1174030

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TAP0010.1177/09593543231174030Theory & PsychologyPlesa

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Theory & Psychology

Authenticization: Consuming
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© The Author(s) 2023

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DOI: 10.1177/09593543231174030
https://doi.org/10.1177/09593543231174030
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Patric Plesa
York University

Abstract
Research on authenticity continues to grow in diverse fields and under various definitions. I argue
that the concept of authenticity has become a marketable self-branding strategy to meet the ends
of neoliberal capitalism with often consequential and contradictory effects on subjectivity. Using
Lehman et al.’s (2019) review of the various definitions of authenticity in the literature, I claim
that a process I am calling authenticization overlaps the diverse and contradictory definitions to
produce commodified forms of authenticity. The production and consumption of commodified
forms of authenticity reflect the neoliberal norms of individualization, responsibilization, and
self-governance, which, through the process of authenticization, become values that reshape
“authentic” self-expression. Self-understanding and freedom are compromised in the production
and consumption of commodified forms of authenticity with potential consequences for identity
and mental health.

Keywords
authenticity, authenticization, biopolitics, identity, neoliberalism

Authenticity seems like a dated subject that had its peak with existentialism, then a resur-
gence with positive psychology and by extension popular psychology and self-help.
However, authenticity research continues to linger, indicating that the phenomenon per-
sists in our social lives (Hewlin et al., 2020; Newman, 2019). A review by Lehman et al.
(2019) looking at literature on authenticity in management, marketing, psychology, and
sociology from 1990–2017, shows that in each field the literature doubled between the
2000–2009 bracket to the 2010–2017 bracket, suggesting growing popularity in research
on authenticity.
Given the persistence of research on authenticity, it is worth investigating how this
phenomenon is defined and what it pertains to in our social lives. In this article, I outline

Corresponding author:
Patric Plesa, York University, 4700 Keele Street, Toronto, ON M3J 1P3, Canada.
Email: patricplesa@rogers.com
2 Theory & Psychology 00(0)

the various definitions of authenticity from a number of fields to examine how the phe-
nomenon is perceived and appraised. I primarily rely on social media as a setting where
authenticity emerges as a prominent social phenomenon both explicitly and implicitly in
user content and evaluations. My aim is to engage in a critical understanding of the over-
lapping definitions of authenticity as they are enacted and commodified as products for
consumption. Below, I argue that the demands of neoliberal capitalism have commodi-
fied authenticity into a process I am calling authenticization, which relies on poor and
contradictory definitions of authenticity.
The process of authenticization is the consumption and reproduction of neoliberal
norms within a social economy that demands authentic subjectivities while ironically
subverting the possibility for autonomy in self-understanding to exist. Authenticization
parallels Foucault’s (1982) objectification and subjectification as a process of self-under-
standing that is mediated by power relations in coconstructing notions of subjectivity. I
thus argue that our discursive possibilities for self-understanding are mediated by neolib-
eral norms, which can have the existential consequence of reshaping our internal values
and their external expression as marketable forms of commodified authenticity via a
process of authenticization. I have chosen the term authenticization to disambiguate
from other existing uses of authentication, authentification, and authentization. Before
discussing the implications of authenticization, it is important to look at the definitions
of authenticity over time, some problems with the original notions of authenticity, and
how the philosophical construct became a popular social phenomenon.

Defining authenticity
Authenticity relates to the older concept of sincerity, which constitutes a moral approach
to dealing honestly with others. Sincerity became internalized as authenticity in being
true to oneself as a predicate to being true to others, however, the notion of contemporary
authenticity is less concerned with social relations and is more so a virtue in itself (Varga
& Guignon, 2020). The word authenticity has the same etymological origins as the word
authority and part of the existential definition of authenticity includes “acting on one’s
own authority” (Lehman et al., 2019, p. 6). Heidegger (1927/1962) and Sartre (1943/1992)
conceptualized existential authenticity as a special type of autonomy. Existential authen-
ticity was defined as a freedom in consciousness to act in accordance with one’s internal
values, as opposed to acting in conformity with the ways others behave, the latter consti-
tuting existential inauthenticity (McBride, 1997). Nevertheless, this is an oversimplified
definition, which will be discussed in greater depth later. It is sufficient to note here that
authenticity is more than autonomy and it requires self-understanding (Taylor, 1992).
Lehman et al.’s (2019) review of contemporary research on authenticity reveals three
categories of meaning: (1) authenticity as consistency between a person’s internal values
and beliefs and external expression (subjective, uniqueness, relies on lay judgements,
closest to existential definition); (2) authenticity as conformity to an assigned or chosen
social category (subjective and objective, sameness, democratically negotiated); and (3)
authenticity as connection to a place, time, or person (objective, unique or same, relies
on expert knowledge). I rely on the definitions in this model later in this paper to discuss
the overlap between authenticity as consistency, conformity, and connection in relation
Plesa 3

to the process of authenticization. First, a review of the traditional problems with the
concept of authenticity will reveal some of the lingering issues that have not been
addressed adequately as the concept gained popularity.

Traditional problems with authenticity

Despite the growing trend in authenticity research and the lay use of the term, some
scholars have argued that the definitions are vague (Medlock, 2012) given the array of
possible meanings, while others have related authenticity to moral relativism and narcis-
sism (Lasch, 1978). These critiques are primarily concerned with the consistency notion
of authenticity, which has its roots in existentialism and constitutes much of what the lay
term describes as being true to oneself. This understanding of authenticity often suggests
the existence of a “true self,” which proposes a metaphysically problematic essentialist
structure that contributes to the definitional vagueness, narcissism, and moral relativism
that has led some to propose abandoning authenticity altogether (Bialystok, 2014;
Feldman, 2014; Varga & Guignon, 2020).
The notion of a true self is often synonymous with authenticity (Winnicott, 1996) or
one’s internal values, which are idealized positive and moral overestimations of the self
(Strohminger et al., 2017). The true self, I would argue, is a subjective set of qualities that
are aspirational rather than intrinsic (Plesa, 2020). Furthermore, these qualities are nei-
ther solipsistic nor consistent over context and time, yet they are often referenced as
one’s moral compass. This individualistic notion of a true self is not shared cross-cultur-
ally or traditionally in communal societies where shared values are considered the ave-
nue toward a meaningful life (Audain, 1995; Gambrel & Cianci, 2003; Lehman et al.,
2019). Notions of a true self also implicitly create a false dichotomy between the indi-
vidual and the environment (including other people) where the self is viewed as a stable
self-creation rather than the coconstruction between individual and society (Slater,
1970). The notion of a true and stable self implies that moral values originate within,
rather than being learned in a communal cultural context.
If authenticity is idealized as a moral virtue that relies on one’s intuitions and gut feel-
ings, it ignores irrational and violent tendencies in favour of an optimistic view of human
nature. Freud (1923/1989) and Nietzsche (1886/1989) challenged the notions of a
rational and moral human nature, and later psychoanalytic notions of truth became asso-
ciated with the irrational, leading to the belief that the most spontaneous expression is
authentic while the contemplated response is not (van Leeuwen, 2001). In this way, what
would become regarded as authentic had more to do with intuition and spontaneity than
morality. Disregarding the idealized ethic of authenticity poses the possibility that one
can be authentically immoral so long as one’s internal values (which can be irrational)
are consistent with their external expression (which can be spontaneous). However, this
only discounts authenticity as a moral virtue and not as an existential and social
phenomenon.
So far, we have seen that the traditional problems with authenticity rest on the assump-
tions of a true self and its use as an idealized moral virtue. Nevertheless, authenticity
does not require a true self or moral virtuosity to be understood. Under the consistency
definition of authenticity, one only needs their external expression to be aligned with
4 Theory & Psychology 00(0)

their internal values. Those values can be learned in a given context, they do not need to
be morally virtuous, and they do not need to originate within a true self. This brings us
to the existential definition of authenticity.

Defining existential authenticity

To understand the relevance of authenticity outside of moral virtuosity and ideals of a
true self, at least for the purposes of this article, a closer look at existentialism is required.
I mentioned earlier that existential authenticity relies on autonomy and self-understand-
ing. Heidegger (1927/1962) defines authenticity as a particular kind of freedom that
assumes accountability, personal responsibility, and intentionality toward the meaning of
one’s existence. It entails a commitment to own one’s actions in the world, which is a
“virtue” only insofar as it creates the possibility for being a moral agent and defining the
self through one’s actions over time (Guignon, 2004). In this way, Heidegger rejects a
true self as well as an authentic self, because the self changes over time with experience
and each experience is a moment that can be authentic or inauthentic (Steiner & Reisinger,
2006).
What is existentially authentic is a moment of accepting our freedom in our self-
understanding as an act in accordance with our commitment to meaning. Existential
freedom is established in consciousness as a choice to act in accordance with self-under-
standing or alternatively in conformity with others (Plesa, 2021). To behave in conform-
ity with others or to pretend that the freedom to choose doesn’t exist is existentially
inauthentic, which, for Heidegger (1927/1962), results in losing our identity. “The deci-
sion to be authentic or not is taken in the existential moment, in the moment of funda-
mental self-understanding, not in a psychological or behavioral moment when one
decides how to respond to an experience or what to do” (Steiner & Reisinger, 2006, p.
306). What is existentially authentic then, is a state of being in the world determined by
freedom and self-understanding, rather than the revelation of a true and stable self.
For Heidegger (1927/1962), authenticity involves courage in recognizing and acting
on one’s own possibilities, rather than the conformist tendency to share in the possibili-
ties of others. Authenticity is then not a moral question, rather it is about introducing
one’s possibilities into the world and taking responsibility for them. Authenticity requires
courage because it can lead to anxiety and alienation whereas inauthenticity often leads
to being accepted by others in conforming to their possibilities and in turn sacrificing
one’s identity (Heidegger, 1956/1958). Inauthenticity is based in human tendencies: to
identify with others while also claiming some artificial uniqueness (e.g., status), making
safe choices based on what others do, adopting a popular view of the world while assum-
ing it is one’s own, and refusing the responsibility of one’s own perspectives (Steiner &
Reisinger, 2006). For Heidegger (1927/1962), the importance of accepting one’s own
possibilities is in seeing one’s future potential and discovering meaning in the world,
which can also serve as an example for others to accept their own possibilities and be
authentic rather than being dominated by a mundane and meaningless existence
(Heidegger refers to the latter as an existentiell existence). Encouraging others to see
their own future possibilities allows them to be authentic and constitutes what Heidegger
calls “leaping ahead,” whereas “leaping in” for others by solving problems for them,
Plesa 5

even if well-intentioned, removes their possibilities for being authentic and discovering
meaning (Steiner & Reisinger, 2006).
The project of existential authenticity is about meaning. For Heidegger (1927/1962),
that meaning exists out there in the world ready to be discovered by people courageous
enough to accept their own possibilities. For Sartre (1943/1992), meaning is something
we are responsible for creating through authenticity, which accepts that the world is
meaningless and yet has the courage to create a reason for existing. For both existential-
ists, courage is required to face the fear and responsibilities of being authentic.
The existential understanding of authenticity is rich and complex, which makes it dif-
ficult to neatly summarize and apply operationally. For these reasons, the use of authen-
ticity is often oversimplified and mistaken. A brief history will elucidate the distinctions
between existential authenticity and commodified authenticity.

Distinctions between existential authenticity and commodified authenticity

Existential authenticity is a philosophical concept that has been adapted into practical
applications via the Human Potential Movement (Friedman, 1976), humanistic psychol-
ogy (Maslow, 1962), positive psychology (Wood et al., 2008), therapy (May, 1960;
Rogers, 1959), and self-help (McGee, 2005), resulting in a progressively neoliberal
notion of authenticity by reifying individualization, responsibilization, and self-govern-
ance. Existential authenticity relied on freedom in consciousness and self-understanding
to from a self-transcendence model of authenticity (Taylor, 1992). Transcendence is our
freedom to reinterpret the facts about ourselves toward our future becoming, which is
never complete and always changing (Sartre, 1943/1992). Self-transcendence, in being
perpetually incomplete, produces angst, which explains why existential authenticity
requires courage. However, this arguably negative view of existential authenticity was
reframed through humanistic psychology as a cultural transition toward positive human
flourishing. Humanistic psychology views human nature as intrinsically good and aim-
ing toward self-actualization, which is facilitated by authenticity (Maslow, 1962; Rogers,
1959). Humanistic authenticity relied on the existential framework but described it as
incongruities between the true self (experience), the noticed self (awareness), and the
expressed self (behaviour; Barnett & Deutsch, 2016), which effectively internalized
authenticity once more into a true self, contradicting self-transcendence and bringing
about what I am calling self-transformation.
This transition between transcend yourself and transform yourself, as technologies of
the self, was ushered in by humanistic psychology and became a cultural phenomenon
with the Human Potential Movement during the spiritualism and psychedelic culture of
the 1960s hippy era. Authenticity became popular toward self-transformation as an indi-
vidualized endeavour of self-governance (see Barnett & Deutsch, 2016) that would ulti-
mately make it more consistent with later neoliberal values than the existential
self-transcendence model. Nevertheless, existential authenticity was arguably consistent
with neoliberal values from its inception, considering the focus on the individual self
being responsible for governing behaviours that align with self-understanding. Although
some scholars have argued against such individualistic interpretations of existential
authenticity (see Taylor, 1992), others point out how the translation from the philosophi-
6 Theory & Psychology 00(0)

cal understanding to practical and colloquial applications provokes an inevitable transi-

tion to a commodity for self-making (Genz, 2015; Green, 2019; Shepherd, 2015).
During the 1950s, some social scientists began writing critiques of what they consid-
ered a growing cultural trend of inauthenticity and conformity, ushering in a prevalent
desire for existential authenticity (Varga & Guignon, 2020). Consequently, since the
1960s, authenticity also became conflated with nonconformity; a personal freedom to do
as one pleases in defiance to obedience and authority (Taylor, 1992), which captures the
counterculture of the hippy era. Nevertheless, a growing trend toward a poorly defined
notion of authenticity leads to a culture of nonconformity with established norms and
rituals, which ironically becomes conformist. For example, the recent alt-right conserva-
tive movement signals authenticity via the sloganization of freedom, nonconformity, and
political incorrectness while falling prey to popular views of the world that individual
members claim as their own and simultaneously consuming the commodified authentic-
ity of their intellectual dark web heroes, like Ben Shapiro, Jordan Peterson, and Dave
Rubin, among others (Weiss, 2018). These intellectual “nonconformists” defend com-
mon sense views of the world that lack depth of understanding and are based on superfi-
cial judgements laden in faith and false dichotomies of what is natural/unnatural (Farrell,
2018). Furthermore, members of the alt-right are often reactionary to changing values
and rather than expressing their own authentic possibilities, they reject those of others.
Authenticity retained its nonconformist and self-transformational qualities into the
1990s when positive psychology emerged as an empirical science to test the theoretical
claims of humanistic psychology toward human flourishing, branding authenticity as a
tool for happiness and positive well-being (Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000; Wood
et al., 2008). Simultaneously, a neoliberal turn had taken place in Western politics, with
a shift toward laissez-faire free-market capitalism. With the new economic model, a
cultural shift toward individualization, responsibilization, and self-governance arose (see
Harvey, 2005), which became internalized as personal ideals of success in what Teo
(2018) calls neoliberal forms of subjectivity. As neoliberal norms pervaded personal and
public life, authenticity became instrumentalized in positive psychology as an avenue
toward achieving neoliberal success. Using research on successful individuals and build-
ing taxonomies of character strengths, positive psychology fashioned “authentic” paths
toward happiness and personal achievement (Gable & Haidt, 2005).
Positive psychology provided a seemingly scientific conception of authenticity within
a neoliberal cultural ethos that emphasized resilience, personal responsibility, self-gov-
ernance, competition, and individuality (Binkley, 2011). At the same time, the self-help
industry was booming in the 1990s and early 2000s, with authenticity becoming a hot
commodity toward the ever-evolving notions of growth and self-improvement (Rimke,
2000). One of the fathers of positive psychology, Martin Seligman (2004), helped popu-
larize authenticity with his own self-help book appropriately titled, Authentic Happiness.
The self-help industry banked on the scientific validation from positive psychology
while ignoring the growing criticisms toward the “science.” Positive psychology has
been criticized for false data, intellectual dishonesty, lack of reflexivity, naïve optimism,
superficial knowledge, and falsified results, leading some to conclude that it is a pseudo-
science (see Bacigalupe, 2001; Brown et al., 2013; Fernandez-Rios & Vilarino, 2016;
Frawley, 2015; Held, 2004; Lazarus, 2003; Miller, 2008; Yen, 2010). Even Seligman
Plesa 7

(2011) had some reservations a decade after publishing Authentic Happiness, claiming
he did not like the title (he wanted to call it Positive Psychology, but the publisher said
“happiness” sells more books) or the overused word “authentic.”
The self-help industry, with the scientific aura of positive psychology, transformed
authenticity into an instrumental virtue to meet the ends of capitalism as an economic
commodity for marketability and employment (Varga, 2011). Becoming an authentic
subject means internalizing the neoliberal norms of individualization, responsibilization,
and governance to be economically viable for work, which becomes equated with suc-
cess and neoliberal happiness (Davies, 2014; Schrecker & Bambra, 2015). In this way,
the humanistic transform yourself more readily became a neoliberal commodify yourself
technology of self. Furthermore, neoliberalism endorses a cultural ignorance which
assumes a priori that any nonneoliberal subjectivities (i.e., people who are not “entrepre-
neurial selves”) are inferior (Teo, 2022). Thus, the consumption of authenticity fulfils a
need to actualize the entrepreneurial self and thereby become marketable.
Authenticity has not only become a commodity, but as Taylor (1992) has suggested,
it has become subjective, self-indulgent, and ultimately meaningless, contrasting the
existential definitions, which required self-transcendence. He argues that reviving the
self-transcendence model of authenticity, which relies on Sartre’s work, is necessary to
combat the contemporary culture of trivialized authenticity. This involves a relational
approach that accounts for a collective understanding of social good. Authenticity must
be a collective social project that includes the maintenance of a free society in which
shared social virtues are possible (Guignon, 2004). The ability to find or create meaning
for oneself in the world rests on this possibility, and hence makes up part of one’s com-
mitment to meaning as an intersubjective enterprise. Consequently, the self-transcend-
ence model of authenticity is much harder to realize than the inane types of authenticity
circulating in popular psychology and the self-help industry.
Although I agree with Taylor’s (1992) approach toward a relational form of existen-
tial authenticity, my aim here is not to salvage authenticity, but rather, to apply a herme-
neutic of scrutiny toward what I am calling a process of authenticization. This process
internalizes neoliberal values and externalizes a performance of commodified authentic-
ity for others to consume and replicate. Commodified authenticity is instrumental toward
economic ends; however, it usurps other possible meanings of authenticity, which conse-
quently obscures (but not eliminates) the possibility for authenticity to exist as consist-
ency between internal values and external expression (see Lehman et al., 2019). This
disruption between the internal and external expression parallels Hochschild’s (1983)
notion of deep acting in emotional labour, which is a way to commodify emotions by
changing one’s internal feelings to align with a company’s expectations for positive and
authentic emotional expression that has the consequence of estranging employees from
their own feelings at work. Similarly, authenticization has the possibility of reshaping
our internal values to coincide with the demands of neoliberalism, thereby alienating us
from the process of self-understanding that helps us determine what our values are and
why we have them. This process has the potential to make authenticization indistinguish-
able from any other notions of authenticity. Authenticization creates authentic subjects
via the consumption of commodified authenticity, which obfuscates possibilities for
autonomy in self-understanding. As part of subjectivity-making, authenticization serves
8 Theory & Psychology 00(0)

to alienate us from ourselves and lose our sense of identity (see Heidegger, 1927/1962)
as we become neoliberal subjects (see Teo, 2018).

Authenticization
Authenticization functions to create authenticity under neoliberal power dynamics, much
like Foucault’s (1961/1988) objectification and subjectification creates subjectivity
under systemic power dynamics. For Foucault (1982) the subject is objectified through
dividing practices (e.g., marginalized groups, criminals, prisoners, mental patients) and
scientific classification (e.g., sex, sexuality, intelligence, diagnosis), which turns the sub-
ject into an object of knowledge that institutions can observe and classify. Institutions
use dividing practices and scientific classification to create bodies of knowledge, which
act as the truth conditions for the discursive possibilities we have in understanding our-
selves. The neoliberal market economy acts as a site of truth, in what Foucault (1979/2008)
called a regime of truth, which is a power to give reality to something nonexistent (e.g.,
madness), in this case authenticity, and then submit it to a division between truth and
error. The sets of practices that make up authenticity together with the regime of truth
form a knowledge–power dynamic that obliges us to submit to that truth by virtue of
truth’s subjectifying power (see Lorenzini, 2015). We thus become subjects, meaning
that our identities are formed, through a process of self-understanding mediated by
power relations to external authority (i.e., institutions, the market), in other words, sub-
jectification (Foucault, 1975/1995). We take part in creating our subjectivity using the
institutional knowledge available to us within a social and political context. Where
objectification and subjectification create the conditions for becoming subjects via
knowledge–power relations, authenticization creates the conditions for becoming
authentic subjects via knowledge–power relations.
Institutions hold bodies of knowledge within a social and political context. As such,
institutions are subject to the neoliberal norms of contemporary capitalism, which propa-
gate the values of individualization, responsibilization, and self-governance (Harvey,
2005). These norms are then replicated in our subject-making possibilities and condition
what it means to be an authentic subject within neoliberal capitalism (see Teo, 2018). The
neoliberal market as a regime of truth is also a site of veridiction, which Foucault
(1979/2008) describes as producing not only truth, but also, the conditions for judging
true from false. As I mentioned earlier, the commodification of authenticity under neo-
liberal power aims to meet the demands of capitalism, which hold the truth conditions
(i.e., veridiction) for authenticity based on market demands. Under neoliberalism,
authenticity is part of the commodify yourself technology of self. Treating authenticity as
a commodity toward the marketability of the self effectively relies on the definitional
vagueness of the term, to easily transition between consistency, conformity, and connec-
tion models of authenticity. Returning to Lehman et al.’s (2019) review, we can see how
the process of authenticization relies on the various and contradictory definitions of
authenticity, framed instrumentally within a neoliberal cultural matrix, and with prob-
lematic consequences.
Plesa 9

Authenticization as consistency
Lehman et al.’s (2019) first definition of authenticity, namely consistency (between inter-
nal values and external expression) appears in three themes in the research: self-concept,
self-presentation, and organizational and brand identity. Self-concept is focused on clas-
sical philosophy dealing with the “backstage” of identity, namely the notion of a true self
(contrasting the front stage, which is the outward appearance). Notions that align with
the concept of a true self are typically associated with autonomy, which has positive
outcomes in work environments when individuals feel their work is meaningful and they
are part of a good team, such as increased well-being and self-esteem. This follows from
the operationalization of authenticity in positive psychology that sees the autonomy of
the true self as a characteristic to be nurtured toward productivity, workflow, employabil-
ity, success, and happiness (see Davies, 2015; Seligman, 2004). Within the process of
authenticization, it is advantageous to imagine we have an autonomous, true, and stable
self that is individually unique, responsible for its own creation and governance, and
highly competitive for achieving success in work and life.
Self-presentation deals with the “front stage” of identity, which is the external expres-
sion of one’s internal values, or sometimes, surface acting. The front stage work is most
often studied as inauthenticity because surface acting is the display of an external expres-
sion that is incongruent with internal feelings, and this regularly leads to negative out-
comes in the workplace when clients/customers sense “inauthenticity” (Gino et al.,
2015). As such, for effective observable authenticity, the emphasis must be on revealing
one’s true feelings and intentions, like Hochschild’s (1983) deep acting in emotional
labour, which is also reminiscent of the psychoanalytic notions that the most spontane-
ous expressions are the most genuine (see van Leeuwen, 2001), whereas the well-
thought-out expression may be read as surface acting. Authenticization as a process of
authentic subject making then encourages an unrehearsed self-presentation that is
demonstrative of one’s intuitions and internal values.
Organizational and brand identity research focuses on how a brand is perceived as
consistent with its core values (e.g., the founding members or mission statement), its
delivery to the public, and consistency over time. Emotional branding tactics such as
storytelling, craft production methods, and relations between owners and employees or
consumers engender attachment and positive associations that people perceive as authen-
tic (Varga, 2011). However, if a brand touts its own authenticity, it can backfire. Brands
are judged as authentic based on their sincerity, consistency between delivery and core
values, and consistency over time even with changing values, where inauthenticity is
conceptualized as betrayal (Lehman et al., 2019). Authenticization internalizes organiza-
tional practices within the self, creating the possibility of turning the self into a brand to
sell to a prospective buyer, whether it is an employer or a consumer.
On social media, the self as a brand faces these same pressures of consistency in val-
ues over time and delivery to the public. Nevertheless, knowing the emotional branding
tactics that work, along with the value of authenticity as determined by public approval,
the consistency between internal values and external expression is compelled by what is
marketable (Plesa, 2021). The self as a brand is subject to authenticization in manufac-
turing authenticity under neoliberal power relations. The neoliberal market produces the
10 Theory & Psychology 00(0)

truth condition for authenticity, normalizing it based on “natural” forces of supply and
demand. As such, the market is the site of veridiction that provides the conditions for
verification–falsification of authenticity (see Foucault, 1979/2008).
Actualizing the neoliberal commodify yourself technology of self indicates that one
must emphasize the marketable aspects of the self and conceal the unmarketable to par-
ticipate in a competitive online economy for often precarious work (e.g., social media
influencer), while imaging oneself as an autonomous true self with freely chosen or
inherent values (Illouz, 2008; Sugarman, 2015). Consistency authenticity can be com-
modified, usually by gatekeepers, to meet the demands of audiences (Peterson, 2005).
For example, Armstrong (2004) found that the increasing popularity of rap among White
audiences created a demand for harsher lyrics, vulgarity, and the packaging of rappers as
violent Black criminals, with companies like Coca-Cola creating a $20-million ad cam-
paign presenting rappers with a “being true to oneself” theme. What is commodified as
authentic is based on the demands of audiences, providing the truth conditions for the
market (see Foucault, 1979/2008), thereby verifying that form of authenticity to be fab-
ricated for profit (e.g., increasing violent lyrics despite no actual increase in violence).

Authenticization as conformity
Lehman et al.’s (2019) second category of authenticity is conformity, which refers to an
entity’s correct classification, group membership, or genre, and has two research themes:
category membership and category reinterpretation. Category membership is a form of
authenticity granted by an audience that determines if one fits the particular category
through appraisal, rewards, and critiques. Along with audiences are critics, regulators,
and professional bodies, which collectively help determine the authentic category mem-
bership of an entity, acting as a site of veridiction (see Foucault, 1979/2008). An authen-
tic entity then has more legitimacy, is more trustworthy, people are more likely to invest,
and the entity may garner support from other established category members for greater
authenticity. Category reinterpretation sees authenticity as a social category that is being
created to suit the tastes of audiences and also redefine them. As such, conformity authen-
ticity can be manufactured to signal authenticity or create and redefine authenticity
claims for a specific category, group, or genre.
Peterson (2005) argues that authenticity is socially constructed, whether applied to
genuine objects, arts, or people. He acknowledges the value of authenticity and describes
what he calls “authenticity work,” or what we do to signal authenticity. The simplest
form is authenticity through group membership, which he explains may have drawbacks,
such as celebrated Black, Jewish, and European authors only being commended when
they write about their own group and derided when writing about other groups. Peterson
(2005) also comments on the elasticity of group membership as a stretching to the limits
of what can constitute membership in a particular group, such as people doing the
“authenticity work” in referencing their mixed ethnicity, hot bloodedness, or natural
dancing abilities to participate in the Salsa dance community, or vague spatiotemporal
ties to a geographic location to justify using an artform that is traditionally from that
place.
Plesa 11

In attempting to become authentic subjects via the process of authenticization, con-

formity to a category, group, or genre is often beneficial for social and financial capital.
For example, the #StayWoke movement on social media, which originated in the Black
community as a term describing sociopolitical awareness, became appropriated as a
group identifier for anyone (and especially White people) seeking the social capital asso-
ciated with being enlightened on sociopolitical problems (Whiteout, 2018). “Woke cul-
ture” emerged as an unintentional parody of progressive politics spurred by phenomena
like virtue signalling, which refers to overt proclamations (and exaggerations) of one’s
moral righteousness by signalling how aware (woke) one is, sometimes in the absence of
moral action (Westra, 2021). Virtue signalling and woke culture became a type of authen-
ticity work to signal one’s affiliation to a group. Furthermore, that group membership
becomes the authenticator for expressing certain values and beliefs that belong to that
group.
Authenticization creates perverse incentives to stretch the limits of group membership
when individuals stand to gain personal social or financial capital online, for example,
increased followers on social media, sponsored posts, advertising deals, paid content,
merchandise, and employment opportunities. Social and financial incentives to attach
oneself to sociopolitical problems via group affiliation or “allyship” undermine the soci-
opolitical goals of those groups, which demand systemic change through action rather
than individuals signalling awareness (i.e., authenticity work). For marginalized groups,
“visibility” and “exposure” may present some immediate material benefits, however,
these “opportunities” are often given to select and marketable individuals rather than
groups, which simultaneously works to diffuse the sociopolitical aims of the group
(Rushing, 2016). For example, the girl power movement in the 1990s promised libera-
tion through personal responsibility, individualism, and overt sexuality, simultaneously
engendering a postfeminist ideology that only permitted freely chosen sexual autonomy,
which meant any association with victimhood must be considered shameful (Rutherford,
2018). Under neoliberalism, liberation from oppression is idealized through autonomy
and personal responsibility by focusing on authentic and liberated individuals as the role
models for marginalized groups to emulate, despite the systemic impediments prevent-
ing groups from attaining liberation (Bay-Cheng, 2015; Toffoletti & Thorpe, 2018).
Authenticity through status identity also determines worth based on obscurity and
marginalization (Peterson, 2005). Niche identities become commodified as the authen-
ticity being sold (for profit) in their art, or perhaps words, or performance based on their
marginalization. Here we have a more explicit example of neoliberal capitalism func-
tioning through authenticization as a commodify yourself technology that incentivizes
the selling of one’s identity as authentic while obscuring the distinction between consist-
ency and conformity authenticity. Not only does authenticization sustain contradictory
definitions of authenticity but it can also have contradictory effects. When marginalized
groups fight for political power by challenging the oppressive power structures of capi-
talism, the aims are to dismantle the systemic problems that produce and maintain that
marginalization (Ahmed, 2006; Downs & Manion, 2004; Sweetman, 2013). Nevertheless,
a threat to capitalism is merely an opportunity. As Fisher (2009) points out, capitalist
realism commodifies the real and turns it into a for-profit spectacle. For example, the real
in hip-hop was critiquing the problems of capitalism, which became commodified as
12 Theory & Psychology 00(0)

gangster rap and sold to the public, defusing the critique into an aesthetic. The rapper no
longer lives the “real” life, the rapper makes art about the “real” life for money (Fisher,
2009).
It may appear contradictory to sustain anticapitalist beliefs, commodify them into art,
and then sell them for money in a capitalist market. However, capitalist ideology permits
dissonance by overvaluing beliefs, where our external behaviours can be justified even if
contradictory to our values so long as our beliefs align with our values (Žižek, 1989). In
this way we can despise capitalism and money while continuing to participate in capital-
istic exchange and fetishizing money (Fisher, 2009). This is not a critique of any indi-
vidual’s cognitive dissonance, but rather, a demonstration that capitalism has the power
to commodify the otherwise uncommodifiable. For example, the marginalized subject
has consistency authenticity in externalizing anticapitalist values and conformity authen-
ticity in belonging to the marginalized group. Capitalism creates the opportunity to trans-
form that individual’s authenticity into a commodity (e.g., an aesthetic, a spectacle) for
public consumption via the process of authenticization. Authenticity is then reduced to a
marginalized identity where anything that individual produces is celebrated so long as it
reifies that identity. If that identity is defined by marginalization, then it only has market
value so long as it is marginalized or maintains the aesthetic of marginalization. In other
words, commodifying individual marginalization for profit does not incentivize solu-
tions for the marginalized group. Furthermore, as with the previous example of “ethnic”
authors, they are only celebrated for their “ethnic” work, not their work in general, or in
this case, their humanity (Peterson, 2005). Their humanity is seen through a single lens
(marginalized, different, bizarre, exotic, Other), which operates to magnify profitability
rather than their humanity.
The problem with authenticization is that it disrupts an essential part of self-creation
by capitalizing on some “authentic” part of the self and commodifying it into a perfor-
mance, a spectacle, an aesthetic (see Fisher, 2009). On the one hand, it can produce
income, but on the other hand, it can become hard to separate the performance from the
self, sometimes with tragic consequences (e.g., suicide). For example, some musicians
portray a destructive part of the self on stage (e.g., reckless, alcoholic, drug user) that
becomes inseparable from the self and ends up being self-destructive (e.g., Jim Morrison,
Kurt Cobain, Amy Winehouse; Peterson, 2005). The aesthetic performance of one’s
authenticity as a commodity for consumers becomes the catalyst to the loss of that per-
son’s sense of identity, as consistency transgresses into conformity.

Authenticization as connection
Authenticization not only relies on consistency and conformity to commodify yourself,
but also, connection authenticity to create opportunities for others to become authentic
by consuming authenticity. Lehman et al.’s (2019) final category—connection authentic-
ity between a valued object and a person, place, or time—has three research themes:
provenance, transference, and symbolism. Provenance is the spatiotemporal connection
between a valued object and its author (e.g., a Picasso painting), with the addition that
authenticity may be transferable from that object onto the owner (i.e., the current owner
of a Picasso painting). Transference is similar to provenance, however, it refers to a
Plesa 13

spatiotemporal connection between an object and a value (e.g., a celebrity’s birthplace or

article of clothing), where the value is not imbued by the creator of the object but by
association to something meaningful. Symbolism refers to an object that is deemed
authentic in representing the original qualities of an entity, place, or object (e.g., a reli-
gious icon, a restored car).
Relying on connection, authenticization imbues individuals to commodify and con-
sume authenticity in order to become authentic subjects. This resembles what some
scholars have called authenticity contagion (Newman & Smith, 2016; Rozin et al., 1989),
which is a type of magical thinking where the immaterial qualities of a person, usually a
celebrity, are transferred onto objects or places they’ve come in contact with (e.g., mem-
orabilia, their place of birth). Authenticization makes authenticity contagion possible
beyond connection to physical objects. On social media, connection via replication of
behaviours and content (e.g., virtue signalling, dances) is endemic. Here, authenticity
contagion is generated through replicas and homages that symbolically represent or point
to an original, while it is evident that the replica is indeed not the original. This applies
to the replication of template memes and the colloquial humour used in them, viral vid-
eos and the reactions to them, online challenges and dances, and many other forms of
reproduction intended to piggyback on the social (and sometimes financial) capital of
some original content. In fact, replicability is the logic on which one of the newest social
media platforms, TikTok, was built, where users are encouraged to react to, and imitate,
each other’s content to gain social and financial capital (Zulli & Zulli, 2020).
Contagion is an important part of why people consume authenticity, because it brings
a sense of social inclusion and belonging. Conversely, those most excluded may be most
susceptible to consuming authenticity via contagion, where studies found that, for exam-
ple, individuals with a stronger need to belong will value and pay more for celebrity
memorabilia (Newman & Smith, 2016). Another particularly potent example is tourism,
where agencies often attempt to offer authenticity via a spatiotemporal connection to the
past by trying to capture authentic objects (e.g., sites or places like Venice) before they’re
gone, while ironically contributing to their destruction via rampant tourism (Howard,
2016). Travelling is linked with capitalist consumer culture and the search for authentic-
ity. Howard (2016) found that

travellers in Nepal and Northern India often expressed a set of projections and contrasting
attitudes that were typically critical of Western culture and life at home, while often
demonstrating positive, yet uncritical appraisal for people and places perceived as exotic, non-
modern and natural. (p. 357)

Such travellers attempt to obtain authenticity contagion and reconnect with their pre-
discursive “true selves,” which are idealized as equally nonmodern and natural.
Furthermore, through authenticization, we fetishize the Other (or an exotic place or
time), turn them into commodities, consume them, and simultaneously convince our-
selves we are critical of the process of capitalist commodification. Nevertheless, as men-
tioned previously, capitalist ideology permits this contradiction by overemphasizing
beliefs over actions (Žižek, 1989). This is perhaps further obscured by the fluid experi-
ence of turbo-capitalism, where “both the age of authenticity and consumerism centre on
14 Theory & Psychology 00(0)

a restless individualism and the value of choice in an ever-changing market of consum-

able objects and experiences” (Howard, 2016, p. 362). We become consumers of sensa-
tions (see Urry, 2002) and authenticization offers us reward sensations for performing
commodified authenticity for others to consume. The regime of truth governing authen-
ticity provokes the question of whether the citizen–consumer can change social dimen-
sions of the market via consumption alone (see Peters, 2007).
Lehman et al. (2019) argue that consistency authenticity, which pertains to one’s sub-
jective appraisal of self, is enhanced by the consumption of any of the three categories of
authenticity (i.e., consistency, conformity, or connection) in order to satisfy an absence of
authenticity and uncover the “true self.” If the easily commodifiable forms of authentic-
ity conform to neoliberal values, which is what I argue the process of authenticization is,
then over time one’s subjective authenticity becomes a reflection of those values.
Essentially, authenticization not only produces commodified and easily consumable
forms of authenticity with contradictory definitions and consequences but has the poten-
tial to modify one’s internal values to align with neoliberal norms in the process, in a
similar way that deep acting in emotional labour estranges one from their own feelings
(Hochschild, 1983).
In attempting to turn ourselves into authentic subjects, we consume commodified
forms of authenticity that eventually reshape our internal values to align with the neolib-
eral norms of individualization, responsibilization, and self-governance (see Harvey,
2005). We lose the opportunity to create our own authentic possibilities by the allure of
performing highly marketable forms of commodified authenticity for social and material
prosperity. This allure is tied into the regime of truth governing authenticity, where truth
contains within it an obligation for us to submit with a simple uncritical logic: if X is true
then I must submit to it (Lorenzini, 2015). Foucault (1980/2014) suggests that under-
standing truth in relation to regimes of truth and veridiction provides the possibility for
resistance, to choose not to submit to a truth but to a different value that may not be
upheld as true.
However, unlike implicit forms of subjectification that internalize capitalism in sub-
jectivity, authenticization presents the illusion of choice and neoliberal prosperity via the
elusive desire to become authentic subjects. This illusion of choice obscures the possibil-
ity for understanding the truth conditions of authenticity, especially when they are con-
tradictory. The poor and overlapping definitions of authenticity carry vague nuances of
existential depth (self-transcendence), being true to oneself (moral value), discovering
one’s true self (self-transformation), being likeable and accepted (belonging), and mar-
ketable value as a self-brand (commodify yourself). As such, we willingly participate in
authenticization as an “autonomous” choice driven by a culture of self-improvement and
the desire to be unique individuals who simultaneously belong with others in categorical
groups. In the process, questions of identity, freedom, and meaning linger with potential
consequences for mental health.

Consequences of authenticization: A conclusion

Authenticization relies on reliable forms of authenticity with roots in existentialism,
humanistic psychology, and positive psychology, such as consistency, conformity, and
Plesa 15

connection, especially as symbolism and authenticity contagion (see Lehman et al.,

2019), however, the incentives for attaining authenticity are coercive. Social media
incentivizes the reproduction of neoliberal norms via authenticity as a marketable
appendage to one’s self as a brand. Authenticization becomes a process of self-govern-
ance for the marketability of the self, obfuscating the possibility for choosing what one
finds personally authentic. Furthermore, the definition of authenticity is itself obscured
by the regime of truth that conditions its verification and falsification (see Foucault,
1979/2008). “Even if authenticity itself may be at times difficult to define or verify, there
seems to be clear proof that it has a powerful pull on audiences and markets, regardless
of whatever meaning is invoked and wherever it arises” (Lehman et al., 2019, p. 31).
Indeed, authenticity seems to exist, and more than that, it is highly valued. What I am
suggesting is that the connection between one’s internal values and external expression
is compromised via the coercive power relations that incentivize commodified authentic-
ity to become part of self-governance, as authenticization.
When power relations operate through subjectification and objectification, they
delimit the available discourse for self-making and self-understanding (see Foucault,
1982). As such, the process of authenticization engenders a real and valuable authenticity
that affects both internal values and external expression via neoliberal norms. Through
neoliberal norms and power relations what is authentic is what can meet the demands of
capitalism, even if the expression of authenticity contradicts capitalist and neoliberal
values (e.g., nonconformists). Whatever is threatening to capitalism becomes a niche
investment market for social and economic capital, until it is absolved of its power to
challenge capitalism from the outside and becomes assimilated to a critique that is sus-
tained within capitalism and sponsored by its dominant members. Here we can recall the
commodification of gangster rap (see Armstrong, 2004; Fisher, 2009), the girl power
movement (Rutherford, 2018), but also consider, for example: the love your body move-
ment, which has been criticized for compelling women to perform heterosexy femininity
as signifiers of women’s liberation (Toffoletti & Thorpe, 2018); gay pride parades, which
have become emblematic of corporate sponsorship (referred to as rainbow capitalism)
without addressing the continuing systemic oppression faced by the LGBTQ+ commu-
nity (Chasin, 2001; Mowlabocus, 2021); and the use of BIPOC identities and activism as
living diversity statements for companies using co-opted progressive language to sell
products (McKellar, 2021; Mirzaei et al., 2022; Mukherjee & Banet-Weiser, 2012).
What is initially authentic as a freely chosen nonconformist purview of the world
becomes commodified, especially on social media, as a consumable authenticity that
others can invest in, perform, and capitalize on. This effectively alters what is subjec-
tively authentic (or consistent with one’s set of values) into a categorical form of authen-
ticity (conformity), which becomes contradictory. People whose identities become niche
expressions of commodified authenticity lose their sense of self in the process as they
conform to neoliberal norms. Neoliberalism sells the ideals of individualism, responsibi-
lization, and self-governance, however, we can argue that the individualism it purports is
compromised by its very assimilating nature into a conformist individuality that is sold
as a commodity with the mere appearance of uniqueness. On the other hand, we are
responsible for governing the appearance of the highly unique and marketable aspects of
the self as authentic, in order to compete with others for resources in a market driven by
16 Theory & Psychology 00(0)

demand and the illusion of scarcity (see Figueroa, 2019). Authenticization ensures that
the objectifying and subjectifying power relations that coconstruct the self are hidden
behind a façade of individual freedom, autonomy, choice, meaning, self-making, or, in
other words, authenticity.
Furthermore, authenticization relies on connection authenticity to produce, repro-
duce, and encourage the consumption of commodified authenticity to become authentic
subjects. Parroting other people’s authenticity on social media by imitating their perfor-
mances of authenticity has become a popular form of pastiche (see Zulli & Zulli, 2020).
Over time, some imitations can caricature or stereotype the original entity or event. For
example, performative outrage is an instance of caricatured authentic outrage on behalf
of marginalized communities via the desire for authenticity contagion and fueled by the
moral pressure to conform (see Clark, 2020). Performative outrage stems from beliefs
rather than values and can often be appraised as inauthentic, however, moral pressures
exist to encourage instances of performative outrage and simultaneously discourage both
internal and external criticisms, lest the critic become the target of outrage and face can-
cellation (see Gharavi, 2020; Velasco, 2020). Once more, this is supported by a capitalist
ideology that places more value on beliefs than actions (see Žižek, 1989).
Nevertheless, performative outrage serves as an example of capitalist realism, which
holds it as a virtue that its processes “turns belief to aesthetics, [and]. . . engagement to
spectatorship” (Fisher, 2009, p. 5) because it allegedly protects us from fanaticism. It
says, capitalism may be imperfect, but at least it’s not like dictatorships (often pointing
to communism). This has the effect on people that an actual positive state of the world
can only be an illusion, which Fisher (2009) compares to the symptoms of a person living
with depression. One cannot imagine what it is like to exist in a positive state of affairs
and accepts that life must be meaningless. For Heidegger (1927/1962) also, anxiety is a
response to meaninglessness that can imbue the courage to face that anxiety through
authenticity. The existential project is to discover or create meaning, which requires
authenticity as a commitment to act with freedom in a state of self-understanding (see
Heidegger, 1927/1962; Sartre, 1943/1992). On the other hand, authenticization com-
modifies a facsimile of existential authenticity (consistency) into categorical and sym-
bolic forms of authenticity (conformity and connection). If authenticity is commodified
under neoliberal power, we lose the freedom to be ourselves by becoming consumers of
authenticity. We cannot discover or create meaning, only consume it as commodified
authenticity as we lose our sense of identity. Authenticization is then also similar to
Heidegger’s (1927/1962) existentiell authenticity, which is described as coping with the
mundane in the absence of freedom.
The response to a mundane and meaningless existence can manifest as anxiety and
depression, which have been on the rise globally (Ormel et al., 2020; World Health
Organization, 2017). Capitalism produces the conditions that give rise to anxiety and
depression and then treats mental health conditions as natural facts rather than condi-
tioned responses (Fisher, 2009). We are encouraged to take individual responsibility for
our own mental health, coping, treatment, and recovery (see Harvey, 2005). Moreover,
the promise of well-being in capitalism operates on indefinite postponement (i.e., a life-
long process), much like work, education, and training, where “a consequence of this
‘indefinite’ mode of power is that external surveillance is succeeded by internal policing.
Plesa 17

Control only works if you are complicit with it” (Fisher, 2009, p. 22). The internalized
neoliberal values become our indefinite mode of internal policing.
Autheticization is also a lifelong process of indefinite postponement where the
authentic ideal is never achieved, but always striven toward via modes of self-govern-
ance. Likewise, it is socially constructed under neoliberal norms and therefore aims at
assimilation to those norms. The power of those dominant norms is reprogramed into
self-surveillance (i.e., internal policing) to perform the authenticization of self in align-
ment with neoliberal social norms. Fisher (2009) also argues that neoliberalism has dis-
pensed with ethical values in favour of a business ontology that makes it appear obvious
that everything ought to be run like a business. Authenticization, as a neoliberal process
of self-governance, also adopts this business ontology toward authenticity as a consumer
commodity in the buying and selling of authentic selves. Through authenticization we
commodify ourselves, consume commodified authenticity, and reshape what it means to
be authentic—based on internalized neoliberal values—while potentially losing sight of
who we are and what possibilities we have to discover meaning.
My aim here was to critique the process of authenticization and point out the potential
consequences it has on understanding ourselves, meaning, and mental health. I have not
committed to providing any solutions, though I have pointed to Taylor’s (1992) use of
Sartre’s self-transcendence model of authenticity as a viable alternative to authenticiza-
tion, which focuses on the relations we share with others in the world as a source of
intersubjective meaning rather than the traditional subjective and individualistic forms of
authenticity. Furthermore, it may be possible to undermine the performance of commodi-
fied authenticity using Butler’s (1990) notions of subversion, which must remain vaguely
defined if they are to be subversive at all, but do hint at transgression of norms and
expectations, irony, and the condition that changes in boundaries and definitions are
indispensable toward liberation from oppression. In this way, it parallels Foucault’s
(1980/2014) suggestion for resisting the regime of truth by first understanding the pro-
duction of truth, and then choosing not to submit.

Funding
The author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this
article.

ORCID iD
Patric Plesa https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4124-0433

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Author biography
Patric Plesa’s research tackles critical issues in psychology from theoretical perspectives toward
improving understanding, innovating interventions, and reassessing practices that affect mental
health, well-being, and the environment. He is working on psychedelics research, existentialism,
ecopsychology, and critical psychology. Specifically, he is interested in questions around systemic
issues, meaninglessness, and subjectivity. Recent publications include: “Reassessing Existential
Constructs and Subjectivity: Freedom and Authenticity in Neoliberalism” in Journal of Humanist
Psychology (2021) and (with R. Petranker), “Manifest Your Desires: Psychedelics and the Self-
Help Industry” in International Journal of Drug Policy (2022).