REFLECTIONS ON THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF MODERNIZATION IN CHINA AND

JAPAN: MILITARY ASPECTS

Author(s): Richard J. Smith
Source: Journal of the Hong Kong Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society , 1976, Vol. 16
(1976), pp. 12-24
Published by: Royal Asiatic Society Hong Kong Branch

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/23886743

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REFLECTIONS ON THE COMPARATIVE STUDY
OF MODERNIZATION IN CHINA AND JAPAN:
MILITARY ASPECTS

Richard J. Smith*

Paul Cohen has recently warned against measuring nineteenth

century China's modernization by the yardstick of Meiji Japan.
“ From the vantage point of Japan's ‘success,’ ” he writes, "the late
Ch'ing epitomizes 'failure,' and next to the dynamism of the Meiji
era, China, during the latter half of the nineteenth century, appears
as the very embodiment of stasis. The trouble with this perspective
is that it glosses over a very important fact, namely that China
and Japan, in their respective encounters with the West in the last
century, did not start out at the same point."1 Cohen suggests that
a "much more valid way of measuring change in nineteenth century
China is by internal points of reference." "Modernization is not,
after all,a horserace," he maintains.2
This approach has much to commend it, if only as a reminder
that China did not simply stand still in the nineteenth century.
Thomas Kennedy correctly indicates, for example, that for all its
weaknesses, the "self-strengthening" movement from 1860 to 1894
1895 brought "far more comprehensive and far-sighted [changes]
than earlier studies infer."3 Cohen notes that when we measure
the modernizing experiences of China and Japan against those of
the rest of the world, rather than against each other, "we find that
both China and Japan come off relatively well."4
Yet the knowledge that historians would eventually vindicate
China's modernizing efforts would have been small consolation to
Li Hung-chang at Shimonoseki. One doubts that he muttered at
the signing table in 1895, "How far China has come in the last
thirty years!” The fact is that Chinese modemizers continually
viewed their progress in terms of Japan's accomplishments. Li
Hung-chang wrote as early as 1872: "Japan is just a small nation.
Recently she has begun to trade with Europe; she has instituted

* Dr. Smith is Assistant Professor of History, Rice University,

Houston, Texas. His article ‘The Employment of Foreign Military Talent:
Chinese Tradition and Late Ch'ing Practice" appeared in Vol.15 of this
Journal, pp.113 -138.

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 STUDY OF MODERNIZATION IN CHINA & JAPAN 13

iron factories and built many steamships. She has changed to the
use of Western weapons. [• • .] Perhaps she is merely planning for
self-protection. But if Japan seeks only self-protection, she is
nevertheless oppressing and looking down on our China. Should
not China plan for herself?”5
The outcome of the Sino-Japanese War perhaps causes us to
cast the “success’’ of Japan and the "failure" of China in too sharp
relief. But Cohen's protests to the contrary, modernization is a
horserace. It involves the notion of catching up, or at least main
taining competitive presence. And nowhere is the race more evident
than in military affairs. Yet curiously, very little attention has been
given to the military as a perspective from which to view the com
parative modernization of China and Japan.6 This is especially
surprising in light of the importance attached to military reform by
moderaizers in both countries, the common threat posed to each
by Western imperialism, and the same basic access to foreign
military technology and assistance in the nineteenth century. This
research note, based on my own preliminary investigations, sug
gests two tentative conclusions: First, that Japan's modernizing
advantages in the military sphere on the eve of the Western en
counter do not explain her military "success" in the Meiji period;7
and second, that the modernizing implications of Japan's successful
military reforms, and the relative "failure" of China's, extend well
beyond the sphere of military affairs.
Four main stages have been identified with the responses of
China and Japan to the Western "impact":(1)Recognition of
Western military superiority; (2) recognition of Western scientific
technology as the basis of military superiority; (3) recognition of
the need to train native personnel in Western military technology;
and (4) recognition that scientific technology in the military sphere
is merely part of Western science and technology in general, and
that in order to develop it, the pure science and general learning of
the West also had to be introduced.8 These phases unfolded rela
tively slowly in China, while in Japan they occurred almost simul
taneously.
A common feature of the effort to achieve national strength
and self-sufficiency in both China and Japan was the employment
of foreigners in military affairs. This policy, which entailed certain
obvious risks, brought substantial benefits to Japan in the Meiji
period, as Ernst Presseisen has indicated.9 In China, however,

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14 RICHARD J. SMITH

foreign military aid reaped few long-

from "Chinese" Gordon to Constantin von Hanneken introduced
a measure of modernity to at least a few armies in the late Ch'ing
period, but none of these individuals was able to promote more
basic institutional reform.10 The effects of Japan's success and
China's failure in this regard were far-reaching.
Generally speaking, China's approach to military reform in the
years from 1860 to 1895 may be compared with that of Japan in
the years from 1853 to 1868. In each instance, foreign assistance
was acquired piecemeal by both the central government and local
governments, with no real coordination between the two. Similar
rationales were offered, and similar results obtained, although in
the case of China the new knowledge and technology acquired was
used to bolster rather than to undermine the existing central govern
ment.11

A high priority for both pre-Meiji Japan and late Ch'ing China
was the training of troops and officers in Western techniques. In
each country, the use of foreign military assistance followed similar
lines. The training program established for the Bakufu by the
French Minister, Leon Roches, at Yokohama during the mid-1860%
for example, may be compared with the central government train
ing program set up by the British Minister, Frederick Bruce, at
Tientsin in the early 1860's.12 Similarly, the various foreign-train
ing efforts begun in Chöshu and other hart during the 1860's bear
a basic resemblance to the post-Taiping training camps established
at Shanghai, Canton, Foochow and elsewhere.13 The Japanese
even had their own rough equivalent of China's famous Ever
Victorious Army.14 Common problems in these early military im
provement programs included language difficulties, foreign rivalries,
financial limitations, lack of standardization in arms and training,
and foreign meddling.15
China never overcame these problems. From the 1860's to the
early 1890's, a handful of foresighted individuals, most notably Li
Hung-chang, undertook a variety of modernizing enterprises aimed
at building up China's "wealth and power." Their efforts succeeded
in a limited way, but were severely hindered by obscurantism,
official opposition, bureaucratic inertia, and the deliberate policies
of the Empress Dowager, Tz'u-hsi, who carefully manipulated poli
tical factions in order to maintain and enhance her own power.16

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 STUDY OF MODERNIZATION IN CHINA & JAP\N 15

The modernizing activities of Li and others were never coor

dinated by the central government. Nor were any efforts made to
integrate the "regional" armies of these leaders into the dynasty、
"regular" military system. At the time of the Sino-Japanese War,
the Ch'ing army was little more than a motley collection of diverse
armies at various stages of development. There was no standar
dization in arms, dress or training, no unity in command, and only
the most rudimentary commissariat, transport, medical and other
services.17 China's two small, uncoordinated provincial military
academies did little to improve the situation. China had no draft
system and no General Staff. Funding for most modernizing pro
jects (including the armies of Li and others) was irregular and
unpredictable. Meanwhile, the “regular’’ military forces of the
empire—some of which had undergone cosmetic surgery to become
"re-trained troops’’ (lien-chün) or members of the Peking Field
Force (shen-chi ying)~continued to consume about two-thirds of
the national “budget.’’18

China's failure to reform her military institutions in the nine

teenth century prevented the emergence of a modern, Western
trained Chinese officer corps. In the eyes of most foreign observers
in China, this was the key deficiency of the Chinese army.19 Lack
ing sufficient numbers of competent Chinese officers, individual
Ch'ing officials found it necessary to continue employing foreigners
not only to instruct and drill Chinese troops, but also occasionally
to lead them.20 The presence of these individuals in Chinese armies
often produced or exacerbated anti-foreign feelings, encouraged
foreign interference, and created security problems.21 The existence
of neutrality laws and other legal obstacles complicated the problem
of employing foreigners in a military capacity after the breakdown
of the "Cooperative Policy，” and the absence of central government
guidelines for the employment of foreign nationals encouraged
rivalry and intrigue among the Western powers for heightened
inflluence in Chinese military affairs.22 In all, the experience of
using foreign military assistance was humiliating, expensive and
frustrating.

The contrast with Japan is striking. Although no less anxious

than the Chinese to maintain control over foreign military em
ployees, and to avoid surrendering administrative authority to
them, the Japanese treated foreigners far more regularly, rationally,
and regally.23 Extremely careful in its centrally-supervised hiring

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16 RICHARD J. SMITH

policies, the Meiji government manag

difficulties that had plagued the Chinese ef
tance efficiently.
Building on the foundation of pre-Me
trained and Western-oriented leadership
vernment direction and support, Japan
modernization of her military after 1868
effort was Yamagata Aritomo, who became Vice Minister of
Military Affairs upon his return to Japan after a year-long tour of
Europe in 1869-1870.25 With French advice and assistance，the
Meiji government created an Imperial Guard in 1871, which not
only made possible the abolition of the feudal hart in the same
year, but also set the stage for the introduction of conscription in
1872. By 1875, the Japanese had established a centralized military
academy at Tokyo, with branch schools in veterinary medicine and
other subjects.26 At the same time, numerous officers were sent
abroad for further military education.27 By 1893，Japan had a
total of sixteen military schools instructing over 2,600 students per
year.28 Overseas- educated officers returned in a steady stream to
assist in teaching these individuals.
In 1878, following the Satsuma Rebellion (1877), the Japanese
established an independent General Staff on the German model.
This marked the eclipse of the French in Japanese military affairs
and the rise of Germany. Presseisen attaches profound significance
to this development: "So long as French influence prevailed,
Japan's army remained under unified civilian control, her law code
owed much to French legal opinions, and her government might
have evolved toward a liberal, parliamentary system. After Ger
many's triumph the command structure, the constitution, and the
Imperial Court followed the German ideological style.’’29
The outstanding contributions of Jacob Meckel's German mili
tary mission to Japan in 1885 have been described in detail by
Presseisen.30 The salient point is that by the early 1890's, Japan
had built a modern, centralized army and had eliminated the need
for further foreign military assistance. China, meanwhile, bad done
neither. The Sino-Japanese War underscored the stark contrast
between the Chinese and Japanese reform efforts.31

Armies, like individuals, can both reflect and effect change in

society. Sir Lewis Namier has offered the opinion that "the social

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 STUDY OF MODERNIZATION IN CHINA & JAPAN 17

history of nations is largely moulded by the forms and development

of their armed forces."32 In so-called underdeveloped countries,
especially those facing an immediate military challenge, armies
can perform a crucial modernizing function. Ike Nobutaka in
dicates that during the Meiji era "the armed forces were probably
more modern than the rest of the nation in terms of technology
and organization," but it was not only in these areas that the
Japanese military made its modernizing influence felt.33
In the political sphere, it is clear that the new-style army of
Meiji Japan contributed to the consolidation of the regime, and to
the further development of a national political consciousness. Con
scription at once solidified government authority and enhanced
national security. Throughout the nineteenth century, moreover,
the military provided a deep pool of bureaucratic talent. From
1885 to 1912, for example, over thirty-five percent of all Japan's
civilian ministries were under military men (41 of 112). The balance
of generals and admirals in the cabinet did not shift in favor of
civilians until 1898.34 In the lower echelons of the bureaucracy,
too, the military provided talented and disciplined personnel. At
yet another level, the rank and file acquired at least a heightened
sense of political participation, as well as a vibrant nationalistic
spirit. Educational opportunities within the army only increased
this tendency.35
In the social realm, the military also promoted modernizing
change. Conscription, for example, helped level society, giving
greater meaning to concepts such as social equality and the idea of
mobility based on performance.36 The growth of the military,
which continued throughout the nineteenth century, contributed to
urbanization, with all its concomitant changes.37 Living standards
and health care improved for large numbers of traditionally dis
advantaged individuals who were now entering the army. Individual
expectations were naturally raised. Recruits acquired new tastes
and personal needs. It is said that the habit of cigarette smoking
was spread in Japan by soldiers who had picked up the practice in
the army. Many recruits also developed a taste for beef, a mark of
cultural refinement in the Meiji period.38
Other new influences in the army spread rapidly to Japanese
society at large. Western-style uniforms, for example, became
standard in the army; soon they were adopted for policemen, train
conductors, and other civil functionaries. The shift to wearing

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 18 RICHARD J. SMITH

Western attire in Japan, although never c

received some of its impetus from the militar
ing of Western-style military caps necessita
knots, which quickly became a mark of
Japanese society generally. As early as the
began wearing a military uniform in the
royalty.39 One can hardly imagine Chinese
same.

Another socio-cultural effect of military modernization was t

boost given to music, drama, art, literature and even the use of
Japanese vernacular by the Sino-Japanese War. Donald Keen
brilliantly summarized the impact of the war on these area
Japanese life, emphasizing also the change in Japanese attit
toward China, the growth of Japanese national pride, and t
tered perceptions of Westerners toward Japan as a result of the
and Japan's resounding victory.40
In economic terms, the modernizing effect of the militar
more difficult to judge. Ogawa's study of conscription, for exam
sees the military as a mixed blessing in nearly every spher
economic life, including labor, productivity, and consumptio
Yet on balance, military development seems to have benefitte
economy. Even the most outspoken critics of the military an
costs, such as Ono Giichi and H. T. Oshima, concede that th
were at least some economic advantages to the Meiji progra
military modernization~especially in the creation of military
military-related industries, which served as model plants, an
the increased demand for products through inter-industry linka
Military needs, in other words, generated 狂 demand for mo
products produced by modern means, and contributed to the gro
of economies of scale. The Sino-Japanese War brought J
numerous economic benefits and a huge indemnity (231 mi
taels; nearly 368 million yen), which was put to effective mod
ing use although war expenditures and the indemnity did contrib
to economic problems such as business fluctuations and inflat
For China, much of the foregoing discussion can be state
reverse. Although the lack of a centralized military did not ap
ably impair the Ch'ing government's authority as long as "region
leaders remained loyal to the throne, it did prevent China f
contending effectively with foreign aggression, and eventual
dermined support of the dynasty. Furthermore, the fragmentati

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 STUDY OF MODERNIZATION IN CHINA & JAPAN 19

of the army hindered the growth of nationalistic sentiment among

Chinese soldiers. Locally raised, armed, and trained, most Chinese
troops had little sense of national identification.44 The great ma
jority of Chinese soldiers remained illiterate and uninformed.
Not surprisingly, the Chinese military contributed little bureau
cratic talent to the civil sector. In fact, the Manchus actively dis
couraged this tendency. With few notable exceptions (e.g. Liu
Ming-ch'uan), the Ch'ing government avoided the appointment of
military men to high posts in the bureaucracy.. Throughout the
nineteenth century, the virtually unchanged civil service examina
tion system remained the accepted channel of bureaucratic mobility.
Only after the Sino-Japanese War did this begin to change.45

The Ch'ing military did nothing to promote social change. In

deed, it tended to reflect the least modern aspects of Chinese society.
Even in the new-style armies of Li Hung-chang and others, personal
ties of blood, friendship or local affinity often counted for more
than expertise, thus helping to militate against the introduction of
new ideas and influences.46

There is no evidence to suggest that the Chinese military con

tributed significantly to urbanization or to the cultural transforma
tion of Chinese soldiers. Although some troops received exposure
to limited Western influences through contact with foreign instruc
tors or temporary residence in treaty port areas, the lifestyle of
most Chinese soldiers changed imperceptively. Manchu troops
remained isolated in Banner garrisons, and Chinese troops continu
ed to wear Chinese uniforms and the Manchu-imposed queue.
Ch'ing military forces ate Chinese food, lived in Chinese housing,
and often even reverted to Chinese-style weapons.47 The existence
of widespread corruption and opium smoking, coupled with the
lack of modern medical and other facilities, neither improved the
living conditions of the average Chinese soldier nor altered his
expectations.48
The disastrous effects of the Sino-Japanese War on China are
too well-known to require elaboration.49 Ironically, however, Japan
contributed substantially to China's military modernization and
political transformation in the post-war era, providing large
numbers of advisers and instructors, as well as a variety of educa
tional opportunities for Chinese students in Japan.50 Mutatis mu
tandus, we may say that Japan in late nineteenth century China

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20 RICHARD J. SMITH

played an historic role similar to that pl

Tokugawa Japan, first precipitating a po
helping to resolve it in favor of revolut
last time Japan would play the part in Ch
Viewed from the perspective of military m
and Japan, two factors seem crucial to M
international success:(1)A sustained sense
justify fundamental institutional change
government leadership and support in im
gether with the systematic use of foreign
obviously correct in pointing out that p
number of distinct advantages in responding
to the Western “impact”51 But we may q
the self-conscious and concerted moderni
central government Japan could have ach
so quickly, even with these advantages. An e
change in Japan during the period 1853-186
that Bakumatsu military reform efforts we
tive than those of the T'ung-chih era.52
In China, the Manchus refused to spon
change, fearful of upsetting the system
balances that had preserved their rule in Ch
years. More concerned with the mainten
than with the problem of external defens
incentive to go beyond the limited military
them to suppress the major rebellions of
was not until 1907 that the throne took t
dismantle the costly, cumbersome and w
system~steps that even then were soon re
It should be noted that Manchu rule w
other areas of Chinese life, notably the e
insists, for example，that the Ch'ing go
economic realm were less those of commis
that the policies of the Chinese governm
wrong as inadequate."54 But in comparin
cess with China's failure, Perkins attribu
primarily to "lack of funds." Sapped of
domestic wars, heavy indemnities, the s
useless "regular" standing armies, and the
irregularly financed "temporary" imper

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 STUDY OF MODERNIZATION IN CHINA & JAPAN 21

vernment was, in Perkins, words, "an almost unbelievably weak

[financial] instrument•”

Even if the Ch'ing government had been moved to undertake

more fundamental military reform, China's transition to modernity
would have been painful; but without such reform, it was virtually
impossible.

NOTES

1 Paul Cohen, Between Tradition and Modernity: Wang T'ao and

Reform in Late Ch'ing China (Cambridge, Mass., 1974), 4.
2 Ibid.; see also 148 -149.
3 Thomas Kennedy, "Self-Strengthening: An Analysis Based on Some
Recent Writings," Ch ing-shih wen-t'u 3.1(November, 1974), 27.
4 Cohen, 149.
5 Quoted in S. Y. Teng and John K. Fairbank, eds” Chinäs Response
to the West: A Documentary Survey 1839 •1923 (New York, 1966), 109.
6 Sec, for example, William Lockwood, "Japan's Response to the
West: The Contrast With China," World Politics, 9.1(October, 1956);
Marion Levy, "Contrasting Factors in the Modernization of China and
Japan," Economic Development and Cultural Change, 2 (October, 1953);
Marion Levy, "Some Structural Problems of Modernization and 'High
Modernization': China and Japan," Proceedings of the Symposium on
Economic and Social Problems of the Far East (1962); Allan Cole, "Con
trasting Modernization in China and Japan," Ch'ung-chi hsüeh-pao, 4.2
(May, 1965); E.O. Reischauer, "Modernization in Nineteenth-Century China
and Japan," Japan Quarterly, 10.3 (July - September, 1963), etc. A partial
exception is the fine article by John K. Fairbank, et. al•，entitled "The
Influence of Modern Western Science and Technology on Japan and
China,” Explorations in Entrepreneurial History, 7 (1954).
7 Two of the most obvious advantages were, of course, Japan's greater
and more immediate awareness of the Western military challenge (a product
of geography and historical timing), and the military orientation and ethos
(bushidai) of the Japanese elite, as compared to the civil orientation and
ethos (wen-te) of the Chinese elite. Other factors were also important,
including the absence ot opium smoking among Japanese officers and the
rank and file, which again contrasts so markedly with the case in China.
See Jonathan Spence, "Opium Smoking in Ch'ing China,’’ in Frederic
Wakeman, Jr., and Carolyn Grant, eds., Conflict and Control in Late
Imperial China (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London, 1975).
8 See Fairbank, et. al” ‘The Influence,’’ 192 •194, esp. 193.
9 Emst Presseisen, Before Aggression: Europeans Prepare the Japanese
Army (Tucson, 1965), 139.
10 See Richard J. Smith, Ward, Gordon and the Ever-Victorious Army:
Foreign Assistance and Military Modernization in Nineteenth Century
China (manuscript).

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 22 RICHARD J. SMITH

11 Comparative studies on selected aspects

these two time periods would be illuminating
example, the aims and accomplishments of t
(established in 1862) and the Bansho Shirabesh
the former, see Wright, The Last Stand of C
T'ung-chih Restoration, 1862 -1874 (New York, 1967), 241-248; on the
latter, consult Marius Jansen, “New Materials for the Intellectual History
of Nineteenth-Century Japan," Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, 20
(1957), 569 • 582. On the use of Westerners in military affairs in Japan
from 1853 -1868, see Presseisen,1-23; H. J. Jones, “ßakumatsu Foreign
Employees," Monumenta Serica, 29.3 (Autumn, 1974).
12 Presseisen, chapter 1;Smith, Ward, Gordon and the Ever-Victorious
Army, chapter 4.
13 Albert Craig, Chöshu in the Meiji Restoration (Cambridge, Mass.,
1961),131•136, 201“203, etc.; Richard J. Smith, "Foreign-Training and
China's Self-Strengthening: The Case of Feng - huang-shan, 1864 -1873,"
Modern Asian Studies, 10.2 (1976).
14 Presseisen, 22 - 23.
15 See notes 7 and 8; also Hyman Kublin, “The ‘Modern’ Army of
Early Meiji Japan," Far Eastern Quarterly, 9.1(November, 1949), 24 - 26;
Meron Medzini, French Policy in Japan during the Closing Years of the
Tokugawa Regime (Cambridge, Mass., 1971),125 -133.
16 For a discussion of Li's modernizing efforts, his extensive use of
foreign assistance, and the obstacles he encountered, see S. Y. Teng and
John K. Fairbank, China's Response to the West (New York,1966),
111-112; K. C. Liu, "The Confucian as Patriot and Pragmatist: Li Hung
chang's Formative Years, 1823 •1866," Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies、
30 (1970); Kenneth Folsom, Friends, Guests and Colleagues (Berkeley and
Los Angeles, 1968), 152- 157; and K. C. Liu, “Li Hung-chang in Chihli，’’
in Albert Feuerwerker, et. al” eds. Approaches to Modern Chinese History
(Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1967).
17 See, for example, Lord Charles Beresford, The Break-up of China
(New York and London, 1899), 267 - 289, esp. 270-280; Major A. E. J.
Cavendish, ‘The Armed Strength (?) of China," Journal of the Royal
United Service Institution, 42 (June, 1898), 709 - 710, 713 - 714, 717; Richard
J. Smith, "Chinese Military Institutions in the Mid-Nineteenth Century,
1850-1860," Journal of Asian History, 8.2 (1974), 127.
18 See Smith, "Foreign-Training," 212; Cavendish, 709 - 710, 713-714.
19 See, for example, Cavendish, esp. 720 - 723; Captain W. R. E. Gill,
4tThe Chinese Army," Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, 24
(1881),371-377; Chester Holcombe, Chincfs Past and Future (London,
1904), 81-88; "The Chinese and Japanese Armies," reprinted from the
Army and Navy Gazette in the Journal of the Military Service Institution
of the United States,15 (1894), 1258; James Scott, 'The Chinese Brave,"
Asiatic Quarterly Review,1(1886X esp. 240; etc.
20 See Smith, Ward’ Gordon and the Ever-Victorious Army, Chapters
8 and 9.
21 See Yang-wu yiin-tung cited in Smith, "Foreign-Training," 218. On
Chinese resistance to foreign instructors and officers, see ibid.; also Caven
dish, 720-721.
22 See, for example, L. C. Arlington, Through the Dragon's Eyes
(London, 1931),18; Stanley Wright, Hart and the Chinese Customs (Belfast,
1950), 478-481; John Rawlinson, China's Struggle for Naval Development,
1839-1895 (Cambridge, Mass., 1967), 65-78, 93-94，163; Holcombe, 80-85,
esp. 83.

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 STUDY OF MODERNIZATION IN CHINA & JAPAN 23

23 See Umetani Noboni, "Foreign Nationals Employed in Japan during

the Years of Modernization," East Asian Cultural Studies, 10.1 (March,
1971).
24 Ibid” 5 • 6.
25 Sec Roger Hackett, ‘The Meiji Leaders and Modernization: The
Case of Yamagata Aritomo，’’ in Marius Jansen, ed., Changing Japanese
Attitudes toward Modernization (Princeton, 1965).
26 Yamagata Aritomo, ‘The Japanese Army," in Okuma Shigcnobu,
comp., Fifty Years of New Japan (New York, 1909), 206.
27 Ibid” 206.
28 Ibid., 206 - 208.
29 Presseisen, vii; also chapters 2 and 4.
30 Ibid” esp.135 -136. As a professor at the Army Staff College and
an adviser to the General Staff, Meckel helped to reorganize the Army
Ministry, refine the General Staff, improve the system and content of
Japanese military education, and develop the Japanese system of logistics
and medical services. In addition, he helped restructure the army into
divisions and taught the Japanese "the demands of full-scale mobilization,
which included a strategic railroad network, a new conscription act, and
improved staff exercises."
31 Mary Wright, The Last Stand» 220-221; Rawlinson,167 • 204; Pres.
seisen,139 -143; Hsü, The Rise of Modern China (New York, etc., 1975),
418 - 420; Yamagata Ariyoshi, 4tlTic Army," in Albert Stead, ed., Japan
by the Japanese (London, 1904),107 -109; etc.
32 Cited in Roger Hackett, ‘The Military: Japan," in Robert E. Ward
and Dankwart Rustow, eds., Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey
(Princeton, 1964), 328.
33 Ike Nobutaka, “War and Modernization," in Robert Ward, cd”
Political Development in Modern Japan (Princeton, 1968), 209.
34 Hackett, <4The Military," 346 • 348.
35 Sec, for example, Ike, 196; also Shibusawa Kcizo, cd” Japanese Life
and Culture in the Meiji Era (translated and adapted by Charles Terry;
Tokyo, 1958), 303 - 309, esp. 308 • 309.
36 Hackett, ‘The Military," 335.
37 Ogawa Gotaro, The Conscription System in Japan (New York, 1921),
chapter 3.
38 Shibusawa, 306 • 307.
39 H. Paul Varley, Japanese Culture: A Short History (New York，
1973),163 -164.
40 Donald Keene, ‘The Sino*Japanese War of 1894 • 95 and Its Cultural
Effects in Japan," in Donald Shively, cd” Tradition and Modernization in
Japanese Culture (Princeton, 1971).
41 Ogawa, part 2.
42 Sec Harry T. Oshima, "Meiji Fiscal Policy and Economic Progress,”
in William Lockwood, ed., The State and Economic Enterprise in Japan
(Princeton, 1968), esp. 372. See also Shibusawa, 305, 315; Fairbank, et. al”
199 - 200; Ike, 205.

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 24 RICHARD J. SMITH

43 See Ono Giichi, War and Armament Expenditures of Japan (New

York，1922), 57-58, 70.71, 140-144, 273 - 277, and Ono's Expenditures of
the Sino-Japanese War (New York, 1922),120 -126; also Oshima, 372 - 375,
376, note 18.
^ Smith, “Foreign-Training,” 219 - 220; Yamagata, ‘The Army," 107
108; British Public Record Office, W.O. 33/34, Captain Trotter, "Some
Remarks on the Army of Li Hung-Chang;" Rawlinson, 190.
45 Smith, "Foreign-Training," 219, 221; sec also Rawlinson, 202.203;
Thomas William Aycrs, Chang Chih-tung and Educational Reform in China
(Cambridge, Mass., 1971),164 -189, 204-215.
46 Smith, "Foreign-Training," 218 • 219; Cavendish, 721.
47 Cavendish, 711, 713-715, 719-723.
48 Smith, "Chinese Military Institutions," 157, note 135.
49 See Fairbank, et. al； "Economic Change," 20-21; Hsii, The Rise of
Modern China, 527 • 534. On the more positive side of the ledger, consult
Ernest Young, "Nationalism, Reform and Republican Revolution: East
Asia: Essays in Interpretation, 160-162; Hsü, The Rise of Modern China,
535.

50 See, for example, Hatano Yoshihiro, 4<The New Armies," in Mary

Wright, ed., China in Revolution: The First Phase, 1900 -1913 (New Haven
and London, 1968).
51 Paul Cohen, Between Tradition and Modernity: Wang T'ao and
Reform in Late Ch'ing China (Cambridge, Mass., 1974), 4,148 -149.
52 See Kublin.

53 Smith, "Foreign-Training;" Ralph Powell, The Rise of Chinese Mili

tary Power, 1895 ‘1912 (Princeton, 1955), 245 • 246, 262. An interesting
question is whether the Manchus could have preserved their power, and
even enhanced it, by undertaking meaningful military reform at the central
government level. Although vested interests in the army were pervasive and
solidly entrenched, one cannot assume that what happened to the dynasty
in 1911 would necessarily have happened in the same way had the Ch'ing
government initiated reforms in the 1860's and 1870's comparable to those
undertaken by the dynasty in the early 1890's. By the beginning of the
twentieth century, anti-Manchu sentiment was a powerful ideological wea
pon, at least in part because the Manchus had proven so totally incapable
of protecting Chinese interests against foreign encroachments. But during
the Tung-chih period, anti-Manchuism was no real issue at all.
54 Dwight Perkins, "Government as an Obstacle to Industrialization:
The Case of Nineteenth-Century China," Journal of Economic History
(1967), esp. 486, 492. “

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