Alpharic Research
Institute
Centre for Research in Philosophy, Theology and
MEANINGFUL IMPACTS RELIGION AND CULTURE DYNAMICS
TO THE SOCIETY
BY
GODSWILL OME UFERE
Email: uferegodswillmatthias@gmail.com, godswillmatthias99@gmail.com; __GSM: +2347045155575
JANUARY, 2021
Introduction
The relationship between culture and religion
is often seen as a pseudo-conceived one
(positive or negative one), with freedom of
both often invoked to defend human and
course of existence. In response, many draw a
distinction between culture and religion, and
what is insinuated is that culture is the
problem, not religion. However, the reality is
that in many cases, culture and religion are not
so distinct, with cultural practices becoming
“religionized” and religious ideas becoming
part of the culture. But recognizing this
relationship that occur among the two can
open a door of acceptance without bias. The
common connection that we make between
culture and religion could only be seen when a
good and pure consideration of their dynamics
are stressed. This work will demonstrate this
by examining perspectives on culture and
Ethics
Email: alpharicinstitute@gmail.com
+2349066927954
religion, how it is conceptually used by and
for the adherents and scholars, and how this
can provide lessons for an understanding
drawn out of the notions pointed in their areas
of dynamism – in a way to buttress the
meaningfulness of the dynamics seen in
religion and culture to the society.
Perspectives on Culture
Sociological systems theory has always been
uneasy about culture. Talcott Parsons had
conceived of culture as the system of value-
orientation whose generalized symbols of
action orientation solved the problem of
double contingency in social systems (Parsons
and Shils 51). But already when concluding
the famous "truce" between anthropology and
sociology concerning the use of the terms
culture and social system, respectively, he
rather ambivalently accepted culture as a
factor which shapes human behaviour by
"transmitted and created content and patterns
of values, ideas, and other symbolic-
meaningful systems", but compared this to a
notion of social system which is interested in
"the specifically relational system
interaction among individuals
collectivities" (Parsons and Kroeber 583).
There
seems to be something more basic going on
with respect to the social which poses
problems that may or may not be solved by
cultural rules. Without really revising either
the notion of the solution of the problem of
double contingency or the terms of the truce,
Parsons later went on to relegate culture to a
distinction between correct and incorrect
behaviour (Parsons 73). Yet he always insisted
on the possibility of speaking of the cultural
system as that specific aspect of action which
is organized around symbols, ideas, beliefs,
and other "stable patternings of meaning"
(Parsons 77).
 On Concept of Culture
NiklasLuhmann removes culture as the one
and only solution to the problem of double
contingency (Luhmann 13). Instead, the
problem of ego's selections of behaviour
depending on alter's selections, with alter's
selections depending in turn on ego's, is
solved, if it is solved, by the very fact of a
selection which must not be given by culture
but can as well be the result of a chance event,
a tentative offer, an involuntary gesture.
Luhmann therefore asks for a temporal
analysis of both the problem and its solution
instead of a cultural one.
of
and Like Parsons he accepts culture as a token for
the distinction between correct and incorrect
behaviour, or between correct and incorrect
"use of themes", as he would have it, and
conceives of culture as the "supply of themes"
ready for use in communication situations
(Luhmann 163). Thus, sociological systems
theory joins the sociological mainstream
which describes culture as "an ongoing
argument about rightness of choice" (Douglas
89), high culture being an argument about
taste (Bourdieu 79), low culture being an
argument about morals. Culture is a "shared
understanding" developed in situations where
all orientation relates to how others orientate
to the situation (Becker 1982). It combines a
well-chosen bias with the social relations that
are to be maintained (Thompson/Ellis and
Wildavksy 90).
Culture thus is part of the "operation
bootstrap" by which social systems emerge as
independent from organic and environmental
conditions (Parsons 179). It is that part of the
operation which settles down as symbols. Yet,
some doubts remain. Parsons never
endogenized culture into his conception of a
social system. He always kept it distinct from
it, thus entertaining a refuge for culture which
is just one of four aspects of the action system
(the cultural, the social, the organic, the
personal), with three of these aspects not to be
reduced to the social. Culture is sited outside
the social, with art, religion, and science
almost as in Dilthey, as part of the cultural not
of the social. Luhmann also treats culture
differently from other notions. Yet he seems
to have different reasons for doing so. He for
instance calls it "one of the worst notions ever
invented", having "devastating effects" for
religion as well as for art (Luhmann 95). He
takes great care to describe it as a "historical
notion", invented in the 18th century, when
culture lost the genetive which it had in
ancient times. Culture with the Greeks and
Romans had been an expression of care,
attention, and worship, as is documented in
phrases like culturaanimi, as Cicero's name
for philosophy, or culturadolorumas an
expression for the Christian faith.
Culture now became an independent sphere of
decisively "intellectual" comparisons of
human behaviour in different times and
regions. Culture emerged as the result of the
possibility of describing as "interesting" what
until then just had been of use or not, be it
something beautiful, just, true, lovable,
economical, or the opposite.
These comparisons destroyed the sense of
articles of faith as well as of works of art. Or
rather, they introduced a sense which had
nothing to do any more with religious reasons
for religion, or artistic reasons for art (since
then religion for religion's sake as well as l'art
pourl'arthas been stamped the cultural Fall of
Man). To compare articles of faith or works of
art among each other amounts to not taking
their singularity seriously anymore. Ironically,
in becoming aware of this effect, culture
compensated it by taking itself seriously, by
demanding honoring, and by developing
notions of comparably incomparable
singularity. That finally killed articles of faith
and works of art, since by comparing,
honouring, and singularizing them one looses
all sense of their socially improbable
operation, that is, of their production inside a
decoupled and embedded system. Of course,
to switch from honouring to criticizing, as did
cultural criticism, only changes the signature
but does not change the general direction of
intellectual contempt.
Sociological systems theory brackets culture
as a possible candidate for the solution of its
most important problem, i.e., the problem of
double contingency. Such a bracketing only
makes sense when there are different solutions
for this problem. And indeed, such a possible
track was kept open by Parsons when
distinguishing between the social and the
cultural, and is undertaken by Luhmann when
proposing a temporal instead of a cultural
analysis of solutions to the problem of double
contingency coming about. It is culture's
stable patternings of meaning barring an
analysis of how meaning comes about which
sociological systems theory worries about.
Sociological theory ought not to stick with the
stable patternings but should proceed to an
analysis of the meaning which becomes
patterned by culture. For Luhmann,
radicalizing here on Parsons, there has to be a
theory of meaning which explains how stable
patternings come about, given the all-
pervasive aspect of time passing and events
vanishing. That is, on this issue, Luhmann
joins Mead and Schütz by insisting on an
analysis of meaning well before any analysis
of action, let alone culture, becomes possible.
Perspectives on Religion
In the face of continuing debate about the
adequacy and definition of the concept of
'religion', it is argued that it is necessary for
the social sciences to become more self-
critical about their various - and changing -
uses of the term. As it is showed here, three
main uses are currently dominant: religion as
belief/meaning, religion as identity, and
religion as structured social relations (Herbert
34). By contrast, some uses which were once
important are currently recessive, including
Marxist approaches to religion as ideology,
and Parsonian conceptions of religion as
norms and values. Some new uses are also
emerging, including 'material' religion,
religion as discourse, and religion as practice.
Drawing these together, the fact proposes a
taxonomy of five main major uses of the term.
It reflects on their adequacy, and points out
where there are still occlusions: above all with
regard to 'super-social' or 'meta-social'
relations with non-human or quasi-human
beings, forces and powers (Marett 02).
 On Its Concept
The concept of religion has never been
uncontentious, and its critics have never been
quiet. Today it faces criticisms from a number
of directions, some old and some new.
Controversy over the definition of religion is a
constant. It has proved impossible to fix on a
definition which all - or even a majority - can
agree. But in this regard 'religion' is little
different from 'the economy', 'politics',
'society' or 'history' - and scholars in all these
areas proceed quite happily without
necessarily being able to define their object of
study. The difficulty of definition arises from
the fact that these are not indexical terms but
general concepts which direct attention to
complex constellations and aspects of social
and material relations for certain purposes.
However, the definition of religion is not the
same as the concept of religion. The latter
faces additional difficulties. Christian
theologians have long objected that 'religion'
is a modern concept which carries a baggage
of secular presuppositions, and which
narrows, distorts, and sucks the living truth
out of that which it attempts to dissect (e.g.
Cantwell-Smith in 1962, John Milbank in
1991, Karl Barth in 1997). Others object that
the concept of religion is too Christian rather
than too secular. Thus Thomas Herbert argued
that sociological studies of religion hugged the
form of the churches so closely that they
rendered other manifestations of religion
'invisible' (97). Postcolonial critiques expand
this line of argument by showing that the
concept of religion has ethnocentric
imperialist biases, and fails to do justice to
non-Western cultures by forcing them into a
Western straitjacket
An interesting response to these debates is
found in Jim Beckford's proposal that the
concept of religion should be tied more
closely to its contexts of use (Beckford 23).
The proposal is for a moderate form of social
constructionism which denies that there is an
essence of religion, and views the concept as
essentially contested. These contests are not
merely academic, but constitute the social life
of religion. Religion is constantly being
constructed, as political and legal authorities
claim the right to define religion, some social
groups vie for the privilege of being counted
as religious, others seek to wrest control of the
meaning of religion from dominant groups,
and still others seek to restrict religion and its
sphere of influence. Although Beckford has
proved the value of his approach in his own
empirical work, for example on cult
controversies (Beckford 25) and religion in
prisons (Beckford and Gilliat 98), it is easiest
to apply when the category of 'religion' is
clearly in play. However, that is often not the
case, since individuals and groups regularly
classified as religious may not use or accept
the term themselves. Nor do they necessarily
use other staple terms of scholarly discussion,
such as Christian, Buddhist, theist, agnostic,
New Age, sectarian, and so on. Thus the
problem remains that scholars of religion need
some broad conception of religion in order
even to identify a suitable field for study. As
some propose, it is possible to drop the
category of religion altogether, and revert to
existing categories such as culture and
politics. But these are no less problematic (or
ethnocentric), and given the academy's
existing secular bias, the likely result will not
be a new attentiveness to aspects of social life
which have previously been neglected. The
solution to these issues proposed here is that
the social scientific study of religion should
simply become more self-conscious and self-
critical in its approach to 'religion'.
Religion as Belief and Meaning
One of the most popular conceptions of
religion today is of religion as belief. On this
account, being religious has to do with
believing certain things, where that amounts to
subscribing to certain propositions and
accepting certain doctrines. Sometimes the
content of belief is further specified in
definitions of religion: for example, belief in
the existence of supernatural beings or forces
(Marett 04). A similarly culturally oriented
understanding of religion, but with a much
broader conception of culture than 'belief', is
evident in sociological and anthropological
approaches to religion which interpret religion
as an embracing system of meaning which
covers the whole of life (Berger 65).
The concept of religion as cultural order has
been extended in the last decade or so by
studies of religion which pay much greater
attention to material culture. This
development, signalized by the launch of the
journal Material Religion: The Journal of
Objects, Art and Belief in 2005 has been
pioneered by scholars such as Colleen
McDannell and David Morgan, both of whom
argue that objects play an indispensible role in
ordering cultural and social life (43). Still,
rather than responding to criticisms of the
concept of religion by abandoning the term,
the starting-point of here is the belief that it is
more fruitful for scholars of religion to
become critically aware of the scope, variety
and contingency of the term and its uses - and
so better able to justify and critique their own
conceptual choices.
The Dynamism of Culture
Culture is dynamic because it has to adapt to
the situations in which people are. People are
not static, contactless islands: they travel, they
meet other cultures, they import customs and
goods. The situation in which people live are
different when different customs are
introduced in society, when another people
stand next to you, when the power is in the
hands of one man or another. That make
societies dynamic.
There is this widespread conception of culture
as a monolithic “thing", with defined
boundaries and with recognizable features.
This is called reification of culture and is not
widespread among those who deals
academically with culture, because it does not
describe the inner diversity of culture in a
society and the similarities shared by different
cultures. Culture is a name we give to an
homogenous system of practices and such
customs, it is meant to identify them and to
describe them not to make them objects.
Cultural reification is cause of racism and
stereotypes, but this is not related to what we
are dealing with here. We have developed
dynamic conception of cultures, that observe
how culture are evolving, meeting and
interacting. Culture are, not static monuments There are three major theoretical approaches
to be admired, they are dynamic systems of toward the interpretation of culture. A
organization of social and personal life: functionalist perspective acknowledges that
cultural purity is a myth, nationalistic there are many parts of culture that work
propaganda, that's not the way cultures are. together as a system to fulfill society’s needs.
Functionalists view culture as a reflection of
The turn to historical methods and suspicion
society’s values. Conflict theorists see culture
of universal theories of religion has led to an
as inherently unequal, based upon factors like
ethos of particularism in which the increasing
gender, class, race, and age. An interactionist
data of religions are treated like atomistic and
is primarily interested in culture as
self-sufficient units of knowledge. But as
experienced in the daily interactions between
complex systems, religions exhibit patterns
individuals and the symbols that comprise a
that are visible only when we look beyond the
culture. Various cultural and sociological
most particulate scale of analysis, similar to
occurrences can be explained by these
phenomena examined in the natural and social
theories; however, there is no one “right” view
sciences. To see religions as complex and
through which to understand culture. The
dynamic systems enables us to resist the
dynamism of culture makes it peculiar to
fragmentation of knowledge, account for
different people of different entity.
change without sacrificing systemic
consistency, and formulate generalizations The Dynamism of Religion
that allow for comparison across religious
One important way in which religion can be
systems. The study of Buddhism is used as a
understood as a system is to look at its
reference point for these methodological
dynamism over time. In dynamic systems,
discussions. Music, fashion, technology, and
structures are the patterns of continually
values—all are products of culture. But what
changing systemic properties. While
do they mean? How do sociologists perceive
apparently unidentifiable in the particulate,
and interpret culture based on these material
dynamic structures are as real as tornadoes
and nonmaterial items? Let’s finish our
and living bodies, which are things that cannot
analysis of culture by reviewing them in the
be seen at the level of gases or cells,
context of three theoretical perspectives:
respectively. However, because of the
functionalism, conflict theory, and symbolic
complexity involved, a natural confusion
interactionism.
arises in determining exactly what patterns
constitute an entity. We might begin by saying
a system’s identity “resides in the continued
presence . . . of key components and key
relationships” (Stausberg31), although this
does not account for continuity in complex
adaptive systems through evolution (Stewart
26). We can nevertheless move forward if we
keep in mind that identification means
simplification for some purpose whose context
dictates what counts as a system component or
relationship (Stausberg 2011). This modeling
can be guided by “[metamodels] which are a
kind of specific metaphor: a way of thinking
about things that serves as a powerful tool for
the generation of specific hypotheses in
specific cases” (Thayer and Collier 33). This
dictates that:
Instead of attempting to construct the
identity and dynamics of a self
organizing network from the bottom up
by identifying separate individuals and
only afterwards grouping them into
what the investigator hopes is the
appropriate aggregate, complex
systems theory proceeds by letting the
dynamic patterns produced by the
flows and processes involved identify
the specific architecture. (Taylor 1).
One does not ask after its “universal Platonic
substance or form” nor its “intrinsic and
essential attributes” (Thayer 98). To
understand religions as dynamic systems
means recognizing them as their evolution
through time and place. A system is dynamic
if it changes in time. It is dynamic if its
outputs depend on its history, in contrast to a
system that responds identically when
presented with identical input, regardless of its
history. A billiard ball on a pool table is not a
dynamic system because identical strikes
result in identical trajectories regardless of the
prior history of strikes.
A religion is a dynamic system because
identical inputs—for example, the same ritual
performed within the same community at
different times— may have different
outcomes. Interactions originating externally
are a system’s inputs, and those affecting its
environment are outputs.
Religion as a dynamic system changes in
response to “feedback,” which is input that is
a response to its output. Feedback is necessary
in autonomous or resilient systems and
implements system state, or memory. The
proliferation of our knowledge about
religions, and the increasing specializations it
breeds, brings to mind Kenneth Stewart’s
observation about the sciences: “One wonders
sometimes if science will not grind to a stop in
an assemblage of walled-in hermits, each
mumbling to himself words in a private
language that only he can understand” (198).
Modern science has always demanded more
than the accumulation of inductive
knowledge. Natural history, which began as
an inventory of biodiversity, was commonly
denigrated as mere “stamp collecting” until
the theory of evolution gave it a unifying
framework. The discovery and classification
of unique life forms are still essential to
biological science, but without the perception
of similarity and the ability to group things,
every observation becomes independent and
occupies a unique class consisting only of
itself. This is not sufficient for the production
of knowledge.
The ability to generalize and
observations is also essential, although if
taken too far, all observations become
aggregated into the same class and become
again meaningless. The balance of both
difference and similarity underlies
measurements and classifications of scientific
knowledge. The walled-in hermits
Stewart feared would be the fate of the
sciences is in fact the reality of religious
studies today:
What one usually finds is
proliferation of extremely meticulous,
often rigorous, narrow, specialized
studies. While appreciating much of
this specialized scholarship, one can
make a strong case that
contemporary scholarly studies are
usually rather trivial, written for a very
limited readership of similar specialists,
and are of limited contemporary
significance or relevance. In many
ways, we’ve greatly lowered our
expectations of what we can expect
from scholars. (Allen 21).
Some scholars of religion have turned to
cognitive studies in order to envision the
putative structures that evolution has imparted
to human thought, thereby reactivating the
paradigm of universal theorizing (Stausberg
39). We apply systems theory to religion, on
group the other hand, to deny that we can come up
with a “law of gravity” for religions.
Combining the three ideas of boundaries,
complexity, and dynamism, we can see
religions as co-evolving self-adaptive
the structures, stabilized by feedback processes,
existing in a common environment, and
that communicating at multiple hierarchical levels.
This does not predetermine what kind of
system religion is: depending on what we pay
attention to, religions can be envisioned as
different kinds of systems, or as components
the of other systems. Unlike a general theory of
religion that strives for completeness, systems
theory provides concepts that allow us to
recognize the whole as something larger and
more complex than we can ever hope to
these describe with a general theory.
Meaningful Impacts of the Dynamics in
Religion and Culture
Cultural and religious dynamics (collectively),
simply put, include the various facets of a
culture and religion which are under a process
of continuous, subtle changes due to a myriad
of environmental, human and financial forces.
These would include traditions, language,
relationships, dress and fashion styles; beliefs,
liturgy, affiliations, superstitions, tenets,
values and virtues. Culture is very important
to all social groups as well as religion as they
define them for who they are and give them a
sense of belonging, identity and stability in a
diverse world. That makes it very relevant to
monitor and regulate the changes which may
be allowed in order to keep up with the times
and which are essential
The dynamics of culture and religion provides
a sense of progressive to the established tenets
underscored in a particular society. In such,
culture interacts with, influences, and is
influenced by, religion, and therefore provides
lessons for the advancement of the both. In the
first instance, cultural expression is the human
way of responding to the impact the world has
on our lives, on the tensions we may feel
between ourselves and our surroundings, and
on altering material forms in a way that
reflects meaning back at us, through music,
the arts and books. Therefore religion or
belief, which reveals the most profound of
meanings that humans carry--their origins,
their purpose on earth--is naturally manifested
through the creation of culture and the
adaption of material objects, through the use
of symbolism, places of worship, and
sermons. Looked at in this light, culture can
give us an idea of what the manifestation of
freedom of religion looks like as a lived
experience, and conversely, a lack of cultural
expression can serve as an indication of the
more subtle ways this may be restricted and
cultural expression upheld.
In the second place, the level of ideas, values,
and norms that is often highlighted in human
society is improved. One new dynamic
expression added to religion or culture has a
long way to go in adding more meaning to the
ideas and virtues of the people, even their
values. But in a way that is fixed, unchanging,
and most often, as an obstacle to human
rights. Culture is seen as holding harmful
practices, containing barriers to gender
equality, and being hostile or intolerant to
other groups, including other religious groups
or religious minorities. However, a key debate
concerns the legitimacy of these assumptions
about both culture and religion. This has
happened, in part, through the development of
voices arguing that both culture and religion
are changing, dynamic, and contain values
that align with each other and with universal
standards of cultural and religious recognition.
These arguments regarding the change and
dynamism of values suggest that culture can
contribute to religion in a way that resonates The cultural and religious dynamics stressed
with people on the ground and adds new above show the effectiveness of their
dimensions to the understanding and existence in the human society. They also
promotion of culture and religion. gives spice of life to know all the diverse in
the world. These will help us being under the
More so, the dynamism of religion has caused
diverse culture and religion in the world
it to reach out to culture and its expressions.
would be able to appreciate what we believe.
The centrality of religion to other modes of
Of course, it will help to develop better ways
human capabilities and activity, such as
of life and advancement in certain areas of
ethical and intellectual expression; moral
life. Culture and religion with their dynamics
education of the young, family, and larger
are concerned with mimetic and memetic
community; and cultural continuity and other
waves throughout the society where they
forms of affiliation and interaction (Nussbaum
evolve. This also tend to bring to light that,
178–179), explains why it is afforded special
according to Peter Landry “the importance of
protection beyond freedom of conscience.
cultural and religious changes has never been
Even if substitute forms of expression and
in question and will continue to be
activity are available “to strike at religion is
appreciated.”
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