Brand

Luciano SEGRETO
Hubert BONIN
Andrzej K. KOZMINSKI
Caries MANERA
and
Manlred POHL
(eds.)

¿
P.I.E. Peter Lang
 i! ICCA
INSTITUTE FOR CORPORATE
CULTUREAFFAIRS e.V. KOZMINSKI UNIVERSITY

Preface ·····-------------
The papers ofthis book were first presented ata Conference organised
by the ICCA in Warsaw, in March 2007, with the support of the
Kozminski University of Warsaw.

ICCA gratefully acknowledges the financia! support of Kozminski

University.

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Brussels, 2012
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ISBN 978-90-5201-793-8
D/20 12/5678/19
CHAPTER 4. Lham~
Printed in Germany
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data.
European business and brand building 1 Luciano Segreto ... [et al.] (eds.). CHAPTER 5. A Reas~
p. cm.
Papers presented at a conference organized by ICCA in Warsaw, in Mar. 2007.
Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 978-90-5201-793-8
l. Brand name products-Europe- Congresses. 2. Branding (Marketing)--Europe- Hubert Bonfn
Congresses. 3. Corporate image- Europe- Congresses.
I. Segreto, Luciano. II. Institute for Corporate Culture Affairs. CHAPTER 6. The _-L~~
HD69.B7E97 2011 658.8'27094--dc23 2011042023
CIP also available from the British Library, GB.
Bibliographic inforrnation published by "Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek" CHAPTER 7. The T -~ ~
"Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek" lists this publication in the "Deutsche Brand Building o
Nationalbibliografie": detailed bibliographic data is available on the Internet at
<http://dnb.de>.
 CHAPTER8

Corporate Growth and Changes in Brand Identity

The Case of the Zara Group 1

Xoán CARMONA BADÍA

University ofSantiago de Compostela

l. A concise history of the Zara group

Zara is the only Spanish brand to appear in the 100 Top Brands
published by Interbrand-Business Week in its 2009 edition. It is the fifth
most highly-valued brand within the clothing industry, preceded only by
Louis Vuitton, H&M, Nike and Gucci. Since its frrst appearance in
771h position on this prestigious ranking back in 2005, it has recorded an
uninterrupted upward trend that by 2009 had it placed in soth position. 2
Zara is, however, just one of the eight brands that belong to Inditex, a
corporation from the Spanish region of Galicia, whose head-offices are
in the city of A Coruña. Its origins date back to 1963 when Arnancio and
Antonio Ortega and their respective wives set up, under the name of
Confecciones Goa, a small workshop for making ladies' dressing gowns
and nightdresses. Arnancio Ortega, who in due course would become
the head ofthe company, was 27 years old at the time, and although he
had no formal qualifications in either design or business management,
he did indeed have a great deal of experience in the clothing business, as
he had already been employed in several stores in A Coruña and had
worked as, amongst other things, a sales rep. For their part, the two
women, Rosalía Mera and Primitiva Renedo, had both started off
working at a very young age as seamstresses, whereby they were
extremely well-versed in the practica! aspects ofthe small business they

This is a frrst approach to the issue and is broadly dependent on extensive interviews
with many persons concemed with the history of the furn. I am very grateful to al! of
them.
From 2005 to 2009, its ranking was 77, 73, 64, 62 and 50. See http://www.interbrand.
comlbest_global_ brands.aspx.

187
European Business and Brand Building

were about to run. Given that the only capital available to the founders
of the small workshop was what they could raise by their own means,
Confecciones Goa began operating as a modest manufacturer of a very
limited range of ladieswear, selling its products to local haberdasheries
and retail outlets. 3 Just in case the business failed to get off the ground,
Amancio Ortega initially kept his job in the shirt-makers where he
worked.
Confecciones Goa recorded moderate growth in the following
decade, and by around 1973 it already had sorne 90 female workers,
almost all ofwhom were young single women, who were employed in a
new factory that the Ortega farnily had built on the outskirts ofthe city,
in A Moura. The prernises left vacant by Confecciones Goa, within the
city itself, now housed a new farnily business, Samlor, which employed
58 people and made ladies' jackets and trousers. 4 At that moment,
Amancio Ortega was the registered owner of Goa, whilst his brother ran
Samlor. 5 These were, therefore, two small family businesses that
purchased their fabrics from severa! suppliers in Catalonia and, lacking
their own retail outlets, sold their ladies' garments through a network of
sales reps working on comrnission to dedicated stores, large
supermarkets and retail chains, such as Simago, Pryca and Continente. 6
The Ortega brothers were still a long way from being Spain's largest
clothing manufacturer, which at that time was Induyco, a company in
the El Corte Inglés Group, Spain's largest chain of department stores. 7
Yet even in the Galicia region, Goa and Samlor were a long way behind
Dresslock or Regojo, with this latter company having not only two Iarge
factories in Redondela and Zamora, but also an extremely large network
of workshops working for them. 8
The 1970s saw far-reaching changes in Spain's industrial clothing
market, which up until that time had been located mainly in Catalonia,

R. Tijeras, Las sagas del poder, Barcelona, Plaza & Janés, 199&. L. Alonso Alvarez,
"Vistiendo a tres continentes. La ventaja competitiva del grupo Inditex-Zara",
Revista de Historia Industrial, No. 1&, 2000. C. Sánchez, Dinero fresco. La nueva
aristocracia económica que ha desplazado a las grandes familias, Madrid, Ediciones
Temas de Hoy, 2003 . Pilar Ortega, Amancio and Antonio sister had also runa small
haberdashers in the same city since 1962.
4
Historical Archive of the Kingdom of Galicia (AHRG), lnstitutional Administration
ofSocio-professional Services (AISS) , File 55.&90.
AHRG, AISS, File 52.966.
L. Alonso Alvarez, op. cit.
Fomento de la Producción, Las 1.500 mayores empresas españolas en 1973,
Barcelona, 1975.
X. Carmona Badía and J. Nadal Oller, El empeño industrial de Galicia. 250 años de
historia, A Coruña, Fundación Barrié de la Maza, 2005 .

188
 Xoán Carmona Badía

Madrid and Valencia/ and these led to a major restructuring of the

business world that had built up around the industry. One such change
was the emergence in Galicia, a region that in the 19th century had seen
the capitulation of its extensive household linen industry before the
onslaught of Catalonia' s mechanised cotton manufacturers, 10 of a raft of
companies dedicated to the manufacture of items of clothing. This
sudden appearance of the clothing industry in a region with no textile
sector at all and with no tradition in the world of design was informed
by several factors. The first of these was the growth of the market for
ready-to-wear garments as opposed to those sewn by seamstresses,
either within the household itself or else made to measure, which had
already begun to occur in the previous decade, following economic
deregulation in 1959. Up until the 1960s, the main market for mass-
produced clothing had been uniforms for the armed forces and custodial
institutions and, on the open market, the manufacture of shirts and
blouses. It is not that other garments were of no importance, but, for
example, when buying a suit the normal thing was to visit a tailor or
dressmaker, and mothers and grandmothers made a large part of the
household's textile items. A study published as recently as 1972
affmned that "fewer than 50% of Spanish people" wore ready-to-wear
clothes. 11 Accordingly, the industrial clothing sector in the 1970s was an
activity that could almost be considered a new one, since demand
increased exponentially, and established companies had to adapt to a
change in which design appeared to replace the individuality that had
been a feature of the former bespoke clothing. In fact, those years saw
many large traditional companies close down, and sorne of them left
huge gaps in the market ready to be filled by new players. It was an
industry that, furthermore, had few entry barriers and in which labour
costs accounted for a significant part of the overall total. This "new"
nature implied a lesser effect of agglomeration econornies, and in a
region such as Galicia allowed a group of entrepreneurs, mostly already
present in the sector or with farnily ti es to it, as most of them worked in

Servicio Sindical de Estadística, Estadísticas de Producción Industrial, Madrid,

1970.
10
X. Carmona Badía, El atraso industrial de Galicia. Auge y liquidación de la
industria textil rural, 1750-1900, Barcelona, Editorial Ariel, 1990.
11
J. Ferrán Nada!, Canales de distribución en España, Barcelona, !ESE, 1972, p. 144.
The author cites figures from the Encuesta de Presupuestos Familiares (Survey on
Household Budgets) that show that household expenditure on industrial clothing was
11.5%. The description that Ferrán Nada! makes of the marketing channels around
1972 is that they were still wholly traditional: only 14% of the distribution of mass-
produced clothing items was made by large retail outlets, with the majority being
channelled through small fabric retailers who gradually included them alongside their
own products.

189
European Business and Brand Building

tailor's shops or were the sons and daughters of the owners, to embark
upon the production of mass-produced fashion. Such was the case of
Caramelo, Roberto Verino, Unicén and Adolfo Domínguez, who were
the frrst of these Galician industrialists to become widely known.
A second factor that in all likelihood contributed to the success of
these businesses was the lengthy downturn in the labour market that
began in Galicia around 1976 and persisted almost until 1993. The loss
of jobs and the difficulty in fmding one were especially acute in the
districts ofFerrol and Vigo, with the female population being the hardest
hit. 12 Galicia's two largest clothing companies, which we referred to
earlier, namely, Dresslock and Regojo, went into temporary receivership
in 1973 and 1978, respectively, making both entire workshops and
individual seamstresses redundant. 13 The shrinking labour market had
two major ramifications. The frrst was to increase the supply of female
labour, which in certain districts was highly skilled in dressmaking,
prepared to work for low wages, and even had the necessary equipment.
The second effect, at a time when Spain was moving from dictatorship
to democracy, was to generate a favourable attitude amongst local insti-
tutions towards anything that involved creating jobs. This meant the
availability of public premises and subsidies, especially when coopera-
tives were involved. Entrepreneurs therefore found the way open for the
arrangement of an outsourcing system for the most labour-intensive
activities, thereby enabling them to optimise the relationship between
those undertaken within their own factories and those carried out in
subcontracted workshops, cooperatives and in many cases even through
home work in the manner of the Verlagssystem. 14
This favourable economic scenario became even more so during the
second half of the 1970s due to political change, which meant not only
replacing dictatorship with democracy but also a clear generational shift
in which the new political, economic and professional elites sought to
shrug off the unimaginative style of dress used by the supporters of
General Franco's former regime. Accordingly, new businesses sprang
up with the remit not only to put fashion within the reach of female
pockets but also to fmd new styles and more informal designs for
menswear. 15

12
X. Vence Deza, Capitalismo e desemprego en Galicia, Vigo, Edicións Xerais, 1986.
13
Fomento de la Producción, op. cit., and X. Carmona (ed.), Empresarios de Galicia,
Vol. 2, Santiago, Fundación Caixa Galicia, 2009.
14
M.X. Rodríguez Galdo, E. Pis Sánchez & M.T. Costa Campí (eds.). Evaluación del
potencial de desarrollo endógeno de Galicia, Santiago, Xunta de Galicia, 1992.
15
For the influence of sociological and politica1 changes on fashion, see L. Welters and
P.A. Cunningham (eds.), Twentieth-Century American Fashion, Oxford-New York,
Berg, 2005.

190
 Xoán Carmona Badía

This was the context within which Amancio Ortega too k two of the
decisions that would lie at the heart of his subsequent transformation
into the market leader in the sector: introduce his own outlets for the
distribution of his clothing items and extend his production range so as
to minimise his dependence on outside suppliers.
The Ortega family's frrst steps in the field of retailing, all taken in
the city of A Coruña between 1971 and 1975, were somewhat erratic
and only relatively successful. In 1971, they opened a shop called Sprint
that sold clothes products from various provenances and then another
that also sold records, books and other leisure items. lt is only from
1975 that mention can be made of the Zara retail model, with the
opening of a clothes store under this name, dedicated to the sale of items
of clothing. These were supplied largely by other manufácturers, given
that in-house products still made up only a very small range, which was
furthermore restricted to ladieswear. 16 lt was precisely this situation that
led to the joint decision to enlarge both the production range for clothing
items and the number of self-owned retail outlets under the Zara name.
Regarding the increase in production, the frrst decision taken by the
Ortega brothers was to move Goa to Sabón, a new industrial estate that
was being developed just outside the city, and use the old site to open a
new factory dedicated to the manufacture of men's pyjamas, thereby
embarking upon the production of clothing items for this customer
segment. In order to open this new life dedicated to menswear they
established a partnership with two people with extensive experience and
knowledge of the business, Isidore Bermathou and José Antonio
Vázquez Sánchez, who had been the technical and commercial directors,
respectively, at Pressman, a medium-sized factory in Vigo dedicated to
the manufactures ofmen's and ladies' wear. The former, who trained as
a textile engineer in Paris, was also an expert in the commissioning of
factories of this kind. Together they formed Confecciones Noite in
1976, a company that would soon extend its product range from
pyjamas to men's and children's dressing-gowns, and soon after that to
track suits, with this latter line being almost untouched by Spanish
manufacturers and one that would be extremely successful.
Confecciones Noite supplied these three product lines in men's and
children's wear to several distributors, with a significant amount being
exported, especially to Mexico, the Middle East and France, and
amongst its customers in this country were chains such as Printemps and
even Galeries Lafayette.

16
J.M. Castellano, "Una ventaja competitive: el factor tiempo. El caso lnditex-Zara",
Papeles de Economía Española, No. 56, 1993.

191
European Business and Brand Building

Soon after this, the Ortega brothers applied the same business
strategy to begin manufacturing shirts, which they undertook around
1979. On this occasion, the partners were again two people who had
already worked in the clothing sector, Rogelio García Vigo, who had
done so in a well-known and modem shirt factory in A Coruña,
Manufacturas Nogueira, and Enrique García Amil. The company,
Confecciones Píos, soon became a major shirt manufacturer. As with .
Noite, the Ortega brothers held a slight majority of its stock, with the
minority holding being shared between the other two partners. With
Noite and Fíos they increased their own range of clothing, always
expanding towards products related to the ones they were already
turning out (from ladies' dressing gowns to men' s and children's, from
ladies' nightdresses to men' s pyjamas and shirts) and with a minimum
outlay of family funds, thanks to the option of resorting to new partners
and bank loans.
As well as having their own workshops, like Goa and Samlor, these
fmns began to build up a network of subcontracting relationships with
home-based seamstresses and smalllocal workshops 17 to which in sorne
cases they contracted the sewing and fmishing (checking, labelling,
etc.), and in others only sorne of these tasks. Each one of the companies
set up an independent network abiding by the rule of not competing for
subcontractors with other members of the gro up.
In step with the growth in the number of production plants and the
enlarged product range, the Ortega brothers opened two shops in
A Coruña and a further three in other cities in Galicia: Vigo, Lugo and
Orense. This meant that by 1979 they now had six of their own retail
outlets located in the region' s main cities. 18 Nevertheless, the growth in
production in the 1970s far outpaced that of the distribution network,
whereby in 1979 production still prevailed over distribution in the
group. Yet a sea change had already come about in the business group' s
strategy. The increase in production and the enlargement ofthe range of
clothes made by the group ' s new manufacturing companies would
enable the retail outlets to gradually become the sole sales points for
their output, although for the time being they still sold to third parties.
This meant that the vertical integration policy, which is widely
considered to be one of the keys to the group's subsequent
competitiveness, was already partly in place in the late 1970s, although
it would not be completed untillater.

17
X.R. Blanco and J .F . Salgado, Amancio Ortega: de cero a Zara, Madrid, Editorial La
Esfera de los libros, 2004, p. 50.
18
lnditex. Initial public stock offering of Industria del Diseño Textil, S.A. April 2001 ,
chap. IV, p. l.

192
 Xoán Carmona Badía

During the first half of the 1980s, the group's productive structure
continued expanding, until by 1986 it had seven manufacturing
companies, three of which were new and owned by Amancio Ortega, 19
who by then had emerged as the veritable driving-force behind the
business, and 49 self-owned retail outlets under the Zara banner, a name
that was beginning to gain in popularity in Spain's major cities. By that
time, the product range had already extended to knitwear and the most
common items in men's, ladies' and children's wear, in sorne cases
through the building or purchase of new pocket-sized factories in
Galicia itself, and in others by contracting factories that had previously
worked for other retailers.
In this second stage of the group's expansion in production, a
decisively important factor was that the extemal network of contractors
was joined by a large number of cooperatives that contracted with the
factories. These cooperatives, dotted around Galicia and in most cases
promoted by clergymen and local authorities, began mainly from 1983
to be part of the structure of the division of labour that had been
operating up until then and in which outside workshops performed the
most intensive tasks (sewing, assembling), whilst the pattem design,
cutting and colour design were carried out in the main workshops in A
Grela and soon after in Arteixo, which were also responsible for quality
control, labelling and packing. 20 By 1988, the largest cooperative
networks, formed at the initiative of two churchmen, one in A Coruña
and the other in the coastal town of Corcubión, already had
68 cooperatives in which 1,357 people worked. 21
This meant that by the mid-1980s, the manufacturing structure was
extremely flexible, basically consisting of three echelons. The frrst of
these, in which strategic decisions were taken, was controlled directly
by the Ortega family, with Amancio at the head. The second was made
up either by those production companies in which the Ortega family
operated with other partners, albeit always maintaining control of the
company, as in the aforementioned cases of Confecciones Noite and
Fíos, or by those plants in which the family were the sole owners. They

19
These were Nikole, Choolet and Trisko. See Fomento de la Producción, Las 2.000
mayores empresas españolas en 1986, Barcelona, 1987.
20
Regarding the importance of the cooperatives in the sharp growth recorded in the
1980s, see P. Alonso Logroño, and R. Rodríguez González, "Territorio en mutación:
la industria textil-confección como factor de desarrollo local en Galicia", Anales de
Geografia, No. 25, 2005 and R. Herranz, R. and D. Hoss, "División del trabajo entre
-- ·::r La centro y periferia. Cooperativas e industrialización difusa en Galicia", Sociología del
Trabajo, No. 11, 1991.
21
X. López Neira y R. Dosil, "O cooperativismo. Un medio eficaz na promoción do
emprego", Encrucillada. Revista Galega de Pensamento Cristián, No. 56, 1988.

193
European Business and Brand Building

were, in all cases, small companies in terms of direct employment, and

none of them exceeded the barrier of 250 employees. They were
factories that specialised in the different business segments of ladies',
men's and children' s wear, undertaking the initial and fmal stages ofthe
process and outsourcing those in-between. It was the third echelon of
this complex structure that was responsible for these latter tasks. This
echelon comprised more than a hundred small independent workshops
and cooperatives distributed throughout the length and breadth of
Galicia, and sewed for the group's factories. During the second half of
the 1980s they accounted for the bulk of the workforce involved in the
group' s manufacturing activities.
This structure perrnitted not only an enormous amount of flexibility
through the modulation of orders placed with outside contractors
according to prevailing circumstances but also the recording of very
high outputs with a minimal investment, as the business group was not
required to invest anything in these kinds ofunits nor assume any risk of
incurring in sunken costs. For their part, the cooperatives were entitled
to a whole range of public subsidies both because of their condition as
such and because of their location in areas of industrial decline or
because they hired unemployed workers.
The key feature of this structure was the capacity to coordinate the
flows between group factories, outside workshops and demand, and it
was during this time that these skills were honed and would subsequently
be used to consolidate the group's step up into an intemationalleader.
The first echelon, the one controlled by the Ortega family through
the company Goasam, which owned the Zara retail chain, was the one
that coordinated manufacturing and distribution and which underwent
vertical integration in a slow but steady manner, as the production range
was enlarged to become the sole supply source for the group' s stores,
whereupon no more sales were made to other distributors.Z2 The process
concluded in the early 1990s, when the Ortega farnily bought up their
partners' shares in companies such as Noite and Fíos, thereby
controlling 100 per cent ofthe capital in all the group's companies.

22
According to Fábrega, sales to third parties had already ceased by 1986, see
F. Fábrega, Zara. El modelo de negocio de lnditex, Madrid, Editorial Claves de
Gestión, 2004, p. 27.

194
 Xoán Carmona Badía

Table l. Number of retail outlets open at year-end

Zara Inditex Group
1975 1 1
1979 6 6
1985 41 41
1989 98 98
1995 n.a.a. 508
1999 395 922
2005 852 2,692
2009 1,520 4,264
Source: Fomento de la Producción, Alonso Alvarez, op. cit., and lnditex, Annual Reports.

The now spectacular growth in production facilities and retail outlets

recorded in the 1980s meant looking for more complex organisational
arrangements for a group that by the end of the decade had already
become Spain's foremost clothing concem. The policy adopted
accordingly involved creating a holding that would act as the group's
parent company, and which would in most cases hold the entire stock of
the subsidiary companies, both those dedicated to production and those
involved in procurement and distribution. This company, called Inditex,
began to operate in 1979, although it would not be publicly registered
until six years later, in 1985.

2. Why was Zara so successful?

As well as being the year in which formal expression was given to
the new structure, 1985 is a significant date in the group's history as it is
when it was joined by a group of university professors and professional
management executives, amongst whom José María Castellanos would
soon make a name for himself, going on to become the company's chief
executive and its mouthpiece for twenty years. So, too, because these
events would signal the start of the company's exponential growth and
its process of intemationalisation. Today, with 4,500 retail outlets in
73 countries, Zara is the world' s largest clothing business, ahead of both
H&M and The Gap (3,100) in terms of the number of points of sale. 23
The results for 2008 also place the group with the Zara trademark in the
same position as regards tumover, outperforming the US company The
Gap for the first time. 24

23
Benetton, the only company with more retail outlets than the Spanish group, around
6,000, has franchised most ofthe stores that display its brand and does not own them.
See Benetton Group, Annual Report, 2008.
24
According to the annual reports of the two companies, in 2008 Inditex posted a
turnover of$14.8 billion as opposed to the $14.5 recorded by The Gap.

195
European Business and Brand Building

Table 2. Inditex stores by global regions at year-end 2008

Europe A frica Middle East Asia-Pacific America Total
Brand
Zara 1,188 4 59 96 173 1,520
Pull & Bear 495 1 45 6 36 583
Massimo Dutti 398 1 28 16 27 470
Bershka 503 1 30 - 57 591
Stradivarius 412 3 37 - 4 456
Oysho 322 - 24 - 28 374
Zara Home 207 1 18 - 13 239
Uterque 31 - - - - 31
TOTAL 3,556 11 241 118 338 4,264
Source: Inditex, Annual Report 2008.

Table 3. Number of Inditex stores in certain selected countries

at year-end 2008
-; o ;>..

= = ·¡;;"' ..><:....
;>..

"'=
<!)

·o; bl) ;>.. <.) <.)

"'
<!)

~ ~
< "'=
"'=
";( c.. :a
Brand
m
c..
ªo
p...
~ ....
~'«
<!)

:E
E
....
<!)
tl
~
"'= ¡.....= ~
m
~
"' u
......

Zara 514 79 87 115 48 50 30 25 22 63 41 40 23

Pul! &Bear 287 59 34 14 30 18 18 13 8 3 - - -
Massimo Dutti 250 40 8 17 26 11 6 10 10 10 - - 4
Bershka 262 42 36 41 41 23 16 13 19 5 - - -
Stradivarius 265 35 23 17 - 6 15 13 21 - - - -
Oysho 176 30 54 10 28 13 11 11 9 - - - -
ZaraHome 115 18 22 17 13 7 2 8 3 7 - - -
Uterque 27 2 - - - 2 - - - - - - -
TOTAL 1,896 305 264 231 186 130 98 93 92 88 41 40 27
Source: Inditex, Annual Report 2008.

Zara' s success has inspired numerous books and articles that seek to
explain it. In an article published in 2000, Luis Alonso set out to provide
an overview of sorne of the views that were being expressed
accordingly. The first of these was the flexibility of its manufacturing
system, which is due to a higher level of vertical integration than its
competitors, its logistics system, which means it can rapidly adapt its
offer to changes in demand with minirnal inventory costs, and fmally,
the decentralisation and autonomy enjoyed by each of the group's
chains. Such flexibility means rninirnising the time elapsed between the
product' s design and its fmal display at the point of sale, reducing it to
20 per cent ofthe normal figure for the sector. Accordingly, "whereas its
competitors require on average six months to design the product and a
further three to manufacture it and deliver it to the point of sale, Zara
takes between three and four weeks in the first case and a week in the

196
 Xoán Carmona Badía

second".25 The proximity of part of the supplier workshops to the

logistics centres for the group' s chains is also one of the aspects
contributing to this response that outpaces competitors who outsource
their production further afield.
The second aspect is appropriate market segmentation, to which we
shall refer in more detail in the next section, and the third is acute
awareness of consumer preferences, orto put it another way, the system
for detecting the focus of demand and for attracting customer loyalty.
Vázquez Vicente26 has pointed out that this customer-focus has been
achieved on the basis of two types of innovations: those involving the
relaying of information from the stores to the factory and those
involving the automation and computerisation of the production plants.
The first provide on-the-spot information on the situation and outlook
for the change in demand for each type of garment and the latter quickly
adapt production to demand. This customer-focus in a chain that has
already surpassed four thousand retail outlets has also moulded another
of the more significant changes that have taken place in Inditex in recent
years: from being a manufacturing group that integrated distribution it
has become a retail group that integrates both its own production
facilities and a network of contracts. In any case, control has passed
from manufacturing to distribution.
Zara's success has also meant various business schools27 have
included an analysis of this Galician company amongst their case
studies. Most of these attribute Zara' s competitive advantage to the first
of the aspects discussed above, that is, the agility of its supply chain.
When discussing this, Ferdows, Lewis and Machuca (2004? 8 admit to
having analysed it in search of sorne groundbreaking innovation, albeit
with no success. Ferdows et al. contend that there are three features that
create synergies. The first is the comprehensive nature of its interna!
communication chain. The second involves keeping an even tension
throughout the whole chain. The third requires making the utmost use of
the advantages of vertical integration. These three features enabled Zara
to become a benchmark for the new Fast Fashion that became all the
rage from the 1980s, and in the opinion of sorne authors it is the

25
Alonso Alvarez, op. cit., p. 175.
26
X.H. Vázquez Vicente, "O segredo do éxito", in http://www.vieiros.com/nova.
php?id=15630&Ed=1 [Accessed: 23.03.2011].
27
See for instance the cases prepared by N. Frairnan, M. Singh for the Columbia
Business School (2002) or the one by P. Ghemawat and J.L. Nueno for the Harvard
Business School (2003).
28
K. Ferdows, M.A, Lewis and J.A.D. Machuca, "Rapid-fire Fulfillment'', Harvard
Business Review, November 2004.

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European Business and Brand Building

company that has best adapted to the transition from ready-to-wear to

fast fashion.29
Yet none of this would have been possible without the organisational
learning we referred to in the frrst section of this paper, which is what
explains the supply chain' s flexibility; it was formed on the basis of a
small number of node companies that weaved around themselves an
extensive fabric of externa! workshops. Growth in the group's
manufacturing capacity was undertaken on the basis of a limited increase
in the former, the node companies, and an increase in the number and
geographical locations of the latter, the workshops. The cooperatives
that in the 1980s operated mainly in Galicia were steadily replaced by
outside contractors operating in Portugal or Morocco, but the network
upheld a similar structure even though its various component parts were
gradually moving further away.

3. Brand and image in Zara

Most literature about Zara refers to the agility and responsiveness of
its supply chain strategy, which is usually regarded as a key factor in its
competitive advantage, but aspects such as image and brand management
have received less attention from researchers. Sorne of them have
pointed out that the Zara case is an astonishing example ofhow a global
brand can be built up spending hardly any money on advertising, since
the Spanish frrm spends just 0.3-0.4 per cent of its sales revenue on it
(as opposed to the 3-4 per cent of other major retailers ). 30
There are four stages in the history of Zara' s image. One prior to the
creation of the Zara brand (1963-1978); a second one coinciding with
the introduction of the brand (1978-1991); a third one (1991-1999)
involving the development of the main brand and the segmentation of
the market through a multi-brand strategy, anda final one in which Zara
becomes a global brand with a formal reporting policy and a department
that creates image.
A. 1963-1978: the origins
Confecciones Goa was set up as a manufacturer with a limited range
of women' s clothing that sought to compete largely in terms of price, so
the brand was of relatively minor importance. Dressing gowns bore the
Goa label and ladies wear was labelled Sarnlor, and then during the 1970s

29
M. Tungate, Fashion Brands. Branding Style from Armani to Zara, London and
Philadelphia, Kogan Page, 2005. N. Tokatli, "Global Sourcing: insights from the
global clothing industry - the case of Zara, a fast fashion retailer", Journal of
Economic Geography, 8, 2008.
30
N. Kumar and S. Linguri, "Fashion Sense", Business Strategy Review, Summer 2006.

198
 Xoán Carmona Badía

N&B, Noite and Fíos were used to label menswear. Testifying to the scant
importance the Ortega brothers gave to this mark of identification during
their frrst years as manufacturers is the fact that they didn't apply to the
Spanish Patents and Trademarks Office to register their frrst trademark
until 1974, when they did so for the Sarnlor brand, to be followed by
Noite three years later. The designers were the owners themselves, who
based their work on irnitating other models and on their own experience
within the sector. Their aim was to sell designer clothes similar to those
on display in more exclusive stores, albeit for a more affordable price.
Zara is, therefore, in its origins, a very different case to ltalian
fashion, where there was an existing textile industry that saw ready-to-
wear as a way of expanding its market, in which designers licensed their
creations to companies that were already up and running and where,
generally speaking, the cooperation between designers, industrialists and
institutions played an important role.31 In that context, and in most cases,
the brand was the designer's own. Yet in the Spanish case, the textile
industry was located in Catalonia, twelve hundred kilometres away from
A Coruña, and the only relationship between it and Zara's initial
development involved suppliers and customers, as it was the Catalan
companies that supplied Amancio Ortega with fabrics. Galicia had no
tradition in accessories either, and the isolation Franco imposed on Spain
had blocked any form of contact with the process of Americanisation
that had swept through Europe in the post-war years and helped ltalian
fashion to gain a foothold in the US market. Here, therefore, the focus
was to be on the domestic market.
Finally, even well into the 1980s neither the institutions in Galicia
nor those in Spain overall made any attempt to assist the development of
the fashion industry. lt was only in 1984, andas part ofthe policies on
industrial restructuring, that the Ministry of Industry set up the Centre
for Fashion Design and Development (Centro de Promoción y Diseño
de Moda) and drafted its frrst Fashion Design and Development Plan
(Plan de Promoción y Diseño de Moda), for the purpose of contributing
to the intemational projection of Spanish fashion by supporting catwalks
such as Cibeles in Madrid or Gaudí in Barcelona and by helping the
sector in disparate other ways. 32 Yet by that time the new Spanish ready-

31
E. Merlo, Moda italiana: storia di un 'industria dall'Ottocento ad oggi, Venezia,
Marsilio Editare, 2003 . E. Merlo, "Tuming Fashion into Business: The Emergence of
Milan as an Intemational Fashion Hub", Business History Review, Vol. 80, No. 3,
2006. S. Saviolo, "Brand and Identity Management in Fashion Companies", SDA
Bocconi School of Management, Working Paper No. 66, 2002.
32
"La promoción de la moda española en el exterior: el papel del INFE (Instituto
Nacional para el Fomento de la Exportación)", Información Comercial Española,
No. 606, 1984. See also IPMark, No. 272, 1986.

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European Business and Brand Building

to-wear clothing industry had already found its own feet and, what's
more, the gap between the larger and smaller companies was now a
barrier to collective action. Zara is not therefore the result of a liaison
between designers and industrialists, nor is it the result of institutional
support or of the cooperation of institutions, but rather it is the outcome
ofthe endeavour of a family and their team of collaborators to capitalise
upon their own abilities and the prevailing circumstances.
B. 1978-1991: the creation ofthe Zara brand
The frrst major turnaround in Zara' s history was when it jumped onto
the bandwagon of design and the popularisation of fashion that was in
vogue in Spain during the :first years of the recession in the 1970s. The
owners of the little Goa business joined a movement that had its
maximum exponent in Galicia and which besides the birth of Zara
fathered companies such as Caramelo, Antonio Pemas and Adolfo
Dominguez. The sudden appearance of this new fashion at affordable
prices in Spain in the 1970s took place under the name of "moda
gallega", Galician fashion, and Zara clearly bene:fited from this move-
ment, although it always kept away from all the sector's organisational
and promotional activities, such as the group Galicia-Moda, formed in
1983 under the auspices ofthe regional govemment (Xunta de Galicia),
the organisation of the Luar fashion show or the Galician Textile
Association (Asociación Textil Gallega), founded in 1991.33 In fact,
even before these institutional campaigns, the frrst boost to the sector' s
image had been given by Adolfo Dominguez with a successful
advertising campaign launched in 1979 with the motto "la arruga es
bella" (wrinkles are beautiful) and with the popular US TV series Miami
Vice being involved in the creation ofthe wardrobe. Adolfo Dominguez
targeted a higher price segment than Zara, and his becoming the
standard bearer for the sector had a major bearing on the success of
"moda gallega". In the early 1980s, all the clothing originating in
Galicia had that feel-good factor of providing fashion at an affordable
price for the frrst time in Spain. In order to be part of this new move-
ment that popularised fashion, an identity and a brand were required.
Amongst all the trademarks they had been using, and of which we have
seen that only two had been registered, the Ortega farnily business opted

33
As part of this movement, a magazine called GALICIA MODA was published and
the Asociación Textil de Galicia paid for a supplement in Vogue. The first Luar
fashion shows, held in Vigo, were attended by Caramelo, Florentino, Unicen,
Pressman and other Galician designers, and Harrod's and Galeries Lafayette were the
invited guests. The movement was part of a series of cultural and artistic events, in
which even rack music hada special part to play. In fact, Vigo, together with Madrid,
hosted one of the most significant movements in the Spanish musical scene in the last
third ofthe 20th century, the so-called "movida".

200
 Xoán Carmona Badía

for the frrst time for a trademark that would henceforth identify not only
the retail outlets but also the majority of the products it manufactured.
With this in mind, it adopted the name of one of its retail outlets, Zara,
and applied it across the board to a range of products that was starting to
grow sharply. The Zara brand was registered accordingly at the Spanish
Patents and Trademarks Office in June 1978. Zara gradually began to
gain ground within the labelling of the group' s manufactured products,
and in the early 1980s the head-offices called upon Noite, Fíos and other
plants to stop using those brands on their labelling and start using Zara
on their products.
Table 4. First applications to the Spanish Patents and Trademarks Office
Samlor 31/1 /1974
Noite 4/2/1 977
Zara 19/6/1978
Nikole 8/1111978
Goasam, S.A. 6/11 /1979
Confecciones Fías, S.A. 27/08/1980
Choolet 28/7/1982
Goa de Goasam 26/3/1985
Zintura 4/7/1985
Source: www.oepm.es.

Goasam, the company incorporated in 1974 as owner of Zara,

defmed a brand management policy based on what authors have referred
to as "altemative routes to advertising" for creating brand value. 34 Such
a policy involved reducing the expenditure on advertising to a minimum,
using it solely to announce the start of the annual sales, not attending
fashion shows and refusing to use top models for the photo shoots for
collections and for posters in stores. Zara thus set itself apart from the
majority of designers in the higher segment, but also from the bulk of its
competitors, such as Mango in Spain. The main features within this
"altemative route" for the creation ofbrand value during this period were
the centrallocation of their premises, studied shop-window displays and
open planning (no counter), which was still a novelty in the Spain ofthe
1970s. The retail outlets were identified by the brand and became the
best identifying feature. A key factor in this matter was the hiring of the
window dresser Joan Bemardó35 in 1974/5, who would be the one
responsible for training the frrst teams charged with this task.

34
J. Cerviño, Marcas internacionales. Como crearlas y gestionarlas, Madrid, Pirámide,
2002.
35
C. Monllor, Zarápolis, Barcelona, Ediciones del Bronce, 2001 , pp. 199-200. Blanco
y Salgado, op. cit., p. 54.

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European Business and Brand Building

Another feature that was introduced at this time and played an

important role in the creation of brand value was the implementation of
a policy on changing and returning items that was much more straight-
forward and customer-focused than in any other clothing outlet in Spain.
The customer could at any time change a Zara ítem or ask for their
money back without having to give a reason and without any fuss. This
conveyed an image of trust, reliability and quality in customer service
that helped to consolidate the brand image and to attract loyalty to it.
Nevertheless, in Zara' s first years price was the main characteristic
underpinning its image. 36 In terms of pricing, Zara contrasted with, for
example, Adolfo Dominguez or with the large department stores that
retailed fashion, as in the case of El Corte Inglés, as well as with
Cortefiel, which was then the sole chain of clothing stores of any
importance in Spain. 37
e 1991-1999: segmenting the market through
the creation of new fashion retail chains
By the end of the 1980s, with its hundred-odd stores Zara had now
become the largest fashion retailer in Spain. However, two problems
appeared on the immediate horizon. On the one hand, its identification
with low-price products, which rnight therefore end up exposed to
competition by products from countries with lower wages; and on the
other, the possibility of market saturation, at a time when every Spanish
city had one or more Zara stores. 38 The company's strategy for
addressing these two issues would involve a three-pronged approach
over the following years. The first of these meant giving greater
importance to design and quality, enlarging and professionalizing the
creative teams and the scouting network for trends and market tastes, as
well as improving quality control systems. 39 The aim of these measures
was to help take a step up into the market's rniddle segment, forgoing
price competition and seeking to add value to the brand. The second of
these approaches was a firm commitrnent to intemationalisation, which

36
As late as 1991 the magazine Eco, when comparing it to other Galician fashion
producers defmed Zara as a producer of "cheap fashion", Eco, No. 47 (1991).
37
Ministerio de Industria y Energía, Centro de Promoción de Diseño y Moda, Moda y
diseño: un desafio empresarial, Santander, 1986. Cortefiel's bias was more towards a
middle-aged maJe public; its prices were higher and it had a more austere and
traditional image.
38
J. Bonache and J. Cerviño, "Caso Zara: el tejido internacional", in J.J. Durán (ed.),
Multinacionales españolas. Algunos casos relevantes, Vol. I, Madrid, Editorial
Pirámide, 1996, pp. 54-55 .
39
José María Castellano indicated in 1993 that "Although the products the group
markets have a good quality-price ratio, the fashion component is the basic feature
that defmes them", Castellano, op. cit., p. 404.

202
 Xoán Carmona Badía

was to kick off in 1989-1990 with the opening of the frrst stores in the
most emblematic areas in Porto, New York and París, and then continue
in geometric progression over subsequent years. This intemational
deployment was not only a growth strategy to offset the possible
saturation of the domestic market but also a lever for dismissing Zara' s
tag as a cheap clothes brand. Zara began to use signs in its Spanish
stores to announce the cities in which it was opening. The reference to
Paris, New York or other renowned fashion cities and the sites chosen
by the Galician chain in their more evocative areas acted as yet another
lever for escaping from that unfortunate tag. Even the possibility of
setting different prices in each country helped to develop this approach.
The third and last of these strategic approaches was to seek the
segmentation of the market by introducing new brands and self-owned
retail outlets for each one of them; in other words, brand-chains, which
would help to redress the two problems mentioned. This would
contribute not only to combating - as would intemationalisation - the
saturation effect that Zara might experience but also to the goal of
moving up a step for the business group as a whole. The new mix of
brand-chains built up from then on would include sorne that were
positioned in the middle segment or which were defmed not so much in
terms of higher/lower price parameters but rather according to
psychographic or generational ones. 40 Zara thereby embarked upon its
transformation into a multi-brand group by both creating new chains and
acquiring already existing ones.
The first step taken to segment the domestic market was the creation
of Pull & Bear in 1991, which would go on to form its own chain, with
its manufacturing facilities located in the Ferrol area, sorne 40
kilometres away from A Coruña. It specialised in clothing designed for
the young male market. That same year, Inditex bought two-thirds ofthe
stock in Massimo Dutti, a Catalan chain of stores providing men' s
fashion for the middle segment. It had been founded in 1985 by
Annando Lasauca and had a plant in Martorell and an attractive chain of
retail outlets in Spain and Portugal. It would be used as a way of
improving the company' s positioning in quality.41 Lasauca resigned a
few months later and Inditex took over its entire capital.

40
R.S. Tedlow, New and Improved. The Story of Mass Marketing in America, Boston,
Harvard University Press, 1990.
41
Coinciding with the purchase of Massimo Dutti, El País newspaper remarked that
"the Galician company' s aim here is to replace the cheap clothes' image with one
that identifies it with greater quality" (El País, 3/08/1991).

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European Business and Brand Building

Table 5. Brand-chains of the Inditex group in 2009

Foundation/ Target
Headquarters Description
Acquisition market
M&W Arteixo-A Fashion for everybody
Zara 1975
0-50 Coruña at affordable price
M&W Narón-A "casual, laid-back clothing
Pull & Bear 1991
14-28 Coruña for _young_people"
M&W Tordera- Slightly more formal fashion with
Massimo Dutti 1991
25-45 Barcelona middle prices and upper quality
M&W Tordera- "meeting points for fashion,
Bershka 1998
13-23 Barcelona music and street art"
" latest trends in design, fabrics
M&W Sallent-
Stradivarius 1999 and accessories for a young
15-27 Barcelona
female public"
Oysho 2001
w Tordera-
Lingerie & underwear
0-50 Barcelona
Arteixo-A
ZaraHome 2003 Families Home fumishing
Coruña
Arteixo-A
Uterque 2008 M&W Accessories
Coruña '

Source: Inditex Annual Reports.

One ofthe problems ofmulti-brand strategies that analysts frequently

single out is higher advertising costs. For Inditex, however, this was not
a problem, as its "altemative routes to advertising" approach enabled it
to adopt this strategy practically without cost. 42 The results, on the other
hand, were excellent, as shown by both the progressive weight the new
chains were acquiring within the group as a whole and its own effective
distancing from the image ofbeing a lower market segment retailer. 43
D. 1999-2007: Zara, a global brand
with a formal reporting policy
By 1998 Inditex was indisputably the largest Spanish group within the
textile-clothing sector and had a major intemational projection, as 259 of
its 748 stores were located abroad. Its flagship brand, Zara, was extremely
popular in Spain, Portugal and France, and was growing in popularity in
countries such as Mexico, Greece, Japan, Belgium and Israel, with more
than ten stores in each of these. Yet Inditex was still a farnily business,
which had so far based its growth on self-fmancing and bank loans, with
75 per cent owned by Amancio Ortega and the rest shared between his

42
J.J. Durán Herrera (ed.), Las marcas renombradas españolas. Un activo estratégico
para la internacionalización de España, Madrid, McGraw Hill, 2002, p. 125.
43
Gene Cabaleiro, a Galician businessman in the sector admitted sorne time later that
"People used to hide their Zara bags, now they show them off. It was time to start
appreciating what we do here" . On this subject, see Monllor, op. cit., p. 189.

204
 Xoán Carmona Badía

closest family and an inner core of senior executives. If this strictly

family-based ownership may have seemed somewhat surprising, even
more so was the company's reporting policy. There was no department
formally responsible for this task and secrecy was the norm regarding
group operations. This was true to such an extent that no one actually
knew what Amancio Ortega, the founder and head oflnditex, looked like.
The complexity of the business group and the need to seek fmancing
for its new expansion plans based on intemational growth and on the
introduction of new brands associated with new retail chains led those in
charge at Inditex to adopt two types of inter-related measures. 44 The frrst
ofthese was to list part ofthe holding's capital on the stock market. The
second involved a radical change in its reporting policy, as required to
successfully address the Initial Public Stock Offering (IPO). In 1999 an
expert was hired to head the new communication department. The person
in question had taken part in the privatisation of companies belonging to
Spain's former state holding company, the Instituto Nacional de
Industria, which for almost fifty years had managed and fmanced state-
owned companies in Spain. An irnprovement was made to the
presentation of the annual reports and to the information they contained,
which now included a photograph of the founder; detailed press releases
were issued on the company's operations, an extremely complete website
was designed and uploaded and, finally, a carefully-prepared leaflet was
produced as backing for the IP0. 45 The outcome ofthis change in policy
was a proliferation from this time on of books, scholarly papers and case
studies in various business schools on the Zara business model, based
almost entirely on the torrent of information provided by the
communication department. Inditex went from secrecy to information
overflow. The new attitude towards this issue within the framework of
the new expansion it had embarked upon would lead to spectacular
success in its externa! reporting. Everyone started talking about Zara,
saying what Zara wanted them to say about it.

44
Nonetheless, and as Fábrega indicated (2004), the fmancial reward for the members
of the family - used to the utmost austerity- was also one of the reasons for the IPO
(pp. 48).
45
The change in communication policy regarding the company' s founder and majority
shareholder was truly spectacular. Amancio Ortega began to appear in photos aboard
his luxurious yacht or at race-courses where the most famous jockeys were riding, all
following a pattem reminiscent of the one mapped out by Pat Hudson for British
19'h century industrial tycoons, who after austere beginnings and once their
businesses had become consolidated deemed it necessary to give an irnage of success
to avoid any idle chat, and they did so through a degree of ostentation in externa!
trappings, such as the fme architecture oftheir mansions, well-stocked wine cellars or
owning a stable of purebreds, etc. See P. Hudson, The Genesis of Industrial Capital,
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1986.

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European Business and Brand Building

The IPO was a resounding success,46 and so too were the processes
of market segmentation and intemationalisation. The introduction of
new retail chains associated with new brands has pursued two lines. A
frrst and main one involves catering for a young public that increasingly
accounts for an ever larger percentage of the demand for clothing
products and accessories. This led to the opening of Bershka in 1998, to
be followed a year later by the acquisition of Stradivarius, a small
Catalan chain, but one with very good ideas. At the same time, the
decision was taken to further the children's fashion line, which up until
then had been part of Zara, by boosting Kiddy's Class/Skhuaban. The
second line involving the creation of new chains focused on women's
lingerie (Oysho) and household furnishing (Zara Home). A recent
inclusion has been the Uterque chain for accessories, and children's
wear has been re-branded under the Zara label. The corresponding table
shows the growth recorded by these chains.
Inditex's growth over this period has focused on expansion abroad,
where the nurnber of stores increased sixfold between 1998 and 2007, as
opposed to fourfold for the group as a whole. Whereas at the beginning
of that period the stores abroad accounted for a third of the total, today
they make up half. It has been this growth in Zara' s intemational
presence, combined with its implicit traditional communication and its
new formal reporting policy that have turned Zara into a global brand.
From the perspective ofthe group's image, the greatest achievement,
however, has probably been its ability to convey the idea that nobody is
as quick at anything as Zara. Arranging two deliveries of clothes per
week, orchestrating stock outages to drive a greater rate of visits to
stores and creating an attractive atmosphere within them have managed
to create this image of immediacy and speed that is the very essence of
fashion. Back in 1993 Castellanos affirmed that the important thing was
not pricing but timing; Zara' s customers share this belief. Thus the cycle
of moving up a step to a higher segment has been fulfilled and it has
been achieved by changing the rules of the game. Gone is the concept of
cheap fashion, in which the advantages of popularisation were offset by
a certain disdain from above, and it has now been replaced by the notion
of Fast Fashion, which has no downside. To a certain extent, it is a
similar phenomenon to the one Pepsi-Cola developed in the 1950s.
Admittedly, it is shared with the other major retailers, but Zara has
managed it better. Along these lines, brand and image have hitherto been
paid little attention when analysing Zara' s success.

46
L. Fernández Fernández and S. Fernández López, "Deseño e impacto dunha OPV no
mercado de valores español: os casos de Inditex e Iberia", Revista Galega de
Economía, Vol. 10, No. 2, 2001.

206
 Xoán Carmona Badía

Conclusion
The bulk of the literature on the Zara phenomenon seeks to explain the
reasons for its success in terms of the competitive advantages acquired
over the past twenty years. A large part of it does so by referring mainly to
the final link in the value chain, the stores, or to a series of features of the
communication between the different stages involved in it (flexibility,
speed ofresponse, etc.). All this no doubt explains the Spanish company's
rapid growth and spectacular intemational performance in recent years,
albeit not the mechanisms through which a small company located in a
region far removed from Spain' s textile manufacturing and fashion
centres managed in a very short time to become the country' s sector
leader, as it was by the end of the 1980s. When it comes to interpreting
this frrst chapter in Zara's history, one needs to resort to different
explanations. Here we have stressed, for example, that in its beginnings
Zara was above all a manufacturer, and its initial success was as such, and
not as a retailer. A decisive role in this early success was the ability the
farnily group and its partners showed in building up an extremely
complex network of production units (its own and affiliate companies,
independent workshops, cooperatives, etc.), which was not only a key part
ofthe company's success during the 1970s and 1980s but also involved an
organisational leaming process upon which sorne of the subsequent
advantages would be based.
By linking the brand's evolution to the company' s from the start, we
have seen how today's image of a global brand in which price is just
another one of its defming features, and not the main one, is in fact a
recent development, linked to intemationalisation and the company's
actual growth, and how, in tum, this transformation has been of
considerable irnportance for driving the latter.

CONFECCIONES

Confecciones Goa letterhead. 1976

207
European Business and Brand Building

Former convent of the order of the Oblates, who hosted the first
clothing cooperative who worked for Zara in the area of A Coruña

Inditex headquarters 2011

208