• Who exercises the power?

15. Short Title: Balacuit vs. CFI (G.R. No. L-38429, June 30, 1988)
Full Title: CARLOS BALACUIT, LAMBERTO TAN and SERGIO YU CARCEL, Petitioners-
Appellants, v. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF AGUSAN DEL NORTE AND BUTUAN CITY, Branch 11, and
the CITY OF BUTUAN, Respondents-Appellees.

Facts: The case primarily discussed an issue challenging the validity and constitutionality of a legislative
action by a municipal board:
The Municipal Board of Butuan City passed Ordinance 640 on April 21, 1969 penalizing persons,
group of persons, or business selling admission tickets to any movie or public exhibitions or
performances, from requiring children (age 7 - 12 yo) to full payment.
Petitioners, theater owners, assailed the constitutionality of Ordinance No. 640 passed by the
Municipal Board of the City of Butuan on April 21, 1969. This called for a reduction to ½ of the ticket
price given to minors from 7-12 years old. There was a fine from 200-600 pesos or a 2-6 month
imprisonment
The complaint was issued in the trial court. A TRO was then issued to prevent the law from being
enforced.
The respondent court entered its decision declaring the law valid.
Petitioners attack the validity and constitutionality of Ordinance No. 640 on the grounds that it is
ultra vires and an invalid exercise of police power. Petitioners contend that Ordinance No. 640 is not
within the power of’ the Municipal Board to enact as provided for in Section 15(n) of Republic Act No. 523
where it states that the Muncipal board can only fix license fees for theaters and not admission rates.
The respondent attempts to justify the enactment of the ordinance by invoking the general
welfare clause embodied in Section 15 (nn) of the cited law.

Issue: Is the act of the Municipal Board a valid exercise of police power?

Ruling: NO. To invoke the exercise of police power, not only must it appear that the interest
of the public generally requires an interference with private rights, but the means adopted
must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals.
The ordinance was created to help parents who complain that paying full price for
their children is too financially burdensome. This is not a public necessity. A police power
legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest and welfare. There is nothing
pernicious (harmful) in demanding equal price for both children and adults. A lawful business
or calling may not, under the guise of regulation, be unreasonably interfered with even by the exercise of
police power.
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the petitioners thereby declaring the said Ordinance
unconstitutional, hence null and void.
The ordinance is not justified by any necessity for the public interest:
 The police power legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest and welfare,and a
reasonable relation must exist between purposes and means.
 The evident purpose of the ordinance is to help ease the burden of cost on the partof parents,
however, the petitioners are the ones made to bear the cost of these savings.
 The Ordinance is not practicable because children above 10 may try to pass off their
age as below 10. By the inclusion of a provision to require patrons exhibit certificate
of live birth upon entrance the ordinance becomes clearly unreasonable and
oppressive.
 Moreover, there is no discernible relation between the ordinance and the promotion of
public health, safety, morals and the general welfare.
 There is nothing immoral or injurious in charging the same price for both children and
adults. In fact, no person is under compulsion to purchase a ticket. It is a totally voluntary act
on the part of the purchaser if he buys a ticket to such performances.
 The ticket which represents that right is also, necessarily, a species of property. As
such, the owner thereof, in the absence of any condition to the contrary in the contract by which
he obtained it, has the clear right to dispose of it, to sell it to whom he pleases and at such price
as he can obtain. 24 So that an act prohibiting the sale of tickets to theaters or other places of
amusement at more than the regular price was held invalid as conflictingwith the state
constitution securing the right of property.
 A police measure for the regulation of the conduct, control and operation of a
business should not encroach upon the legitimate and lawful exercise by the citizens
of their property rights.
 The right of the owner to fix a price at which his property shall be sold or used is an inherent
attribute of the property itself and, as such, within the protection of the due process clause.""
Hence, the proprietors of a theater have a right to manage their property in their own
way, to fix what prices of admission they think most for their own advantage, and
that any person who did not approve could stay away.
 Ordinance No. 640 clearly invades the personal and property rights of petitioners for
even if We could assume that, on its face, the interference was reasonable, from the foregoing
considerations, it has been fully shown that it is an unwarranted and unlawful curtailment of the
 property and personal rights of citizens. For being unreasonable and an undue restraint of trade,
it cannot, under the guise of exercising police power, be upheld as valid.

Principles of Police Power affirmed by the Supreme Court:

 To invoke the exercise of police powe, not only must it appear that the interest of the public
generally requires an interference with private rights, but the means adopted must be reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
 The legislature may not, under the guise of protecting the public interest, arbitrarily interfere with
private business, or impose unusual and unnecessary restrictions upon lawful occupations
 IN OTHER WORDS, THE DETERMINATION AS TO WHAT IS A PROPER EXERCISE OF ITS POLICE
POWER IS NOT FINAL OR CONCLUSIVE, BUT IS SUBJECT TO THE SUPERVISION OF THE
COURTS
 In the exercise of police power is necessarily subject to a qualification, limitation or restriction
demanded by the regard, the respect and the obedience due to the prescriptions of the
fundamental law, particularly those forming part of the Constitution of Liberty, otherwiseknown
as the Bill of Rights (Homeowners' Association of the Philippines, Inc. v. Municipal Board of the
City of Manila)
 There must be public necessity which demands the adoption of proper measuresto secure the
ends sought to be attained by the enactment of the ordinance, and the large discretion is
necessarily vested in the legislative authority to determine not only what the interests of the
public require, but what measures are necessary for the protection of such interests.

16. Short Title: Lozano vs. Martinez [146 SCRA 323 (1986)]G.R. No. L-63419 December 18, 1986
Full Title: FLORENTINA A. LOZANO, Petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE ANTONIO M. MARTINEZ, in his
capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch XX, Manila, and
the HONORABLE JOSE B. FLAMINIANO, in his capacity as City Fiscal of Manila, Respondents.

Facts: The constitutionality of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22 for short), popularly known as the
Bouncing Check Law, which was approved on April 3, 1979, is the sole issue presented by these petitions
for decision.
It is aimed at putting a stop to the practice of issuing checks that are worthless which causes
injury to the public interest. Contentions on the law are that:
1) it offends constitutional provision forbidding imprisonment for debt;
2) it impairs freedom of contract; 
 3) it contravenes the equal protection clause;
4) it unduly delegates legislative and executive powers; and
5) its enactment is flawed because the Interim Batasan violated the prohibition on amendments
in the Third Reading
Among the constitutional objections raised against BP 22, the most serious is the alleged conflict
between the statute and the constitutional provision forbidding imprisonment for debt. It is contended
that the statute runs counter to the inhibition in the Bill of Rights which states, "No person shall be
imprisoned for debt or non-payment of a poll tax."
Petitioners insist that, since the offense under BP 22 is consummated only upon the dishonor or
non-payment of the check when it is presented to the drawee bank, the statute is really a "bad debt law"
rather than a "bad check law." What it punishes is the non-payment of the check, not the act of issuing
it. The statute, it is claimed, is nothing more than a veiled device to coerce payment of a debt under the
threat of penal sanction.

Issue: Whether enactment of BP 22 repugnant of the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment

for debt and therefore is an invalid exercise of police power.

Ruling: NO. The enactment of the assailed statute is a valid exercise of Police power and is
not repugnant to the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt. It may be
constitutionally impermissible for the legislature to penalize a person for non-payment of
debt ex contractu, but certainly it is within the prerogative of the lawmaking body to
prescribe certain acts deemed pernicious and inimical to public welfare.
Acts mala in se are not only acts which the law can punish. An act may not be considered by
society as inherently wrong, hence, not malum in se, but because of the harm that it inflicts on the
community, it can be outlawed and criminally punished as malum prohibitum. The state can do this in the
exercise of its police power. 
The enactment of the said statute is a declaration by the legislature that, as a matter
of public policy, the making and issuance of a worthless check is deemed a public nuisance
to be abated by the imposition of penal sanctions.
The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a
worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the non-
payment of an obligation which the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to
coerce a debtor to pay his debt.
The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of
worthless checks and putting them in circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the
public interest, the practice is proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an offense
against property, but an offense against public order.
The SC finds that the enactment of BP 22 is a valid exercise of police power and is not
repugnant to the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt.

17) Short Title: Del Rosario vs. Bengzon

Full Title: G.R. No. 88265 (December 21, 1989)
SANTIAGO A. DEL ROSARIO, GEORGE G. GACULA, EDGARDO G. SANTOS, ALBANO S. SIBAL,
ALBERTO C. REYES, NONITO P. ARROYO, EMMANUEL F. TERENCIO, DOMINGO S. DE LEON,
MODESTO O. LLAMAS, FARIDA U. ALONTO, ZENAIDA A. FLOIRENDO, ISABEL A. MEJIA, LUZ P.
MABANAG, RAMON H. RABAGO, JR., SAMUEL D. TROCIO and OSCAR M. BRION, petitioners, vs.
HON. ALFREDO R. BENGZON, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of
Health, respondent.

FACTS: This is a class suit filed by officers of the Philippine Medical Association asking the Court to
declare as unconstitutional some provisions of the Generics Act of 1988 (Rep. Act No. 6675), and of the
implementing Administrative Order No. 62 issued pursuant thereto, specifically:
(a) Section 6, Pars. (a) and (b) of the Generics Act which provide:
a) All government health agencies and their personnel as well as other
government agencies shall use generic terminology or generic names in all
transactions related to purchasing, prescribing, dispensing and administering
of drugs and medicines.
b) All medical, dental and veterinary practitioners, including private
practitioners, shall write prescriptions using the generic name. The brand
name may be included if so desired.
(b) Section 12, Pars. (b), (c) and (d) of the same law which provide:
b) For the second conviction, the penalty of file in the amount of not less than two
thousand pesos (P2,000.00) but not exceeding five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) at the
discretion of the court.
c) For the third conviction, the penalty of fine in the amount of not less than five
thousand pesos (P5,000.00) but not exceeding ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) and
suspension of his license to practice his profession for thirty (30) days at the discretion of
the court.
 d) For the fourth and subsequent convictions, the penalty of fine of not less than ten
thousand pesos (P10,000.00) and suspension of his license to practice his profession for
one year or longer at the discretion of the court.
(c) Sections 4 and 7, Phase 3 of Administrative Order No. 62, Series of 1989 dated March 9,
1989, of the respondent Secretary of Health, which read as follows:
Section 4. Violative Erroneous, and Impossible Prescriptions.
4.1. Violative Prescriptions:
4.1.1 Where the generic name is not written;
4.1.2 Where the generic name is not legible and a brand name which is legible is
written;
4.1.3 Where the brand name is indicated and instructions added, such as the phase
'No Substitution' which tend to obstruct, hinder or prevent proper generic dispensing.
4.2 What to do with Violative Prescriptions.
Violative prescriptions shall not be filled. They shall be kept and reported by the pharmacist of
the drug outlet or any other interested party to the nearest DOH Officer for appropriate action.
The pharmacist shall advise the prescriber of the problem and/or instruct the customer to get the
proper prescription.
4.3 Erroneous Prescriptions:
4.3.1 When the brand name precedes the generic name.
4.3.2 Where the generic name is the one in parenthesis.
4.3.3 Where the brand name in (sic) not in parenthesis.
4.3.4 Where more than one drug product is prescribed in one prescription form.
4.4 What to do with erroneous prescriptions.
Erroneous prescriptions shall be filled. Such prescriptions shall also be kept and reported by the
pharmacist of the drug outlet or any other interested party to the nearest DOH Office for
appropriate action.
xxx xxx xxx
On March 15, 1989, the full text of Republic Act No. 6675 was published in two newspapers of
general circulation in the Philippines. The law took effect on March 30, 1989.
The petitioner's main argument against paragraphs (a) and (b), Section 6 of the law, is the
alleged unequal treatment of government physicians, dentists, and veterinarians, on one hand, and those
in private practice on the other hand, in the manner of prescribing generic drugs, for, while the
government physicians are allegedly required to use only generic terminology in their prescriptions, and
the those in private practice may write the brand name of the drug in parenthesis below the generic
name. The favored treatment of private doctors, dentists and veterinarians under the law is allegedly a
specie of invalid class legislation.
 Petitioners concede that the requirement for doctors, dentists, and veterinarians to use the
generic terminology in writing their prescriptions, followed by the brand name in parenthesis, is "well and
good". However, under paragraph (d) of the law which reads:
(d) Drug outlets, including drugstores, hospital and non-hospital pharmacies and non-traditional
outlets such as supermarkets and stores, shall inform any buyer about any and all other drug products
having the same generic name, together with their corresponding prices so that the buyer may
adequately exercise his option. Within one (1) year after approval of this Act, the drug outlets referred to
herein, shall post in conspicuous places in their establishments, a list of drug products with the same
generic name and their corresponding prices”
They complain that as per the provision, the salesgirl at the drugstore counter is authorized to
"substitute the prescribed medicine with another medicine belonging to the same generic group." Since
doctors are not allowed to instruct the druggist not to substitute the prescription, or to "Dispense only as
Prescribed", the petitioners argue that "the act of prescribing the correct medicine for the patient
becomes the act of the salesgirl at the drugstore counter, no longer the act of the physician, dentist, or
veterinarian".
Meanwhile, the public respondent points out that the institution of generics in the Philippines will
compel physicians to prescribe drugs based on their therapeutic or "active ingredient," instead of their
well-known brand names. Multiple medications which may produce potentially adverse, even lethal,
chemical reactions in the patient will thereby be avoided. Patients with limited means will be able to buy
generic drugs that cost less but possess the same active ingredients, dosage form, and strength as brand
names, many of which are priced beyond the reach of the common tao because the high costs of
advertising, packaging, royalties, and other inputs of production determine their pricing for the market.

ISSUE:
1. Whether Republic Act 6675 (Generics Act of 1988) is constitutional.
2. Whether the Act impairs the obligation of contract between the physician and patient.

RULING:
1. YES. The Court has been unable to find any constitutional infirmity in the Generics Act. It, on the
contrary, implements the constitutional mandate for the State "to protect and promote the right
to health of the people" and "to make essential goods, health and other social services available
to all the people at affordable cost" (Section 15, Art. II and Section 11, Art. XIII, 1987
Constitution).

There is no merit in the petitioner’s argument on the unequal treatment of government

physicians, dentists, and veterinarian and those in private practice for it proceeds from a
misreading and misinterpretation of the letter and intent of paragraphs (a) and (b), Section 6 of
the Generics Act. Indeed, as explained by the public respondent:
... while paragraph (a) enumerates the government transactions ('Purchasing,
prescribing, dispensing and administering of drugs and medicines') where the sole use of
generic terminology has been required, the 'prescription' of drugs is further governed by
paragraph (b). And the use of the word 'all' in the latter provision emphasizes the
absence of any distinction between government and private physicians . In other words,
in prescribing drugs, physicians, whether in government service or in private practice, are
both governed by exactly the same rules, and thus, are both authorized to include the
brand name in their respective prescriptions. Furthermore, it may be observed that while
paragraph (a) refers to "all government health agencies, and their personnel as well as
other government agencies" (not necessarily physicians, dentists and veterinarians),
paragraph (b) refers to "all medical, dental and veterinary practitioners, including private
practitioners."

The petitioners have distorted the clear provisions of the law and the implementing
administrative order. For it is plain to see that neither paragraph (d) of Section 6 of the Generics
Act, nor Section 4 of Administrative Order No. 62, gives the salesgirl and/or druggist the
discretion to substitute the doctor's prescription. On the contrary, Section 4, par. 4.1, of
Administrative Order No. 62 directs the pharmacist not to fill "violative prescriptions" (where the
generic name is not written, or illegibly written, and the prescription of a brand name is
accompanied by the doctor's instruction not to substitute it), as well as "impossible
prescriptions" (par. 4.5). Even a doctor's "erroneous" prescriptions "shall be filled," not
substituted (par. 4.3, Adm. Order No. 62).
And, Sections 3 and 5 of Adm. Order No. 63 enjoin the drug outlets not (to) favor or
suggest" or "impose" a particular brand or product on the customer. The salesgirl at the
drugstore counter, merely informs the customer, but does not determine (for she is incompetent
to do so) all the other drug products or brands that have the same generic name, and their
corresponding prices.
That information she may obtain from the list of drug products determined by the Bureau
of Food and Drugs to have the same generic name, or which are the chemical, biological, and
therapeutic equivalent of the generic drug. All drugstores or drug outlets are required by the law
to post such list in a conspicuous place in their premises for the information of the customers, for
the choice of whether to buy the expensive brand name drug, or the less expensive generic,
should be exercised by the customer alone.
 The prohibition against the use by doctors of "no substitution" and/or words
of similar import in their prescription, is a valid regulation to prevent the
circumvention of the law. It secures to the patient the right to choose between the
brand name and its generic equivalent since his doctor is allowed to write both the
generic and the brand name in his prescription form. If a doctor is allowed to prescribe a
brand-name drug with "no substitution," the patient's option to buy a lower-priced, but equally
effective, generic equivalent would thereby be curtailed. The law aims to benefit the
impoverished (and often sickly) majority of the population in a still developing
country like ours, not the affluent and generally healthy minority.

2. NO. There is no merit in the petitioners' theory that the Generics Act impairs the obligation of
contract between a physician and his patient, for no contract ever results from a consultation
between patient and physician.
A doctor may take in or refuse a patient, just as the patient may take or refuse the
doctor's advice or prescription. As aptly observed by the public respondent, no doctor has ever
filed an action for breach of contract against a patient who refused to take prescribed
medication, undergo surgery, or follow a recommended course treatment by his doctor.
In any event, no private contract between doctor and patient may be allowed to
override the power of the State to enact laws that are reasonably necessary to secure
the health, safety, good order, comfort, or general welfare of the community. This
power can neither be abdicated nor bargained away. All contractual and property rights
are held subject to its fair exercise.
We hold that the Generics Act and the implementing administrative orders of the Secretary of
Health are constitutional. In light of its beneficial provisions, we cannot heed the petitioners' plea to kill it
aborning, i.e., before it has had a chance to prove its value to our people as envisioned by its makers.
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit.

18) Short Title: Tablarin vs. Judge Gutierrez [152 SCRA 730 (1987)]
Full Title: G.R. No. 78164 (July 31, 1987)
TERESITA TABLARIN, MA, LUZ CIRIACO, MA NIMFA B. ROVIRA, EVANGELINA S. LABAO, in
their behalf and in behalf of applicants for admission into the Medical Colleges during the
school year 1987-88 and future years who have not taken or successfully hurdled tile
National Medical Admission Test (NMAT). petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE JUDGE ANGELINA S. GUTIERREZ, Presiding Judge of Branch XXXVII of the
Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region with seat at Manila, THE
HONORABLE SECRETARY LOURDES QUISUMBING, in her capacity as Chairman of the BOARD
OF MEDICAL EDUCATION, and THE CENTER FOR EDUCATIONAL MEASUREMENT
(CEM), respondents.

Facts: The petitioners sought admission into colleges or schools of medicine for the school year 1987-
1988. However, the petitioners either did not take or did not successfully take the National Medical
Admission Test (NMAT) required by the Board of Medical Education, one of the public respondents, and
administered by the private respondent, the Center for Educational Measurement (CEM).
On March 5, 1987, the petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial
Region, a Petition for Declaratory Judgment and Prohibition with a prayer for Temporary Restraining
Order and Preliminary Injunction.
The petitioners sought to enjoin the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports, the Board of
Medical Education and the Center for Educational Measurement from enforcing Section 5 (a) and (f) of
Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and MECS Order No. 52, series of 1985, dated August
23, 1985 and from requiring the taking and passing of the NMAT as a condition for securing
certificates of eligibility for admission, from proceeding with accepting applications for
taking the NMAT and from administering the NMAT as scheduled on April 26, 1987 and in the
future. After hearing on the petition for issuance of preliminary injunction, the trial court denied said
petition. Thereafter, NMAT was conducted and administered as previously scheduled.
Petitioners accordingly filed this Special Civil Action for certiorari with this Court to set aside the
Order of the respondent judge denying the petition for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.
Republic Act 2382, as amended by Republic Acts Nos. 4224 and 5946, known as the "Medical Act of
1959" defines its basic objectives in the following manner:
Section 1. Objectives. — This Act provides for and shall govern (a) the standardization and
regulation of medical education  (b) the examination for registration of physicians; and (c) the
supervision, control and regulation of the practice of medicine in the Philippines. (Underscoring
supplied)
The statute, among other things, created a Board of Medical Education. The functions of the Board of
Medical Education specified in Section 5 of the statute include the following:
(a) To determine and prescribe requirements for admission into a recognized college of
medicine;
xxxx
 (f) To accept applications for certification for admission to a medical school and keep a register
of those issued said certificate; and to collect from said applicants the amount of twenty-five
pesos each which shall accrue to the operating fund of the Board of Medical Education;
xxxxx
(h) To promulgate and prescribe and enforce the necessary rules and regulations for the proper
implementation of the foregoing functions.
Section 7 prescribes certain minimum requirements for applicants to medical schools:
Admission requirements. — The medical college may admit any student  who has not been
convicted by any court of competent jurisdiction of any offense involving moral turpitude
and who presents (a) a record of completion of a bachelor's degree in science or arts; (b)  a
certificate of eligibility for entrance to a medical school from the Board of Medical Education;  (c)
a certificate of good moral character issued by two former professors in the college of liberal
arts; and (d) birth certificate. Nothing in this act shall be construed to inhibit any college of
medicine from establishing, in addition to the preceding, other entrance requirements that may
be deemed admissible.
MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, issued by the then Minister of Education, Culture and Sports and
dated 23 August 1985, established a uniform admission test called the National Medical Admission Test
(NMAT) as an additional requirement for issuance of a certificate of eligibility for admission into medical
schools of the Philippines, beginning with the school year 1986-1987.   No applicant shall be issued the
requisite Certificate of Eligibility for Admission (CEA), or admitted for enrollment as first year student in
any medical college, beginning the school year, 1986-87, without the required NMAT qualification as
called for under this Order. 
Pursuant to MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, the private respondent Center conducted NMATs for
entrance to medical colleges during the school year 1986-1987. In December 1986 and in April 1987,
respondent Center conducted the NMATs for admission to medical colleges during the school year
1987.1988.
The petitioners invoke a number of provisions of the 1987 Constitution which are, in their
assertion, violated by the continued implementation of Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act 2381, as
amended, and MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985. The petitioners also urge that the NMAT prescribed in MECS
Order No. 52, s. 1985, is an "unfair, unreasonable and inequitable requirement," which results in a denial
of due process.
 
ISSUE: Whether Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and MECS Order No. 52, s.
1985 are constitutional.
RULING: YES. The Supreme Court concludes that prescribing the NMAT and requiring certain minimum
scores therein as a condition for admission to medical schools in the Philippines, do not constitute an
unconstitutional imposition.
The police power, it is commonplace learning, is the pervasive and non-waivable power and
authority of the sovereign to secure and promote all the important interests and needs — in a word, the
public order — of the general community. An important component of that public order is the health and
physical safety and well being of the population, the securing of which no one can deny is a legitimate
objective of governmental effort and regulation.
Perhaps the only issue that needs some consideration is whether there is some reasonable
relation between the prescribing of passing the NMAT as a condition for admission to medical school on
the one hand, and the securing of the health and safety of the general community, on the other hand.
This question is perhaps most usefully approached by recalling that the regulation of the practice of
medicine in all its branches has long been recognized as a reasonable method of protecting the health
and safety of the public.
MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985 articulates the rationale of regulation of this type: the improvement
of the professional and technical quality of the graduates of medical schools, by upgrading the quality of
those admitted to the student body of the medical schools. That upgrading is sought by selectivity in the
process of admission, selectivity consisting, among other things, of limiting admission to those who
exhibit in the required degree the aptitude for medical studies and eventually for medical practice.
The need to maintain, and the difficulties of maintaining, high standards in our professional
schools in general, and medical schools in particular, in the current stage of our social and economic
development, are widely known. We believe that the government is entitled to prescribe an
admission test like the NMAT as a means for achieving its stated objective of "upgrading the
selection of applicants into [our] medical schools" and of "improving the quality of medical
education in the country. We are entitled to hold that the NMAT is reasonably related to the
securing of the ultimate end of legislation and regulation in this area. That end, it is useful to
recall, is the protection of the public from the potentially deadly effects of incompetence and
ignorance in those who would undertake to treat our bodies and minds for disease or
trauma.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED and the Order of the respondent trial court
denying the petition for a writ of preliminary injunction is AFFIRMED.