COMELEC vs.

CRUZ
G.R. 186616, November 20, 2009

MISOLES, KENN RHYAN D.

FACTS:
Before the October 29, 2007 Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan (SK)
Elections, some of the then incumbent officials of several barangays of Caloocan City filed
with the RTC a petition for declaratory relief to challenge the constitutionality of Section 2
of Republic Act (RA) No. 9164 (entitled "An Act Providing for Synchronized Barangay and
Sangguniang Kabataan Elections, amending RA No. 7160, as amended, otherwise known
as the Local Government Code of 1991"). The respondents contented that the challenged
proviso retroactively applied the three-term limit when it set the 1994 barangay elections
as a reckoning point in the application of the three-term limit.
The respondents argued that the term limit, although present in the previous laws, was
not in RA No. 7160 when it amended all previous barangay election laws. Hence, it was
re-introduced for the first time by RA No. 9164 (signed into law on March 19, 2002) and
was applied retroactively when it made the term limitation effective from the 1994
barangay elections.
The RTC fully agreed with the respondents’ position and declared the challenged proviso
constitutionally infirm.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondents’ retroactivity objection does involve a violation of any
constitutional standard.

RULING:
No. The closest the issue of retroactivity of laws can get to a genuine constitutional issue
is if a law’s retroactive application will impair vested rights. Otherwise stated, if a right has
already vested in an individual and a subsequent law effectively takes it away, a genuine
due process issue may arise. What should be involved, however, is a vested right to life,
liberty or property, as these are the ones that may be considered protected by the due
process clause of the Constitution. In the present case, the respondents never raised due
process as an issue. But even assuming that they did, the respondents themselves
concede that there is no vested right to public office. As the COMELEC correctly pointed
out, too, there is no vested right to an elective post in view of the uncertainty inherent in
electoral exercises.
Moreover, a public office is not a property right. As the Constitution expressly states, a
"Public office is a public trust." No one has a vested right to any public office, much less a
vested right to an expectancy of holding a public office. In Cornejo v. Gabriel, decided in
1920, the Court already ruled: Again, for this petition to come under the due process of
law prohibition, it would be necessary to consider an office a "property." It is, however,
well settled that a public office is not property within the sense of the constitutional
guaranties of due process of law, but is a public trust or agency. The basic idea of the
government is that of a popular representative government, the officers being mere agents
and not rulers of the people, one where no one man or set of men has a proprietary or
contractual right to an office, but where every officer accepts office pursuant to the
provisions of the law and holds the office as a trust for the people he represents.
Thus, the challenged proviso did not provide for the retroactive application to barangay
officials of the three-term limit; Section 43(b) of RA No. 9164 simply continued what had
been there before; and the constitutional challenge based on retroactivity was not
anchored on a constitutional standard but on a mere statutory norm.

Page 1 of 21
 PIMENTEL V COMELEC
GR. No. 178413

NABOR, ARCHIE V.

FACTS:
This is a case for Certiorari and Mandamus filed by the petitioner Aquilino Pimentel
III with regards to the proceedings of the Special Provincial Board of Canvassers for
Maguindanao in re-canvassing the votes therein to settle the 12th senatorial seat of the 14
May 2007 elections, now a contest between him and private respondent, Juan Miguel F.
Zubiri. Among his claims in the case at bar is his question of the manner the re-canvassing
was being done where parties are not allowed to ask questions. He claims that it deprives
him of his right to due process and equal protection.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the procedure followed by the Special Provincial Board of
Canvassers for Maguindanao was without legal basis and violate of petitioner’s
constitutional right to due process and equal protection.

RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled that the procedure followed by the SPBOC-
Maguindanao was in order. The matter is a pre proclamation controversy defined by BP
881 or the Omnibus Election Code as “ any question pertaining to or affecting the
proceeding of the board of canvasser which may be raised by any candidate with the
Commission. “ Further, according to Section 16 of Republic Act No. 7166, pre-
proclamation cases to resolve pre-proclamation controversies are allowed in Local and
National Election for Electoral Reforms.

Page 2 of 21
 BALACUIT vs. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF AGUSAN DEL NORTE AND
BUTUAN CITY
G.R. No. L-38429 June 30, 1988
NAMUAG, CHRISTINE FAITH C

FACTS:
On April 21, 1969, the Municipal Board of the City of Butuan passed Ordinance
No. 640, penalizing any person, group of persons, entity, or corporation engaged in the
business of selling admission tickets to any movie or other public exhibitions, games,
contests, or other performances to require children between seven (7) and twelve (12)
years of age to pay full payment for admission tickets intended for adults but should charge
only one-half of the value of the said tickets. Petitioners are managers of theaters of the
said city, aggrieved by the effect of the said ordinance, filed a complaint before the Court
of First Instance of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City assailing the constitutionality of
Ordinance No. 640.
Petitioners maintain that Ordinance No. 640 violates the due process clause of the
Constitution for being oppressive, unfair, unjust, confiscatory, and an undue restraint of
trade, and violative of the right of persons to enter into contracts, considering that the
theater owners are bound under a contract with the film owners for just admission prices
for general admission, balcony and lodge. The respondent invoked the general welfare
clause embodied in Section 15 (n) of Republic Act No. 523 that the power to regulate and
fix the amount of license fees for theaters, theatrical performances, cinematographs,
public exhibitions and other places of amusement has been expressly granted to the City
of Butuan under its charter.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Ordinance No. 640 violates the due process clause of the Constitution.
RULING:

Yes, because it infringes theater owners’ right to property. There is nothing

pernicious in demanding equal price for both children and adults. The petitioners are
merely conducting their legitimate businesses. The object of every business entrepreneur
is to make a profit out of his venture. There is nothing immoral or injurious in charging the
same price for both children and adults. In fact, no person is under compulsion to purchase
a ticket. It is a totally voluntary act on the part of the purchaser if he buys a ticket to such
performances. Such ticket, therefore, represents a right, Positive or conditional, as the
case may be, according to the terms of the original contract of sale. This right is clearly a
right of property. The ticket which represents that right is also, necessarily, a species of
property. As such, the owner thereof, in the absence of any condition to the contrary in the
contract by which he obtained it, has the clear right to dispose of it, to sell it to whom he
pleases and at such price as he can obtain. So that an act prohibiting the sale of tickets
to theaters or other places of amusement at more than the regular price was held invalid
as conflicting with the state constitution securing the right of property.

While it is true that a business may be regulated, it is equally true that such
regulation must be within the bounds of reason, that is, the regulatory ordinance must be
reasonable, and its provisions cannot be oppressive amounting to an arbitrary interference
with the business or calling subject of regulation. A lawful business or calling may not,
under the guise of regulation, be unreasonably interfered with even by the exercise of
police power. A police measure for the regulation of the conduct, control and operation of
a business should not encroach upon the legitimate and lawful exercise by the citizens of
their property rights. The right of the owner to fix a price at which his property shall be sold
or used is an inherent attribute of the property itself and, as such, within the protection of
the due process clause. Hence, the proprietors of a theater have a right to manage their
property in their own way, to fix what prices of admission they think most for their own
advantage, and that any person who did not approve could stay away.

Page 3 of 21
 SANTIAGO A. DEL ROSARIO, Et al. vs. HON. ALFREDO R. BENGZON, in his
capacity as Secretary of the Department of Health
G.R. No. 88265 December 21, 1989

QUIDET, AXIL G.

FACTS: This is a class suit filed by officers of the Philippine Medical Association, the
national organization of medical doctors in the Philippines, on behalf of their professional
brethren who are of kindred persuasion, wherein this Court is asked to declare as
unconstitutional, hence, null and void, some provisions of the Generics Act of 1988 (Rep.
Act No. 6675), and of the implementing Administrative Order No. 62. The law specifically
provides that all government health agencies shall use generic terminology or generic
names in all transactions related to purchasing, prescribing, dispensing, and administering
of drugs and medicines. It also includes medical, dental, and veterinary, private
practitioners shall write prescriptions using the generic name. The petitioner’s main
argument is the alleged unequal treatment of government practitioners and those on the
private practice. It’s because the former are required to use only generic terminology in
the prescription while the latter may write the brand name of the drug below the generic
name.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Generics Act is constitutional as to the exercise of police
power, imposing limitations such as due process?

RULING: Yes, The Court has been unable to find any constitutional infirmity in the
Generics Act. It, on the contrary, implements the constitutional mandate for the State "to
protect and promote the right to health of the people" and "to make essential goods, health
and other social services available to all the people at affordable cost" (Section 15, Art. II
and Section 11, Art. XIII, 1987 Constitution). There is no merit in the petitioners' theory
that the Generics Act impairs the obligation of contract between a physician and his
patient, for no contract ever results from a consultation between patient and physician. A
doctor may take in or refuse a patient, just as the patient may take or refuse the doctor's
advice or prescription. As aptly observed by the public respondent, no doctor has ever
filed an action for breach of contract against a patient who refused to take prescribed
medication, undergo surgery, or follow a recommended course treatment by his doctor (
p. 53, Rollo). In any event, no private contract between doctor and patient may be allowed
to override the power of the State to enact laws that are reasonably necessary to secure
the health, safety, good order, comfort, or general welfare of the community. This power
can neither be abdicated nor bargained away. All contractual and property rights are held
subject to its fair exercise (Anglo-Fil Trading Corporation vs. Lazaro, 124 SCRA 495.)

Page 4 of 21
 GSIS vs. MILAGROS O. MONTESCLAROS,
G.R. No. 146494 July 14, 2004

RAYOS, ZOSIMO II D.
FACTS:
Nicolas Montesclaros (“Nicolas”) married Milagros Orbiso (“Milagros”) on 10 July 1983.
Nicolas was a 72-year old widower when he married Milagros who was then 43 years old.
After several years her husband died and Milagros as wife claimed the benefits but
unfortunately the GSIS denied her claimes. Then Milagros assail unconstitutionality of
section 18 PD 1146 being violative of due process and equal protection clause and she
filed in GSIS for claim for survivorship pension. GSIS denied claim, it said surviving spouse
has no right of survivorship pension if the surviving spouse contracted the marriage with
the pensioner within three years before the pensioner qualified for the pension.
ISSUE:

 W/N is there a denial of due process when Milagros claimed the benefits of her
husband.
 W/N the proviso in Section 18 of PD 1146 is constitutional

RULING:

 Yes, there is a denial of due process of Milagros Montesclaos when it outrightly

denies the claim for survivorship. There is outright confiscation of benefits due the
surviving spouse without giving her an opportunity to be heard. There is also
violation of equal protection. A proviso requiring certain number of years of
togetherness in marriage before the employee’s death is valid to prevent sham
marriages contracted for monetary gains. Here, it is 3 years before pensioner
qualified for the pension. Under this, even if the dependent spouse married the
pensioner more than 3 years before the pensioner’s death, the dependent spouse
would still not receive survivorship pension if the marriage took place within 3 years
before the pensioner qualified for pension. The object of prohibition is vague. There
is no reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose
intended.

 NO. The sole proviso Sec. 18 of PD 1146 is unconstitutional. Under Section 18 of

PD 1146, it prohibits the dependent spouse from receiving survivorship pension if
such dependent spouse married the pensioner within three years before the
pensioner qualified for the pension. The Court holds that such proviso is
discriminatory and denies equal protection of the law. The proviso is contrary to
Section 1, Article III of the Constitution, which provides that [n]o person shall be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person
be denied the equal protection of the laws.

Page 5 of 21
 ERMITA vs CITY MAYOR, 20 SCRA 849, 1967
G.R. No. L-24693 July 31, 1967

SALAS, LADY MAY

Facts:

On June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of Manila passed Ordinance No. 4760
with the following provisions questioned for its violation of due process concerning
Sections 2 and 4 therein:

1. Refraining from entertaining or accepting any guest or customer unless it fills out a
prescribed form in the lobby in open view;
2. Prohibiting admission of less than 18 years old;
3. Usurious increase of license fee to P4,500 and 6,000 o 150% and 200% respectively
(tax issue also);
4. Making unlawful lease or rent more than twice every 24 hours; and
5. Cancellation of license for subsequent violation.

The lower court issued preliminary injunction and petitioners raised the case to
SC on certiorari.

Issue: Is the Ordinance compliant with the due process requirement of the constitution?

Held:
Ordinance is a valid exercise of police power to minimize certain practices hurtful
to public morals. There is no violation on constitutional due process for being reasonable
and the ordinance enjoys the presumption of constitutionality absent any irregularity on its
face. As such a limitation cannot be viewed as a transgression against the command of
due process. It is neither unreasonable nor arbitrary. Precisely it was intended to curb the
opportunity for the immoral or illegitimate use to which such premises could be, and,
according to the explanatory note, are being devoted. Taxation may be made to implement
a police power and the amount, object, and instance of taxation is dependent upon the
local legislative body. Judgment of lower court reversed and injunction lifted.

Page 6 of 21
 CITY OF MANILA VS JUDGE PERFECTO LAGUIO
455 SCRA 308, 2005
SAMIJON, MARIEL V.

FACTS: On 30 Mar 1993, Mayor Lim signed into law Ord 7783 entitled AN ORDINANCE
PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF BUSINESSES PROVIDING
CERTAIN FORMS OF AMUSEMENT, ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES AND FACILITIES
IN THE ERMITA-MALATE AREA, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION
THEREOF, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. It basically prohibited establishments such
as bars, karaoke bars, motels and hotels from operating in the Malate District which was
notoriously viewed as a red light district harboring thrill seekers. Malate Tourist
Development Corporation avers that the ordinance is invalid as it includes hotels and
motels in the enumeration of places offering amusement or entertainment. MTDC
reiterates that they do not market such nor do they use women as tools for entertainment.
MTDC also avers that under the LGC, LGUs can only regulate motels but cannot prohibit
their operation. The City reiterates that the Ordinance is a valid exercise of Police Power
as provided as well in the LGC. The City likewise emphasized that the purpose of the law
is to promote morality in the City.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ordinance 7783 is valid.

HELD: The SC ruled that the said Ordinance is null and void. The SC noted that for an
ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local
government unit to enact and must be passed according to the procedure prescribed by
law, it must also conform to the following substantive requirements:

(1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;

(2) must not be unfair or oppressive;

(3) must not be partial or discriminatory;

(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;

(5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and

(6) must not be unreasonable.

The police power of the City Council, however broad and far-reaching, is subordinate to
the constitutional limitations thereon; and is subject to the limitation that its exercise must
be reasonable and for the public good. In the case at bar, the enactment of the Ordinance
was an invalid exercise of delegated power as it is unconstitutional and repugnant to
general laws.

Page 7 of 21
 WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION, TITANIUM CORPORATION and STA. MESA
TOURIST & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioners, vs. CITY OF MANILA,
represented by DE CASTRO, MAYOR ALFREDO S. LIM, Respondent.
G.R. NO. 122846 January 20, 2009

TACBAS, CAZELYN PEARL

FACTS:
This is a petition to challenge the validity of the City Manila City Ordinance No. 7774
entitled, "An Ordinance Prohibiting Short-Time Admission, Short-Time Admission Rates,
and Wash-Up Rate Schemes in Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging Houses, Pension Houses,
and Similar Establishments in the City of Manila" (the Ordinance).
In City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr., the Court affirmed the nullification of a city ordinance
barring the operation of motels and inns, among other establishments, within the Ermita-
Malate area. The petition at bar assails a similarly-motivated city ordinance that prohibits
those same establishments from offering short-time admission, as well as pro-rated or
"wash up" rates for such abbreviated stays. Our earlier decision tested the city ordinance
against our sacred constitutional rights to liberty, due process and equal protection of law.
The same parameters apply to the present petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the ordinance of the City of Manila is against the due process.
RULING:
Yes, the ordinance of the City of Manila is unconstitutional because it infringes the
individual rights of the citizen and the public interest or public welfare. The State is a
leviathan that must be restrained from needlessly intruding into the lives of its citizens.
However well' -intentioned the Ordinance may be, it is in effect an arbitrary and whimsical
intrusion into the rights of the establishments as well as their patrons. The Ordinance
needlessly restrains the operation of the businesses of the petitioners as well as restricting
the rights of their patrons without sufficient justification. The Ordinance rashly equates
wash rates and renting out a room more than twice a day with immorality without
accommodating innocuous intentions.The promotion of public welfare and a sense of
morality among citizens deserves the full endorsement of the judiciary provided that such
measures do not trample rights this Court is sworn to protect.

Page 8 of 21
 TAÑADA VS TUVERA
146 SCRA 446, No. L-63915 December 29, 1986

VILLANUEVA, MARY JANE N.

FACTS:

Lorenzo Tañada came to court with group of lawyers called Mabini and filed for a writ of
mandamus to compel publication of Presidential issuances invoking the rights of the
people to be informed on matters of public concerns. Juan Tuvera, Executive Secretary
of President Ferdinand Marcos contends that publication in the Official Gazette is not a
sine qua non requirement for effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for
their own effectivity dates and since the presidential issuances in question contain special
provisions as to the date that they are to take effect, publication in the Official Gazette is
not indispensable for their effectivity.

ISSUE:

Whether petitioner is proper in invoking the right on due process to enforce the publication
of Presidential issuances in question.

RULING:

Yes, the SC interpreted publication in Article 2 of the Civil Code as indispensable in every
case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual fifteen-day period shall
be shortened or extended. The SC holds therefore that all statutes, including of those local
application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which
shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity is fixed by the
legislature. The requirement of prior publication seeks to prevent abuses by the lawmakers
and ensure the people's right to due process and to information on matters of public
concern. Omission would offend due process insofar as it would deny the public
knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern it. The conclusive presumption that
every person knows the law, which of course presupposes that the law has been published
if the presumption is to have any legal justification at all. It is no less important to remember
that Section 6 of the Bill of Rights recognizes "the right of the people to information on
matters of public concern," and this certainly applies to, among others, and indeed
especially, the legislative enactments of the government.

Page 9 of 21
 GARCILLANO V. COMMITTEES
575 SCRA 170, 2008

ABUHAN, WILFRED M.

FACTS:
Petitioners in G.R. No. 179275 seek to disallow the Senate to continue with the conduct
of the questioned legislative inquiry on the issue of “Hello Garci” tapes containing the
wiretapped communication of then-President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and COMELEC
Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano, without duly published rules of procedure, in clear
derogation of the constitutional requirement.
The respondents in G.R. No. 179275 admit in their pleadings and even on oral argument
that the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation had been
published in newspapers of general circulation only in 1995 and in 2006. With respect to
the present Senate of the 14th Congress, however, of which the term of half of its members
commenced on June 30, 2007, no effort was undertaken for the publication of these rules
when they first opened their session. Respondents justify their non-observance of the
constitutionally mandated publication by arguing that the rules have never been amended
since 1995 and, despite that, they are published in booklet form available to anyone for
free, and accessible to the public at the Senate's internet web page, invoking R.A. No.
8792.

ISSUE
Whether or not the invocation by the respondents of the provisions of R.A. No. 8792,
otherwise known as the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, to support their claim of valid
publication through the internet is substantial compliance with the constitutional
requirement of publication.

RULING
NO. Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that [t]he Senate or
the House of Representatives, or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries
in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The requisite
of publication of the rules is intended to satisfy the basic requirements of due process.
R.A. 8792 considers an electronic data message or an electronic document as the
functional equivalent of a written document only for evidentiary purposes. In other words,
the law merely recognizes the admissibility in evidence (for their being the original) of
electronic data messages and/or electronic documents. It does not make the internet a
medium for publishing laws, rules, and regulations.
Given this discussion, the respondent Senate Committees, therefore, could not, in
violation of the Constitution, use its unpublished rules in the legislative inquiry subject of
these consolidated cases. The conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation by the Senate has
to be deferred until it shall have caused the publication of the rules because it can do so
only in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure.

Page 10 of 21
 PEOPLE vs. NAZARIO
165 SCRA 186, 1988

ACOT, KARLA JEAN G.

FACTS:
Nazario is an operator of a fishpond in Pinagbayanan, Pagbilao, Quezon which
began its operation since 1959.Alvarez, the Municipal Treasurer wrote the accused a letter
asking him to pay his taxes and fee for the fishpond operation. The accused refused and
failed to pay the municipal taxes from 1964-1966 in the total amount of P362.62 required
of him as fishpond operator as provided for under Ordinance No. 4, series of1955, as
amended, in spite of repeated demands made upon him by the Municipal Treasurer of
Pagbilao, Quezon.The Trial Court found him guilty for the violation of the ordinance.
Petitioner contends that the ordinance no. No. 4, series of 1955, as amended by
Ordinance No. 15, series of 1965 and further amended by Ordinance No. 12, series of
1966, of the Municipal Council of Pagbilao, Quezon is "ambiguous and uncertain". He is
a mere lessee of the fishpond thus he is not covered since the said ordinances speak of
"owner or manager".
ISSUE:
Whether or not the questioned ordinances violates due process for being vague,
thus failure to accord persons targeted by it?
RULING:
No. Ordinances no. 4,15 and 12 does not violate due process. In no way may the
ordinances at bar be said to be tainted with the vice of vagueness. It is unmistakable from
their very provisions that the appellant falls within its coverage. As the actual operator of
the fishponds, he comes within the term " manager." He does not deny the fact that he
financed the construction of the fishponds, introduced fish fries into the fishponds, and
had employed labourers to maintain them. While it appears that it is the National
Government which owns them, the Government never shared in the profits they had
generated. Aside from that the Government is immune from taxes and for another, since
it is not the Government that had been making money from the venture. As the actual
operator of the fishponds in question, and as the recipient of profits brought about by the
business, the appellant is clearly liable for the municipal taxes in question. Neither are the
said ordinances vague as to dates of payment. The dates of payment have been definitely
established. The fact that the appellant has been allegedly uncertain about the reckoning
dates. As far as his liability for the years 1964, 1965, and 1966 is concerned, it only
presents a mere problem in computation, but it does not make the ordinances vague.
Therefore, the Municipal Ordinance is not vague thus constitutional.

Page 11 of 21
 ANG TIBAY VS CIR
G.R. NO. L-46496, FEBRUARY 27, 1940

BARAMBANGAN, MOHAMMAD FADEL B.

FACTS:

Ang Tibay is a leather company owned by Toribio Teodoro, petitioner, who

supplies the Philippine Army. Ang Tibay laid off several of its employees belonging to the
National Labor Union, Inc., the private respondents. They claim that they have been
removed unfairly as the opposing union, National Workers Brotherhood, members were
not laid off by the company. The supposed reason for the lay-off of several employees
was because of lack of materials. Respondents averred that the lack of materials were
untrue but is just the scheme of Toribio Teodoro, who was also part of the opposing union,
to remove members of the opposing union. Respondents filed a case against the
petitioners for unjust labor practice but was unsuccessful. Respondents then filed a
petition praying for a retrial as they have come across new substantial evidence that could
change the ruling of the court.

ISSUE: Whether or not National Labor Union is entitled for a retrial?

RULING:
Yes. National Labor Union is entitled for a retrial as the Court of Industrial Relations
ignored or disregarded the fundamental and essential requirements of due process. The
said right of due process consists of the following: 1) Right to a hearing; 2) The party must
be given an opportunity to present his case and evidence and the tribunal must consider
the evidence presented; 3) "While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to
decide right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having
something to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached." (Edwards vs.
McCoy, supra.); 4) The evidence to support a finding or conclusion must be substantial;
5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing or at least
contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected; 6) The CIR must act on its
own independent consideration of the law and the facts of the controversy and not simply
accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision, and; 7) The CIR should render
its decision that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and
the reasons for the decision rendered.

Therefore, the motion for a new trial should be granted and all the records of the
cases be remanded back to the CIR and ordered to accept all the evidence to be
presented by both sides as the case shall be reopened.

Page 12 of 21
 FABELLA petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
G.R. No. 110379 November 28, 1997

CABACUNGAN, CARL VINCENT C.

FACTS:
On September 17, 1990, then DECS Secretary Cariño issued a return-to-work
order to all public school teachers who had participated in walk-outs and strikes on various
dates during the period September 26, 1990 to October 18, 1990. The mass action had
been staged to demand payment of 13th month differentials, clothing allowances and
passage of a debt-cap bill in Congress, among other things.

On October 18, 1990, Secretary Cariño filed administrative cases against herein
petitioner-appellees, who are teachers of the Mandaluyong High School. The charge
sheets required petitioner-appellees to explain in writing why they should not be punished
for having taken part in the mass action in violation of civil service laws and
regulations.Administrative hearings started on December 20, 1990.

Respondents, through counsel assailed the legality of the proceedings on the

following due process grounds: first, they were not given copies of the guidelines adopted
by the committee for the investigation and denied access to evidence; second, the
investigation placed the burden of proof on respondents to prove their innocence; third,
that the investigating body was illegally constituted, their composition and appointment
violated Sec.9 of the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers. Pending the action
assailing the validity of the administrative proceedings, the investigating committee
rendered a decision finding the respondents guilty and ordered their immediate dismissal.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the teachers were dismissed without due process of law

RULING:
In administrative proceedings, due process has been recognized to include the
following: (1) the right to actual or constructive notice of the institution of proceedings
which may affect a respondent's legal rights; (2) a real opportunity to be heard personally
or with the assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in one's favor, and
to defend one's rights; (3) a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted
as to afford a person charged administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well
as impartiality; and (4) a finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence
submitted for consideration during the hearing or contained in the records or made known
to the parties affected.

The legislature enacted a special law, RA 4670 known as the Magna Carta for
Public School Teachers, which specifically covers administrative proceedings involving
public schoolteachers. Section 9 of said law expressly provides that the committee to hear
public schoolteachers' administrative cases should be composed of the school
superintendent of the division as chairman, a representative of the local or any existing
provincial or national teachers' organization and a supervisor of the division.

In the present case, the various committees formed by DECS to hear the
administrative charges against private respondents did not include "a representative of
the local or, in its absence, any existing provincial or national teacher's organization" as
required by Section 9 of RA 4670. Accordingly, these committees were deemed to have
no competent jurisdiction. Thus, all proceedings undertaken by them were necessarily
void. They could not provide any basis for the suspension or dismissal of private
respondents. The inclusion of a representative of a teachers' organization in these
committees was indispensable to ensure an impartial tribunal. It was this requirement that
would have given substance and meaning to the right to be heard. Indeed, in any
proceeding, the essence of procedural due process is embodied in the basic requirement
of notice and a real opportunity to be heard.

Page 13 of 21
 Indeed, in the case at bar, neither the DECS Secretary nor the DECS-NCR
regional director personally conducted the investigation but entrusted it to a committee
composed of a division supervisor, secondary and elementary school teachers, and
consultants. But there was no representative of a teachers organization. This is a serious
flaw in the composition of the committee because the provision for the representation of a
teachers organization is intended by law for the protection of the rights of teachers facing
administrative charges.

Page 14 of 21
 PAT. EDGAR M. GO vs. NAPOLCOM
GR No. 107845, April 18, 1997

CAGAPE, CHRISTIAN O.
FACTS:
In the evening of January 21, 1983, a team of military personnel raided the house
of Edgar Go. The leader of the raiding team was able to confiscate the amount of One
Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos, assorted papelitos, ballpen and calculator used in the
operation of Jai Alai Bookies. Then another raid was conducted for the second time. The
Fiscal later on dismissed the case for insufficiency. Moreover, when the second raid was
conducted it was proven that illegal Jai Alai activities was still going on in the residence of
the respondent.
Respondent in spite of several notices, failed to appear before the board in order
to refute the charges against him. So, after four (4) months, the Board proceeded with the
hearing and considered the non-appearance of the respondent as a waiver on his part to
present his evidence. PD 1707 in relation to Memorandum agreement between
NAPOLCOM and Director General, INP provides that a syndicate crime and tong
collection are serious offenses against an INP members and is therefore within the
jurisdiction of the dismissal authorities.
On December 20, 1983, petitioner was informed of his dismissal. Petitioner
appealed to the Director General of the PC/INP, complaining of denial of due process. He
claimed that no copy of the complaint with supporting affidavits had been served on him
as required by NAPOLCOM Resolution No. 81-01
ISSUE:
W/N petitioner Edgar M. Go was denied due process.
RULING:
Yes. petitioner was denied the due process of law and that not even the fact that
the charge against him is serious, and evidence of his guilt is strong and can compensate
for the procedural shortcut evident in the record of this case. It is precisely in cases such
as this, that the utmost care be exercised lest in the drive to clean up the ranks of the
police, those who are innocent are denied justice or, through blunder, those who are guilty
are allowed to escape punishment.
The report of the team which conducted the raids was not even in writing and the
supposed testimonies of the two witnesses were not taken down. This is evident from the
decision of the board which, instead of referring to the testimonies or affidavits of
witnesses, repeatedly refers to the results of an "investigation." It is clear that the facts
found by the board were not the result of any investigation conducted by it but by some
other group, possibly the team that allegedly conducted the raids and that what the board
did was simply to rely on their finding.
In summary dismissal proceedings, unless other fully effective means for
implementing the constitutional requirement of notice and hearing are devised, it is
mandatory that charges be specified in writing and that the affidavits in support thereof be
attached to the complaint because these are the only ways by which evidence against the
respondent can be brought to his knowledge.

Page 15 of 21
 MOLLANEDA V. UMACOB,
G.R. No. 140128 June 6, 2001

CARVERO, KIRK RA

FACTS:
Sometime Sept 7, 1994, Leonida Umacob, a public school, teacher went to the office of
Mr. Rolando P. Suase to follow up her request for transfer to a different district. Therein,
Arnold Mollaneda, school Division Superintendent, after entertaining her request hugged
her, embraced her, kissed her nose and lip in a torrid manner, and mashed her breast.
Mollaneda did these acts for several times then warned Umacob not to tell the incident to
anybody. Umacob reported the incident to the police station and filed a complaint for acts
of lasciviousness before the Municipal Trial Court. She also filed an administrative
complaint as well with the Civil Service Commission - Regional Office XI, Davao City
(CSC-RO XI). She furnished the Department of Education, Culture and Sports - Regional
Office XI, Davao City (DECS-RO XI) a copy of her affidavit-complaint. A DECS
investigating committee was formed, which later recommended to the DECS Regional
Director "the dropping of the case" for lack of merit. Meanwhile, the case before the CSC
was heard before Atty. Anacleto Buena, which hearing was attended by both parties and
their counsel. CSC found Mollaneda guilty, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Thus Mollaneda elevated the case to the SC. Mollaneda alleges that 1) Umacob was guilty
of forum shopping, 2) He was denied due process, and 3) witnesses' testimonies were
hearsay. Pending the SC case, the Municipal Trial Court dismissed the case of acts of
lasciviousness.

ISSUE:
1) Whether or not Umacob was guilty of forum shopping; 2) Whether or not court erred in
giving weight to witnesses' testimonies; and 3) Whether or not dismissal of the case in the
MTC merits dismissal of the CSC.

HELD:
1) No. With regard to the DECS and CSC, DECS was just furnished a copy of the
complaint - it was not filed before the DECS. The resolution of DECS was just a
recommendatory resolution. With regard to the filing of the case both in the CSC and the
court, the case filed before the CSC is an administrative case while that before the court
is a criminal case, thus it does not constitute forum shopping. 2) No. The witnesses'
testimonies were offered not to prove its truth, but merely to prove that Umacob told the
witnesses what transpired in the office. What was given more credence was the testimony
of Umacob which was straight and replete with details consistent with human nature. 3)
No. Long-ingrained in our jurisprudence is the rule that the dismissal of a criminal case
against an accused who is a respondent in an administrative case on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence does not foreclose the administrative proceeding against him or
give him a clean bill of health in all respects. In dismissing the case, the MTC is simply
saying that the prosecution was unable to prove the guilt of the respondent beyond
reasonable doubt, a condition sine qua non for conviction because of the presumption of
innocence which the Constitution guarantees an accused. However, in administrative
proceedings, the quantum of proof required is only substantial evidence, which the court
finds in this case.

Page 16 of 21
 GEORGE I. RIVERA VS. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and LAND BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 115147 January 4, 1995

CUAJAO, ARNEL JHON S.

FACTS:

Petitioner Rivera was the Manager of Corporate Banking Unit of Land Bank. Rivera
allegedly told Perez, the Marketing Manager of Wynner which had a pending loan
application with LBP, that he could facilitate the processing, approval and release of the
loan if he would be given a ten percent (10%) commission. Rivera was said to have
subsequently received a P200,000.00 commission out of the P3,000,000.00 loan
proceeds from the LBP. From Lao, who had substantial investments in Wynner, Rivera
supposedly likewise received the amount of approximately P20,000.00 pocket money for
his trip to the United States, as well as additional funds for another trip to Hongkong. The
petitioner also acted, without authority as the personal consultant of Lao and in various
companies where Lao had investments in which drew and received salaries and
allowances approximately P20,000.00 a month evidenced by vouchers.

He was charged by the Land Bank President with these following offenses on the
basis of affidavits of Lao and Perez: Dishonesty; Receiving for personal use of fee, gift or
other valuable thing, in the course of official duties or in connection therewith when such
fee, gift, or other valuable thing is given by any person in the hope or expectation of
receiving a favor or better treatment than that accorded other persons; Committing acts
punishable under the Anti-Graft laws; Pursuit of private business vocation or profession
without the permission required by Civil Service Rules and regulations; Violation of Res.
87-A, R.A. No. 337; resulting to misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
the service. Rivera was preventively suspended; he was found guilty of grave misconduct
and acts prejudicial to the best interest of the service in accepting employment from a
client of the bank and in thereby receiving salaries and allowances in violation of Section
12, Rule XVIII, of the RCS: prohibition in Section 3, paragraph (d), of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act RA 3019. The penalty of forced resignation, without separation
benefits and gratuities, was thereupon imposed on Rivera. modified the decision to the
extent that he was only suspended for 1 year. CSC set aside Merit Systems Protection
Board decision and ruled that Rivera should be dismissed, averred that the CSC
committed grave abuse or discretion but was dismissed for failure to sufficiently show that
CSC indeed acted with grave abuse of discretion. Now strongly asserting that he was
denied due process when Hon. Thelma P. Gaminde, who earlier participated in her
capacity as the Board Chairman of the MSPB when the latter had taken action on LBP's
motion for reconsideration, also took part, this time as a CSC Commissioner.

ISSUES:
Whether or not petitioner Rivera was denied of due process.

RULING:
Yes, Rivera was denied of due process. Given the circumstances in the case at
bench, CSC should have behooved Commissioner Gaminde to inhibit herself totally from
any participation in resolving Rivera's appeal to CSC if we are to give full meaning and
consequence to a fundamental aspect of due process. The argument that Commissioner
Gaminde did not participate in MSPB's decision is unacceptable. It is not denied that she
did participate, indeed has concurred, in MSPB's resolution of denying the motion for
reconsideration of MSPB's decision of 29 August 1990. Citing Zambales Chromite Mining
v CA: “In order that the review of the decision of a subordinate officer might not turn out to
be a farce, then reviewing officer must perforce be other than the officer whose decision
is under review; otherwise, there could be no different view or there would be no real
review of the case. The decision of the reviewing officer would be a biased view; inevitably,
it would be the same view since being human, he would not admit that he was mistaken
in his first view of the case.”

Page 17 of 21
 DLSU v. CA
G.R. No. 127980 December 19, 2007

DELLAVA, WENEFREDO B.

FACTS: Private respondents Alvin Aguilar, James Paul Bungubung, Richard Reverente
and Roberto Valdes, Jr. are members of Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity who were expelled by
the De La Salle University (DLSU) and College of Saint Benilde (CSB) Joint Discipline
Board because of their involvement in an offensive action causing injuries to petitioner
James Yap and three other student members of Domino Lux Fraternity. Sometime in
1995, Mr. James Yap was eating his dinner alone in Manang’s Restaurant near La Salle,
when he overheard two men bad-mouthing and apparently angry at Domino Lux. When
he arrived at his boarding house, he mentioned the remarks to his two other brods. The
three, together with four other persons went back to Manang’s and confronted the two
who were still in the restaurant. The mauling incidents were a result of a fraternity war.
Yap filed a complaint with the Disciplinary Board of DLSU charging private respondents
with Direct Assault. The other members who were assaulted filed a similar complaint. The
Director of the DLSU Discipline Office sent separate notices to private respondents
Aguilar, Bungubung and Valdes, Jr. and Reverente informing them of the complaints and
requiring them to answer. Private respondents filed their respective answers. No full-blown
hearing was conducted nor the students allowed to cross-examine the witnesses against
them.

ISSUE: Whether or not private respondents were accorded due process by the reason
that there was no full blown hearing that was conducted nor were they allowed to cross-
examine the witnesses against them?

RULING: Yes. Private respondents were accorded due process of law. The Due Process
Clause in Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution embodies a system of rights based on
moral principles so deeply imbedded in the traditions and feelings of our people as to be
deemed fundamental to a civilized society as conceived by our entire history.

The constitutional behest that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law is solemn and inflexible. In administrative cases, such as
investigations of students found violating school discipline, there are withal minimum
standards which must be met before to satisfy the demands of procedural due process
and these are: a. that the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of
any accusation against them; b. that they shall have the right to answer the charges
against them and with the assistance if counsel, if desired; c. that they shall be informed
of the evidence against them; d. that they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their
own behalf; and e. that the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating
committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case
Where a party was afforded an opportunity to participate in the proceedings but failed to
do so, he cannot complain of deprivation of due process.

A formal trial-type hearing is not, at all times and in all instances, essential
to due process – it is enough that the parties are given a fair and reasonable
opportunity to explain their respective sides of the controversy and to present
supporting evidence on which a fair decision can be based. “To be heard” does not
only mean presentation of testimonial evidence in court – one may also be heard through
pleadings and where the opportunity to be heard through pleadings is accorded, there is
no denial of due process. Private respondents were duly informed in writing of the charges
against them by the DLSUCSB Joint Discipline Board through petitioner Sales. They were
given the opportunity to answer the charges against them as they, in fact, submitted their
respective answers.

Page 18 of 21
 ATENEO DE MANILA UNIVERSITY V. HON. JUDGE IGNACIO CAPULONG
G.R. No. 99327 May 27, 1993
EDULAN, RIZZAH BETH L.
FACTS:
Leonardo H. Villa, a first year law student of ADMU, died of serious physical injuries
at Chinese General Hospital after the initiation rites of Aquila Legis. Bienvenido Marquez
was also hospitalized at the Capitol Medical Center for acute renal failure occasioned by
the serious physical injuries inflicted upon him on the same occasion. Petitioner Dean
Cynthia del Castillo created a Joint Administration-Faculty-Student Investigating
Committee tasked to investigate and submit a report within 72 hours on the circumstances
surrounding the death of Lennie Villa. Said notice also required respondent students to
submit their written statements within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt. Although
respondent students received a copy of the written notice, they failed to file a reply. In the
meantime, they were placed on preventive suspension. The Joint Administration-Faculty-
Student Investigating Committee, after receiving the written statements and hearing the
testimonies of several witness, found a prima facie case against respondent students for
violation of Rule 3 of the Law School Catalogue entitled "Discipline." Respondent students
were then required to file their written answers to the formal charge. Petitioner Dean
created a Disciplinary Board to hear the charges against respondent students. The Board
found respondent students guilty of violating Rule No. 3 of the Ateneo Law School Rules
on Discipline which prohibits participation in hazing activities. However, in view of the lack
of unanimity among the members of the Board on the penalty of dismissal, the Board left
the imposition of the penalty to the University Administration. Accordingly, Fr. Bernas
imposed the penalty of dismissal on all respondent students. Respondent students filed
with RTC Makati a TRO since they are currently enrolled. This was granted. A TRO was
also issued enjoining petitioners from dismissing the respondents. A day after the
expiration of the temporary restraining order, Dean del Castillo created a Special Board to
investigate the charges of hazing against respondent students Adel Abas and Zosimo
Mendoza. This was requested to be stricken out by the respondents and argued that the
creation of the Special Board was totally unrelated to the original petition which alleged
lack of due process. Judge Capulong, upon students’ appeal, ordered Ateneo to reverse
its decision and reinstate the said students.
ISSUE: W/N there was denial of due process against the respondent students.
RULING:

NO. Corollary to their contention of denials of due process is their argument that it
is Ang Tibay case and not the Guzman case which is applicable in the case at bar. Though
both cases essentially deal with the requirements of due process, the Guzman case is
more apropos to the instant case, since the latter deals specifically with the minimum
standards to be satisfied in the imposition of disciplinary sanctions in academic institutions,
such as petitioner university herein, thus: (1) the students must be informed in writing of
the nature and cause of any accusation against them; (2) that they shall have the right to
answer the charges against them with the assistance of counsel, if desired: (3) they shall
be informed of the evidence against them (4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence
in their own behalf; and (5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating
committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case.

Requirements are met. Respondent students were notified and required to submit
written statements, and such notices and letters were addressed individually to them.
Such notices and letters clearly show that respondent students were given ample
opportunity to adduce evidence in their behalf and to answer the charges leveled against
them. The requisite assistance of counsel was met when, from the very start of the
investigations before the Joint Administration Faculty-Student Committee, the law firm of
Gonzales Batiler and Bilog and Associates put in its appearance and filed pleadings in
behalf of respondent students.

Page 19 of 21
 RUBEN SERRANO vs NLRC & ISETANN DEPARTMENT STORE
323 SCRA 445, 2000

LANGAM, ARTHUR JAY II D.

FACTS:

Petitioner was hired by respondent Isetann Department Store as a security checker to

apprehend shoplifters and prevent pilferage of merchandise. He was initially hired on
October 4, 1984 on a contractual basis and became a regular employee on April 4,1985.
After working in Isetann Department Store for a couple of years, Petitioner became head
of the Security Checkers on 1988.

In the year 1991, a cost-cutting measure was applied by the private respondent and
decided to phase out its entire security section and engage the services of an independent
security agency.

Petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, illegal layoff, unfair labour practice,
underpayment of wages, and non-payment of salary and overtime pay.

Labor Arbiter ruled that private respondent failed to establish that it had retrenched its
security section to prevent or minimize losses to its business and failed to accord due
process to petitioner. Also, private respondent failed to use reasonable standards in
selecting employees whose employment would be terminated. National Labour Relations
Commission reversed the decision and ordered petitioner to be given its pay.

ISSUE:

Whether or there is due process on the dismissal of the petitioner.

RULING:

Petitioner contends that abolition of private respondent’s Security Checkers Section and
the employment of an independent security agency do not fall under any of the authorized
causes for dismissal under Article 283 of the Labor Code.

There are three reasons why, on the other hand, violation by the employer of the notice
requirement cannot be considered a denial of due process resulting in the nullity of the
employee’s dismissal or layoff.

The Court says, first is that Due Process Clause of the Constitution is a limitation on the
governmental powers. It does not apply to the exercise of private power, such as
termination of employment under the Labor Code.

The second reason is that notice and hearing are required under the Due Process Clause
before the power of organized society are brought to bear upon the individual. Even in
cases of dismissal under Article 282, the purpose for the requirement of notice and hearing
is not to comply with Due Process Clause of the Constitution. The time for notice and
hearing is at the trial stage.

The third and last reason is the notice requirement under Art. 283 cannot be considered
a requirement of the Due Process Clause is that employer cannot really be expected to
be entirely and impartial judge of his own cause.

The Court view that failure to send notice of termination to Serrano is not tantamount to
violation of his constitutional right to due process but merely constitutes non-compliance
with the provision on notice under Art. 283 of the Labour Code.

Page 20 of 21
NO CASE DIGEST SUBMITTED

NAME CASE
Velasco v. Villegas, 120 SCRA 586,
1 NAVIDAS, Jebobroeylet
1983
Executive v. Southwing, 482 SCRA 673,
2 ADORIO, Richelle Starr
2006
Estate of Franciso v. CA, 199 SCRA 595,
3 LIBUTAN, Joely
1991
4 LICERA, Rodel Lim v. CA, 387 SCRA 149, 2002

Page 21 of 21