[ G.R. No. 235898.

March 13, 2019 ]

MARLON DOMINGUEZ Y ARGANA, PETITIONER, V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

RESPONDENT.

DECISION

CAGUIOA, J:

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure filed by Marlon Dominguez y Argana (Dominguez) assailing the Decision2 dated May 9,
2017 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 38665, which affirmed the Decision3 dated
March 22, 2016 of the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City, Branch 203 (RTC) in Criminal Case
No. 10-533, finding Dominguez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 11, Article II of
Republic Act No. (RA) 9165, otherwise known as "The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002,"4 as amended.

The Facts

Dominguez was charged with violation of Section 11, Article II of RA 9165. The accusatory
portion of the Information reads as follows:

That on or about the 17th day of August 2010, in the City of Muntinlupa,

Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, not being authorized by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, have in his possession, custody and control Metamphetamine
Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug weighing 0.03 [gram] contained in a transparent
plastic sachet, in violation of the above-cited law.

CONTRARY TO LAW.5

Upon arraignment, Dominguez pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Thereafter, trial ensued.

Version of the Prosecution

At around 2:00 in the morning of August 17, 2010, SPO1 Gerardo Parchaso (SPO1 Parchaso)
was conducting monitoring and possible arrest of violators of RA 9165 at Purok 3, Brgy. Poblacion,
Muntinlupa City.6 From a meter away, he saw a man wearing a red shirt and white shorts, holding
with his left hand a small transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance suspected
to be shabu. This man was later identified as Dominguez.7

SPO1 Parchaso grabbed the hands of Dominguez and seized therefrom one heat-sealed
transparent plastic sachet containing the substance suspected to be shabu.8 Assisted by PO2
Salvador Genova (PO2 Genova), SPO1 Parchaso introduced himself as a police officer, arrested
Dominguez, and informed him of his violation and his rights under the law.9 However, seeing that
there was already a crowd gathering in the area, SPO1 Parchaso and PO2 Genova decided to leave
the scene, and brought Dominguez and the seized item to their office.10

At the police station, SPO1 Parchaso marked the seized item with "MD," the initials of
Dominguez.11 With the help of Police Inspector Domingo J. Diaz (P/Insp. Diaz), and another police
officer, PO2 Mark Sherwin Forastero (PO2 Forastero), they prepared Dominguez's Booking and
Information Sheet, and took photographs of Dominguez and the marked seized item.12 They also
conducted the inventory which was witnessed by Orlando Rodriguez, a local government employee
of Muntinlupa City.13 SPO1 Parchaso explained that despite P/Insp. Diaz's calls to the
representatives of the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the media to witness the inventory, no one
came.14 Nevertheless, they still proceeded with the inventory to comply with the period within which
to bring the evidence to the Philippine National Police - Southern Police District (PNP-SPD) Crime
Laboratory for examination.15

The marked seized item was brought to the PNP-SPD Crime Laboratory for examination. SPO1
Parchaso was the one who prepared the request for laboratory examination, but it was PO2 Genova
who delivered the marked seized item. Upon inquiry, SPO1 Parchaso explained that it was only PO2
Genova who had an identification card at the time of delivery.16 Nonetheless, the request was
received by PNP Non-Uniformed Personnel Bernardo Bucayan, Jr. (NUP Bucayan, Jr.), which he
turned over to Police Chief Inspector Abraham Verde Tecson (PCI Tecson).17 Based on Physical
Science Report No. D-294-10S, prepared by PCI Tecson, the specimen weighing 0.03 gram, yielded
a positive result for shabu.18

Version of the Defense

Dominguez vehemently denied the accusations against him. He testified that at 11:00 in the
evening of August 16, 2010, while he was at home watching television and eating inside his house at
Argana St., Brgy. Poblacion, Muntinlupa City, two men in civilian clothes entered therein and
arrested him.19 They immediately grabbed him by his shorts and nape and told him not to resist.20

The two men introduced themselves as police officers.21 When Dominguez asked the men,
"Ano pong kasalanan ko sa inyo?"22 The men replied, "Sumama ka na sa amin para hindi ka
masaktan."23 Immediately thereafter, the men brought Dominguez and boarded him on a white
Toyota Revo, where he was told, "Aregluhin mo na lang ito," to which he replied, "Sir, ano hong
aaregluhing sinasabi niyo?"24

The man, later identified as Police Officer Bob Yangson (PO Yangson), showed Dominguez a
plastic sachet containing a white crystalline substance, and insisted that the same was recovered
from him.25 The other man was later identified as PO2 Forastero. At the police station, PO Yangson
and PO2 Forastero took a photograph of Dominguez while they reiterated that Dominguez should
settle the matter to avoid criminal charges.26 However, Dominguez did not enter into any settlement
with them because he denied having possessed said sachet and also, due to lack of money.27

The wife of Dominguez, Rowelyn, also testified that on August 17, 2010, at around 11:00 in the
evening, two men who introduced themselves as police officers barged inside their house.28  She
saw PO2 Forastero slap and punch Dominguez while the other police officer held him.29  When they
brought Domiguez at the police station, Rowelyn followed them. She claimed that PO2 Forastero
told her: "Misis halika, may P50,000 ka ba?" to which she replied: "Sir, wala po akong P50,000.00,
ako'y isang mananahi lang po ngayon, hindi po ako makakabigay sa inyo ng
P50,000.00."30 Thereafter, PO2 Forastero said that they will detain and charge Dominguez with
violation of Section 5 or Section 11 of RA 9165.31

Ruling of the RTC

After trial on the merits, in its Decision32 dated March 22, 2016, the RTC convicted Dominguez
of the crime charged. The RTC held that the prosecution sufficiently established all the elements for
illegal possession of dangerous drugs, and that the integrity of the shabu seized from Dominguez
had been duly preserved. It further held that chain of custody has not been broken. The dispositive
portion of the said Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding

accused Marlon Dominguez y Argana @ "OXO" guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. Accordingly, the accused is
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one
(1) day as minimum to fourteen (14) years as maximum to pay a fine in the amount
of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00).

xxxx

SO ORDERED.33

Aggrieved, Dominguez appealed to the CA.

Ruling of the CA

In the questioned Decision34 dated May 9, 2017, the CA affirmed the RTC's conviction of
Dominguez, holding that the prosecution was able to prove the elements of the crime charged. The
CA explained:

A close look at the sequence of events narrated by the prosecution witnesses

particularly by SPO1 Parchaso shows that during the police officers' monitoring,
accused-appellant was caught with a sachet of shabu in plain view and in flagrante
delicto[.] It bears stressing that accused-appellant was particularly identified by
SPO1 Parchaso as the person in possession of the seized sachet marked as "MD."
Subsequently, through chemical analysis, the contents of the same sachet were
found to be shabu. Accused-appellant was positively found to be in possession of
prohibited drugs without proof that he was duly authorized by law to possess them.
Having been caught in flagrante delicto, there is, therefore, a prima facie evidence
of animus possidendi on the part of accused-appellant - a burden of evidence, which
accused-appellant miserably failed to discharge in this case.35

The CA also held that there was no showing that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
item was compromised. It stated that the chain of custody can be easily established. It further
stressed that defenses of denial and frame-up cannot prevail over the positive and categorical
assertions of the police officers, particularly SPO1 Parchaso, who was a stranger to Dominguez and
against whom no ill motive was established.

For these reasons, the CA disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The March 22, 2016 Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City, Branch 203 in Criminal Case No. 10-533,
convicting accused-appellant Marlon Dominguez y Argana @ "OXO" for illegal
possession of dangerous drugs, is AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.36

Hence, the instant appeal.

 Issue

For resolution of the Court is the issue of whether the RTC and the CA erred in convicting
Dominguez of the crime charged.

The Court's Ruling

The appeal is meritorious. The Court acquits Dominguez for failure of the prosecution to prove
his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Dominguez focuses his appeal on the validity of his arrest and the search and seizure of the
sachet of shabu and, consequently, the admissibility of the sachet. Notably, the CA already
highlighted the fact that Dominguez raised no objection to the irregularity of his arrest before
arraignment.37 Thus, considering such and his active participation in the trial of the case, the CA
ruled that he is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the RTC, thereby curing any defect in
his arrest.38

Well settled is the rule that an accused is estopped from assailing the legality of his arrest if he
failed to move to quash the information against him before his arraignment.39 Any objection
involving the arrest or the procedure in the acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the person of
an accused must be made before he enters his plea, otherwise, the objection is deemed
waived.40 Even in the instances not allowed by law, a warrantless arrest is not a jurisdictional
defect, and objection thereto is waived where the person arrested submits to arraignment without
objection.41

Applying the foregoing, the Court agrees that Dominguez had already waived his objection to the
validity of his arrest. However, it must be stressed that such waiver only affects the jurisdiction of the
court over the person of the accused but does not carry a waiver of the admissibility of evidence, as
the Court ruled in Homar v. People:42

We agree with the respondent that the petitioner did not timely object to the
irregularity of his arrest before his arraignment as required by the Rules. In addition,
he actively participated in the trial of the case. As a result, the petitioner is deemed
to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court, thereby curing any defect in his
arrest.

However, this waiver to question an illegal arrest only affects the

jurisdiction of the court over his person. It is well-settled that a waiver of an
illegal, warrantless arrest does not carry with it a waiver of the inadmissibility
of evidence seized during an illegal warrantless arrest.43 (Emphasis ours)

Thus, it is now necessary for the Court to ascertain whether the warrantless search which
yielded the alleged contraband was lawful.

Enshrined in the Constitution is the inviolable right of the people to be secure in their persons
and properties against unreasonable searches and seizures, as defined under Section 2, Article III
thereof, which reads:

Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for
any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
 issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.

To protect the people from unreasonable searches and seizures, Section 3 (2), Article III of the
1987 Constitution provides that evidence obtained and confiscated on the occasion of such
unreasonable searches and seizures are deemed tainted and should be excluded for being the
proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree. In other words, evidence obtained from unreasonable
searches and seizures shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any
proceeding.44

Nevertheless, the constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures is not
absolute but admits of certain exceptions, namely: (1) warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest
recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence;45 (2)
seizure of evidence in plain view;46 (3) search of moving vehicles;47 (4) consented warrantless
search;48 (5) customs search; (6) stop and frisk situations (Terry search);49 and (7) exigent and
emergency circumstances.50

The CA and the RTC concluded that Dominguez was caught in flagrante delicto, declaring that
he was caught in the act of actually committing a crime or attempting to commit a crime in the
presence of the apprehending officers, when he was caught holding a sachet of shabu.
Consequently, the warrantless search was considered valid as it was deemed an incident to the
lawful arrest.

For an arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto, two elements must concur, namely: (a) the person
to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (b) such overt act is done in the presence or
within the view of the arresting officer.51 The officer's personal knowledge of the fact of the
commission of an offense is absolutely required.52 The officer himself must witness the crime.53

The prosecution and the defense presented different versions of the events. However, even if
the Court were to believe the version of the prosecution, the instant case reveals that there could
have been no lawful warrantless arrest made on Dominguez. SPO1 Parchaso's testimony on direct
examination discloses as follows:

[Fiscal Rodriguez:]

Q Where in particular did your group go?

A We proceeded immediately to the place where there was report, sir at Purok Tres, Barangay
Poblacion, Muntinlupa City.

Q At approximately what time did you reach that Purok Tres at Barangay Poblacion?

A 2:00 in the morning, sir.

Q Upon reaching that place, what happened?

A We separated at the area where we conducted monitoring and observation, and I entered this one
small alley, sir.
Q What is the name of this alley, if you know?

A It is near Argana Street, sir, Barangay Poblacion, Muntinlupa City.

Q While in the alley, what happened?

A When I was entering or approaching the said alley, I saw a man standing at the said alley,
sir.

Q And what was this man doing?

A He is not far from me, about one (1) meter, sir, and I saw him holding maliit na plastic
sachet.

Q Can you describe to this Honorable Court the alley where you found this person?

A It is a small alley, sir.

Q Is this alley lighted?

A Opo.

Q What was this man doing with the plastic sachet?

A When I saw him, sir, he was wearing a red t-shirt and white short. And he was holding the
transparent plastic sachet on his left hand.

Q Upon seeing this, what did you do?

A I immediately grabbed him, held him and arrested him on the same time, sir.54 (Emphasis added)

In People v. Racho,55 the Court ruled that the determination of validity of the warrantless

arrest would also determine the validity of the warrantless search that was incident to the
arrest. A determination of whether there existed probable cause to effect an arrest should therefore
be determined first, thus:

Recent jurisprudence holds that in searches incident to a lawful arrest, the arrest
must precede the search; generally, the process cannot be reversed. Nevertheless,
a search substantially contemporaneous with an arrest can precede the arrest if the
police have probable cause to make the arrest at the outset of the search. Thus,
given the factual milieu of the case, we have to determine whether the police officers
had probable cause to arrest appellant. Although probable cause eludes exact
and concrete definition, it ordinarily signifies a reasonable ground of
suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to
warrant a cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the
offense with which he is charged.56 (Emphasis ours)

The circumstances as stated above do not give rise to a reasonable suspicion that Dominguez
was in possession of shabu. From a meter away, even with perfect vision, SPO1 Parchaso would
not have been able to identify with reasonable accuracy the contents of the plastic
sachet. Dominguez' acts of standing on the street and holding a plastic sachet in his hands,
are not by themselves sufficient to incite suspicion of criminal activity or to create probable
cause enough to justify a warrantless arrest. In fact, SPO1 Parchaso's testimony reveals that
before the arrest was made, he only saw that Dominguez was holding a small plastic sachet. He was
unable to describe what said plastic sachet contained, if any. He only mentioned that the plastic
contained "pinaghihinalaang shabu" after he had already arrested Dominguez and subsequently
confiscated said plastic sachet:

[Fiscal Rodriguez:]

Q What happened after you arrested him?

A I was able x x x [to recover] from him, in his possession a transparent plastic sachet with
pinaghihinalaang shabu, sir.57

The present case is similar to People v. Villareal,58 where the Court held that the warrantless
arrest of the accused was unconstitutional, as simply holding something in one's hands cannot in
any way be considered as a criminal act:

On the basis of the foregoing testimony, the Court finds it inconceivable how
PO3 de Leon, even with his presumably perfect vision, would be able to identify with
reasonable accuracy, from a distance of about 8 to 10 meters and
while simultaneously driving a motorcycle, a negligible and minuscule amount of
powdery substance (0.03 gram) inside the plastic sachet allegedly held by appellant.
That he had previously effected numerous arrests, all involving shabu, is insufficient
to create a conclusion that what he purportedly saw in appellant's hands was
indeed shabu.

Absent any other circumstance upon which to anchor a lawful arrest, no

other overt act could be properly attributed to appellant as to rouse suspicion
in the mind of PO3 de Leon that he (appellant) had just committed, was
committing, or was about to commit a crime, for the acts  per se of walking
along the street and examining something in one's hands cannot in any way
be considered criminal acts. In fact, even if appellant had been exhibiting unusual
or strange acts, or at the very least appeared suspicious, the same would not have
been sufficient in order for PO3 de Leon to effect a lawful warrantless arrest under
paragraph (a) of Section 5, Rule 113.

Neither has it been established that the rigorous conditions set forth in
paragraph (b) of Section 5, Rule 113 have been complied with, i.e., that an offense
had in fact just been committed and the arresting officer had personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the appellant had committed it. The factual circumstances of the
case failed to show that PO3 de Leon had personal knowledge that a crime had
been indisputably committed by the appellant. It is not enough that PO3 de Leon
had reasonable ground to believe that appellant had just committed a crime; a crime
must in fact have been committed first, which does not obtain in this
case.59 (Emphasis and underscoring ours)

The Court reached the same conclusion in the case of Comerciante v. People:60

On the basis of such testimony, the Court finds it highly implausible that
PO3 Calag, even assuming that he has perfect vision, would be able to identify
with reasonable accuracy — especially from a distance of around 10 meters,
 and while aboard a motorcycle cruising at a speed of 30 kilometers per hour
— miniscule amounts of white crystalline substance inside two (2) very small
plastic sachets held by Comerciante. The Court also notes that no other overt
act could be properly attributed to Comerciante as to rouse suspicion in the
mind of PO3 Calag that the former had just committed, was committing, or
was about to commit a crime. Verily, the acts of standing around with a
companion and handing over something to the latter cannot in any way be
considered criminal acts. In fact, even if Comerciante and his companion were
showing "improper and unpleasant movements" as put by PO3 Calag, the same
would not have been sufficient in order to effect a lawful warrantless arrest under
Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. That his
reasonable suspicion bolstered by (a) the fact that he had seen his fellow officers
arrest persons in possession of shabu; and (b) his trainings and seminars on illegal
drugs when he was still assigned in the province are insufficient to create a
conclusion that what he purportedly saw in Comerciante was
indeed shabu.61 (Emphasis and underscoring ours)

The prosecution failed to establish the conditions set forth in Section 5 (a), Rule 11362 of the
Rules of Court that: (a) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has
just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (b) such overt act is
done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. As already discussed, standing on
the street and holding a plastic sachet in one's hands cannot in any way be considered as criminal
acts. Verily, it is not enough that the arresting officer had reasonable ground to believe that the
accused had just committed a crime; a crime must, in fact, have been committed first,63 which does
not obtain in this case.

As regards the ruling of the CA, wherein it noted that Dominguez was caught with a sachet
of shabu in plain view, the Court holds that the plain view doctrine is inapplicable in the case at bar.
In People v. Compacion,64 citing People v. Musa,65 the Court explained how the plain view doctrine
applies and ruled that it does not apply if it is not readily apparent to the police officers that they have
evidence incriminating the accused, thus:

The "plain view" doctrine may not, however, be used to launch unbridled
searches and indiscriminate seizures nor to extend a general exploratory search
made solely to find evidence of defendant's guilt. The "plain view" doctrine is usually
applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but
nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. [Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 29 L. Ed. 2d 564 (1971)] Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme
Court stated the following limitations on the application of the doctrine:

What the "plain view" cases have in common is that the police
officer in each of them had a prior justification for an intrusion in the
course of which he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence
incriminating the accused. The doctrine serves to supplement the
prior justification — whether it be a warrant for another object, hot
pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or some other legitimate
reason for being present unconnected with a search directed
against the accused — and permits the warrantless seizure. Of
course, the extension of the original justification is legitimate
only where it is immediately apparent to the police that they
have evidence before them; the "plain view" doctrine may not
be used to extend a general exploratory search from one object
 to another until something incriminating at last emerges. [Id.,
29 L. Ed. 2d 583. See also Texas v. Brown, 460 U.G. 730, 75 L. Ed.
2d 502 (1983)]

It was not even apparent to the members of the composite team whether the plants involved
herein were indeed marijuana plants. After said plants were uprooted, SPO1 Linda had to conduct a
field test on said plants by using a Narcotics Drug Identification Kit to determine if the same were
indeed marijuana plants. Later, Senior Inspector Villavicencio, a forensic chemist, had to conduct
three (3) qualitative examinations to determine if the plants were indeed marijuana.66

The plain view doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement
officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which
he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; and (c) it
is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime,
contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure.67 The law enforcement officer must lawfully make an
initial intrusion or properly be in a position from which he can particularly view the area.68  In the
course of such lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the
accused. The object must be open to eye and hand, and its discovery inadvertent.69

In the case at hand, while it can be said that the presence of the police officers was legitimate as
they were patrolling the area and that discovery of the plastic sachet was inadvertent, it should be
emphasized that, as to the third requisite, it was clearly not apparent that such plastic sachet is an
evidence of a crime, a contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure. To recall, when SPO1 Parchaso
saw Dominguez, he only saw that Dominguez was holding a very small plastic sachet. To the Court's
mind, a very small plastic sachet is not readily apparent as evidence incriminating Dominguez, such
that it can be seized without a warrant. A very small plastic sachet can contain just about anything. It
could even be just that — a very small plastic sachet — and nothing more.

Although laboratory results later showed that the plastic sachet taken from Dominguez indeed
contained shabu, this cannot justify the seizure of the plastic sachet from Dominguez because at the
time of the warrantless seizure, it was not readily apparent to SPO1 Parchaso that the very small
plastic sachet contained anything, much less shabu. Thus, the circumstances of this case do not
justify a seizure based on the plain view doctrine.

In sum, despite the fact that Dominguez can no longer question the validity of his arrest, it is
crystal clear that the sachet of shabu seized from him during the warrantless search is inadmissible
in evidence against him. There being no warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest or seizure of
evidence in plain view, the shabu purportedly seized from Dominguez is rendered inadmissible in
evidence for being the proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree. As the confiscated shabu is the
very corpus delicti of the crime charged, Dominguez must be acquitted and exonerated from all
criminal liability.

The Court is not unaware of the drug menace that besets the country and the direct link of
certain crimes to drug abuse.70 The unrelenting drive of law enforcers against trafficking and use of
illegal drugs and other substance is indeed commendable.71 Those who engage in the illicit trade of
dangerous drugs and prey on the misguided members of the society, especially the susceptible
youth, must be caught and properly prosecuted.72 Nonetheless, the Court acknowledges that this
campaign against drug addiction is highly susceptible to police abuse and that there have been
cases of false arrests and wrongful indictments.

The Court has recognized, in a number of cases, that law enforcers resort to the practice of
planting evidence to extract information from or even to harass civilians.73 Thus, to the Court's mind,
the allegation of Dominguez that he was a victim of extortion has the ring of truth to it. In this regard,
the Court reminds the trial courts to exercise extra vigilance in trying drug cases, and directs the
Philippine National Police to conduct an investigation on this incident and other similar cases, lest an
innocent person is made to suffer the unusually severe penalties for drug offenses.

The overriding consideration is not whether the Court doubts the innocence of the accused but
whether it entertains a reasonable doubt as to his guilt.74 In order to convict an accused, the
circumstances of the case must exclude all and every hypothesis consistent with his
innocence.75 What is required is that there be proof beyond reasonable doubt that the crime was
committed and that the accused committed the crime.76 It is only when the conscience is satisfied
that the crime has indeed been committed by the person on trial that the judgment will be for
conviction.77 In light of this, Dominguez must perforce be acquitted.

As a final note, the Court reiterates that it is committed to assist the government in its campaign
against illegal drugs; however, a conviction can only be obtained after the prosecution discharges its
constitutional burden to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Otherwise, this Court is duty-bound to
uphold the constitutional presumption of innocence.78

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appeal is hereby GRANTED. The

Decision dated May 9, 2017 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 38665 is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, accused-appellant Marlon
Dominguez y Argana is ACQUITTED of the crime charged on the ground of
reasonable doubt, and is ORDERED IMMEDIATELY RELEASED from detention
unless he is being lawfully held for another cause. Let an entry of final judgment be
issued immediately.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Superintendent of the New Bilibid
Prison, Muntinlupa City, for immediate implementation. The said Superintendent
is ORDERED to REPORT to this Court within five (5) days from receipt of this
Decision the action he has taken.

SO ORDERED.
 [ G.R. No. 244045, June 16, 2020 ]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. JERRY SAPLA Y GUERRERO

A.K.A. ERIC SALIBAD Y MALLARI, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

DECISION

CAGUIOA, J:

Can the police conduct a warrantless intrusive search of a vehicle on the sole basis of an unverified
tip relayed by an anonymous informant? On this question, jurisprudence has vacillated over the
years. The Court definitively settles the issue once and for all.

In threshing out this issue, it must be remembered that in criminal prosecutions, including
prosecutions for violations of the law on dangerous drugs, our constitutional order does not adopt a
stance of neutrality - the law is heavily in favor of the accused. By constitutional design, the accused
is afforded the presumption of innocence1 - it is for the State to prove the guilt of the accused.
Without the State discharging this burden, the Court is given no alternative but to acquit the
accused.

Moreover, if the process of gathering evidence against the accused is tainted by a violation of the
accused's right against unreasonable searches and seizures, which is a most cherished and
protected right under the Bill of Rights, the evidence procured must be excluded, inevitably leading
to the accused's acquittal.

Therefore, while the Court recognizes the necessity of adopting a decisive stance against the
scourge of illegal drugs, the eradication of illegal drugs in our society cannot be achieved by
subverting the people's constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures. In simple
terms, the Constitution does not allow the end to justify the means. Otherwise, in eradicating one
societal disease, a deadlier and more sinister one is cultivated - the trampling of the people's
fundamental, inalienable rights. The State's steadfastness in eliminating the drug menace must be
equally matched by its determination to uphold and defend the Constitution. This Court will not sit
idly by and allow the Constitution to be added to the mounting body count in the State's war on
illegal drugs.

The Case

Before the Court is an appeal2 filed by the accused-appellant Jerry Sapla y Guerrero a.k.a. Eric
Salibad y Mallari (accused-appellant Sapla), assailing the Decision3 dated April 24, 2018 (assailed
Decision) of the Court of Appeals (CA)4 in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 09296, which affirmed the
Judgment5 dated January 9, 2017 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tabuk City, Branch 25 in
Criminal Case No. 11-2014-C entitled People of the Philippines v. Jerry Sapla y Guerrero a. k.a. Eric
Salibad y Mallari, finding accused-appellant Sapla guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating
Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 9165,6 otherwise known as the "Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002," as amended.

The Facts and Antecedent Proceedings

The facts and antecedent proceedings, as narrated by the CA in the assailed Decision, and as culled
from the records of the case, are as follows:

In an Information dated 14 January 2014, the appellant was charged with violation of Section
5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. The accusatory portion of the said Information reads:

"That at around 1:20 in the afternoon of January 10, 2014 at Talaca, Agbannawag, Tabuk City,
Kalinga and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession, control and custody four (4) bricks of
marijuana leaves, a dangerous [drug], with a total net weight of 3,9563.111 grams and transport in
transit through a passenger [jeepney] with Plate No. AYA 270 the said marijuana without license,
permit or authority from any appropriate government entity or agency.

CONTRARY TO LAW."

The next day, or on 15 January 2014, [accused-appellant Sapla] was committed to the Bureau of Jail
Management and Penology (BJMP) at Tabuk City, Kalinga.

Upon his arraignment on 29 January 2014, [accused-appellant Sapla] pleaded "not guilty" to the
crime charged against him. In the court a quo's Pre-Trial Order dated 11 March 2014, the
Prosecution and the Defense stipulated their respective legal issues to be resolved by the court a
quo. Also, the Prosecution identified and marked its pieces of evidence, while the Defense made no
proposals nor pre-mark[ed] any exhibits.

Trial ensued thereafter.

The Prosecution presented three (3) police officers as its witnesses, namely: 1) Police Officer (PO)2
Jim Mabiasan (hereinafter referred to as PO2 Mabiasan), an officer assigned at the 3rd Maneuver
Company, Regional Public Safety Battalion (RPSB) at Tabuk City and was the seizing officer; 2)
PO3 Lito Labbutan (hereinafter referred to as PO3 Labbutan), an intelligence operative of Kalinga
Police Provincial Office - Provincial Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operations Task Group (KPPO
PAIDSOTG) who was tasked as the arresting officer; and 3) Police Senior Inspector (PSI) Delon
Ngoslab (hereinafter referred to as PSI Ngoslab), deputy company commander of the RPSB and
team leader of the joint checkpoint operation.

The evidence for the Prosecution established that on 10 January 2014, at around 11:30 in the
morning, an officer on duty at the RPSB office received a phone call from a concerned citizen, who
informed the said office that a certain male individual [would] be transpiring marijuana from Kalinga
and into the Province of Isabela. PO2 Mabiasan then relayed the information to their deputy
commander, PSI Ngoslab, who subsequently called KPPO-PAIDSOTG for a possible joint operation.
Thereafter, as a standard operating procedure in drug operations, PO3 Labbutan, an operative of
KPPO-PAIDSOTG, coordinated with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA). Afterwards,
the chief of KPPO-PAIDSOTG, PSI Baltazar Lingbawan (hereinafter referred to as PSI Lingbawan),
briefed his operatives on the said information. Later on, the said operatives of KPPO-PAIDSOTG
arrived at the RPSB. PSI Ngoslab immediately organized a team and as its team leader, assigned
PO2 Mabiasan as the seizing officer, PO3 Labbutan as the arresting officer, while the rest of the
police officers would provide security and backup. The said officers then proceeded to the Talaca
detachment.

At around 1:00 in the afternoon, the RPSB hotline received a text message which stated that the
subject male person who [would] transport marijuana [was] wearing a collared white shirt with green
stripes, red ball cap, and [was] carrying a blue sack on board a passenger jeepney, with plate
number AYA 270 bound for Roxas, Isabela. Subsequently, a joint checkpoint was strategically
organized at the Talaca command post.

The passenger jeepney then arrived at around 1:20 in the afternoon, wherein the police officers at
the Talaca checkpoint flagged down the said vehicle and told its driver to park on the side of the
road. Officers Labbutan and Mabiasan approached the jeepney and saw [accused-appellant Sapla]
seated at the rear side of the vehicle. The police officers asked [accused-appellant Sapla] if he [was]
the owner of the blue sack in front of him, which the latter answered in the affirmative. The said
officers then requested [accused-appellant Sapla] to open the blue sack. After [accused-appellant
Sapla] opened the sack, officers Labbutan and Mabiasan saw four (4) bricks of suspected dried
marijuana leaves, wrapped in newspaper and an old calendar. PO3 Labbutan subsequently arrested
[accused-appellant Sapla], informed him of the cause of his arrest and his constitutional rights in
[the] Ilocano dialect. PO2 Mabiasan further searched [accused-appellant Sapla] and found one (I)
LG cellular phone unit. Thereafter, PO2 Mabiasan seized the four (4) bricks of suspected dried
marijuana leaves and brought [them] to their office at the Talaca detachment for proper markings.

At the RPSB's office, PO2 Mabiasan took photographs and conducted an inventory of the seized
items, one (1) blue sack and four (4) bricks of suspected dried marijuana leaves, wherein the same
officer placed his signature on the said items. Also, the actual conduct of inventory was witnessed by
[accused-appellant Sapla], and by the following: 1) Joan K. Balneg from the Department of Justice;
2) Victor Fontanilla, an elected barangay official; and 3) Geraldine G. Dumalig, as media
representative. Thereafter, PO3 Labbutan brought the said [accused-appellant Sapla] at the KPPO-
PAIDSOTG Provincial Crime Laboratory Office at Camp Juan M. Duyan for further investigation.

At the said office, PO2 Mabiasan personally turned over the seized items to the investigator of the
case, PO2 Alexander Oman (hereinafter referred to as PO2 Oman), for custody, safekeeping and
proper disposition. Also, PSI Lingbawan wrote a letter addressed to the Provincial Chief, which
requested that a chemistry examination be conducted on the seized items. The following specimens
were submitted for initial laboratory examination: 1) one (1) blue sack with label J&N rice, marked
"2:30PM JAN. 10, 2014 EXH. "A" PNP-TALACA and signature;" 2) one (1) brick of suspected dried
marijuana leaves, which weighed 998.376 grams, marked "2:30PM JAN. 10, 2014 EXH. "A-1" PNP-
TALACA and signature;" 3) one (1) brick of suspected dried marijuana leaves, which weighed
929.735 grams, marked "2:30PM JAN. 10, 2014 EXH "A-2" PNP-TALACA and signature;" 4) one (1)
brick of suspected dried marijuana leaves, which weighed 1,045.629 grams, marked "2:30PM JAN.
10, 2014 EXH "A-3" PNP-TALACA and signature;" 5) one (1) brick of suspected dried marijuana
leaves, which weighed 979.371 grams, marked "2:30PM JAN. 10, 2014 EXH. "A-4" PNP-TALACA
and signature,"· The said initial examination revealed that the specimens "A-1" to "A-4" with a total
net weight of 3,9563.111 grams, yielded positive results for the presence of marijuana, a dangerous
drug. In addition, Chemistry Report No. D-003-2014 revealed that indeed the said specimens [did]
contain marijuana and that the said report indicated that the "specimen[s] submitted are retained in
this laboratory for future reference."

Also, further investigation revealed that [accused-appellant Sapla] tried to conceal his true identity by
using a fictitious name - Eric Mallari Salibad. However, investigators were able to contact [accused-
appellant Sapla's] sister, who duly informed the said investigators that [accused appellant Sapla's]
real name is Jerry Guerrero Sapla.
On the other hand, the Defense presented [accused-appellant Sapla] as its sole witness.

The [accused-appellant Sapla] denied the charges against him and instead, offered a different
version of the incident. He claimed that on 8 January 2014, he went to Tabuk City to visit a certain
relative named Tony Sibal. Two (2) days later, [accused-appellant Sapla] boarded a jeepney, and
left for Roxas, Isabela to visit his nephew. Upon reaching Talaca checkpoint, police officers f1agged
down the said jeepney in order to check its passenger[s'] baggages and cargoes. The police of1icers
then found marijuana inside a sack and were looking for a person who wore fatigue pants at that
time. From the three (3) passengers who wore fatigue pants, the said police officers identified him as
the owner of the marijuana found inside the sack. [Accused-appellant Sapla] denied ownership of
the marijuana, and asserted that he had no baggage at that time. Thereafter, the police officers
arrested [accused-appellant Sapla] and brought him to the Talaca barracks, wherein the sack and
marijuana bricks were shown to him.7

The Ruling of the RTC

On January 9, 2017, the RTC rendered its Decision convicting accused-appellant Sapla for violating
Section 5 of R.A. 9165. The RTC found that the prosecution was able to sufficiently establish
the corpus delicti of the crime. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:

ACCORDINGLY, in view of the foregoing, this Court finds accused JERRY SAPLA Y GUERRERO,
a.k.a. ERIC SALIBAD Y MALLARI guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged and suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

The accused to pay the fine of Five Million (P5,000,000.00) Pesos.

The 4 bricks of dried marijuana leaves be submitted to any authorized representative of the PDEA
for proper disposition.

SO ORDERED.8

Feeling aggrieved, accused-appellant Sapla filed an appeal before the CA.

The Ruling of the CA

In the assailed Decision, the CA denied accused-appellant Sapla's appeal and affirmed the RTC 's
Decision with modifications. The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated 9 January 2017 of the Regional
Trial Court of Tabuk City, Branch 25 in Criminal Case No. 11-2014-C is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS in that accused-appellant Jerry Sapla y Guerrero is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay the fine of P1,000,000.00.

SO ORDERED.9

The CA found that although the search and seizure conducted on accused-appellant Sapla was
without a search warrant, the same was lawful as it was a valid warrantless search of a moving
vehicle. The CA held that the essential requisite of probable cause was present, justifying the
warrantless search and seizure.

Hence, the instant appeal.

 The Issue

Stripped to its core, the essential issue in the instant case is whether there was a valid search and
seizure conducted by the police officers. The answer to this critical question determines whether
there is enough evidence to sustain accused-appellant Sapla's conviction under Section 5 of R.A.
9165.

The Court's Ruling

The instant appeal is impressed with merit. The Court finds for accused-appellant Sapla and
immediately orders his release from incarceration.

The Constitutional Right against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures

As eloquently explained by the Court in People v. Tudtud (Tudtud),10 "the Bill of Rights is the

bedrock of constitutional government. If people are stripped naked of their rights as human beings,
democracy cannot survive and government becomes meaningless. This explains why the Bill of
Rights, contained as it is in Article III of the Constitution, occupies a position of primacy in the
fundamental law way above the articles on governmental power."11

And in the Bill of Rights, the right against unreasonable searches and seizures is "at the top of the
hierarchy of rights, next only to, if not on the same plane as, the right to life, liberty and property, x x
x for the right to personal security which, along with the right to privacy, is the foundation of the right
against unreasonable search and seizure."12

The right of the people against unreasonable searches and seizures is found in Article III, Section 2
of the 1987 Constitution, which reads:

Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.

Hence, as a rule, a search and seizure operation conducted by the authorities is

reasonable only when a court issues a search warrant after it has determined the existence of
probable cause through the personal examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and
the witnesses presented before the court, with the place to be searched and the persons or things to
be seized particularly described.

Because of the sacrosanct position occupied by the right against unreasonable searches and
seizures in the hierarchy of rights, any deviation or exemption from the aforementioned rule is not
favored and is strictly construed against the government.

Valid Warrantless Searches and Seizures

There are, however, instances wherein searches are reasonable even in the absence of a search
warrant, taking into account the "uniqueness of circumstances involved including the purpose of the
search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and
seizure was made, the place or thing searched, and the character of the articles procured."13
The known jurisprudential instances of reasonable warrantless searches and seizures are:

(1) warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest;

(2) seizure of evidence in plain view;

(3) search of a moving vehicle;

(4) consented warrantless search;

(5) customs search;

(6) stop and frisk; and

(7) exigent and emergency circumstances.14

Search of a Moving Vehicle and its Non-Applicability in the Instant Case

In upholding the warrantless search and seizure conducted by the authorities, the RTC and CA
considered the police operation as a valid warrantless search of a moving vehicle.

According to jurisprudence, "warrantless search and seizure of moving vehicles are allowed in
recognition of the impracticability of securing a warrant under said circumstances as the vehicle can
be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant may be sought. Peace
officers in such cases, however, are limited to routine checks where the examination of the vehicle is
limited to visual inspection."15

On the other hand, an extensive search of a vehicle is permissible, but only when "the officers made
it upon probable cause, i.e., upon a belief, reasonably arising out of circumstances known to the
seizing officer, that an automobile or other vehicle contains [an] item, article or object which by law is
subject to seizure and destruction."16

The Court finds error in the CA's holding that the search conducted in the instant case is a search of
a moving vehicle. The situation presented in the instant case cannot be considered as a search of a
moving vehicle.

The fairly recent case of People v. Comprado17 (Comprado) is controlling inasmuch as the facts of
the said case are virtually identical to the instant case.

In Comprado, a confidential informant (CI) sent a text message to the authorities as regards an
alleged courier of marijuana who had in his possession a backpack containing marijuana and would
be traveling from Bukidnon to Cagayan de Oro City. The CI eventually called the authorities and
informed them that the alleged drug courier had boarded a bus with body number 2646 and plate
number KVP 988 bound for Cagayan de Oro City. The CI added that the man would be carrying a
backpack in black and violet colors with the marking "Lowe Alpine." With this information, the police
officers put up a checkpoint, just as what the authorities did in the instant case. Afterwards, upon
seeing the bus bearing the said body and plate numbers approaching the checkpoint, again similar
to the instant case, the said vehicle was flagged down. The police officers boarded the bus and saw
a man matching the description given to them by the CI. The man was seated at the back of the bus
with a backpack placed on his lap. The man was asked to open the bag. When the accused agreed
to do so, the police officers saw a transparent cellophane containing dried marijuana leaves.
In Comprado, the Court held that the search conducted "could not be classified as a search of a
moving vehicle. In this particular type of search, the vehicle is the target and not a specific
person."18 The Court added that "in search of a moving vehicle, the vehicle was intentionally used
as a means to transport illegal items. It is worthy to note that the information relayed to the police
officers was that a passenger of that particular bus was carrying marijuana such that when the police
officers boarded the bus, they searched the bag of the person matching the description given by
their informant and not the cargo or contents of the said bus."19

Applying the foregoing to the instant case, it cannot be seriously disputed that the target of the
search conducted was not the passenger jeepney boarded by accused-appellant Sapla nor the
cargo or contents of the said vehicle. The target of the search was the person who matched the
description given by the person who called the RPSB Hotline, i.e., the person wearing a collared
white shirt with green stripes, red ball cap, and carrying a blue sack.

As explained in Comprado, "to extend to such breadth the scope of searches on moving vehicles
would open the floodgates to unbridled warrantless searches which can be conducted by the mere
expedient of waiting for the target person to ride a motor vehicle, setting up a checkpoint along the
route of that vehicle, and then stopping such vehicle when it arrives at the checkpoint in order to
search the target person."20

Therefore, the search conducted in the instant case cannot be characterized as a search of a
moving vehicle.

Probable Cause as an Indispensable Requirement for an Extensive and Intrusive Warrantless

Search of a Moving Vehicle

In any case, even if the search conducted can be characterized as a search of a moving vehicle, the
operation undertaken by the authorities in the instant case cannot be deemed a valid warrantless
search of a moving vehicle.

In People v. Manago,21 the Court, through Senior Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe,

explained that a variant of searching moving vehicles without a warrant may entail the setting up of
military or police checkpoints. The setting up of such checkpoints is not illegal per se for as long as
its necessity is justified by the exigencies of public order and conducted in a way least intrusive to
motorists.

However, in order for the search of vehicles in a checkpoint to be non-violative of an individual's right
against unreasonable searches, the search must be limited to the following: (a) where the officer
merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fair
grounds; (b) where the officer simply looks into a vehicle; (c) where the officer flashes a light therein
without opening the car's doors; (d) where the occupants are not subjected to a physical or body
search; (e) where the inspection of the vehicles is limited to a visual search or visual inspection; and
(f) where the routine check is conducted in a fixed area.22

Routine inspections do not give the authorities carte blanche discretion to conduct intrusive

warrantless searches in the absence of probable cause. When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to
an extensive search, as opposed to a mere routine inspection, "such a warrantless search has been
held to be valid only as long as the officers conducting the search have reasonable or probable
cause to believe before the search that they will find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a
crime, in the vehicle to be searched."23
Simply stated, a more extensive and intrusive search that goes beyond a mere visual search of the
vehicle necessitates probable cause on the part of the apprehending officers.

It was in Valmonte v. de Villa24 ( Valmonte) where the Court first held that vehicles can be stopped
at a checkpoint and extensively searched only when there is "probable cause which justifies a
reasonable belief of the men at the checkpoints that either the motorist is a law-offender or the
contents of the vehicle are or have been instruments of some offense."25 This doctrine was directly
adopted from United States jurisprudence, specifically from the pronouncement of the Supreme
Court of the United States (SCOTUS) in Dyke v. Taylor.26

As subsequently explained by the Court in Caballes v. Court of Appeals,27 probable cause means

that there is the existence of such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonably discreet
and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the items, articles or
objects sought in connection with said offense or subject to seizure and destruction by law is in the
place to be searched:

x x x a reasonable ground of suspicion supp01ied by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves

to warrant a cautious man's belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is
charged; or the existence of such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonably discreet
and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the items, articles or
objects sought in connection with said offense or subject to seizure and destruction by law is in the
place to be searched. The required probable cause that will justify a warrantless search and seizure
is not determined by a fixed formula but is resolved according to the facts of each case.28

Sheer Unverified Information from an Anonymous Informant does not engender Probable Cause on
the part of the Authorities that warrants an Extensive and Intrusive Search of a Moving Vehicle

As readily admitted by the CA, the singular circumstance that engendered probable cause on the
part of the police officers was the information they received through the RPSB Hotline (via text
message) from an anonymous person. Because of this information, the CA held that there was
probable cause on the part of the police to conduct an intrusive search.29

Does the mere reception of a text message from an anonymous person suffice to create probable
cause that enables the authorities to conduct an extensive and intrusive search without a search
warrant? The answer is a resounding no.

The Court has already held with unequivocal clarity that in situations involving warrantless searches
and seizures, "law enforcers cannot act solely on the basis of confidential or tipped information. A tip
is still hearsay no matter how reliable it may be. It is not sufficient to constitute probable cause in the
absence of any other circumstance that will arouse suspicion."30

A. United States Jurisprudence on Probable Cause vis-a-vis Tipped Information

Considering that the doctrine that an extensive warrantless search of a moving vehicle necessitates
probable cause was adopted by the Court from United States jurisprudence, examining United
States jurisprudence can aid in a fuller understanding on the existence of probable cause vis-a-
vis tipped information received from confidential informants.

In the 1964 case of Aguilar v. Texas,31 the SCOTUS delved into the constitutional requirements for
obtaining a state search warrant. In the said case, two Houston police officers applied to a local
Justice of the Peace for a warrant to search for narcotics in the petitioner's home based on "reliable
information" received from a supposed credible person that the "heroin, marijuana, barbiturates and
other narcotics and narcotic paraphernalia are being kept at the above described premises for the
purpose of sale and use contrary to the provisions of the law."32

In invalidating the search warrant, the SCOTUS held that a two pronged test must be satisfied in
order to determine whether an informant's tip is sufficient in engendering probable cause, i.e., (1) the
informant's "basis of knowledge" must be revealed and (2) sufficient facts to establish either the
informant's "veracity" or the "reliability" of the informant's report must be provided:

Although an affidavit may be based on hearsay information, and need not reflect the direct personal
observations of the affiant, Jones v. United States, 362 U. S. 257, the magistrate must be informed
of some of the underlying circumstances from which the informant concluded that the narcotics were
where he claimed they were, and some of the underlying circumstances from which the officer
concluded that the informant, whose identity need not be disclosed, see Rugendorf v. United States,
376 U. S. 528, was "credible" or his information "reliable."33

Subsequently, in the 1983 case of Illinois v. Gates,34 the police received an anonymous letter
alleging that the respondents were engaged in selling drugs and that the car of the respondents
would be loaded with drugs. Agents of the Drug Enforcement Agency searched the respondents' car,
which contained marijuana and other contraband items.

In finding that there was probable cause, the SCOTUS adopted the totality of circumstances test and
held that tipped information may engender probable cause under "a balanced assessment of the
relative weights of all the various indicia of reliability (and unreliability) attending an informant's
tip"35 In the said case, the SCOTUS found that the details of the informant's tip were corroborated
by independent police work.

The SCOTUS emphasized however that "standing alone, the anonymous letter sent to the
Bloomingdale Police Department would not provide the basis for a magistrate's determination that
there was probable cause to believe contraband would be found in the Gateses' car and home. x x x
Something more was required, then, before a magistrate could conclude that there was probable
cause to believe that contraband would be found in the Gateses' home and car."36

B. The Line of Philippine Jurisprudence on the Inability of a Solitary Tip to Engender Probable Cause

As early as 1988, our own Court had ruled that an extensive warrantless search and seizure
conducted on the sole basis of a confidential tip is tainted with illegality. In People v.
Aminnudin,37 analogous to the instant case, the authorities acted upon an information that the
accused would be arriving from Iloilo on board a vessel, the M/V Wilcon 9. The authorities waited for
the vessel to arrive, accosted the accused, and inspected the latter's bag wherein bundles of
marijuana leaves were found. The Court declared that the search and seizure was illegal, holding
that, at the time of his apprehension, Aminnudin was not "committing a crime nor was it shown that
he was about to do so or that he had just done so. x x x To all appearances, he was like any of the
other passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. It was only when the informer pointed to
him as the carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly became suspect and so subject to
apprehension."38

Subsequently, in People v. Cuizon,39 the Court, through former Chief Justice Artemio V.

Panganiban, held that the warrantless search and subsequent arrest of the accused were deemed
illegal because "the prosecution failed to establish that there was sufficient and reasonable ground
for the NBI agents to believe that appellants had committed a crime at the point when the search
and arrest of Pua and Lee were made."40 In reaching this conclusion, the Court found that the
authorities merely relied on "the alleged tip that the NBI agents purportedly received that
morning."41 The Court characterized the tip received by the authorities from an anonymous
informant as "hearsay information"42 that cannot engender probable cause.

In People v. Encinada,43 the authorities acted solely on an informant's tip and stopped the tricycle
occupied by the accused and asked the latter to alight. The authorities then rummaged through the
two strapped plastic baby chairs that were loaded inside the tricycle. The authorities then found a
package of marijuana inserted between the two chairs. The Court, again through former Chief
Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, held that "raw intelligence"44 was not enough to justify the
warrantless search and seizure. "The prosecution's evidence did not show any suspicious behavior
when the appellant disembarked from the ship or while he rode the motorela. No act or fact
demonstrating a felonious enterprise could be ascribed to appellant under such bare
circumstances."45

Likewise analogous to the instant case is People v. Aruta46 (Aruta) where an informant had told the
police that a certain "Aling Rosa" would be transporting illegal drugs from Baguio City by bus.
Hence, the police officers situated themselves at the bus terminal. Eventually, the informant pointed
at a woman crossing the street and identified her as "Aling Rosa." Subsequently, the authorities
apprehended the woman and inspected her bag which contained marijuana leaves.

In finding that there was an unlawful warrantless search, the Court in Aruta held that "it was only
when the informant pointed to accused-appellant and identified her to the agents as the carrier of the
marijuana that she was singled out as the suspect. The NARCOM agents would not have
apprehended accused-appellant were it not for the furtive finger of the informant because, as clearly
illustrated by the evidence on record, there was no reason whatsoever for them to suspect that
accused-appellant was committing a crime, except for the pointing finger of the informant."47 Hence,
the Court held that the search conducted on the accused therein based solely on the pointing finger
of the informant was "a clear violation of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search
and seizure."48

Of more recent vintage is People v. Cogaed49 (Cogaed), which likewise involved a search

conducted through a checkpoint put up after an "unidentified civilian informer" shared information to
the authorities that a person would be transporting marijuana.

In finding that there was no probable cause on the part of the police that justified a warrantless
search, the Court, through Associate Justice Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen, astutely explained that
in cases finding sufficient probable cause for the conduct of warrantless searches, "the police
officers using their senses observed facts that led to the suspicion. Seeing a man with reddish eyes
and walking in a swaying manner, based on their experience, is indicative of a person who uses
dangerous and illicit drugs."50 However, the Court reasoned that the case of the accused was
different because "he was simply a passenger carrying a bag and traveling aboard a jeepney. There
was nothing suspicious, moreover, criminal, about riding a jeepney or carrying a bag. The
assessment of suspicion was not made by the police officer but by the jeepney driver. It was the
driver who signaled to the police that Cogaed was 'suspicious.'"51

In Cogaed, the Court stressed that in engendering probable cause that justifies a valid warrantless
search, "[i]t is the police officer who should observe facts that would lead to a reasonable degree of
suspicion of a person. The police officer should not adopt the suspicion initiated by another
person. This is necessary to justify that the person suspected be stopped and reasonably searched.
Anything less than this would be an infringement upon one's basic right to security of one's person
and effects."52 The Court explained that "the police officer, with his or her personal knowledge, must
observe the (acts leading to the suspicion of an illicit act," and not merely rely on the information
passed on to him or her.53

Adopting former Chief Justice Lucas P. Bersamin's Dissenting Opinion in Esquillo v. People,54 the
Court in Cogaed stressed that reliance on only one suspicious circumstance or none at all will not
result in a reasonable search.55 The Court emphasized that the matching of information transmitted
by an informant "still remained only as one circumstance. This should not have been enough reason
to search Cogaed and his belongings without a valid search warrant."56

Subsequently, in Veridiano v. People57 (Veridiano), a concerned citizen informed the police that the
accused was on the way to San Pablo City to obtain illegal drugs. Based on this tip, the authorities
set up a checkpoint. The police officers at the checkpoint personally knew the appearance of the
accused. Eventually, the police chanced upon the accused inside a passenger jeepney coming from
San Pablo, Laguna. The jeepney was flagged down and the police asked the passengers to
disembark. The police officers instructed the passengers to raise their t-shirts to check for possible
concealed weapons and to remove the contents of their pockets. The police officers recovered from
the accused a tea bag containing what appeared to be marijuana.

In finding the warrantless search invalid, the Court, again through Associate Justice Marvic Mario
Victor F. Leonen, held that the accused was a "mere passenger in a jeepney who did not exhibit any
act that would give police officers reasonable suspicion to believe that he had drugs in his
possession. x x x There was no evidence to show that the police had basis or personal knowledge
that would reasonably allow them to infer anything suspicious."58

The Court correctly explained that "law enforcers cannot act solely on the basis of confidential or
tipped information. A tip is still hearsay no matter how reliable it may be. It is not sufficient to
constitute probable cause in the absence of any other circumstance that will arouse suspicion."59

A year after Veridiano, the Court decided the case of Comprado. As in the instant case, the
authorities alleged that they possessed reasonable cause to conduct a warrantless search solely on
the basis of information relayed by an informant.

The Court held in Comprado that the sole information relayed by an informant was not sufficient to
incite a genuine reason to conduct an intrusive search on the accused. The Court explained that "no
overt physical act could be properly attributed to accused-appellant as to rouse suspicion in the
minds of the arresting officers that he had just committed, was committing, or was about to commit a
crime."60

The Court emphasized that there should be the "presence of more than one seemingly innocent
activity from which, taken together, warranted a reasonable inference of criminal activity."61 In the
said case, as in the instant case, the accused was just a passenger carrying his bag. "There is
nothing suspicious much less criminal in said act. Moreover, such circumstance, by itself, could not
have led the arresting officers to believe that accused-appellant was in possession of marijuana."62

Recently, the Court unequivocally declared in People v. Yanson63 (Yanson) that a solitary tip hardly
suffices as probable cause that warrants the conduct of a ·warrantless intrusive search and seizure.

In Yanson, which involves an analogous factual milieu as in the instant case, "the Municipal Police
Station of M'lang, North Cotabato received a radio message about a silver gray Isuzu pickup - with
plate number 619 and carrying three (3) people - that was transporting marijuana from Pikit. The
Chief of Police instructed the alert team to set up a checkpoint on the riverside police outpost along
the road from Matalam to M'lang."64
Afterwards, "[a]t around 9:30 a.m., the tipped vehicle reached the checkpoint and was stopped by
the team of police officers on standby. The team leader asked the driver about inspecting the
vehicle. The driver alighted and, at an officer's prodding, opened the pickup's hood. Two (2) sacks of
marijuana were discovered beside the engine."65

In the erudite ponencia of Associate Justice Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen, the Court held that, in
determining whether there is probable cause that warrants an extensive or intrusive warrantless
searches of a moving vehicle, "bare suspicion is never enough. While probable cause does not
demand moral certainty, or evidence sufficient to justify conviction, it requires the existence of 'a
reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to
warrant a cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is
charged.'"66

The Court explained that in prior cases wherein the Court validated warrantless searches and
seizures on the basis of tipped information, "the seizures and arrests were not merely and
exclusively based on the initial tips. Rather, they were prompted by other attendant circumstances.
Whatever initial suspicion they had from being tipped was progressively heightened by other factors,
such as the accused's failure to produce identifying documents, papers pertinent to the items they
were carrying, or their display of suspicious behavior upon being approached."67 In such cases, the
finding of probable cause was premised "on more than just the initial information relayed by assets.
It was the confluence of initial tips and a myriad of other occurrences that ultimately sustained
probable cause."68 However, the case of Yanson was markedly different from these other cases.
Just as in the instant case, the police officers proceeded to effect a search, seizure, and arrest on
the basis of a solitary tip:

This case is markedly different. The police officers here proceeded to effect a search, seizure, and
arrest on the basis of a solitary tip: the radio message that a certain pickup carrying three (3) people
was transporting marijuana from Pikit. When the accused's vehicle (ostensibly matching this
description) reached the checkpoint, the arresting officers went ahead to initiate a search asking the
driver about inspecting the vehicle. Only upon this insistence did the driver alight. It was also only
upon a police officer's further prodding did he open the hood.

The records do not show, whether on the basis of indubitably established facts or the prosecution's
mere allegations, that the three (3) people on board the pickup were acting suspiciously, or that
there were other odd circumstances that could have prompted the police officers to conduct an
extensive search. Evidently, the police officers relied solely on the radio message they received
when they proceeded to inspect the

vehicle.69

In ruling that the sole reliance on tipped information, on its own, furnished by informants cannot
produce probable cause, the Court held that "[e]xclusive reliance on information tipped by informants
goes against the very nature of probable cause. A single hint hardly amounts to "the existence of
such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe
that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in
the place to be searched."70

As correctly explained by the Court in Yanson, "[t]o maintain otherwise would be to sanction frivolity,
opening the floodgates to unfounded searches, seizures, and arrests that may be initiated by sly
informants."71
And very recently, on September 4, 2019, the Court, through former Chief Justice Lucas P.
Bersamin, promulgated its Decision in People v. Gardon-Mentoy72 (Gardon-Mentoy). In the said
case, police officers had set up a checkpoint on the National Highway in Barangay Malatgao, Narra,
Palawan based on a tip from an unidentified informant that the accused-appellant would be
transporting dangerous drugs on board a shuttle van. Eventually, the authorities flagged down the
approaching shuttle van matching the description obtained from the informant and conducted a
warrantless search of the vehicle, yielding the discovery of a block-shaped bundle
containing marijuana.

In holding that the warrantless search and seizure were without probable cause, the Court held that
a tip, in the absence of other circumstances that would confirm their suspicion coming from the
personal knowledge of the searching officers, was not yet actionable for purposes of conducting a
search:

Without objective facts being presented here by which we can test the basis for the officers'
suspicion about the block-shaped bundle contained marijuana, we should not give unquestioned
acceptance and belief to such testimony. The mere subjective conclusions of the officers concerning
the existence of probable cause is never binding on the court whose duty remains to "independently
scrutinize the objective facts to determine the existence of probable cause," for, indeed, "the courts
have never hesitated to overrule an officer's determination of probable cause when none exists."

But SPO2 Felizarte also claimed that it was about then when the accused-appellant panicked and
tried to get down from the van, impelling him and PO1 Rosales to restrain her. Did such conduct on
her part, assuming it did occur, give sufficient cause to search and to arrest?

For sure, the transfer made by the accused-appellant of the block shaped bundle from one bag to
another should not be cited to justify the search if the search had earlier commenced at the moment
PO1 Rosales required her to produce her baggage. Neither should the officers rely on the still-
unverified tip from the unidentified informant, without more, as basis to initiate the search of the
personal effects. The officers were themselves well aware that the tip, being actually double hearsay
as to them, called for independent verification as its substance and reliability, and removed the
foundation for them to rely on it even under the circumstances then obtaining. In short, the tip, in the
absence of other circumstances that would confirm their suspicion coming to the knowledge of the
searching or arresting officer, was not yet actionable for purposes of effecting an arrest or
conducting a search.73

The Court is not unaware that in the recent case of Saluday v. People74 (Saluday), a bus inspection
conducted by Task Force Davao at a military checkpoint was considered valid. However, in the said
case, the authorities merely conducted a "visual and minimally intrusive inspection"75 of the
accused's bag-by simply lifting the bag that noticeably appeared to have contained firearms. This
is markedly dissimilar to the instant case wherein the search conducted entailed the probing of the
contents of the blue sack allegedly possessed by accused-appellant Sapla.

Moreover, in Saluday, the authorities never received nor relied on sheer information relayed by an
informant, unlike in the instant case. In Saluday, the authorities had relied on their own senses in
determining probable cause, i.e., having personally lifted the bag revealing that a firearm was inside,
as well as having seen the very suspicious looks being given by the accused therein.

Further, in Saluday, the Court laid down the following conditions in allowing a reasonable search of a
bus while in transit: (1) the manner of the search must be least intrusive; (2) the search must not be
discriminatory; (3) as to the purpose of the search, it must be confined to ensuring public safety; and
(4) the courts must be convinced that precautionary measures were in place to ensure that no
evidence was planted against the accused.76

It must be stressed that none of these conditions exists in the instant case.

First, unlike in Saluday wherein the search conducted was merely visual and minimally intrusive, the
search undertaken on accused-appellant Sapla was extensive, reaching inside the contents of the
blue sack that he allegedly possessed.

Second, the search was directed exclusively towards accused appellant Sapla; it was discriminatory.
Unlike in Saluday where the bags of the other bus passengers were also inspected, the search
conducted in the instant case focused exclusively on accused-appellant Sapla.

Third, there is no allegation that the search was conducted with the intent of ensuring public safety.
At the most, the search was conducted to apprehend a person who, as relayed by an anonymous
informant, was transporting illegal drugs.

Lastly, the Court is not convinced that sufficient precautionary measures were undertaken by the
police to ensure that no evidence was planted against accused-appellant Sapla, considering that the
inventory, photographing, and marking of the evidence were not immediately conducted after the
apprehension of accused-appellant Sapla at the scene of the incident.

C. The Divergent Line of Jurisprudence

At this juncture, the Court clarifies that there is indeed a line of jurisprudence holding that information
received by the police provides a valid basis for conducting a warrantless search,77 tracing its
origins to the 1990 cases of People v. Tangliben78 (Tangliben) and People v. Maspil, Jr.79 (Maspil,
Jr.). Several of the cases following this line of jurisprudence also heavily rely on the 1992 case
of People v. Bagista80 (Bagista).

It is high time for a re-examination of this divergent line of jurisprudence.

In Tangliben, acting on information supplied by informers that dangerous drugs would be transported
through a bus, the authorities conducted a surveillance operation at the Victory Liner Terminal
compound in San Fernando, Pampanga. At 9:30 in the evening, the police noticed a person carrying
a red travelling bag who was acting suspiciously. They confronted him and requested him to open
his bag. The police found marijuana leaves wrapped in a plastic wrapper inside the bag.

It must be stressed that in Tangliben, the authorities' decision to conduct the warrantless search did
not rest solely on the tipped information supplied by the informants. The authorities, using their own
personal observation, saw that the accused was acting suspiciously.

Similar to Tangliben, in the great majority of cases upholding the validity of a warrantless search and
seizure on the basis of a confidential tip, the police did not rely exclusively on information sourced
from the informant. There were overt acts and other circumstances personally observed by the
police that engendered great suspicion. Hence, the holding that an inclusive warrantless search can
be conducted on the solitary basis of tipped information is far from being an established and
inflexible doctrine.

To cite but a few examples, in the early case of People v. Malmstdedt,81 the authorities set up a
checkpoint in response to some reports that a Caucasian man was coming from Sagada with
dangerous drugs in his possession. At the checkpoint, the officers intercepted a bus and inspected
it. Upon reaching the accused, the police personally observed that there was a bulge on the
accused's waist. This prompted the officer to ask for the accused's identification papers, which the
accused failed to provide. The accused was then asked to reveal what was bulging on his waist,
which turned out to be hashish, a derivative of marijuana. In this case, the Court ruled that the
probable cause justifying the warrantless search was based on the personal observations of the
authorities and not solely on the tipped information:

It was only when one of the officers noticed a bulge on the waist of accused, during the course of the
inspection, that accused was required to present his passport. The failure of accused to present his
identification papers, when ordered to do so, only managed to arouse the suspicion of the officer that
accused was trying to hide his identity.82

In People v. Tuazon,83 the authorities did not solely rely on confidential information that the accused
would deliver an unspecified amount of shabu using a Gemini car bearing plate number PFC 411.
Upon conducting a visual search of the motor vehicle that was flagged down by the authorities, the
police personally saw a gun tucked on the accused's waist. Moreover, the accused was not able to
produce any pertinent document related to the firearm. This was what prompted the police to order
the accused to alight from the vehicle.

In People v. Quebral,84 the authorities did not solely rely on the police informer's report that two men
and a woman on board an owner type jeep with a specific plate number would deliver shabu, a
prohibited drug, at a Petron Gasoline Station in Balagtas, Bulacan. The authorities conducted a
surveillance operation and personally saw the accused handing out a white envelope to her co-
accused, a person included in the police's drug watch list.

In People v. Saycon,85 in holding that the authorities had probable cause in conducting an intrusive
warrantless search, the Court explained that probable cause was not engendered solely by the
receipt of confidential information. Probable cause was produced because a prior test-buy was
conducted by the authorities, which confirmed that the accused was engaged in the transportation
and selling of shabu.

In Manalili v. Court of Appeals and People,86 the person subjected to a warrantless search and
seizure was personally observed by the police to have reddish eyes and to be walking in a swaying
manner. Moreover, he appeared to be trying to avoid the policemen. When approached and asked
what he was holding in his hands, he tried to resist. The Court held that the policemen had sufficient
reason to accost the accused-appellant to determine if he was actually "high" on drugs due to his
suspicious actuations, coupled with the fact that based on information, this area was a haven for
drug addicts.87

In People v. Solayao,88 "police officers noticed a man who appeared drunk. This man was also
'wearing a camouflage uniform or a jungle suit.' Upon seeing the police, the man fled. His flight
added to the suspicion. After stopping him the police officers found an unlicensed 'homemade
firearm' in his possession."89

In People v. Lo Ho Wing,90 the authorities did not rely on an anonymous, unverified tip. Deep
penetration agents were recruited to infiltrate the crime syndicate. An undercover agent actually met
and conferred with the accused, personally confirming the criminal activities being planned by the
accused. In fact, the agent regularly submitted reports of his undercover activities on the criminal
syndicate.
The jurisprudence cited by the CA in holding that the anonymous text message sent to the RPSB
Hotline sufficed to engender probable cause on the part of the authorities, i.e., People v.
Tampis91 (Tampis), stated that "tipped information is - sufficient to provide probable cause to effect
a warrantless search and seizure."92

However, in Tampis, as in the aforementioned jurisprudence, the police did not merely rely on
information relayed by an informant. Prior to the warrantless search conducted, the police actually
"conducted a surveillance on the intended place and saw both appellants packing the suspected
marijuana leaves into a brown bag with the markings 'Tak Tak Tak Ajinomoto' inscribed on its
side."93 In Tampis, the authorities were able to personally witness the accused packing illegal drugs
into the brown bag prior to the warrantless search and seizure.

Moreover, it is observed that when the Court in Tampis held that "tipped information is sufficient to
provide probable cause to effect a warrantless search and seizure,"94 the Court cited the case
of Aruta as its basis. However, the Court in Aruta did not hold that tipped information in and of itself
is sufficient to create probable cause. In fact, in Aruta, as already previously explained, despite the
fact that the apprehending officers already had prior knowledge from their informant regarding
Aruta's alleged activities, the warrantless search conducted on Aruta was deemed unlawful for lack
of probable cause.

The earliest case decided by the Court which upheld the validity of an extensive warrantless search
based exclusively on a solitary tip is the case of Maspil, Jr., wherein the authorities set up a
checkpoint, flagged down the jeep driven by the accused, and examined the contents thereof on the
sole basis of information provided by confidential informers.

In justifying the validity of the warrantless search, the Court in Maspil, Jr. depended heavily on the
early case of Valmonte, which delved into the constitutionality of checkpoints set up in Valenzuela
City.

It bears stressing that the Court in Valmonte never delved into the validity of warrantless searches
and seizures on the pure basis of confidential information. Valmonte did not hold that in checkpoints,
intrusive searches can be conducted on the sole basis of tipped information. Valmonte merely stated
that checkpoints are not illegal per se.95 In fact, in Valmonte, the Court stressed that "[f]or as long
as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection
of the vehicle is limited to a visual search, said routine checks cannot be regarded as violative of an
individual's right against unreasonable search."96

Hence, the jurisprudential support of the Court's holding in Maspil, Jr. is, at best, frail.

With respect to Bagista, the Court held therein that the authorities had probable cause to search the
accused's belongings without a search warrant based solely on information received from a
confidential informant.

In Bagista, the Court relied heavily on the SCOTUS' decision in Carroll vs. U.S97 (Carroll) in holding
that "[w]ith regard to the search of moving vehicles, this had been justified on the ground that the
mobility of motor vehicles makes it possible for the vehicle to be searched to move out of the locality
or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought."98

Does Carroll support the notion that an unverified tipped information engenders probable cause?
In Carroll, which upheld the validity of a warrantless search of a vehicle used to transport contraband
liquor in Michigan, the SCOTUS found that the warrantless search was justified in light of the
following circumstances:
The search and seizure were made by Cronenwett, Scully and Thayer, federal prohibition agents,
and one Peterson, a state officer, in December, 1921, as the car was going westward on the
highway between Detroit and Grand Rapids at a point 16 miles outside of Grand Rapids. The facts
leading to the search and seizure were as follows: on September 29th, Cronenwett and Scully were
in an apartment in Grand Rapids. Three men came to that apartment, a man named Kruska and the
two defendants, Carroll and Kiro. Cronenwett was introduced to them as one Stafford, working in the
Michigan Chair Company in Grand Rapids, who wished to buy three cases of whiskey. The price
was fixed at $13 a case. The three men said they had to go to the east end of Grand Rapids to get
the liquor and that they would be back in half or three-quarters of an hour. They went away, and in a
short time Kruska came back and said they could not get it that night, that the man who had it was
not in, but that they would deliver it the next day. They had come to the apartment in an automobile
known as an Oldsmobile Roadster, the number of which Cronenwett then identified, a[s] did Scully.
The proposed vendors did not return the next day, and the evidence disclosed no explanation of
their failure to do so. One may surmise that it was suspicion of the real character of the proposed
purchaser, whom Carroll subsequently called by his first name when arrested in December following.
Cronenwett and his subordinates were engaged in patrolling the road leading from Detroit to Grand
Rapids, looking for violations of the Prohibition Act. This seems to have been their regular tour of
duty. On the 6th of October, Carroll and Kiro, going eastward from Grand Rapids in the same
Oldsmobile Roadster, passed Cronenwett and Scully some distance out from Grand Rapids.
Cronenwett called to Scully, who was taking lunch, that the Carroll boys had passed them going
toward Detroit, and sought with Scully to catch up with them to see where they were going. The
officers followed as far as East Lansing, half way to Detroit, but there lost trace of them. On the 15th
of December, some two months later, Scully and Cronenwett, on their regular tour of duty, with
Peterson, the State officer, were going from Grand Rapids to Ionia, on the road to Detroit, when Kiro
and Carroll met and passed them in the same automobile, coming from the direction of Detroit to
Grand Rapids. The government agents turned their car and followed the defendants to a point some
sixteen miles east of Grand Rapids, where they stopped them and searched the car.

xxxx

We know in this way that Grand Rapids is about 152 miles from Detroit, and that Detroit and its
neighborhood along the Detroit River, which is the International Boundary, is one of the most active
centers for introducing illegally into this country spirituous liquors for distribution into the interior. It is
obvious from the evidence that the prohibition agents were engaged in a regular patrol along the
important highways from Detroit to Grand Rapids to stop and seize liquor carried in automobiles.
They knew or had convincing evidence to make them believe that the Carroll boys, as they called
them, were so-called "bootleggers" in Grand Rapids, i.e., that they were engaged in plying the
unlawful trade of selling such liquor in that city. The officers had soon after noted their going from
Grand Rapids half way to Detroit, and attempted to follow them to that city to see where they went,
but they escaped observation. Two months later, these officers suddenly met the same men on their
way westward, presumably from Detroit. The partners in the original combination to sell liquor in
Grand Rapids were together in the same automobile they had been in the night when they tried to
furnish the whisky to the officers which was thus identified as part of the firm equipment. They were
coming from the direction of the great source of supply for their stock to Grand Rapids, where they
plied their trade. That the officers, when they saw the defendants, believed that they were carrying
liquor we can have no doubt, and we think it is equally clear that they had reasonable cause for
thinking so. Emphasis is put by defendant's counsel on the statement made by one of the officers
that they were not looking for defendants at the particular time when they appeared. We do not
perceive that it has any weight. As soon as they did appear, the officers were entitled to use their
reasoning faculties upon all the facts of which they had previous knowledge in respect to the
defendants.99
Hence, in Carroll, the probable cause justifying the warrantless search was not founded on
information relayed by confidential informants; there were no informants involved in the case
whatsoever. Probable cause existed because the state authorities themselves had personally
interacted with the accused, having engaged with them in an undercover transaction.

Therefore, just as in Maspil, Jr., the jurisprudential support upon which Bagista heavily relies is not
strong.

It is also not lost on the Court that in Bagista, the Court did not decide with unanimity.

In his Dissenting Opinion in Bagista, Associate Justice Teodoro R. Padilla expressed the view that
"the information alone received by the NARCOM agents, without other suspicious circumstances
surrounding the accused, did not give rise to a probable cause justifying the warrantless search
made on the bag of the accused." In explaining his dissent, Justice Padilla correctly explained that:

In the case at bar, the NARCOM agents searched the bag of the accused on the basis alone of an
information they received that a woman, 23 years of age with naturally curly hair, and 5'2" or 5'3" in
height would be transporting marijuana. The extensive search was indiscriminately made on all the
baggages of all passengers of the bus where the accused was riding, whether male or female, and
whether or not their physical appearance answered the description of the suspect as described in
the alleged information. If there really was such an information, as claimed by the NARCOM agents,
it is a perplexing thought why they had to search the baggages of ALL passengers, not only the bags
of those who appeared to answer the description of the woman suspected of carrying marijuana.

Moreover, the accused was not at all acting suspiciously when the NARCOM agents searched her
bag, where they allegedly found the marijuana.

From the circumstances of the case at bar, it would seem that the NARCOM agents were only
fishing for evidence when they searched the baggages of all the passengers, including that of the
accused. They had no probable cause to reasonably believe that the accused was the
woman carrying marijuana alluded to in the information they allegedly received. Thus, the
warrantless search made on the personal effects of herein accused on the basis of mere
information, without more, is to my mind bereft of probable cause and therefore, null and void. It
follows that the marijuana seized in the course of such warrantless search was inadmissible in
evidence.100

It is said that dissenting opinions often appeal to the intelligence of a future age.101 For Justice
Padilla's Dissenting Opinion, such age has come. This holding, which is reflected in the recent tide of
jurisprudence, must now fully find the light of day as it is more in line with the basic constitutional
precept that the Bill of Rights occupies a position of primacy in the fundamental law, hovering above
the articles on governmental power. The Court's holding that tipped information, on its own, cannot
engender probable cause is guided by the principle that the right against unreasonable searches
and seizures sits at the very top of the hierarchy of rights, wherein any allowable transgression of
such right is subject to the most stringent of scrutiny.

Hence, considering the foregoing discussion, the Court now holds that the cases adhering to the
doctrine that exclusive reliance on an unverified, anonymous tip cannot engender probable
cause that permits a warrantless search of a moving vehicle that goes beyond a visual
search - which include both long-standing and the most recent jurisprudence - should be the
prevailing and controlling line of jurisprudence.
Adopting a contrary rule would set an extremely dangerous and perilous precedent wherein, on the
sheer basis of an unverified information passed along by an alleged informant, the authorities are
given the unbridled license to undertake extensive and highly intrusive searches, even in the
absence of any overt circumstance that engenders a reasonable belief that an illegal activity is afoot.

This fear was eloquently expressed by former Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban in his Concurring
and Dissenting Opinion in People v. Montilla.102 In holding that law and jurisprudence
require stricter grounds for valid arrests and searches, former Chief Justice Panganiban explained
that allowing warrantless searches and seizures based on tipped information alone places the
sacred constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures in great jeopardy:

x x x Everyone would be practically at the mercy of so-called informants, reminiscent of

the Makapilis during the Japanese occupation. Any one whom they point out to a police officer as a
possible violator of the law could then be subject to search and possible arrest. This is placing
limitless power upon informants who will no longer be required to affirm under oath their
accusations, for they can always delay their giving of tips in order to justify warrantless arrests and
searches. Even law enforcers can use this as an oppressive tool to conduct searches without
warrants, for they can always claim that they received raw intelligence information only on the day or
afternoon before. This would clearly be a circumvention of the legal requisites for validly effecting an
arrest or conducting a search and seizure. Indeed, the majority's ruling would open loopholes that
would allow unreasonable arrests, searches and seizures.103

It is not hard to imagine the horrid scenarios if the Court were to allow intrusive warrantless searches
and seizures on the solitary basis of unverified, anonymous tips.

Any person can easily hide in a shroud of anonymity and simply send false and fabricated
information to the police. Unscrupulous persons can effortlessly take advantage of this and easily
harass and intimidate another by simply giving false information to the police, allowing the latter to
invasively search the vehicle or premises of such person on the sole basis of a bogus tip.

On the side of the authorities, unscrupulous law enforcement agents can easily justify the infiltration
of a citizen's vehicle or residence, violating his or her right to privacy, by merely claiming that raw
intelligence was received, even if there really was no such information received or if the information
received was fabricated.

Simply stated, the citizen's sanctified and heavilv-protected right against unreasonable search and
seizure will be at the mercy a phony tips. The right against unreasonable searches and seizures will
be rendered hollow and meaningless. The Court cannot sanction such erosion of the Bill of Rights.

D. The Absence of Probable Cause in the Instant Case

Applying the foregoing discussion in the instant case, to reiterate, the police merely adopted the
unverified and unsubstantiated suspicion of another person, i.e., the person who sent the text
through the RPSB Hotline. Apart from the information passed on to them, the police simply had no
reason to reasonably believe that the passenger vehicle contained an item, article or object which by
law is subject to seizure and destruction.

What further militates against the finding that there was sufficient probable cause on the part of the
police to conduct an intrusive search is the fact that the information regarding the description of the
person alleged to be transporting illegal drugs, i.e., wearing a collared white shirt with green stripes,
red ball cap, and carrying a blue sack, was relayed merely through a text message from
a completely anonymous person. The police did not even endeavor to inquire how this stranger
gathered the information. The authorities did not even ascertain in any manner whether the
information coming from the complete stranger was credible. After receiving this anonymous text
message, without giving any second thought, the police accepted the unverified information as
gospel truth and immediately proceeded in establishing the checkpoint. To be sure, information
coming from a complete and anonymous stranger, without the police officers undertaking even a
semblance of verification, on their own, cannot reasonably produce probable cause that warrants the
conduct of an intrusive search.

In fact, as borne from the cross-examination of PO3 Mabiasan, the authorities did not even
personally receive and examine the anonymous text message. The contents of the text message
were only relayed to them by a duty guard, whose identity the police could not even recall:

Q x x x [W]ho received the information, was it you or another person, Mr. Witness?

A The duty guard, sir.

Q And usually now, informations (sic) is usually transmitted and text (sic) to the duty guard, Mr.
Witness?

A Yes, sir.

Q Can you produce the transcript of the text message (sic) can you write in a piece of paper, Mr.
Witness?

A Our duty guard just informed us the information, sir.

Q So the text was not preserve (sic), Mr. Witness?

A Yes, sir.

Q Who is you duty guard, Mr. Witness?

A I cannot remember, sir.104

Simply stated, the information received through text message was not only hearsay evidence; it
is double hearsay.

Moreover, as testified by PO3 Mabiasan himself, tipped information received by the authorities
through the duty guard was unwritten and unrecorded, violating the Standard Operating
Procedure that any information received by a police station that shall be duly considered by the
authorities should be properly written in a log book or police blotter:

Q Is it not an (sic) Standard Operating Procedure that any information received by the Police
Stations or a detachment properly written in a log book or written in a Police blotter, that is the
Standard Operating Procedure, correct, Mr. Witness?

A Yes, sir.

Q It was not written the information that you received, correct, Mr. Witness?
A Not at that time, sir.105

Further, it does not escape the attention of the Court that, as testified to by PSI Ngoslab on cross-
examination, the mobile phone which received the anonymous person's text message was not even
an official government issued phone.106 From the records of the case, it is unclear as to who owned
or possessed the said phone used as the supposed official hotline of the RPSB Office. Furthermore,
PSI Ngoslab testified that he was not even sure whether the said official hotline still existed.107

Surely, probable cause justifying an intrusive warrantless search and seizure cannot possibly arise
from double hearsay evidence and from an irregularly-received tipped information. A reasonably
discreet and prudent man will surely not believe that an offense has been committed and that the
item sought in connection with said offense are in the place to be searched based solely on the say-
so of an unknown duty guard that a random, unverified text message was sent to an unofficial
mobile phone by a complete stranger.

Therefore, with the glaring absence of probable cause that justifies an intrusive warrantless search,
considering that the police officers failed to rely on their personal knowledge and depended solely on
an unverified and anonymous tip, the warrantless search conducted on accused-appellant Sapla
was an invalid and unlawful search of a moving vehicle.

The Inapplicability of The Other Instances of Reasonable Warrantless Searches and Seizures

Neither are the other instances of reasonable warrantless searches and seizures applicable in the
instant case.

Without need of elaborate explanation, the search conducted on accused-appellant Sapla was not
incidental to a lawful arrest. Such requires a lawful arrest that precedes the search, which is not the
case here. Further, the prosecution has not alleged and proven that there was a seizure of evidence
in plain view, that it was a customs search, and that there were exigent and emergency
circumstances that warranted a warrantless search.

Neither can the search conducted on accused-appellant Sapla be considered a valid stop and
frisk search. The Court has explained that stop and frisk searches refer to 'the act of a police officer
to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s) or contraband.' Thus, the
allowable scope of a 'stop and frisk' search is limited to a "protective search of outer clothing for
weapons."108 The search conducted by the authorities on accused-appellant Sapla went beyond a
protective search of outer clothing for weapons or contraband.

Moreover, while it was clarified by the Court in Malacat v. Court of Appeals109 that probable cause
is not required to conduct stop and frisk searches, "mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a
'stop and frisk.' A genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officer's experience and
surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about
him."110 In Comprado, Cogaed, and Veridiano, the Court has held that mere reliance on information
relayed by an informant does not suffice to provide a genuine reason for the police to conduct a
warrantless search and seizure. In other words, in the aforesaid cases, the Court has held that
information from an informant is mere suspicion that does not validate a stop and frisk search.

Invalid Consented Warrantless Search

Neither can the Court consider the search conducted on accused-appellant Sapla as a valid
consented search.
The CA found that accused-appellant Sapla "consented to the search in this case and that the illegal
drugs - four (4) bricks of marijuana, discovered as a result of consented search [are] admissible in
evidence."111

The Court disagrees.

In Tudtud, the Court held that there can only be an effective waiver of rights against unreasonable
searches and seizures if the following requisites are present:

1. It must appear that the rights exist;

2. The person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of such right;
and

3. Said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right.112

Considering that a warrantless search is in derogation of a constitutional right, the Court has held
that "[t]he fundamental law and jurisprudence require more than the presence of these
circumstances to constitute a valid waiver of the constitutional right against unreasonable searches
and seizures. Courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental
constitutional rights; acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights is not to be presumed. The fact
that a person failed to object to a search does not amount to permission thereto."113

Hence, even in cases where the accused voluntarily handed her bag114 or the chairs containing
marijuana to the arresting officer,115 the Court has held there was no valid consent to the
search.116

Again, in Veridiano, the Court emphasized that the consent to a warrantless search and seizure
must be unequivocal, specific, intelligently given and unattended by duress or coercion.117 Mere
passive conformity to the warrantless search is only an implied acquiescence which does not
amount to consent and that the presence of a coercive environment negates the cl2im that the
petitioner therein consented to the warrantless search.118

The very recent case of Yanson is likewise instructive. As in the instant case, "Sison, [the therein
accused] who was then unarmed, was prodded by the arresting officers to open the pickup's hood.
His beguiling conformity is easily accounted by how he was then surrounded by police officers who
had specifically flagged him and his companions down. He was under the coercive force of armed
law enforcers. His consent, if at all, was clearly vitiated."119

In the instant case, the totality of the evidence presented convinces the Court that accused-appellant
Sapla's apparent consent to the search conducted by the police was not unequivocal, specific,
intelligently given, and unattended by duress or coercion. It cannot be seriously denied that accused-
appellant Sapla was subjected to a coercive environment, considering that he was confronted by
several armed police officers in a checkpoint.

In fact, from the testimony of PO3 Mabiasan himself, it becomes readily apparent that accused-
appellant Sapla's alleged voluntary opening of the sack was not unequivocal. When PO3 Mabiasan
asked accused-appellant Sapla to open the sack, the latter clearly hesitated and it was only "[a]fter a
while [that] he voluntarily opened [the sack]."120
At most, accused-appellant Sapla's alleged act of opening the blue sack was mere passive
conformity to a warrantless search conducted in a coercive and intimidating environment. Hence, the
Court cannot consider the search conducted as a valid consented search.

The Exclusionary Rule or Fruit of the Poisonous Tree Doctrine

The necessary and inescapable consequence of the illegality of the search and seizure conducted
by the police in the instant case is the inadmissibility of the drug specimens retrieved.

According to Article III, Section 3(2) of the Constitution, any evidence obtained in violation of the
right against unreasonable searches and seizures shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.

Known as the exclusionary rule, "evidence obtained and confiscated on the occasion of such
unreasonable searches and seizures [is] deemed tainted and should be excluded for being the
proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree. In other words, evidence obtained from unreasonable searches
and seizures shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding."121

Therefore, with the inadmissibility of the confiscated marijuana bricks, there is no more need for the
Court to discuss the other issues surrounding the apprehension of accused-appellant Sapla,
particularly the gaps in the chain of custody of the alleged seized marijuana bricks, which likewise
renders the same inadmissible. The prosecution is left with no evidence left to support the conviction
of accused-appellant Sapla. Consequently, accused-appellant Sapla is acquitted of the crime
charged.

Epilogue

The Court fully recognizes the necessity of adopting a resolute and aggressive stance against the
menace of illegal drugs. Our Constitution declares that the maintenance of peace and order and the
promotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of
democracy.122

Nevertheless, by sacrificing the sacred and indelible right against unreasonable searches and
seizures for expediency's sake, the very maintenance of peace and order sought after is rendered
wholly nugatory. By disregarding basic constitutional rights as a means to curtail the proliferation of
illegal drugs, instead of protecting the general welfare, oppositely, the general welfare is viciously
assaulted. In other words, when the Constitution i.s disregarded, the battle waged against illegal
drugs becomes a self-defeating and self-destructive enterprise. A battle waged against illegal drugs
that tramples on the rights of the people is not a war on drugs; it is a war against the people.123

The Bill of Rights should never be sacrificed on the altar of convenience. Otherwise, the malevolent
mantle of the rule of men dislodges the rule of law.124

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appeal is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated April
24, 2018 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 09296 is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Accordingly, accused-appellant Jerry Sapla y Guerrero a.k.a. Eric Salibad y Mallari
is ACQUITTED of the crime charged on the ground of reasonable doubt, and is ORDERED
IMMEDIATELY RELEASED from detention unless he is being lawfully held for another cause. Let an
entry of final judgment be issued immediately.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City,
for immediate implementation. The said Director is ORDERED to REPORT to this Court within five
(5) days from receipt of this Decision the action he has taken.

SO ORDERED.
 THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 229071, December 10, 2018

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. EANNA O'COCHLAIN, Accused-

Appellant.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

On appeal is the February 9, 2016 Decision1 and July 21, 2016 Resolution2 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 36412, which affirmed the November 22, 2013
Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 13, Laoag City, in Criminal Case No.
15585-13, finding accused-appellant Eanna O'Cochlain (Eanna) guilty of violating
Section 11, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002.

At the time of his arrest, Eanna was a 53-year old Irish national married to a Filipina
and residing in Barangay Aring, Badoc, Ilocos Norte. In an Information4 dated July 15,
2013, he was charged with illegal possession of marijuana, committed as follows:

That on or about [the] 14th day of July 2013 in the City of Laoag and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously had in his possession, custody and control: two (2)
sticks of dried Marijuana Leaves, a dangerous drug, with an aggregate weight of 0.3824
grams, without any license or authority to possess, in violation of the aforesaid law.5
With the assistance of a counsel de parte and in the presence of a public prosecutor,
Eanna pleaded "NOT GUILTY" in his arraignment.6 He was allowed to post bail for his
temporary liberty, but a hold departure order was issued to prevent him from leaving
the Philippines and his passport was surrendered to the court for its custody in the
course of the proceedings.7

Version of the Prosecution

Aside from the sworn statements of other intended witnesses,8 the testimonies in open
court of Security Screening Officer Dexter Suguitan (SSO Suguitan), Police Officer 3
Joel Javier (PO3 Javier), and PO1 Erald Terson (PO1 Terson) reveal as follows:

While on his break time around 7:00 p.m. on July 14, 2013, SSO Suguitan of the
Department of Transportation - Office of Transportation Security (OTS), assigned at the
initial security screening checkpoint of the Laoag City International Airport, was told by
CAAP9 Security and Intelligence Flor Tamayo (CSI Tamayo) that the parking space in
front of the departure area smelled like marijuana ("agat sa marijuana"). He suspected
that Eanna was the one who smoked the illegal drug, recounting that at aroud 6:35
p.m. he saw a certain male Caucasian at the parking area lighting something
unrecognizable as he was covering it with his palm. CSI Tamayo observed that
whenever he would suck what he seemed to be smoking, no visible vapor would come
out from his mouth.

However, SSO Suguitan dismissed CSI Tamayo's story as he thought that it would be
impossible for a passenger to smoke marijuana at the airport. After a while, he
returned to his post at the initial check-in area. Meanwhile, CSI Tamayo reported what
he saw to PO2 Pancho Caole, Jr. (PO2 Caole, Jr.) and SSO Fidel Bal-ot (SSO Bal-ot) ,
who were manning the final screening area.

Later on, SSO Bal-ot directed SSO Suguitan to proceed to the final security
checkpoint.10 The latter was instructed to conduct a pat down search on Eanna, who
agreed. He was frisked while he raised his hands by stretching sideward to the level of
his shoulders with palms open. When something was felt inside the pocket of his upper
garment, he was asked to take it out. He then brought out a pack of Marlboro red from
his left pocket, as well as a matchbox and another pack of Marlboro red from his right
pocket. The pack of Marlboro red on his left hand contained cigarettes but the one on
his right hand contained two (2) rolled sticks of what appeared to be dried marijuana
leaves. SSO Suguitan knew it was marijuana because that was what CSI Tamayo earlier
told him. He took the pack of Marlboro red containing the two rolled sticks of dried
marijuana leaves and showed it to PO1 Peter Warner Manadao, Jr. (PO1 Manadao, Jr.)
and other police personnel on duty. SSO Suguitan put them on the nearby screening
table in front of Eanna and PO1 Manadao, Jr. The two rolled sticks of dried marijuana
leaves were the only items placed thereon.

PO1 Udel Tubon11 then called the attention of PO3 Javier, who was the investigator on
duty of the Philippine National Police (PNP) - Aviation Security Group (ASG). PO1
Manadao, Jr., PO2 Caole, Jr., SSO Suguitan, and SSO Bal-ot were at the final
checkpoint when he arrived. They told him that marijuana was found in Eanna's pocket.
SSO Suguitan turned over to PO3 Javier the pack of Marlboro red containing the two
rolled sticks of dried marijuana leaves. PO3 Javier then placed them on a tray, together
with Eanna's other belongings. As the area started to become crowded, the seized
items were brought by PO3 Javier to the PNP-ASG office. He was accompanied by SSO
Suguitan and Eanna.

Together with PO3 Javier at the PNP-ASG office were Police Superintendent Diosdado
Apias (P/Supt. Apias), PO1 Manadao, Jr., PO2 Caole, Jr., SSO Suguitan, SSO Bal-ot,
and a certain SPO3 Domingo. While waiting for the arrival of the barangay officials,
which took 15-20 minutes, the two rolled sticks of dried marijuana leaves were placed
on the investigation table where everybody could look but not touch. Eanna was seated
in front of the table, while the others guarded him. PO3 Javier then prepared the
inventory. The two rolled sticks of dried marijuana leaves and other seized items were
listed. The check-in baggage of Eanna was also inspected, but it only contained clothes
and other personal belongings. The confiscation/inventory receipts were signed by PO3
Javier and SSO Suguitan, as well as two (2) officials of Barangay Araniw, Laoag City
(Barangay Chairman Edilberto Bumanglag and Barangay Kagawad Benjamin Teodoro)
and an ABS-CBN cameraman (Juanito Badua), who acted as witnesses. In their
presence, as well as of Eanna, PO3 Javier marked the two rolled sticks of dried
marijuana leaves as "EO-1" and "EO-2" and, thereafter, placed them inside a Ziploc re-
sealable plastic bag. The guard of the PNP-ASG office, PO1 Terson, took pictures during
the inventory and marking, while P/Supt. Apias prepared the requests for the medico-
legal examination of Eanna and the laboratory examination of the two rolled sticks of
dried marijuana leaves. The marking, physical inventory, and photographing were
likewise witnessed by PO1 Manadao, Jr. and PO2 Caole, Jr., who executed a Joint
Affidavit of Arrest with PO3 Javier.

Subsequently, Eanna was brought to the Governor Roque R. Ablan, Sr. Memorial
Hospital for his medico-legal examination. PO3 Javier proceeded to the Ilocos Norte
Provincial Crime Laboratory Office to submit the request for laboratory examination and
the two rolled sticks of dried marijuana leaves. The request and the specimens were
received by PO3 Padayao, the evidence custodian. Based on the qualitative examination
conducted by Forensic Chemist Police Inspector Amiely Ann Luis Navarro (P/Insp.
Navarro), which was reduced into writing, the specimens were found to be positive for
the presence of marijuana.

Version of the Defense

At around 6:30 p.m. on July 14, 2013, Eanna was with his wife at the Laoag City
International Airport for their Cebu Pacific flight bound for Manila. Since the x-ray
machine operator at the initial security screening was not yet around, he left his wife in
the line and smoked his pre-rolled tobacco and Marlboro cigarette outside, about 30
meters away. Ten minutes passed, he went back to the initial security checkpoint
carrying his check-in and cabin luggage, camera bag, and some shopping bags. The
airport police conducted a body search and examined his belongings. Afterwards, he
proceeded to the final security check where he was inspected by a male "immigration
officer" wearing a brown shirt. As a result, a red Marlboro cigarette pack, containing
two pieces of rolled paper of flavored tobacco, was found in his possession.12 It was
shown to him while he was in front of his wife. The cigarette pack was then put on the
desk, on top of one of his luggage. A camera bag (containing a Sony camera,
connecting cables, headphones, an MP3 player, cigarette paper, and a pack of
Marlboro) was also searched. The officer got some tiny grains after sticking his fingers
into the bag. He showed them to Eanna and asked what they were. The latter replied
that they were flavored tobacco, which he has been smoking for the past 30 years.
Despite the claim, the officer directed an airport police to bring Eanna to the police
station that was about 150 meters away.

Together with his wife, Eanna was escorted by about five to six airport police. At the
PNP-ASG office, his camera bag and other luggage arrived approximately 20 minutes
later. They were placed on top of the table and stayed there for 30-45 minutes before
the police started to search the contents and catalog the items. Prior to the inventory of
the seized items, Eanna and his wife repacked their luggage as the latter still proceeded
with her scheduled flight. Thereafter, with the permission of PO3 Javier, Eanna went
outside the office to smoke as he waited for his Batac-based Filipino relatives who
arrived approximately after two hours. While smoking outside, he could not see what
was happening, if any, to his luggage and camera bag.

The camera crew of ABS-CBN arrived at almost 11:00 p.m. An asset from the Philippine
Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) called Badua and told him to come to the PNP-ASG
office. He went with an off-duty security guard of ABS-CBN Laoag City. There, he was
allowed to cover the incident, which became the basis of a television news report.

The sticks of the alleged marijuana were shown to Eanna thrice - once at the airport
and twice at the police station. On the second instance, he was shown two thin rolled
sticks that were placed on top of the table in front of him. On the third time, however,
he saw a thin and a fat rolled sticks made of paper that were different from what he
was using.

RTC Ruling

After trial, Eanna was convicted of the crime charged. The fallo of the November 22,
2013 Decision states:
WHEREFORE, accused Eanna O'Cochlain is hereby pronounced GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the charge of illegal possession of marijuana weighing 0.3824 gram
and is therefore sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of
TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS and to pay a fine of
THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P300,000.00).

The two sticks of marijuana subject hereof are confiscated, the same to be disposed in
the manner that the law prescribes.

SO ORDERED.13
The search conducted on Eanna and his subsequent arrest were upheld. According to
the RTC, the search upon his person was not unreasonable but was actually an
exception to the proscription against warrantless searches and seizures. It was justified
as it proceeded from a duty or right that was enforced in accordance with the aviation
rules and regulations to maintain peace, order and security at the airports. In fact,
Eanna's plane ticket carried a proviso allowing airport authorities to check on his person
and baggage pursuant to the requirement of Section 9 of R.A. No. 6235.14 Moreover,
another exception to the rule is consented warrantless search and seizure. In this case,
Eanna agreed to the body pat down search that was requested by SSO Suguitan.

For the RTC, SSO Suguitan was a credible witness. It was observed that he was
spontaneous in his testimony and that he appeared candid and truthful in his
statements. There was nothing in his testimony or in the manner he testified that could
arouse serious suspicion of lying. Some of his inconsistent statements, which the
defense considered as irreconcilable, were insignificant and trivial as they do not
impinge on any of the elements of the offense charged. Instead, the statements bolster
SSO Suguitan's credibility as they were indicia of his unrehearsed testimony.

The RTC opined that Eanna's denial was not based on clear and convincing evidence;
rather, it was bare and self-serving. His testimony was even fraught with incoherence
and serious inconsistencies which he obviously committed as he desperately tried to
show that what was taken from his possession was mere tobacco. Considering his flip-
flopping testimony, his denial was not given credence and did not prevail over the
credible testimony of SSO Suguitan and the unquestioned findings of the forensic
chemist.

Finally, as to the chain of custody of the illegal drug seized, the RTC was satisfied that
the prosecution was able to preserve the integrity and evidentiary value of the subject
marijuana. It ruled:
In this case, the Court does not doubt a bit that the two sticks of marijuana presented
in evidence are the same sticks of marijuana confiscated from the accused. There was
not only compliance by the airport authorities of the requirements of Section 21 of the
law and its implementing rules and regulations, there is a complete account of the
complete chain of custody of the two sticks of marijuana that negates any doubt that
their integrity and evidentiary value have been preserved. As it has been established by
the prosecution, upon being informed of the arrest of the accused, after SSO Suguitan
had confiscated the two [sticks] of marijuana from the accused, PO3 Joel Javier, the
duty police investigator at the airport at [the] time who was at the ramp outside the
departure terminal was called and when he arrived at the place where the accused was
accosted and was informed of the arrest of the accused, he took custody of the two
sticks of marijuana which were then on the screening desk or table and invited the
accused to the office of the PNP-CAAP Aviation Security Group located within the
premises of the airport not far tram the departure terminal. There, PO3 Javier marked
the two sticks of marijuana with E0-1 and. E0-2. Upon the arrival of two Barangay
officials, Barangay Chairman Edilberto Bumanglag and Kagawad Benjamin Teodoro of
Barangay Araniw, Laoag City which has territorial jurisdiction over the airport, and a
member of the media in the person of Juanito Badua, a cameraman of ABS-CBN,
Laoag, PO3 Javier also conducted the required inventory not only of the two sticks of
marijuana but the other belongings of the accused contained in his luggage. In the
course of the inventory, PO1 Erald Terson, also a member of the PNP� Aviation
Security Group, took pictures of the seized items as he was directed to do by their
superior. Sometime later, as the accused was brought for medical examination, PO3
Javier was the one who brought the two sticks of marijuana together with the prepared
letter request to the Ilocos Norte Provincial Crime Laboratory Office for examination.
And to complete the chain, the prosecution established that at the said crime lab, the
two sticks were received by PO3 Padayao who thereupon turned them over to the
forensic chemist, Police Inspector Amiely Ann Navarro. As the Court takes judicial
notice from the record of the case, the two sticks were finally submitted to court on July
19, 2013, received by the Branch Clerk of Court, Atty. Bernadette Espejo[,] who issued
the corresponding Acknowledgment Receipt therefor.

Significantly relative to the chain of custody and as would have equally done by the
other concerned witnesses such as forensic chemist Police Inspector Navarro who
issued her written chemistry reports of the qualitative examinations she conducted on
the specimens, and PO3 Padayao, both of the crime lab, SSO Suguitan[,] who
discovered the two sticks of marijuana[,] identified the same in open court, pointing in
the process the respective markings E0-1 and E0-2 that he witnessed to have been
placed by the investigating police officer, PO3 Javier[,] which, after the inventory, the
latter placed in a plastic bag (Ziploc). PO3 Javier himself also identified the two sticks of
marijuana.

At this point, the Court is not oblivious of the fact that in his testimony SSO Suguitan
initially claimed that he turned over the two sticks of marijuana to PO1 Manadao, Jr.
But actually[,] as it can be clearly appreciated from the testimony of SSO Suguitan, the
turn over that he said was merely the placing of the two sticks of marijuana on top of
the table at the final screening area, in front of PO1 Manadao and the accused. In fact,
as SSO Suguitan conoborated PO3 Javier, the two sticks of marijuana which were still
on the screening desk were thereafter placed on a tray and PO3 Javier was the one who
then actually took custody thereof as the accused was invited to the office of the PNP-
CAAP Aviation Security Group. PO3 Javier himself, when he was asked by the defense if
it was PO1 Manadao who turned over the specimens to him, categorically said, "No, sir,
Mr. Dexter Suguitan."

Also, the Court cannot be amiss to point out that the two sticks of marijuana could not
have been switched with another or contaminated while it was in the custody of PO3
Javier. While admitting that there were many things that they prepared while they were
already in their office, he testified in effect that no such [thing] happened. The people
there at the office were not examining the specimens, they were just looking and not
holding it.

The Court at this point cannot but express its observation that PO3 Javier, just like SSO
Suguitan, was equally credible. He was straightforward, consistent and candid in his
testimony that it cannot in any way be considered suspect.15
Eanna moved to reconsider the RTC judgment, but it was denied; hence, a notice of
appeal was filed.16

CA Ruling

Finding no cause to overturn the findings of fact and conclusions of law, the CA affirmed
the assailed RTC Decision.

The CA affirmatively answered the issue of whether there was probable cause to justify
the warrantless search of Eanna and the seizure of his belongings. It appreciated the
prosecution's version that CSI Tamayo saw him smoking while out.side the departure
area of the airport terminal. Although no smoke coming from his mouth was seen, CSJ
Tamayo still smelled the scent of marijuana. Similar to the RTC ruling, the warrantless
search and seizure was also valid because the search was conducted pursuant to a
routine airport security procedure and Eanna voluntarily gave his consent thereto.
It was likewise held that all the elements of the crime of illegal possession of dangerous
drug were satisfactorily established. First, Eanna was caught in possession and custody
of two sticks of marijuana on July 14, 2013 at the Laoag City International Airport
during the routine search conducted by the airport authorities. Second, he failed to
prove that he was authorized by law to possess the same. And third, he freely and
consciously possessed the illegal drug.

The CA downplayed the alleged varying testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. As

the RTC opined, the inconsistences raised by the defense were minor and trivial and
could not affect the RTC's finding as to the credibility of the airport police officers.

Finally, anent the chain of custody rule, the CA regarded as specious Eanna's claim that
the procedures set forth in Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 were not followed. The
testimony of SSO Suguitan was quoted and the ratiocination of the RTC was adopted to
support the finding that the airport officials complied with the rule.

Eanna filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied on July 21, 2016.

Now before us, the Office of the Solicitor General manifested that it would no longer file
a supplemental brief as it had exhaustively discussed the legal issues and arguments in
its appeal brief before the CA.17 On his part, Eanna filed a Supplemental Brief18 to
bolster his claim that there were gaps in the chain of custody of the alleged illegal drug
seized. He argues that:
 1. PO3 Javier was not at the scene where Eanna was found in possession of the
alleged illegal drug; thus, he had no personal knowledge of its possession by
Eanna and its seizure by SSO Suguitan.

2. It was not made clear by the prosecution that the two sticks of rolled paper
allegedly containing marijuana were marked immediately upon confiscation.

3. The drug evidence was rendered susceptible to alteration, tampering and

swapping because the Ziploc where it was placed was not sealed by an adhesive
tape or any means other than the natural, built-in re�sealable feature of the
plastic bag.

4. The presence of the marking "JEP" on the two rolled sticks of alleged marijuana
could not be explained and the marking made thereon compromised their
integrity and physical appearance.

5. The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty is unavailing

because the police authorities deviated from the mandated procedure and
offered no valid ground to show that their actuations were justified.

Our Ruling

The judgment of conviction is affirmed.

Airport screening search is a constitutionally reasonable administrative

search.

The search and seizure of an illegal drug during a routine airport inspection made
pursuant to the aviation security procedures has been sustained by this Court in a
number of cases.19 In the leading case of People v. Johnson,20 we held:
Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure of their
persons or property to the public in a manner reflecting a lack of subjective expectation
of privacy, which expectation society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Such
recognition is implicit in airport security procedures. With increased concern over
airplane hijacking and terrorism has come increased security at the nation's airports.
Passengers attempting to board an aircraft routinely pass through metal detectors;
their carry-on baggage as well as checked luggage are routinely subjected to x-ray
scans. Should these procedures suggest the presence of suspicious objects, physical
searches are conducted to determine what the objects are. There is little question that
such searches are reasonable, given their minimal intrusiveness, the gravity of the
safety interests involved, and the reduced privacy expectations associated with airline
travel. Indeed, travelers are often notified through airport public address systems,
signs, and notices in their airline tickets that they are subject to search and, if any
prohibited materials or substances are found, such would be subject to seizure. These
announcements place passengers on notice that ordinary constitutional protections
against warrantless searches and seizures do not apply to routine airport procedures.21
Thus, while the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures is guaranteed by Section 2, Article
III of the 1987 Constitution,22 a routine security check being conducted in air23 and
sea24 ports has been a recognized exception. This is in addition to a string of
jurisprudence ruling that search and seizure may be made without a warrant and the
evidence obtained therefrom may be admissible in the following instances: (1) search
incidental to a lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving motor vehicle; (3) customs search;
(4) seizure of evidence in "plain view"; (5) consented warrantless search; (6) "stop and
frisk" search; and (7) exigent and emergency circumstance.25

Notably, Section 2, Article III of the Constitution was patterned after the Fourth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America.26 Having been derived
almost verbatim therefrom, the Court may turn to the pronouncements of the US
Federal Supreme Court and State Appellate Courts, which are considered doctrinal in
this jurisdiction.27

Like in our country, the circumstances under which a warrantless search, unsupported
by probable cause, may be considered reasonable under the Fourth Amendment are
very limited and that exceptions thereto are few specifically established and well
delineated.28 In a similar way, the government bears the burden of proving that a
warrantless search was conducted pursuant to an established exception to the Fourth
Amendment warrant requirement.29

US courts have permitted exceptions to the Fourth Amendment when "special needs,
beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable cause
requirement impracticable" such as work-related searches of government employees'
desks and offices, warrantless searches conducted by school officials of a student's
property, government investigators conducting searches pursuant to a regulatory
scheme when the searches meet "reasonable legislative or administrative standards,"
and a State's operation of a probation system.30 The Fourth Amendment permits the
warrantless search of "closely regulated" businesses; "special needs" cases such as
schools, employment, and probation; and "checkpoint" searches such as airport
screenings under the administrative search doctrine.31

Searches and seizures are ordinarily unreasonable in the absence of individualized

suspicion of wrongdoing.32 However, because administrative searches primarily ensure
public safety instead of detecting criminal wrongdoing, they do not require individual
suspicion.33 Where the risk to public safety is substantial and real, blanket suspicionless
searches calibrated to the risk may rank as "reasonable."34 In particular, airport
searches have received judicial sanction essentially because of the magnitude and
pervasiveness of the danger to the public safety and the overriding concern has been
the threat of death or serious bodily injury to members of the public posed by the
introduction of inherently lethal weapons or bombs.35

Although the US Supreme Court has not specifically held that airport screening

searches are constitutionally reasonable administrative searches, it has suggested that
they qualify as such.36 Airport security searches can be deemed lawful administrative
searches because (1) these searches constitute relatively limited intrusions geared
toward finding particular items (weapons, explosives, and incendiary devices) that pose
grave danger to airplanes and air travelers; (2) the scrutiny of carry-on luggage is no
more intrusive (in both its scope and intensity) than is necessary to achieve the
legitimate aims of the screening process (that is, to ensure air travel safety); (3) airline
passengers have advance notice that their carry-on luggage will be subjected to these
security measures, thus giving passengers the opportunity to place their personal
effects in checked luggage; (4) all passengers are subject to the same screening
procedures; and (5) passengers are aware that they can avoid the screening process
altogether by electing not to board the plane.37 Moreover, abuse is unlikely because of
its public nature.38

As a permissible administrative search, the scope of airport routine check is not

limitless.39 Airport screening procedures are conducted for two primary reasons: first, to
prevent passengers from carrying weapons or explosives onto the aircraft; and second,
to deter passengers from even attempting to do so.40 The oft-cited case of United
States v. Davis41 sets the appropriate standards for evaluating airport screening
searches as constitutionally reasonable administrative searches, thus:
[S]earches conducted as part of a general regulatory scheme in furtherance of an
administrative purpose, rather than as part of a criminal investigation to secure
evidence of crime, may be permissible under the Fourth Amendment though not
supported by a showing of probable cause directed to a particular place or person to be
searched.

As we have seen, screening searches of airline passengers are conducted as part of a

general regulatory scheme in furtherance of an administrative purpose, namely, to
prevent the carrying of weapons or explosives aboard aircraft, and thereby to prevent
hijackings. The essential purpose of the scheme is not to detect weapons or explosives
or to apprehend those who carry them, but to deter persons carrying such material
from seeking to board at all.

Of course, routine airport screening searches will lead to discovery of contraband and
apprehension of law violators. This practical consequence does not alter the essentially
administrative nature of the screening process, however, or render the searches
unconstitutional. x x x.

There is an obvious danger, nonetheless, that the screening of passengers and their
carry-on luggage for weapons and explosives will be subverted into a general search for
evidence of crime. If this occurs, the courts will exclude the evidence
obtained.42 (Citations omitted.)
The constitutional bounds of an airport administrative search require that the individual
screener's actions be no more intrusive than necessary to determine the existence or
absence of explosives that could result in harm to the passengers and aircraft.43 The
search cannot also serve unrelated law enforcement purposes as it effectively
transforms a limited check for weapons and explosives into a general search for
evidence of crime, substantially eroding the privacy rights of passengers who travel
through the system.44 As in other exceptions to the search warrant requirement, the
screening program must not turn into a vehicle for warrantless searches for evidence of
crime.45 It is improper that the search be tainted by "general law enforcement
objectives" such as uncovering contraband unrelated to that purpose or evidence of
unrelated crimes or evidencing general criminal activity or a desire to detect "evidence
of ordinary criminal wrongdoing."46 In United States v. $124,570 US. Currency,47 the US
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit noted that the US Supreme Court has repeatedly
emphasized the importance of keeping criminal investigatory motives from coloring
administrative searches.48

Hence, an airport search remains a valid administrative search only so long as the
scope of the administrative search exception is not exceeded; "once a search is
conducted for a criminal investigatory purpose, it can no longer be justified under an
administrative search rationale."49 Where an action is taken that cannot serve the
administrative purpose, either because the threat necessitating the administrative
search has been dismissed or because the action is simply unrelated to the
administrative goal, the action clearly exceeds the scope of the permissible search.50 To
the extent that airport administrative searches are used for purposes other than
screening luggage and passengers for weapons or explosives, they fall outside the
rationale by which they have been approved as an exception to the warrant
requirement, and the evidence obtained during such a search should be excluded.51

Furthermore, to be constitutionally permissible, warrantless and suspicionless airport

screening searches must meet the Fourth Amendment standard of
reasonableness.52 "What is reasonable depends upon all of the circumstances
surrounding the search or seizure and the nature of the search or seizure itself."53 There
can be no ready test for determining reasonableness other than by balancing the need
to search against the invasion which the search entails.54 In other words, an
administrative screening search must be as limited in its intrusiveness as is consistent
with satisfaction of the administrative need that justifies it.55 Specifically, the Court
must balance an individual's right to be free of intrusion with "society's interest in safe
air travel."56 On this score, Davis again has provided a guidepost. There it was held that
an airport security search is considered as reasonable if: (1) the search is no more
extensive or intensive than necessary, in light of current technology, to satisfy the
administrative need that justifies it, that is to detect the presence of weapons or
explosives; (2) the search is confined in good faith to that purpose; and (3) a potential
passenger may avoid the search by choosing not to fly.57

In State v. Hanson,58 the Intermediate Court of Appeals of Hawai'i believed in the

soundness of the logic of the US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in United States
v. Skipwith,59 which ruled:
Necessity alone, however, whether produced by danger or otherwise, does not in itself
make all non-probable-cause searches reasonable. Reasonableness requires that the
courts must weigh more than the necessity of the search in terms of possible harm to
the public. The equation must also take into account the likelihood that the search
procedure will be effective in averting the potential harm. On the opposite balance we
must evaluate the degree and nature of intrusion into the privacy of the person and
effects of the citizen which the search entails.

In undertaking our calculation of the weight to be accorded to these three factors in the
case at bar - public necessity, efficacy of the search, and degree of intrusion - we need
not reiterate what was said in Moreno about the dangers posed by air piracy; suffice it
to say that there is a judicially-recognized necessity to insure that the potential harms
of air piracy are foiled. The search procedures have every indicia of being the most
efficacious that could be used. The group being screened is limited to persons with the
immediate intention of boarding aircraft. Metal detectors, visual inspection, and rare
but potential physical searches appear to this court to provide as much efficiency to the
process as it could have.

On the other side of the judicial scales, the intrusion which the airport search imposes
on the public is not insubstantial. It is inconvenient and annoying, in some cases it may
be embarrassing, and at times it can be incriminating. There are several factors,
however, which make this search less offensive to the searched person than similar
searches in other contexts. One such factor is the almost complete absence of any
stigma attached to being subjected to search at a known, designated airport search
point. As one commentator has put it in the border search context, "individuals
searched because of their membership in a morally neutral class have less cause to feel
insulted . . . ." In addition, the offensiveness of the screening process is somewhat
mitigated by the fact that the person to be searched must voluntarily come to and enter
the search area. He has every opportunity to avoid the procedure by not entering the
boarding area. Finally, the circumstances under which the airport search is conducted
make it much less likely that abuses will occur. Unlike searches conducted on dark and
lonely streets at night where often the officer and the subject are the only witnesses,
these searches are made under supervision and not far from the scrutiny of the
traveling public.

Moreover, the airlines, which have their representatives present, have a definite and
substantial interest in assuring that their passengers are not unnecessarily harassed.
The officers conducting the search under these circumstances are much more likely to
be solicitous of the Fourth Amendment rights of the traveling public than in more
isolated, unsupervised surroundings.

Our conclusion, after this tripartite weighing of the relevant factors, is that the
standards for initiating a search of a person at the boarding gate should be no more
stringent than those applied in border crossing situations. In the critical pre-boarding
area where this search started, reasonableness does not require that officers search
only those passengers who meet a profile or who manifest signs of nervousness or who
otherwise appear suspicious. Such a requirement would have to assume that hijackers
are readily identifiable or that they invariably possess certain traits. The number of lives
placed at hazard by this criminal paranoia forbid taking such deadly chances. As Judge
Friendly has stated:
Determination of what is reasonable requires a weighing of the harm against the need.
When the object of the search is simply the detection of past crime, probable cause to
arrest is generally the appropriate test . . . . When the risk is the jeopardy to hundreds
of human lives and millions of dollars of property inherent in the pirating or blowing up
of a large airplane, the danger alone meets the test of reasonableness, so long as the
search is conducted in good faith for the purpose of preventing hijacking or like damage
and with reasonable scope and the passenger has been given advance notice of his
liability to such a search so that he can avoid it by choosing not to travel by air.
(Citations omitted.)
According to United States v. Aukai,60 US case law had erroneously suggested that the
reasonableness of airport screening searches is dependent upon the passenger's
consent, either ongoing consent or irrevocable implied consent. It opined:

The constitutionality of an airport screening search, however, does not depend on

consent, see  Biswell, 406 U.S. at 315, and requiring that a potential passenger be
allowed to revoke consent to an ongoing airport security search makes little sense in a
post-9/11 world. Such a rule would afford terrorists multiple opportunities to attempt to
penetrate airport security by "electing not to fly" on the cusp of detection until a
vulnerable portal is found. This rule would also allow terrorists a low-cost method of
detecting systematic vulnerabilities in airport security, knowledge that could be
extremely valuable in planning future attacks. Likewise, given that consent is not
required, it makes little sense to predicate the reasonableness of an administrative
airport screening search on an irrevocable implied consent theory. Rather, where an
airport screening search is otherwise reasonable and conducted pursuant to statutory
authority, 49 U.S.C. � 44901, all that is required is the passenger's election to
attempt entry into the secured area of an airport. See Biswell, 406 U.S. at 315; 49
C.F.R. � 1540.107. Under current TSA regulations and procedures, that election
occurs when a prospective passenger walks through the magnetometer or places items
on the conveyor belt of the x-�ray machine.61 (Citation omitted.)

Currently, US courts are of the view that the constitutionality of a screening search
does not depend on the passenger's consent once he enters the secured area of an
airport. The requirement in Davis62 of allowing passengers to avoid the search by
electing not to fly does not extend to one who has already submitted his luggage for an
x-ray scan.63 If a potential passenger chooses to avoid a search, he must elect not to
fly before placing his baggage on the x-ray machine's conveyor belt.64 The right to
abandon air travel must be exercised prior to commencing the screening procedures.
Any other rule would allow potential hijackers to leave whenever detection seemed
imminent and permit them to try again another day.65

The instant case does not qualify as a legitimate administrative search in an

airport.

Similar to the mission of the Transportation Security Administration of the US

Department of Homeland Security, the Office of Transportation Security under the
Department of Transportation and its predecessors has been primarily66 mandated to
ensure civil aviation security.67 To be precise, the OTS is tasked to implement Annex 17
of the ICAO Convention on aviation security which seeks to safeguard civil aviation and
its facilities against acts of unlawful interference, which include but not limited to:

1. unlawful seizure of aircraft,

2. destruction of an aircraft in service,

3. hostage-taking on board aircraft or on aerodromes,

4. forcible intrusion on board an aircraft, at an airport or on the premises of an

aeronautical facility,

5. introduction on board an aircraft or at an airport of a weapon or hazardous

device or material intended for criminal purposes,

6. use of an aircraft in service for the purpose of causing death, serious bodily
injury, or serious damage to property or the environment,

7. communication of false information such as to jeopardize the safety of an aircraft

in flight or on the ground, of passengers, crew, ground personnel or the general
public, at an airport or on the premises of a civil aviation facility.68
Among others, the OTS has to enforce R.A. No. 6235 or the Anti-�Hijacking Law.69 It
provides that an airline passenger and his hand-carried luggage are subject to search
for, and seizure of, prohibited materials or substances and that it is unlawful for any
person, natural or juridical, to ship, load or carry in any passenger aircraft, operating as
a public utility within the Philippines, any explosive, flammable, corrosive or poisonous
substance or material.70

It is in the context of air safety-related justifications, therefore, that routine airport

security searches and seizures are considered as permissible under Section 2, A1iicle III
of the Constitution.

In this case, what was seized from Eanna were two rolled sticks of dried marijuana
leaves. Obviously, they are not explosive, flammable, corrosive or poisonous
substances or materials, or dangerous elements or devices that may be used to commit
hijacking or acts of terrorism. More importantly, the illegal drugs were discovered only
during the final security checkpoint, after a pat down search was conducted by SSO
Suguitan, who did not act based on personal knowledge but merely relied on an
information given by CSI Tamayo that Eanna was possibly in possession of marijuana.
In marked contrast, the illegal drugs confiscated from the accused in Johnson and the
subsequent cases of People v. Canton,71People v. Suzuki,72Sales v. People,73 and People
v. Cadidia,74 where incidentally uncovered during the initial security check, in the course
of the routine airport screening, after the defendants were frisked and/or the alarm of
the metal detector was triggered.

Airport search is reasonable when limited in scope to the object of the Anti-Hijacking
program, not the war on illegal drugs. Unlike a routine search where a prohibited drug
was found by chance, a search on the person of the passenger or on his personal
belongings in a deliberate and conscious effort to discover an illegal drug is not
authorized under the exception to the warrant and probable cause requirement.75 The
Court is not empowered to suspend constitutional guarantees so that the government
may more effectively wage a "war on drugs." If that war is to be fought, those who
fight it must respect the rights of individuals, whether or not those individuals are
suspected of having committed a crime.76

Nonetheless, there is a valid consented warrantless search in this case.

The constitutional immunity against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal

right which may be waived.77 A person may voluntarily consent to have government
officials conduct a search or seizure that would otherwise be barred by the Constitution.
Like the Fourth Amendment, Section 2, Article III of the Constitution does not proscribe
voluntary cooperation.78

Yet, a person's "consent to a [warrantless] search, in order to be voluntary, must be

unequivocal, specific and intelligently given, [and] uncontaminated by any duress or
coercion[.]"79 The question of whether a consent to a search was "voluntary" or was the
product of duress or coercion, express or implied, is a question of fact to be determined
from the totality of all the circumstances.80
Relevant to this determination are the following characteristics of the person giving
consent and the environment in which consent is given: (1) the age of the defendant;
(2) whether [he] was in a public or a secluded location; (3) whether [he] objected to
the search or passively looked on; (4) the education and intelligence of the defendant;
(5) the presence of coercive police procedures; (6) the defendant's belief that no
incriminating evidence [will] be found; (7) the nature of the police questioning; (8) the
environment in which the questioning took place; and (9) the possibly vulnerable
subjective state of the person consenting.81
Consent to a search is not to be lightly inferred, but shown by clear and convincing
evidence.82 The government bears the burden of proving "consent."83 In the US, it has
been held that when the government relies on the "consent" exception to the warrant
requirement, two main issues must be litigated: did the defendant indeed consent, and
did the defendant do so with the requisite voluntariness?84 Here, we have ruled that to
constitute a waiver, it must first appear that the right exists; secondly, that the person
involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of such a right; and,
lastly, that said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right.85

While knowledge of the right to refuse consent is one factor to be taken into account,
the government need not establish such knowledge as the sine qua non of effective
consent.86 On the other hand, lack of objection to the search and seizure is not
tantamount to a waiver of constitutional right or a voluntary submission to the
warrantless search and seizure.87 Even when security agents obtain a passenger's
express assent to a search, this assent ordinarily will not constitute a valid "consent" if
the attendant circumstances will establish nothing more than acquiescence to apparent
lawful authority.88

The Fourth Amendment inquiry of whether a reasonable person would have felt free to
decline the officers' requests or otherwise terminate the encounter applies equally to
police encounters that take place on trains, planes, and city streets.89 "Consent" that is
the product of official intimidation or harassment is not consent at all.90

In this case, the Court finds that there is a valid warrantless search based on express
consent. When SSO Suguitan requested to conduct a pat down search on Eanna, the
latter readily agreed. Record is devoid of any evidence that he manifested objection or
hesitation on the body search. The request to frisk him was orally articulated to him in
such language that left no room for doubt that he fully understood what was requested.
Unperturbed, he verbally replied to the request demonstrating that he also understood
the nature and consequences of the request. He voluntarily raised his hands by
stretching sideward to the level of his shoulders with palms open. His affirmative reply
and action cannot be viewed as merely an implied acquiescence or a passive conformity
to an authority considering that SSO Suguitan is not even a police officer and cannot be
said to have acted with a coercive or intimidating stance. Further, it is reasonable to
assume that Eanna is an educated and intelligent man. He is a 53-year old working
professional (claimed to be employed or attached to a drug addiction center) and a
well-travelled man (said to have been in 22 different countries and spent hours in
customs).91 Indubitably, he knew, actually or constructively, his right against
unreasonable searches or that he intentionally conceded the same. Having been
obtained through a valid warrantless search, the sticks of marijuana are admissible in
evidence against him. Corollorily, his subsequent arrest, although likewise without
warrant, was justified since it was effected upon the discovery and recovery of an illegal
drug in his person in flagrante delicto.

There is substantial compliance with the chain of custody rule.

At the time of the commission of the crime, the applicable law is R.A. No.
9165.92 Section 1 (b) of Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002,
which implements the law, defines chain of custody as -
[T]he duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled
chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage,
from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping
to presentation in court for destruction. Such record of movements and custody of
seized item shall include the identity and signature of the person who held temporary
custody of the seized item, the date and time when such transfer of custody [was]
made in the course of safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final
disposition.93
The chain of custody rule is but a variation of the principle that real evidence must be
authenticated prior to its admission into evidence.94 To establish a chain of custody
sufficient to make evidence admissible, the proponent needs only to prove a rational
basis from which to conclude that the evidence is what the party claims it to be.95 In a
criminal case, the prosecution must offer sufficient evidence from which the trier of fact
could reasonably believe that an item still is what the government claims it to
be.96 As regards the prosecution of illegal drugs, the well-established US federal
evidentiary rule is when the evidence is not readily identifiable and is susceptible to
alteration by tampering or contamination, courts require a more stringent foundation
entailing a chain of custody of the item with sufficient completeness to render it
improbable that the original item has either been exchanged with another or been
contaminated or tampered with.97 This evidentiary rule was adopted in Mallillin v.
People,98 where this Court also discussed how, ideally, the chain of custody of seized
items should be established:
As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the
admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the
matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony
about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is
offered into evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would
describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it
while in the witness' possession, the condition in which it was received and the
condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would
then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the
condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have
possession of the same.99
In the present case, the prosecution was able to prove, through the documentary and
testimonial evidence, that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items were
properly preserved in every step of the way.

Upon confiscation of the two rolled sticks of dried marijuana leaves from Eanna, SSO
Suguitan put them on the nearby screening table in front of Eanna and PO1 Manadao,
Jr. The sticks were the only items placed on the table.100 Thereafter, the seized items
were turned-over by SSO Suguitan to PO3 Javier, who placed them on a tray together
with he other belongings of Eanna.101 It must be emphasized that SSO Suguitan is an
airport screening officer and not a police officer who is authorized to "arrest" or
"apprehend"102 Eanna. Hence, he should not be considered as the "apprehending
officer" who must immediately mark and conduct the physical inventory and
photograph of the seized items conformably with Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 and its
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR).

PO3 Javier was the only one in possession of the two rolled sticks of dried marijuana
leaves from the time he took custody of the same at the airport up to the time he
submitted the same to the crime laboratory office.103 At the PNP-ASG office, the
confiscated illegal drug was marked, physically inventoried, and photographed in front
of Eanna, with SSO Suguitan, a Barangay Chairman, a Barangay Kagawad, and an ABS-
CBN cameraman as witnesses.104 Per Request for Laboratory Examination,105 the
specimens were personally delivered by PO3 Javier to the Ilocos Norte Provincial Crime
Laboratory Service where PO3 Padayao received them. Finally, based on the Chemistry
Report106 of Police Inspector Navarro and the stipulation of facts107 agreed upon by the
parties, the specimens tested positive for the presence of marijuana after a qualitative
examination.

The specimens contained in the Ziploc re-sealable plastic bag that were marked, tested,
and presented in court were positively identified not only by PO3 Javier but also by SSO
Suguitan as the same two rolled sticks of dried marijuana leaves seized from
Eanna.108 Hence, it would be immaterial even if, as Eanna argues, PO3 Javier had no
personal knowledge of their possession by Eanna and their seizure by SSO Suguitan.

Eanna contends that the two sticks of rolled paper allegedly containing marijuana were
not marked immediately and were just laid bare on a table at the PNP-ASG office.
According to him, the ABS-CBN video footage taken shortly before midnight, which
Badua submitted and which was already edited following the news report format,
showed that the two sticks were without markings at first and then with markings later
on.

The Court notes that the compact disk showing the video of what transpired inside the
PNP-ASG office does not contain the full footage that Badua had taken. It was already
edited for purposes of news report.109 Assuming that there is truth to the allegation that
the two sticks of marijuana were not immediately marked, such fact does not
automatically result in an acquittal. As long as the integrity and evidentiary value of an
illegal drug were not compromised, non-compliance with Section 21 (1) of R.A. No.
9165 and its IRR may be excused. In several cases,110 we affirmed the conviction of the
accused-appellant despite recognizing that the seized illegal drug was not immediately
marked at the place of arrest. Likewise, in People v. Sic-open,111 the Court sustained
the conviction of the accused-�appellant even if the physical inventory and
photograph of the illegal drug were not immediately done at the place where it was
confiscated. Here, the reason for the non-observance with the rule is justified.
Immediate marking, physical inventory, and photograph of the confiscated drug cannot
be done at the final checkpoint area because it started to become crowded by the
constant comings and goings of departing passengers. The seized items were fittingly
brought by PO3 Javier to the PNP-ASG office where it was made sure that the barangay
officials and a media man were in attendance to witness the regularity of the entire
proceedings.

The peculiar situation in airports calls for a different treatment in the application of
Section 21 (1) of R.A. No. 9165 and its IRR. To require all the time the immediate
marking, physical inventory, and photograph of the seized illegal drug will definitely
have a domino effect on the entire airport operation no matter how brief the whole
procedure was conducted. Stuck passengers will cause flight delays, resulting not just
economic losses but security threats as well. Besides, to expect the immediate marking,
physical inventory, and photograph of the dangerous drug at the place of arrest is to
deny the reality that the persons112 required by law to witness the procedure are
unavailable at the moment of arrest. Unlike in a buy-bust operation which is supposed
to be pre-planned and already coordinated in order to ensure the instant presence of
necessary witnesses, arrests and seizures in airports due to illegal drugs are almost
always spontaneous and unanticipated.

In our view, the period of waiting for the arrival of the witnesses did not affect the
integrity and evidentiary value of the subject illegal drug, on the following grounds:

First, the airport police ensured that only authorized personnel were inside the PNP-ASG
office during the investigation. PO3 Javier claimed that he was with SPO3 Domingo,
PO1 Manadao, Jr., PO2 Caole, Jr., SSO Suguitan, SSO Bal-ot, and P/Supt. Apias.113 It
was only the members of the PNP-ASG and of the Laoag City PNP, the media, and the
two barangay officials who were allowed to stay inside the room.114 The defense counsel
recognized that the PNP-ASG office has a limited space and not big in size, estimating it
to be around three by four meters (although PO1 Terson approximated it to be five by
seven meters).115

Second, the airport police made sure that no one could touch the confiscated drug even
if it was in full view of everyone. PO3 Javier testified that the two rolled sticks of dried
marijuana leaves were placed on the investigation table where everybody could look
but not hold.116 Eanna could also see any attempt to switch or alter the evidence as he
was seated just in front of the table while the others guarded him.117 Interestingly,
instead of being concerned at the time of the risk of substitution, he even requested to
smoke so he was allowed to go out of the PNP-ASG office.118 Although the apprehending
officers could have exercised a better judgment, they are under no obligation to explain
why the accused was permitted to leave the office in order to smoke. Such fact should
not be taken against them as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are
not automatically rendered infirmed. Certainly, we consider the totality of
eircumstanees present in this case. Eanna's right to be presumed innocent until proven
otherwise includes the constitutional right to enjoy his liberty, albeit in a restricted
sense due to his arrest. He retains his (limited) freedom of movement during the course
of the investigation. Likewise, it must be added that the natural tendeney of an
innocent person aceused of committing a crime is not to rest easy by ensuring that the
evidence being used against him is not altered, tampered or swapped. In this case,
Eanna's resolve to smoke outside notwithstanding a pending concern either shows that
he was adamant in his claim that what was confiscated from him were merely flavored
tobaeco or that he was already resigned to the fact that he was busted possessing
marijuana. The Court cannot speeulate or engage in guesswork.

And third, the plausibility of tampering with the evidence is nil as the airport police
were preoccupied in accomplishing the necessary documentation relative to the arrest
and seizure. PO3 Javier shared that while waiting for the arrival of the barangay
offieials, their group were busy preparing documents which mainly consist of reports
regarding the incident.119 The trial court equally noted that "there were a lot of things
they were doing like the preparation of the spot report that they [would] forward to
Manila such that their Deputy Chief even helped them. It is precisely for [this] reason
that the two sticks of marijuana [appear] to have been submitted to the crime lab only
at 12:50 a.m. of the following day, July 15, 2013."120

It has been raised that the drug evidence should have been placed in a sealed
container. Eanna asserts that the evidence was rendered susceptible to alteration,
tampering and swapping because the Ziploc was not sealed by an adhesive tape or any
means other than the natural, built-in re-sealable feature of the plastic bag. Contrary to
his allegation, however, the specimens that were submitted to the RTC were actually
placed in a big transparent re�sealable Hefty One Zip plastic bag sealed with a
masking tape with markings.121 Even if there is truth to his representation, the
specimens contained in the Ziploc re-sealable plastic bag that were marked, tested, and
presented in court were positively identified by SSO Suguitan and PO3 Javier, who both
testified under oath, as the same two rolled sticks of dried marijuana leaves that were
seized from Eanna. Raising a mere possibility is not enough. Eanna should have shown
with particularity how the drug evidence was altered, tampered or swapped. The nature
of illegal drugs as fungible things is not new to him. He is not a stranger to prohibited
drugs, claiming to be familiar with marijuana since he is employed or attached to a
drug addiction center and has been in 22 different countries and spent hours in
customs.122 As the RTC opined, he could have submitted for laboratory examination the
tiny grains of dried leaves and seeds that were found in his camera bag in order to
prove that the alleged sticks of marijuana seized from him were in fact flavored tobacco
that he used to smoke all the time.123

The same reasoning as above can be said even if we are to admit that PO3 Padayao
placed his own marking on the specimens he received from PO3 Javier and before he
turned them over to the forensic chemist. A marking made on the corpus delicti itself is
not automatically considered a form of contamination which irreversibly alters its
physical state and compromises its integrity and evidentiary value.

Where a defendant identifies a defect in the chain of custody, the prosecution must
introduce sufficient proof so that the judge could find that the item is in substantially
the same condition as when it was seized, and may admit the item if there is a
reasonable probability that it has not been changed in important respects.124 However,
there is a presumption of integrity of physical evidence absent a showing of bad faith, ill
will, or tampering with the evidence.125 Merely raising the possibility of tampering or
misidentification is insufficient to render evidence inadmissible.126 Absent some showing
by the defendant that the evidence has been tampered with, it will not be presumed
that those who had custody of it would do so.127 Where there is no evidence indicating
that tampering with the exhibits occurred, the courts presume that the public officers
have discharged their duties properly.128

In this jurisdiction, it has been consistently held that considering that the integrity of
the evidence is presumed to be preserved unless there is a showing of bad faith, ill will,
or proof that the evidence has been tampered with, the defendant bears the burden to
show that the evidence was tampered or meddled with to overcome a presumption of
regularity in the handling of exhibits by the public officers and a presumption that the
public officers properly discharge their duties.129People v. Agulay130 in fact ruled that
failure to comply with the procedure in Section 21 (a), Article II of the IRR of R.A No.
9165 does not bar the application of presumption of regularity in the performance of
official duties. Thus:
The dissent agreed with accused-appellant's assertion that the police operatives failed
to comply with the proper procedure in the custody of the seized drugs. It premised
that non-compliance with the procedure in Section 21 (a), Article II of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9165 creates an
irregularity and overcomes the presumption of regularity accorded police
authorities in the performance of their official duties. This assumption is without
merit.

First, it must be made clear that in several cases decided by the Court, failure
by the buy-bust team to comply with said section did not prevent the
presumption of regularity in the performance of duty from applying.

Second, even prior to the enactment of R.A. 9165, the requirements contained
in Section 21 (a) were already there per Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation
No. 3, Series of 1979. Despite the presence of such regulation and its non-
compliance by the buy-bust team, the Court still applied such presumption. We
held:

The failure of the arresting police officers to comply with said DDB Regulation No. 3,
Series of 1979 is a matter strictly between the Dangerous Drugs Board and the
arresting officers and is totally irrelevant to the prosecution of the criminal case for the
reason that the commission of the crime of illegal sale of a prohibited drug is
considered consummated once the sale or transaction is established and the
prosecution thereof is not undermined by the failure of the arresting officers to comply
with the regulations of the Dangerous Drugs Board.131 (Emphasis in the original)
People v. Daria, Jr.,132Peop1e v. Gratil,133 and People v. Bala134 have followed
the Agulay ruling.

It is unfortunate that rigid obedience to procedure on the chain of custody creates a

scenario wherein the safeguards supposedly set to shield the innocent are more often
than not exploited by the guilty to escape rightful punishment.135 The Court reiterates
that while the procedure on the chain of custody should be perfect, in reality, it is
almost always impossible to obtain an unbroken chain.136 The chain of custody need not
be perfect for the evidence to be admissible.137 A complete chain of custody need not
always be proved.138 Thus, failure to strictly comply with Section 21 (1) of R.A. No.
9165 does not necessarily render an accused person's anest illegal or the items seized
or confiscated from him inadmissible or render void and invalid such seizure.139 The
most important factor is the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized item.140

Non-compliance with the requirements of the law is not automatically fatal to the
prosecution's case and the accused may still be held guilty of the offense charged. This
Court ratiocinated in People v. Del Monte:141
Under Section 3 of Rule 128 of the Rules of Court, evidence is admissible when it is
relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law or these rules. For evidence to be
inadmissible, there should be a law or rule which forbids its reception. If there is no
such law or rule, the evidence must be admitted subject only to the evidentiary weight
that will [be] accorded [to] it by the courts. x x x

We do not find any provision or statement in said law or in any rule that will bring
about the non-admissibility of the confiscated and/or seized drugs due to non-
compliance with Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165. The issue therefore, if there is
non-compliance with said section, is not of admissibility, but of weight - evidentiary
merit or probative value - to be given the evidence. The weight to be given by the
courts on said evidence depends on the circumstances obtaining in each case.142 (Italics
in the original.)
We restated in People v. Moner143 that if the evidence of illegal drugs was not handled
precisely in the manner prescribed by the chain of custody rule, the consequence
relates not to inadmissibility that would automatically destroy the prosecution's case
but rather to the weight of evidence presented for each particular case. The saving
clause under Section 21 (1) of R.A. No. 9165 recognizes that the credibility of the
prosecution's witnesses and the admissibility of other evidence are well within the
power of trial court judges to decide. The Court went on to state that under the doctrine
of separation of powers, it is important to distinguish if a matter is a proper subject of
the rules of evidence, which are promulgated by the Court pursuant to paragraph (5),
Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, or if it is a subject of substantive law,
which is passed by an act of Congress. Taking into account the distinction in criminal
law that a substantive law declares what acts are crimes and prescribes the punishment
for committing them while a procedural law provides or regulates the steps by which
one who commits a crime is to be punished, it was concluded that the chain of custody
rule is a matter of evidence and a rule of procedure; therefore, it is the Cmni which has
the last say regarding the appreciation of evidence.

Certainly, the chain of custody rule is a matter of evidence and a rule of procedure, it
being ultimately anchored on the weight and admissibility of evidence which the courts
have the exclusive prerogative to decide. Any missing link, gap, doubt, challenge,
break, problem, defect or deficiency in the chain of custody goes to the weight of the
evidence, not its admissibility.144 Once admitted, the court evaluates it and, based
thereon, may accept or disregard the evidence.145 In People v. Sipin,146 this Court,
through the ponente, recently conveyed:
At this point, it is not amiss for the ponente to express his position regarding the issue
of which between the Congress and the Judiciary has jurisdiction to determine
sufficiency of compliance with the rule on chain of custody, which essentially boils down
to the application of procedural rules on admissibility of evidence. In this regard,
the ponente agrees with the view of Hon. Associate Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De
Castro in People v. Teng Moner y Adam that "if the evidence of illegal drugs was not
handled precisely in the manner prescribed by the chain of custody rule, the
consequence relates not to inadmissibility that would automatically destroy the
prosecution's case but rather to the weight of evidence presented for each particular
case." As aptly pointed out by Justice Leonardo-De Castro, the Court's power to
promulgate judicial rules, including rules of evidence, is no longer shared by the Court
with Congress.

The ponente subscribes to the view of Justice Leonardo-De Castro that the chain of

custody rule is a matter of evidence and a rule of procedure, and that the Court has the
last say regarding the appreciation of evidence. Evidentiary matters are indeed well
within the powers of courts to appreciate and rule upon, and so, when the courts find
appropriate, substantial compliance with the chain of custody rule as long as the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items have been preserved may wanant
the conviction of the accused.
The ponente further submits that the requirements of marking the seized items,
conduct of inventory and taking photograph in the presence of a
representative from the media or the DOJ and a local elective official, are
police investigation procedures which call for administrative sanctions in case
of non-compliance. Violation of such procedure may even merit penalty under
R.A. No. 9165, to wit:
Section 29. Criminal Liability for Planting of Evidence. - Any person who is found guilty
of "planting" any dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and essential chemical,
regardless of quantity and purity, shall suffer the penalty of death.

Section 32. Liability to a Person Violating Any Regulation Issued by the Board. - The
penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6) months and one (1) day to four (4) years
and a fine ranging from Ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) to Fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person found violating any regulation duly
issued by the Board pursuant to this Act, in addition to the administrative sanctions
imposed by the Board.
However, non-observance of such police administrative procedures should not affect
the validity of the seizure of the evidence, because the issue of chain of custody is
ultimately anchored on the admissibility of evidence, which is exclusively within the
prerogative of the courts to decide in accordance with the rules on evidence. (Emphasis
and italics in the original)
Strict compliance with the requirements of Section 21 (1) of R.A. No. 9165 may not
always be possible under field conditions; the police operates under varied conditions,
many of them far from ideal, and cannot at all times attend to all the niceties of the
procedures in the handling of confiscated evidence.147 Like what have been done in past
cases, we must not look for the stringent step-by-step adherence to the procedural
requirements; what is important is to ensure the preservation of the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items, as these would detennine the guilt or innocence
of the accused.148 The identity of the confiscated drugs is preserved when the drug
presented and offered as evidence in court is the exact same item seized from the
accused at the time of his arrest, while the preservation of the drug's integrity means
that its evidentiary value is intact as it was not subject to planting, switching,
tampering or any other circumstance that casts doubt as to its existence.149

To assess an allegedly faulty chain of custody, the court looks for ampie corroborative
evidence as to the evidence's acquisition and subsequent custody.150 Before admitting
or excluding real evidence, it must consider the nature of the evidence, and the
surrounding circumstances, including presentation, custody and probability of
tampering or alteration.151 If, after considering these factors, it is determined that the
evidence is substantially in the same condition as when the crime was committed, the
evidence may be admitted.152 The court need not rule out every possibility that the
evidence underwent alteration; it needs only to find that the reasonable
probability is that the evidence has not been altered in any material aspect.153 Physical
evidence is admissible when the possibilities of misidentification or alteration are
eliminated, not absolutely, but as a matter of reasonable probability.154 All that is
required is that the evidence m question was the same as that involved in the offense
and that it 1s substantially unchanged.155

Courts are reminded to tread carefully before giving full credit to the testimonies of
those who conducted the illegal drug operations and must thoroughly evaluate and
differentiate those errors that constitute a simple procedural lapse from those that
amount to a gross, systematic, or deliberate disregard of the safeguards drawn by the
law and the rules.156 In the performance of this function, among the evidentiary rules to
apply are the following: test in measuring the value of a witness' testimony,
appreciation of inculpatory facts, positive and negative evidence, one-witness rule, best
evidence rule, suppression of evidence, presumption of regular performance of official
duty, rules on circumstantial evidence and conspiracy, and (non) presentation of poseur
buyer or marked money.157

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the February 9, 2016 Decision and the July 21,
2016 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 36412, which affirmed the
November 22,2013 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 13, Laoag City, in
Criminal Case No. 15585-13, finding accused-appellant Eanna O'Cochlain guilty for
violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 170180               November 23, 2007

ARSENIO VERGARA VALDEZ, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

The sacred right against an arrest, search or seizure without valid warrant is not only ancient. It is
also zealously safeguarded. The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. 1 Any evidence
obtained in violation of said right shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. Indeed,
while the power to search and seize may at times be necessary to the public welfare, still it must be
exercised and the law implemented without contravening the constitutional rights of the citizens, for
the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic principles
of government.2

On appeal is the Decision3 of the Court of Appeals dated 28 July 2005, affirming the Judgment 4 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 31, Agoo, La Union dated 31 March 2004 finding petitioner
Arsenio Vergara Valdez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 11 of Republic Act No.
9165 (R.A. No. 9165)5 and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from eight
(8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor medium as minimum to fifteen (15) years of reclusion
temporal medium as maximum and ordering him to pay a fine of ₱350,000.00. 6

I.

On 26 June 2003, petitioner was charged with violation of Section 11, par. 2(2) of R.A. No. 9165 in
an Information7 which reads:

That on or about the 17th day of March 2003, in the Municipality of Aringay, Province of La Union,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, control and custody dried
marijuana leaves wrapped in a cellophane and newspaper page, weighing more or less twenty-five
(25) grams, without first securing the necessary permit, license or prescription from the proper
government agency.

CONTRARY TO LAW.8

On arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued with the
prosecution presenting the three (3) barangay tanods of San Benito Norte, Aringay, La Union
namely, Rogelio Bautista (Bautista), Nestor Aratas (Aratas) and Eduardo Ordoño (Ordoño), who
arrested petitioner.

Bautista testified that at around 8:00 to 8:30 p.m. of 17 March 2003, he was conducting the routine
patrol along the National Highway in Barangay San Benito Norte, Aringay, La Union together with
Aratas and Ordoño when they noticed petitioner, lugging a bag, alight from a mini-bus.
The tanods observed that petitioner, who appeared suspicious to them, seemed to be looking for
something. They thus approached him but the latter purportedly attempted to run away. They
chased him, put him under arrest and thereafter brought him to the house of Barangay Captain
Orencio Mercado (Mercado) where he, as averred by Bautista, was ordered by Mercado to open his
bag. Petitioner’s bag allegedly contained a pair of denim pants, eighteen pieces of eggplant and
dried marijuana leaves wrapped in newspaper and cellophane. It was then that petitioner was taken
to the police station for further investigation. 9

Aratas and Ordoño corroborated Bautista’s testimony on most material points. On cross-
examination, however, Aratas admitted that he himself brought out the contents of petitioner’s bag
before petitioner was taken to the house of Mercado. 10 Nonetheless, he claimed that at Mercado’s
house, it was petitioner himself who brought out the contents of his bag upon orders from Mercado.
For his part, Ordoño testified that it was he who was ordered by Mercado to open petitioner’s bag
and that it was then that they saw the purported contents thereof. 11

The prosecution likewise presented Police Inspector Valeriano Laya II (Laya), the forensic chemist
who conducted the examination of the marijuana allegedly confiscated from petitioner. Laya
maintained that the specimen submitted to him for analysis, a sachet of the substance weighing
23.10 grams and contained in a plastic bag, tested positive of marijuana. He disclosed on cross-
examination, however, that he had knowledge neither of how the marijuana was taken from
petitioner nor of how the said substance reached the police officers. Moreover, he could not identify
whose marking was on the inside of the cellophane wrapping the marijuana leaves. 12

The charges were denied by petitioner. As the defense’s sole witness, he testified that at around
8:30 p.m. on 17 March 2003, he arrived in Aringay from his place in Curro-oy, Santol, La Union.
After alighting from the bus, petitioner claimed that he went to the house of a friend to drink water
and then proceeded to walk to his brother’s house. As he was walking, prosecution witness Ordoño,
a cousin of his brother’s wife, allegedly approached him and asked where he was going. Petitioner
replied that he was going to his brother’s house. Ordoño then purportedly requested to see the
contents of his bag and appellant acceded. It was at this point that Bautista and Aratas joined them.
After inspecting all the contents of his bag, petitioner testified that he was restrained by
the tanod and taken to the house of Mercado. It was Aratas who carried the bag until they reached
their destination.13

Petitioner maintained that at Mercado’s house, his bag was opened by the tanod and Mercado
himself. They took out an item wrapped in newspaper, which later turned out to be marijuana leaves.
Petitioner denied ownership thereof. He claimed to have been threatened with imprisonment by his
arrestors if he did not give the prohibited drugs to someone from the east in order for them to
apprehend such person. As petitioner declined, he was brought to the police station and charged
with the instant offense. Although petitioner divulged that it was he who opened and took out the
contents of his bag at his friend’s house, he averred that it was one of the tanod who did so at
Mercado’s house and that it was only there that they saw the marijuana for the first time. 14

e. replied that he was going to his brother'en proceeded to walk to his brother'w

Finding that the prosecution had proven petitioner’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the RTC
rendered judgment against him and sentenced him to suffer indeterminate imprisonment ranging
from eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor medium as minimum to fifteen (15) years of
reclusion temporal medium as maximum and ordered him to pay a fine of ₱350,000.00. 15

Aggrieved, petitioner appealed the decision of the RTC to the Court of Appeals.  On 28 July 2005,
1âwphi1

the appellate court affirmed the challenged decision. The Court of Appeals, finding no cogent reason
to overturn the presumption of regularity in favor of the barangay tanod in the absence of evidence
of ill-motive on their part, agreed with the trial court that there was probable cause to arrest
petitioner. It observed further:

That the prosecution failed to establish the chain of custody of the seized marijuana is of no
moment. Such circumstance finds prominence only when the existence of the seized prohibited
drugs is denied. In this case, accused-appellant himself testified that the marijuana wrapped in a
newspaper was taken from his bag. The corpus delicti of the crime, i.e.[,] the existence of the
marijuana and his possession thereof, was amply proven by accused-appellant Valdez’s own
testimony.16

In this appeal, petitioner prays for his acquittal and asserts that his guilt of the crime charged had not
been proven beyond reasonable doubt. He argues, albeit for the first time on appeal, that the
warrantless arrest effected against him by the barangay tanod was unlawful and that the warrantless
search of his bag that followed was likewise contrary to law. Consequently, he maintains, the
marijuana leaves purportedly seized from him are inadmissible in evidence for being the fruit of a
poisonous tree.

Well-settled is the rule that the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses and their
testimonies are accorded great respect and weight, in the absence of any clear showing that some
facts and circumstances of weight or substance which could have affected the result of the case
have been overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied. 17

After meticulous examination of the records and evidence on hand, however, the Court finds and so
holds that a reversal of the decision a quo under review is in order.

II.

At the outset, we observe that nowhere in the records can we find any objection by petitioner to the
irregularity of his arrest before his arraignment. Considering this and his active participation in the
trial of the case, jurisprudence dictates that petitioner is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction
of the trial court, thereby curing any defect in his arrest. The legality of an arrest affects only the
jurisdiction of the court over his person.18 Petitioner’s warrantless arrest therefore cannot, in itself, be
the basis of his acquittal.

However, to determine the admissibility of the seized drugs in evidence, it is indispensable to

ascertain whether or not the search which yielded the alleged contraband was lawful. The search,
conducted as it was without a warrant, is justified only if it were incidental to a lawful
arrest.19 Evaluating the evidence on record in its totality, as earlier intimated, the reasonable
conclusion is that the arrest of petitioner without a warrant is not lawful as well.

Petitioner maintains, in a nutshell, that after he was approached by the tanod and asked to show the
contents of his bag, he was simply herded without explanation and taken to the house of the
barangay captain. On their way there, it was Aratas who carried his bag. He denies ownership over
the contraband allegedly found in his bag and asserts that he saw it for the first time at the barangay
captain’s house.

Even casting aside petitioner’s version and basing the resolution of this case on the general thrust of
the prosecution evidence, the unlawfulness of petitioner’s arrest stands out just the same.

Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides the only occasions on which a
person may be arrested without a warrant, to wit:
Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.—A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based
on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his
case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

xxx

It is obvious that based on the testimonies of the arresting barangay tanod, not one of these
circumstances was obtaining at the time petitioner was arrested. By their own admission, petitioner
was not committing an offense at the time he alighted from the bus, nor did he appear to be then
committing an offense.20 The tanod did not have probable cause either to justify petitioner’s
warrantless arrest.

For the exception in Section 5(a), Rule 113 to operate, this Court has ruled that two (2) elements
must be present: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done
in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. 21 Here, petitioner’s act of looking around
after getting off the bus was but natural as he was finding his way to his destination. That he
purportedly attempted to run away as the tanod approached him is irrelevant and cannot by itself be
construed as adequate to charge the tanod with personal knowledge that petitioner had just
engaged in, was actually engaging in or was attempting to engage in criminal activity. More
importantly, petitioner testified that he did not run away but in fact spoke with the
barangay tanod when they approached him.

Even taking the prosecution’s version generally as the truth, in line with our assumption from the
start, the conclusion will not be any different. It is not unreasonable to expect that petitioner, walking
the street at night, after being closely observed and then later tailed by three unknown persons,
would attempt to flee at their approach. Flight per se is not synonymous with guilt and must not
always be attributed to one’s consciousness of guilt. 22 Of persuasion was the Michigan Supreme
Court when it ruled in People v. Shabaz 23 that "[f]light alone is not a reliable indicator of guilt without
other circumstances because flight alone is inherently ambiguous." Alone, and under the
circumstances of this case, petitioner’s flight lends itself just as easily to an innocent explanation as
it does to a nefarious one.

Moreover, as we pointed out in People v. Tudtud,24 "[t]he phrase ‘in his presence’ therein, connot[es]
penal knowledge on the part of the arresting officer. The right of the accused to be secure against
any unreasonable searches on and seizure of his own body and any deprivation of his liberty being a
most basic and fundamental one, the statute or rule that allows exception to the requirement of a
warrant of arrest is strictly construed. Its application cannot be extended beyond the cases
specifically provided by law."25

Indeed, the supposed acts of petitioner, even assuming that they appeared dubious, cannot be
viewed as sufficient to incite suspicion of criminal activity enough to validate his warrantless
arrest.26 If at all, the search most permissible for the tanod to conduct under the prevailing backdrop
of the case was a stop-and-frisk to allay any suspicion they have been harboring based on
petitioner’s behavior. However, a stop-and-frisk situation, following Terry v. Ohio,27 must precede a
warrantless arrest, be limited to the person’s outer clothing, and should be grounded upon a genuine
reason, in light of the police officer’s experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief
that the person detained has weapons concealed about him. 28

Accordingly, petitioner’s waiver of his right to question his arrest notwithstanding, the marijuana
leaves allegedly taken during the search cannot be admitted in evidence against him as they were
seized during a warrantless search which was not lawful. 29 As we pronounced in People v. Bacla-an
—

A waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not also mean a waiver of the inadmissibility of
evidence seized during an illegal warrantless arrest. The following searches and seizures are
deemed permissible by jurisprudence: (1) search of moving vehicles (2) seizure in plain view (3)
customs searches (4) waiver or consent searches (5) stop and frisk situations (Terry Search) and (6)
search incidental to a lawful arrest. The last includes a valid warrantless search and seizure
pursuant to an equally valid warrantless arrest, for, while as a rule, an arrest is considered legitimate
if effected with a valid warrant of arrest, the Rules of Court recognize permissible warrantless
arrests, to wit: (1) arrests in flagrante delicto, (2) arrests effected in hot pursuit, and, (3) arrests of
escaped prisoners.30

When petitioner was arrested without a warrant, he was neither caught in flagrante delicto
committing a crime nor was the arrest effected in hot pursuit. Verily, it cannot therefore be
reasonably argued that the warrantless search conducted on petitioner was incidental to a lawful
arrest.

In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General posits that apart from the warrantless search
being incidental to his lawful arrest, petitioner had consented to the search. We are not convinced.
As we explained in Caballes v. Court of Appeals 31 —

Doubtless, the constitutional immunity against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal
right which may be waived. The consent must be voluntary in order to validate an otherwise illegal
detention and search, i.e., the consent is unequivocal, specific, and intelligently given,
uncontaminated by any duress or coercion. Hence, consent to a search is not to be lightly inferred,
but must be shown by clear and convincing evidence. The question whether a consent to a search
was in fact voluntary is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances.
Relevant to this determination are the following characteristics of the person giving consent and the
environment in which consent is given: (1) the age of the defendant; (2) whether he was in a public
or secluded location; (3) whether he objected to the search or passively looked on; (4) the education
and intelligence of the defendant; (5) the presence of coercive police procedures; (6) the defendant's
belief that no incriminating evidence will be found; (7) the nature of the police questioning; (8) the
environment in which the questioning took place; and (9) the possibly vulnerable subjective state of
the person consenting. It is the State which has the burden of proving, by clear and positive
testimony, that the necessary consent was obtained and that it was freely and voluntarily given. 32

In the case at bar, following the theory of the prosecution— albeit based on conflicting testimonies
on when petitioner’s bag was actually opened, it is apparent that petitioner was already under the
coercive control of the public officials who had custody of him when the search of his bag was
demanded. Moreover, the prosecution failed to prove any specific statement as to how the consent
was asked and how it was given, nor the specific words spoken by petitioner indicating his alleged
"consent." Even granting that petitioner admitted to opening his bag when Ordoño asked to see its
contents, his implied acquiescence, if at all, could not have been more than mere passive conformity
given under coercive or intimidating circumstances and hence, is considered no consent at all within
the contemplation of the constitutional guarantee. 33 As a result, petitioner’s lack of objection to the
search and seizure is not tantamount to a waiver of his constitutional right or a voluntary submission
to the warrantless search and seizure.34

III.

Notably, the inadmissibility in evidence of the seized marijuana leaves for being the fruit of an
unlawful search is not the lone cause that militates against the case of the prosecution. We likewise
find that it has failed to convincingly establish the identity of the marijuana leaves purportedly taken
from petitioner’s bag.

In all prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, the following elements must concur: (1)
proof that the transaction took place; and (2) presentation in court of the corpus delicti or the illicit
drug as evidence.35 The existence of dangerous drugs is a condition sine qua non for conviction for
the illegal sale of dangerous drugs, it being the very corpus delicti of the crime. 36

In a line of cases, we have ruled as fatal to the prosecution’s case its failure to prove that the
specimen submitted for laboratory examination was the same one allegedly seized from the
accused.37 There can be no crime of illegal possession of a prohibited drug when nagging doubts
persist on whether the item confiscated was the same specimen examined and established to be the
prohibited drug.38 As we discussed in People v. Orteza39 , where we deemed the prosecution to have
failed in establishing all the elements necessary for conviction of appellant for illegal sale of shabu –

First, there appears nothing in the record showing that police officers complied with the proper
procedure in the custody of seized drugs as specified in People v. Lim, i.e., any apprehending team
having initial control of said drugs and/or paraphernalia should, immediately after seizure or
confiscation, have the same physically inventoried and photographed in the presence of the
accused, if there be any, and or his representative, who shall be required to sign the copies of the
inventory and be given a copy thereof. The failure of the agents to comply with the requirement
raises doubt whether what was submitted for laboratory examination and presented in court was
actually recovered from appellant. It negates the presumption that official duties have been regularly
performed by the police officers.

In People v. Laxa, where the buy-bust team failed to mark the confiscated marijuana immediately
after the apprehension of the accused, the Court held that the deviation from the standard procedure
in anti-narcotics operations produced doubts as to the origins of the marijuana. Consequently, the
Court concluded that the prosecution failed to establish the identity of the corpus delicti.

The Court made a similar ruling in People v. Kimura, where the Narcom operatives failed to place
markings on the seized marijuana at the time the accused was arrested and to observe the
procedure and take custody of the drug.

More recently, in Zarraga v. People, the Court held that the material inconsistencies with regard to
when and where the markings on the shabu were made and the lack of inventory on the seized
drugs created reasonable doubt as to the identity of the corpus delicti. The Court thus acquitted the
accused due to the prosecution’s failure to indubitably show the identity of the shabu.

In the case at bar, after the arrest of petitioner by the barangay tanod, the records only show that he
was taken to the house of the barangay captain and thereafter to the police station. The Joint
Affidavit40 executed by the tanod merely states that they confiscated the marijuana leaves which they
brought to the police station together with petitioner. Likewise, the Receipt 41 issued by the Aringay
Police Station merely acknowledged receipt of the suspected drugs supposedly confiscated from
petitioner.

Not only did the three tanod contradict each other on the matter of when petitioner’s bag was
opened, they also gave conflicting testimony on who actually opened the same. The prosecution,
despite these material inconsistencies, neglected to explain the discrepancies. Even more damning
to its cause was the admission by Laya, the forensic chemist, that he did not know how the
specimen was taken from petitioner, how it reached the police authorities or whose marking was on
the cellophane wrapping of the marijuana. The non-presentation, without justifiable reason, of the
police officers who conducted the inquest proceedings and marked the seized drugs, if such was the
case, is fatal to the case. Plainly, the prosecution neglected to establish the crucial link in the chain
of custody of the seized marijuana leaves from the time they were first allegedly discovered until
they were brought for examination by Laya.

The Court of Appeals found as irrelevant the failure of the prosecution to establish the chain of
custody over the seized marijuana as such "[f]inds prominence only when the existence of the
seized prohibited drug is denied." 42 We cannot agree.

To buttress its ratiocination, the appellate court narrowed on petitioner’s testimony that the marijuana
was taken from his bag, without taking the statement in full context.43 Contrary to the Court of
Appeals’ findings, although petitioner testified that the marijuana was taken from his bag, he
consistently denied ownership thereof. 44 Furthermore, it defies logic to require a denial of ownership
of the seized drugs before the principle of chain of custody comes into play.

The onus of proving culpability in criminal indictment falls upon the State. In conjunction with this,
law enforcers and public officers alike have the corollary duty to preserve the chain of custody over
the seized drugs. The chain of evidence is constructed by proper exhibit handling, storage, labeling
and recording, and must exist from the time the evidence is found until the time it is offered in
evidence. Each person who takes possession of the specimen is duty-bound to detail how it was
cared for, safeguarded and preserved while in his or her control to prevent alteration or replacement
while in custody. This guarantee of the integrity of the evidence to be used against an accused goes
to the very heart of his fundamental rights.

The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty invoked by the prosecution and
relied upon by the courts a quo cannot by itself overcome the presumption of innocence nor
constitute proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 45 Among the constitutional rights enjoyed by an
accused, the most primordial yet often disregarded is the presumption of innocence. This elementary
principle accords every accused the right to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proven
beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, the burden of proving the guilt of the accused rests upon the
prosecution.

Concededly, the evidence of the defense is weak and uncorroborated. Nevertheless, this "[c]annot
be used to advance the cause of the prosecution as its evidence must stand or fall on its own weight
and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the defense." 46 Moreover, where the
circumstances are shown to yield two or more inferences, one inconsistent with the presumption of
innocence and the other compatible with the finding of guilt, the court must acquit the accused for
the reason that the evidence does not satisfy the test of moral certainty and is inadequate to support
a judgment of conviction.47

Drug addiction has been invariably denounced as "an especially vicious crime," 48 and "one of the
most pernicious evils that has ever crept into our society," 49 for those who become addicted to it "not
only slide into the ranks of the living dead, what is worse, they become a grave menace to the safety
of law-abiding members of society,"50 whereas "peddlers of drugs are actually agents of
destruction."51 Indeed, the havoc created by the ruinous effects of prohibited drugs on the moral fiber
of society cannot be underscored enough. However, in the rightfully vigorous campaign of the
government to eradicate the hazards of drug use and drug trafficking, it cannot be permitted to run
roughshod over an accused’s right to be presumed innocent until proven to the contrary and neither
can it shirk from its corollary obligation to establish such guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

In this case, the totality of the evidence presented utterly fails to overcome the presumption of
innocence which petitioner enjoys. The failure of the prosecution to prove all the elements of the
offense beyond reasonable doubt must perforce result in petitioner’s exoneration from criminal
liability.

IV.

A final word. We find it fitting to take this occasion to remind the courts to exercise the highest
degree of diligence and prudence in deliberating upon the guilt of accused persons brought before
them, especially in light of the fundamental rights at stake. Here, we note that the courts a quo
neglected to give more serious consideration to certain material issues in the determination of the
merits of the case. We are not oblivious to the fact that in some instances, law enforcers resort to the
practice of planting evidence to extract information or even harass civilians. Accordingly, courts are
duty-bound to be "[e]xtra vigilant in trying drug cases lest an innocent person be made to suffer the
unusually severe penalties for drug offenses." 52 In the same vein, let this serve as an admonition to
police officers and public officials alike to perform their mandated duties with commitment to the
highest degree of diligence, righteousness and respect for the law.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Arsenio Vergara
Valdez is ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to
cause the immediate release of petitioner, unless the latter is being lawfully held for another cause;
and to inform the Court of

the date of his release, or the reasons for his continued confinement, within ten (10) days from
notice. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice