Week 8

Vivares v. St. Theresa’s College, G.R. No. 202666, September 29, 2014

Doctrinal Ruling:
There are three strands of the right to privacy: locational; informational; and decisional privacy. The
right to informational privacy is usually defined as the right of individuals to control information
about themselves.

In developing the writ of habeas data, the Court aimed to protect an individual’s right to
informational privacy, among others. A comparative law scholar has, in fact, defined habeas dataas
"a procedure designed to safeguard individual freedom from abuse in the information age."13 The
writ, however, will not issue on the basis merely of an alleged unauthorized access to information
about a person. Availment of the writ requires the existence of a nexus between the right to privacy
on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other.

To have an expectation of privacy in Facebook posts, a user must show intention to keep posts
private through the use of privacy tools.

For instance, a Facebook user canregulate the visibility and accessibility of digital images(photos),
posted on his or her personal bulletin or "wall," except for the user’sprofile picture and ID, by
selecting his or her desired privacy setting:

(a) Public - the default setting; every Facebook user can view the photo;
(b) Friends of Friends - only the user’s Facebook friends and their friends can view the photo;
(b) Friends - only the user’s Facebook friends can view the photo;
(c) Custom - the photo is made visible only to particular friends and/or networks of the Facebook
user; and
(d) Only Me - the digital image can be viewed only by the user.

It is well to emphasize at this point that setting a post’s or profile detail’s privacy to "Friends" is no
assurance that it can no longer be viewed by another user who is not Facebook friends with the
source of the content. The user’s own Facebook friend can share said content or tag his or her own
Facebook friend thereto, regardless of whether the user tagged by the latter is Facebook friends or
not with the former. Also, when the post is shared or when a person is tagged, the respective
Facebook friends of the person who shared the post or who was tagged can view the post, the
privacy setting of which was set at "Friends."

Had it been proved that the access tothe pictures posted were limited to the original uploader,
through the "Me Only" privacy setting, or that the user’s contact list has been screened to limit
access to a select few, through the "Custom" setting, the result may have been different, for in such
instances, the intention to limit access to the particular post, instead of being broadcasted to the
public at large or all the user’s friends en masse, becomes more manifest and palpable.

Spouses Hing v. Choachuy, G.R. No. 179736, June 26, 2013

Doctrinal Ruling:

Meaning of the right to privacy: The right to privacy is the right to be let alone.
The "reasonable expectation of privacy" test: The reasonableness of a person’s expectation of privacy
depends on a two-part test: (1) whether, by his conduct, the individual has exhibited an expectation
of privacy; and (2) this expectation is one that society recognizes as reasonable.

Surveillance cameras should not cover places where there is reasonable expectation of privacy. Nor
should these cameras be used to pry into the privacy of another’s residence or business office as it
would be no different from eavesdropping, which is a crime under Republic Act No. 4200 or the Anti-
Wiretapping Law.

People v. Cogaed, G.R. No. 200334, July 30, 2014

Doctrinal Ruling:

The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a component of the right to privacy.

Stop and Frisk

Requirement for stop-and-frisk search: Not probable cause, but genuine reason that criminal activity
may be afoot and that the person may be armed and dangerous.

Mere suspicion is not enough for a “stop-and-frisk”; there must be “genuine reason” to believe that
the person has a concealed weapon.

Consented Search

The implied acquiescence to the search, if there was any, could not have been more than mere
passive conformity given under intimidating or coercive circumstances and is thus considered no
consent at all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee.

The prosecution and the police carry the burden of showing that the waiver of a constitutional right
is one which is knowing, intelligent, and free from any coercion. In all cases, such waivers are not to
be presumed.

Veridiano v. People, G.R. No. 200370, June 7, 2017

Doctrinal Ruling:

The requirement of lawful arrest prior to the search: For a valid search incident to a lawful arrest, the
lawful arrest must precede the search; the process cannot be reversed.

Consented warrantless Search

Silence or lack of resistance is not necessarily consent to a warrantless search but mere implied
acquiescence given under intimidating or coercive circumstances.

Stop and Frisk

A "stop and frisk" search is defined as the act of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street,
interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s) or contraband.
The allowable scope of a "stop and frisk" search is limited to a "protective search of outer clothing
for weapons.

In Flagrante Delicto Arrest

On the other hand, the elements of an arrest effected in hot pursuit under paragraph (b) of Section 5
(arrest effected in hot pursuit) are: first, an offense has just been committed; and second, the
arresting officer has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it.

Arrest of a jeepney passenger at a checkpoint on the basis of an informant’s tip cannot be justified as
a valid in flagrante delicto arrest, absent any overt act from the person to be arrested indicating that
a crime has just been committed, was being committed, or is about to be committed. A hearsay tip
by itself does not justify a warrantless arrest.

Hot Pursuit

Requirements for a valid in flagrante delicto arrest: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an
overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a
crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.

Hot pursuit arrest: Law enforcers need not personally witness the commission of a crime, but must
have personal knowledge of facts and circumstances indicating that the person sought to be arrested
committed it.

The rule requires that an offense has just been committed. It connotes "immediacy in point of time."
An arrest under Rule 113, Section 5(b) of the Rules of Court entails a time element from the moment
the crime is committed up to the point of arrest.

Search of a moving Vehicle

A checkpoint search is a variant of a search of a moving vehicle.

For as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the
inspection of the vehicle is limited to a visual search, said routine checks is not violative of the right
against unreasonable searches.

An extensive search may be conducted on a vehicle at a checkpoint when law enforcers have
probable cause to believe that the vehicle's passengers committed a crime or when the vehicle
contains instruments of an offense.

A tip is still hearsay no matter how reliable it may be. It is not sufficient to constitute probable cause
in the absence of any other circumstance that will arouse suspicion.

Saluday v. People, G.R. No. 215305, April 3, 2018

Doctrinal Ruling:

Consent must be given voluntarily, intelligently and without duress. The constitutional immunity
against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right, which may be waived. However, to be
valid, the consent must be voluntary such that it is unequivocal, specific, and intelligently given,
uncontaminated by any duress or coercion.
If a police officer, without coercion or intimidation, asks for permission to open a bag and the bag
owner says, “yes, just open it,” there is consent to the search of the contents of the bag.

The State can impose non-intrusive security measures and filter those going in a public bus. The
search of persons in a public place is valid because the safety of others may be put at risk. A person's
expectation of privacy is diminished whenever he or she enters private premises that are accessible
to the public. Thus, a bus inspection at a military checkpoint constitutes a reasonable search.

Guidelines for reasonable public bus searches:

Prior to entry, passengers and their bags and luggages can be subjected to a routine inspection akin
to airport and seaport security protocol. Metal detectors and x-ray scanning machines can be
installed at bus terminals. Passengers can also be frisked. In lieu of electronic scanners, passengers
can be required instead to open their bags and luggages for inspection, in the passenger's presence.
Should the passenger object, he or she can validly be refused entry into the terminal.

While in transit, a bus can still be searched by government agents or the security personnel of the
bus owner in the following three instances. First, upon receipt of information that a passenger carries
contraband or illegal articles, the bus where the passenger is aboard can be stopped en route to
allow for an inspection of the person and his or her effects. This is no different from an airplane that
is forced to land upon receipt of information about the contraband or illegal articles carried by a
passenger onboard. Second, whenever a bus picks passenger en route, the prospective passenger
can be frisked and his or her bag or luggage be subjected to the same routine inspection by
government agents or private security personnel as though the person boarded the bus at the
terminal.

This is because unlike an airplane, a bus is able to stop and pick passengers along the way, making it
possible for these passengers to evade the routine search at the bus terminal. Third, a bus can be
flagged down at designated military or police checkpoints where State agents can board the vehicle
for a routine inspection of the passengers and their bags or luggage.

In both situations, the inspection of passengers and their effects prior to entry at the bus terminal
and the search of the bus while in transit must also satisfy the following conditions to qualify as a
valid reasonable search. First, as to the manner of the search, it must be the least intrusive and must
uphold the dignity of the person or persons being searched, minimizing, if not altogether eradicating,
any cause for public embarrassment, humiliation or ridicule. Second, neither can the search result
from any discriminatory motive such as insidious profiling, stereotyping and other similar motives. In
all instances, the fundamental rights of vulnerable identities, persons with disabilities, children and
other similar groups should be protected. Third, as to the purpose of the search, it must be confined
to ensuring public safety. Fourth, as to the evidence seized from the reasonable search, courts must
be convinced that precautionary measures were in place to ensure that no evidence was planted
against the accused.

The search of persons in a public place is valid because the safety of others may be put at risk. Given
the present circumstances, the Court takes judicial notice that public transport buses and their
terminals, just like passenger ships and seaports, are in that category.

Aside from public transport buses, any moving vehicle that similarly accepts passengers at the
terminal and along its route is likewise covered by these guidelines. Hence, whenever compliant with
these guidelines, a routine inspection at the terminal or of the vehicle itself while in transit
constitutes a reasonable search. Otherwise, the intrusion becomes unreasonable, thereby triggering
the constitutional guarantee under Section 2, Article III of the Constitution.

To emphasize, the guidelines do not apply to privately-owned cars. Neither are they applicable to
moving vehicles dedicated for private or personal use, as in the case of taxis, which are hired by only
one or a group of passengers such that the vehicle can no longer be flagged down by any other
person until the passengers on board alight from the vehicle.

Dela Cruz v. People, G.R. No. 200748, July 23, 2014

Doctrinal Ruling:

The drug test is not covered by allowable non-testimonial compulsion.

We are aware of the prohibition against testimonial compulsion and the allowable exceptions to such
proscription. Cases where non-testimonial compulsion has been allowed reveal, however, that the
pieces of evidence obtained were all material to the principal cause of the arrest.

In the instant case, we fail to see how a urine sample could be material to the charge of
extortion.1âwphi1 The RTC and the CA, therefore, both erred when they held that the extraction of
petitioner’s urine for purposes of drug testing was "merely a mechanical act, hence, falling outside
the concept of a custodial investigation."

The drug test was a violation of petitioner’s right to privacy and right against self-incrimination. It is
incontrovertible that petitioner refused to have his urine extracted and tested for drugs. He also
asked for a lawyer prior to his urine test. He was adamant in exercising his rights, but all of his efforts
proved futile, because he was still compelled to submit his urine for drug testing under those
circumstances.

Miguel v. People, G.R. No. 227038, July 31, 2017

Doctrinal Ruling:

Bantay Bayan or civilian volunteers for the preservation of peace and order in their respective areas
have the color of a state-related function and are deemed law enforcers for purposes of the
prohibitions in the Bill of Rights. Consequently, evidence obtained by them during an illegal search is
inadmissible as evidence pursuant to the exclusionary rule under the Constitution.

Pollo v. Constantino-David, G.R. No. 181881, October 18, 2011

Doctrinal Ruling:

Where the employee used a password on his computer, did not share his office with co-workers and
kept his computer locked, he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in his computer files.

Accessing and copying contents of a computer hard drive are examples of search.

The constitutional guarantee is not a prohibition of all searches and seizures but only of
"unreasonable" searches and seizures.
The right against unreasonable searches and seizures equally applies to a government workplace.
Individuals do not lose this merely because they work for the government instead of a private
employer.

Test to determine the validity of an employer’s intrusion into an employee’s privacy: 1) whether an
employee has a legitimate expectation of privacy; and 2) whether the employer’s intrusion for non-
investigatory, work-related purposes, as well as for investigations of work-related misconduct, is
reasonable.

Probable cause is not required for a public employer to conduct a legitimate, work-related non-
investigatory intrusions as well as investigations of work-related misconduct. Such intrusion should
be judged by the standard of reasonableness. Under this reasonableness standard, both the
inception and the scope of the intrusion must be reasonable.

Test for determining the reasonableness of an employer’s intrusion into an employee’s right to
privacy: 1) whether the action was justified at its inception; and 2) whether the search as actually
conducted was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference. A
search of an employee’s office by a supervisor will be "justified at its inception" when there are
reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the employee is guilty
of work-related misconduct, or that the search is necessary for a non-investigatory work-related
purpose.

Example of an employee who failed to prove that he had an actual subjective expectation of privacy
in is government office or government-issued computer: Petitioner did not allege that he had a
separate enclosed office which he did not share with anyone, or that his office was always locked and
not open to other employees or visitors. Neither did he allege that he used passwords or adopted
any means to prevent other employees from accessing his computer files. On the contrary, he
submits that he normally would have visitors in his office, whom he even allowed to use his
computer.

A government employee’s subjective expectation of privacy can be negated by a government policy

regulating the use of office computers.

Example of a reasonable search of a government employee’s computer files: A search by a

government employer of an employee’s office undertaken in connection with an investigation
involving a work-related misconduct is justified at inception when there are reasonable grounds for
suspecting that it will turn up evidence that the employee is guilty of work-related misconduct. It was
a reasonable exercise of the managerial prerogative of the Commission as an employer aimed at
ensuring its operational effectiveness and efficiency. Consequently, the evidence derived from the
questioned search are deemed admissible.

People v. Pastrana, G.R. No. 196045, February 21, 2018

Doctrinal Ruling:

Additional requirements for the validity of a warrant under the Rules of Court: Warrant must be in
connection with one specific offense and the judge, before issuing the warrant, must personally
examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath, the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them.

Requirement: Probable cause: Probable cause for a search warrant means the existence of such facts
and circumstances which could lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with said offense are in the
place to be searched.

Reason for the one specific offense requirement in search warrants: To ensure that the warrant is
issued only on the basis of probable cause. Otherwise, it would be impossible for the judges to find
the existence of probable cause. The purpose is to outlaw general warrants.

A search warrant for violation of the Securities Regulation Code and Estafa is invalid.

Lapi v. People, G.R. No. 210731, February 13, 2019

Doctrinal Ruling:

The "plain view" doctrine applies when the following requisites concur:
(a) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is
in a position from which he can view a particular area;
(b) the discovery of evidence in plain view is inadvertent;
(c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime,
contraband or otherwise subject to seizure.

The first requisite of the plain view doctrine assumes that the law enforcement officer has "a prior
justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area." This means
that the officer who made the warrantless seizure must have been in a lawful position when he
discovered the target contraband or evidence in plain view.

Vaporoso v. People, G.R. No. 238659, June 03, 2019

Doctrinal Ruling:

A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may have
been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a search warrant.

On this note, case law requires a strict application of this rule, that is, “to absolutely limit a
warrantless search of a person who is lawfully arrested to his or her person at the time of and
incident to his or her arrest and to ‘dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of
the commission of the offense.’ Such warrantless search obviously cannot be made in a place other
than the place of arrest.”

Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure enumerates the instances wherein a peace
officer or a private person may lawfully arrest a person even without a warrant: A peace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: a) When, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an
offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge
of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person
to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving
final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.

Paragraph (a) of Section 5 is commonly known as an in flagrante delicto arrest. For a warrantless
arrest of an accused caught in flagrante delicto to be valid, two requisites must concur: (l) the person
to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or
within the view of the arresting officer.

On the other hand, the elements of an arrest effected in hot pursuit under paragraph (b) of Section 5
(arrest effected in hot pursuit) are: first, an offense has just been committed; and second, the
arresting officer has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it.

Homar v. People, G.R. No. 182534, September 2, 2015

Doctrinal Ruling:

In a search incident to a lawful arrest, there must be a lawful arrest preceding the search, the process
cannot be reversed.

Sanchez v. People, G.R. No. 204589, November 19, 2014

Doctrinal Ruling:

Lack of overt act

The mere acts of leaving a residence of a known drug peddler and boarding a tricycle are not
sufficient for a valid in flagrante delicto arrest. Such acts cannot be considered criminal.

Lack of Probable Cause

When police officers chased the tricycle to arrest the accused, they had no personal knowledge to
believe that they accused bought shabu from the notorious drug dealer and actually possessed the
illegal drug when he boarded the tricycle.

Stop and Frisk

A "stop and frisk" search is defined as the act of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street,
interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s) or contraband.

The apprehending police officer must have a genuine reason, in accordance with his experience and
the surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person to be held has weapons concealed
about him.

"stop-and-frisk" serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of effective crime prevention and
detection, which underlies the recognition that a police officer may, under appropriate circumstances
and in an appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of investigating possible criminal
behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the more pressing interest of safety and self-
preservation which permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the person with
whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used
against the police officer.

People v. Cristobal, G.R. No. 234207, June 10, 2019

Doctrinal Ruling:

A “stop and frisk” becomes unlawful the moment the police officers continue with the search on a
person’s body even after that finding this person has no weapon.

A search and seizure carried out without a judicial warrant becomes "unreasonable" within the
meaning of said constitution.

There is no valid search incident to a lawful arrest if a motorcycle driver is stopped/flagged down for
a traffic violation that is punishable by a fine and subjected to a search, as there can be no lawful
warrantless arrest for an offense punishable by a fine.

People v. Edano, G.R. No. 188133, July 7, 2014

Doctrinal Ruling:

Requirements for a valid in flagrante delicto arrest: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an
overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a
crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.

Trying to run away when approached by a police officer, even when no crime has been overtly
committed, and without more, cannot be evidence of guilt. There was no overt act that person had
just committed, was actually committing, or was attempting to commit a crime to justify a
warrantless arrest.

Flight per seis not synonymous with guilt and must not always be attributed to one’s consciousness
of guilt. It is not a reliable indicator of guilt without other circumstances, for even in high crime areas
there are many innocent reasons for flight, including fear of retribution for speaking to officers,
unwillingness to appear as witnesses, and fear of being wrongfully apprehended as a guilty party.
Thus, appellant’s attempt to run away from PO3 de Leon is susceptible of various explanations; it
could easily have meant guilt just as it could likewise signify innocence.

Reyes v. People, G.R. No. 229380, June 06, 2018

Doctrinal Ruling:

The act of walking while reeking of liquor per se cannot be considered a criminal act that justifies an
in flagrante delicto arrest.

A hearsay tip by itself does not justify a warrantless hot pursuit arrest, because the arresting officers
had no personal knowledge of any fact or circumstance indicating that the accused had just
committed a crime.

Macad v. People, G.R. No. 227366, August 01, 2018

Doctrinal Ruling
An extensive search of a moving vehicle is only permissible when there is probable cause.

When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such a warrantless search has been
held to be valid only as long as the officers conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause
to believe before the search that they will find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime,
in the vehicle to be searched.

Accordingly, PO1 Falolo had probable cause that petitioner was committing the crime of transporting
dangerous drugs, specifically marijuana bricks, due to the unique scent of marijuana emanating from
the bag and the unusual shapes and hardness of the baggage. As PO1 Falolo was not in uniform at
that time, he intended to inform his colleagues at the PHQ Barracks to conduct a check point so that
they could verify his suspicion about the transport of illegal drugs. As seen in his testimony, PO1
Falolo already had probable cause to conduct an extensive search of a moving vehicle because he
believed before the search that he and his colleagues would find instrumentality or evidence
pertaining to a crime, particularly transportation of marijuana, in the vehicle to be searched.

Dominguez v. People, G.R. No. 235898, March 13, 2019

Doctrinal Ruling:

The "plain view" doctrine applies when the following requisites concur:
(a) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is
in a position from which he can view a particular area;
(b) the discovery of evidence in plain view is inadvertent;
(c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime,
contraband or otherwise subject to seizure.

The object must be open to eye and hand, and its discovery inadvertent.

Law enforcers must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in a position from which they can
particularly view the area.

There can be no valid plain view seizure if at the time of the warrantless seizure, it was not readily
apparent to the police that the very small plastic sachet contained anything, much less shabu.

The plain view doctrine is applied where a police officer is not searching for the evidence against the
accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object.

The acts per se of walking along the street and examining something in one's hands cannot
considered criminal acts to justify a warrantless arrest.

People v. Sapla, G.R. No. 244045, June 16, 2020

Doctrinal Ruling:

Examples of valid visual searches: For the search of vehicles in a checkpoint to be non-violative of an
individual’s right against unreasonable searches, the search must be limited to the following: (a)
where the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the public
fair grounds; (b) where the officer simply looks into a vehicle; (c) where the officer flashes a light
therein without opening the car’s doors; (d) where the occupants are not subjected to a physical or
body search; € where the inspection of the vehicles is limited to a visual search or visual inspection;
and (f) where the routine check is conducted in a fixed area.

A more extensive and intrusive search that goes beyond a mere visual search of the vehicle
necessitates probable cause.

In this particular type of search, the vehicle is the target and not a specific person." The Court added
that "in search of a moving vehicle, the vehicle was intentionally used as a means to transport illegal
items.

A search and seizure must be carried through a judicial warrant; otherwise, such search and seizure
become “unreasonable.”

Pilapil v. Cu, G.R. No. 228608, August 27, 2020

Doctrinal Ruling:

Plain view doctrine requirements: a) prior justification for intrusion; b) inadvertent discovery; and c)
contraband is immediately apparent.
The "plain view" doctrine applies when the following requisites concur:
(a) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is
in a position from which he can view a particular area;
(b) the discovery of evidence in plain view is inadvertent;
(c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime,
contraband or otherwise subject to seizure.

The first requisite of the plain view doctrine assumes that the law enforcement officer has "a prior
justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area[.]" This
means that the officer who made the warrantless seizure must have been in a lawful position when
he discovered the target contraband or evidence in plain view.

A municipal mayor has no authority to conduct warrantless search or ocular inspection on a mining
site. -- Mayor Pilapil and his team of police officers and barangay officials were able to view the
subject explosives during the course of their ocular inspection on the mining site operated by BCMC
and Prime Rock. Mayor Pilapil and his team entered and conducted an ocular inspection on the
mining site of BCMC and Prime Rock without any judicial warrant. The Local Government Code does
not authorize a municipal mayor to conduct warrantless inspections of mining sites. The Mining Act
and its RIRR do not confer any authority upon a municipal mayor to conduct any kind of inspection
on any mining area or site.

The illegality of the aforesaid ocular inspection means that Mayor Pilapil and his team were not in a
lawful position when they were able to view the subject explosives. Accordingly, Mayor Pilapil and
his team's subsequent warrantless seizure of the subject explosives is not reasonable and runs
against the constitutional proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures.

Manibog v. People, G.R. No. 211214, March 20, 2019

Doctrinal Ruling:

For a "stop and frisk" search to be valid, the totality of suspicious circumstances, as personally
observed by the arresting officer, must lead to a genuine reason to suspect that a person is
committing an illicit act. Consequently, a warrantless arrest not based on this constitutes an
infringement of a person's basic right to privacy.

Genuine reason for a “stop and frisk”: The combination of the police asset’s tip and the arresting
officers’ observation of a gun-shaped object under person’s shirt already suffices as a genuine reason
for the arresting officers to conduct a stop and frisk search.

The general rule is that a search and seizure must be carried out through a judicial warrant;
otherwise, such search and seizure violates the Constitution. Any evidence resulting from it shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

Valid warrantless searches

Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution requires a warrant to be issued by a judge before a
search can be validly effected. The rule requiring warrants is, however, not absolute. Jurisprudence
recognizes exceptional instances when warrantless searches and seizures are considered permissible:

1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest;

2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view";
3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle's inherent mobility
reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly
reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity;
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and frisk; and
7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.

Sales v. People, G.R. No. 191023, February 06, 2013

Doctrinal Ruling:

Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure of their persons or
property to the public in a manner reflecting a lack of subjective expectation of privacy, which
expectation society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Such recognition is implicit in airport
security procedures. With increased concern over airplane hijacking and terrorism has come
increased security at the nation’s airports. Passengers attempting to board an aircraft routinely pass
through metal detectors; their carry-on baggage as well as checked luggage are routinely subjected
to x-ray scans. Should these procedures suggest the presence of suspicious objects, physical searches
are conducted to determine what the objects are. There is little question that such searches are
reasonable, given their minimal intrusiveness, the gravity of the safety interests involved, and the
reduced privacy expectations associated with airline travel. Indeed, travelers are often notified
through airport public address systems, signs, and notices in their airline tickets that they are subject
to search and, if any prohibited materials or substances are found, such would be subject to seizure.
These announcements place passengers on notice that ordinary constitutional protections against
warrantless searches and seizures do not apply to routine airport procedures.

The search of the contents of petitioner’s short pants pockets being a valid search pursuant to
routine airport security procedure, the illegal substance (marijuana) seized from him was therefore
admissible in evidence. Petitioner’s reluctance to show the contents of his short pants pocket after
the frisker’s hand felt the rolled papers containing marijuana, and his nervous demeanor aroused the
suspicion of the arresting officers that he was indeed carrying an item or material subject to
confiscation by the said authorities.
Dela Cruz v. People, G.R. No. 209387, January 11, 2016

Doctrinal Ruling:

Searches pursuant to domestic port security measures are not unreasonable per se. The security
measures of x-ray scanning and inspection in domestic ports are akin to routine security procedures
in airports. The reason behind it is that there is a reduced reasonable expectation of privacy when
coming into airports or ports of travel.

X-ray machine scanning and actual inspection upon showing of probable cause that a crime is being
or has been committed are part of reasonable security regulations to safeguard the passengers
passing through ports or terminals.

Barangay tanods are deemed law enforcers and bantay bayan has the color of a state-related
function for purposes of the prohibitions in the Bill of Rights.

Domestic port security personnel authorized to oversee the security of persons and vehicles within
its ports are not necessarily law enforcers, but they should be considered agents of government
under Article III of the Constitution. The actions of port personnel during routine security checks at
ports have the color of a state-related function.

Requirements for a valid warrantless customs search: (1) the persons conducting the search were
exercising police authority under customs law; (2) the search was for the enforcement of customs
law; and (3) the place searched is not a dwelling place or house.