout the state as well as a substantial hindrance to busi-
ness activity due to the greater risk and thus higher price of
secured loans. These economic factors, as well as the policy of
providing convenient administration at the forum, have led to
the much-reiterated conflict of laws rule: The law of the place
of the immovable (law of the situs) governs marital interests
in immovables. 25 With the law of the situs governing, the domi-
cile of the owner would not be a factor in the determination of
the marital property rights. But this rule, like the rule concern-
ing movables, has the provision protecting vested interests -
the source doctrine. 26 Thus if property acquired in a separate
property state is exchanged during marriage for immovable
property in a community state, that immovable property is
treated as local separate property.27 Similarly, if an immovable
in a separate property state is acquired in the name of one
spouse, but in exchange for community property, a constructive
trust is held to have been formed as would have been the case
25. Newcomer v. Orem, 2 Md. 297, 56 Am. Dec. 717 (1852) ; RESTATEMENT,
CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 237, 238 (1934) ; GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 122 (3d
ed. 1949). This rule stems from the old theory of territoriality of law, i.e., that
law has effect only on that which is within its borders. The principle of comity,
particularly in the United States, has made great inroads on this theory. See
STUMBERG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 7 (2d ed. 1951).
26. "When parties acquire property, it is to be presumed that they do it in
view of the law as it exists at the time and place, and its character as community
or separate-estate is determined with its first acquisition - nor does changing its
character from personalty to realty, and vice versa, affect the situation." Stephen
v. Stephen, 36 Ariz. 235, 239, 284 Pac. 158, 159 (1930).
27. Stephen v. Stephen, 36 Ariz. 235, 284 Pac. 158 (1930) ; Joiner v. Joiner,
131 Tex. 27, 112 S.W.2d 1049 (1938).
19581 COMMENTS
37. This conclusion, that the law of the situs determines whether income from
property is an acquired movable or not, was followed in Stone v. Sample, 216
Miss. 287, 62 So.2d 307 (1953) ; Succession of Packwood, 9 Rob. 438 (La. 1845) ;
Johnson v. Commissioner, 1 T.C. 1041 (1943), appeal dismissed, 139 F.2d 491
(8th Cir. 1943) ; Estate of Hale, 2 Cof. 191 (San Francisco Super. Ct. 1906).
In Commissioner v. Porter, 148 F.2d 566 (5th Cir. 1945) the income to a Texas
spouse was from a spendthrift trust established as a gift in New York; there was
no conflict of laws as to this income being movable, but the court went on to say
that because the trust was a spendthrift trust the income was to be treated as
income and not as separate gifts. Presumably, the same would not be true of a
discretionary trust. Accord: Estate of Ernest v. Hinds, 11 T.C. 314 (1948).
38. Castro v. Illies, 22 Tex. 479 (1858) and Hall v. Harris, 11 Tex. 300 (1854)
are the leading cases. See cases cited in 13 L.R.A. 236 (1891) ; 45 Am. JUR. 465,
§ 82 (1943). Of. Neuner, Marital Property and the Conflict of Laws, 5 LOUISIANA
LAW REVIEW 167, 180 (1943).
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. XVIII
Louisiana Rule
The Louisiana Legislature has exerted its power over the
marital property within its jurisdiction to a greater extent and
intensity than has any other state. Article 2400 of the Louisiana
Civil Code provides: "All property acquired in this state by non-
39. See 1 RABEL, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 373 (1945).
40. The registration of automobiles may be an exception to this.
41. GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS 380, n. 11 (1949) ; 1 RABEL, THE CONFLICT
OF LAWS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 372 (1945) ; Harding, Marital Domicile and
Marital Rights in Movables, 30 MICH. L. REV. 859 (1932).
42. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 292 (1934).
43. That rights of owners in common are protected in co-owners' dealings with
third parties, see 2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 426 (3d ed. 1939).
19581 COMMENTS