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 2020 IEEE Third International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Knowledge Engineering (AIKE)

The Cyber Security of Battery Energy Storage Systems and Adoption of Data-driven
Methods
2020 IEEE Third International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Knowledge Engineering (AIKE) | 978-1-7281-8708-2/20/$31.00 ©2020 IEEE | DOI: 10.1109/AIKE48582.2020.00037

Nina Kharlamova1, Seyedmostafa Hashemi2, Chresten Træholt3

CEE Department of Electrical Engineering
Technical University of Denmark
Copenhagen, Denmark
ninkhar@elektro.dtu.dk1, shtog@elektro.dtu.dk2, ctr@elektro.dtu.dk3

Abstract — Battery energy storage systems (BESSs) are becoming
a crucial part of electric grids due to their important roles in
renewable energy sources (RES) integration in energy systems.
Cyber-secure operation of BESS in renewable energy systems is
significant, since it is susceptible to cyber threats and its potential
failure may result in economical and physical damage to both the
BESS and the system. However, there is a lack of comprehensive
study on the attack detection methods for industrial BESSs. This
paper reviews the state-of-the-art work in the area of BESS cyber
threats, investigates how to detect cyberattackes in the operation
stage. We address the problem of enhancing the communication
channels' integrity can by implementing blockchain in the design
stage of BESS, combined with applying artificial intelligence (AI)
and machine learning (ML) methods for false data injection
attack (FDIA) detection in the BESS operation stage. The focus
is on the application of ML and AI methods for FDIA detection
on different system layers. Based on our analysis, data-driven
approaches such as clustering and artificial-neutral-network-
based state estimation (SE) forecast are recommended for the
implementation in BESSs.
Keywords-cyber security; battery energy storage system; false
data injection attack; cyber threat; cyberattack; battery state
estimation; renewable energy source; machine learning; artificial
intelligence.
I. INTRODUCTION
Global warming is one of the most acute problems of the
modern world. In 2015 United Nations (UN) introduced
sustainable development goals that targeted at preventing
climate change [1]. According to the UN, the carbon dioxide
level that is provoking climate change in the atmosphere
reached a maximum in 2019 [2]. The power system energy
production sector is culpable for approximately three-quarters
of the global aggregated CO2 emissions [3].
To diminish the negative influence of the energy sector on
the environment, renewable energy sources (RES) have been
widely integrated in power systems. RES have a lower
emission rate compared to conventional energy sources;
therefore, they are more environmentally friendly. One of the
major complexities of integrating RES into the energy system
is their high dependence on the availability of natural resources
(e.g. wind and solar radiation). The implementation of battery
energy storage systems (BESSs) allows for the seamless
integration of RES in the electrical grid, avoiding
compromising the reliability of the power supply.
The BESS is an essential part of the electrical grid. The
potential failure of BESS may result in economical and
physical damage [4]. Also, exploiting the BESS outside of
optimal conditions may accelerate battery degradation. The
BESS cyber threats can be divided in various ways. In [5], the
attacks are grouped based on the part of the system that they
are targeted at, while in [6] the classification is based on the
property of system data that attack is depriving. In this work we
use the second type of classification.
BESS exhibits vulnerabilities at all levels that are
interconnected and works in parallel with the electrical grid.
Consequently, an undetected cyberattack on one layer of the
system would deteriorate the work of others. For example, the
cyberattack on sensing devices might lead to the
misrepresenting the state of charge (SOC) calculation based on
corrupted measurements and sabotage the work of the battery
management system (BMS). Therefore, it is crucial to consider
all the layers while developing the defense strategy of the
BESS including the possibility of false data injection attack
(FDIA) against the BESS sensor measurements, state
estimation (SE) results, of BESS and the electric grid, along
with spoiling communication channels.
The cyber-secure operation of some battery applications
such as electric vehicles (EV) [7]–[10] as well as some
particular parts of the BESS (e.g. BMS [11]–[13], SOC
forecast [14]–[17], communication channels [11], attack
vectors [18], etc.) has received widespread attention. Some
reviews consider cyber security of the BESS adapting the
knowledge from the Internet of things (IoT) domain [19] and
highlighting the importance of data encryption and user
authentication [11], [13]. However, to the best of our
knowledge, no overview would consider the security concerns
of BESS as a comprehensive system in which components are
interconnected as well as the detection of corrupted commands
from the system operators or third parties to the BESS.
This paper addresses the problem of ensuring safe, reliable,
and cyber-secure operation of BESS. We aim to determine
possible vulnerabilities of the BESS components from the
cyber security viewpoint and study existing solutions for attack
detection that can be potentially adapted for industrial BESS
cyber security domain.
In Section II, we overview the major types of the BESS
cyber threats that can result in the failure of providing data
integrity, confidentiality, and availability. We highlight the
menace of utilizing stolen data for designing more complex and
challenging-to-detect cyberattacks. In Section III, cyberattack
detection methods are reviewed and analyzed.

This work is supported by the Danish project “BOSS: Bornholm smartgrid

secured by grid connected battery systems” co-founded by Danish Energy
technology Development and Demonstration program (EUDP) contract no.
64018-0618

978-1-7281-8708-2/20/$31.00 ©2020 IEEE 188

DOI 10.1109/AIKE48582.2020.00037

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Figure 1. The cyber threats of the BESS
II. CLASSIFICATION OF CYBER THREATS FOR THE BESS
In order to ensure the cyber-secure operation of the BESS
in parallel with a grid, we have to comply with requirements of
data integrity, confidentiality, and availability. Based on these
requirements, cyberattacks can be divided into three types that
are aimed at different parts of the system. The cyber threats of
different types are depicted in Fig. 1. These threats are
reviewed below [6].
A. Integrity Attack
Data integrity is one of the major requirements to fulfill
while ensuring grid cyber-secure operation. An integrity attack
aims to modify the data, delay its delivery, or replay previously
stolen data in order to damage system observability, and
manipulate its parameters [6]. Data integrity is associated with
FDIA since this attack imposes the modification of the data.
The integrity attack can appear in all the system layers;
however, the proper design of the system allows us to
considerably reduce the possibility of the attack on the
communication and sensing levels.
1) FDIA Attacks
FDI is an attack based on data manipulation. FDIAs are
divided into groups depending on the level of adversary’s
awareness about the system and historical data. In this paper,
we divide the cyberattacks into those that are purely integrity
attacks and do not require any system data and those that are
based on the data collected through a data confidentiality
attack. Moreover, we consider the battery to be a black box, in
which the internal sensors and communication channels are
physically protected. Hence, the possible FDIAs are limited to
FDIA against the electric grid SE and battery SE.
a) FDIA against Electric Grid SE
The state-of-the-art FDIA in electrical engineering domain
is FDIA against electric grid SE. Due to the physical features of
the smart grid, the power balance should be maintained at all
times. Thus, in order to not be easily detected, the attack vector
is designed so that the power balance is kept. For instance,
zero-dynamic attacks use unstable zero bugs to attack meters
[20], [21]. FDIAs may be targeted to cause a particular
influence on the system and developed considering the system
data in case of a confidentiality attack. The FDIAs that appear
due to the combination of integrity and confidentiality attacks
are described below.
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b) FDIA against Battery SE
SE of the battery is a set of battery parameters that support
the decision-making process while managing the BESS as a
part of the electrical grid. SE of the battery can include the
SOC, state of health (SOH), etc., yet in most cases, the authors
consider either only SOC or SOC in the combination with
SOH. In this paper, we use the definition of SOC provided by
[16] that is the ratio of the currently available battery capacity
to the rated capacity of the battery. The SOH allows evaluating
the degradation of the battery. These parameters are used to
observe the current state of the battery and predict its’ further
behavior. Corrupted SE may result in an inadequate response
of BMS, and, therefore, the faster degradation of the battery,
overcharge resulting in the physical damage [23] and financial
losses [24]. Considering the EV domain, one of the major
potential consequences of an undetected cyberattack is rapid
battery degradation.
Besides, battery capacity is not constant over the battery
lifetime. It shrinks within the time due to battery degradation. If
we do not take into account, the system operator is not aware of
the true capabilities of the BESS for power supply, and,
consequently, it will fail to fulfill the requirements of the
system operator. In this section, we define the methods for
battery parameters calculation, scrutinize types of cyberattacks
that can jeopardize battery parameters, and discuss strategies to
detect abnormal forecast of battery parameters.
2) Random Delay Attack
A random delay attack is an attack that introduces a random
delay into a sequence of control commands. In spite of its
simplicity, the attack can have a massive negative impact on
the key components of the electric grid. Furthermore, the
cryptography is futile against this type of attack [22].
To define possible attacks that might compromise battery
parameters, let us discuss the cyberattacks that were
highlighted in the domain of EV. EVs are one of the major
applications of batteries, and, therefore, it is necessary to be
aware of the research carried out in this domain. Cyber security
of EVs has gained attention due to the raising attack potential
along with the cases of real attacks [23], [24]. The most
straightforward attack on the SOC is introducing constant high
SOC to the system so that the battery is used while it is closed
to be discharged. The drawback of this attack is that there is an
acceptable range between SOCmin and SOCmax. Thus, the
attacker can increase SOC only up to the upper boundary. To
not be detected, the attacker makes sure that all the physical
constraints are met and battery SOC stays in an acceptable
range to not interrupt the work of BMSs. The intermittent
attack avoids this problem by removing the attack once the
boundary condition is reached and introduces the attack
period [25]. Besides, there are targeted attacks on the battery
SOC that are aimed to accelerate battery degradation and
efficiency [25]. The attack vector is formed as a result of the
optimization problem formulated to decrease battery lifetime
reducing battery capacity.

Figure 2. The methods for the BESS cyberattacks detection
B. Confidentiality Attack
Unauthorized access to data is carried out through a
confidentiality attack. These attacks are not aimed to damage
the system directly; nonetheless, they enable the attacker to
design more comprehensive FDIA with regard to the system
data. In this section, we discuss the attacks that might lead to
data leakage as well as the attack that appears with the stolen
data in use.
1) Cyber Threats for the BESS Confidentiality
There are two types of ways to access system data
depending on the source. Physical attacks are related to
physical theft and dumpster diving. Network attack vectors are
shown through direct download, passive monitoring, timing
channel, VM vulnerabilities, spyware malware, phishing, and
cross-site scripting [18]. In this work, we divide the attacks into
communication channel attack, storage attack, and false data
injection (FDI) with no regard to the source.
2) Confidentiality Attack Based FDIA
Unauthorized access to data storage is a potential threat
since the attacker may not only modify the existing data [26]
and spam the storage with false data [13], but also use it for
constructing the superior attack vectors. The man-in-the-middle
attack is another type of attack that retrieves the data from the
system and potentially modifies it by placing the malicious user
between two communicating nodes [27].
Confidentiality attack based FDIA is FDI that are designed
based on the seized data. These attacks are more challenging to
detect since they are designed based on the system topology
and historic measurements. Besides, they might be targeted at
manipulation of the system state. Confidentiality attack based
FDIA requires the combination of integrity and confidentiality
attack to design and conduct these kinds of attacks. The
example of these types of attacks is replay attacks that includes
wiretapping of the system’s measurements and repeatedly
broadcasting them in the system [20].
C. Availability Attack
Denial of service (DoS) attack does not allow the user to
access the service by overloading either the physical or
network connections [28]. DoS attack is targeted to
compromise the communication network in the smart grid
[29]–[31]. DoS attack can be specifically hazardous for the
islandic grid [31]. The attack can distract the work of
secondary frequency control and disturb the work of an electric
grid [32].
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III. DETECTION METHODS OF BESS CYBERATTACKS
After we diminished the possibility of cyberattack in the
design stage, we define methods to detect possible cyberattacks
from numerical data: battery SE (and training set for it) [14],
and energy system measurements [33]. Cyberattack detection
methods with a regard to the attack type are summarized in
Fig. 2, and are explained in the following sections.
A. Manipulated Battery SE Attack Detection
The important requirement to reach the sufficient efficiency
of these methods is the data set of the proper size and quality.
According to the most full and up-to-date review of SOC
forecast methods, the literature uses either experimental data or
the data collected from EVs. There are typical data sets
mentioned in the literature (Federal Urban Driving Cycles
(FUDS), US06, etc) along with the detailed description of their
influence on the suitability of particular machine learning (ML)
and artificial neural network (ANN) algorithms [34].
Nevertheless, none of them contain the data regarding the
industrial implementation of BESS and the working cycle of
them for that purpose.
It is worth mentioning that the working cycle of the battery
used in EV differs from the one used in the industry. Therefore,
even though EV data sets are more spread and easier to obtain,
we cannot fully rely on the results of the forecast using them.
Nevertheless, we may adjust the methods used for data
preprocessing for EV data sets to obtain better results
considering that the achieved results cannot be fully
extrapolated on other battery applications.
To regulate the work of the BESS the BMS is applied. This
system employs measurements to monitor battery parameters
(e.g. SOC) and optimize battery performance ensuring its safe
operation. The measurements are received from sensors
deployed in battery cells. Since the measuring units within the
battery are protected physically, we narrow down the
possibility of FDIA to battery SE parameters that are calculated
by BMS and used for the BESS management.
The state-of-the-art method of FDIA detection in the smart
grid domain is based on the residual calculation. It was firstly
implemented in a bad data detector (BDD) with the weighted
least square criterion (WLS) [33]. The residual is proportional
to the difference between the measurements and the forecast; it
should not exceed the threshold τ. The partial protection of the
sensors might be adapted for the implementation in the BESS
cyber security domain [35].
The residual-based method requires an accurate forecast of
the measurements. The approaches for battery SE forecast are
discussed in detail in Section V. There we discuss various ways
for battery SE forecast and derive that data-driven methods
have a significant potential for SE of the battery in the EV
domain. These approaches have proven to be more accurate,
efficient, and adaptive, comparing to the state-of-the-art.
Nevertheless, data preprocessing issues, high requirements to
initial data, as well as a complication in model adjustment such
as choosing proper hyper-parameters, activation function, and
work under uncertainties such as battery degradation requires
 the improvement of existing techniques to achieve a better
result.
B. System Commands Attack Detection
Due to the constant data exchange between the BESS and
the electric grid, the possible cyberattacks within the smart grid
might influence the integrity of commands that the BESS
receives. In this paper, we define the novel type of attack on the
BESS data integrity employing FDIA against the grid. The
detection of the system cyberattack from the BESS viewpoint
is a challenging problem that does not have an accepted
solution yet. In this section, we study the methods that might be
adapted for tackling this problem.
Distributed FDIA detection methods were introduced in the
smart grid domain in order to carry out the cyberattack
detection in decentralized systems. The distributed cyberattack
detection was firstly considered in Guan and Ge in [36]. The
authors have suggested the method for distributed attack
detection in the cyber-physical system. Distributed FDIA
detection methods are divided into three groups: statistical-
based, data time-stamps based, and estimation residuals based
[49]. One of the examples of a statistical-based method is
decentralized consensus strategy such as distributed average
consensus algorithm. distributed receding-horizon control [37].
The residual-based methods adapt the methods suggested for
FDIA on SE [38] that is based on comparing the measurements
with forecasted data [35]. The application of the residual-based
method requires an accurate forecast. The difference between
these values should not exceed the threshold τ.
Local measurements can be considered to improve the SE
forecast given the type of the BESS service. Mashlakov et
al. [39] describe a method for SOC forecasting for the battery
serving for a frequency on different data sets to distinguish
properties of power system dynamics and frequency control
regulatory environments in particular. In [14] authors apply
frequency data for SOC forecast for the BESS management.
Data-driven algorithms are also suggested to detect
cyberattacks locally. In [40], a deep learning algorithm is
successfully used for local cyberattack detection in the IoT
system [40]. Deep learning is widely used in the cyber security
domain for FDIA [41] detection. To apply a deep learning
algorithm, the training data are required. This data can be
obtained through simulations [42] or from the existing
databases [34].
One of the spread approaches is forecasting the
consumption by clustering typical load profiles [43], [44]. In
[44], the authors use probabilistic neural networks (PNNs) to
cluster consumers into groups based on their load profiles and
forming the typical load profile. The amount of groups is
defined by the “knee” criterion.
C. Training Set Attack
Data-driven algorithms gain attention in the cyber security
domain. To obtain a reliable ML or ANN attack detection
algorithm, the proper training data set is required. Training data
integrity can be jeopardized not only by means of a cyberattack
but also due to meters imperfection, etc. In order to ensure the
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data set integrity to obtain an accurate forecast, we carry out
the data preprocessing.
Data preprocessing includes cleaning, transformation,
filtering, and reduction of data. In the first step, the data is
cleaned from noisy and incomplete measurements. In the next
step, measurements are normalized and categorized. One of the
most spread ways of data transformation is normalizing it in
particular ranges so that we elevate the convergence rate and
increase the robustness. As an example, data can be categorized
into charge, idle, and discharge. In the third step, we apply
filters of different kinds such as moving average filter, a finite
impulse response (FIR) lowpass filter, simple mean filter,
Kalman filter (KF), etc. In the last step, we remove non-
discriminative features to enhance computational efficiency.
CONCLUSION
BESS is becoming an important part of electric grid that
assists for the integration of the RES in the electric grid. Cyber
security of BESS has to be provided in the design and
operation stages. In addition, cyberattacks on electric grids that
can influence the work of the BESS have to be considered.
Various FDIAs detection methods are proposed in the
literature, and a comprehensive review of related papers were
presented in this paper. We concluded that the application of
data-driven algorithms including ML and ANN has a high
potential in the domain of sensor measurement forecast and has
been widely discussed in the recent literature. Likewise, these
approaches are adapted to forecast battery SE such as SOC and
SOH. In the future work, the reviewed methods are to be
compared on the same dataset of industrial BESS.
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