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Received: 7 September 2020    Accepted: 9 September 2020

DOI: 10.1111/1468-5973.12328

FORUM ARTICLE

Military crisis responses to COVID-19

Jori Pascal Kalkman

Faculty of Military Sciences, Netherlands

Defence Academy (NLDA), Breda, The
Netherlands
Correspondence
Jori Pascal Kalkman, Faculty of Military
Sciences, Netherlands Defence Academy
(NLDA), Hogeschoollaan 2, 4818BB Breda,
The Netherlands.
Email: jp.kalkman@mindef.nl
Abstract
Countries across the globe have mobilized their armed forces in response to the
COVID-19 pandemic. Current contributions of armed forces have resulted from an
urgent need for additional personnel and resources, and were facilitated by a fram-
ing of the crisis in terms of war. These deployments were in the interest of armed
forces and enabled them to improve their operational readiness, boost their societal
standing and support societies with their expertise. Even though armed forces may
provide crucial aid in times of need, it is important that civilian crisis organizations
are not undermined, civilian control and civil rights are guaranteed, and the effects
on other military operations are considered and discussed. This Forum contribution
offers some reflections and recommendations.

KEYWORDS

COVID-19, crisis response, military

1 |  I NTRO D U C TI O N
As countries across the globe are responding to the COVID-19 pan-
demic, many governments have readily deployed military personnel
and capabilities to support the crisis response. Military resources have
been activated to assist overwhelmed hospitals and civilian medical
personnel, for instance by creating additional hospitals or deploying
military doctors and nurses to existing medical facilities (Megerian &
Cloud, 2020). To this end, China reportedly mobilized over 10,000
military personnel, while France triggered Operation Resilience to
respond to the outbreak (“Macron launches army Operation”, 2020).
Military support also included the transportation of medical sup-
plies and patients, the deployment of army medical logistics plan-
ners, the transportation of healthcare workers and the disinfection
of hospitals and other public spaces (Benavides, 2020; Megerian
& Cloud, 2020; Rohmensen, 2020; Sabbagh & McKernan, 2020;
“South Korea mobilizes army”, 2020; Tiron & Tritten, 2020). Other
medical contributions by armed forces are the development and
testing of possible vaccines, and the production of medical supplies,
including facemasks and disinfectant (Chazan, 2020; US DoD, 2020).
More controversially, however, troops have also been deployed to
enforce mandatary lockdowns by patrolling the streets, constructing
roadblocks and curbing movement. These measures, which aimed to
stem the spread of the coronavirus, have been adopted throughout
the world (e.g. Isacson, 2020). Finally, troops have been deployed
to reduce the negative fallout from the lockdowns and the extreme
economic impact by planning meal deliveries to vulnerable peo-
ple and supporting food banks (Savage & Bachelor, 2020; Tiron &
Tritten, 2020).
Armed forces have been sent abroad to support other coun-
tries in managing the health crisis as well. Notably, Chinese mil-
itary medics and supplies have been sent to various partner
countries and Russian doctors, machines and personal protec-
tive equipment were deployed to Italy (Giuffrida & Roth, 2020;
Lei, 2020). Yet, most military aid was offered within countries'
own borders and constituted therefore domestic deployments.
While the use of armed forces for domestic crisis management is
not unique (Kalkman, 2019), the sheer scale and size of military
capabilities deployed inside countries are unprecedented in recent
times. This contribution aims to explain the prominent role of the

J. Contingencies and Crisis Management. 2020;00:1–5. wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/jccm |

© 2020 John Wiley & Sons Ltd     1
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armed forces in managing the COVID-19 outbreak and to describe
the effects of this large military role.
In the next two sections, explanations for the significant military
role in managing the COVID-19 crisis are offered, based on a combi-
nation of examples from news reports and scientific literature. The
first explanation refers to the situation at hand to stress the need for
military participation in resolving the crisis. The second focuses on
the motivations and considerations of the armed forces themselves
to pursue a large role during the current crisis. Subsequently, sev-
eral effects of the large military role are introduced and debated. A
final section discusses some practical recommendations based on
the analysis.
2 |  E X PL A N ATI O N O F L A RG E-S C A LE
M I LITA RY D E PLOY M E NT S D U R I N G
COV I D -19
One main motivation for deploying armed forces in response to the
COVID-19 outbreak is the fact that armed forces have specific ca-
pabilities that civilian health agencies lack (in sufficient quantity).
The examples in the opening paragraph show that armed forces
have specific expertise and slack resources that can crucially sup-
port and complement civilian response endeavours. Medical facili-
ties and services are easily overwhelmed when a pandemic breaks
out, while armed forces are capable of rapidly mobilizing significant
(medical) resources and are comparatively well-organized to oper-
ate under conditions of uncertainty and stress. In addition, they may
conduct activities that contribute to the health efforts but fall out-
side the scope of health organizations (e.g. enforcing a lockdown)
(Watterson & Kamradt-Scott, 2016). In other words, the COVID-19
crisis resulted in a need for military assistance.
The perceived need for military contributions to manage the
COVID-19 outbreak was boosted by the militarization of the crisis
situation. Indeed, the COVID-19 crisis was rapidly militarized as it
spread around the globe. Political leaders adopted and embraced
the metaphor of war in their speeches to emphasize the gravity of
the situation and legitimize their far-reaching decisions. New York's
governor Cuomo, for instance, stated that ‘[t]his is a war, we have
to treat it like a war’ (Walters, 2020). French president Macron also
declared “war” on the virus before announcing a military-style oper-
ation (i.e. Operation Resilience) (“Macron launches army Operation”,
2020). A BBC-article summarized it nicely by stating: “Healthcare
workers are on the frontlines, scientists are the new generals,
economists draw up battle plans, politicians call for mobilisation”
(Bernhard, 2020).
The militarization of COVID-19 is not unprecedented. Earlier
disease outbreaks have been coined in security terms by employ-
ing wartime discourse. This happened during outbreaks of Ebola
(Roemer-Mahler & Elbe, 2016; Walsh & Johnson, 2018), Asian in-
fluenza (Curley & Herington, 2011), Zika (Wenham & Farias, 2019),
pandemic influenza (Kamradt-Scott & McInness, 2012; Watterson
& Kamradt-Scott, 2016) and in response to the spread of HIV/AIDS
(Sjöstedt, 2008). And if there is an “enemy” to be “fought” in “bat-
tle” or “war,” which organization would be better suited to take the
lead than the military? During the Ebola crisis, Liberia and Sierra
Leone activated their armed forces, while Western governments
likewise deployed thousands of military units (Roemer-Mahler &
Elbe, 2016). In response to the Zika crisis, the Brazilian military
was also sent onto the streets to “combat” the “enemy,” while si-
multaneously signalling the gravity of the situation to the popula-
tion (Wenham & Farias, 2019). Indeed, the framing of an infectious
disease outbreak in military terms has legitimized military involve-
ment in the past and has done so as well during the COVID-19
outbreak.
3 | E X PL A N ATI O N O F TH E M I LITA RY
W I LLI N G N E S S TO B E I N VO LV E D I N TH E
R E S P O N S E TO COV I D -19
Apart from the need for military capabilities, the armed forces also
have an interest in being involved. In fact, several organizational
interests can be identified. First, the COVID-19 pandemic directly
affects the operational readiness and activities of armed forces. By
the end of April, crew members on forty US Navy ships had tested
positive, significantly delaying unit deployments (Starr, 2020).
In addition, military movements were significantly restricted,
personnel quarantined and institutions closed (Chazan, 2020;
Stewart & Ali, 2020). In the past, the adverse impact of outbreaks
of influenza on military readiness has stimulated military atten-
tion for and investments in tackling health crises (Kamradt-Scott
& McInness, 2012). The pandemic influenza of 1918, perhaps
most notably, hit armed forces hard, as it spread through military
movements and caused severe mortality among soldiers, while
further cancelling draft calls and dropping morale (Watterson &
Kamradt-Scott, 2016). More recently, the Russian armed forces
have come to face serious recruitment difficulties as thousands of
its draftees have been rejected because they were HIV positive
(Sjöstedt, 2008). Armed forces, for these reasons, have a clear or-
ganizational interest to get involved and manage health crises like
COVID-19.
Second, armed forces may have political interests to engage
in the COVID-19 crisis response. The crisis offers an opportunity
to show taxpayers and potential recruits how efficient and im-
portant the organization is to society. In fact, as the debate over
looming cutbacks in public spending after the crisis appears to have
already started, a reduction in military spending is criticized and
rejected by reference to the considerable role that armed forces
have played during the COVID-19 crisis (Lazaro, 2020). Similarly,
the UK Army, which had a tarnished reputation after the wars in
Iraq and Afghanistan, used its contributions during the COVID-19
crisis to promote itself as a “force for good” in order to improve its
image and resolve its recruitment and retention problems (Kennard
& Glenton, 2020). Other political interests are easily identified
(Kalkman & Groenewegen, 2018).
KALKMAN
Thirdly, military organizations may well see themselves as in-
dispensable in the management of the current crisis, as they play
a “critical role” (EEAS, 2020). Israeli defence officials, for instance,
claimed that the Israeli military is the only organization that is able
to manage the COVID-19 outbreak and subsequently asked for the
mandate to do so without delay at the risk of more casualties (Limor
& Beit-Or, 2020). From the other direction, military ways of work-
ing have been pushed for adoption in civilian health structures. The
promotion of Mission Command, referring to a way of operating
in which commanders formulate a clear intent while leaving their
subordinates sufficient discretion to achieve the intent, offers an
example of introducing military organizing principles in managing
the health crisis (Pearce et al., 2020). Although many armed forces
emphasize their subservience to civilian (health) organizations, crisis
response organizations often believe that they have unique capabil-
ities that are of great (or even indispensable) value (see Rosenthal
et al., 1991) and the current crisis shows that armed forces are no
exception to this.
4 | E FFEC T S O F TH E L A RG E M I LITA RY
RO LE
As armed forces are likely to play a large role in response to the
COVID-19 pandemic and in future public health crises, it is worth-
while reviewing some effects of a significant military position during
the novel coronavirus outbreak.
The armed forces have vast resources and developed expertise
with operating in stressful situations. Its way of operating, hierarchi-
cal and top-down, can result in fast decision-making and may over-
come delays through cutting red tape. Armed forces have, however,
in the past displayed a tendency to introduce Command and Control
principles at the cost of coordination and collaboration with crisis
partners (Walsh & Johnson, 2018). Particularly when a health crisis
is framed in terms of war metaphors, the role of civilian partners and
civil society may be easily discarded (Elbe, 2006). Yet, civil-military
collaboration is needed and such collaboration benefits from mu-
tual respect and building inter-organizational trust (Kalkman & De
Waard, 2017), which are all too easily neglected for the sake of a
rapid crisis response.
Relatedly, large-scale military deployments in the homeland
may affect civilian control and civil rights. Civilian control refers
to the situation in which a (democratically elected) government
is ultimately in charge over its armed forces. The use of military
capabilities has improved the legitimacy and decisiveness of gov-
ernments and empowered their crisis response efforts, but con-
cerns have been raised over the effects on civilian control and
civil rights as well. In fact, dependence on military interventions in
response to COVID-19 may undermine weakened civilian control
or even promote military rule (Graham, 2020; Isacson, 2020). By
extension, civil rights may also come under pressure, particularly
when soldiers are deployed to impose lockdowns. Some armed
forces have even been accused of using excessive violence against
|
      3
inhabitants when implementing COVID-19 measures (Eboh
et al., 2020; HRW, 2020).
Lastly, there are direct and indirect impacts on the armed
forces themselves. Operational readiness is under pressure by the
COVID-19 outbreak, and military resources are now deployed do-
mestically, while the traditional responsibility of protection against
external threats remains important to military organizations (see
Burke et al., 2020). This also necessitates that armed forces re-
visit their specific strategic priorities regarding where to deploy
as well as balance personnel health risks against task implemen-
tation. While the current high-profile military contributions to the
management of the COVID-19 crisis may encourage recruitment
and retention, domestic military operations have in the past been
perceived as distracting from expeditionary missions and were
therefore not unequivocally popular among personnel (Watterson
& Kamradt-Scott, 2016). Many of these operational and personnel
consequences emerge in the longer term but they have real-time
implications nonetheless.
5 | I M PLI C ATI O N S
This contribution demonstrates that practitioners and scholars
have both supported and criticized the large military role in re-
sponse to the COVID-19 pandemic. While it is too early to come to
any definitive conclusions, the armed forces have made significant
contributions to reducing the crisis' worst effects in the short term
and these cannot be ignored. But where do the concerns identified
above leave us for the next steps ahead in the pandemic? Clearly,
military decision makers would do well to consider how they can
avoid spreading COVID-19, but will also have to balance domestic
deployments against expeditionary missions abroad while simulta-
neously considering the impacts of the crisis and domestic deploy-
ments on military personnel. In addition, it remains crucial to work
together with civilian counterparts to ensure protection of civilian
control and civil rights, and collectively pursue goals that have been
identified by civilian authorities.
AC K N OW L E D G E M E N T S
I wish to thank Lieske van Eck for her moral support and inspira-
tion while this article was being written. I also want to express my
gratitude to the Forum editors for their insightful feedback and
suggestions.
C O N FL I C T O F I N T E R E S T
None.
ORCID
Jori Pascal Kalkman  https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7685-019X
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4       KALKMAN
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